REPORT
ON THE INTERCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
BETWEEN SPECIAL BRANCH AND C.I.D.,
AND
ON THE R.U.C. UNITS INVOLVED,
INCLUDING THOSE IN CRIME BRANCH C1(1).
Report on the Interchange of Intelligence between Special Branch and CID, and on the RUC Units involved, including those in Crime Branch C1(1)

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Report On The Interchange of Intelligence Between Special Branch and CID and on Related RUC Units

Introduction

On 16 January 1980 the Chief Constable commissioned a report on the interchange of intelligence between SB and CID and on the staffing and organisation of Units in C1(1) in Crime Branch. The terms of reference are at Annex A.

2. In addition to studying papers and previous reports, I have visited all the units in C1(1) (except the Technical Support Unit (TSU)), the three Criminal Intelligence Units (CIU) in the Regions and five Collator’s Offices (Newry, Dungannon and Omagh in South Region; Ballymena in North Region; Tennant Street in Belfast). Discussions have also been held with senior SB and CID officers at RUC HQ, the Regional Heads of SB and CID, and Computer Services in connection with the computerization of Crime Records.

Definitions

3. Although this report is mainly about subversive crime, ordinary crime is mentioned because it is part of the responsibility of the present Criminal Intelligence system covering Criminal Intelligence Section (CIS) in Headquarters, the Criminal Intelligence Units and the Collator system. To avoid confusion in this report the following definition of subversive crime, based on current practice, has been adopted:-

criminal acts committed by known or suspected members of or sympathisers of subversive organisations, acting either for their organisation or in a private capacity.
All other crimes are "ordinary" crime. Again to avoid confusion the following definitions will also be used in this report:

**Agent**: an individual recruited (and usually controlled by SB on regular payments) to provide information on the activities of a subversive organisation.

**Informant**: an individual recruited (and usually controlled by CID) to provide information on criminal activities.

**The Roles of SB and CID**

4. The relationship between SB and CID is close but sometimes uneasy. An element of competition can appear in their work in the areas where their functions overlap. Some competition in effectiveness is acceptable; rivalry which interferes with the efficient conduct of business is not. It has been stated that the functions and character of SB and CID are quite different; SB is an intelligence gathering organisation; CID an operational branch. In fact, they are involved in both activities. SB gather intelligence but it has to be analysed and used operationally with SB advising on it's use. CID use intelligence to assist their efforts to charge offenders, but in doing so are gatherers of intelligence. SB and CID are complementary branches; their operations have the common objective of securing the conviction of individuals or the prevention of acts of terrorism. Their considerable experience and skills can only be used effectively if they are sensitive to each others requirements and problems.

5. It is neither possible nor desirable to cover every situation that can arise in the interchange of intelligence between SB and CID. It is however worthwhile seeking to lay...
down general rules to guide their relationship in the areas where there could be conflict of interest. These rules should aim to reduce the friction that has and, in a few places, still does exist between CID and SB. They should also aim to improve the acquisition and use of intelligence.

6. The common ground between CID and SB in the acquisition of intelligence on subversive organisations and their adherents is:–

(a) agent operations;
(b) interviews.

Agent/Informant Operations

7. CID and SB have a fundamentally different attitude to agent and informant handling;

**CID** follow the long established practice by which CID officers run their own informants without declaring their identity to anyone except ACC 'C' who is responsible for controlling funds for paying informants. Informants are paid on results. Some are handled on a long term basis; most last only a few months. This reflects the requirements and duties of CID officers who direct their efforts to the crimes currently under investigation.

**SB** take a long term view of both the cultivation and running of agents. This means accepting the commitment of regular payments to agents even in periods of low productivity.
Agents

8. CID officers have been instructed to attempt to recruit agents in subversive organisations. However their work makes it difficult for them to spend time on long term agents; indeed to do so could well take them away from their proper duties. Moreover CID are not trained in running agents; nor do they have funds for regular payments to agents. Where relations between CID and SB are good, these difficulties can be overcome by involving SB in handling and paying agents. Where the competitive spirit has become excessive and relations are poor, the temptation is for CID to work on their own. This can result in an agent operating without the knowledge of SB. At a time when subversive organisations are reduced to a hard core of experienced activists, the result can be confusion and duplication of effort, and in extreme cases the loss of valuable agents. It was to overcome this problem that the Army agreed to declare their agents to SB at both HQ and Regional level. The S1 Report (paragraph 67b) recommended that all CID agents in a position to report on subversive organisations should be declared to SB. I recommend that these declarations should be made to both SB HQ (DHSB) and the Regional HSBs.

9. While in general it is undesirable to have two branches running agents in the same small areas, there may be cases when a CID officer has developed a close relationship with an agent which makes it essential to the continuation of the case for him to be involved in handling the agent. SB must be involved in these cases.

10. I recommend that the following ground rules be adopted for agent handling:

*Ch Supt C1's Instruction of 24 April 1979.
(a) whenever possible, an agent in a subversive organisation recruited by CID should be handed over to SB;

(b) when (a) is not possible, the agent should be handled jointly by CID and SB;

(c) unless there are exceptional circumstances, reporting of intelligence should be on SB 50s.

The charging of an agent must be the result of a conscious decision by both SB and CID in which the balance of advantage has been carefully weighed. Procedures must allow this process to work to the satisfaction of both SB and CID. All proposals to effect arrests, other than those arising directly out of an incident, must be cleared with SB to ensure that no agents, either RUC or Army, are involved. It is to be hoped that relations at Divisional level are sufficiently good to enable local discussion about arrests to take place. There still remains the possibility of arresting Army agents or an agent run at Regional or HQ level in SB. I recommend that all arrest lists be cleared by Regional HSBs.

12. CID officers need to be alert to the possibility of recruiting as agents the individuals they are interviewing. When an opportunity to recruit arises, SB must be involved at an early stage, both in debriefing and handling the agent, because many interviews are based on SB intelligence. It is also important to ensure that information provided by the individual is handled in such a way that his value as an agent is not put at risk at an early stage of his career. I recommend
that this point be included in an instruction to all CID officers (see paragraph 19).

Interviews

13. The process of persuading an individual to talk often requires patience and there is always a temptation for a busy CID officer to end an interview with someone who is clearly not going to incriminate himself. Even when an admission has been obtained, an individual may be able to give other valuable intelligence. The security situation requires the RUC to seize every opportunity to acquire intelligence on subversive organisations. This means that interviews must be conducted by officers well-informed about the individual in custody and supported by those best able to direct the questioning and follow up the intelligence given. In no area is the close co-operation of SB and CID more essential.

14. One factor which has affected SB participation in interviews, arose from the situation in early 1972 when SB, partly through shortage of staff and partly due to the attitude of the Judiciary and DPP to SB questioning in the then Holding Centre in Holywood Barracks, became reluctant to become involved in interviews. SB with their deep knowledge of subversive activity have an essential role to play in interviews, and the recommendation in the SI Report for additional staff was intended, amongst other things, to allow SB to participate to a greater extent in interviewing. ACC E has decided that SB officers must be prepared to appear in court though these appearances should not be so frequent that SB officers become too well known and thereby less effective in their primary role of intelligence gathering.
15. Where relations between CID and SB are good the arrangements for interviews to obtain intelligence, whether or not admissions are made, work well. Elsewhere there is little doubt that the best use is not being made of interviews. If it seems that an individual has intelligence of value, CID officers should wherever possible consider delaying charging him and allowing SB the opportunity of speaking to him.

16. So that the best intelligence value can be obtained from interviews, I recommend that the following general rules should be adopted:

(a) CID officers should always be aware of the possibility of obtaining intelligence in addition to admissions. The exploitation of these opportunities requires SB officers as well as CIUs and Collators to support interviews at Regional and Divisional level;

(b) if a CID officer decides that an individual being interviewed is not going to make an admission but may have intelligence of value, he should arrange for the interview to be taken over by SB;

(c) if an individual has made an admission and the CID officer considers he may have intelligence of value to give, SB should be allowed to question the individual on more general matters. It is important that CID should not proceed immediately to a charge whenever an admission has been obtained.

17. CID officers have on occasion been slow to produce reports of interviews and some CID officers do not include all significant intelligence obtained during interviews. It is unrealistic to expect police officers, whether SB or CID, to report every scrap of intelligence, though it would be better if they did. But important intelligence held in an officer's
memory or "up his sleeve" and not related to other intelligence already on record, is unlikely to be properly exploited. Moreover there is usually more than one way of exploiting intelligence and the possibility of mounting covert operations rather than going directly for further arrests and interviews must always be considered. This can only be done if intelligence is declared to those who need to know. Improvements in attitudes to reporting will be achieved through education and supervision. This is a matter for senior staff who should make clear to junior staff what is required of them.

18. However one procedural improvement can be made to enable intelligence to get into SB records as quickly as possible. CIU and Collators keep records only of the movement of Intelligence Briefs and there is at present no means of checking that interview notes are produced quickly for all interviews. I recommend that the originators of Intelligence Briefs should also show in their records when intelligence from the interview is received (including nil returns when the individual interviewed refused to talk at all) so that delays in producing reports can be taken up with the CID officers concerned.

19. I recommend that the recommendations and points in paragraphs 8 - 18, and other general points in this report, should be incorporated in an instruction issued by DCC Ops to all SB and CID officers and that this instruction should be used as the touchstone for resolving any difficulties and differences that may arise in agent running and interviewing in relation to subversive organisations.

20. A point made more than once was that intelligence obtained by SB from interviews (whether their own or joint with CID) was not reported as fully as interviews conducted by CID, and was not passed into the CIUs. The current practice is for SB interview notes to be converted into SB 50s which are distributed
in the usual way. The intelligence is then put on Form 5/56 by SB HQ and passed to CIS for transmission to CIUs and Collators. Intelligence of immediate operational importance is passed sideways to CID. While it has to be accepted that SB receive some intelligence which may not be given wider dissemination, it is important that SB should put as much intelligence as possible in the Form 5/56 reports. I recommend that ACC E should draw this requirement to the attention of his staff.

**Intelligence Briefs**

21. Intelligence Briefs (IBs) for CID interviews are produced by:-

(a) CIUs for Regional Crime Squads and for CID in certain Divisions in Belfast. A composite IB including SB intelligence is produced and after the interview sent to SB HQ;

(b) Collators for CID in Divisions. The IBs are divided into the SB intelligence section and the Collator's factual section. After interviews the intelligence section is returned to SB for retention and the factual section to the Collators;

(c) CIS and, occasionally, ICS for HQ Crime Squad. The IBs are returned to SB HQ after the interviews.

22. In general the system for producing IBs works satisfactorily. Consideration was given to the question whether CIUs should produce IBs for all Divisions within their Region. This would have ensured that RUC HQ records were more used in their production than appears to be the case outside Belfast. However on balance I consider it better to retain the present system for

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*ACC E's Instruction SB 5/71 of 13 October 1977*
North and South Regions because it encourages a close relationship between SB and CID in Divisions.

23. The role of CIS and ICS in producing IBs is covered in paragraph 46.

CID Informants

24. Although CID informants are outside the immediate area of this report, I was struck by the absence of any coherent policy for reviewing and exploiting CID coverage of criminal activities. CID officers in Divisions may well know about the informants of their colleagues in the Division. But criminals do not recognise Divisional boundaries; nor are the officers in a Division likely to be fully aware of the requirements of CID in other Divisions. The present procedures do not allow CID officers at HQ and Regional level to identify those areas of criminal activity on which CID are not well informed; or to direct the use of informants in one Division for investigations in another. The Chief Superintendent C1 has sought from CID officers a declaration of the areas of criminal activity covered by their informants. This survey should be concluded as quickly as possible. The process should be carried further. To enable the Chief Superintendent in charge of CID operations to exercise better control in this area, he needs to know the identity of the major CID informants (it is not necessary for him to know the name of every casual contact or informant of CID officers). I recommend that Chief Superintendent C1 should be authorised to establish a procedure for securing these declarations.

CID Informant Reporting

25. CID officers normally report intelligence received from informants to the senior CID officer in the Division and to
Collators. Chief Superintendent C1 has sought to establish a method of reporting more sensitive items to RUC HQ. This procedure did not go far enough and C1 have been considering the establishment of a system similar to the SB 50 for sensitive intelligence on ordinary crime (they could be called CID 50s) which would enable intelligence of this kind to reach CID at HQ and CIS who would pass to SB any items which could have subversive connections. I recommend that this matter should be pursued with a view to establishing a system of CID intelligence reporting. When a system is in operation CID officers will need, through training and direction, to be encouraged to make use of it.

26. There is another step which would improve the criminal intelligence system in Northern Ireland. CID officers have established a wide range of trusted contacts throughout the community whom they use during investigations into crime. Officers working closely together will make use of each others contacts; other CID officers are unlikely to be aware of these contacts. I recommend that ways of extending this practice should be examined by Superintendant C1(1).

Criminal Intelligence

27. The three tier criminal intelligence system in Northern Ireland (CIS, CIUs and Collators) set up in 1976 is modelled on the system established in other Police areas of the United Kingdom following recommendations in the Baumber Report and in subsequent Working Party reports setting out the aims and structure of the criminal intelligence system at the various
levels of Police organisation. Despite adjustments reflected in the Force Order of 1979* it is, particularly at Headquarters level, still not working satisfactorily. The reason is that circumstances have produced in Northern Ireland an intelligence system which, as a result of the threat from subversive organisations and the need to devote a large proportion of RUC effort against this threat, is significantly different from that in Great Britain. In Great Britain intelligence of a Special Branch nature forms a small part of Police intelligence; there is not the same emphasis on subversive as opposed to ordinary crime. In Northern Ireland the central point for intelligence about most serious crimes is Special Branch, which maintains the central records of subversive organisations and is devoting increasing effort to the analysis of intelligence for operations against and investigations of these organisations. This situation must inevitably detract from the role of CIS.

28. The expansion of effort on analysis of subversive activities by E3 in SB HQ is a natural development from SB's role of studying subversive crime and has been carried a stage further with the current re-organisation of E3 following the S[...] Report. This re-organisation should develop its function as the driving force in investigations of and operations against subversive organisations. This is heavy responsibility which requires the Assessment and Co-ordination Group within E3 to think operationally and to establish close relations not only with units involved in targeting covert operational units (Targetting and Co-ordination Group, Belfast, and Intelligence Analysis Group, Armagh) but also CID who will take on investigations from SB, and CIS, for their factual records (see also paragraph 45). While the protection of sources must always be a prime consideration, the system will

*Force Order No 72/79 of 30 July 1979
not work at full efficiency if SB are over-protective of intelligence which should be exploited.

29. Before examining the units and various levels of the criminal intelligence system, the question has to be asked whether it is necessary to have a separate criminal intelligence system in addition to the system in SB for studying subversive crime. My conclusion is that it is for the following reasons (but that adjustments are needed, particularly at HQ level):

(a) the CIUs and Collators provide a vehicle for the passage of intelligence from SB to CID (in the form of IBs) and the results of interviews from CID to SB;

(b) CIUs and Collators hold crime records at Regional and Divisional level that are not easily available from any other units;

(c) CID need a support service which is provided by the Criminal Intelligence System;

(d) provision has to be made for some research into ordinary crime covering more than one Division or Region.

Collators

30. The Collators' offices visited maintain, with variations to meet local circumstances, the record system set out in the Collators Handbook. Local circumstances also dictate the proportion of effort devoted to ordinary and subversive crime. Where there is a lower level of ordinary crime, most effort goes to subversive crime. By contrast in Belfast considerable effort goes into the recording of information relating to ordinary crime.
31. The basic system appears to meet the requirements of CID, SB and uniformed sections who are making increasing use of the Collators' records. However the system is still not fully effective for a number of reasons:

(a) information available to uniformed officers is not being reported fully. This is particularly true of Reservists who are best placed to report local activity but are often reluctant to do so;

(b) although the general standard of Collators has improved, there are still some who are not really suitable for this kind of work;

(c) CID officers are not passing Collators the results of all their interviews on ordinary crime. This is a problem particularly in larger stations with considerable numbers of CID officers with whom the Collators cannot develop the close personal relationship that is possible in smaller stations. Although there are no doubt some CID officers who deliberately withhold information, this situation is mainly the result of the amount of processing necessary when an individual has been charged. (I understand that this processing is currently the subject of a separate study);

(d) the staffing of Collators' offices which does not allow a 24 hours service.

32. The contribution of the Collator system would be improved by Divisional and Sub-Divisional Commanders (and senior CID officers in Divisions) making clear to their staff that they are expected to contribute to and make use of the system; and

/...
selecting suitable officers as Collators. The Supt in charge of C1(1) will, with the Field Liaison Officers, also have a significant role to play (see paragraph 58). The issue, due to take place shortly, of a new Section 27 to Force Regulations should assist this process.

33. A 24 hour a day/7 day a week manning of Collators' offices would enable greater use of the Collators' records by both CID and uniformed staff in Divisions. It would also ensure that Collators were available to brief all uniformed patrols. I am, however, doubtful if in general the extra staff needed to meet this requirement would be justified by the present demands on the Collator system. When Collators are not available, the briefings are carried out by the duty Sgts who make use of the Collator's Bulletins and Minutes. There is a limit to the number of items individuals can absorb in a briefing and the duty Sgts are able to get across the main points. If the demand on the Collator system in a particular Division (probably in Belfast) suggested that a full time service was desirable, a limited trial period could be run to assess the value and implications. The Divisional Commander would have to allocate the extra staff temporarily.

34. There are however a number of steps that can be taken to make the Collator service available over a longer period and to meet particular requirements:-

(a) where there is more than one Collator in an office, their shifts should be staggered to cover the times of greatest local activity;

(b) when there is a special requirement, eg, to produce IBs at short notice or to provide back up during an interview, their overtime requirements should be considered sympathetically;
(c) consideration should be given to providing typist/clerks to assist Collators so that they can devote more time to briefing and developing contacts with CID and uniformed Police.

Criminal Intelligence Units (CIUs)

35. CIUs in general fulfill the role set out for them. They will be needed so long as Crime Squads operate at Regional level and require support for their investigations and interviews. Regional Crime Squads (RCS) are now directed only to serious crime of a subversive nature. If this drops in volume (which taking into account unsolved crimes, is unlikely for some years), the RCS will turn to ordinary crime or be disbanded. If the former occurred the responsibilities of CIUs for ordinary crime and in particular their relationship with CIS, would have to be reconsidered. If CID were re-organised on a Divisional basis with a separate squad only at RUC HQ, CIUs would not be required, but the CIS/Collator system would have to be expanded. In the meantime CIUs should not be used for tasks outside their present functions. There could be a temptation outside Belfast to turn them into liaison and secretariat units because they operate 0900 - 2300 every day. These could distort their role and move them into areas better covered by other officers in, if necessary, new units.

36. CIUs do not as a matter of routine receive the reports of the interviews of members of subversive organisations carried out by CID in Divisions. Some Divisions hand reports to Collators who pass them to CIUs; other Divisions do not consider the Collator suitable to receive more sensitive information. There is a dilemma here but CIUs should receive all such reports. I recommend that when CID in Divisions are not prepared to pass reports of interviews with a subversive
connection to the Collator, the reports should go direct to the CIU.

37. CIUs have also been tasked to provide briefing information which is not easily available to them. In Armagh the CIU was asked to produce for Traffic Units conducting checks the registration numbers of vehicles used by members of subversive organisations. For their own purpose CIUs do not need vehicle registration numbers; lists of this kind should be compiled by Collators with the assistance of Field Liaison Officers. In fact the CIUs vehicle number index, which is only a selection from numbers held by Collators, is of very limited value and I recommend it is no longer maintained.

38. Similarly CIUs have carried out basic research into weapons and explosives. In addition to the indices needed for use in support of interviews, CIUs in North and South are producing charts of weapons/incidents that are a duplication of work by both DRC and WEIU and, so I am told, the various records do not agree. I recommend that this practice should stop and that DRC or WEIU, as appropriate, should issue to CIUs on a regular basis copies of their charts on weapon use. The graphic element in ICS should be used for this purpose.

39. CIUs do not receive the charts of subversive groups issued by the Intelligence Collation Section. As the unit responsible for servicing Regional Crime Squads, they should receive this information. I recommend that the three CIUs should receive through CIS copies of these charts.

Enquiry Bureau

40. In Belfast an Enquiry Bureau is housed with the CIU and makes use of CIU records. It is however not part of the
Criminal Intelligence system. I recommend that the Enquiry Bureau should be amalgamated with the CIU.

Criminal Intelligence Section (CIS)

41. In line with GB practice, CIS was intended to be the focal point of study of subversive crime and even though it has begun to look at non-subversive crime, this remains very much of secondary importance. CIS has been in the unfortunate position of having a clear role in theory but in practice having to accept that SB has the prime role in analysing subversive crime. In addition the establishment of WEIU and the expertise of DRC removed from CIS the recording and analysis of intelligence and scientific reports about weapons and explosives. There are however a number of functions that CIS performs which cannot easily be taken on by any other section of C Branch. Criminals do not recognise Divisional boundaries. Ordinary crime which covers not just Divisional but also Regional boundaries, needs study at a central point. The indications are that crimes organised within Northern Ireland and by gangs coming into the Province are on the increase and will need to be studied. At the same time the expectation is that subversive crimes will gradually diminish. The RUC will then increase it's efforts against ordinary crime. A central section responsible for guiding the intelligence effort against ordinary crime will be needed and must be working efficiently.

CIS Records

42. CIS records are built up on:-

(a) Reports on crimes - Duty Officers Reports, etc;

(b) Intelligence from Special Branch (5/56 Reports);
(c) CIU Daily Record Sheets containing details of interviews and extracts of the Record Sheets produced by Collators (mostly sightings) and Regional Crime Squad interviews.

Records are kept of the crimes set out in the Collators Handbook. In addition special indices have been constructed for criminal activities under investigation. At present records are being compiled of serious subversive crime between 1970 and 1975 (when CIS was established) and of unsolved serious crimes.

43. This elaborate record system is only of value if it enables analysis to be carried out which will assist the solution of crimes. The records should not be maintained for their own sake. In the subversive field it is certainly of value to maintain a record of crimes, particularly those which are unsolved. For crimes after 1976 there are adequate records in CIUs and Collators' offices which can provide CID with the information available on a crime; SB can from their intelligence provide pointers to the people responsible for crimes; DRC can draw attention to the previous use of weapons; NIFSL or the Army can analyse the explosives and components used in bombs. There is little or no analysis which CIS can carry out into these kind of crimes and no need for them to keep records of interviews which are held in CIUs.

44. The area where least effort has been directed is to non-subversive crime. CIS should not get bogged down by extensive records on the more trivial crimes, but this is an area to which their efforts could well be directed. Study of criminal activity on a Province-wide basis, sometimes initiated by CIS but more frequently by CID, will be needed in future. CIS should therefore concentrate on crimes in the
grey area between subversive and ordinary crime, and on particular projects in relation to ordinary crime. In doing so they must be able to respond quickly to CID requirements.

45. I **recommend** that CIS records should consist of:–

(a) indices of unsolved serious (both subversive and ordinary) crime:

murders
attempted murders
bombings
robberies
knee-cappings;

(b) indices of types of crime where a pattern may be discernable:

eg, sexual offences
burglaries with marked characteristics;

(c) indices of types of crime which CIS have been asked to study;

(d) Special MO Indices (including the MO Index at present in C3 – see paragraph 47);

(e) intelligence on those responsible for crimes.

When CIUs are abolished the question of absorbing their records into CIS should be considered.

46. CIS also produces Intelligence Briefs for Headquarters Crime Squad and service Headquarters Crime Squad in it's investigations. The argument for CIS producing the Intelligence
Briefs is that they are able to know more clearly the requirements of CID and are able to contribute a considerable amount of factual information from their own records. The latter point is valid; the former less so. In fact IBs for Headquarters Crime Squad have been produced by either CIS or ICS. There should be one section responsible and I recommend that in future ICS should produce the Special Branch contribution to all Headquarters Crime Squad IBs. This must however be done in a way that provides CID with the information in as much detail as is possible bearing in mind the need to protect sources. It is equally important that when the IBs have been produced the Special Branch officers involved should whenever possible discuss them with the CID officers who will be conducting the interviews. In some cases it may be desirable to nominate an E3 officer to liaise with CID. The SB brief and the CIS factual brief should be passed to CID through CIS.

MO Index

47. The MO Index is at present under C3. There has recently been a proposal to transfer it to C1(1) and to link it closely to CIS. In fact there is overlapping between records kept by CIS and the MO Index. Moreover the MO Index, set up in 1946 when there was considerably less crime in Northern Ireland, needs revision to concentrate on those areas where it is likely to be most effective. It has already to some extent become a kind of specialised MO Index. It should therefore be part of the criminal intelligence system. I recommend:–

(a) the MO Index and its staff be transferred to CIS
   (this would encourage greater contact between CIS and
   CID on the ground);
(b) a separate study be carried out to consider how it can best be integrated into the CIS system.

48. The study should also examine responsibility for the two other functions of MO section:-

(a) the provision of albums of photographs for witnesses;

(b) the use of photofit equipment.

49. CIS's present staff consist of:-

1 Ch Insp (uniform)
1 D/I (SB)
1 Sgt (uniform)
1 D/Con (CID)
3 Cons (uniform)
2 W/Cons (uniform)

In addition 1 Sgt and a Con are attached to Headquarters Crime Squad and the Army have provided a Sgt and L/Cpl.

The staff required for CIS's revised functions (excluding the MO Index) should be:-

1 DI (SB or CID) - Analysis
1 Sgt (should be CID) - Records
4 Cons (should be CID) - Records, including backrecord research
1 Sgt - Army records and assist with
1 L/Cpl - CIS records and displays.

or 2 WPCs

If the WPCs are retained CIS would be manned only by RUC personnel. This would be logical in view of its increased emphasis on ordinary crime. Moreover CIS staff are authorised
to have access to the information in the Army 3702 computer. On the other hand the Army staff are of assistance in obtaining Army information and by retaining them, two RUC officers would be released for other duties.

The saving in staff would be either 1 D/CI or 1D/CI and 2 WPCs.

**Field Liaison Officers (FLO)**

50. Field Liaison Officers have been appointed as the links between CIS, CIUs and the Collators. They fulfill a useful role and will be involved with Supt C1(1) in developing the criminal intelligence system.

**Intelligence Collation Section (ICS)**

51. The role of ICS set out in ACC E's Instruction of September 1979* and his Minute of May 1979†, has been to analyse intelligence on individuals and their activities and present it in a form that can be easily assimilated by members of the RUC outside SB. In carrying out this role ICS have produced:

(a) Intelligence Briefs for special investigations, usually for Headquarters Crime Squad. In future, it will produce more briefs if the recommendation in paragraph 46 is accepted;

(b) lists of members of paramilitary groups in connection with investigations into particular crimes;

(c) photographs with brief records for use by operational sections of the RUC, eg, at VCPs;

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†OPS 67/78 of 4 September 1978.
(d) charts setting out the members of paramilitary groups with their functions. These are based on analysis of Special Branch records and are distributed regularly to senior RUC officers, Divisional Commanders and members of Special Branch;

(e) studies of subversive activity initiated by ACC E.

51. The current staff of ICS consist of:

1 DI
2 D/SgtS
6 D/Cons
2 W/Cons

52. ICS in its present work has clear cut functions, both regular and in relation to special investigations. Both are important in that they are aimed at informing and assisting members of the RUC outside Special Branch in dealing with subversive crime. This function can only be carried out by a group within Special Branch because to be really effective it requires access to Special Branch records and discussions with Special Branch officers on sensitive matters such as the identity of agents. However, it makes no sense for ICS to continue as a separate group and the S1 Report (paragraph 120) recommended its inclusion in E3. The re-orientated E3 in SB HQ will contain an element (E3a) for analysing intelligence with the object of mounting operations and investigations, as well as producing assessments and briefs. I recommend that ICS should provide support to this element in E3 and also to WEIU and DRC (see paragraphs 54 and 58). A chart showing the suggested arrangement of E3 is at Annex B.

Weapons and Explosives Intelligence Unit (WEIU)

53. WEIU was set up in 1978* in an attempt to direct more effort to the investigation of the use of weapons and explosives by subversive organisations. Although a beginning has been made on the study of components of bombs, WEIU, for a variety of reasons, has not been working satisfactorily. This is not a reflection on the staff. It has not been possible with the existing staff to investigate weapons (more could be done for example on home-made weapons used by Loyalist paramilitary organisations); it has only limited access to SB intelligence. In all it has a less than effective relationship with SB and with DRC.

54. WEIU will only be effective when it is able to put together the scientific reports which provide pointers to methods and areas of manufacture of explosives and firearms with all the available intelligence on these subjects. There is no problem in WEIU receiving scientific advice wherever it is placed. However SB will always have serious reservations about supplying their most sensitive reports on a regular basis to a group operating outside SB. This is not unreasonable because experience has shown that individuals who are not accustomed to handling sensitive information will not always handle it with the same care as those who are. WEIU will only have full access to intelligence if it is within SB.
I recommend therefore that WEIU should be transferred to SB (its proposed position in SB is shown at Annex B). Any CID requirements on WEIU should be put to Supt E3.

55. This recommendation produces a number of problems. The first relates to the use of Army personnel. These consist of a Warrant Officer with Ordinance experience who is able to give technical advice to the WEIU, and a L/Cpl with record keeping experience. If WEIU becomes part of SB there will be

*Force Order No 54/78 of 22 May 1978.
no need to provide staff to undertake collation; because this can be done by the present staff in E3. However the technical expertise of the WO 1 will need to be replaced. Indeed an understanding of the nature of explosives is highly desirable if investigations in this field are going to be fruitful. I recommend that consideration should be given to the training of 2 RUC officers in explosives. The Army have facilities for this kind of training.

56. WEIU has been an investigative section. It is important that a move to Special Branch should not result in it becoming concerned solely with the processing of intelligence about weapons and explosives. It should continue to carry out investigations into components with the ultimate aim of producing for CID individuals for further investigation. This role is not inconsistent with the kind of investigations that Special Branch are already carrying out. It should also service CID in investigations based on intelligence.

57. The staff of WEIU consists of:-

1 DI (CID)
1 D/Sgt (CID)
2 Cons
1 WO 1
1 L/Cpl

I recommend:-

(a) the DI should be responsible for:

(i) overall analysis and supervision;
(ii) liaison with DRC, NIFSL and the Army;

(b) investigations should be conducted by a D/Sgt and 2 DCs;
(c) the DI should be a member of SB (the present DI would be acceptable in SB) and that the D/Sgt and DCs should be CID.

58. There is some duplication in the records of WEIU and DRC on the weapons side. WEIU need only maintain investigation folders; the basic information can be supplied by DRC, using, if necessary, the services of ICS when displays are needed. I recommend that appropriate arrangements should be made between DRC and ICS (E3f).

59. The Weapons and Explosives Intelligence Committee, chaired by DHSB, meets monthly to consider latest developments. Although all business of substance is dealt with outside the Committee as it arises, the Committee meetings provide a useful occasion for all with interests in this field from both sides of the Irish Channel to meet regularly. The informal exchanges are often more important than the formal business of the Committee. It should continue in its present form. The DI in WEIU (E3e) should continue to attend.

60. The WEIU needs to retain its close relationship with NIFSL on whom it relies for scientific assessments of explosives and bomb components. The NIFSL section dealing with this subject is undermanned and the staff are pressed to find time for investigational as opposed to evidential work. I recommend that the head of NIFSL should be asked to look into ways of improving this situation.

Data Reference Centre (DRC)

61. DRC is responsible for:-

(a) analysis of firearms and ammunition used by or recovered from subversive organisations;
(b) test firing all legally held weapons;

(c) test firing all new Police weapons.

In addition the Head of DRC in his personal capacity inspects rifle club ranges on behalf of the NIO; gives advice on the purchase of ammunition by the RUC; and gives advice on general matters connected with firearms. These personal responsibilities will not be inherited by his successor.

62. DRC is another unit which has tended to "float" because although making scientifically based assessments, it is intelligence orientated. But it has been without access to a large proportion of the intelligence available in SB. To be fully effective it needs to be closely associated with SB records and with the WEIU. The logical solution is for DRC to come under SB. This can be done without reducing the service it provides other agencies (the Army regards its links with DRC as essential); and without altering the present staff, including Army personnel. The link between DRC and SB would be provided by the Inspector (it would have to be an SB post if the newly appointed uniform Inspector is not acceptable to SB). His duties would include:

(a) writing reports covering the intelligence aspects of weapons. He would use SB Headquarters records as well as the information provided by DRC. This would ensure that DRC assessments were made on the basis of full information. In this he would have to work closely with the DI in charge of the WEIU (E3e);

(b) liaison on weapons intelligence with the Garda;

(c)
63. Mr [Name] immense knowledge of firearms and their use by subversive organisations has been crucial to the development of DRC. He is due to retire within a year; even if he is given an extension, his departure cannot be long delayed. His successor will not have his flair and skill for sometime, if ever (it would be worth considering a retiring Army Ordinance Officer if existing staff in DRC are not suitable for promotion). The role of the Inspector will then become of even greater importance because it will be his responsibility to ensure that DRC assessments are well founded and closely related to intelligence in SB records.

64. I recommend therefore that the responsibility for DRC should be transferred to Special Branch; that its staff should be administered by Supt B1 and, for intelligence purposes, be linked to the WEIU (E3e) within B3. I also recommend that the Inspector post be occupied by an officer acceptable to Special Branch.

**Technical Support Unit (TSU)**

65. The TSU which provides technical support for investigations should remain in Crime Department but I recommend that it moves to C3.

**Role of Supt C1(1)**

66. The analysis of their functions has shown that C1(1) comprises a number of units operating over the same ground but unable to fulfill the roles for which they were originally established. A more simple arrangement is needed with each unit having specific functions and clear lines of responsibility. This can be achieved by the transfer of ICS, WEIU and DRC to SB, and the transfer of TSU to C3. The remaining units (CIS, CIUs,
Collators) form a single coherent grouping solely concerned with criminal intelligence. In this the responsibilities of the Superintendent will be:

(a) to ensure that there is an effective interchange of intelligence between SB and CID. In this he will need to work very closely with Supt E3 in SB to see that CID’s requirements are met by SB;

(b) to develop the criminal intelligence system. This will involve him in regular visits to CIUs and Collators offices; discussions with Divisional and Sub-Divisional Commanders to secure their full support of the system and their co-operation in replacing unsuitable Collators;

(c) to ensure that the criminal intelligence system is meeting the requirements of CID.

Sub-Divisional Intelligence Groups (SDIG)

67. Outside Belfast it was suggested that informal exchanges between Collators, other branches of the RUC and Army (including UDR) were sufficiently frequent for the satisfactory conduct of business and that formal meetings of SDIGs were no longer necessary. I suggest that the Intelligence Review Committee should be asked to consider the desirability of continuing the SDIG system in whole or in part.

General

68. Although SB have in recent years become much more open in passing intelligence to those who need to know, they must resist the temptation to be over protective of their intelligence and of their operations and investigations. Intelligence
collected and recorded can only be used in relation to record checks (vetting) and assessments. Important as these functions are for security and Government policy, full value will be obtained from intelligence only when it is developed by SB for further intelligence gathering and investigation; or is passed to other sections of the RUC for executive action.

69. The point was made a number of times that senior CID officers should be told about investigations and covert operations being mounted by SB so that they could avoid initiating investigations which could conflict with SB activity and make plans for CID to take over investigations from SB. Although this is a sensitive area, sometimes involving other agencies, I have sympathy with this point. For the efficient conduct of business it is essential that a close relationship be developed at HQ level between SB and C1, and at Regional level between the Regional Heads of CID and SB. The CID officers involved must respect the confidences they receive and obey the basic rule of consulting SB first if they wish, for operational reasons, to discuss an SB operation or investigation with other members of CID.

70. Similarly SB officers must keep their Regional and Divisional Commanders informed on operations, investigations and important intelligence. Commanders in their turn must accept limitation on the dissemination of these confidences. The whole system of intelligence and intelligence based operations will only work properly if those who need to know are informed; and they are all confident that security will be maintained.

71. Co-operation between SB and CID should be a matter of conscious policy at all levels. Efforts must be made to develop a trusted relationship (as is the case in many Divisions) and any temptation for one branch to score off the other must
be resisted. It is not possible to legislate for human relationships; it is a matter of education and encouragement. Senior officers should however be prepared to take a firm line where poor relationships are interfering with the efficient conduct of business; even to the extent of transferring staff who insist on conducting business in their own way to the detriment of the overall objectives of the RUC.

72. A summary of recommendations and conclusions is at Annex C.

P J Walker
31 March 1980
Terms of Reference

1. To examine:

   (a) the functions and organisation of the following RUC units:

      Weapons and Explosives Intelligence Unit (WEIU)
      Data Reference Centre (DRC)
      Intelligence Collation Section (ICS)
      Criminal Intelligence Section (CIS)
      Criminal Intelligence Units (CIUs)

   (b) The interchange of intelligence between Special Branch and CID.

2. To make recommendations concerning:

   (a) changes in the functions, organisation and staffing of these units;

   (b) their relationship with other RUC, Army and civilian (NIFSL) units operating in the same field;

   (c) the practice, procedures and policies of the interchange of intelligence between Special Branch and CID;

   (d) the functions of Divisional Collators in relation to these units.
E3
Det Supt

E3a
Intelligence Assessment and Co-ordination Group
(2 D/CIs, 4 DIas, 2 D/Cons)

E3b
Intelligence and Correspondence Desk
Officers
(1 DI, 4 D/Sgts)

E3c
Intelligence and Correspondence Processing Team
(1 Sgt, 6 Cons)

E3d

E3e
Weapons and Explosives Group
(1 DI, 1 D/Sgt, 2 D/Cons)

Data Reference Centre
(1 DI)

E3f
Intelligence Collection Group
(1 DI, 2 D/Sgts, 6 Dcs, 2 WPCs)
Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions

1. SB and CID are complementary branches (paragraph 4).

2. It is desirable to lay down general rules in areas of potential conflict between SB and CID (paragraph 5).

3. Declarations of CID agents should be made to DHSB and Regional HSBs (paragraph 8).

4. The following ground rules should be adopted for agent handling:

   (a) CID should whenever possible hand over agents to SB;

   (b) if (a) is not possible, there should be joint SB/CID handling;

   (c) intelligence from agents recruited by CID should be reported on SB 50s (paragraph 9).

5. All arrest lists should be cleared by Regional HSBs (paragraph 11).

6. CID officers need to be alert to the possibility of recruiting agents during interviews (paragraph 12).

7. Interviews (paragraph 14) there must be close co-operation between SB and CID in this area of activity (paragraph 13).

8. The following rules should be adopted for interviews;

   (a) CID must be aware of the possibility of obtaining intelligence as well as admissions;
(b) when an admission is not being obtained, the interview should be taken over by SB;

(c) SB should, whenever possible, be given an opportunity to interview an individual after he has made an admission but before he is charged (paragraph 16).

✓9. The records of Intelligence Briefs should show when intelligence from interviews is handed over by CID (paragraph 18).

✓10. An instruction incorporating recommendations and general points should be issued to all SB and CID officers (paragraph 19).

✓11. ACC E should draw the attention of his staff to the need to include as much intelligence as possible in Form 5/56 reports passed to CIS (paragraph 20).

✓12. The system for producing Intelligence Briefs is working satisfactorily (paragraphs 21-22).

✓13. The survey of CID informant coverage should be completed as quickly as possible (paragraph 24).

✓14. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a CID reporting system (paragraph 25).

✓15. (paragraph 26).

✓16. The circumstances in Northern Ireland have distorted the criminal intelligence system and given SB a prime role in the study of subversive crime (paragraphs 27-28).
17. A criminal intelligence system is necessary (paragraph 29).

18. The Collator system is basically sound but could be improved by greater involvement by all members of the RUC (paragraphs 30-34).

19. When CID in Divisions are reluctant to pass reports of interviews on subversive crimes to the Collators, the reports should be sent direct to CIUs (paragraph 36).

20. CIUs should no longer maintain vehicle indices (paragraph 37).

21. CIUs should not carry out basic research into weapons and explosives but rely on DRC and WEIU (paragraph 38).

22. CIUs should receive ICS charts of subversive groups (paragraph 39).

23. The Enquiry Bureau in Belfast should be amalgamated with the CIU (paragraph 40).

24. CIS should direct its efforts to ordinary crime (paragraphs 41-45).

25. SB Intelligence Briefs for the HQ Crime Squad should be prepared by ICS (paragraph 46).

26. The MO Index should be transferred to CIS (paragraphs 47-48).

27. ICS should be within E3 and provide support to E3a, WEIU and DRC (paragraph 52).

28. WEIU should be transferred to SB (paragraph 54).

29. Army personnel will no longer work in WEIU and consideration should be given to training RUC officers in explosives (paragraph 55).
30. Duplication between the records of WEIU and DRC should be avoided (paragraph 58).

31. Weapons and Explosives Intelligence Committee should continue in its present form (paragraph 59).

32. The head of NIFSL should be asked to examine ways of increasing staff in the Explosives Section (paragraph 60).

33. The Inspector in DRC will have a key role in co-ordinating DRC's work with SB intelligence (paragraph 62).

34. DRC should come under SB E3 (paragraph 64).

35. TSU to move to C3 (paragraph 65).

36. The role of Supt C1(1) in developing the criminal intelligence system (paragraph 66).

37. The need to retain SDIGs should be examined by the Intelligence Review Committee (paragraph 67).

38. It is important for SB to brief CID and Regional/Divisional Commanders on their intelligence and operations. CID and Commanders must in their turn handle this information securely (paragraphs 68 - 70).

39. Senior staff must take firm action to ensure close co-operation between SB and CID (paragraph 71).