Influence of the European Community/Union’s ideas and regional practices on the regionalisation process in the Mediterranean

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ABSTRACT

The main aim of the working paper is to understand the effect of the European Union (EU) as an external actor on the regionalisation process in the Mediterranean. The author offers an upgrade of New Regionalism Approach (NRA), initiated by Hettne and Söderbaum (1998, 2000), and applies it to the Mediterranean area. She claims that the change of regionality (regionness) can be understood through analysing change in regional social structure (regional practices and norms based on common and collective knowledge respectfully). In this aim, the research shows the effect of the EU’s ideas/perceptions and interests conducted through its (EU) foreign policy regional practices on the creation and development of Mediterranean regional practices and norms. Meta-theoretically the conceptualisation is reflectivist and theoretical approach to International Relations is (agency-based) social constructivism. The working paper’s main argument is: it is primarily due to the narrow and instrumental EU perceptions (ideas) of the Mediterranean as a fixed reality (region) that the EU in its relations with the Mediterranean embarks on the logic of consequences and also makes other actors follow this foreign policy behaviour (practices). Therefore, the EU regional practices translated into Mediterranean regional practices have up to now not been reproduced with success, let alone to be able to launch the regional norms, logic of appropriateness and raise the Mediterranean regionness.

Keywords: regionalisation process, Mediterranean, European Community/Union, New regionalism Approach (NRA), regional social structure, regional practices, regional norms

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1. Introduction

Mediterranean as a region in the making is rarely studied in the current literature; mainly what prevails is a research starting point of the Mediterranean being the European Union (EU) neighbourhood area and not an area in its own process of regionalisation. According to many analysts (e.g. Adler et al., 2006) the EU is the most influential regionalising actor in the Mediterranean, Pace (2006b) claims even hegemonic. In this respect, students mainly focus on the analysis of the EU policy toward the Mediterranean, especially the current Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP); exposing the effects of the policies mainly on the EU (member states), ¹ much less for the South Mediterranean Arab partners.² Study of the EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is recently also placed within the more and more developing study of inter-regionalism, seen as the third generation of regionalisms.³ Disputably, the Mediterranean in EU’s ideas and (discursive) practices is being treated as one of the co-operating regions, however in definition without the Mediterranean EU member states or as a neighbourhood (Pace 2006b) (see below). The problem deriving form this kind of research perspective is a disregard of the need to study regionalism (projects) and regionalisation of the Mediterranean itself; its domestic regionalising actors, whether states, inter-governmental institutions, non-state actors or other mixed-actor coalitions (see Šabić and Bojnović, 2007). The second problem presents itself as a consequence of the first, i.e. the 'external perspective of the Mediterranean'. The latter, despite its long historical existence and relevance (Troebst, 2003) as a regional space and complex (see e.g. Calleya, 1997: 59-88), is taken as a fixed, natural unit, unchanged reality in time and space, an ‘accomplished’ region. The EU as (one of) the most successful regionalist projects contributes to this perception by setting a model for other areas to develop into regions and for researchers to study them (Farrell, 2005). This perception of regions prevents one from studying the process of social construction of an area into a region, especially being sensitive of time-space contextualisation.


³ Within this context researchers understand the EU as a region in itself, with its own actor capacity, entering in relations with other regions – regional governmental organisations (e.g. Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Söderbaum and van Langenhove, 2005).
The paper, therefore, especially takes into consideration the understanding of the process of regionalisation/social construction of the Mediterranean. The focus of the paper is to understand the effect of the EU as an external actor on this process. The aim of the research is to answer the question ‘how the EU effects/influences the Mediterranean regional structure’ – Mediterranean regional practices and norms under construction by its (inter)-region-building project of creating a Euro-Mediterranean region. This is to be shown by an analysis in which the author presupposes that the ideas within the EU Mediterranean policies’ conducted through EU regional practices are fixed and instrumental and consequently cause ‘logic of consequences’-driven EU behaviour, affecting also other actors’ practices. This explains the stagnation or even setbacks in the development of Mediterranean regional structure and therefore also level of regionality.

Theoretical contextualisation of the paper is based on a reflectivist epistemological presumption, aiming for understanding rather than explaining. The understanding goes in line with the ‘how-the-EU-influences question’, however, the paper limits itself not to study from the perspective of (EU) foreign policy analysis. Ontological presumptions are holistic, combining the latter with agency-based research; i.e. focusing on the building of the regional social structure by relevant regionalising actors (mostly the EU). The paper will use and upgrade the conceptualisation of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) with social constructivist tools to present the theoretical framework for grasping the research problem.

The paper firstly takes into account a wider time-space context of the current EU-Med relations. The starting point of the paper is the current level of Mediterranean regionality; a finding based on an earlier historical-developmental research of the regionalisation process in the Mediterranean based on the NRA; the Mediterranean since the Cold War has been developing from almost completed regional complex to regional society with already emerging elements of regional community (Bojinović, 2007). Secondly, the author undertakes a study of content analysis of secondary literature and also (for identification of EU ideas, EU regional practices and emerging Mediterranean regional practices and norms) the study of relevant primary sources (EU-Med conferences’ conclusions). Finally, the paper reflects on the findings and uses the NRA to show the effects of the identified fixed ideas and instrumental perceptions of the Mediterranean ‘region’ on the Mediterranean regional structure and development of regionality.
2. Conceptualisation and contextualisation

To surpass the weakness of a region as a fixed reality in time and space, the paper draws on the main epistemological presumptions of the wider social theory/philosophy of science (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Giddens, 1984; Searle, 1995; Brglez, 2006), namely that all the regions and our knowledge of them are in the making – constantly in the process of social construction. The approach to the study of regionalist phenomena used to grasp the research object is the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), developed by Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum. The meta-theoretical orientation of this approach is reflectivist, and puts emphasis on epistemologically holistic presumptions, i.e. that the importance reflected by social constructivist approach to International Relations (IR). In the paper I use more agency-based departure and elements of social constructivism to upgrade NRA and apply it to the Mediterranean region in the making.

The NRA builds on the presumption that it is impossible to think about international relations without theory (Söderbaum, 2004: 37). The approach defines the theory as constitutive (in contradiction to explanatory) and defends its non-causative contribution with constitutive position of Wendt (1999: 85), redirecting the essence of scientific inquiry of social reality from ‘why’ to ‘how’. Constitutive theorising seeks to establish conditions of possibility for objects or events by showing what they are made of and how they are organised (Baaz, 1999; Guzzini, 2000; Guzzini in Leander, 2001; Adler, 2006; Wight, 2006; Brglez, 2006). This perspective also ties together other central constructivist points of departure (Fearon and Wendt, 2006: 58). NRA builds on the ambition to understand and contribute to structural/ social transformation and emancipation, where not only patterns of power and domination are the focus, but also the emancipation of historical and contextual development processes are taken into account. NRA

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4 As presented in the ‘first version’, when it was in the explorative research phase (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998), NRA was according to its authors (Söderbaum 2004: 37) structurally and systemically biased. NRA has been upgraded by its authors two years later (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000), proposed to be developed into a theory. NRA is ‘revisited’ by Hettne (2003) and used in the case study of regionalisation of South Africa by Söderbaum (2004, see Ch. 3) in order to be better designed to deal with the process of regionalisation. I use the concepts as (re)formulated and underpinned in the later, updated and revised versions, aiming for new regionalism theory-building. NRA and levels of regionness have been used in studying the contribution of macro-regions to peace (Tavares 2004), however the latter is not the focus of this paper.

5 NRA authors claim that NRA tries to integrate: theory of IR/international political economy, development theory and regional integration theory (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998). Authors later identify several sources of New regionalism theory, being developed from the NRA: besides social constructivism the two other sources are global social theory and comparative regional studies (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000).

6 The three central points of constructivism: role of ideas in constructing social life, showing the socially constructed nature of agents or subjects, the research strategy is methodological holism rather than methodological individualism (Fearon and Wendt, 2006: 57).
“/…/ focuses on the content of regionalism, rather than the form, implying a critical questioning of any given type of regionalism, for whom and for what consequences it is being put into practice, consolidated or resisted” (Söderbaum, 2004: 39). In this context NRA would be placed within the so-called ‘thick’ constructivism, focusing on the constitutive role of norms and ideas in defining identities and therefore prescribing appropriate behaviour of certain types of actors (Carlsnaes, 2006: 340) (e.g. Adler and Barnet 1998; Finnemore, 1996). This approach puts more attention on agency, it remains ontologically holistic, but also epistemologically interpretativist. “Constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being”; constructivists (of all types) are therefore not interested in how things are, but in how they became what they are (Adler, 2006: 95, 101). This implies awareness of the time-space related processes of change and goes in line with the NRA. To sum up, constructivism is ‘all about change’; it underlines the constitutive effects of intersubjective knowledge and ideas on social reality and its evolution. And since one can not arbitrarily define the point in time when the ideas and knowledge (see below) relevant for the construction of a region came into being, I believe this should be a researcher’s first task.

It is reasonable to assume that regional identities may be historically deep-seated. Hence it is necessary to take a longer historical perspective than simply the nation-building period, e.g. the Westphalian era in European and international history. This is of particular importance in the South, where state-system is much more recent, feeble and often quite artificial.

Historicity ‘only’ shows up as part of contexts that make possible social reality, the path-dependent process involving structural and agent change, and the mechanisms involved in the explanation of change (Adler, 2006: 202). Therefore, one of the first research steps in this paper is a contextualisation of the constitutive role of the EC/EU’s ideas and practices in the regionalisation process of the Mediterranean. Similarly, NRA departs from this logic of process and accordingly proposes an understanding of a (social construction of) a region. Accordingly, becoming rather than being is thus what NRA focuses upon.

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7 Especially Giddens (1984: 286) calls for sensitivity of a social analyst to the time-space constitution of social life, by stressing that “/…/‘time-space’ relations can not be ‘pulled out’ of social analysis without undermining the whole enterprise /…/.”

8 This does not mean one should always research an object from the beginning of its cognitive existence (or at least of our perception of this beginning). The ambition is not to make an exhaustive description of the history of a certain area, but rather to show the historical construction of the social actors and their cumulative legacies which have served to construct the heterogeneous regional space (see Söderbaum, 2004: 54). Pace (2006b) explains similarly, however, when contextualising current discourses on the Mediterranean limits her focus only to the relevant states’ nation-building historical context.

9 This has implications for the highly disputed understanding of the definition of a region (see Hetne, 2005 for a conceptual discussion). A region in NRA is understood in the framework of a ‘definitional flexibility’ and is ‘a
Within the NRA (but not exclusively to this approach) process of regionalisation is understood differently than regionalism. Regionalisation is the actual process of increasing exchange, contact and co-ordination and so on (Hveem, 2003: 83), and refers to co-operation, integration, cohesion and to identity when creating a regional space (Hveem in Söderbaum, 2004: 7). It may be caused by regionalism but it may also emerge regardless of whether there is a regionalist project and regionalism ideology or not (Ibid.), i.e. can emerge as consciously planned or caused by spontaneous process (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 462, Hettne, 2005: 545). As an effect, “regionalisation process can also proceed unevenly along the various dimensions of the ‘new regionalism’ (i.e. economics, politics, culture, security and so on)” (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 462) which is especially true for the Mediterranean.

When different processes of regionalisation in various fields and at various levels intensify and converge with the same geographical area, the cohesiveness and thereby the distinctiveness of the region in the making increases. Therefore NRA seeks to describe this process of regionalisation in terms of levels of regionness, i.e. the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 461; Hettne, 2003: 28).

The definition above proposes two terms; one is a geographical area which is a precondition for a development of this area into a region. The second – attained cohesiveness, which I see as an index of how intensively the process of regionalisation has developed, is the one which the NRA builds on, when it proposes to analyze the level of ‘regionness’. The latter is ‘the scope to which territorial areas are being transformed into regions’ (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998: 6). Therefore, to my understanding, it is the intensification (process, development) of the qualitative aspect of the ‘region’ that an area attains through time, which is attempted to be understood, ‘measured’

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10 Regionalism refers to a program, an ideology to a situation where there exists a clear idea of a region, a set of goals and values associated with a specific project that an identifiable group of actors wish to realize (Hveem, 2003: 83). A similar term is region-building (e.g. Neumann, 2003), however, it uses a different (post-positivist) ontology and methods. More on conceptualisation of regionalism related terms in Hettne (2005).


12 Moreover regionalisation as increased emphasis on organising cross-border transactions within a region – may be intended not as an end, but as a means to an end; e.g. a stepping stone to the global market or not even the means but simply be a way of hedging (Hveem, 2003: 83-84). However, social science does understand regionalisation as a process not necessarily related to territorial, geographic terms. Regionalisation can refer to different locales, which are not places, but settings of interaction (Giddens, 1984), simply put, region means context of interaction in whatever reference. Some have applied similar framework to regions in IR science, naming them functional regions (Väyrinen, 2003). In this paper I stick to territorial precondition for an area to become a region.

13 Cohesiveness (social, economic, political) is a concept presented as a precondition for a region to exist/become already by Hurrell (1995) in the pioneering book on ‘new regionalism’ (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995).
and expressed by the level of *regionness*. This level can both increase and decrease, literally meaning that a “/…/ region can be a region ‘more or less’” (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 461).14

NRA identifies five levels of *regionness* – regionality or five phases in a process of becoming a region: regional space, regional complex, regional society, regional community, and a regional institutionalized polity (Hettne, 2003). In Table 1, I offer a short overview of the five levels of *regionness* (as presented in Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 462-68; Hettne, 2003: 28-29) and their respective elements and characteristics, the main regionalising actors active at each level and preconditions for an area to raise the *regionness* on a higher level. The authors of the NRA contribute to theory-building by providing the tools to explain how an area advances from one level of *regionness* to another. As Hettne (2003: 29) explains, goal of the NRA is to ‘facilitate a better understanding of the *endogenous* dynamic’, meaning how the regionalisation is shaped from within the region by a large number of different actors.15 In the dual perspective of the process of regionalisation in the Mediterranean, I offer an understanding of the EU as an external actor, i.e. an agency side within the exogenous perspective of the regionalisation process of the Mediterranean. This definition serves for analytical purposes: the EU is an external actor, due to the primary postulate of the NRA, i.e. the territory of an area is the one which is being transformed into a region. As the object of the analysis is the Mediterranean area, any entity which is territorially or mandate-linked outside this area is taken as external.16

14 Other authors focus on different view of region-construction, pointing out the so called regionhood (van Langenhove 2003). The author defines the concept as (i) the region as a system of intentional acts in the international and national arena; (ii) the region as a ‘rational’ system with statehood properties; (iii) the region as a reciprocal achievement; (iv) the region as a generator and communicator of meaning and identity, and applies the term to the NRA in the way that this approach “seeks to describe regionalisation as process in terms of levels of regionness, i.e. the process whereby a geographical area is acquiring regionhood” (*Ibid.*).

15 The exogenous perspective, on the other hand, focuses on how regionalisation and globalisation are intertwined, contradictory as well as complementary articulations of global transformation (Söderbaum, 2003: 12). Another goal of the NRA is “to provide a framework for comparative analysis of emerging regions” (Hettne, 2003: 29).

16 The exogenous perspective is disputable, especially because many relevant actors are non-territorially defined (non-state actors), and also as the EU is not the only relevant international governmental organisation (others being NATO, OSCE, League of Arab states, etc.). Since the EU also already functions as a region in itself (has actorness capacity), this case is easier to define.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of regionness</th>
<th>Regionalising actors</th>
<th>Elements, characteristics</th>
<th>Preconditions for rising regionness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **regional space**  | inhabitants, localities | - geographically bounded community,  
                      - control over a set of natural resources,  
                      - unification through a certain set of cultural values and common bonds of social order forged by history | - increasing interaction within the territory  
                      - more frequent contact with human communities  
                      - translocal relationship |
| **regional complex** | states, human groups | - little shared knowledge or mutual trust,  
                      - anarchy, inward orientation of states,  
                      - collective memory,  
                      - possible temporary decline in level of *regionness* due to nation/state-building,  
                      - state balance of power,  
                      - unification through area’s conflicts,  
                      - exploitative rather than co-operative and mutually reinforcing economic interdependencies,  
                      - states looking towards larger external system, rather than the region,  
                      - coercive regionalisation process (territorial conquests, building of empires, civilisations) | - states must relax their ‘inward-orientedness’ and become more open to external relation,  
                      - degree of transnational contact has to increase dramatically |
| **regional society** | states, regional IGOs, non-state actors, social institutions, micro-regions | - multidimensional regionalisation,  
                      - anarchical society,  
                      - more rule-based pattern of relations,  
                      - variety of processes of communication and interaction, formal and ‘real’ region,  
                      - membership (in formal regions),  
                      - increasing interdependence,  
                      - relaxed ‘inward-orientation’,  
                      - moving towards transcendence of national space | - mutual reinforcement and complementarities of the diverse processes at various levels and sectors  
                      - increasing and widening relations between the formal and the real region  
                      - institutionalisation of cognitive structures and gradual deepening of mutual trust and responsiveness |
| **regional community** | all the above + regional civil society | - enduring organisational framework (formal or less formal)  
                      - social communication,  
                      - convergence and compatibility of ideas, values, organisations, and processes (actions)  
                      - regional collective identity  
                      - social trust at the regional level | - ‘we’-ness vs. those from the outside the macro-region,  
                      - dividing line between the national communities gradually disappearing |
| **regional institutionalised polity** | all the above, + region | - fixed structure of decision-making,  
                      - stronger actor capability,  
                      - strong civil society,  
                      - accumulation of social capital,  
                      - stable inter-state security arrangement,  
                      - prevention and handling of regional wide natural catastrophes and emergencies,  
                      - conflict management and conflict resolution,  
                      - creation of welfare,  
                      - improved regional balance between different areas | ? |
3. **Influence of actors' ideas and practices on regional social structure**

This part of the paper focuses on the agency’s influence on the regional social structure. “Agency is often motivated and explained by ideas, identity, accumulation of knowledge and learning, rather than by traditional routines, structural factors or established institutions” (Söderbaum, 2004: 44, Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 460). Moreover, as social structures of regional quality are constructed, they also, in turn, influence and reconstruct agents (Finnemore, 1996). Söderbaum (2004: 40) in this context argues that “/i/n order to understand structural and social change within a particular region there is a need to move from structure and systemic perspective toward regionalisation process and agency, actors, visions and strategies.” There are nearly always a multitude of strategies and ideas about a particular region, which merge, mingle and clash. The NRA focus is on how the regionalising actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions of *regionness* (Söderbaum, 2004: 47). Actors do not only response to structural conditions but also attempt to modify and change them. In this way regionalisation is seen as an instrument to change existing structures, take advantage of new opportunities that arise as well as to create bonds of identity and community. Regionalisation is the process of structural change at the regional level which determines the opportunities and parameters for state policy (for regionalist projects) (Grugel and Hout, 1999: 10). I follow this view; however, do not think that structure is less important. It is only the research focus which emphasises the role of agency, and not the researchers’ statement on the reality (see Söderbaum, 2003: 9-10).

Constructivists see the role of ideas as constituting (state) interests (Benko, 1992; Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999; Onuf, 1999). Ideas are performed (implemented) through practices or agency behaviour (Doty, 1993). Cox and Sinclair (1996: 98) name ideas ‘intersubjective meanings’, or shared notions of nature of social relations, which tend to perpetuate habits and social behaviour. These notions, though durable over long periods of time, are historically

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17 Although Finnemore (1996: 25) states the structure side is the most neglected by the dominant approaches in the IR, the NRA quite differently, has been more concentrated on the structure, mainly the exogenous structure. The NRA authors put slightly different attention to the agency-structure poles in the regionalisation process. Hettne (2003: 29) sees the structural factors important and includes them in the analysis: “/t/he endogenous approach must be combined with an exogenous approach in order to show how the impact of globalisation varies between different conditions of *regionness*, thereby creating different pathways of regionalisation.” On the other hand, Söderbaum (2004) argues the need to put more attention to the agency.
conditioned (*Ibid.*). I understand the role of the regionalising actors’ ideas on the area becoming a region in the following constructivists’ tendency to emphasize the constitutive role of ideas, the ways in which ideas give other factors the explanatory role, that they have by investing them with meaning and content. From this perspective ideas permeate social life rather than form a distinct variable whose explanatory force can be isolated (Fearon and Wendt, 2006: 60).

The practices are defined as 'doing something repeatedly' (Keck and Sikkink, 1998 in Björkdahl, 2002: 159). The agency behaviour or practices on the regional level (per)form regional practices agreed by relevant regionalising actors. I understand as ‘regional practices’ the competent action in line with rules and role that agents perform on a certain field of action (Bourdieu, 1980/90: 52-65). Regional practices (Björkdahl [2002] names them common practices) are carried out in an interactive activity of the relevant regionalising actors on the basis of common knowledge (Wendt, 1999) or shared 'background abilities' (Searle, 1995: 127-47) or *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1990). All practices are a result by orientations given by the common knowledge and the structure of the field as a system of authorizations and punishments (*ibid.*). More simply, the practices are defined as all the ways in which people deal with rules (not restricted to legal rules, binding the agency and structure) – follow, brake, make, change or get rid of them (Onuf, 1998: 59). The intersubjective practices which are openly reproduced following rules on their own bring about structural change (Guzzini, 2000: 164). The latter cannot be conceived as a simple aggregation of individual action (*Ibid.*). The structural change here implies norm construction, and is ‘the change’ this paper puts focus on. Since practices and norms are perceived as mutually constitutive, changes in practice can spur norm evolution; the element of repetitive action is often stressed as crucial to the formation of an international norm (Björkdahl, 2002: 55, 159). Norms and practices are mutually constitutive, meaning that existing practices constitute the norm, and the new norm will constitute a new practice (*Ibid.*).

Aiming at regional social construction analysis on the basis of NRA, I claim that the change in level of *regionness* (raise or fall) is connected to the change in regional social structure. The regional practices lead to change in level of regionality by firstly changing common knowledge and secondly initiating regional norms. This change happens at the level of transformation of regional society to regional community. Within the NRA framework, first ideas which emerge in...

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18 For post-positivist interrogation of practices and their signification see Doty (1997).
the regional space are on the control of a certain set of natural resources (in the common
territory) and ideas on common values and bonds produced by history. They are transformed in
practices – interaction and frequent contacts between inhabitants constructing a translocal
relationship. If the latter is repeated, the actors in the area will incorporate it into formulation of
new ideas on the region and in regional practices. The reflective capacity of concerned actors is
hereby seen as an important explanation for the emergence and quality of regionalism
(Söderbaum, 2004: 45-46); it is only when the main regionalising actors will reproduce the ideas
on the common values and bonds in the region, they will relax their ‘inward-orientedness’,
become more open, practice the idea of transnational (regional) contact and increase it to
regional society. This process is shown in Figure 1 by green colour and bigger, italic numbers.

**FIGURE 1: SHAPING OF THE REGIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND INFLUENCE OF THE LATTER ON THE SHAPING OF
THE STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY ENVIRONMENT**
At the level of regionalisation in the form of regional society the regional practices spur regional norms, which are also intersubjective and similarly affect the actors; the regional norms lead to creation of (regional) collective identity (Finnemore, 1996) based on collective knowledge (Wendt, 1999: 159-63).\textsuperscript{19} Norms are ‘shared expectations about appropriate behaviour, held by a community of actors’ (Finnemore, 1996: 22). They are shared and social and by definition concern behaviour. Norms are social rules, not legal, formal rules and their role is in channelling behaviour (practices) (Finnemore, 1996: 28-29). Norms on the region, which the actors themselves have constructed and disseminated (at this point regional contact, interdependence) impose the ‘logic of appropriateness’ into the formulation of the actors’ ideas on the region and are structure-driven (Finnemore, 1996: 30; Kajnč, 2006). If this logic prevails, the level of regionness can rise to regional community, as actors will strengthen the norms cognitively and in regional practices (discourse, actions). As Adler and Crawford (2006: 16) note, “instrumental use of norms and instrumental agreements may in time become the structures within which deeper processes of social communication and the internalisation of values and norms develop.” Social communication’s effect on people’s practices is therefore crucial, as it is “the practical or pragmatic agreement on practicing the same practices – e.g. the rule of law – which in time can lay the basis for conflicting actors to develop reciprocal peaceful dispositions” (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 17). In this case, the regional norms induce practices, so automatically that over time they gain a taken-for-granted status (Tunkin, 1974, Keck and Sikkink, 1998 in Björkdahl, 2002: 160). However, if the actors embark on ‘logic of consequences’, which is agent-driven, the norms will not survive (be reproduced), but will be changed or modified in the purpose of different actors’ utility functions and capabilities (Finnemore, 1996: 30). The level of regionness in this case will most likely not rise (will stagnate or rise occasionally and then fall), according to different logics of actors which prevail. In any case the changed regional social structure influences the capabilities and constraints which the actors have available when acting; new context emerges, in which the actor formulates ideas, interests and practices anew (Doty, 1993; Finnemore, 1996). This process is shown in Figure 1 by red colour and smaller, bold numbers.

\textsuperscript{19} ‘Collective images of social order’ according to Cox and Sinclair (1996: 99) are held by different groups of people, may be several and opposed, however it is them who express the nature and legitimacy to prevailing power relations, the meanings of justice and public good and are put in practice through institutions, which in turn influence the development of ideas.
4. Recent perspective of the regionalisation process in the Mediterranean – Mediterranean as a regional society

Co-operation of the Mediterranean states is generally evaluated as an unsuccessful regionalist or integration project, due to the fact that there is no functioning political or economic mandated regional (pan-Mediterranean) international governmental organisation in place. Moreover, preconditions for a peaceful co-existence in the area still have not been achieved due to the ongoing disputes and armed conflicts in the area, mainly the Palestinian-Israeli. In this (fixed definitional) sense one could hardly speak of the Mediterranean region (in construction even). However, the ideas on regional co-operation (seen in regional initiatives) and regional practices existing in the area (formal and real regional institutions) show the Mediterranean is currently experiencing a regional society level of regionality (see below). I present the ‘recent’ developments of the Mediterranean regionalisation as such due to the time and space in which the EC/EU begin to affect this process, i.e. in the 1960s. After the second World War the advanced stage of regional complex with elements of regional society in the Mediterranean did not start to raise because realisation of domestic actors’ regionalisation ideas were constrained by external actors’ interference and the global system structure.\(^{20}\) The Cold War shifted the Mediterranean importance for external actors from \textit{economically} transport/trade to oil-based (Roucek, 1953: 79-81; Campbell, 1975) and from \textit{geostrategic} military\(^{21}\) to additional ideological\(^{22}\) importance (Vukadinović, 1984; Strpić, 1989).

As decolonisation among Arab states quickly unfolded after the war, one can observe the process of nation- and state-building being a platform for initiating regional co-operation in order to protect their statehood from external powers’ meddling in internal affairs of states and the

\(^{20}\) The general processes that emerged in the international community were all very much present in the Mediterranean. In political terms the area was called ‘\textit{micro-planète}’ (Legrand, 1983: 56); its sates were members of both military alliances (NATO, Warsaw Pact) and also of the Non-aligned movement, they had both capitalist and socialist economic systems (Matić, 1988: 135) and were bordering the remaining European colonial empire.

\(^{21}\) Vukadinović (1984: 19) notes there were 199 USA military bases in the Mediterranean, situated in Turkey, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, France and Morocco (see also Campbell, 1975: 607-8; Roucek, 1953). However, Campbell (1975: 608) points out that other NATO states like France, UK and even Italy were soon divorcing their interest from those of the USA and were not interested in common defence of the Mediterranean.

\(^{22}\) The Soviet Union was financially supporting the Middle East countries and European Mediterranean states’ communist parties (in France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) (Calvocoressi, 1991: 216). The American dollar diplomacy ‘targets’ were Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon; whereby more than half of the money was represented as ‘defence support’ (Aron, 1966: 521). Some states like Yugoslavia, Syria and Egypt (also as United Arab Republic) were profiting from the both sides by ‘unthreatened blackmail’, whereby the former francophone colonial states still maintained close economic ties with France (Aron, 1966: 508-99, 512; Lundestad, 1999: 66).
region’. Tripp (1995) exposes that paradoxically, the League of Arab states was set up as a guarantee for each of the participating state’s sovereignty and independence which could be threatened from within or from outside the region. This shows that to some extent it was not logic of appropriateness but logic of consequences, which spurred (sub)-regional co-operation. Nevertheless, it is important to understand also the historic construction of the ideas on the co-operation in the Mediterranean by Arab and European nations; an initial contradicting dualism of the Arab and the Latin idea. The contradiction smoothened in the break of the 18th and 19th Century due to dynamic expansion of the European influence and subsequent intensification of international contacts in the area, however on expense of predominance of the Latin idea. The latter is reflected in the Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, when the Mediterranean starts to be represented as ‘a system of mutually beneficial exchanges’ (Izzo and Fabre in Moulakis, 2005: 32), creating possibility to think about the Mediterranean as a coherent geographical and economic system, united as the object of European embrace. This idea was directly put in practice in 1910, when International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea (CIESM), seated in Monaco, was formed on the proposal of International Congress of Geography (Ocean Portal, 2003). However, this first realisation of a ‘formal’ region was especially underlined as apolitical. Another practice – the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 is taken “as a symbol of a genuine desire to construct a region – to invent the Mediterranean, whose complementary elements contribute to the enrichment, material and cultural, of all participants” (Moulakis, 2005: 32-33). The experience of contact with the rapidly

23 He claims there existed (and still does) lack of identification of Arab interest when forming League of Arab states; the main states’ preoccupations at the time were a) ensuring a French withdrawal from Syria, b) preventing an establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (which on the other hand was a very strong American foreign policy goal) and c) fearing hegemonic designs of some of the Arab states themselves (Tripp, 1995: 287).

24 Moulakis (2005) presents the contradicting Latin and the traditional Arab ideologies of the Sea and the area. The first, ‘produced’ by Spain, France and Italy, views the Mediterranean as mare nostrum, ‘a whole, unified conceptually, functionally and in terms of historical evocation as part of our world’ (Moulakis, 2005: 15). A critical reaction to the first notion is one of the humanist mediterraneanisms that celebrate complementary variety of a Mediterranean cosmos under the same southern light (ibid.). The Arab traditional ideology is less positive; it sees the Mediterranean Sea as peripheral, small – being only one of the many bays of the ocean – and even dangerous, inimical. The sea as seen in this light does not bind; it separates (Moulakis, 2005: 15-22).

25 At this time, different sciences like geography, botany, geology, meteorology, anthropology, ecology start to contribute to the notion of the Mediterranean ‘region’ by studying it as a coherent unit (Moulakis, 2005: 33). For an overview on the (ideas on the) Mediterranean by diverse scientific disciplines see Horden and Purcell (2002).

26 One of the main concerns at the time of its formation were expressed as: the desire that countries be represented at the governmental level in order to give more weight to the recommendations of scientists, and the need to free the Commission from any political interference. Possibly due to this, CIESM remains one of the first and most enduring scientific intergovernmental organisations in the world (CIESM, 2005).
modernising and industrialising West let the Arab entities in some noteworthy cases to projecting the Mediterranean not as a divider (pointing to big difference in economic development) but as a link, a means of attacking the prospects of once owned social society to the Western vehicles of progress while maintaining a sense of pride and one’s own identity (Moulakis, 2005: 22). The attachment of the Mediterranean to Europe, albeit through colonisation, meant inclusion of the area into the world system of exchange (Ibid.), perception of interdependence, albeit exploitative rather than co-operative and a start of formal regional co-operation. On the other hand, the predominance of the Latin idea brought negative effects for regionalisation of the Mediterranean; especially external forces’ meddling in the ‘regional’ affairs – big non-Mediterranean European states’ (Austrian and Russian empires, United Kingdom) political interventions and economic interests in their strife to maintain the balance of power within the European concert system. This also shaped the context for the regional development (Broomley, 2004).28

During the Cold War it was the Non-aligned movement (NAM) which was very important for the production of new ideas on the Mediterranean favourable to the rise of regionness. Two Mediterranean states – Yugoslavia and Egypt – had a leading role in the movement, and the majority of states in the area opted for NAM. The movement was an example of political unity – a Mediterranean feeling shared by southern European as well as Third World countries in the area motivated by the perception of a cultural and political oppression enforced by the imperialist quarters (West, USA, NATO) (Jackson 1983) and this ‘gave way for a search of a Mediterranean region de-linked from western dominance’ (Aliboni 2000). NAM intensely debated on the Mediterranean affairs within the scope of its political meetings (Žic, 1988: 364); since the beginning of its existence one of NAM’s aims was to turn the Mediterranean into ‘a zone of peace and security’ (Dromnjak, 1984: 1080; Petković, 1984), which the movement managed to get codified also within the UN documents (Žic, 1988: 364).29

27 Authors mainly agree on the heavy weigh of the external political actors’ involvement in the Mediterranean from the 19th Century (Roucek, 1953; Aron, 1966; Campbell, 1975; Calvocoressi, 1991; Knutsen, 1997; Aliboni, 2000).
28 More on the earlier stages of regionalisation in the Mediterranean see in Bojinović (2007).
29 NAM even launched a periodic ministerial conference of the non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean, which met firstly in 1990, but is highly improbable that this imitative would relaunch due to great identity crisis of the NAM after the end of East-West confrontation (Bin, 1997: 61).
States as regionalising actors did produce ideas on raising the *regionnness* to formal region in the field of political co-operation, communicate them and also manage to put them into regional practices, however, the latter sometimes did/do not seem to endure. Therefore, the ideas on regional co-operation are only slowly transformed into norms due to the fact that regional practices do not easily sustain. In 2000, there were 25 Mediterranean states co-operating in CIESM and within three sub-regional IGOs. Over 20 Mediterranean states co-operate in an inter-regional IGO – European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EMPPO), found in 1951 (COW, 2003). At this time one can observe “practically each of the states holding and building an idea of their own state/nation/government, as a messiah of the Mediterranean future – Albania, Israel, Libya, Egypt, France, Yugoslavia, even Malta” (Dromnjak, 1984: 81). The first idea of regional co-operation in various sectors at a multilateral level was put in practice on a ministerial meeting of four central Mediterranean states (Italy, Malta, Libya and Tunisia) already in 1972, although it did not produce concrete achievements (Bin, 1997: 60, Adler and Crawford, 2006: 21). Ideas of two other non-institutionalised forms of political co-operation were proposed. Mediterranean Dialogue 5+5 (initially 4+5), proposed by France in 1983 and realised in 1990, was ‘reserved’ for western Mediterranean states. 5+5 Dialogue was progressively abandoned already after 2 years, however, relaunched by Portugal in 2001 (Bin, 1997; Calleya, 2006). This institution showed positive results of informal communication but also the urgency to develop a preventive security arrangement (*Ibid.*), as the unresolved disputes and conflicts between the Mediterranean states still represent(ed) the main obstacle in inter-governmental relations, especially the Arab-Israeli one (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 29-30; Bromley, 2004). The second idea, Forum of Dialogue and Co-operation in the Mediterranean was proposed by Egypt and France in 1991, and launched in 1994, including 11 Mediterranean states, with no limitations for membership (Calleya, 2006: 113; Selim 1995). Mediterranean states, with no limitations for membership (Calleya, 2006: 113; Selim 1995). Mediterranean

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30 Moulakis (2005) refers to a collection of country studies by Thierry Fabre and Robert Ilbert (*Les représentations de la Méditerranée*) and presents also Turkish, Moroccan, Spanish and Italian Mediterranean.

31 A Maltese proposal of Council of the Mediterranean in 1992, modelled on Council of Europe, advanced into an idea of Stability Pact for the Mediterranean in 1995 did not make it into practice (Bin, 1997; Calleya, 2006). Another idea was the Italian-Spanish idea of Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), launched in 1989/90, but unrealised (Bin, 1997; Gomez, 1998; Joffé, 2001; Calleya 2006). Its aim was ‘to establish a Mediterranean international society by promoting and managing interdependence between Western Europe and the Middle East’, drawing on CSCE’ three baskets of co-operation. The idea failed to materialise because it was to place two very different international regions on the same footing and to institutionalize them in a single framework, while interaction between Europe and the Mediterranean was too weak (Calleya, 2006: 115).

32 Members are Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey, membership criteria are being a Mediterranean state and consensus among the members (Calleya, 2006: 113).
Forum is a rare example of a regional initiative assessed as fully working (Aliboni, 2000), co-operating in the fields of political, economic, social and cultural affairs on the basis of very efficiency-oriented guidelines, practices of preventive diplomacy, continuous dialogue and understanding among each other. Its main asset has proved to be flexibility in achieving consensus on political matters but on expense of ensuring continuity (rotating presidency, no permanent secretariat) and stable financial mechanism for implementation (Calleya, 2006: 113). Nevertheless, the establishment of the forum was at the time being slowed down by the influential (external) actors’ conflicting ideas on the regional practices it should include: Spanish, Italian, Tunisian and Moroccan idea on including a clear mandate in security matters, however Egypt’s stand was the forum to be a technical institution for challenging European aid to the Southern Med nations; the EU’s stress on separate relations with eastern and western Arab world; and the American objection to the formation of any political framework for Mediterranean co-operation excluding the USA (El-Sayed, 1995: 20).

Since inter-governmentalism was/is scarce, it is the non-state actors who have since 1970s taken ‘the lead’, constantly intensifying the local and regional civil society’s co-operation in the Mediterranean affairs. One can observe Mediterranean international and local NGOs, co-operating in networks or independently (Feliu, 2005; Schumacher, 2005), networks of research centres and epistemic communities, local communities and cities (micro-regional co-operation) mainly in the fields of environmental protection and sustainable development, but also in social affairs, cultural dialogue and all types of human rights protection (Šabić and Bojinović, 2007).

During the Cold War, and after, intense presence of external actors in the area continued; some actors changed (e.g. USA replaced Great Britain) and new emerged – IGOs (regional – RGOs and global) and global civil society. Some influential RGOs’ initiatives are EC/EU policies/programs, C/OSCE Mediterranean component (Petković, 1984; Dromnjak, 1984; Žic, 1988; Bin, 1997; Aliboni, 2000; Adler and Crawford, 2006) and NATO Mediterranean dialogue 33 E.g.: Forum of Mediterranean NGOs for Ecology and Sustainable Development, Institut de la Méditerranée, Mediterranean Development Forum, Forêt méditerranéenne, Mediterranean Water Network, Mediterranean Information Office, Inter-Mediterranean Geographical Commission as part of The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, la Conference Permanente des Villes de la Méditerranée. Global NGOs with Mediterranean ‘dimension’ are International Council for Local Environmental Initiative (ICLEI) or Friends of the Earth and their FOE-MedNet programme (Šabić and Bojinović, 2007). Even social and political co-operation was present during Cold War, i.e. Conference of progressive parties and movements in the Mediterranean (Dromnjak, 1984).
Besides RGOs, the role of UN system in Mediterranean environmental and development projects is also of great importance (Dromnjak, 1984; Žic, 1988), although remaining on the level of technical co-operation, unable to produce ‘spill-over’ effects (Haas in Adler and Crawford, 2006: 21).

**Table 2: Mediterranean as a Regional Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Ideas</th>
<th>Examples of Regional Co-operation</th>
<th>Regional Social Structure (Regional Practices, Norms)</th>
<th>Element of Regional Society</th>
<th>↑/↓/↑*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic states</strong></td>
<td>political co-operation, Arab sub-regional co-operation</td>
<td>4+5 dialogue, 4 central Med. states, CSCM (unrealised), League of Arab states</td>
<td><em>Cold War</em>: individual messiahs, conflict-resolution, rule of law, econ. co-operation</td>
<td>multidimensional, anarchical society,</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-institutional (sub-)regional political co-operation economic vs. political mandate</td>
<td>5+5 Dialogue (failed) Council of Med. and Med. Stability pact, (unrealised)</td>
<td>post-<em>Cold War</em>: conflict-resolution, rule of law, norms on Med. as zone of peace and security, no nuclear weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs/ (sub-) RGOs</td>
<td>functional formal inter/(sub) regional co-operation</td>
<td>Mediterranean Forum</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-state, micro-regions</td>
<td>environ. protect., sustain. develop., social affairs, cult. dialogue, human rights protection</td>
<td>Co-operation of NGOs, NGO networks, cities, micro-regions, epistemic communities</td>
<td><em>Cold War and after</em>: norms on environment, human rights, social affairs, cultural dialogue, sustainable development</td>
<td>regional civil society, moving towards transcendence of national space</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External states</strong></td>
<td>ideological and geostrategic competition</td>
<td>alliances, dollar / rubble diplomacy</td>
<td>Region/bilateral alliances with USA/ Soviet Union, military threats</td>
<td>regional complex, outward looking co-operation</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs/ RGOs</td>
<td>political unity, de-linkage from West. dominance, zone of peace and stability</td>
<td>UN umbrella agencies, NAM,</td>
<td>regional promotion within UN, NAM ministerial conferences, norms on Med. as zone of peace and security</td>
<td>‘real’ region, variety of processes of communication and interaction</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-state, micro-regions</td>
<td>mainly security of RGOs and Med.</td>
<td>NATO, C/OSCE, EC/EU</td>
<td>bilateral econ. agreements, parliamentary and security regional dialogue</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regional programs of global NGOs</td>
<td>ICLEI, FOE-MedNet</td>
<td>norms on environmental protection, human rights, sustainable development</td>
<td>regional action of global civil society</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 Adler and Crawford (2006: 7) claim that through the practices of European normative vs. USA material power the bipolarity remains exercised after the end of the Cold War and that this is very much present in the Mediterranean.
Table 2 presents the level of Mediterranean *regionness* in time of Cold War (and after) when the role of the EC as a regionalising actor begins. Generally, the area is developing at the level of regional society by different regionalising actors (non-state, vs. state, domestic vs. external) and content (‘real’ vs. formal region). One identifies frequent implementations of a need of and will for co-operation in the Mediterranean. Domestic states, however, show slow progress in rising the Mediterranean *regionness* (e.g. by formal (sub)-regional functional and informal political co-operation); they are able to produce ideas on regional co-operation and turn them into regional practices (e.g. rule of law, conflict-prevention, free-trade agreements), but are not able to sustain them, let alone transform them into regional norms. The raise of *regionness* during the Cold War and after stands more on the local and regional non-state actors’ initiatives of ‘real’ regionalisation process. Lack of formal political co-operation that produces this stagnation of level of regionality is only exacerbated by continued external actors’ (states, RGOs) penetration in the genuine Mediterranean regionalisation, which contributes to a higher diversity of the ideas, initiating different regional practices. It is clearly visible that two dividing lines are ‘who’ co-operates (geographic participation) and with what ‘mandate’. Regarding the first ‘divider’, one notices centripetal co-operation tendencies on Eastern and Western sides of the basin. Furthermore, the second dividing ‘factor’ are the contents of regionalism; some actors wish for purely economic, others for all-encompassing co-operation, including security-political mandate.

As a result, one observes two opposing extremes which strongly influence development of *regionness*; the first is the fact that the persistent regional disputes and conflicts which remain unresolved by peaceful means prevent development of trust among actors (mainly states) and a possibility of established regional practices to spur regional norms and further actor-behaviour based on logic of appropriateness. These elements still reproduce regional complex. On the other hand, there seems to be at least a few cases of a ‘surplus’ of the elements of regional society pointing already to level of regional community, i.e. a possible norm evolution (Mediterranean as a zone of peace and security, regional environmental protection, regional sustainable development, human rights protection), that were established by the Mediterranean-related activities of NAM, within the UN-umbrella agencies and NGOs’ regional co-operation. Therefore the partial finding of the paper is a current simultaneous growing dichotomy of level of *regionness* in the Mediterranean (developing community vs. reproducing complex).
5. European Community/Union ideas and practices on the Mediterranean

The EC launched its Mediterranean policy already in the 1960s within the idea of developing privileged relations with countries of the Mediterranean basin in practice by a set of bilateral association agreements of a mainly commercial nature (Bin, 1997: 61). In 1972, the EC enhanced and renamed this policy into the so-called Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), which concentrated on financial and technical co-operation, promotion of industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture, again through bilateral agreements (Žic, 1988: 366). At this stage one can understand the role of the EC as another external actor forging relations with individual Mediterranean states. Despite naming the policy ‘Mediterranean’, it only depicted a common name for the countries from the EC economic co-operation area, with no ‘regional’ substance. The Euro-Arab dialogue which was launched after the 1973 oil crises “due to the European fear of the loss of oil supplies” (Campbell, 1975: 611), was the first example of the EC talking to Mediterranean states represented as a group, although a sub-regional one. The idea of the purpose of the Dialogue, however, was not common; this initiative was abandoned due to disagreement between the two parties regarding the content and priorities, clearly pointing that Mediterranean states wanted EC to help them resolve regional conflicts by peaceful means (which is a precondition leading to development of regional society). Ideas on the area were still diversified between the (EU) states of the Mediterranean. But, as Bicchi (in Adler and Crawford, 2006: 21) claims, this was the first time the EC recognised the Mediterranean as ‘a region’ or as Adler and Crawford (2006: 21) interpret ‘a region to be created’. One of the problems with the realisation of EC’s ideas on the Mediterranean at the time was its attention on the European side of the area due to the growing strength of the communist parties of the Southern European states (Campbell, 1975). This shows that the EC still treated the Mediterranean individually and unequally, according to states’ ‘strategic importance’ for the EC,

36 Agreements were signed with Greece, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco in the 1960s, with Malta, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in the 1970s and with Yugoslavia in 1980 (Žic, 1988: 365-66).
37 EC gave priority to economic matters related to energy, but the Arab states pushed for the discussion on the Palestinian problem (Bin, 1997: 60; Adler and Crawford, 2006: 21). However EC did launch Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation (PAEAC) in 1974, trying to promote peace in the Middle East, strengthen political, economic and cultural co-operation between Europe and the Arab world (MEDEA, n. d.).
38 France was the leading regionalising actor, as it was the only EC member with a clear idea of a ‘Mediterranean community with France as its natural leader’. But other member and non-member states did not offer support to put the idea in practice further than discourse; Italy and Spain did not agree with French leadership, Greece and Turkey were sceptical, Israel hostile and the Arab states maintained their reserve (Campbell, 1975: 622-23).
which resulted in ‘an associative patchwork rather than a coherent framework’ (Shlaim in Gomez, 1998: 135). This EU practice did not positively contribute to the regionalisation, as it institutionalised differences between the states of the area. After the Cold War, to extend some of the benefits of the single market project to non-members (Gomez, 1998: 139), the EC launched a ‘Renovated/Redirected Mediterranean Policy’ (RMP), ‘aiming at strengthening regional cooperation of mainly economic nature’ (Joffé, 2001: 34), but the ongoing policy of bilateral trade agreements revealed its weak point, i.e. “lack of a truly multilateral forum in which a sense of collective (Mediterranean) responsibility might emerge” (Aliboni in Bin, 1997: 61).

In this regard the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, also the Barcelona Process), initiated in 1995, seemed a step forward, as it applied new regional practices to achieve the building of stability and enhancement of prosperity through economic integration, political and cultural dialogue and also security without military dimension. However, one security-military related issue, continuing the previously emerging regional norm is mentioned in the Barcelona declaration (1995), under the aim of ‘Establishing a common area of peace and stability’: The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Other Euro-

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39 Differences were seen between the European Greece and Turkey, to whom a carrot of future membership was held, compared to e.g. Morocco and Tunisia, being offered only limited commercial agreements. Israel has been treated even more exceptionally, signing a free-trade agreement in 1975 (Gomez, 1998: 135). The same continued in the EMP, when the EU was unwilling to discuss Israel’s nuclear arsenal, resulting in a strong feeling among the Arabs that the EU is treating it preferentially, not extending this to Arabs (El-Sayed, 1999: 155).

40 Nevertheless, one of the achievements was a convergence of the EC member states’ and EC institutions’ perceptions about the Mediterranean ‘region’ as a foreign policy priority (Gomez, 1998: 140). This may have been attained mainly due to the growing negative perception of the migration from the Mediterranean ‘reservoir’, which in the 1950s and 60s seemed appreciated for purposes of faster industrial development of north-west Europe, however, in the 1980s became a source of insecurity when the migration frontier shifted along the coast of southeastern Mediterranean, perceiving the area as ‘Europe’s Rio Grande’ (King, 1998: 125-29).

41 Initially, EMP’s agreements were to include only Maghreb countries, but were then extended to Mashreq states (Gomez, 1998: 143). The Balkan Mediterranean states remained out of EMP. Slovenia and Croatia, as two of them, were striving very hard to gain the status of a partner state, however, the latter was ‘reserved for’ the Southern Mediterranean states. In the end, Slovenia after heavy lobbying observed the Barcelona conference as a guest on behalf of the convenor – the Spanish government (as Albania, Russia, USA, Switzerland, Vatican, Norway, Monaco and Central-Eastern European States with EU association agreements). The Croatian government did not succeed to get an invitation and protested against this decision, but unsuccessfully (Geršak, 2006). EMP excludes former Yugoslavia and Albania for political and historical reasons (see Pace, 2006b: 103).

42 Due to the inter-state regional conflicts and ‘potential spill in from the neighbouring countries’ (King, 1998: 118) (especially in terms of security) many researchers take as the object of analysis the Middle East, being a more ‘real’ regional complex than the Mediterranean (e.g. Aarts, 1999; Bilgin, 1998; Bromley, 2004; Cantori and Spiegel, 1970; Coskun, 2006; Fawcett, 2005; Lemke, 2002; Lindholm Schulz and Schulz, 2005; Tripp, 1995). This is also very obvious in practice; USA started quite a few ‘regional’ co-operation initiatives after 1990, like Middle East
Mediterranean conferences conclusions do not mention this idea being put into practice. EMP to some extent drew from the idea of CSCM, modelled on the CSCE’s three baskets, especially the co-operative security scheme (Aliboni 1999), and the inclusion of the ‘cultural’ basket, which was to break down the barriers between the cultures of the Mediterranean and promote a dialogue between civilizations (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 20, 26). A set of regional practices to realise this political-economic-cultural co-operation idea was also CSCE-inspired (‘code of peace’, soft security practices). Complementary to those, the ‘second’ basket aim (to achieve an ‘area of shared prosperity’) includes some new regional practices – genuine for European integration process, i.e. starting from free trade areas to create common economic spaces and spill-over to other fields of co-operation (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 25).

Additionally, social communication within the EMP includes a new regional practice, i.e. institutionalization and codification of multilateral co-operation, namely the Euro-Mediterranean conferences, multilateral documents like Barcelona Declaration, Charter for Peace and Stability, Guided Principles of the Dialogue of Cultures and Civilizations, agreed upon on intergovernmental level by the EU and all the partner states. Multilateralism enables an idea (a possibility) of Mediterranean partners representing a unified group, their common ideas, common values and even norms, but the idea for Mediterranean to co-operate is externally imposed – in the context of communication with the EU (see below). Principle of regionality is inherent in the Barcelona Process, but a complementary element, aiming at promotion of intra-regional trade and sub-regional co-operation in the south at best (del Sarto and Schumacher 2005). Adler and Crawford (2006) interpret EMP as a region-building approach; however, it is the Euro-Mediterranean region which is being build and not a Mediterranean one. Within this Euro-Med focus, the idea of the Mediterranean states as a unified group is also put in practice

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44 These are principles that set the normative guidelines around which the prospective region is supposed to be constituted, including: respect for international law and human rights, non-intervention, respect for territorial integrity of the states and settlement of disputes by peaceful means (Barcelona declaration, 1995). Soft security practices include: partnership building measures, enhanced political dialogue, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 25).
through EU’s discourse, referring to the group as the ‘Other’ in contrast to ‘Self’. This understanding of the Mediterranean is quite criticised, because it ‘simplifies Mediterranean reality’ regarding the area as a ‘fixed-taken-for-granted entity’ just in order to make it manageable by the EU’s foreign policy (Pace, 2006b). The simplification is seen in treating the area as it already was a region, but excluding from it the Mediterranean EU member states, actually treating the Mediterranean only in terms of ‘Southern partners’, while totally excluding the Balkan Mediterranean states. The focus is therefore not on the regionalisation of the Mediterranean area, but on the EU herself, how the EU will manage its neighbouring area in order to continue being the EU – the process of becoming a regional institutional polity. The Mediterranean is important for Europe as one external space in the practice of forging a European Self, having the area as a tool not as a purpose (Pace, 2006b). An instrumental use of the Mediterranean is especially exposed in security terms (see below). Adler and Crawford (2006: 20) illustrate that the EU is saying “Take this money, the norms and the practices, go create your own region, and thus give us your stability” (emphasis added); I believe this is what EU could be doing but is not. Within the EMP one sees more of what Pace (2006a) calls ‘normative regionalism’; external projection of EC/EU regionalism model to ‘Southern partners’, not letting the Mediterranean ‘create its own region’.

The first problem deriving from this fixed perception of the Mediterranean is rooted in the dual state of development of Mediterranean regionality. The EU is deepening this dichotomy by firstly, building a different – Euro-Mediterranean (inter)-region and secondly, Euro-Med is again simultaneously being built at two different levels. The aim of the EMP is to construct on one hand, a ‘Euro-Med common space’, meaning the first level of regionness of Euro-Med ‘region’, and on the other hand, ‘a Euro-Med security community’ (regional community), since the EU claims the building rests on the basis of already existing or ‘presumably shared’ ‘common values and norms’ (Pace, 2006a: 6, 2006b; del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 23). This is especially problematic since the EU herself admits allegedly ‘shared values and norms’ refers to her own member states’ set of norms, not the ones distinctive for the Mediterranean nor Euro-Med (del

45 This understanding is even further simplified in a perception that practically all partners treat EMP as an EU discursive practice of its relation with its Arab partners, even the ‘Southern partners’ themselves (Pace, 2006b).
46 Calleya (2005: 42) evaluates that the shifts in patterns of relations taking place in the Mediterranean during the last five years forced the EU constantly to focus its attention on sub-regional relation in the area.
Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 23-24). In this respect Adler and Crawford (2006: 19) see the EMP as a laboratory, providing for an experiment in international relations; the EMP is interpreted as an exercise in soft power projection\textsuperscript{47} to deal with soft security issues (Joffif\textsuperscript{e} 2001). The EU’s region-building experimentation, in my view, is multi-level; the EU herself is in the process of becoming an institutionalised regional polity, the Mediterranean is building elements of regional community, however, has not yet completed regional complex nor society, and at this stage, the EU is already building a Euro-Mediterranean ‘something’ at different levels (inter-regional space and/or community) at the same time! The Mediterranean during the Cold War with the NAM activities, UN agencies functional and non-state actors’ co-operation has started to show only the first predispositions for capability of developing a regional identity (as an element of regional community) and acting as a unified actor. But the EU is imposing on it a need to act as if it already existed as a coherent region with actorness capacity. This dichotomy reproduces the Mediterranean inability or even legitimate unwillingness to develop regionness level by level and has been present from the very beginning of the EC’s communication with the Mediterranean, when EC detached herself from helping the area firstly to establish regional society, i.e. resolve ‘regional’ conflicts\textsuperscript{48}.

Secondly, additional strong dichotomy which negatively affects the initiated regional practices to sustain and spur regional norms is present within the EU’s conflicting discourses on the Mediterranean ‘as a unified actor’ (Malmvig 2004). On one hand, the EU performs a co-operative security discourse, articulating partnership based on equality and respect, regarding the Mediterranean as an ‘equal Other’. The opposite discourse is ‘security through liberal reforms’, where the Mediterranean is defined as a troubled and unstable space, due to the political and economic systems of its states, therefore representing security challenges to the EU; the area in this discourse is also ‘Other’, but a radical and inferior ‘Other’ (\textit{Ibid.}). Within the EMP neither of the discourses is hegemonic, but within the ENP, Malmvig (2004: 20) finds more elements of the ‘liberal reform discourse’. Pace (2006a: 6-9) similarly sees the same intensification of ‘liberal

\textsuperscript{47} On normative/civilizing/soft power Europe, see e.g. Adler and Crawford (2006), Bicchi (2006), Hettne and Söderbaum (2005), Pace (2006a, 2006b).

\textsuperscript{48} This detachment from conflict resolution is reflected within the Euro-Arab dialogue, and the EMP’s exclusion from the Middle East Peace Process, which was in both cases acts as insufficient and unsuitable (El-Sayed 1999; Aliboni, 2005: 2), a stumbling block on the road to build area of peace and stability (Aliboni, 1999: 140). As the EU has realised in its documents in 2004, it is clear that it will not be possible to create a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress unless the regional conflicts are settled (del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 24).
democracy as the standard of legitimacy’ within the ENP, although packed within normative power projection through presumably ‘common values and interests’. The EU in its discourse openly admits ENP shift from ‘values and norms’ to ‘common interests’ (again common to EU member states), i.e. seeking to establish a cushion of new neighbours after the 2004 enlargement. This ‘buffering logic’ ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ clearly defines the peripheral role of the Mediterranean, defined by the EU (in this case the centre) (del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005). However, the ‘shared values and norms’ (EU-Med shared) discourse is still present.\textsuperscript{49} Hence, the norms and principles are not goals and values by themselves but rather used in order to achieve the common (EU) interest – influence and stabilisation of the neighbourhood (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005: 7).\textsuperscript{50} Additionally, the norms are EU ‘owned’ but through discourse of being ‘common and shared’ by the ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ are imposed as Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU defines the Mediterranean; constructs it through a continuous process of policy-making, and as an effect does not allow for the indigenous regional dynamic to develop (Pace, 2006b).

Simultaneously as defining, the EU also deconstructs the idea of the Mediterranean as a unified region when institutionally, as a ‘partner’ it treats individual Southern Mediterranean states and not the Mediterranean area. This EU practice, which Pace (2006a) calls normative bilateralism is especially present within the newly formed ENP and its instruments – jointly agreed Action plans. Bilateralism is restored due to the EU’s need to cope with socio-economic instability of the Mediterranean, which EMP failed to achieve. Again the focus is on the EU and not on the Mediterranean; social construction of the Mediterranean is shaped by the EU’s own security concerns (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005: 8).

Importantly, the ‘Southern Mediterranean partners’ (states) respond to the presented turnabouts and inconsistencies of the EC/EU ideas and practices on the Mediterranean. The Arab states are ambiguous partners due to their strong misgivings about the EMP’s impact on their economies and the structure of Peace Process in Middle East. They understood their joining to the EMP as almost ‘a compulsory option’, driven by fear that their economic interests will be jeopardised

\textsuperscript{49} Along this line goes the aim of creating a ‘ring of friends’, not pursuing membership in the EU yet at the same time begin to share norms and values of the EU (emphasis added) (Prodi in Johansson-Nogués, 2004: 243).

\textsuperscript{50} Also, due to EU actorness shifting from one level/context to another, depending on resource situation and political climate within the EU, the partnership can shift from association to integration (and back) (Pace, 2006b).
should they not participate. The partners’ never appreciated being put into a group of ‘Southern Mediterranean states’ as some are real or potential rivals or foes, and have very different relations with the EU.\footnote{This especially applies to Israel (del Sarto and Tovias in del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 29).} Similarly, additional fears that the bilateral practices of the EU would hamper Arab horizontal co-operation (especially prospects for establishing an Arab free-trade area) have made the EMP participating Arab governments in addition to Libya and Mauritania institutionalise a system of regular consultations to benefit from the EMP experience in promoting inter-Arab economic co-operation (El-Sayed, 1999: 149). However, this is clearly an externally ‘motivated’ regional practice; a response to EU-Med initiated regional practices.

Restored bilateralism (within the ENP) hampers also indigenous civil society regional initiatives, since it is not included in the agreements reached with the governments. Civil society in social and cultural dialogue are one of the ‘new’ actors the EU has involved in the EMP and the ENP (Schumacher 2005). Besides the multilateral state-related programmes\footnote{E.g. MEDA Regulation and MEDA II financial instruments, EMWIS (Euro-Mediterranean Information System on the Know-How in the Water Sector), EUMEDIS (science and technology co-operation), SMAP (Short and Medium-term Priority Environmental Action Programme), Euro-Mediterranean Forum or Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue (Šabić and Bojinović, 2007).} EU financially supports or co-founds also transnational NGOs, research think tanks and micro-regional co-operation (Jünemann 2002).\footnote{EU programmes dealing with human rights: MEDA Democracy, youth exchange programmes (EMYP – Euro-Med Platform), Euro-Med Heritage Programme – EMHP, Euro-Med Audiovisual Programme – EMAP; transnational NGOs: EMHRN – Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, EMHRF – Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders and Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (EuroMed Foundation); research think tanks: FEMISE – Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts Économiques, MEDEA – Institut Européen de Recherche sur la Coopération Méditerranéenne et EuroArabe), EuroMeSCo – Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission; micro-regional co-operation (Coopération Métropoles Méditerranée within the INTERREG III programme) (Šabić and Bojinović, 2007).} This bottom-up approach of democratisation by promotion of thick web of communication between mixed-actor coalitions,\footnote{The term is taken after (Söderbaum 2004) who finds similar cases of ‘regionalising actors’, ‘seldom acting in autonomous and distinct spheres’, in the area of South Africa.} has been criticised for reasons of ambiguity (Schumacher 2005), maladministration (Jünemann 2002) and for being planned only to blur the EU borders in its periphery (del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 26). It is plausible to presume that the EU-founded mixed-actor coalitions influence positively the formation of democratisation and human rights-related regional practices of Mediterranean civil society; however imposed under the conditions of the EU ideas on the region. This again contributes to a multitude of different ideas on the area, preventing the regional practices to be embedded in common knowledge and
It seems to go along the EU project of managing the Mediterranean ‘region’, by building a Euro-Mediterranean community when the Mediterranean regional society has not yet been formed. The findings on the influence of EU ideas and practices are presented in Table 3.

**Table 3: Role of the EC/EU ideas and practices on the Mediterranean regional social structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EC/EU</th>
<th>EU ideas on the Mediterranean</th>
<th>EU (foreign policy) practices</th>
<th>Regional social structure (regional practices, norms)</th>
<th>Level of regionness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean policy: 1960s GMP: 1970s, 1980s</td>
<td>developing privileged relations with states attention on the European Med. states Diversity among the EC member states’ ideas</td>
<td>bilateral agreements of economic nature, individual state treatment, according to strategic importance for EC</td>
<td>economic co-operation (but bilateral)</td>
<td>regional complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Arab dialogue, 1973-, 1974</td>
<td>to assure strategic oil supplies for European states (Latin idea) recognising the Med. as a region (to be created)</td>
<td>mainly economic (energy-related) dialogue, excluding Middle East conflict-resolution</td>
<td>state-level economic dialogue, parliamentary Euro-Arab co-operation (PAEAC), political, economic, cultural dialogue</td>
<td>regional complex, regional society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP: 1989/90</td>
<td>extending some of the benefits of the EC single market project</td>
<td>bilateral trade agreements</td>
<td>trade co-operation (but bilateral)</td>
<td>regional complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP, 1995– ENP, 2004–</td>
<td><strong>A:</strong> initially dividing Maghreb and Mashreq, excluding the Balkans vs. <strong>B:</strong> Mediterranean as a region - Med. as a partner vs. - Med. as inferior/ radical/ peripheral ‘Other’ vs. <strong>C:</strong> building a Euro-Mediterranean region - Euro-Med. regional space/community</td>
<td>financing state-level, sub- and micro-regional programmes normative regionalism vs. normative bilateralism co-founding and financing civil society regional actors</td>
<td>code of peace, soft security practices, Middle East as a weapon-free zone (discursive practice, only in Barcelona declaration), free trade area – in view common economic space, social and cultural co-operation including civil society actors, EU-Med conferences, parliamentary co-operation, EMP participating Arab states regular consultations, invoking common values and norms</td>
<td>regional society (inter-) regional space (inter-) regional community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Conclusion

The Mediterranean in 1960s was a regional complex with rudimental elements of regional society, which during the Cold War strengthened, especially by initiatives and co-operation of non-state and global actors (NGOs, UN system, NAM) and pointed to first elements of developing regional community. The basis of the latter was a developing norm, namely the Mediterranean as a zone of peace and security and an idea of the Western Europe being the economic vehicle of progress for the Southern Mediterranean either by economic or other non-political functional cooperation. Nevertheless, remaining regional conflicts being unresolved by peaceful means prevented (and still do) even firm establishment of the regional society and its possible raise. Although the EC/EU launched many forms of social communication and co-operation with Mediterranean actors, it failed to address the problem of peace being the first precondition for further Mediterranean regionalism. Instead, the EC/EU formed its policies on a false presumption that by creating economic, social, cultural and political co-operation it will manage the restless neighbouring area, without directly providing for (a regional framework of) conflict-resolution. The EC already in the Euro-Arab dialogue and later in the EMP clearly detached its direct role from the Arab-Israeli conflict-resolution, although the Mediterranean as a zone of peace and security was the only issue in the end of the Cold War, representing a possible regional norm evolution on the political field. Barcelona declaration mentions the Middle East as a similar weapon-free zone, however does not pursue the idea directly in regional practices. The economic co-operation that the Southern ‘partners’ in the recent EU-Mediterranean policies are engaged in are similarly ineffective, offering coercive ‘invitations’ to co-operation and have resulted even in EU-defensive sub-regional practices.

The main presupposition of the paper concerned a fixed perception of the Mediterranean held by the EC/EU and could be contextualised by asking *Who needs regional co-operation as a road to peace in the Mediterranean?* The paper claimed and proved that the EC/EU inappropriately shaped all its policies on the bases of ‘we (EC/EU) in order to feel secure’ answer (reproducing the colonialist Latin idea) rather than ‘the Mediterranean domestic actors in order to have a possibility for the regionalisation and/or regionalism under conditions they desire / or not’. The EC/EU implemented/-s practices based on the former perception of the Mediterranean, and even
though its policies did launch some OSCE and EU integration-inspired Mediterranean regional practices, the latter are not based on the same common knowledge (common ideas and values) and therefore do not spur regional norms. The negative effects of the EC/EU ideas and practices on Mediterranean social structure and therefore also regionalisation process, are:

a) constant alternating between bilateralism, sub-regionalism and ‘holism’; the second meaning division to Maghreb, Mashreq and Balkans, the third treatment of the Mediterranean as it already was a unified actor, when the EU herself is only in the process of becoming one,

b) building a new region – a Euro-Mediterranean region simultaneously from two starting points (regional space and regional community). The EU should not be imposing a regionalist project on the Mediterranean area, which is still unable to imagine or at least agree on and practice its own regionalist project,

c) instrumentally taking ideas on the Mediterranean regional political co-operation, which have already been assessed by Mediterranean states as inappropriate (e.g. CSCM),

d) as a normative power external actor by imposition of its own norms on the Mediterranean the EU reproduces the logic of consequences and aggravates domestic actors’ ability to produce their own ideas, regional practices and norms, practice the logic of appropriateness and possibly raise the Mediterranean regionness.

Nevertheless, the EU-Mediterranean regional framework has constructed some regional practices which contribute to the development of the Mediterranean regionalisation and are to be kept also as elements of the EU policies. One is a stimulation of (sub-)regional economic co-operation, which has always been anticipated by the Mediterranean states; from the beginning of its meddling in the area (Western) Europe was perceived as possible vehicle of progress and development. Another positive example are mixed-actor coalitions, which are welcome as they enable strengthening of the Mediterranean civil society, however, need to be revised in order to remain offered non-instrumentally.
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