


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PREMIERSHIP

Lecture 3

‘QUIET, CALM DELIBERATION’:
HAROLD MACMILLAN, 1957-63

by

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'QUIET, CALM DELIBERATION: HAROLD MACMILLAN, 1957-63.'

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When it comes to weighing and measuring prime ministers, Harold Macmillan causes me particular difficulty. Part of it has to do with my age. I was a few months short of ten when he succeeded Anthony Eden in January 1957 and in my Daily Express – infused household in North London, I was, for reasons I now forget (but suspect they had something to do with the advocacy of the Beaverbrook press) convinced that he rather than 'Rab' Butler would carry off the prize (a track record in political forecasting which, I regret to say, has sadly deteriorated with the passing years).

The real problem for me is this: Macmillan was the first British Prime Minister with whom I was in any way familiar. Though I did not meet him face-to-face until August 1975, it was as if I grew up with him politically and stylistically. He became – and has remained – the human benchmark against which I measure his successors. I expect them all to be witty, stylishly self-ironic, steeped in the classics and marinated in a very personal sense of their country's history and its place in the world. Generally speaking I have been disappointed ever since. I wasn't surprised to learn that his last known words on Mrs Thatcher, at the height of her powers in the mid-1980s, were: 'I do wish she would read a book.'¹

Anthony Sampson, in his excellent short-life of Macmillan published in 1967, saw him as 'a study in ambiguity'² partly because 'like Disraeli, he seemed to see himself as part of a fashionable play.'³ His capacity to dazzle through this carefully constructed smokescreen was a formidable political instrument for getting his way while leaving doubters not only unbruised but purring with pleasure at the sense of occasion Macmillan could create.

When I interviewed them in the mid-1980s, both Lord Hailsham and Lord Home retained a powerful sense of the Macmillan effect over the 20 years which had elapsed since his last painful Cabinet meeting on 8 October 1963 when he sat, crippled by the pain of his prostate trouble, and asked his colleagues if he should carry on to lead them into the next election.⁴ (They all concurred with the exception of Enoch Powell⁵). The gloom and the anguish of that day was exceptional because, in Home's words, normally 'Harold Macmillan enjoyed the company of Cabinet. He was a very amusing man...Apart from the business altogether, it was fun.'⁶

This in itself is evidence that at least one aim of his premiership was achieved. As his official biographer, Alistair Horne, put it: 'Perhaps the two most hard-worked words in Macmillan's extensive vocabulary of jocularities were "fun" and a "bore". Being Prime Minister was, whatever the pressures and problems, always "fun" — and he determined from the very first day that working for him should be, too.'⁷ Of all our postwar prime ministers, the laughter rang loudest and longest through the Cabinet Room doors when 'Uncle Harold' was in the chair.

Lord Hailsham probably caught the flavour of the Macmillan Downing Street best of all when he told me 'there was an element of the dining club or the country house party about his conduct of Cabinets and Cabinet committees. There would be quotations from Homer. There would be vague historical analogies; the trade union leaders would be described as medieval barons in the period of the Wars of the Roses. And some of them would be relevant and some of them would be mildly misleading. But they would all be amusing and detached and very carefully thought out when one had to watch what he was doing as well as what he was saying.'⁸

This, of course, was a product of what Hailsham himself called 'the beautiful acting of Harold Macmillan'.⁹ It also had to do with his great gifts, not just as a manipulator of mood, but as a deployer of what his political opponent, Hugh Gaitskell, once called in another context 'the subtle terrorism of words'.¹⁰ The whole effect, I believe, was made possible by that constant tension within Macmillan between the 'gownsmen' and the 'swordsmen'; the scholar and the warrior.

It was upon 'this duality',¹¹ as he called it, that Macmillan brooded towards the end of his first hectic week as Prime Minister which had begun with him telling the Queen 'half in joke, half in earnest, that I could not answer for the new Government lasting more than six weeks'¹² with the party still in turmoil after Suez.

'There was', he wrote, of his new station in life,

'...a certain atmosphere of unreality and even absurdity. Perhaps because I had spent so many of my hours of my life in reading, and since my whole education had been based on the old learning, I was at any rate on one side of my nature and training what has been called "a gown man": a product of a system which was intended to supply in the Middle Ages "clerks" as priests and administrators...Even my family business [publishing] had close connections with this quiet world of literature and art. The First World War turned me unexpectedly into a 'sword man'. Action – harsh, brutal, compelling – ousted learning.'¹³

My own personal encounter with him – an 'entirely off-the-record' chat, as he put it – about another gown-and-sword-man, Lord Hailsham (whose profile I was preparing for The Times¹⁴), brimmed with the fluencies and the brutalities which this 'duality' stimulated.

'The English', Mr Macmillan (as he still was) told me, 'they don't like clever people. The whole Tory Party spent 1868-74 trying to get rid of Dizzy. There were distrustful of Churchill...If any of my colleagues go to heaven it will be Quintin.'¹⁵ Then came the brutalities [this is August 1975 with Mrs Thatcher still finding her feet as Conservative Leader]: 'You couldn't imagine a woman as Prime Minister if we were a first class power....You can't make a foreign policy when you're in the debtors' court.'¹⁶

'The old Conservative Party at its best it was a national party with many mansions,' he went on before ruminating on what might-have-been in 1963 when the Party fought over his succession:

'Hailsham had the essential qualities of heart and brain...I thought they would probably support Rab [Butler]. I was surprised when they didn't. Rab is a backroom-boy by nature; a marvellous chief-of-staff. Macleod and Hailsham had the qualities of a commander. I think the present system of education tends to produce staff officers rather than commanders...[But Hailsham] did himself great injury with his weakness and lack of self-control. He's curiously un-English some ways [with] some of the characteristics of Shelley.'¹⁷

Needless to say, this was heady stuff for a young 28 year old journalist in solo session with an old statesman 52 years his senior – almost a command performance, with gown and sword jostling in almost every line, for somebody he had not met before. But, as Hailsham said, it required care on the part of the listener (especially that bit about his surprise when Butler failed to make it to No.10 in October 1963).

Yet on reflection this old man in his deeply bookish room in the Little Essex Street offices of the family firm was more Gladstone than Disraeli in the sense that the 'beautiful actor' was to the fore enjoying his undoubted effect on the young man from The Times. For Colin Matthew, editor of the Gladstone Diaries (as reported in Roy Jenkins' superb new life of the Grand Old Man), reckons that, even by the time of his second premiership, 'there was becoming something contrived about Gladstone's conversational performances, and that "performances" was indeed the right word for them [because]...in this period, it was almost certain that one of the guests would note his conversation or mood in a letter or a diary.'¹⁸

I have concentrated in my opening remarks on the Macmillan style because, as Alistair Horne has expressed it, the style was very much the man.¹⁹ 'It's very important not to have a rigid distinction between what's flippant and what is serious', as Macmillan himself put it to his biographer when deep into his ripest anecdotage²⁰ (pre-echoing by a decade Roy Jenkins' apt distinction between the 'earnest' and the 'frivolous' in political life²¹). And just such a combination did impinge directly on the conduct of Cabinet government almost from the moment Macmillan replaced the brittle Eden.

He had the klaxon removed from the prime ministerial car²² and he soothed the nerves of the Private Office, still jagged from the Eden experience by, as his No.1 Private Secretary, Sir Freddie Bishop recalled, writing 'out in his own hand this quotation – which I didn't immediately spot, but I believe it comes from Gilbert and Sullivan²³ – "Quiet, calm deliberation disentangles every knot". And that stayed pinned up on the Cabinet door for quite a long time until he thought that we'd got over our little tremors and then he took it down and gave it to me.'²⁴

On a later occasion, when Duncan Sandys was expected to give a particular Cabinet committee an especially hard time, Macmillan sent Bishop to the chemists in Whitehall ahead of the meeting to buy enough tranquillisers for every minister. When they sat down, there was a packet of 'Relaxatabs' on every blotter. The meeting went like a charm!²⁵

Of course, a great deal of this was camouflage at which Macmillan, of all our postwar premiers, was the past master (to use a phrase he liked to apply to others²⁶). Before speeches and great occasions generally, he would be almost physically sick with nervous apprehension.²⁷ Of all the premiers the long-serving political correspondent, Jimmy Margach, knew well, he ranked Macmillan with Lloyd George, Baldwin, and MacDonald as 'extraordinarily difficult men to understand, for they loved to withdraw themselves introspectively into their celtic mists.'²⁸

Macmillan's political impulses were similarly mercurial. In old age, Attlee revealed how close Macmillan had come to joining the Labour Party in the 1930s claiming Macmillan, not he, would have led Labour if he had.²⁹ 'Very left wing man!' was how Attlee described Macmillan once both of them were safely in retirement.³⁰ Macmillan himself had claimed in 1936 that 'Toryism has always been a form of paternal socialism' and reading his loving essay on the Whig tradition, again penned late in life, confirmed my own view that Macmillan was as much a Whig as a Tory.³¹ Certainly he was not a 'good Tory' and admitted as much to his biographer, Alistair Horne.³² Put all this together with his profound admiration for David Lloyd George³³ (who coached him as a young MP on how to make effective speeches³⁴) and his close intellectual liaison with Maynard Keynes³⁵ (whose General Theory the family firm published in 1930), and you can see why the more narrowly-formed of modern Conservatives view 'Uncle Harold' (as they most certainly do not like to call him) with such suspicion.

No modern premier, Gladstone and Churchill apart, ever brought a more eclectic mixture of experience to No.10 along with his Sovereign's commission. Macmillan really did have a sense of how his forbears had tackled the job. The ghosts in the Cabinet Room were almost flesh and blood to him (as were the ghosts he saw in the galleries in the House of Commons after his parliamentary triumphs – the wraiths of the really brilliant figures who, unlike him, had not survived the Great War. It was, as a friend of his put it to me, almost as if he could hear the spectral Raymond Asquith's and the Patrick Shaw-Stewart's saying 'What you Harold – you Prime Minister?'³⁶).

Back to flesh and blood. How did this extraordinary, elusive man tackle the job? For all the touch of the country house about his No.10, the Macmillan Cabinets were tightly run. He was very much in charge. He removed the racks of notepaper from the Cabinet Table on which he and others had scribbled abusive notes to each other as poor Eden underwhelmed them from the chair.³⁷

To the most recent analyst of his premiership, Richard Lamb: 'The archives show that even more than generally believed Macmillan ran his Government on the lines of an American President rather than a traditional British Prime Minister...Intellectually Macmillan towered head and shoulders above his Cabinet colleagues and, often mistrustful of their judgement, he insisted on full control...[he] interfered continuously with his colleagues' conduct of their departmental affairs.'³⁸

This, I think, overstates Macmillan's overmighty tendencies. Christopher Soames, who sat in the Cabinet Room under both Macmillan and Mrs Thatcher, had no doubts about their relative position on the Richter Scale of overmightiness and he put Ted Heath in the frame as 'the nearest parallel to Maggie.'³⁹ Yet there is something to Lamb's case. Macmillan had strong tendencies towards being his own Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer (especially when the hapless Selwyn Lloyd was filling those seats) and not just because he had held both posts himself on the way to the top job.

For Macmillan possessed a powerful sense of the strategic — the wholeness, the interlocking nature of government policy — and of his position as the chief, perhaps the sole, keeper of that strategy. And what was notable about his stewardship of the machinery of state was, I think, his desire to streamline it in order to enable its operators, both ministerial and official, to contemplate more effectively the deeper problems afflicting Britain — its economy, its society, its place in the world — and to set changes in train.

From rummaging among his files at the Public Record Office (sadly his private archive still remains unscannable at the Bodleian in Oxford awaiting Cabinet Office clearance⁴⁰), I would divide his efforts into two-parts:

- 1: First, the post-Suez rethinks of 1957-60.
- 2: Secondly, his avowed pursuit of 'modernisation' across the board between 1961 and 1963.

Linking both periods was an intense sense of 'overload' – of the burden on ministers and the central mechanics of state.

On top of all this, of course, lay an immense constant and intensely personal new responsibility. For Macmillan was the first British prime minister with a fully fledged strategic nuclear force launchable in a matter of minutes on his say so, not that of the Minister of Defence, the Foreign Secretary or the Cabinet as a whole (with a huge apparatus of skeletal, military government and an airman's finger on the button should Mr Khrushchev have arranged for Macmillan and his Cabinet to be destroyed by pre-emptive strike⁴¹). Though I have no time today to go into that fully, there is no question that this duty weighed heavily on Macmillan especially at moments of crisis over Berlin and Cuba in 1961 and 1962.

Let's look now at those post-Suez rethinks. It is not known if Macmillan saw Eden's own inquest on the significance of Suez⁴² (though Selwyn Lloyd did⁴³), but he set in train a series of initiatives and inquiries very similar in their tone and pitch to those thoughts that afflicted this predecessor in the bleak last hours of his premiership.

They ranged from the more determined pursuit of science and technology as a national priority⁴⁴ to the first ever cost/benefit analysis of the Empire undertaken in 1957⁴⁵ (the Indian Mutiny of 1857, you might think, would have been a more appropriate moment for this rather than the moment the Gold Coast was moving towards independence as the newly constituted Ghana); and to no less than wide-ranging two studies of Britain's place in the world. The first of these was undertaken by a committee of permanent secretaries in 1957-58 under the leadership of his friend and constant source of solace and support, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook.⁴⁶ The second was carried out very secretly in 1959-60 by what was in effect an expanded Joint Intelligence Committee under the leadership of the Foreign Office's Sir Patrick Dean.⁴⁷

Overlapping with these policy reviews was a rummage around the thousand-and-one inefficiencies that poisoned (and still do) everyday ministerial life. For in 1957 (once more on the initiative of the seasoned Norman Brook,⁴⁸) Macmillan commissioned a Committee of Privy Counsellors, under the chairmanship of Lord Attlee, to examine 'The Burden on Ministers.'⁴⁹

What were the results of these attempts to 'rub ministers' noses in the future' (to borrow a phrase Douglas Hurd would later use of Ted Heath's Central Policy Review Staff⁵⁰)? On two levels a great deal. For that great tectonic shifting of our country's geopolitical plates – the withdrawal from the tropical empire and the first tilt towards Europe – were powerfully influenced by a combination of what Macmillan liked to called 'events'⁵¹ and those studies (even though the starkly realistic conclusions of the 1959-60 'Study of Future Policy' were thought to be too bleak to be put before the full Cabinet in February 1960 and the Cabinet Paper summarising the study's outcome was pulled at the last minute.⁵²)

Very little resulted from the examination of 'overload' except a feeble exhortation of ministers to attend fewer dinners and to get their juniors to meet the less important foreign dignitaries flying into Heathrow or Gatwick.⁵³ As for science, Macmillan was dissuaded by Brook from creating a fully-fledged Ministry after the 1959 election contenting himself with appointing Lord Hailsham Minister of Science among his other duties.⁵⁴ This, too, is the era in which Macmillan (even with a thumping majority of 100 after the October 1959 election) declined to contemplate rigorously the problem of tackling trade union power in the form of unofficial strikes,⁵⁵ though he did eventually tread where Attlee, Churchill and Eden had shrunk from going in placing some curbs on unrestricted Commonwealth immigration in 1962.⁵⁶

Macmillan's second phase, his overtly modernising one, stretched across virtually the whole fabric of government – from the 'grand design' he put to the about to be inaugurated President Kennedy in early 1960 (after a characteristically broody Christmas at Birch Grove⁵⁷) with its emphasis on Britain as the special interlocutor between an integrating Europe we would probably soon seek to join and a pivotal

United States on whose strength all of Western Europe depended in the cold war⁵⁸ to a more modern Britain with a revitalised infrastructure (a Beeching modernised railways⁵⁹ plus new motorways⁶⁰ and rebuilt cities⁶¹), all overseen by a streamlined, less-burdened Cabinet structure⁶² with its eye on the future trends of population and employment in late twentieth century Britain,⁶³ all underpinned by a new accommodation between government, capital and labour through a new National Economic Development Council⁶⁴ and a new settlement between the classes thanks to a National Incomes Commission.⁶⁵

Macmillan the would-be Moderniser has scarcely been appreciated by posterity thanks to the troubles which arrived in battalions after the loss of the Orpington by-election to the Liberals in May 1962,⁶⁶ the panic sacking of a third of his Cabinet the following July,⁶⁷ General de Gaulle's veto of the British application for EEC membership on January 1963,⁶⁸ the Profumo scandal of the summer of 1963⁶⁹ and Macmillan's sad, prostate-afflicted demise amidst a rabble of a party conference the following autumn,⁷⁰ his machinery-of-state (the one bailiwick where his personal writ really ran) still largely unmodernised.⁷¹ With, as some would say, his last disastrous act as fixing the succession for the wrong man, Alec Home, and usurping those royal prerogatives by which he set such store into the bargain.⁷²

What, in the spectrum of postwar premierships, is one to make of this catalogue of hopes and promise unfulfilled? Can one, apart from the perhaps overfast but relatively bloodless dash from empire between 1960 and 1963, say more than another recent chronicler of the Macmillan years, Professor John Turner, that Macmillan,

'had a broader vision than most leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, and greater courage in facing change. [That] in his time he avoided many of the obvious pitfalls and rescued a little dignity from the wreckage. One man alone can do little more?⁷³

For me the key sentence is the last one. 'One man alone can do little more.'

For the immediate post-Suez years illustrate with a vengeance just how reduced were the circumstances of the country of which Macmillan was the Queen's First Minister and how his scope was reduced accordingly. Of course he was the prisoner of atavisms even in his avowed quest for modernity. Edmund Dell is right to see huge, public expenditure guzzling enterprises such as aerospace and nuclear energy as technological surrogates for the imperial impulse.⁷⁴ Macmillan was the epitome of this syndrome and he used all his fabled skills of persuasion in its cause. For example, the Cabinet meeting at which final approval was given for Concorde to be developed in November 1962 lives on in Whitehall legend and has been beautifully enshrined by Nigel Lawson and the late Jock Bruce-Gardyne.

'He told his colleagues about his great aunt's Daimler', they wrote,

'which had travelled at the "sensible speed of thirty miles an hour," and was sufficiently spacious to enable one to descend from it without removing one's top hat. Nowadays, alas! people had a mania for dashing around. But that being so Britain ought to "cater for this profitable modern eccentricity"! He thought they all really agreed. No one seriously dissented. It was all over in a few minutes.'⁷⁵

A classic example of sentiment triumphing over cost/benefit analysis.

Yet Macmillan regarded himself as a practical person, a businessman as well as a swordsman and a gownsman. Macmillan, like Mrs Thatcher, had a penchant for scribbling derogatory remarks on papers from colleagues whose views he did not care for. (It is said that Mrs Thatcher's use of the word 'wet' in such marginalia led to its modern political usage).⁷⁶ Such 'heckling' can be very revealing. It certainly was in Macmillan's case.

My favourite example is the savaging that poor Derrick Heathcoat Amory's paper on 'Treasury Control' received in October 1958.

Amory: 'I would not deprecate [investment], for in the last 50 years we have been not nearly investment-minded enough. But at a time of great shortage of savings, the aggregate of Ministers' desires will always outrun the constable. We then need a system of presenting the whole picture so that Ministers can take rational choices on which is the more and which the less important.'

Macmillan (in that spidery hand, the product of the bullet that went through it at the Battle of the Loos⁷⁷): 'Rot'.

Amory: 'I am bound to say that these periodic attempts to cut or to increase short-term capital expenditure are likely to frustrate the whole objective of exercising effective control over the long-term programmes and keeping them in line with our long-term resource to carry them out.'

Macmillan: 'Have you ever been in a) war b) business c) active politics?'

Amory: '...if we are forced to keep on chopping and changing our control will undoubtedly collapse altogether.'

Macmillan: 'Hurrah!'

The Prime Minister rounded off, gownsman style, as if he were marking an essay: 'Chancellor of Exch. This is a very bad paper. Indeed, a disgraceful paper. It might have been written by Mr Neville Chamberlain's ghost.'⁷⁸

It was Heathcoat Amory's predecessor of course, Peter Thorneycroft, who had left the Treasury the previous January when Macmillan and what Rodney Lowe has called the Cabinet 'paternalists' saw off the anti-collectivists⁷⁹ who wished to see public expenditure pegged at 1957 levels and who were prepared to cut planned spending on both defence and welfare to achieve it.⁸⁰ (This led to Macmillan's famous

dismissal of the resignation of his entire Treasury team as 'a little local difficulty' as he flew away from Heathrow for a six-week tour of the Commonwealth⁸¹). Years later, Lord Thorneycroft was lionised by the newer Conservatives for what they saw as his prototypical Thatcherism. And the affable Thorneycroft, with affection in his voice, nonetheless gained a posthumous revenge in his verbal exchanges with Macmillan when he told me in 1993:

'Dear Harold, he was a great spender. He'd been brought up in areas of great unemployment and he thought that writing cheques was the best way of dealing with it. This wasn't my view or the view of my junior ministers.'⁸²

It would be wrong, however, to see Macmillan as careless of the public finances, as profligacy incarnate. His most famous remark – 'Never had it so good' – was coupled in May 1957 with a warning that it might not last thanks to the perils of inflation.⁸³

In many ways that famous Bedford speech delivered four months after his arrival at No.10 pre-echoed his entire premiership – a premiership in which optimism and pessimism, caution and the desire to break free vied constantly. Nearly four years later, a year and a bit before he sacked Selwyn Lloyd from the Exchequer as part of 'The Night of the Long Knives', Macmillan, prompted by his grandsons complaint about Treasury restrictions on racing-cars of all things, minuted his Chancellor thus:

'Whenever Britain seems to excel or have the chance to excel in anything, H.M.G. clamps down. We have the drivers; not the cars. Drab; second-rate; without zest or pride. That's what we risk Britain and the British people becoming.'⁸⁴

Macmillan was not alone among postwar prime ministers in feeling what Harold Nicolson called 'the gigantic pressures of history'⁸⁵ when confronted by examples, big or small, of their country's relative economic decline.

It was more than a streak of fatalism that held Macmillan back from trying to shake his Britain, its economy and its institutions, into the modernity he sought. (He subscribed, after all, to Baldwin's famous dictum that, in Macmillan's version of it: 'There are three bodies that no sensible man directly challenges: the Roman Catholic church, the Brigade of Guards and the National Union of Mineworkers.'⁸⁶) And, as Alistair Horne put it, '...how can you actually force regeneration on a country that doesn't want to be regenerated?'⁸⁷

It may have been that even if the nation had been thirsting for ruthless, across-the-board shake-ups, Macmillan would have lacked Mrs Thatcher's sharklike appetite for the resultant blood in the water. Certainly even within the boundaries of his own modernising inclinations, something held Macmillan back. Perhaps it was, in part, his Whiggish-cum-old Tory-like respect for traditional institutions. But no postwar premier saw the problems more acutely. And in no postwar premier was the gap between perception and remedy more pronounced.

I suspect that as his prime ministership lengthened Macmillan sensed that his attempts to keep airborne the 'four balls', as he called them, of full employment, stable prices, a strong pound and a balance in payments in surplus,⁸⁸ were doomed to failure. His celtic melancholy, I suspect, would have led him to conclude that his fellow classical scholar and gownsman, H.H. Asquith was right when he said of the premiership: 'Power, power? You may think you are going to get it but you never do.'⁸⁹ Macmillan's own version of this was 'Power? It's like a Dead Sea fruit' When you achieve it, there is nothing there⁹⁰. No wonder he sought solace in literature – Pride and Prejudice⁹¹ by day, and as he once so unfortunately put it, by 'going to bed with a Trollope'⁹² at night.

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'PREMIERSHIP' 3

'QUIET, CALM DELIBERATION': HAROLD MACMILLAN, 1957-63.

ENDNOTES

1. Private Information.
2. Anthony Sampson, Macmillan, A Study in Ambiguity, (Allen Lane, 1967).
3. Ibid. Picture caption between p.262 & p.263.
4. Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, (Macmillan, 1989), pp.540-1.
5. Harold Macmillan, diary entry for 8 October 1963 quoted in Horne, Macmillan, 1957-1986, p.541.
6. Lord Home interviewed for the Brook Productions/Channel 4 Television Series, All The Prime Minister's Men, Programme 1, broadcast on July 1986.
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8. Lord Hailsham, interviewed for All The Prime Minister's Men, Programme 1, broadcast on July 1986.
9. Ibid.
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11. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959, (Macmillan, 1971), p.197.
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16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Roy Jenkins, Gladstone, (Macmillan, 1995), p.463.
19. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, p.603.
20. Ibid, p.610.
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22. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, p.13.
23. It does – from The Gondoliers. You can see a photograph of it in Alan Thompson, The Day Before Yesterday: An Illustrated History of Britain from Attlee to Macmillan, (Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971), p.163.
24. Sir Frederick Bishop speaking on The Last Edwardian: Obituary Tribute to Lord Stockton, broadcast on BBC Radio 4, December 1986.
25. Sir Frederick Bishop speaking on Living with Harold, broadcast on BBC Radio 4, 26 September 1989.
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29. James Margach, The Abuse of Power: The War between Downing Street and the Media from Lloyd George to James Callaghan, (W.H. Allen, 1978), pp.116-17
30. Clem Attlee: The Granada Historical Record Interview, (Panther, 1967), p.18.
31. For the 'paternal socialism' remark see Sampson, Macmillan, p. ; for his Whiggery see Macmillan, The Past Masters, pp.183-97.
32. Alistair Horne, speaking on Living with Harold.
33. Macmillan, The Past Masters, pp.32-78.
34. Ibid, pp.57-60.
35. Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change 1914-1939, (Macmillan, 1966), pp.363, 366; Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 1894-1956, (Macmillan, 1988), p.63.
36. Private Information.
37. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, p.13.
38. Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth, (John Murray, 1995), p.1.
39. Lord Soames is quoted anonymously in Peter Hennessy, Cabinet, (Blackwell, 1986), p.95. But, since his death in 1987, I have felt able to attribute his remarks.
40. Private Information.
41. Conversation with Sir Frank Cooper for the Wide Vision Productions/Channel 4 Television series, What Has Become of Us? 28 March 1994; PRO, AIR 8/2238, Hudleston to Cross, July 1959.
42. Public Record Office, PREM 11/1138, 'Lessons after Suez: thoughts of Prime Minister'.
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46. PRO, PREM 11/2321, 'The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs'.
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51. See Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution, (Gollancz, 1995), p.165.
52. Michael Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshall Lord Carver, (Century Hutchinson, 1989), pp.288-9.
53. PRO, CAB 130/137, GEN 616, 'The Burden on Ministers', first meeting, 31 October 1957.
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55. As his Parliamentary Private Secretary, Anthony Barber, later put it to me: 'The situation was entirely different in those days and the whole atmosphere and people's attitude to the trade union movement and to trade union leaders.' Lord Barber speaking on Living with Harold.
56. Harold Macmillan, At The End of the Day 1961-1963, (Macmillan, 1973), pp.77-83.
57. His PRO files suggest Macmillan regularly resorted to what were in effect long essays over the holiday period. A later example is a rather pessimistic minute to Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defence, about the UK's capacity to carry on making its own nuclear delivery systems should the Nassan agreement founder depriving the Royal Navy of Polaris missiles. See PRO, PREM 11/4412, Macmillan to Thorneycroft, 26 December 1962.
58. PRO, PREM 11/3325, 'Grand Design', December 1960.
59. PRO, PREM 11/4548, 'Railways': PRO, PREM 11/4520, 'Ministerial discussion on modernising Britain Part I'.
- 60.
61. PRO, PREM 11/4277, 'Minister of Transport's proposals for expansion of the building industry.'
62. PRO, CAB 128/36, CC(62) 63, 2 October 1962.
63. PRO, CAB 134/2396 and 2397, 'Committee on Population and Employment.'
64. For Macmillan's attempts to link these factors see the unique (in Cabinet minute-taking terms) transcript of his opening remarks to the Cabinet Meeting of 28 May 1962. PRO, PREM 11/3930, 'Remarks made by Prime Minister at Cabinet on 28 May 1962'.
65. Ibid.
66. Horne, Macmillan 1957-86, pp.335-7.

67. Ibid, pp.339-59; Macmillan, At The End of the Day, pp. 93-102; Lamb, The Macmillan Years, pp.446-51.
68. Macmillan, At The End of the Day, pp.365-8; Horne, Macmillan, 1957-86, pp.445-51; Lamb, The Macmillan Years, pp.192-203.
69. Horne, Macmillan 1957-86, pp.471-97; Matthew Parris, Great Parliamentary Scandals: Four Centuries of Calumny, Smear and Innuendo, (Robson, 1995), pp.138-63.
70. Horne, Macmillan 1957-86, pp.546-57; Robert Shepherd, Iain Macleod, A Biography, (Hutchinson, 1994), pp.306-337.
71. He had not even implemented his plan to take time off from chairing Cabinet (the idea was that the Lord Chancellor would stand in) to make extra time to think. Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957/63, (Hodder, 1981), p.264.
72. See especially Enoch Powell, 'How Macmillan Deceived The Queen', The Spectator, 13 October 1973. For Macmillan punctilious attitude towards the remaining personal prerogatives of the Sovereign. see PRO, PREM 11/2654, Bligh to Adeane, 9 September 1959.
73. John Turner, Macmillan, (Longman, 1924), pp.274-5.
74. Edmund Dell, Political Responsibility and Industry, (Allen and Unwin, 1973), p.30.
75. Jock Bruce-Gardyne and Nigel Lawson, The Power Game, (Macmillan, 1976), p.28.
76. Private Information.
77. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986, p.15.
78. PRO, PREM 11/2962, 'Discussions on Budget, 1960'. Heathcoat Amory to Macmillan, 23 October 1958.
79. Dr Lowe was speaking at the Twentieth Century British Seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, 25 October 1995.
80. PRO, CAB 128/
81. Horne, Macmillan 1957-1963, p.74.
82. Conversation with Lord Thorneycroft for What Has Become of Us? 29 July 1993.
83. Harold Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959, (Macmillan, 1971), pp.350-1.
84. PRO, PREM 11/3883, 'Personal minutes for Prime Minister to Mr Selwyn Lloyd during his period as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1960-1962', Macmillan to Lloyd, 28 February 1961.
85. Nicolson used this phrase when musing on the closure of the Festival of Britain in The Listener, 1 November 1951.
86. Quoted in the Observer, 22 February 1981.
87. Alistair Horne speaking on Living with Harold.
88. PRO, PREM 11/3930.

89. John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace to War 1912-1916, (Methuen, 1985), p.474.
90. Anthony Sampson, The New Anatomy of Britain, (Hodder, 1971), p.
91. Harold Macmillan talking to Ludovic Kennedy, Reflections, BBC1, 20 October 1983.
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