
Background

Formed in April 1970, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) has attempted to offer a radical centrist approach to politics. As a bi-confessional party, attracting cross community support Alliance has offered an antidote to the unionist-nationalist, two community approach to Northern Ireland politics. However, Alliance has attracted scant academic attention, despite its position as the only party capable of attracting substantial support from Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland from 1970 to 2001. Only one academic article analysing the party was published during the first 28 years of its existence.¹ The APNI claims to be neither unionist nor nationalist, nor a ‘halfway house’ between the two, but instead seeks to ‘represent the whole community’.² The party has always advocated devolved power sharing as the most appropriate political approach and has promoted the development of a common Northern Irishness as the ideal in terms of identity. According to some survey evidence, 30% of Northern Ireland’s population do not describe themselves as unionist or nationalist.³ As such, Alliance ought to have been pursuing fertile rather than ‘mythical’ centre ground.⁴ However, the party has struggled to develop electoral support.

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement has posed new questions for Alliance. The party’s electoral support has been in irregular but steady decline since 1977, when the party’s vote peaked at 14.4%. The party has averaged 7.6% of the vote in elections since 1970, but has not attained this level of support since 1993. As supporters of
devolution, the party supported the Good Friday Agreement. The membership survey conducted for this project found that 94% of its members voted in favour of the Agreement in the May 1998 referendum; 90% of members would have voted likewise at the time of the survey in 2000-01. However, the new moderation of the agenda of other parties has begged the question, whither Alliance? All the major parties in Northern Ireland now support devolution with power sharing and an Irish dimension (the Democratic Unionist Party insists merely that it would ‘renegotiate the Good Friday Agreement). With these parties camping on Alliance’s centre ground, Alliance has been obliged to rethink its political appeal. Under a consociational system based upon accommodation of ethnic bloc elites and communal autonomy, Alliance’s vision of cross-community, non-unionist, non-nationalist politics, appears to have been overtaken by a alternative form of devolved power-sharing emphasising the legitimacy of cultural and political differences. Alliance favours a ‘milder form of consociationalism’, based upon structures emphasising inter-communal reconciliation and cooperation, with greater incentives for party moderation.\(^5\)

The research hypothesis was based upon establishing whether Alliance could position itself as a viable third pillar within a dual ethnic bloc, consociational party system, post-Good Friday Agreement. Academic literature on the impact of consociational systems has suggested that ‘all parties become more or less parties of the middle’.\(^6\) It has been suggested that traditional centre parties thus lose votes and any pivotal role a centre party may have enjoyed disappears.\(^7\) To describe Alliance as a pivotal party would be to exaggerate its role. Nonetheless, the party possessed ideological importance as a centrist organisation rejecting the traditional discourse of Northern Ireland politics. Furthermore, the party has political importance, most recently
through representation in the Northern Ireland Assembly, holding 6 seats. However, the importance of this representation has been diminished by Alliance’s failure to secure Executive representation and through what the party views as the reductionism of an ethnic bloc system which requires Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) to self-designate as unionist, nationalist, or ‘other’. Under parallel voting rules, ‘other’ votes may be worth less, in that although overall Assembly majorities for decisions are required, it is the parallel majorities (unionist and nationalist) for key decisions that are greater importance. Alliance MLAs designated themselves as ‘Other’, but three redesignated as unionist in November 2001 to ensure the re-election of the UUP’s David Trimble as First Minister and to protect the Good Friday Agreement. In this respect, the party was indeed pivotal, but could not remain as such without (temporarily at least) compromising its ideological integrity.

The research hypothesis concerned whether Alliance could reconstitute itself as a viable, radical centrist alternative to unionist and nationalist bloc parties within this new political framework and to examine the extent to which the vision and ideas of the party’s members were in accord with those of the party’s leadership. In order to ascertain this, it was necessary to assess various issues; the perception of party members as to the ideological and electoral proximity of their party in relation to others; the views of leaders and led concerning future visions; tactical imperatives confronting the party and the extent of inter-party cohesion.
Objectives

The overarching aim of the research project was to establish whether the views of Alliance Party members amounted to a radical third tradition in Northern Ireland, or whether, alternatively, third traditions existed; unionist leaning; centrist, or nationalist-leaning, arising from internal tensions within Northern Ireland’s political centre. Within this overall aim, there were several objectives:

To provide the first ever dataset on the composition and attitudes of the membership of the Alliance Party.

*Achieved in full. Dataset from postal questionnaire (702 replies; 67.6% response rate from the 1,038 members) lodged with the ESRC UK Data Archive in August 2001.*

To assess the extent to which the main centre party in Northern Ireland constitutes a homogeneous entity.

*Achieved in full. Significant differences were found among party members according to religion on lower preference vote transfers; redesignation of the party as unionist and national identity. Other internal differences – not religion based – were found on views of unionism and nationalism. See results for details.*

To analyse the extent to which the Alliance Party offers a distinctive third tradition of its own

*Achieved in full. Recent events, notably the redesignation of some Alliance MLAs as Unionist, has meant that Alliance has altered its perception of its role within the Northern Ireland polity, following the realignment of political forces under the Good Friday Agreement. See results for details.*
To explore the views of the Alliance Party membership as to the most appropriate form of power-sharing political settlement in Northern Ireland.

Achieved in full. Alliance members remain overwhelmingly supportive of the devolved power sharing of the Good Friday Agreement, although some harbour reservations concerning the rigidity of the parallel consent voting requirements in the Northern Ireland Assembly. See results for details.

Methods

The main feature of the research was the deployment of a postal questionnaire survey, sent to all 1,038 Alliance Party members during 2000-01. A copy of the questionnaire and all results has been registered at the ESRC UK Data Archive, creating the first ever dataset on the Alliance Party (reference: SN: 4406). 702 replies were received from members, amounting to a 67.6% response rate. The survey was constructed after discussions with the Alliance party executive concerning content and meetings with the party project facilitator, Dr Stephen Farry. The questionnaire contained 79 closed response questions, yielding demographic and attitudinal profiles of the party. The quantitative study was complemented by semi-structured interviews conducted with 22 Alliance Party members in a range of geographical locations in Northern Ireland, conducted in summer and Autumn 2001. These interviews were conducted with a range of individuals, ranging from the party leader, David Ford, to grassroots members. The interviews explored in greater depth the themes developed in the questionnaire, concentrating in particular upon the future role for Northern Ireland’s established centre party. The research project also used a party documentation search
in the Northern Ireland Political Collection, concentrating upon original party statements in 1970; submissions to the multi-party negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent party publications.

The project wished to test where Alliance members stood in relation to members of the two main political parties – the UUP and SDLP – in relation to a series of key issues. Firstly, it was necessary to examine the basis of difference – social or ideological – between Alliance members on the key question of whether Alliance could redesignate as a unionist party if necessary, for the ‘greater good’ of saving the Good Friday Agreement. Secondly, do the views of Alliance members constitute a different, radical vision, or could Alliance be accommodated comfortably within a new centre created by all 3 parties? Furthermore, did the views of Alliance members lean towards those of the UUP or to the SDLP? Datasets on UUC and SDLP members (see results for details) were pooled to answer these questions. A binomial logistic regression was used to examine the explanatory variables within Alliance membership; a multinomial logistic regression was used for pooled data (please see below). This was discovered through use of a multinomial logistic regression of pooled data, also utilising a recent (2000) membership survey of Ulster Unionist Council and a recent (1999) membership survey of the SDLP, also undertaken by the author (ESRC R000222668, New Nationalism in Northern Ireland). This contrasted the views of UUC members with pro- and anti- redesignation subgroups within Alliance, before exploring the relative positions of Alliance, UUC and SDLP members on a series of issues.
A series of common questions were deployed for the construction of ‘unionist-nationalist’ dimensions. These were attitudes to a united Ireland; joint sovereignty; policing reform; republican violence; IRA decommissioning; prisoner releases and Orange Order marches.

**Results**

*Radical centrist force, or latent unionist (and Protestant) party?*

In assessing the role of Alliance as a central pillar within unionist-nationalist bloc politics, the research attempted to analyse the distinctiveness of the party, its members and electoral appeal. The party has pitched its appeal as being untainted by unionism and nationalism. As the party declares, its vision is non-territorial and ‘radically different from that offered by nationalists on both sides’.\(^8\) Alliance describes itself as a ‘liberal, pluralist, non-ethnic party, rather than a collection of soft Unionists and soft Nationalists co-habiting together in an uneasy coalition’.\(^9\) Party members overwhelmingly (93.5%) see Alliance as a centre party. The party’s achievement in attracting support from Protestants and Catholics is unique, in that it is unmatched by any party during the part three decades. However, over one-quarter (27.1%) regard Alliance as a unionist party; fewer than 3% think the party is nationalist. The party has always supported the retention of Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom, initially because it saw the UK as a better guarantor of the social and economic rights of the citizens of Northern Ireland than the Irish Republic. This unionist constitutional position has inhibited support from Catholics; fewer than one in five Alliance Party members are Catholic. The idea of Alliance as a ‘radical’ centre
party divides party members. One third think their party is indeed radical; slightly more (35.9%) disagree.

*Third pillar or potential redesignator?*

The criticism of Alliance as essentially a unionist party has important implications for its location as a radical third pillar. Several interviewees criticised the drift towards support for pro-Good Friday Agreement unionism, as a move away from the radical party critique of unionist and nationalist politics. In the Westminster elections of 2001, Alliance stood aside in several constituencies to allow pro-GFA unionists to maximise support. In North Down, for example, the withdrawal of Alliance meant the transfer of many of its 7,500 votes in the 1997 election to the pro-GFA UUP candidate, allowing her to take the seat, from the anti-GFA UKUP incumbent. In November 2002, the redesignation of 3 Alliance MLAs ensured the re-election of the UUP’s David Trimble as First Minister, even though the Alliance party leader, when interviewed for this project, had insisted that ‘if an Agreement requires me to lie, it is an Agreement not worth saving’. The APNI organiser, Stephen Farry, said that ‘Hell would freeze over’ before Alliance MLAs redesignated as unionist.\(^\text{10}\) Other members believed that redesignation was justified to save the Agreement.\(^\text{11}\) Overall however, only one-third of members were prepared to support redesignation of the party as unionist to save the Good Friday Agreement. Opposition to redesignation was particularly strong among Catholics. Clearly redesignation may have a further deterrent effect upon potential Catholic members and a negative effect upon existing members.
In attempting to discover the basis of opposition to redesignation, two items were hypothesised: social and ideological. The principal social category was Catholicism, on the basis that Catholics would be most likely to be affronted to any movement (even temporary) by Alliance into a Unionist bloc. The other main social category hypothesised was those in the higher socio-economic strata, most strident in their disavowal of sectarian politics. In ideological terms, those expected to be most hostile to redesignation of Alliance as Unionist would be those members with the least affinity to the constitutional principles of unionism. The project also wished to test whether members of Alliance hostile to electoral pacts were also hostile to redesignation. A binomial logistic regression was used to contrast those potentially accepting redesignation with those who rejected the idea under any circumstances.

The project found that religious affiliation was the only significant social predictor of whether an Alliance member was pro- or anti- redesignation of the party into the Unionist bloc. The Catholic section of Alliance was less happy with the idea of redesignation. Clearly, if this section of the party were to leave as a consequence, it would further undermine the claim of Alliance to uniqueness as a cross-community party. Those members hostile to electoral pacts were also significantly more likely to oppose the redesignation of Alliance, irrespective of religion. Overall, opposition to electoral pacts was not as extensive as hostility to redesignation of Alliance, but, at 50.8%, such opponents still formed a majority of party members. Deployment of the Nationalist-Unionist dimension found that the further towards the Unionist end of the dimension an Alliance member was placed, the more likely that the member would support redesignation. The research suggests the existence of a segment of Alliance members who are, in effect, neo-unionists. They share similar views on constitutional
positions and approaches to devolved power-sharing as the pro-GFA wing of the
UUC. The hypothesis that economic position was important in indicating attitudes to
redesignation was scarcely upheld however, barely attaining significance (p = .08).
Younger members of Alliance are most opposed to redesignation, displaying greater
commitment to the radical vision. It is this group that may have greater difficulty with
Alliance’s original belief in latent unionism, reflected in the leadership’s initial view
that the British government was the most appropriate guarantor of social and
economic rights.

Overall, the research project found that Alliance members are indeed more unionist
than nationalist in respect of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. Almost half
(48.6%) believe that the best solution is the retention of Northern Ireland within the
United Kingdom, with only 15.7% dissenting. Only 18.4% of party members support
joint British-Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland (58.9% oppose) and fewer than
one in ten (8.6%) support a united Ireland (59.9% oppose). However, on several non-
constitutional issues, the attitudes of party members lie closer to those of the
nationalist SDLP than the Ulster Unionist Party. Here, differences between pro- and
anti-redesignation Alliance members are minimal. Any redesignation of Alliance as
Unionist would not be matched by ideological proximity. The distance between the
Alliance and SDLP memberships is significantly less than that between Alliance and
the UUC. This is true of several aspects of the ‘micro-agenda’ of the GFA. Alliance
members are closer to those of the SDLP on issues such as the early release of
prisoners; opposition to Orange Order marches in nationalist areas; the Patten reforms
of policing in supporting Sinn Fein’s presence in government, irrespective of whether
the IRA decommissions its weapons.
Internal sectarian division

The difficulties for Alliance in promoting itself as a non-sectarian centrist party may be compounded by the existence of internal differences in attitude according to religion, in addition to the distinctions in attitudes to redesignation noted above. Perhaps predictably, such divisions are apparent between Catholics (anti) and Protestants (pro) over whether abortion should be legalised in Northern Ireland. There are statistically significant differences between Protestant and Catholics within the party on, in particular, support for changes to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)) and in respect of lower preference vote transfers. Catholics are much more supportive of full implementation of the Patten Commission report on policing than Protestants. Catholics and Protestants within Alliance state they are unlikely to record lower preference vote transfers to Sinn Fein, but Protestants are significantly less likely. Catholics and Protestants are likely to vote transfer to the SDLP (a scalar model of likelihood was used) but Catholics are more likely to transfer in this direction. Overall, the UUP and SDLP, as might be expected, are by some distance the leading recipients of the main parties of potential Alliance Party member vote transfers, although the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition performs equally well.

Differences according to religion are also evident in the divergent national identities held by Alliance members. Catholics are more likely to use the labels Irish or Northern Irish; Protestants are much more likely to use the label ‘British’. The party leadership claims that ‘only Alliance supporters more strongly associate with a
The concept of Northern Irishness ahead of Britishness or Irishness. however, this is untrue of party members, British forming the largest single category of identity (28.9%) although Northern Irish (22.9%) and British-Irish (26.9) were nearly as common. That almost half of Alliance members did not associate with an exclusive national identity, in rejecting the labels British or Irish, suggests that a pluralistic or hybrid form of identity is important to party members. Certainly the diversity of national identities contrasts to the near unanimity in unionist or nationalist parties surveyed (UUC members overwhelmingly identified themselves as British; SDLP members as Irish).

The extent of sectarian division should not be overstated. The project did not find an independent effect of religion upon constitutional preferences, nor were there discernible differences on most issues arising from the Good Friday Agreement. Nonetheless, in terms of the Alliance promotion of radicalism, based upon the construction of a novel ‘Northern Irish’ identity, internal party differences are problematic. Furthermore, differences over vote transfers indicate according to religions indicate the difficulty in promoting Alliance as a distinctive party devoid of unionist or nationalist tendencies. For some Catholics, there is a tendency to see nationalist parties as more likely repositories of support than their Protestant colleague within Alliance. Whilst this does not necessarily compromise the attempt of the APNI leadership to promote the party as a ‘separate’ centre party, internal division according to religion offers a caveat.
Electoral demise

As noted above, Alliance’s electoral support has been in steady decline. The party attracts votes from Protestants and Catholics, but the 10-12% of the Protestant vote the party attracted in the mid-1990s has fallen. The greater willingness of SDLP voters to transfer ‘in-house’ to Sinn Fein has also harmed Alliance electoral support. Several interviewees, including the Party Chair and Vice-Chair, associated the demise with two factors; the inadequacies of the party leader (replaced in October 2001) and the failure of the party to achieve a place in the Northern Ireland Executive. A majority of interviewees believed that the party had ‘done its job’ in helping bring about devolved power sharing, a view in accordance with the wider survey, which found that 60.5% of party members believed that Alliance had ‘achieved most of its objectives’ through the GFA. According to one party member, this was because we ‘are a unionist party with a small u. We wanted Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, but we wanted to see everyone treated fairly. That is what the agreement is about and is why we support it’.

No interviewees believed that there was a prospect of a return to double figures percentage electoral support, last achieved in 1987, in the foreseeable future. The decline in Alliance support has created considerable problems of party organisation. Interviewees referred to a ‘crisis’ of the party in the west of Northern Ireland. The four counties of Armagh, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone yielded only 17.7% of the party membership. The party is largely a product of two counties, Antrim and Down and is viewed by its own members as a party of affluent Greater Belfast. A Coleraine
former councillor, defeated in the 2001 district council elections, complained of the lack of attention given to the party and the absence of a party election machine, claiming that she ‘might as well have been an independent rather than a member of a party’.\textsuperscript{16} The party has an elderly membership. Almost three-quarters (73.2\%) are 55 or over and 27.6\% joined in the year of the party’s formation, 1970.

\textit{Theoretical concerns concerning the Good Friday Agreement}

Although solid in its support for devolved power-sharing and the GFA, Alliance would prefer integrative power-sharing to the consociational model applied to Northern Ireland. There is an element of self-interest in this approach, in that a less rigid division of parties into unionist or nationalist would allow a greater role for Alliance than under the current use of ‘pure’ parallel consent (50\% support from unionists and nationalist with the votes of ‘other’ parties of lesser importance). Almost half (46.8\%) of Alliance members believed that decisions in the Assembly should require only a simple majority of all members, against 37.4\% opposed to the idea. Increased salience for Alliance MLAs, accompanied by a role in the Executive, may have a beneficial effect for the party, which lacks visibility.

Nonetheless, Alliance concerns are not confined to mere electoralism. The party leadership resented the lack of opportunity to voice concerns during the negotiations prior to the Good Friday Agreement. ‘We were presented with an Agreement by the Prime Minister as a fait accompli- it was take it or leave it’, commented the party leader.\textsuperscript{17} The party supported the Agreement on three grounds; firstly, it concurred with its long standing belief in power sharing; secondly, the party believed that
moderate centre politics might be undertaken by former political rivals, rather than competitive inter-ethnic bloc rivalries; thirdly, the party believed that the power-sharing mechanisms of the Good Friday Agreement could be transcended by more informal cross-community relations. In interviews, Alliance members remained concerned that the conflict might not be over. The leadership tended to stress that the GFA was a vehicle mainly of conflict management rather than resolution.

Interviewees expressed concern over aspects of post-Agreement politics. Predictably, the divisions within unionism were a cause, but most interviewees expressed optimism that unionist difficulties were short-term products of controversial aspects such as prisoner releases; policing changes and lack of movement on decommissioning. To some extent, these concerns are shared by Alliance members. Over one-third (36.4%) opposed the early release of paramilitary prisoners; 69.3% insist that the IRA must decommission all its weapons and 42.1% would make Sinn Fein’s participation in the Assembly conditional upon such decommissioning.

Alliance support for the Agreement is based partly upon a view that there are few serious alternatives, a point made by virtually all interviewees. Almost half (49.9%) believed that an alternative form of devolution should be tried if the GFA collapsed. Only joint British-Irish rule (21.7%) and direct rule from Westminster (21.4%) received any substantial measure of support as alternatives. A majority of party members do see the Assembly as the appropriate repository of power in Northern Ireland. Few interviewees saw local councils as a viable alternative, with a number being highly critical of the calibre of local councillors and unimpressed by the performance of local councils.
Do the members matter?

Northern Ireland’s new political dispensation was built upon an accommodation of political elites. This begs the question of whether the members surveyed in this research project actually matter. 70% of members describe themselves as not particularly active or inactive and 64.2% believed that they had ‘little or no influence’ in decision-making within the party. The membership ‘grassroots’ indicated in interviews that they were felt that the Alliance negotiating team had performed well in the negotiations leading to the GFA. However, there was some concern at the lack of electoral clout displayed by party leaders (invisibility was a regularly aired factor). Very few members felt they had ‘considerable influence’ upon decision-making within the party (only 1.6% felt this way) and many interviewees felt it desirable for the leadership to have autonomy in multi-party negotiations and in interpreting Alliance’s future role. Most interviewees supported the withdrawal of Alliance candidates in the Westminster 2001 election to enhance the chances of pro-GFA unionists. However, few interviewees supported the idea of a redesignation of Alliance MLAs as unionist (a finding which mirrored survey evidence). Most felt that this would compromise Alliance’s long-held political position of being neither unionist nor nationalist.

The tactical and temporary redesignation of Alliance MLAs as Unionists occurred in early November 2001, after the conclusion of this project. It was a decision indicative of the ease by which the party elite could insulate itself from the views of members, a majority of whom opposed the move. The impact, if any, of such a move, has yet to be discerned.
Summary

As custodians of a third tradition in Northern Ireland, Alliance has been confronted by a series of ideological and political problems since the creation of the Good Friday Agreement. Although the Agreement contains the three strands (North; North-South; East-West) long advocated by the party, Alliance has been obliged to redefine its role, to the chagrin of longstanding members who supported its ‘purist’, non-unionist, non-nationalist ideas. Alliance has been obliged to act as ballast to a political agreement which, in the short term at least, legitimises a unionist-nationalist dichotomy. For Alliance, unionist or nationalist represented merely different political positions rather than separate communities, a view to which many party members still adhere. In effectively supporting pro-GFA Unionist election candidates by withdrawing its own and redesignating, albeit temporarily, as Unionist, Alliance has moved from promotion of a radical third tradition towards being a party which endorses the segmental autonomy of consociationalism as a means to a better end. As the electorate turns increasingly to the party which will best defend the interests of their bloc, Alliance’s appeal as a multi-ethnic, bi-confessional party has limited appeal. The centre ground may be broader, if defined as the broad areas of cross-community political consensus within the Assembly, but the centre party is likely to continued to shrink.

Activities

The work has been discussed at the Political Studies Association of Ireland Annual Conference, 2-4 November 2001, at which a paper was presented (see Outputs)

Research findings are to be outlined via a paper at the ‘Constructions of Irishness’
conference, organised by the Centre for Irish Studies at the University of Salford, 20-22 March 2002. BBC Northern Ireland’s Hearts and Minds programme requested copies of the party data.

**Outputs**

The dataset on Alliance Party members arising from the questionnaire survey, ‘A Membership Survey of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland’, was accepted by the ESRC UK Data Archive on 28 August 2001. The reference number is SN-4406 (assigned 3 December 2001).

Publications/papers arising from the project thus far include:


‘The future of the ‘radical centre’ in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement, Paper presented to the Political Studies Association of Ireland Annual Conference, NUI Galway, 2-4 November 2001 (with J. Evans)

A revised version of this paper has been submitted to *Political Studies*.

Forthcoming publications include:


**Impacts**

The research has already been used by the Alliance Party for an internal party review. Results from the research project have been published in *Alliance Party News*. The research has also been used by BBC Northern Ireland. It is expected that the dataset will be used over the next few years by political scientists with an interest in parties and the party system in Northern Ireland.

**Future Research Priorities**

The future of the political centre in Northern Ireland will remain a source of interest in coming years. Alliance MLAs have already reshaped their identity, albeit temporarily, redesignating as unionist to bolster the Good Friday Agreement. Future research should concentrate upon establishing a wider comparative framework.
examining the role of central pillar parties within consociational bloc systems, exploring the durability, tactical flexibility and role of such parties.

There is also a need for comparative data, with completion of further datasets on political parties in Northern Ireland. At present, there is no data on, as examples, the other bi-confessional party in Northern Ireland, the Women’s Coalition, whilst coverage of main parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party is also lacking.

7 Ibid.
8 Alliance Party, *Centre Forward*, op cit, p. 4
10 Interviews with David Ford and Stephen Farry, Belfast, both 21 August 2001.
11 For example, interviews with Betty Sinclair, Lisburn, 22 August 2001; Bob Houston, Whitecross, 21 August 2001
12 Farry and Neeson, op cit. p. 1224.
14 Interviews with Tom Ekin, Belfast, 21 August 2001; Jayne Dunlop, Coleraine, 22 August 2001.
15 Interview with Hugh Thompson, Belfast 21 August 2001.
16 Interview with Jayne Dunlop, 22 August 2001, with further comments e-mailed to me.
17 Interview with David Ford op cit.