Policing, Crowd Dynamics and Public Order at Euro2004
A report to the Home Office on the project ‘A European study of the interaction between police and crowds of foreign
nationals considered to pose a risk to public order’.

Dr. Clifford Stott*, Dr. Otto Adang++, Andrew Livingstone**, Martina Schreiber*+.
*School of Psychology, University of Liverpool;
+Police Academy of the Netherlands;
**School of Psychology, Cardiff University.

Address for correspondence is Dr. Clifford Stott, The Henri Tajfel Laboratory, School of Psychology, University of Liverpool, L69 7ZA. U.K. email: c.stott@liverpool.ac.uk. This research report was made possible by grants from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-000-23-0617) and from the U.K. Home Office.
Summary

Background.
The 2004 European Football Championships in Portugal (Euro2004) are widely regarded as one of the most successful international football tournaments ever held in Europe in terms of the low level of ‘disorder’. This document reports upon a series of empirical studies exploring the reasons behind this successful outcome. More specifically, this is a report upon a large scale project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and the U.K. Home Office exploring relationships between psychological theory, policy, public order policing, fan psychology and behavior at the European Football Championships in Portugal in 2004 (Euro2004). The central focus of the report is an empirical evaluation of the contribution of a specific theoretical model of crowd dynamics and psychology to the use of force strategy and tactics of the Polícia de Segurança Pública. It also explores the subsequent impacts of this collaboration upon policing and the levels of 'hooliganism' among England fans at the tournament. The report begins with an overview of psychological theory in the domain of crowd psychology. It details the framework through which this theory had the potential to impact upon the security policy of Euro2004. It then reports upon a series of inter-related empirical studies which:

(a) formally assess the relationship between security policy and psychological theory;
(b) analyses the impact of this policy upon public order policing and the levels of 'hooliganism' at the tournament;
(c) explores collective psychology among a 'high risk' fan group attending the tournament.

Findings on Police strategy and behavioural outcomes

◊ There is considerable evidence of a ‘low-profile’ policy orientation in match cities, a policy that was consistent with the model of good practice proposed by Stott & Adang (2003a,b).
◊ A four level Police use of force strategy for public order was utilised that was focused upon facilitating fans legitimate behaviours, monitoring for emergent risk and providing a dynamic policing profile capable of early ‘low-impact’, information-led intervention.
◊ There was a visible police presence during crowd events in only 56% of all samples taken. Where police were visibly present, they were generally in standard uniform rather than in full ‘riot gear’. ‘Riot police’ were positioned close to gathering crowds but kept deliberately out of sight. Extensive use was also made of non-uniformed officers.
◊ Such low profile policing was not ‘laissez-faire’ but highly ‘pro-active’, utilising at an early stage a wide range of non-confrontational tactical options. Interventions, where necessary, were low impact, rapid and targeted accurately at the risk factors.
◊ Both the level of police visibility and the number of incidents of disorder in match cities were both significantly lower than at Euro2000.
Findings on Fan Psychology

◊ England fans experienced policing and their relationship with other fans in match cities as positive.
◊ In this context fans differentiated themselves strongly from hooligans, and perceived themselves to be similar to fans of other nations. Moreover, this differentiation and similarity were related to fans’ experiences of policing.
◊ Euro2004 transformed the association between England fans and the police. Prior to the tournament, strong identification as an England fan implied dissimilarity to police. After the tournament identification among England fans was associated with similarity to the police in match cities.
◊ The data supports the contention made by Stott et al (in press) that low profile approach avoids the social and psychological processes necessary for widespread ‘rioting’ to occur at football matches with an international dimension. Moreover, this form of policing response supports the psychology necessary for ‘self-policing’ in such contexts and the long term marginalisation of ‘hooligan’ behaviour among high risk fans.

Implications

◊ The data suggest that the model of best practice was implemented by the PSP, and that this created a context in which ‘disorder’ was minimised and England fans maintained a non-confrontational sense of identity. The implications of these findings for understanding police responses to football related disorder over the longer term are discussed.

Acknowledgments

Data collection was made possible through the long-term co-operation of the U.K. Home Office especially David Bohannon and Martin Goodhay; the Policia de Segurança Pública especially José Leitão, Paulo Pereira, José Neto, Luis Simões, and João Pires; the British Consulate in Portugal especially Gary Fisher and Glynne Evans; the Euro2004 Organising Committee especially Paulo Gomes and Luís Trindade Santos; the Football Supporters Federation especially Kevin Miles; the numerous fans and others that have supported our research. Thanks should also be extended to the U.K. Police Euro2004 delegation especially David Swift; to Ian Murphy, Nicola Jones and Doug Hopkins at the Football Association; to Geoff Person, University of Liverpool; to Ged Poynton at Liverpool Football Club; to Kenneth Scott, Strathclyde Police, Wim Van Oorschot and Theo Brekelmans, Police Academy of the Netherlands; also our Portuguese structured observation team, Sara Couto, Magda Oliveira, Afonso Sousa, Telma Fernandes, Cláudia Reis, Joana Couto, Henrique Figueiredo, Carla Duarte, Jorge Araújo, Ana João Silva, António Vicente, Rui Gouveia, Ana Neves, Catarina Moço, Hugo Pimentel, Filipe Fernandes, Rui Marques.
1. Rationale.
   1.1 Crowd dynamics, social identity and intergroup interaction.
   1.2 Constructing relationships between theory and practice.
   1.3 A model of good practice.
   1.4 Research, policy and practice at Euro2004.
   1.5 The current report.


3. Method
   3.1 PSP strategy document
   3.2 Structured observations
   3.3 Semi-structured observations
   3.4 Police interviews
   3.5 Web based questionnaires
      3.5.1 Pre-tournament measures
      3.5.2 Post match measures
      3.5.3 Recruitment and respondents

   4.2 Study 2: Tactical Profile and Police Understandings.
   4.3 Study 3: Quantitative Analysis of Police Deployment

5. Analysis of Fans’ Psychology
   5.1 Pre-tournament measures
   5.2 Post-tournament measures

6. Conclusions.
   6.1 Policing strategy and outcomes
   6.2 Fan psychology
   6.3 Implications: policing, crowd psychology and public order
   6.4 Limitations
   6.5 Conclusions: theory and practice in public order policing

7. References

8. Appendices
1. Rationale.

The low levels of football related violence at the recent European Football Championships in Portugal (Euro2004) have led it to be regarded as one of the most successful international football tournaments ever staged in Europe (Home Office, 2005). This is particularly striking given the presence in Portugal during the tournament of an estimated 150,000 England fans (IFC, 2004), a fan group who have a history of involvement in major ‘riots’ at previous football tournaments in Europe. Indeed, across the tournament, only one England fan was arrested for a violence-related offence in match cities. In contrast, 955 England fans were arrested for similar offences at the previous European Championships in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2000. The issue of how this difference emerged is a fundamental one for policy and practice in relation to the management of ‘high risk’ crowds.

One prominent explanation for this positive outcome is that it was the result of legislation, which prevented ‘known hooligans’ from leaving their home country during the tournament. In other words, positive outcomes were achieved through controlling the movement of those individuals and groups who were predisposed toward creating ‘disorder’ (c.f. Home Office, 2005).

The aim of the present paper is to focus upon an alternative locus of explanation. This alternative suggests that the success of Euro2004 was related to the close relationships developed between social psychological theory and research on crowd dynamics and police public order management policy and practice in match cities in Portugal.

At one level, this report provides an in-depth empirical assessment of this alternative explanatory focus (see also Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, in press; Stott & Pearson, 2006). It does so by providing a series of inter-related studies on the nature of policing policy, strategy and tactics during the tournament and the impact this had upon the collective psychology and behaviour of England fans. At another level, this report explores the relationship between theory and research in social psychology, public policy,
and related impacts upon policing practice and crowd psychology. In doing so, it highlights (a) the relevance of a specific model of crowd dynamics as a predictive tool that can usefully inform and instruct policy as it relates to the effective management of high risk crowd events, and (b) the mutually constructive relationship that can be created between psychological theory and policing policy and practice, particularly in relation to the management of social conflict.

1.1 Crowd dynamics, social identity and intergroup interaction.

The elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM) proposes that collective behaviour during crowd events is driven by crowd participants’ shared ‘social identity’ and that crowds should be understood as an intergroup phenomena (see Reicher, 2001 for an overview). Social identity here is defined “a model of one’s position in a set of social relations along with the actions that are possible and proper (legitimate) given such a position.” (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p.581). It follows from this definition that the form (i.e., who does or does not share that identity) and content of crowd participants’ social identity, and therefore the nature of their collective action, can radically alter if the social relationships surrounding crowd members change during a crowd event. In other words, while collective action and crowd behaviour is driven by social identity, subsequent intergroup interaction can in turn change that social identity.

The ESIM has been developed and validated through a series of analyses of ‘rioting’ in a variety of different settings in the U.K. including anti-tax (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000) environmental (Drury & Reicher, 2000) and student (Reicher, 1996a) protests. Of particular relevance here is its utility in accounting for both the presence and absence of collective ‘violence’ amongst British football fans travelling outside the U.K. (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001). For example, Stott and Reicher (1998a) provide a qualitative analysis of the social psychological processes through which ‘rioting’ between England fans and police developed during the 1990 World Cup Finals in Italy. One key element of this analysis was to highlight
the existence of asymmetries in how Italian police and England fans understood the same intergroup context. Whereas ‘ordinary’ England fans tended to see themselves as differentiated from ‘hooligans’ and engaging in normatively appropriate behaviour (e.g., singing loudly in large groups), their experiences suggested that they were viewed and treated by police as uniformly dangerous.

A second key element of Stott and Reicher’s (1998a) analysis was to suggest that these asymmetries were important because of the ability of one group (i.e., the police) to then impose their understanding of the context on the other group (i.e., England fans) through relatively undifferentiated and subjectively violent forms of police intervention. This intergroup interaction in turn served to unite large numbers of ‘ordinary’ England fans and ‘hooligans’ around a common understanding of ‘victimhood’ and an emergent perception of the appropriateness of violent ‘retaliation’ against the police. Moreover, the emergent identity also empowered England fans such that retaliation was not only seen as proper but also as possible social action. This retaliation precipitated an upward spiral of conflict, culminating in a large scale ‘riot’. In other words, police expectations of a uniformly violent group acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy because of the effect of their subsequent strategy and tactics on fans’ social identity.

In addition to these analyses of processes within crowds, the ESIM has also developed through analyses of police understanding and strategy in relation to crowd events. These have highlighted how police orientations can be shaped by an understanding of crowds as holding an inherent potential for violence (e.g., Le Bon, 1895. trans., 1947). This understanding is then used to inform and legitimise undifferentiated forms of police intervention against crowd members (Drury, Stott & Farsides, 2003; Stott, 2003; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). However, while these two strands of research – each emphasising a different side of the intergroup dynamic – clearly tally in terms of the ESIM’s theoretical account of crowd dynamics, they have not previously been combined in a single study (Reicher, 1996a; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). Moreover,
previous ESIM studies have been unable to provide quantitative measurements of police deployments or fan psychology as they relate to specific crowd events.

1.2 Constructing Relationships Between Theory and Practice.

Nevertheless, the ability of the ESIM to provide a powerful and parsimonious explanation of crowd dynamics in a range of settings, both ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’, suggests its considerable relevance for public order policing policy (see also Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004). This is particularly so in view of the findings of other programmes of research which clearly demonstrates the association between policing and public order outcomes (e.g. Adang, 1991, 1998; Baker, 2005; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Hall & De Lint, 2003; Innes, 2005; King & Waddington, 2004, 2005; Sheptycki, 2005; Waddington & King, 2005). More specifically, a large scale structured observational study of police deployment at the previous European Championships in the Netherlands and Belgium (Euro2000) identified two distinct and contrasting forms of policing. These were characterised as ‘low ‘ and ‘high’ profile, where high profile deployments were defined in terms of the relative visibility of uniformed police, ‘riot police’ (i.e., officers wearing protective equipment) and police ‘riot vehicles’ (i.e., vans and water cannon), less active communication with fans and an absence of non-confrontational intervention activity prior to the emergence of ‘disorder’ (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001).

The study demonstrated that the greatest levels of ‘disorder’ occurred during events defined by the policing authorities as presenting a ‘low risk’ of disorder but where high profile policing had been utilised. Observed disorder during such ‘low risk’ events was at approximately twice the level of that observed in cities where low profile policing was the norm. Observations in high profile cities also identified a lower overall level and quality of contact between police and fans. In contrast, during events defined as high risk there were no significant differences in the levels of observed ‘disorder’ between cities utilising high and low profiles (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001).
As well as reliably quantifying both police deployment and levels of ‘disorder’, these findings are also important because they expose the problems policy makers face in creating accurate risk assessments of threats to public order. They also powerfully demonstrate the potentially counterproductive impact of high profile policing and the relative efficiency of the low profile approach. Moreover, and consistent with the ESIM, the findings suggest that these outcomes were related to the nature of interactions between police and fans. None the less, just as ESIM’s preoccupation with underlying psychology has so far meant that a quantitative analysis of police deployment and disorder has not been forthcoming, Adang and Cuvelier’s (2001) focus on broad patterns of behaviour meant that the social psychological processes underlying these patterns were not fully examined (Stott, 2003).

Following Euro2000, these two research programmes were integrated within a collaborative project designed specifically to address their common theoretical and empirical limitations whilst also attempting to generate links with operational policing policy, particularly as this related to the next European Championships – Euro2004.

On this basis of studies financed by the U.K. Home Office, Stott and Adang (2003a,b,c) proposed that the potential for disorder tended to emerge at times when policing profile was subjectively ‘disproportionate’ or not in ‘balance’ with the levels of risk fans collectively saw themselves to be posing. They suggested that this ‘imbalance’ tended to occur where police strategy was developed on the reputation of the relevant fan group as uniformly violent and upon a policing philosophy of ‘riot control’. This philosophy was in turn often related to the accountability concerns of senior officers (see also Cronin & Reicher, 2006). Police tactics in such circumstances tended to be relatively ‘static’ and reliant upon highly visible demonstrations of the capability for – and actual use of – indiscriminate and overwhelming coercive force. Their analysis suggested that if crowds of fans encountered such high profile policing when they understood themselves as posing little, if any, threat to public order, it tended to generate shared understandings among fans of the
inappropriateness or illegitimacy of police action. In such social relational contexts the ‘non-violent’ social identity initially held by fans appeared to change such that conflict came to be understood as more acceptable. Moreover, some fans actually sought to provoke and engage in ‘disorder’, and those that did were more likely to influence wide sections of the crowd.

In contrast, Stott and Adang (2003a,b) suggested that where police deployments were graded, proportionate and dynamic (i.e. capable of changing in profile across the event), levels of ‘disorder’ were low. They argued that in these situations police strategy and tactics tended to be ‘evidence led’ (i.e., based upon information gathered during the event regarding fans’ manifest behaviours) driven by a philosophy of ‘public order management’ characterised by a concern with the facilitation of fans legitimate behaviours and non-confrontational intervention into crowds prior to and in the absence of ‘disorder’. Here, policing tended to avoid early displays of riot police. Instead, they utilised in the first instance officers in ordinary police uniform (or plain clothes). These officers were deployed in pairs or small groups, often engaging fans in positive interpersonal interaction. Through such interaction officers were able to gather information on the levels and sources of risk. Thus, if and when necessary, interventions tended to be rapid and more discriminate or specifically-targeted. Their analysis suggested that this form of low-profile policing tended to generate shared understandings among fans of police action as appropriate or legitimate. Moreover, not only did fans tend to differentiate themselves from ‘hooligans’, thus undermining the ability of violent fans to influence the wider crowd (Turner, 1991), but there was also evidence of active ‘self-policing’ such that fans would begin to actively regulate each others’ behaviour (Stott & Adang, 2003a).

Taking this evidence as a whole, the research programme began to suggest that ‘risk’ in the context of public order was a dynamic phenomena related to the ‘balance’ between patterns of police deployment and the levels and sources of risk. It suggested that low-profile policing was effective because it
was more capable than high profile policing of identifying sources of risk, maintaining proportionality and avoiding indiscriminate forms of police intervention. The effectiveness of low profile policing also appeared to be embedded in its ability to generate (or at least maintain) shared perceptions among fans of the legitimacy of their collective social relationships with the police. In other words, low-profile policing actively avoided the forms of collective psychology that the ESIM proposes are necessary for large scale ‘rioting’ to occur (e.g. Stott & Drury, 2000).

1.3 A Model of Good Practice.

This research provided a basis for developing a model of ‘good practice’ for policing ‘high-risk’ crowds of foreign nationals attending football matches with an international dimension (Stott & Adang, 2003a, b). This model proposed that in order to minimise disorder, policing should be graded, dynamic, information-led, designed to avoid indiscriminate intervention and facilitate the legitimate intentions of fans (see also Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004). More specifically, initial contact with the masse of visiting fans should be characterised by officers deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform (or plain clothes) engaging in positive interaction, information gathering and monitoring. This phase should be seen as an opportunity to communicate the intention of the police to facilitate the legitimate behaviours of fans, to set the limits of police tolerance with regard to ‘anti-social’ behaviour and to identify, to actively construct perceptions of legitimate policing among fans and to undermine only those fans who are seeking to be disruptive and confrontational.

In situations of increased or increasing risk, the model suggests that there should first be some attempt to validate a particular behaviour as a source of risk. This validation should if possible involve the ‘visiting’ police force (i.e. police from the nation of the visiting fans) because often they will have the necessary experience and understanding to validate the host force’s assessment. If risk is detected and validated, then a second stage of tactical deployment should occur, characterised by the firm communication to fans of
‘tolerance limits’. The model makes clear that there may also be some value in increasing the visibility of the police force at this time, perhaps in the form of the visible deployment of a ‘riot’ squad in standard uniform (i.e., not wearing helmets or holding shields and batons in sheaths).

Should these measures prove ineffective, then the model proposes that further intervention could take place. However, it is made clear that such intervention should be specifically targeted. Thus, as any increase in intervention takes place, information about which individuals or groups are posing the risk must be clearly communicated to the officers that are being deployed into the crowd. Once an intervention has removed the identified risk, the additional officers should be removed quickly and a normal level of policing restored. While the model suggests that means should be available to make more forceful interventions possible it makes clear the means often deployed in such interventions (e.g. CS spray, tear gas, water cannon) were invariably ultimately counterproductive.

1.4 Research, Policy and Practice at Euro2004.

In 2001, a group of senior officers from the PSP (Polícia de Segurança Pública – one of Portugal’s two main police forces) charged with the development of policy for Euro2004 became aware of the potential relevance of this research. In particular, they sought to utilize it to support the development of a low profile approach for Euro2004, in opposition to pressures they faced within Portugal to develop a policy more in line with the high profile approach (see Adang & Stott, forthcoming). This involved generating a formal partnership between the PSP and the first and second authors and inviting them to (a) conduct a series of evaluations of police responses to football matches with an international dimension in Portugal (e.g. Stott & Adang, 2003a; Adang & Stott, 2004); (b) give a series of presentations to senior commanders within the PSP (e.g. Stott & Adang, 2002, 2003a,b) using this research to inform and
support PSP policy development; and (c) conduct an evaluation of the policing of Euro2004.

As part of this evaluation process, Stott, et al (in press) presented an analysis of England fans’ phenomenology during Euro2004. This suggested that fans perceived policing during the tournament to be appropriate and their social relations with the PSP as legitimate. In this social relational context, Stott et al. (in press) suggest that England fans displayed bonds of identification with football fans from other nations and differentiated themselves from hooligans. Moreover, their ‘ethnographic’ approach allowed for the observation of what they describe as “key incidents” during crowd events. In particular, they present evidence of self-policing among England fans, and of the overall maintenance of non-violent norms in match cities even in the presence of fans who were actively seeking to provoke disorder. Thus, with indications that the profile of the PSP was in line with the theoretical principles and model of ‘good practice’, collective psychology and public order outcomes were consistent with those predicted by the model.

1.5 The current report.

While the analysis presented by Stott et al. (in press) offers preliminary support for the effectiveness of an ESIM based approach, its focus is nevertheless limited to fan psychology. As with previous ESIM analyses, it therefore lacks a detailed analysis of policing strategy for the tournament, and consequently prohibits a conclusive assessment of the extent to which the theoretical principles did actually inform the PSP’s strategic policy. It is equally inconclusive regarding the actual nature of police deployment, and broader patterns of public order during the tournament. Finally, Stott et al.’s (in press) qualitative analysis precluded an examination of overall levels of key psychological variables (e.g., similarity with police; expectations and experiences of outgroups; identification with fans of other nations), and of how these variables related to one another.

---

1 This evaluation was made possible through a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant ref: RES-000-23-0617)
The aim of the present paper is therefore to address these limitations by presenting a comprehensive, integrated analysis of the two sides of the intergroup dynamic as they relate to the same event. This analysis begins by examining policing strategy and philosophy, particularly in terms of their relation to ESIM principles. This is followed by an analysis of police deployment. These data on policing are then supplemented by a survey-based study of fan psychology, and an analysis of public order outcomes.


The empirical aspects of this paper are broken down into two broad sections. First we provide three studies of the policing policy, strategy and tactical deployment for the tournament. Second, we provide a quantitative analysis of the psychology of England fans that compliments the qualitative analysis provided by Stott et al. (in press).

The first policing study provides a qualitative analysis of the PSP strategic policy document for the tournament (see below). A translated version of this document was read and quotations are included as italics where these were judged by the authors to convey theoretically meaningful aspects of it as these relate to the principles outlined in the introduction.

The second policing study provides a detailed qualitative analysis of police deployment during Euro2004 drawing from data obtained from semi-structured observations and interviews with PSP Commanders. This analysis was conducted by the first author in two phases. In the first phase, police interviews were analysed thematically using techniques developed by Stott & Reicher (1998b). The transcripts were read and the material was organised into different categories according to pre-defined themes (e.g., tactical deployments, strategic understanding, roles of officers, etc.). The material within each thematic category was re-read and relevant sub-categories were identified (e.g., ‘low impact’, emphasis upon communication, non-confrontation, differentiation, etc.).
In the second phase, this analysis was compared with a body of semi-structured observational data in order to identify how aspects of police understanding tallied with police deployments during the tournament. In particular, this second phase sought to identify areas of consistency or contrast between police perspectives and data on actual deployments. The results of this analysis are illustrated with reference to the semi-structured observational data and quotations from interviews with police. Respondents have been coded in terms of the overall role of the officer and his area of command.

The third policing study provides a quantitative analysis of police deployment using data gathered through a programme of structured observations. This third study complements the qualitative analysis of the second study, and permits a comparison between police deployment at Euro2004 and at the previous European Championships in the Netherlands and Belgium (Euro2000).

3. Method

Data relating to police philosophy, strategy and deployment were gathered from five primary sources. These were the PSP strategy document for the tournament, structured and semi-structured observations, interviews with police, and web-based questionnaires.

3.1 PSP Strategy Document
This strategy document, released on the 23rd of November, 2003, was developed by the Co-ordinating and Planning Committee for Euro2004 of the PSP National Directorate Ministry of Internal Administration (Coordinating and Planning Committee for Euro2004 (PSP), 2003). It defined the strategic and tactical policy of the PSP in relation to the tournament.

3.2 Structured Observations
Structured observations of fourteen matches were conducted between 12th June and the 1st July, 2004. The method directly mirrored that employed by
Adang & Cuvelier (2001). Observations were conducted around all matches involving the national teams of Portugal, the Netherlands, Germany and England. This selection ensured that an equal number of matches that had been defined by the authorities as posing ‘increased’ and ‘normal’ risk to ‘public order’ were sampled. A total of 1896 observational samples were taken. These are subdivided into 7 ‘increased risk’ matches (899 samples) and 7 ‘normal risk’ matches (997 samples).

Observations were conducted by 16 bilingual Portuguese nationals. Half were Psychology postgraduates or final year undergraduates recruited from universities in Portugal, and half were final year students recruited from the Instituto Superior de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna (the Portuguese National Police Academy) in Lisbon. The observation teams were trained at a 3-day workshop preceding the tournament. This included lectures on theoretical background and observation techniques, and culminated in a test observation around the Portuguese Cup Final on May 16, 2004. During the tournament the observers were split into four teams of four. Two teams were based in Lisbon (teams south) and two in Oporto (teams north). Each match observation was carried out by one team who operated in two pairs, each consisting of one psychology and one police student.

Observations generally started at 20.00 hours on the day preceding the selected match and continued until 00.00 hours before recommencing at 12.00 hours on the match day and finishing twelve hours later at 00.00. Each pair chose a separate location where crowds of fans had gathered (e.g., at official fan zones, in public squares, outside of stadiums). Each observer within the pair selected a separate physical area within that location and began observations for at least one hour. Observations were taken once every fifteen minutes on a series of pre-defined categories. These included overall

---

2 This was done in order to allow comparison between the current data and a data set obtained from Euro2000. The two method for the two studies was identical except: the Euro 2000 study had less samples as none were taken on evenings before matches and of the four observers making up the observation teams, two made observations within the cities working individually (for a full breakdown of the Euro2000 method see Adang & Cuvelier, 2001).

3 The Portuguese authorities had three classifications of risk ‘normal’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’. We have collapsed ‘high’ and ‘medium’ into a single ‘increased’ risk category. All matches played by Germany and England had been classified as ‘high’ or ‘increased’ risk.
numbers of fans and police, the nature of police deployment, and the quality and quantity of interactions between fans and police. A complete breakdown of the categories employed in the structured observations can be found in Appendix 1.

3.3. Semi-structured observations

The current authors conducted semi-structured observations throughout the tournament while ‘participating’ in crowd events surrounding all matches included in the structured analysis. These observations recorded the approximate chronology of events and the observers’ qualitative impressions of fan behaviour, fan group interactions, police deployment (numbers, uniform, behaviour, etc.), fan and police interactions and any other aspects of the situation judged at the time by the observer to be relevant. These data were recorded directly onto audio recorders and later transcribed as field notes. Photographs and video were also used to record events when this was possible.

In addition to these observations, an international monitoring team of three highly experienced police commanders from Scotland and the Netherlands also collected data on police deployment, composition of fan groups and the work of international police teams during the tournament. All their observations were conducted around matches that included at least one of the targeted fan groups from Portugal, the Netherlands, England or Germany. In the period from the 12th to the 30th of June 2004 the monitoring team visited 12 matches in the cities of Aveiro, Braga, Coimbra, Porto and Lisbon. Additional observations were made by this team on 6 days amongst English supporters in the city centre of Lisbon and in the tourist areas of Cascais and Estoril.

Each of the observers from the structured observation teams were also instructed to audio-record their qualitative impressions at the end of each sample. These were later transcribed in English and submitted to the authors. Finally, at the end of the tournament all observation teams took part in a
debrief sessions in which their observations were discussed. These sessions were audio recorded and transcribed.

3.4 Police interviews
The first and second authors were well known to all police commanders from the PSP because of our involvement in the development stage of the police strategy, and requests for interview were always accepted. Fifteen unstructured interviews were conducted with 12 Senior Officers from the PSP. All interviewees were male and included the Operational Commanders in Oporto, Lisbon, Coimbra, Faro, Guimares and Braga, and thus included those who had made operational decisions for all of England’s matches in Portugal. Interviews were also conducted with the senior Operational Commander from the Corpo de Intervenção (northern Portugal) – the PSP’s ‘riot police’ – and with the National Investigation Police (NIP)\(^4\) senior Operational Commander in Oporto, two NIP Deputy Commanders from Lisbon, the senior Commander from the National Information Point - the central police information collation unit for public order related events during Euro2004 – and the Head of Police Training for the PSP. Finally, an interview was conducted approximately two weeks after the tournament with the Head of the U.K. Police delegation to Portugal for Euro2004.

All interviewees spoke in English (although our Portuguese Cicerone was generally present to assist with translation). Interviews were conducted by both the first and second authors and took place at the local police headquarters, at the National Police Academy in Lisbon, in the field or in the U.K.. Where possible, interviews were conducted on more than one occasion. All interviews included in this analysis took place between the 16\(^{th}\) June and the 24\(^{th}\) July, 2004. A full list of the interviews may be found in Appendix 2. There was no formal interview schedule; rather interviews were shaped by our research questions to the nature of events that had occurred in their local command area. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.

\(^4\) The non-uniformed branch of the PSP that were used extensively for public order duties during the tournament.
3.5 Web based questionnaires

Data were collected from fans via web-based questionnaires located at URL www.footballfans.org.uk. The pre-tournament questionnaire was posted two weeks before, and removed on the day the tournament began. Immediately following each of England’s four matches a questionnaire relating to the host city (i.e., Coimbra or Lisbon) was posted and remained active until one month after the tournament had concluded.

The pre- and post-tournament questionnaires began by asking fans’ age, gender and how many times they had previously travelled abroad to support England. Both questionnaires included five items measuring ingroup (i.e., England fan) identification adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears’ (1995) and Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, and Turner’s (1999) four and one item measures. These were followed by a series of items designed to measure key variables. These were perceived similarity with other groups, differentiation from ‘violent’ others, expectations about- and experiences of- intergroup relations. These are described in the pre- and post-tournament measures subsections below.

Except for age, gender and history fans responded to all items by clicking check boxes on five point likert-type scales ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Both questionnaires also included two open ended items for fans to provide their qualitative impressions (see Appendix 3).

3.5.1 Pre-tournament measures

The five statements measuring ingroup identification ($\alpha =0.77$). were followed by one item measuring the extent to which fans differentiated themselves from ‘violent’ others or ‘hooligans’, and one item measuring fans’ perceived similarity with opposition fans. One item also measured fans’ perceived similarity to the Portuguese Police in match cities. High scores on these items represent high levels of identification, differentiation and similarity respectively.

In order to measure fans’ expectations of intergroup relationships, two items gauged expectations about the local population in match cities ($r = 0.63$, $p <$
.001), and three items gauged expectations about the police in match cities \((\alpha = 0.88)\). Finally, one item gauged expectations about relations with opposition fans. High scores on these items represent positive expectations.

### 3.5.2 Post match measures

The post-match questionnaires were based upon the pre-tournament measures but included additional items. There were no significant differences on any items across all four of the post-tournament questionnaires relating to the different matches. Therefore the data were combined into a single post-tournament data file.

The five ingroup identification items \((\alpha = 0.76)\) were again followed by single item measures of differentiation from ‘violent’ others, perceived similarity to opposition fans and perceived similarity to the Police in match cities. High scores on these measures represent high levels of identification, differentiation and similarity respectively. Five item scales gauged fans’ experiences of their ingroup \((\alpha = 0.90)\), and fans’ experiences of the local population in match cities \((\alpha = 0.90)\). A single item gauged fans’ experiences with opposition fans, while a six item scale \((\alpha = 0.93)\) gauged fans’ experiences of policing in match cities.

### 3.5.3 Recruitment and respondents

England fans were recruited in a number of different ways: through small articles on the Football Association’s (F.A.) official ‘EnglandFans’ website; in five editions of ‘Freelions’ (a magazine produced by an independent football fan organisation called the Football Supporters Federation); through email distribution ‘loops’ set up by other independent fan organisations, and through flyers advertising our research and website URL that were distributed by the authors during the tournament. In addition, before the tournament the first author attended seven meetings held by England fan organisations. At these meetings, fans were encouraged to subsequently complete both the pre- and post tournament online questionnaires.

One hundred and two questionnaires were submitted, 39 pre-tournament and 63 within one month of the end of the tournament. Of the pre-tournament
respondents three were female. The mean age was 34 years, 18% had never travelled abroad as an England fan before and 33% had travelled between one and five times previously. The remaining 49% had travelled abroad with England six or more times. Thirteen of the post-tournament respondents were female and four did not specify their gender. The mean age was 35 years, 73% had travelled abroad to watch England between one and five times previously with the remainder having travelled abroad with England more than six times.


In defining the task of the PSP in relation to the tournament, the document draws out how “security must take account of the need to promote the festive nature of the event” (section 2.2). Whilst acknowledging the need to take local conditions into account, the document emphasises the importance of achieving uniformity in police response based upon a common set of principles.

The planning of security must be based on a national strategy for defining uniform principles, giving the local commanding officers responsibility for implementation and adaptation of the basic concept and the specific characteristics of their respective areas of involvement (section 2.3).

These strategic principles state that policing should seek to avoid an intimidating and confrontational style. Instead, the policy prioritises ‘low profile’ community based policing over a more ‘high profile’, confrontational style.

The anticipated policing profile is a “low profile”. One, firmly established in the community, and one in which the police officer is seen more as someone acting in a peaceful, festive context. Avoiding any particular demonstration of a “high profile” presence characterised by a highly equipped force focused on public order, which might result in fear and alarm on the part of orderly citizens/fans, and result in provoking the more aggressive or violent citizens/fans. However, the Police must make it clear that they have resources for more forceful
The document also states that the policing profile should be dynamic (i.e., capable of rapid change), proportionate (i.e., accurately reflect the level of risk posed by the situation), and ready to respond specifically to fans’ who are behaving in a ‘disorderly’ manner (i.e., targeted, information-led, and based upon clear criteria about tolerance limits). Specifically, the document states that the PSP must provide a “graded intervention response depending upon the situation” that is “informed and selective”, and based upon a “high level of tolerance” that is “well defined, generally known and applied” (section 3.2).

In order to achieve this, the strategy document instructs that police presence must be “permanent… alongside citizens and crowds, but with an attitude of full integration in an environment where expectations are peaceful and festive” (section 3.3). However, given the emphasis upon low profile, graded intervention and facilitation from the outset, it also states that “the police officers deployed must wear their normal seasonal uniforms and be ready to provide citizens with information and to resolve minor problems involving a low level of aggression” (section 3.4). Whilst recognising the need to develop and posses the capability for more forceful intervention, the policy is explicit that any increase in the level of force must utilise information gathered from officers on the ground in order that it can be accurately targeted. Thus the document states:

*The intervention/reaction must be “informed”, so as to avoid intervention directed at crowds or at all citizens who happen to be present in a given location – or intervention that would result in criticisms of police intervention against “innocent” people – and it must be targeted only at those individuals who have brought about the incident or who have thus adopted aggressive and violent attitudes.* (section 3.7)

In addition, there is also an emphasis upon proportionate and ‘low impact’ interventions such that the objectives would be to isolate the targets “from
other citizens present and removed quickly and discreetly” (section 3.8). To achieve this, the document stipulates that non-uniformed officers (the NIP) will form a “significant component” (section 3.9) of police deployment. These non-uniformed officers would assist in achieving the central strategic objectives by being able to provide:

A constant presence, but not an ostentatious one, amongst crowds; Information in real time, which in addition to communicating the situation, makes it possible to gauge and report the “feel” of the crowd and the intentions of certain members of the more excitable/aggressive groups; low visibility intervention, aimed at resolving minor conflicts, thereby avoiding the intervention of uniformed officers which might be badly received or even provoke a response; support for intervention/reaction, making it possible for this to be targeted at the main instigators of conflict. (section 3.9)

The document then goes on to summarise how these strategic intentions can be best achieved in terms of four levels of graded tactical deployment. Level one is defined as “normal policing (PC’s and foot patrols)” (section 4.1). The objective of this level is to provide “presence, visibility and the resolving of minor disputes” (section 4.1a). The police composition at this level would be “one police officer or teams of two police officers… operating in a patrol car or on foot” (section 4.1a). Level two is defined as “rapid response teams (primary engagement)” (section 4.1b). Here the central objectives are for “vigilance, reinforcement and intervention in minor conflict involving a small number of offenders (preceding potential activation of level 3)” (section 4.1b). Thus, officers deployed at level two would be in small teams (preferably of four officers) in standard uniform (i.e. not wearing protective equipment) and used as a means of supporting officers at level one. They would be used to deter escalation where “groups of people are displaying improper behaviour but who are not engaging in violence” or to intervene “in conflicts involving a small number of people in which at least one of them shows signs of aggression or violence” (section 4.2b).
The third level of tactical deployment is designed to “support level two teams when it is expected that the conflict might escalate... when it is found that action at level two will not be sufficient.” (section 4.2c). Here the intervention would involve the same officers used to make rapid intervention teams at level two but deploy them in larger groups with visible protective equipment and batons. Finally, level four would involve the deployment of specifically trained ‘riot squads’ (Corpo de Intervenção) who would be deployed in full protective equipment including fireproof clothing, helmet, limb guards, shield and baton.

The strategy document therefore outlines a strategic policy and tactical model that resonates with the pre-tournament model of good practice and theoretical principles outlined in ESIM based research. In particular, the policy sought to create forms of low-profile policing that were fully integrated within the crowd, focused upon facilitation but graded, dynamic and information led. In this way where escalation in the use of force was judged to be necessary police intervention was more likely to be low impact, targeted and proportionate and therefore less likely to be reliant upon the indiscriminate use of coercive force.

4.2 Policing Study 2: Tactical Profile and Police Understandings.

Having outlined the PSP public order policy for the tournament we now turn to the question of the extent to which these strategic intentions and tactical model were actually adopted in the host cities of Portugal.

Uniformed officers It was specifically acknowledged by commanders that the early and visible use of ‘riot police’ – the Corpo de Intervenção – from the outset of contact with fans would be disproportionate and provocative.

We managed the situation not to put immediately the anti-riot units on the ground. Because I believe maybe they [England fans] were expecting that. And in that kind of situation where they have a lot of alcohol in the blood they are not in condition to be reasonable. So if we put an intervention team in the ground I believe we could have produced some incidents.

Police Commander, PSP, Coimbra.
Consequently, while our observations suggest that the Corpo de Intervenção were stationed within close proximity to gathering crowds, they were placed deliberately out of sight in order to avoid provoking hostile reactions from fans. For example, the Police Commander in Coimbra describes how a concern about the possible negative impact of police deployment underpinned the lack of visible deployment of the Corpo de Intervenção on the day England played Switzerland in Coimbra.

_In that situation where we had that kind of tension that I mentioned before, we were counting that the violence could actually happen at any moment. But we have to be sure that we were not the cause, you see? So the anti-riot unit was there but not in front of the football supporters. We placed it 100m away, they were around the corner, on the top of the stairs in the main square on the downtown._

_Police Commander, PSP, Coimbra._

Instead, when and where crowds gathered, our observations record that the PSP initially tended to utilise the ‘level 1’ tactic of officers in normal uniform, patrolling across a wide area in pairs or small groups of no more than four or five officers, and generally positioned on the edges of crowds. Figure 1 illustrates this tactic during the day of the match between the Netherlands and Germany in Oporto, the match defined by the authorities as posing the highest risk of the tournament.

![Figure 1. Officers in standard uniform with high visibility tabards patrolling a ‘high risk’ crowd event.](image)

A Senior Commander from Oporto described how these ‘level 1’ officers were briefed to (a) be visible and monitor for emerging ‘risk’ (b) facilitate fans
legitimate intentions, and (c) react if necessary to low level ‘disorder’. A Sector Commander in central Oporto described the role of his officers.

S: Their first priority is to be a councillor or a help assistant guy. Second, because they are spare they can be aware of any trouble before it happens or to intervene if there is a small problem to take care of. So if they are spare they can watch a larger area. In case of any need they can be assembled.

C: So is it a deliberate policy that they are in pairs?

S: Yes, to see and be seen.

Sector Commander, PSP, Oporto.

Our observations record that these ‘level one’ officers would on occasion be supported by larger groups of police officers (the ‘level 2’ rapid response units) also in standard uniform who worked both with and without protective equipment. Figure 2 illustrates such a group intervening to clear a roadway of a crowd of England fans prior to England’s opening match of the tournament against France. This is notable because it shows a relatively large group of officers in standard uniform displaying the ‘SIR’ of the rapid response squads, some of whom have been deployed with helmets but have left them attached to their belts.

Figure 2. A ‘level 2’ rapid response unit clearing a roadway of England fans.

A Senior Commander from Lisbon described how he understood this combination of tactical levels as a means of spreading resources across wide areas whilst providing a visible, non-confrontational and proportionate police capability for rapid intervention.
The idea we have and what we plan is trying to make the presence of police, try to have police presence in every place… in normal [uniform], trying to solve the problem as soon as it appears… At least the fans knew, everyone knew that the police will be near by and react, fast. And I think they also understood that we were here in normal uniform but if necessary there were more police officers to come. But we didn’t to be there at first level with anti-riot helmets and with lots of platoons and things like that.

Police Commander, PSP, Lisbon.

However, not all local commanders made use of uniform officers to fulfil the level 1 role. For example, observations in Coimbra record an almost total absence of uniformed officers deployed visibly during crowd events. There is evidence that this was due to local police anxieties that uniform officers working in pairs at this level would be vulnerable to attack by England fans. The interview data suggest that as a consequence, uniform officers here were generally deployed in the level 2 support role.

O: And how did the level one police officers?
D: The level one in uniform you mean?
O: Yes.
D: Most of the level one policing… was in cars. Teams of three policemen if it was needed to make some arrests… and also to give some confidence to the police because in these situations, of course, we are all a little bit nervous with what we can have in the next moment…
O: In the build up to the tournament there was some uncertainty among police officers?
D: Yes, yes. Because all of that image we have for instance from English football supporters everyone is a little bit nervous with the situation… But most of all police officers get a little bit nervous thinking about the result. People getting some physical injuries, getting to hospital that kind of situations we all try to avoid.

Police Commander, PSP, Coimbra

There was evidence that this lack of uniformed officers led to situations where police interventions could have occurred but did not. For example, our observations record that in a central square crowded with England fans before England’s match against Switzerland, a fight broke out between two
local men. In full sight of the majority of fans, one of these men violently kicked the other across the face while the other was crouched on the floor. A brief struggle ensued before the victim ran from the square pursued by his antagonist. Throughout this episode, and despite the fact that approximately two hundred England fans were gathered in the area, our observations record that no uniform police were present and no police intervention occurred.

*Non-Uniformed Officers* Our observations record that during major gatherings of fans small groups of non-uniformed officers regularly deployed into crowds. According to police commanders, these non-uniformed officers tended to have high levels of experience in dealing with football crowds. Our observations record that they tended to operate throughout the crowd, as opposed to merely on the edges. Figure 3 illustrates a group of these officers working in Lisbon during events surrounding an England match.

![Figure 3](image.png)

*Figure 3. A group of non-uniform officers working in Lisbon on the day of the match between England and Croatia.*

It was acknowledged by Commanders that the use of these non-uniformed officers was driven by their ability to provide ‘real time’ and accurate information on emerging tensions and to provide an immediate ‘low impact’ policing response.

*C: Do you think they [non-uniform police] are useful?*
*S: Yes.*
*C: Why?*
*S: Because they are in the middle of the supporters. They can perceive better than us [Commanders] the tensions. Also, small incidents, they can solve with low visibility.*

*Police Commander, PSP, Lisbon.*
Moreover, these officers were understood to have a greater capability to deal with the potential stresses of operating within boisterous crowds.

**PP:** They [non-uniformed officers]… are used to big crowds, big pressure, noise and risk situations and they make also policing in the city in the days that we don’t have any match….They [are] used to be in the middle of crowd. And it’s been experienced to be there to talk with them, don’t see the others like an enemy that are there drinking and shouting and singing and so. And I think, well we have some of them with that experience and they can be not tense like people with uniform…. So that in other places if some are used to do that they are tense and I think they create hard profile just looking for the problems. Police Commander, PSP, Oporto.

A Deputy Commander of the non-uniformed officers in Lisbon described the role of his officers.

**O2:** Our first mission is to look for those [problematic] situations but we also act depending on the level of crime or violence or depending on the situation itself. If we have to act we also work in a team, not one by one, we work always in teams. If we see that the situation is becoming something that will evolve to another degree of violence or crime we act immediately.

**C:** To try and calm the situation?

**O2:** Yes. Because we work under cover, yes, we are spotting. We are looking for the situations, through the fans, always looking for something. To prevent that things happen. When we see or when we think that things are going to happen, we act.

Deputy Police Commander, NIP, Lisbon.

Thus, in addition to their surveillance role non-uniformed officers were ‘pro-active’. For example, Stott et al. (in press) report an incident following England’s final match of the tournament in which a small group of England fans began to throw missiles at a large crowd of Portuguese fans in the Rossio Square in Lisbon. Portuguese fans almost immediately began to attack these England fans, who in turn retreated into a café on the west side of the square. Very quickly, a large group of approximately thirty non-uniformed officers emerged from the crowd, donned fluorescent bibs which were marked with
the word ‘POLICE’ and created a cordon around the café between the two groups, preventing further attacks from taking place. Shortly afterwards, through collaboration with U.K. police officers, the England fans were removed from the area and the situation calmed\(^5\).

These non-uniformed officers also described an intention to communicate with fans at an early stage as a way of defining the limits of what was acceptable in fan behaviour. It was acknowledged that the use of force would be initiated only after such limits were communicated and superseded. For example, an NIP commander in Oporto described an incident involving German fans.

\[
\text{N: What happened over there I think it was even for us the first major nights work. The Germans after being arrested they said it was that everything started with a Dutch that thrown a beer, a bottle of beer. But what my men said that were in the place, nothing like that. The argument started, they exchanged some word and so on and when the police tried to, our guys, tried to react and put a little bit calm, they react against us. And it was against us, against the police. And they threw a chair and they tried to be a little bit more arrogant and we didn’t allow them and we arrest the five… [Then] everything calmed. Even I saw that only couple of guys noticed our movement….}
\]

\[
\text{C: When you describe the actions that you do during the football event, why do you think it has the effect on keeping the situation calm?}
\]

\[
\text{N: … I think the idea that I have of my work and the way we do it is we react, if we need to apply the strength we do it but first of all we try to talk and to talk and to talk and to talk. And when we react directly to someone, we don’t do it to a group, we go straight to one or two persons and we took them from the group immediately…. Here in Portugal that’s what we are using …}
\]

\[
\text{Police Commander, NIP, Oporto.}
\]

\[\text{International Police Co-operation} \]

Our observations record that an important role was also played by small groups of uniformed and non-uniformed foreign police officers (or ‘spotters’). These police officers were always accompanied by a Cicerone from the PSP. Whilst their primary role was the identification of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5} For a fuller account of this incident see Stott et al. (in press).}\]
‘hooligans’, on occasion these officers would intervene to validate ‘real time’ information and assist in dealing with situations that might otherwise have escalated. For example, the Head of the U.K. police delegation describes how he actively prevented the deployment of the Corpo de Intervenção into a Square containing a large crowd of England fans playing ‘mass football’ in Coimbra just prior to the match against Switzerland.

C: When you say that you had contact with this intervention squad that were going into the Praca do Comercio [the main Square in Coimbra] what exactly did you do?

DS: The vans parked and they got out and said ‘What’s going on?’ And I got a local Portuguese guy and [my Cicerone] Pedro to ask what they are doing, why they are doing it? And it had been a telephone call from a bar keeper or whatever complaining about the ball bouncing.

C: And they were actually being deployed at that point and you were able to stop that?

DS: We were able to stop that by simply saying: Don’t think that is necessarily a good idea, you know, they are not really …

C: So the platoon commander essentially listened to what you had to say and that effected his deployment.

DS: Right.

U.K. Police Delegation Commander.

Preventing this deployment was particularly important because the interview data suggest that had the Corpo de Intervenção been deployed, they may have been used indiscriminately against all England supporters present in the Square:

So that’s how we managed the situation. If the spotters noticed for instance some kind of violence against a non-football supporter, or for instance, some kind of damage in the public property, that anti-riot unit would immediately go down the stairs and clean all the square. Because we had the means for that.

---

6 It is common for England fans when gathering in large crowds abroad to play football. This presents some danger as they play by kicking a heavy leather ball high into the air and waiting for it to drop before it is kicked up again. It is a deliberately dangerous game as the ball can, and does, fall onto tables with drinks, break windows and injure people who are walking through the area.
Police Commander, PSP, Coimbra.

Corpo de Intervenção Despite this example from Coimbra, our observations recorded very few instances of ‘riot police’ being deployed during the tournament. Figure 4 illustrates one of these instances just prior to the match between the Netherlands and Germany on the 15th of June, 2004. Overall, though, PSP records confirm an almost total absence of public order incidents. Consistent with this, our observations record only minor incidents of conflict in areas controlled by the PSP. This low level of conflict is also reflected in data from the National Information Point7 and in the arrest figures. Specifically, only one England fan was arrested by the PSP for a violence-related offence.

Figure 4. Officers from the Corpo de Intervenção monitoring an entry point to the Dragão Stadium in Oporto.

4.3 Policing Study 3: Quantitative Analysis of Police Deployments.

The qualitative analysis of policing indicates that the low profile policy was largely implemented. In order to assess the generalisability of the qualitative analysis we now turn to an analysis of the quantitative data derived from the structured observations. These data indicate that there was a visible police presence in 56% of samples. There was a significant difference in levels of visible police deployment ($\chi^2 = 6.22, p < .05$) between ‘normal’ and ‘increased’ risk events.

---

7 There were minor incidents involving England fans that developed at the entry point to the Stadio de Luz just prior to England’s opening match against France and just prior to England’s match against Croatia.
This difference was not in the expected direction with ‘increased’ risk situations recording a 53 % visible police presence and ‘normal’ risk showing a 59 % police presence. On closer analysis this difference is entirely due to the special case of the match between England and Switzerland in Coimbra which was ‘increased’ risk but which showed only a 19 % police visibility. Excluding Coimbra, the difference is non-significant ($\chi^2 = 0.22, p > .05$). Across both ‘normal’ and ‘increased’ risk situations, 42 % of samples saw no visible police presence during crowd events. This overall level of police visibility is significantly lower than Euro 2000 ($\chi^2 = 205.5, p < .001$).

If police were visibly present the proportion was on average 5.5 officers per 100 fans, with on average 4.5 officers per 100 fans in relation to ‘normal risk’ matches and 6.9 officers per 100 fans around ‘increased risk’ matches ($U = 518, z = 2.357, p < .05$). This compares to a visible presence during Euro 2000 that ranged from an average of 6 officers per 100 fans in low profile, normal risk situations to 50 officers per 100 fans in high profile high risk situations.

If uniformed police were visibly present at sample time, this was never in the form of the Corpo de Intervenção deployed wearing their full protective equipment (i.e., 0% of samples). During Euro 2000 fully equipped ‘riot police’ were present in 15 % of samples, with ‘increased risk’ situations having on average more than twice as many officers deployed wearing protective equipment than ‘normal’ risk situations (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). During Euro2004 police were present in ‘partial riot’ gear in 18 % of all samples (31 % of samples with a uniform police presence). There was no significant difference in the number of police in partial riot gear between ‘normal’ and ‘increased risk’ situations ($\chi^2 = 0.36; p > .05$). In 16 % of samples (28 % of samples with uniform police presence), police ‘riot vehicles’ were visible. There was no significant difference in the visibility of police ‘riot vehicles’ between ‘normal’ and ‘increased risk’ situations ($\chi^2 = 0.001; p > .05$). During Euro2000 police ‘riot vehicles’ were visible in 50 % of samples, and significantly more often in ‘increased’ as compared to ‘normal risk’ situations (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001).
Contrary to our expectations positive interpersonal interactions (‘contacts’) between police and fans were noted in only 5% of all samples (9% of samples with uniformed police presence), with a non-significant trend towards slightly more contacts in ‘increased risk’ situations 7% versus 10% ($\chi^2 = 0.76$; $p > .05$). During Euro 2000 positive contacts between fans and police were significantly higher ($\chi^2 = 509.5$, $p < .001$) noted in 40% of samples, with a non-significant trend in the opposite direction such that there were fewer contacts in ‘increased risk’ situations (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001).

Again consistent with the qualitative analysis above, structured observations during Euro 2004 record an incident of ‘disorder’ as occurring in just 0.4% of all samples. Moreover, of the few incidents that did occur all were rated as ‘small’ by our observers. During Euro 2000, 10% of samples recorded incidents and these were equally divided over ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’. This difference is highly significant ($\chi^2 = 152.83$, $p < .01$). A summary of the differences in patterns of police deployment between Euro2000 and Euro2004 is presented in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Euro 2000</th>
<th>Euro 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total N of samples</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samples with uniformed Police</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. uniform officers/100 fans</td>
<td>6–50</td>
<td>4–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samples with ‘riot’ Police</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samples with ‘riot vehicles’</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samples positive interaction</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samples recording incidents</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Structured observational data related to police deployment at Euro2004 and Euro2000

5. Analysis of Fans’ Psychology

Having addressed the nature of police understandings and deployments we turn now to an analysis of fan psychology. In a qualitative analysis of these processes, Stott et al. (in press) argued that England fans contrasted the ‘low-profile’ policing experienced at Euro2004 with the more intimidating militaristic styles they had encountered at previous matches abroad. The open
ended responses from the post tournament questionnaires resonate with their analysis:

I was very impressed by the low key policing in Lisbon city centre and near to the stadium. I was in Marseilles for the world cup game between England and Tunisia in 1998 and the policing that day was on a very different scale and much more intimidating / frightening. I feel that the Portuguese police got it right by keeping a low profile, treating all the fans with respect and allowing us to have a good time without being intimidating or overbearing but letting it be known that there was a police presence should there be any idiots causing trouble. (Post tournament questionnaire, Resp. 74. Eng v France)

Their analysis also suggests that England fans generally experienced PSP tactics as appropriate. Moreover, it suggests that in this social context England fans subjectively differentiated themselves from ‘hooligans’ and displayed common bonds of identification with fans from other nations (Stott et al, in press). Again, open ended responses from the present study resonate with this analysis:

The Police watched us from a distance and didn’t bother us at all; we were loud, boisterous and using bad language liberally. The Police knew we were not committing any crimes though and left us to have a good time mixing with locals and other nations’ fans. The British Police could learn a lot from the Portuguese, they were superb. (Post tournament Questionnaire, Resp. 96, Portugal v England).

The aim of the following section is to examine these processes through a quantitative analysis focusing on (a) a contrast between pre-tournament expectations and post tournament experiences and (b) change and stability in associations between key variables.

5.1 Pre-tournament measures

Identification and differentiation  First, overall levels of ingroup identification, similarity and difference from relevant outgroups were tested. The mean
values for ‘ingroup identification’ \( (t = 8.65, df\ 38, p < .001) \), ‘differentiation from hooligans’ \( (t = -7.40, df\ 38, p < .001) \) and ‘perceived similarity with opposition fans’ \( (t = -2.45, df\ 38, p < .05) \) were all significantly above the mid-point value of 3. The mean value for ‘perceived similarity with the Portuguese police’ did not significantly differ from this mid-point \( (t = -0.662, df\ 38, p > 0.05) \). This indicates that prior to the tournament fans already displayed positive identification with England fans, strong differentiation from ‘hooligans’ and a perceived similarity with opposition fans but were relatively ambivalent about their similarity with the police. The means and standard deviations for these items are reported in table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire Item</th>
<th>Pre-tournament</th>
<th>Post-tournament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup identification</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiation from hooligans</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity with opposition fans</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity with PSP</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Means and standard deviations for pre- and post-tournament measures of identification and differentiation.

**Expectations of intergroup relations in Portugal** Second, the valance of pre-tournament expectations regarding intergroup relations was explored. The mean values for expectations about intergroup relations with the local population, opposition fans and the police are displayed in table 3. Only expectations about intergroup relations with the local population differed significantly from the mid-point \( (t = 9.16, df\ 38, p < .001) \). Thus, whilst fans tended to be positive in their expectations about the local population they remained relatively unsure about their expected intergroup relationship with the Portuguese police and with opposition fans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire Item</th>
<th>Pre-tournament</th>
<th>Post-tournament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience of ingroup</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup relations with local population</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup relations with opposition fans</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup relations with the PSP</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Means and standard deviations for pre- and post-tournament measures of expectations of intergroup relations in Portugal.
Associations among intergroup expectations, similarity and difference. The associations among pre-tournament measures were then explored by calculating bivariate correlations. The correlation coefficients are reported in table 4. Most notably, ingroup identification shows a strong and significant negative correlation with fans perceived similarity with the Portuguese police. Moreover, perceived similarity with opposition fans was positively correlated with expectations regarding intergroup relations with those fans \((r = 0.460; p < 0.01)\) and with the local population in match cities \((r = 0.472; p > 0.01)\).

5.2 Post-tournament measures

Identification and differentiation: As with the pre-tournament measures, post-tournament measures of ingroup identification \((t = 11.8, df 60, p < .001)\), differentiation from hooligans \((t = -8.4, df 63, p < .01)\), and perceived similarity to opposition fans \((t = -5.62, df 62, p < .01)\) were significantly above the mid-point. In contrast, mean perceived similarity to the Police was now significantly below the mid-point \((t = -2.66, df 58, p < .05)\). Means and standard deviations for these scales are displayed in table 2.

Experiences of ingroup behaviour and intergroup relations with the police: As with pre-tournament expectation measure, fans’ mean experience of intergroup relations with the local population’ \((t = 10.33, df 62, p < .001)\) was significantly above the mid-point (i.e. positive). In addition, post-tournament the means for experience of intergroup relations with opposition fans \((t = 7.98, df 62, p < .001)\) and experience of intergroup relationships with the Portuguese police \((t = 6.04, df 60, p < .001)\) were significantly above the mid-point. Finally, the post-tournament measure of experience of the ingroup \((t = 9.22, df 56, p < .001)\) was also significantly above the mid-point. The means and standard deviations for these measures are displayed in table 3.

Comparison of pre-and post tournament measures Differences between pre- and post-tournament items were tested using between-subjects \(t\)-tests. There were no significant differences in levels of ingroup identification, differentiation
from hooligans, similarity with opposition fans or similarity to the police (all $t$’s < 1).

In order to compare pre- and post-tournament measures relating to intergroup relations, only those items present in both the pre- and post-tournament questionnaires were compared. Thus, scales relating to opposition fans, local population and policing consisted of one, two and three items respectively. There were significant positive increases on all three of these intergroup relations measures: for the local population ($t = -2.63, df 100, p < 0.05$), opposition fans ($t = -5.04, df 99, p < 0.001$) and the Portuguese police ($t = -4.14, df 99, p < .001$).

Post-tournament associations among intergroup experiences, similarity and difference

Bivariate correlations among the post-tournament measures were calculated. These coefficients are reported in Table 4. The expected positive correlation between intergroup relations and perceived similarity with opposition fans did not emerge. Rather, the measures of intergroup relations in match cities were significantly and positively correlated with perceived similarity to the Police. Moreover, in marked contrast to the pre-tournament measures, ingroup identification was strongly and positively correlated with perceived similarity to the Police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Ingroup Identification</th>
<th>Differentiation from Hooligans</th>
<th>Similarity with Opposition fans</th>
<th>Similarity with PSP</th>
<th>Relations with Population</th>
<th>Relations with Opposition fans</th>
<th>Relations with PSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup Identification</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.149**</td>
<td>-0.498**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.433**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity with Opposition fans</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.296*</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.516*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity with PSP</td>
<td>0.454**</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.248~</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.525**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Population</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.472**</td>
<td>0.502*</td>
<td>0.516**</td>
<td>0.795**</td>
<td>0.429**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Opposition fans</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.460**</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.655**</td>
<td>0.416**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Pre- and Post tournament correlations between measures of intergroup relations, identification and differentiation. ** correlation is significant at $p < 0.01$ level (two tailed) * significant at $p < 0.05$ level (two tailed) ~significant at $p = 0.05$ (two tailed). Post tournament correlations are in italic font and are located in the top right portion of the table.

In order to test the reliability of this apparent change in the association between ingroup identification and similarity with the police, an interaction
Analysis was performed using the general linear model, with similarity with the police as the outcome variable and ingroup identification, time (pre- vs. post-tournament), and the ingroup identification \times time interaction as predictors. As expected, the interaction between ingroup identification and time was highly significant, \( F(1,94) = 25.39, p < .001 \), indicating that the association between ingroup identification and similarity with the police was significantly more positive after the tournament than it was before.

6. Conclusions.
This paper set out to explore the extent to which the ESIM can act as a useful predictive tool for practitioners and policy makers in the domain of public order policing. To do so, it presented an analysis of how ESIM based research influenced policing strategy and practice during Euro2004, along with the consequences of this for fan psychology and behaviour. Overall, the data suggest that the ESIM-based model of best practice was implemented by the PSP, and that this created a context in which ‘disorder’ was minimised and England fans maintained a non-confrontational sense of identity.

6.1 Policing strategy and outcomes
In terms of policing, there was considerable evidence of a policy orientation toward a low-profile approach, consistent with the model of good practice. The strategic approach emphasised tolerance limits but focused upon facilitating fans from the outset. Importantly, there was a commitment to the gathering of ‘real time’ information from the crowd to ensure that escalations in police use of force, if necessary, were correctly targeted and did not involve indiscriminate interventions against crowds as a whole.

There was also considerable evidence that this low profile strategy was understood and implemented by PSP officers. For example, the Corpo de Intervenção were rarely deployed and deliberately kept out of the sight whilst extensive use was made of standard uniform and non-uniformed officers. Police understood their role as being about facilitating fans, monitoring for emergent risk and providing an early ‘low-impact’ and information-led
intervention capability (i.e. based upon information gathered during the event). In this way interventions, where judged necessary, were targeted specifically at those fans judged by police to have gone beyond previously communicated tolerance limits. Thus, policing was relatively dynamic (i.e. could change rapidly from one level to another in terms of its use of force) and differentiated.

Importantly, such low profile policing was not ‘laissez-faire’. Rather, it was highly ‘pro-active’, utilising at an early stage a range of non-confrontational tactical options. Moreover, officers had the authority and ability to communicate the tolerance limits to fans and deal quickly with any subsequent incidents of ‘emergent disorder’. It was in this context of ‘tactical depth’ (i.e. exercising a broad range of non-confrontational tactical options) that the deployment of riot police was deemed unnecessary and the overall levels of disorder were extremely low.

The structured observational data confirm the low profile of PSP deployment on the one hand, and the low levels of disorder on the other. Moreover, both the level of police visibility and the number of incidents of disorder were both significantly lower than at Euro2000. These data also identify Coimbra as an exceptional case in terms of the significantly lower levels of uniform police visibility than in other host cities. There is qualitative evidence that this situation in Coimbra was due to a generalised anxiety among PSP officers about policing England fans, and in turn led to a deficiency in monitoring and low impact intervention capability. Nevertheless, whilst Coimbra generally represented an exception to the overall style of PSP policing, some aspects of police strategy were still consistent with the model. For example, while the Corpo de Intervenção were initially deployed in response to a relatively minor incident involving England fans, it was the ability of the PSP to validate this risk assessment with and take advice from the visiting police force which prevented this deployment being followed through. Thus, although failure to adhere to one aspect of the policy almost led to a generally-targeted and disproportionate intervention, adherence to another
aspect of the policy (i.e., international police co-operation) successfully prevented it.

6.2 Fan psychology

Turning to the effect of this policing context on fan behaviour and psychology, the present study also sought to quantitatively test Stott et al.’s (in press) contentions regarding levels of particular variables (e.g., differentiation from hooligans) and the associations among them. There was clear support for the contention that fans experienced policing and their relationship with other fans in match cities as positive overall, and more positive than they had expected prior to the tournament. In this context there is evidence that fans differentiated themselves strongly from hooligans, and perceived themselves to be similar to fans of other nations. Moreover, this differentiation and similarity were positively correlated with experiences of policing.

Most strikingly, there was evidence that Euro2004 transformed the association between ingroup identification among England fans and perceived similarity with the police. Prior to the tournament, ingroup identification among England fans was negatively associated with similarity to the police in match cities. In other words, strong identification as an England fan implied dissimilarity to police prior to the tournament. After the tournament, however, ingroup identification among England fans was positively associated with similarity to the police in match cities. This suggests that the meaning of being an England fan, in terms of their relationship with police at least, underwent a significant change during the tournament.

6.3 Implications: Policing, crowd psychology and public order

The current study clearly provides further strong support for the ESIM analysis of crowd behaviour and is consistent with other analyses of the importance of low profile proactive approaches to public order management (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Hall & De Lint, 2003; Innes, 2005; King & Waddington, 2004, 2005; Sheptycki, 2005; Waddington & King, 2005). However, the current analysis goes beyond existing research in a number of
critically important ways. This study provides detailed quantitative and qualitative data on the patterns of and understandings behind police strategy and deployment across a major international football tournament. It also provides quantitative data on key psychology variables and systematic measures of the levels of public order as these relate to the same event. In so doing this study has shown how psychological theory can positively influence policy, and practice as this relates to policing across a European nation state. Moreover, it has been able to show that when such policy was implemented, not only was conflict avoided but public order outcomes were consistent with ESIM derived predictions as these relate to underlying social psychological processes (Adang & Stott, 2004; Stott & Adang, 2003a,b. – see also Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott, et al. 2001, Stott, 2003).

In particular, the study provides considerable support for Stott et al.’s (in press) contentions regarding the relationship between policing context, fan psychology and public order outcomes. At one level it confirms that England fans at Euro2004 perceived the low profile approach and their subsequent intergroup relations with the PSP as subjectively legitimate. Moreover, fans in this context displayed a form of supra-ordinate identification with fans of other nations. This form of ‘football fan’ identity was couched in terms of non-violence, and was reflected not only in the absence of any major disorder in match cities, but also in the extent to which fans differentiated themselves psychologically from ‘hooligans’.

At another level, the present study provides support for Stott et al.’s (in press) contention that this context of legitimate social relations with the police was one in which a transformation occurred in the subjective meanings of being an England fan, and the relationship that fans have to their social category. In particular, identification as an England fan prior to these subjectively legitimate relationships implied a differentiation from police, whilst subsequent to them it implied similarity. Put in slightly different terms, this suggests that after experiencing legitimacy in social relations with the police those that saw themselves as different from the police began to
psychologically disassociate from the England fan category. This in turn echoes Stott et al.’ (in press) speculation that the policing context also affected the extent to which hooligans saw themselves as empowered or marginalised within the wider community of fans (see also Stott et al, 2001).

Going beyond the previous ESIM based analysis of Stott et al. (in press) the current study suggests that the subjectively legitimate intergroup relations with the police in match cities were closely tied to a perceived similarity with them among fans. This similarity or identification with the police was then directly associated with the presence of the supra-ordinate football fan identity, which in turn was associated with a psychological differentiation from hooligans.

The study has therefore made a considerable contribution to an understanding of the relationship between police profile, fan psychology and levels of disorder in the context of football matches with an international dimension that builds upon previous work (e.g. Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). It supports the contention by Stott and Adang (2004) that low-profile policing is efficient and effective because it is more capable than high profile policing of identifying sources of risk, maintaining proportionality and avoiding indiscriminate forms of police intervention. Moreover, this study also suggests that its effectiveness lies in the ability to manage risk in ways that generate (or at least maintain) shared perceptions among fans of the legitimacy of their collective social relationships with the police. The legitimacy in intergroup relations then helps to marginalise and disempower those fans who would seek to generate disorder within the wider crowd. In short, the present study has provided strong evidence that low profile policing actively manages intergroup interaction in such a manner that avoids the forms of collective psychology, intergroup dynamics and intragroup relations that the ESIM model proposes are necessary for widespread escalation and rioting to occur (e.g. Stott & Drury, 2000).
6.4 Limitations

This contribution notwithstanding, the current study has some key limitations. First, our confidence in the precise causal relations among variables (particularly among fans) would have been greater if a longitudinal design had been possible. Second, comparable data from a context of high-profile policing during the tournament were not available (but see Stott et al., in press). Third, it was not possible to control for any effect of the legislation, alluded to in the introduction, which prevented large numbers of hooligans from attending the tournament. Finally, our police data draws extensively from senior commanders and as such neglects the psychology of those more junior officers actually interacting with fans.

Dealing with each of these limitations in turn, gathering any data on these processes at international football tournaments is in and of itself highly demanding and potentially dangerous. As such, the extensive data from England fans presented here are, along with those reported by Stott et al. (in press), are actually remarkably thorough. This is especially so given the multiple method approach to data collection, which overcame some of the potential issues of sampling error because it allowed for triangulation among multiple data sources (Denzin, 1989). It is also clear that there is a great deal of consistency among the fan data obtained via different methods, undermining any suggestion of biases of one form or another (see also Stott et al., in press, and Drury & Stott, 2003 for discussion on methodology).

In terms of the relative absence of systematic data from high-profile policing contexts, this is clearly true in the present paper. However, Stott et al. (in press) provide a relatively detailed account of how the second of the major incidents of ‘disorder’ in Albufeira was characterised by rapid escalation, increasingly undifferentiated police interventions, and the involvement of previously peaceful fans in ‘violent’ acts. This analysis of the event emphasised how its dynamics were consistent with other ESIM analyses of rioting, particularly in terms of the changing social identity of fans in the face of undifferentiated police interventions. Moreover, to argue that data from
this high profile policing context were less comprehensive than those from low-profile policing contexts misses the point that the existence of both types of policing in the same tournament still represented an unprecedented opportunity to compare public order outcomes and fan psychology in those contexts. While this has not been a key concern of this paper, it is brought to the fore in other analyses within the project (e.g., Stott et al., in press).

It should be made clear that we are not arguing that the relationship between policing profile and fan psychology and behaviour is a simple, deterministic one, or that there is no role for other factors such as the activities of fan organisations (e.g., Gabriel, Wurbs & Miles, 2005; Miles, 2000; 2004; Perryman, 2006), legislative measures such as banning hooligans from travelling, or the efforts of local Government agencies (c.f. Stott & Pearson, 2006). However, as indicated above, the occurrence of two ‘riots’ in an area controlled by Portugal’s second major police force, the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), offers an opportunity for comparison within the same tournament, country and national fan group whilst these other factors remained relatively constant.

As Stott et al. (in press) have argued, the GNR utilised a different form of policing to the PSP. They argue that this style of policing lacked early proactive tactical depth and as such was more reliant upon and more inclined toward the kinds of high profile indiscriminate interventions implicated in the escalation of disorder during previous tournaments (e.g. Stott & Reicher, 1998a). In the absence of any *a priori* evidence of differences in the numbers of ‘hooligans’ present or in the activities of other agencies in either context then an explanation of these differences in public order outcomes in terms of fan psychology and policing strategy is both parsimonious and powerful (Stott & Adang, 2004; Stott, 2003).

Finally, we acknowledge that there is a limitation in our data relating to the psychology of junior officers. We draw attention once again to the difficulties of gaining access to police data, this time caused by language barriers and the fact that junior officers are often too exhausted following their shifts to agree
to partake in research (see Stott, 2003). None the less this is a limitation and one that can be fruitfully pursued in terms of future research seeking to analyse intergroup dynamics as they relate to crowd police interactions.

### 6.5 Conclusions: theory and practice in public order policing

While the above limitations are acknowledged, we would argue that the achievements of the present study greatly outweigh any residual ontological uncertainty. Indeed, the present study represents as complete and comprehensive a study of crowd behaviour as yet exists in the literature (see also Stott et al., in press). This is in no small part because of its ability to directly relate police perspectives and practices to collective (fan) psychology and behaviour within the same events. In so doing, it has come as close as any other study in the literature to presenting the ideal, ‘fully interactive’ analysis of intergroup dynamics (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998b).

The comprehensive nature of this study, and in particular its ability to address both sides of the intergroup dynamic, was at one level only possible because of collaboration between researchers and practitioners. At another level, the utility of good theory and the specific needs of those practitioners made that collaboration possible in the first place. In turn, this collaboration has helped not only to validate but also to develop a theoretical understanding of crowd dynamics. Thus, it is clear that the benefits of such collaboration are reciprocal rather than uni-directional, and also that the viability of such collaboration in the first instance is contingent not just on whether theory is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but also on the extent to which it fits with the agenda and political realities faced by practitioners.

This contingency is brought into sharp focus when considering the inability of this study to directly compare low and high profile police deployment. Specifically, this limitation was largely attributable to differential levels of access to the PSP and GNR. Thus, where there were good bridges of access it is evident that policing was informed by theory, and that this collaboration culminated in one of the most successful international football tournaments ever held within Europe in terms of the levels of disorder.
Nevertheless, potential is clearly no guarantee of receptiveness to a particular theory. Where such collaboration was not evident, not only were levels of disorder higher, but the possibility of analysing why this occurred was undermined. One conclusion to be drawn from this is therefore that nurturing mutually constructive collaborations between psychological theory, policy and practice in the domain of public order policing (or any other domain for that matter) is made more likely by the extent to which theory and researchers speak to the political realities and agendas faced by practitioners. The challenge is therefore how to overcome situations in which the agendas of practitioners and researchers sit at cross purposes, because it is apparent that where such collaborations are least likely, they could potentially have the greatest impact.
7. References


8. Appendices

Appendix 1: Breakdown of Categories used in the Structured Observations

Location
Time
Observer stationary or mobile
Number persons present in total (exclusive of police)
Team 1 (country code)
Team 2 (country code)
Fans of other country present? (no or country code)
Number fans team 1
Number fans team 2
Number of media representatives
Number non-police security
Number unknown civilian/ others
Number police in total
Number of plain clothes police
Number of standard uniform police
Number of partial riot police
Number of full riot police
Number normal police vehicles
Number of police vans
Number water cannon
Number police horses
Number police dogs
Number fans team 1 agitated (not calm)
Number fans team 1 shouting/ singing (not quiet)
Number fans team 2 agitated (not calm)
Number fans team 2 shouting/ singing (not quiet)
Number of team 1 fans within touching distance of team 2 fans
Number of team 2 fans within touching distance of team 1 fans
Number of police within touching distance to fans
Number of fans team 1 in positive interaction with team 2 fans
Number of fans team 2 in positive interaction with team 1 fans
Number of fans team 1 in negative interaction with team 2 fans
Number of fans team 1 in negative interaction with team 2 fans
Number of police in positive interaction with team 1 fans
Number of police in negative interaction with team 1 fans
Number of police in positive interaction with team 2 fans
Number of police in negative interaction with team 2 fans
Incident in last 15 min (none, small, medium, large)
Police intervention in last 15 min (none, stopping, arrest, dispersion)
Use of force by police in last 15 min (yes/no)

Appendix 2: Participants in Interviews with PSP.
PSP Commander, Braga.
PSP Commander, Coimbra.
Head of Corpo de Intervenção, Northern Portugal.
Head of National Information Point, Lisbon.
Head of NIP, Oporto.
PSP Commander, Oporto.
PSP Sector Commander, Central Oporto.
PSP Commander of Lisbon Stadiums.
PSP Commander, Faro.
Head of PSP Training, Lisbon.
Deputy Head of Training, PSP, Lisbon.
Deputy Head of NIP and Senior Colleague, Lisbon.

Appendix 3: Open ended items on web based questionnaire
We would also very much like to hear from you in your own words about your experiences as an England fan during your time in this host city. If you are willing to provide us with your views then please type your responses to the questions in the relevant text box below.

1. Please provide any opinions you have about issues or events that were relevant to you or other England fans during events surrounding this match.
2. If you have not already done so please describe your views upon the overall quality of the policing or stewarding of England fans.