Institutionalised Governance: the case of the NCSL

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Abstract
The paper is based on data from the Knowledge Production and Educational Leadership Project (funded by the ESRC RES-000-23-1192) where we investigated the relationship between the state, public policy and knowledge during the New Labour governments from 1997 onwards. The relationship between the state and civil society is one of institutionalised governance where the public institution in the form of the national ministry and the establishment of Non-Departmental Public Bodies remain important in policymaking but is increasingly inter-dependent with networks of advisors and private consultants who ‘enter’ government as policy designers and deliverers. We intend to develop this through using the National College for School Leadership as a case study based on primary documentation and interview data.
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Introduction

Following the initial announcement by the Prime Minister at the New Heads conference in 1998 (Passmore 1998), a National College for School Leadership was proposed in the Green Paper, *teachers: meeting the challenge of change* (DfEE, 1998), and subsequently Tony Blair made the following statement in his speech to the National Association of Headteachers on 2 June 1999:

> Central to the Green Paper is greater investment in training, support and rewards for heads and those aspiring to headship. Managing a school is as least as great a challenge as running a company. Yet for too long we accepted that chief executives had their MBAs and intensive management and leadership programmes, while headteachers arrived on the first of September with just the keys to the office and a few tips from their predecessor, if they were lucky. We are investing to provide a national system of management and leadership training for school leaders, something I know you strongly support. The DfEE has already started to put a proper training regime in place. Good progress has been made, but we are keen to see improvements, particularly to ensure that training makes better use of successful serving heads. In the Green Paper we proposed to establish a National College for School Leadership. This proposal has attracted wide enthusiasm, as an opportunity to create a single focus for the training and development of headteachers. We are today publishing the prospectus for the new college - a £10m centre, with residential facilities and state-of-the-art ICT to spread its work nationally and internationally. The college will open next year, and we will begin immediately to seek a founding director and partners to take the college forward. New technology will be critical. The sheer scale of the college's audience, with 24,000 serving heads, probably twice that number aspiring to headship and many more in management positions, means that a major part of its operations must be available as a virtual college on the Internet. The college will develop leadership and management skills, taking on responsibility for the full range of school leadership courses. We also intend it to develop a strong international dimension, through placements and ICT, enabling school leaders in this country to build overseas links and set their work in a far wider context. (Blair, 1999)

The College was opened in 2000 and a decade on from the formal announcement there is an opportunity to put the creation of this state monopoly into perspective. The College is located in a purpose built building on the Jubilee Campus of the University of Nottingham, with nine regional centres. The College was set up as an executive Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) with a remit to: first, train and license headteachers to meet supply and demand requirements; second, train and license headteachers and other role incumbents as local ‘leader’ deliverers of national reforms; third, accredit training as a part of a new framework of credentials which redefined
professional competence and practice (a) Leadership from the Middle (LfM) for aspiring and serving middle leaders\(^2\), (b) the National Professional Qualification for Headteachers (NPQH) for aspiring headteachers\(^3\), (c) induction for new heads through HEADLAMP or Headteacher Leadership and Management Programme and then HIP or Headteacher Induction Programme\(^4\), and (d) the Leadership Programme for Serving Headteachers (LPSH) which has recently been replaced with Head for the Future\(^5\); fourth, to fund and control research through the identification of priorities and the tendering process with researchers (through the identification of projects, selection of researcher teams, the control of methodology, and report structure and content); fifth, to establish the model of school leadership that is to be practiced in schools through the design of training, the use of conferences and discussion forums, and the promotion of particular texts and researchers as officially endorsed knowledge producers.

After nearly two decades of the state being rolled back with privatisation and the creation of the conditions for a quasi-market in education, the establishment of the National College for School Leadership (NCSL) is an interesting site to examine how the state retains hierarchical control in public governance. While political science has taken the field on an analytical and discursive journey from government institutions to governance through networks, the New Labour decade is illustrative of how the state is not so much a referee or steering mechanism but remains a director and active player. As Newman (2001:13) has argued the “changing role of the state can be understood as an adaptation to its environment rather than a diminution of its power.” Through an examination of the NCSL we put forward an argument that the New Labour’s approach to education policy is one of institutionalised governance, where the public institution in the form of Whitehall remains strong, and has increased its legitimacy and capacity for control through inviting in and working through networks.

**Institutionalised Governance**

The *Knowledge Production in Educational Leadership (KPEL) Project* examined the relationship between the state, public policy and knowledge. The site in which this has been researched is
government investment in headteachers as leaders of schools with a particular emphasis on the first decade of New Labour (1997-2007). Specifically the Project focused on the production of New Labour education policy through the public institutions of the state and the knowledge that was drawn on to produce, legitimise and operationalise such policies. Attention was given to the way public institutions directly intervened in the construction and identity of a professional group, and did this by inviting and involving private interests in ways that enabled policy to be formed and implemented in the name of the public interest. Such private interests include individual entrepreneurs and philanthropists, consultants from private companies, and members of HEIs who undertake entrepreneurial activity within leadership centres and/or as researchers in Schools of Education. The analysis confirmed a form of *institutionalised governance* where the state is adapting to the interplay between hierarchy, markets and networks (Newman 2001).

Our argument is that the public institution remains strong and a central feature of state activities. Public institutions within Whitehall (PM and No 10 advisors, Department6, Treasury) have secured top-down control of education policy conceptualisation and delivery through, first, a combination of legal, economic, and cultural technologies (policies, funding, laws, green papers, guidance, training) and tools (rewards through performance related pay and penalties through contract termination or non-renewal), where national policy has directly intervened into schools, classrooms, communities and homes in ways that shape practice, discourse and imaginations about what education is about and for; second, a restructuring of Whitehall where the Department has established ‘units’, such as the Standards and Effectiveness Unit, and the Innovation Unit, staffed with pro-reformers drawn from HEIs and schools (including Civil Servants), to focus on the transmission and effectiveness of the local delivery of policy outcomes; and, third, public institutions as an extension of Whitehall’s direct control of policy design and delivery have been strengthened through: (a) expansion of regulation of private interests in the market place, e.g. the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust (SSAT), (b) redesign of provision, e.g. control of workforce supply and demand through the shift from a Teacher Training Agency (TTA) with Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) to the Training and Development Agency (TDA) which now
includes non QTS credentialising; (c) creation of a public monopoly in the design, delivery, evaluation, funding, and research of school leadership through the establishment in 2000 of the NCSL. Formal hierarchical authority matters: first, the primacy of national public institution remains where delivery is translated into targets, with the Minister linking resignation to outcome measures; second, intervention was extended by going “quango crazy” (Driver 2006: 280); and third, alternative policy generating sites are closed down or marginalised through totalising structures, and the promotion of particular cultural tastes about what is seen as normalised good practice.

This analysis goes someway to revising the shift from government to governance in policy science where it is argued that there are processes taking place where government has been “hollowed out” (Rhodes 1994) through the increased role of networks of private sector companies and quangos. The argument constructed is that the state could only steer from a distance. The New Labour decade shows that public institutions continue to matter, not least how Barber (2007) explains the delivery chain from minister to school pupil in the implementation of national standards on learning process and outcomes in schools. Béland (2005) argues that “political institutions create constraints and opportunities for those involved in policy-making” (3), and so histories matter in determining what might be done. What Barber (2007) is clear about is how the institutional logics were such that he had to work on the reform of Whitehall structures, processes and attitudes in order to enable New Labour’s commitment to delivery to operate. However, while institutions do matter, there is abundant evidence of rapid restructuring in ways that show that certain institutions can matter more than others. It is the Department and the construction of Non-Departmental Public Bodies such as the NCSL that matter most. Local government institutions have continued to be restructured and recultured as delivery and supervisory organisations through a combination of inspection, legislative requirements and outsourcing to private contractors. Unions (with the exception of the National Union of Teachers) have been incorporated into a social partnership with government, where they are directly involved in policy making. Hence governance in the form of public dialogue and political debate has been replaced
by central government direction together with contractual compliance. The reliance on a combination of NDPBs and private sector consultancies and contractual provision of educational services means that the public in relation to the institution is circumscribed and essentially means that powerful private interests are able to act in the name of the public. This is where governance in the form of networks fits in, and in particular, how institutions of the state have invited private interests to help frame and deliver public policy. As Béland (2005) goes onto argue the focus on institutions cannot explain change, not least why certain ideas come to the fore and why others are prevented.

Institutionalised governance is about networks within and connected to institutions where there is a need to give attention to “ideational forces” (Béland 2005: 13) where the power processes which build “trust networks” (Tilly 2005) around ideas is significant. Jessop (2002) calls this a “competition state”: first, regulatory public policies create forms of regulation which does not happen in a rational way, “on the contrary, they involve chance discoveries, search processes, policy transfers and social struggles” (Jessop 2002: 135). Hence policies “travel” to, enter and are interpreted and reworked in “embedded” settings (Ozga 2005), and confusion can be generated by “ensembles of policies” that contradict or generate tensions between what is being required and what is preferred (Ball 1994: 25-26). Policy needs translation, training, monitoring and measuring, and becomes regulated by those who work within it producing a risk management imperative (Hood et al. 2004). Governance by networks is limited conceptually, and what needs to be engaged with is what Kingdon (2003) identifies as policy entrepreneurs, and what we call a “regime of practice” made up of ministers, civil servants, advisors appointed from schools and HEIs to Units in the Department or NDPBs such as the NCSL, and private consultants as individuals and from large companies who are located in different institutions (Whitehall, Company) and in different places (UK and internationally) but who have shared or harmonised dispositions regarding neo-liberal reforms (Gunter and Forrester 2008). While Kingdon (2003) identifies the strategies and investment for gain within policy entrepreneurial activity, we agree with Moran (2003) that there is a need to understand the British state in relation to its historical
origins, not least the endurance of “club government” and its reformation in the current configuration of regulation in a marketised system.

The elites in local government, Whitehall, and the profession that made the system work through “club government” faced challenges to their institutional power, not least through influential ideas in texts such as Chubb and Moe (1990), Osborne and Gaebler (1993), and recently Bobbit’s (2002) thesis of the “market state” where choice, personalisation and consumerism mean that public education, and hence the traditional elites who have controlled this, is a thing of the past. This rejection of ‘welfarism’ means that the “troika of providers” between the Minister, schools/Unions, and local authorities (officers, advisors, inspectors) based on “mutual regard, trust and commitment” (Williams 1995: 4) fractured, not least because it only worked as long as there was a deferral to this elite to “act sensibly” through their professional community (Bogdanor 1979: 161). Indeed, as Gewirtz (2002) has shown that such elites were seen to be the source of the problem: the Department had to become more interventionist by ensuring government reforms were delivered, and the “inefficient” and “self-interested” in schools. Unions and local authorities had to embrace reforms or be excluded.

Club government is being overlain and reworked with a form of what we call Contractual government, where some members of previous elites have positioned themselves in such a way as to be actively involved in policymaking. This includes members of local government with some former CEOs remaining close to policy; some members of the profession (particularly headteachers) who have either joined the Standards and Effectiveness Unit or Innovation Unit in the Department or have taken up employment in the NCSL or have remained in post but have led on reforms and been given honours as a result; and some professors from HEIs who have remained close to policy, lead on innovations and changes, and/or joined one of the Units. In addition elites from private sector companies, as individual consultants or as team members, have also been brought into Whitehall (and other parts of the system, not least to take over from ‘failing’ LAs) to provide advice and models of good practice, help reforms to be communicated,
and undertake research to support policy development (Gunter and Forrester 2008). We have framed this as ‘Contractual’ as distinct from ‘Club’ to illustrate the move that has taken place, where “… relationships have tended to shift towards the contractual, competitive and calculative” (Clarke et al. 2000: 9). Current elites overtly interact in ways to demonstrate their disposition to enable reform design and implementation as a means of sustaining their involvement through contractual relations. Their power base is located in contractual renewal and not in bureaucratic sustainability. In Bourdieu’s (2000) terms there is a game in play between private interest networks with Ministers and Civil Servants, with a symbolic exchange of capitals: for ministers and civil servants it is access to private sector knowledge and know how that can increase the status of government as modern and relevant to economic security in a globalising economy, and for private interests (heads, CEOs, private consultants) it is access to the configuration of public provision of services as products that they can construct and provide together with the potential market opportunities therein.

The National College for School Leadership

The National College’s ‘Learning and Conference Centre’ cost £28 million and was officially opened in Nottingham by Tony Blair on 25 October 2002. Comments made by Blair include:

…in any other walk of life where people who are leaders and are having to handle budgets the size of school budgets, or make decisions the size of school decisions, a leadership college would be something that everybody would simply take for granted

If we want to get our school system right in Britain we need the right leadership – that’s absolutely critical.

Leadership is something that comes in part from natural ability but it’s also something that is learned and developed. (NCSL 2002, press release)

This establishment and investment in a state monopoly for leadership training in England is illustrative of institutionalised governance through the interplay between the centralised control of the College with the contracting of particular private interests in the development and delivery of College activities.
New Labour focused on headteachers as deliverers of national reforms locally. Central to their policy process was a concern that reforms would be delayed, fudged or ignored by teachers, and so they needed to put in place, what Barber (2007) has called a “delivery chain” from Minister to pupil, and avoid any interference from those who were framed as potential saboteurs. Interview data shows that the perceptions of ministers, civil servants, and advisors was that headteachers were key to the reform process, and there was a direct relationship between headteachers as leaders in securing change. A direct causal relationship was forged between the headteacher, leadership and standards, with the phrase ‘world class’ being used to describe how the education system had to develop. Policymakers had read school improvement and school effectiveness texts, associated with researchers and commentators in these fields, and accepted the promotion of the causal link, not least because it fitted with their own professional knowledge as former educationalists and generic assumptions about what makes a good school.

The relationship with training is directly connected to the normality of the headteacher as leader and the urgency through which reform needed to happen. Policy texts presented this rationale with narratives around the need for headteachers to be effective leaders, and argued for centralised training with a bespoke and flagship college to demonstrate a national investment in this elite group. What our data show is that New Labour accepted the emerging training framework begun by the previous Conservative administrations (i.e. Headlamp and NPQH) but did not research the provision of short, medium and long term professional development and training that was already in existence in England for the profession, including headteachers. The long established and pluralist provision (Universities, Local Authorities, Private Companies, and combinations of these), together with a lack of compulsion to undertake actual leadership training, was seen as a weakness. Two points are evident in the data: first, the lack of a clear training rite of passage with a common brand that would signal quality and status as a leader; and, second, the lack of a requirement to be trained as a leader, and so the current situation of excellent school leadership by ‘chance’ and poor school leadership by ‘avoidance’ had to be rectified. Three models were sources of inspiration: first, the London Leadership Centre led by former
headteacher Pat Collarbone where NPQH training was undertaken within but separate from a University; second, the Ashridge Management School of training and accreditation; and third, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst where the emphasis on leadership for the armed forces but increasingly for a range of customers in partnership with the private sector. What was not investigated was the experimental and bottom up growth in training locally and also postgraduate programmes provided by higher education. It seems that partnerships that included local authorities, higher education, and Unions were sidelined, and study through MBA, MA, MSc, EdDs and PhDs in leadership were not thought to be appropriate means of upgrading the profession.

The reason for this is through those that New Labour drew on for advice and recommendations for leadership training. This form of contractual governance enabled the centre to keep control but also to deliver reform through bringing into the NCSL people who had a shared disposition to frame leadership in ways that were neo-liberal and to deliver according to prescribed contracts. Prior to New Labour taking office strategising had taken place within government networks to position higher education as unacceptable partners in the provision of professional and practical training that led to the NPQH (Cummings 2002). Many of those who had controlled and shaped this discourse continued under New Labour, and gained contracts to deliver and/or were called on to give advice. Hence while it is difficult to unravel the exact origins of the idea of a National College established by national government and directly funded by the taxpayer, it seems to be located in discussions between ministers, civil servants, advisors, and particular school leadership training providers. What seemed to help was that the NPQH had been piloted and aspiring headteachers had committed to it. The idea of a college took off and was supported within government, not least by Blair and Adonis, and through how particular advisors such as Barber (1998) promoted the school effectiveness and school improvement evidence to justify the huge investment in headteachers as leaders. Notably, while the use of ICT meant that all 24,000 headteachers could be directly connected to the college, the argument for a virtual online college or distance learning college like the Open University, was lost. The tendering process led to
Nottingham University winning the bid and the provision for an iconic building where ICT could be used to link heads at a distance as well as enable residentials. The physical building was seen as necessary to symbolise investment in headteachers as a place to visit and to be treated to a bespoke training experience as a reform elite.

Establishing the NCSL

The College is an executive NDPB sponsored by DfES and so receives core funding/grant direct from government. It is a limited company, where The National College for School Leadership Limited was incorporated on 14 June 2000. It is limited by guarantee and has no share capital (NCSL Annual Report 05/06). The production of the NCSL in this way was a matter of discussion within Whitehall, and we have the papers from April 1999 through to February 2002 which show the options and the process of decision-making.

The main issues in debate are: first, how to control the College; and second, how to secure funds to build and establish the College. This second aspect did not take off as the plans for a Charitable Body to receive donations from benefactors, led by Sir Evelyn de Rothschild, did not happen as the taxpayer funded the building and running costs of the College. The first issue of centralised control of the people leading the College is a key feature that was secured. There are a number of issues that relate to this:

- Prompted by Rothschild as a potential benefactor the Department discussed the issue of “mutuality” where they understood this to mean “an organisation owned by its customers… the benefits are that the organisation is attuned more directly to what customers need and want, without having to satisfy other stakeholders”. However, the advice given by a civil servant is not to go down this route:

  “We certainly want to establish a vigorous alumni organisation for the College – this would be part of the important benefits of networking and sharing good and effective leadership practice and experience. In the longer term, it is an attractive model for the College to be owned and run by its alumni. However it is clear that we are not in
that world yet and would not be for some time, perhaps as long as 10 years. But as an ultimate goal it may well be worth bearing in mind: if through the College and the leadership programmes we have raised leadership practice and enthusiasm in the school sector to the point that the College could successfully be transferred to its alumni, we shall certainly have succeeded” (Memo 29th April 1999).

What is interesting about this data is that mutuality is defined in terms of “alumni” rather than all headteachers as College members, hence control cannot be handed over to headteachers until they have been through the required training and co-option processes.

In a later memo the same civil servant confirms that the time is not right for such a model though in the future it could be a possibility, and the underlying concern is that “we would need to be satisfied that it was safe and sensible to hand the College over to its alumni and that they would run it properly for the benefit of parents and pupils, who as the Secretary of State says are the principal stakeholders” (Memo 7th May 1999). Consequently, what is deemed sensible and safe is the Minister who is in control on behalf of the ‘stakeholders’ that are defined as parents and children. What is not considered in any of the discussion is how parents and children might be in direct control of the College or even represented on the formal governing body. Hence the Secretary of State is the person who is deemed able through the electoral mandate to operate in ways that are “sensible” and “safe”.

In relation to the legal status of the College the direct emphasis was on the ability of the Secretary of State to be in control:

“In terms of formal constitution, the preferred option which Ministers are moving towards is to set the College up as a limited company. They want the College to be at some distance from the Department, so it cannot be set up as an Executive Agency. However, since the College needs to be rooted in Government, giving it authority and a sense of being written into the national landscape, Ministers are clear that they want to appoint the Director and all future Directors, and the Governing Council. I understand that this level of control over appointments means that in formal classification terms the College well be an Executive NDPB” (Memo 6th May 1999).

The emphasis on controlling appointments means that the Secretary of State can ensure that they can control the College “at some distance” by having appropriate appointees.
Attempts to appoint Michael Barber to the Governing Council were thwarted due to his advisory role with Ministers and he is not required to be politically impartial. However, it was agreed that he could attend meetings “on an ad hoc basis in an advisory capacity” (Memo 10th September 1999).

The issue of control is evident in discussion about whether the College should have Royal status. This could be in two forms: first, a Royal Charter, and second, the use of the Royal title. What is evident in the documents is that a Royal Charter would not be deemed appropriate because “the Privy Council Office prefers bodies with Royal Charters to be free from external control” (Memo 23rd November 1999) and a Charter would mean that a body would not be bound by *ultra vires* or the constraint in law to remain within the powers granted by the Charter. Consequently the Department would have “to be very careful to get the terms of the Charter and byelaws right if we want to pin down what the College can and can’t do” (Memo 23rd November 1999). Therefore the setting up of a limited company is deemed the simpler thing to do, and that the College could be kept under control through the courts if necessary.

The use of a Royal title is also dismissed, not only logistically in regard to the convention of awarding this to longer established bodies, but also in terms of branding. The Department is concerned with image and that the College should be seen to be new: “we are looking to set the College up as a modern, forward looking organisation rather than tying it to a more establishment image. Certainly when (name) touched on the possibility of Royal status in much earlier discussions with Ministers and No 10 there was little enthusiasm” (Memo 23rd November 1999).

Operationally the College was set up from 2000 and its work controlled through an annual Remit Letter from the Secretary of State together with funding plans. The first two Remit Letters (Blunkett 2000; 2001) outline the role of the College in relation to training,
networking with Heads and leading on research. Following an *End to End Review of School Leadership Policy and Delivery* (DfES/NCSL 2004) of the College in 2004, the official DfES/NCSL strategic response to the end to end review document suggested “adopting processes that strengthen mutual confidence and provide a well-structured relationship between NCSL and DfES”. (DfES/NCSL undated). Third Remit Letter (Kelly 2004) provides a much more detailed list of requirements regarding focus and activity though the Secretary of State says it “is not intended to reflect on my part to be over prescriptive about the College’s work” (Kelly 2004: 2). The Department’s policy agenda is directly linked to how the NCSL should frame its work, not least the opening of the letter with: “Inspirational leadership in school is crucial for delivering the government’s educational agenda…” (Kelly 2004:1). The NCSL is directed to develop stronger links with the TTA and the SST, but at the same time is clear on the need to control activity, where the Secretary of State sees the need for “greater precision, discipline, outcome-focus and depth in the future work of the College” (Kelly 2004: 2) and cautions, “we will need to exercise restraint and ensure you do not face unmanageably large burdens, spread across too wide a front” as “not every priority can be addressed at once” (Kelly 2004: 2).

**Conclusion**

Work in political science over the past two decades has made the case for how government as the traditional power base for the state has weakened through the use of networks of governance to deliver public services. Our argument is that the establishment of the NCSL is an illustration of something much more subtle taking place, where the state has responded to shifts in regard to its role, but has safeguarded the importance of hierarchy and indeed has made interventions into a professional group and professional practice that demonstrates centralised control. While private interests have been used by government to deliver, and those interests have shaped that provision, this has been through contractual arrangements where particular people and/or companies can be retained or dispensed with. Institutionalised governance in our view best describes what has taken place over the last decade: the public institution in the form of the
Treasury, the Department, and No 10 remain strong, and networks of advisors and consultants provide ideas, status and a workforce to generate policy ideas and to deliver reform strategies. Such networks have their origins in the remnants of club government where elites such as trusted people from LAs, HEIs, and Schools, have determined through their various power bases how to retain power or to concede as and when is necessary. Contractual relationships have enable other elites to enter and play the game, not least how private sector consultants and companies have brought the symbolic capital of neo-liberal practices and distinction.

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References


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Endnotes

1 The NCSL has nine regional (government region) affiliated centres (some housed in universities):

1. Eastern (Eastern Leadership Centre)
2. East Midlands (Northamptonshire County Council)
3. London (London Centre for Leadership in Learning, Institute of Education, University of London)
4. North East (North Leadership Centre, Newcastle University)
5. North West (The Centre for Education Leadership, University of Manchester)
6. South East (Education Management South East)
7. South West (Plymouth LEA)
8. West Midlands (HTI Leadership Centre)
9. Yorkshire and Humber (CCDU Training and Consultancy Ltd)

The lead partners are listed in brackets though there are affiliated providers within a region. The centres' work involves:

- providing information and advice on professional development opportunities
- promoting good practice and facilitating learning networks
- developing, promoting and offering a range of leadership development opportunities
- working with the College to develop a national quality assurance framework
- identifying and addressing gaps in training provision
- undertaking research and development projects which will contribute to NCSL policy and practice (NCSL 2004)

2 Leading from the Middle (LfM) is a 10-month professional development programme for middle leaders. Groups of between two and four middle leaders from primary, secondary and special schools are supported by one leadership coach. See www.ncsl.org.uk

3 National Professional Qualification for Headship (NPQH) was formally launched as a 'qualification' (therefore different to a programme) in September 1997 having undergone trials from January 1997 to July 1997. It was continued by the New Labour government and has gone through several reviews. The NPQH is for aspiring headteachers and is underpinned by the National Standards for Headteachers. It is mandatory to hold or have a place on NPQH in order to apply for a headship in the maintained sector. See www.ncsl.org.uk

4 The Headteachers' Leadership and Management Programme (HEADLAMP) was established in 1995 by TTA to meet induction needs of newly appointed headteachers. The scheme offered school governors an induction grant of £2500 to spend on professional development of newly appointed heads within first 2 years in post. This programme has now been discontinued, and the NCSL now has in place Early Headship Provision of which New Visions is a year-long personal and professional development programme for all new headteachers. See www.ncsl.org.uk

5 The Leadership Programme for Serving Headteachers (LPSH) was introduced in September 1998 for headteachers with three or more years experience. This has now been replaced by Head for the Future. See www.ncsl.org.uk

6 When New Labour came to power in 1997, the national ministry in London was called the Department for Education and Employment after reorganization had taken place in 1995. The DfEE became the DfES or Department for Education and Skills in 2001. In 2007 the DfES was
split into two: Department for Children Schools and Families/Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills.

7 The London Leadership Centre was located at the Institute of Education, University of London. This has been reorganised into the London Centre for Leadership in Learning, Institute of Education, University of London. See www.ioe.ac.uk

8 Now the Ashridge Business School which has direct links with public sector, not least the National School for Government:

“Ashridge is a market leader in public sector learning and development for middle and senior managers, with flagship leadership programmes and complex learning projects that develop individuals and their organisations. Feedback from clients and participants demonstrate the strength, relevance and quality of our work in public sector executive education. To reflect this excellence and improve the services offered to our public and voluntary sector customers, Ashridge has created a dedicated centre for public & voluntary sector leadership. The Ashridge Public Leadership Centre (APLC) is the innovative window on the world of business for leaders and managers in the public sector. Its vision is to be the leading developer of public sector managers. This is inspired by Ashridge’s drive to seek excellence and improve services, to help clients make better decisions in development initiatives and to go to a higher level of quality, better informed, more relevant delivery and better mechanisms to continue improving with better research, better evidence leading to better informed delivery”. www.ashridge.org.uk Accessed 2nd June 2008.

9 Sandhurst has a partnership with the Inspirational Development Group (IDP) and the website explains:

“Sandhurst’s expertise and facilities are offered to market leaders from the corporate and public sectors through a unique partnering agreement with one of Britain’s foremost civilian leadership and team development training organisations. IDG and Sandhurst combine to develop and deliver exemplary bespoke training that is designed to meet a wide spectrum of needs, drawing on the unique blend of the latest commercial techniques and management styles and the proven components of military leadership training developed at Sandhurst over 200 years. A number of businesses and organisations have already gained enormous benefit from training, developed and conducted at Sandhurst through the auspices of this agreement – most prominent being the Grand Slam and World Cup winning England Rugby Team”. www.sandhurst.mod.uk/partners/idc.htm. Accessed 20th October 2007.