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# The Triumph of Development over Culture or Poverty?

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#1 Introduction

The collapse of communism in Europe and its market-reorientation in Asia have changed the terms of debate about managed and protected economies versus free and open markets. [Haass and Liton; Rodan] Even that veteran critic of free-market forces, J.K. Galbraith, notes in his introduction to *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance* that: ‘we accept the market system; there is no plausible alternative.’ [Gills, p.ix]

But there remains a consensus that opening-up economies has not so far helped the poor and weak as much as it should. It has spurred economic growth in the short run, but in a form that threatens longer-term development: ‘increasing the concentration of income, resources and wealth among people, corporations and countries’, ‘dismantling institutions of social protection’, letting ‘criminals reap the benefits of globalisation’, stimulating ‘social tensions that threaten political stability and community cohesion’ and ultimately threatening development itself. [UNDP; for a contrary but minority view see Dollar and Kraay] Those who take the UNDP view argue that increasing inequality and corruption leads to social conflict as the losers, if not winners, interpret greater inequality as greater unfairness. Then stability-seeking investors avoid areas of conflict. [Alesina and Perotti; Garrett; Klak and Myers; see also Muller]

There is also wide agreement that market-led growth has produced environmental damage on a global scale. And local environmental damage may annoy the general public even more [e.g. Kelly] especially where the local culprit is seen as an ‘incomer’.

Economists tend to focus on resistance to economic openness. But others argue that ‘the central problem of today’s global interactions is the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization.’ [Appadurai; Held et al 1999; Smith; Marden] and cultural fright can also threaten economic development. A strong sense of national/cultural identity can reinforce social cohesion and aid development in the short-term. But the openness that goes with development may provoke fears (justified or not) that national/cultural identity is threatened, stimulate economic protectionism as a by-product of cultural protectionism, and thus threaten economic development in the longer-term.

#1.1 The importance of public attitudes

Alesina and Perotti argue that governments could encourage inward investment (and thus development) not only by increasing productivity through ‘improvements in human and
physical capital’ but also by increasing political stability through ‘maintaining public support for market openness.’ Rodrik [1996,1997,1998] has advocated greater emphasis on ‘social safety nets’ and measures to ‘root out corruption’ in order to offset the naturally perverse distributional and social consequences of globalisation that threaten long-term stability.

However, it is public support for (or resistance to) openness that is itself the key socio-political precondition for future development rather than the specific factors that may influence it. Perceptions of increasing inequality, for example, are likely to lead to political instability if inequality is attributed to the policy decisions or the corrupt behaviour of local political actors. They are likely to fuel demands for autarky or protection if inequality is attributed to globalisation. But they are likely to have relatively little effect on the political conditions for development if inequality is attributed to chance, misfortune, or to circumstances beyond anyone’s control. In a similar way perceptions of corruption, environmental damage or cultural threat may have different consequences depending upon the way they are viewed by the public.

In short, how ordinary citizens feel about the downside of development, quite apart from the downside itself, may have a significant impact on its sustainability. These feelings are likely to reflect local traditions, identities, expectations, and leadership quite apart from the nature and scale of economic trends themselves. The translation from economic statistics to public opinion is never simple and automatic. Resistance to openness may well be stimulated, as the UNDP analysts suggest, by the negative aspects of globalisation itself. But other more indigenous factors may also make an independent contribution to parochial rather than cosmopolitan attitudes. Support or resistance to openness may itself be a cultural trait.

And even amongst those who have experienced the downside of development and are aware of it, their thirst for development may outweigh their resentment. These are empirical questions.

#1.2 Understanding grass-roots resistance

‘Public resistance to globalisation’ evokes the image of riots at international conferences in the relative luxury of Seattle, Prague or Davos. Such events are worth study. But our focus is on a different, less visible, less organised, less international and less politically-conscious public – and on a different, less visible, less organised and far more local concept of resistance.

Too much of the literature on public reactions to globalisation is based on inspired speculation fuelled by news-reports: what offends the writer is assumed to offend the ordinary citizen; news-items are assumed to represent public opinion rather than reflect concepts of news-worthiness. And much of the more rigorous empirical research has focused on elites and counter-elites – government officials, activists, and NGOs. [e.g. Mittelman; Kelly] At the other extreme there have been numerous in-depth ethnographic studies of small samples of the public, sometimes intentionally chosen as specially interesting rather than representative cases.[Scott 1985, 1990]

Events, elites, activists and special cases are certainly interesting and important, but not all-important. Quite apart from the intrinsic importance of the ordinary public in a democratic perspective, elites and activists operate against the background of the wider public. And it is that wider public that we wish to understand.

A focus on this less visible, less organised and less politically-conscious public ultimately requires large-scale representative sample surveys with particular attention paid to ensure that
they do not under-represent the less politically active, the poor, the less educated and articulate, villagers and country-dwellers, women, minorities or other ‘peripheral’ sectors of society. But as a first step in that direction we conducted 16 focus-group discussions in four countries. Like traditional ethnographic accounts, focus-group discussions score well on depth even if not on representativeness. But in addition they are particularly useful in helping to design survey questionnaires and to interpret survey answers.

Secondly, a focus on less visible, less organised and more local resistance requires attention to what Scott [1985, 1990] calls ‘infrapolitics’ or ‘the weapons of the weak’ as well as more visible forms of resistance. That includes what seems merely ‘psychological’ resistance. Individually, such forms of resistance have little or no impact. The same could be said of psychological support. But when multiplied by millions they create a climate that may significantly promote or inhibit openness and development. Moreover, as the literature on protest indicates, a general climate of public support or disapproval has a very significant impact upon the actual activity of potential activists.

Studying Scott’s ‘infrapolitics’ requires attention not only to actual political action in which relatively few get regularly involved, but also to attitudes towards key questions of openness – indicators of merely ‘psychological’ but nonetheless more widespread resistance.

There is a profoundly undemocratic view that ordinary people do not have sufficiently well-formed views on these matters to make them worthy of study. But ordinary people do have views, often strongly held, about foreign goods, foreign adverts (and the language used in them), foreign companies, foreign employers, foreign managers, immigrant or ‘guest’ workers, and the influx of foreign ideas and customs. Indeed ordinary people have views (sometimes benign but often xenophobic) about foreigners and ‘foreignness’ in general. These issues engage workers and villagers as well as economists and intellectuals.

But we must not assume resistance: we need to ask about hopes as well as fears, about positive expectations of better times ahead as well as present discontent. We need to explain passivity and support as well as protest and resistance.

#1.3 A comparative study

For comparative purposes we have chosen a carefully balanced set of four small to medium sized transition/developing countries, two from East Europe (Ukraine, the Czech Republic) and two from East Asia (Vietnam, South Korea). Though homogeneity is less in Ukraine than the others, all four share a strong sense of ethnic/nationalist identity threatened by larger neighbours or more distant superpowers. Within all four, there is the potential for cultural fright, albeit to varying degrees. At the same time, all have small economies, lacking in self-sufficiency (unlike e.g. China or the USA) and increasingly exposed to global market forces – which makes protectionism at once especially attractive and especially deadly.

Within each region our selection includes one relatively developed country and one relatively undeveloped (in both economic and human terms). South Korea and the Czech Republic rank close, at 30th and 36th, on the UNDP’s Human Development Index, while perhaps more surprisingly Ukraine and Vietnam also rank close, at 91st and 110th. And in each region, one selected country is governed by former or still-professing communists who are recent and possibly reluctant converts to a global market-economy, the other not.

Over the last decade there has been a striking difference between rates of development in Eastern Europe and East Asia (whether measured by traditional indices of purely ‘economic development’ or the more recent indicators of ‘human development’). Nonetheless both
regions have experienced the adverse effects (as well as the benefits) of economic openness, including sharp economic decline. UNDP analysts argue that ‘the human impacts’ of the 1997-99 crash in relatively successful East Asia are likely to persist ‘long after economic recovery’. For many, that crash must have ended the illusion of inevitable growth, and for some it may have stimulated the long-term pessimism that is more typical of East Europe. Conversely, although the economic record of East Europe is generally dismal, some groups and individuals within post-communist economies have prospered.

In the autumn of 2002 we commissioned (and attended – with simultaneous translation) four focus-group discussions on these issues in each country – two in cities and two in more rural areas.

There were some limited elements of commonality across these focus groups, but also clear differences between countries. Indeed the differences between countries were far more striking than the differences within countries or between categories of participant.

To a lesser extent there were also some differences within countries however. Within Vietnam, participants in major cities and their much poorer and less-developed rural hinterlands expressed remarkably similar views. Other surveys have also noted the same remarkable similarity between attitudes in Vietnamese cities and in their much poorer rural hinterlands (US State Dept 2003) – though those surveys like our focus groups did not penetrate into the remoter parts of Vietnam. But within Ukraine, participants in Russian-speaking Kharkiv expressed distinctive views; within the Czech Republic, participants in Prague, which had suffered from anti-globalisation protesters, expressed distinctive views; and within Korea, participants in rural and underdeveloped Yechon expressed distinctive views. Yet cross-national differences eclipsed these variations within countries.

#2 Discontent

#2.1 Economic despair – and euphoria

Economic perceptions varied from gloomy despair in Ukraine, through less fraught feelings of stagnation or decline in Korea, to more mixed feelings in the Czech Republic and euphoria in Vietnam. This spectrum (shown in Fig #2.1) reflected economic trends rather than economic levels. The euphoria of the relatively poor Vietnamese contrasted with the shaken confidence of the relatively well-off Koreans.

![Fig #2.1: Economic despair](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Euphoria</th>
<th>&lt;--------------------------- ranking --------------------------&gt;</th>
<th>Despair</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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Alone amongst the four countries we studied, the Vietnamese were uniformly enthusiastic about economic trends and they attributed economic improvements ‘to the Party, the state, the government and the people’ [V2] or even to ‘the government, the people, as well as the world’ [V4]. That may sound a little indiscriminate in distributing praise. But it was not. Quite the reverse. Across Vietnam, the Party, state and government were specifically praised for their post-1990 policies which were oriented towards globalisation and the market economy. Participants stressed ‘the new economic mechanism and international connections’
Participants in Prague were optimistic about the economy, despite serious recent floods. But outside Prague, Czech views about the economy were no better than mixed: ‘we produce more, but it’s not visible’ [C8]; ‘some movement forward, but nothing much’ [C9].

Our Korean focus-groups showed that UNDP analysts were right to argue that ‘the human impacts’ of the 1997-99 crash in relatively successful East Asia were likely to persist ‘long after economic recovery’. The illusion of inevitable growth had collapsed, and something like the long-term pessimism of East Europe was evident even at the end of 2002, after the economy had recovered significantly from the crisis. In other countries, the public recognise the IMF as an institution – if they recognise it at all, which many, perhaps most, do not. In Korea by contrast, the ‘IMF’ was much in the minds of the public – but as an event, not an institution. A typical Korean judgement was: ‘the economy is not on the same level as pre-IMF’ [K2]. The word ‘unstable’ recurred [K20, K33, K29]. There was none of the Vietnamese euphoria. Korean attitudes were characterised by a lack of confidence, qualified by an awareness of the post-1999 recovery and some hope for the future.

Ukrainian attitudes plumbed the depths of despair however. ‘The economic situation in the country has worsened in every aspect’ [U17]. They could cope by lapsing into nostalgia: ‘how good it used to be in our kolkhoz …but now it is horrible’ [U32]. Or by lowering their standards to mere survival: ‘our economy is acceptable for the time being – it has not been fully buried yet’ [U9]. Or by taking refuge in irony: ‘in September the workers received their salaries for March – that is wonderful – the rise of the economy is right before our eyes’ [U13 ‘smiling’].

But there were two other significant characteristics of Ukrainian attitudes to the economy. First, like professional economists they distinguished between the economy and living standards: ‘our government, our president, declare that the gross national product is increasing’ but for ‘the family the situation has deteriorated sharply’ [U16]. Second, Ukrainians found it impossible to discuss the state of the economy without spontaneously distinguishing between the different circumstances of different strata’: ‘certain strata live better’ [U8]… but ‘the majority of people live worse’ [U1, U6] …and ‘the difference is very, very big’ [U4]. To Ukrainians, inequality was as visible, and as resented, as poverty.

#2.2 ‘Undeserving’ winners

Although Ukrainians were unable to discuss economic trends without spontaneously drifting onto the issue of ‘who benefits’, focus-group participants in every country had views when asked. Differential benefits were not necessarily condemned. Hard work, skill and initiative should be rewarded. And good luck need not cause resentment. Apart from ideologically committed and extremist egalitarians, perceptions of inequality only lead to public discontent if rewards go to the ‘undeserving’ – however that may be defined.

Resentment of undeserving winners seemed least in Vietnam and greatest in Ukraine. But the spectrum (shown in Fig #2.2) points to an East Europe versus East Asia divide. In the Czech Republic as well as Ukraine the public felt the greatest benefits had gone to
power-holders and criminals – though Ukrainians had more direct experience of this. Vietnamese participants pointed to people working in advanced sectors of the economy or who were personally dynamic. Echoing some of the East European criticisms, Koreans also suggested ‘power-holders’ had benefited. But while they were far more critical than the Vietnamese, Korean criticisms of undeserving winners were even less personalised than in the Czech Republic – focusing on larger companies, conglomerates, and the propertied classes.

![Fig #2.2: Who benefits?](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deserving</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Undeserving</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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</table>

Ukrainians were also able to recognise some legitimate winners such as ‘younger people’[U22] or those with drive and initiative. One Ukrainian participant even put in a good word for a local politician: ‘he entered parliament wearing torn trousers and he went away no better off’[U12].

But these were exceptions. Most Ukrainians felt there had been big and undeserving winners. The winnings went to power-holders: ‘those 300 millionaires in Parliament’[U28] for example. ‘Those who were at the helm – they carried everything away for themselves, bit by bit’[U31].

Czech participants echoed these complaints: ‘politicians are the biggest thieves’[C3].

Koreans were focused on the 1997-99 IMF affair. Generally they felt that ‘ordinary people lost’[K22, supported by others]. ‘New wealth emerged’[K5]. But only one participant suggested ‘foreign countries’[K3] had got the greatest benefit. Most took the view that the benefits went to ‘the propertied’[K22, K26, K33], ‘larger enterprises’[K33], ‘major companies’[K5, K10], ‘conglomerates’[K3, K20] and also to ‘the privileged’[K32], ‘politicians’[K33, K10], ‘officials’[K16], ‘those with power’[K10, K15].

#2.3 Perceptions of growing crime, corruption and inequality

To a greater or lesser extent people in every country thought crime, corruption and inequality were increasing. But again, this caused most anger in Ukraine and least in Vietnam. There was wide agreement that lack of order, lack of strict laws, and the loose morals of the young were to blame for increasing crime and corruption. In part that was blamed on inequality. But, whether plentiful or scarce, money was also blamed as the root of all evil. In some countries increasing crime and corruption was blamed on economic decline, in others on economic success.

In Vietnam, increasing crime, corruption and inequality were all linked to globalisation and development – but as part of the necessary price to be paid for progress. They were
not blamed primarily on the state or its officials. And uniquely, Vietnamese perceptions of growing inequality were framed in terms of countries rather than individuals within Vietnam – so that to some extent growing inequality served to unite the Vietnamese rather than divide them.

In complete contrast, at the other extreme, Ukrainians detected not just an increase but an explosion of crime, corruption and inequality; they focused on inequality between individuals, not countries; and they viewed politicians, officials and power-holders as the problem not the solution.

Czechs and Koreans primarily blamed the younger generation for increasing crime and corruption. And neither felt increasing inequality was a very serious problem.

Thus the spectrum (shown in Fig #2.3) of perceptions of growing crime, corruption and inequality – and reactions to those perceptions seems to place the countries in an order similar to the spectrum of economic perceptions.

Fig #2.3: Perceptions of growing crime, corruption and inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Least concerned</th>
<th>ranking</th>
<th>Most concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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</table>

Although the Vietnamese felt that crime and corruption were increasing they were notably reluctant to blame it on their officials. Indeed they quoted their leaders’ warnings: ‘the late president Nguyen Van Linh said that “when we open the door, fortune comes in and so do the flies” – as the economy grows, social evils, prostitution, motor racing (presumably on public roads, not as a sport) and drugs for example, also increase rapidly – opening brings social evils’[V4].

More significantly however, the Vietnamese viewed social evils as inextricably associated not only with greater openness but with economic growth itself – with the end as well as the means: ‘as the economy grows, people’s lives get better and so do the temptations’[V13]; ‘in every society, criminals increase as the economy increases’[V25]; ‘the market economy has both positive and negative aspects’[V27].

Uniquely the Vietnamese attitude to growing inequality focused on the growing gap between rich and poor countries rather than individuals, and they attributed it to impersonal market forces rather than crime or corruption. Of course, there were some references to growing urban/rural and sectoral inequalities. But there were far more references to international inequalities: ‘the rich countries will become richer and the poor will become poorer’[V4].

But all the other Vietnamese attributed this adverse trend to impersonal forces, their own inadequacy, or incomplete or unenthusiastic globalisation: ‘Vietnam has not fully integrated into the region and the world’[V21]; ‘the life of people in many countries is improved through globalisation – but the difference between the rich and the poor countries is increasing because the education and trade knowledge between them are unequal – and because some (poor) countries support development while others resist’[V12]; because ‘rich
countries have more scientific knowledge’[V1]; because ‘poor countries have low technology and education’[V27]; because they lack ‘initial investment capital’ and because ‘the mechanism of rich countries is freer, making business and development easier – in Vietnam, the incomplete mechanism results in bigger hindrances’[V5]. Ironically, of course, Vietnam itself was not only growing fast in absolute terms, but actually closing the gap with developed countries such as Japan or Europe, not falling further behind.

At the other extreme, Ukrainians detailed – at great length – an explosion of crime and corruption which, in turn, exacerbated the problem of inter-personal inequality by not only increasing it, but doing so without moral justification. Power-holders and criminals enriched themselves. Conversely increasing inequality drove the poor to crime if only in order to survive. So there was vicious circle of crime, corruption and inequality in Ukraine: those at the top chose corruption to get richer and forced those at the bottom into crime to survive. And for Ukrainians increasing crime and corruption were not a consequence of economic development but a cause of economic decline.

Crime and corruption was ‘a major issue’[C24] in the Czech Republic. But, unlike Ukraine, allegations focused almost exclusively on the elite and derived from media-coverage not the more direct experience of focus-group participants.

The overwhelming majority of Koreans felt crime and corruption really were increasing. In addition to complaints about ‘morality having lost its hold’ especially on ‘young people’[K13] and a lack of discipline especially in ‘traffic’[K25] or ‘public washrooms’[K25], they had three peculiarly Korean explanations for it: ‘the IMF’, the ‘card culture’, and ‘local autonomy’.

First Koreans attributed growing crime and corruption to the ‘close relationships between business and political circles during the IMF period’[K4]… ‘businesses felt quite insecure going through the IMF only 2-3 years ago – through those years they have gradually turned to shortcuts’[K3]. ‘Both politics and business are not transparent’[K32] and ‘the Presidents often give special pardons to the corrupted’[K25]. Second the ‘card culture’[K29]: ‘if people’s earnings cannot cope with their consumption, they have to depend on cards and thereby they bring about corruption and crime’[K28]; ‘twenty and thirty year olds even commit murders due to credit card debt’[K4]. Third ‘local autonomy’: the problems of factions, school relations, and regionalism are serious – corruption is a natural result’[K10]; ‘the corruption of officials is getting more serious – local autonomy turned out to be not so much good as bad’[K16].

Without exception all the Koreans accepted that the gap between rich and poor was widening especially ‘since the IMF period’[K24, K22]. But in a country where regional identities are strong, there were references to growing regional as well as individual inequalities and these at least were not attributed to the IMF.

**#2.4 Perceptions of environmental damage and pollution**

Relative to the other three countries, it was the Czech Republic that scored best on perceptions of efforts to reduce pollution and environmental damage. In Vietnam and Korea it was seen as the price of economic development. Koreans felt it was a problem
that was already recognised and being addressed. Vietnamese felt it was a problem that
could – and should – be addressed albeit later on. But in Ukraine it was seen as the
consequence of economic decay, with little chance of any improvement.

In terms of actually tackling pollution and environmental damage, perhaps Korea is
ahead of Vietnam. But in terms of public discontent, according to our focus-group
participants, the Vietnamese public – though not our focus-group participants
themselves – were less discontented than the Koreans, because their priorities were
different. Vietnamese commitment to development is ferocious. Moreover there was a
hint that the Vietnamese were reluctant to get involved in anything that might obstruct
development. So the spectrum of perceptions and attitudes (shown in Fig #2.4) ran
from the Czech Republic to Ukraine, with Vietnam and Korea together in the centre.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Czech Rep</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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Fig #2.4: Perceptions of environmental pollution

On balance Czechs actually thought their environment was improving – despite the impact of
greater car use and the recent floods which had exposed the problems of riverside factories.
‘The air is better, cars now have to be equipped with catalytic converters’[C14, C9]. River
‘waters have improved, they are clean now’[C14]; ‘fish are returning to our rivers’[C24,
C19]. ‘Waste is now being recycled’[C14, C32].

Everyone in Vietnam agreed pollution it was a consequence of development, but for most, it
was an avoidable consequence – caused as much by the ‘low educational level of the
people’[V21], ‘people’s (lack of) awareness’[V17, V5, V9, V12] or the lack of ‘environment-
cleansing technology’[V4] as by development itself. ‘We just care about solving current
problems and do not take into account their long-term consequences’[V18] – though one
Vietnamese participant suggested people ‘do not dare to fight it because of fear of
involvement’[V33].

In Korea too participants explicitly put growth above the environment: ‘as the economy
grows, consumption increases and problems such as disruption of the ecosystem are
inevitable – nevertheless the economy should grow’[K8]. In unpolluted rural Yechon they
felt ‘we must lure factories in spite of air pollution – it will bring back young people and
development’[K16].

On the bright side: The IMF – never far from Korean’s thoughts – was for once presented as
a solution rather than a problem: ‘there are many bankrupt companies since the period of IMF
– for that reason, industrial waste has decreased’[K29] though there were ‘problems when the
buildings and materials of bankrupt companies are not properly disposed’[K28].

Only one Ukrainian saw anything positive being done to reduce pollution. Most pointed to
pollution remaining the same or getting worse: forests were being polluted by ‘garbage’ and
destroyed by ‘felling’[U16]; ‘streets are packed with automobiles and the volume of exhaust is just awful’[U7]; ‘the water and air in Kyiv are polluted, and the health of children is worsening with every year’[U3]. Agricultural pollution was blamed not only on ‘the 1986 Chernobyl accident’ but also ‘the 1970s and 1980s chemicalisation of our agriculture, and the collapse of agriculture in 1991, the time of uncertainty’[U28 supported by all in group]. And urban pollution was blamed on poverty and corruption: ‘foreign car manufacturers like Volvo often install special filters to purify the exhaust but Ukrainians cannot afford them’[U5]; and the switch to LPG engines was blocked because ‘oil traders will lose much money’[U2]. Corruption was never far from Ukrainians’ minds.

But as in Korea, a participant in Kharkiv pointed grimly to ‘the good side of bad luck – the air has become cleaner only because the giant plants have been at a standstill’[U13 supported by everyone in the group]. That view was echoed in far-distant Zhytomir oblast: ‘the environment has improved a bit, automatically so to speak, as factories like Berdychiv leather works have been shut – so the river got cleaner’[U17, U19]; ‘fewer tractors in the collective farm, so the air got cleaner, too – but only weeds grow in our fields’[U20]… ‘cornflowers instead of wheat’[U22]… ‘everything ruined – what a farm it was, such a collective farm’[U24].

### #2.5 Perceptions of cultural threat

Both Czechs and Koreans felt their language, culture or traditions were under threat from globalisation. The Vietnamese felt able to at least preserve theirs. And on this dimension, Ukrainians were the most relaxed: indeed they felt their language, culture and traditions were increasingly respected. It was about the only thing that seemed to be going well for Ukrainians, their only consolation. In terms of reality and perceptions Korean culture was perhaps no more under threat than Czech – and perhaps less so. But Koreans cared more about their unique culture and about differentiating themselves from other cultures. So the spectrum of cultural threat (shown in Fig.5) runs from Ukraine, through Vietnam and the Czech Republic to Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More respected</th>
<th>&lt;-------------------------- ranking --------------------------&gt;</th>
<th>Threatened</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Korea</td>
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Ukrainians felt that there was increasing respect for their culture, traditions – and above all their language – even if they themselves had difficulty speaking it. All three ‘seem to be more respected in general’[U5, U7, U6]. ‘First-graders and pre-schoolers are increasingly beginning to speak Ukrainian’[U5, U6 agrees]… ‘partly this attitude is cultivated in school, but self-confidence has also risen’[U5]: ‘when I went to school, I thought of Ukrainian as something unnecessary – we began to study it in fourth grade as a foreign language’[U7].

A sceptical Ukrainian-speaking teacher in Kyiv claimed however that ‘parents send their children to schools with instruction in Ukrainian only because they want them to know the state language which may be useful later in applying to a university or Kyiv Mohyla Academy – however, I know that these children speak Russian at home… I do not say that they study Ukrainian under compulsion but…’[U3, U6 agrees].

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*PDF created with FinePrint pdfFactory trial version [www.pdffactory.com](http://www.pdffactory.com)*
Apart from one participant who complained about adverts in foreign languages, there was no feeling that specifically Ukrainian culture was under threat. Indeed the complaints about specifically Ukrainian culture focused on its resurgence rather than decline. Participants in the ethnically Russian and Russian-speaking city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine complained that Russian-speakers ‘should not be obliged to know Ukrainian at any cost or to know English at any cost’[U14]. Now it was ‘necessary to know Ukrainian’[U9]… ‘but to us, that is very hard’[U16].

At the opposite extreme, the vast majority of Koreans felt their language, culture and traditions were less respected than in the past. But there were two consolations. First, ‘words from the Japanese occupation are disappearing’[K1]. Second, Korean identity and culture were more widely recognised – in part reflecting Korea’s highly successful staging of the 2002 World Cup Football contest: ‘Korean people are proud of their nationality after the World Cup’[K30]; ‘there is tendency to replace our traditional culture with new culture, but it is good for foreign countries to know more about us – and we held the World Cup games’[K29].

Several participants noted ‘more efforts than ever before to preserve’[K5] Korean language, culture and traditions. But Korea is the most wire-up society on the planet and the internet was, on balance, a threat to Korean culture: ‘because of Internet chatting, our language has changed and been badly affected’[K18]. Young people were abandoning Korean traditions: ‘college students in their early twenties are so poor at grammar, most of them write without final consonants’[K8]; ‘listen to the speech of children – there are big differences from five or ten years ago – they use foreign words too much – and slang also’[K27]; ‘English, Chinese, and Japanese languages are regarded as more important than Korean owing to globalisation’[K12]; ‘when you look for a job, English is the first requirement’[K11].

Korean traditions placed great emphasis on respect for the old. One or two participants felt such traditions were being maintained or even resurgent. But most felt they were ‘disregarded’ by the young [K25]; ‘in the past, the young left seats for the old in a bus but nowadays they pretend to sleep’[K24]; ‘when I was young, I was not able to smoke in public – but these days, the young ask the old for a light for cigarettes’[K23]. Several younger participants spoke up for themselves and confirmed the generation gap: ‘the young are not interested in traditions – to be honest, I am not interested in traditional culture ’[K12 supported by K11].

Czechs also thought their culture – in terms of music, human relations and especially cuisine was being eroded by tourism, development and lack of interest amongst the young: ‘older people perhaps preserve it, but young ones do not have time for it’[C11]; ‘music has declined’[C26]; and ‘people are forgetting about history’[C20 supported by C18]; ‘there is less culture – we have hamburgers’[C7]. Moreover economic growth had made personal relations ‘worse than before, when people had less’ [C27]; ‘families stick together until there is an inheritance’[C25]; ‘if you want to punish your children, give them a house to share’[C32].
The Vietnamese, like the Czechs and Koreans sensed that young people were drifting away from their national culture. Many claimed they were able to at least preserve their national culture – but qualifications and doubts kept bubbling up.

Some were overtly complacent and balanced increasing international respect against declining local interest: ‘although we are integrating, we preserve our traditions well – and our traditional arts are welcomed abroad’[V4]; ‘in the integration for economic development, both rich and poor countries have to accept the rules of the game – we have to understand each other – they have to understand us – they generally respect us’[V31].

But others admitted there were ‘exceptions’: ‘our traditions and morals are preserved – except for some young people’[V33]. Or that traditions were preserved only by political will: ‘we can preserve our traditions because of the resolution of the Communist Party – observing that our traditions and culture tend to disappear, the Party has made resolutions, which have won the support of the people’[V4].

Others doubted the effectiveness of such artificial political action: ‘as the Party resolution states, we are trying to preserve the national culture but actually, we have not succeeded – for example, our language is affected, everyday life is influenced by foreign taste, and we do not respect our identity – we just do it to show outsiders’[V8] – a view that puts a different and rather negative interpretation on increasing international respect for Vietnamese culture. ‘It is difficult for the older, which have experienced two wars against the French and Americans, to lose their spirit of national independence, unity and national identity – but the young are exposed to various cultures, which easily affect Vietnamese tradition’[V16]; ‘if this situation continues, our national culture will disappear’[V18].

#2.6 Ranking discontent

There is a degree of consistency to the five cross-national spectra of discontents that we have examined. As a very crude summary measure we can calculate the average rankings for each country. (See Fig #2.6) That places Vietnam fairly close to the generally most contented end (at 1.5), and Ukraine fairly close to the generally most discontented end (at 3.4). Indeed Vietnam is at the most contented end on 3 of the 5 rankings, and at the next-to-most-contented on the other two. Conversely Ukraine is at the most discontented end on 4 of the 5 rankings.

The Czechs and the Koreans are clearly somewhere in the middle. But equally clearly, the Koreans are more discontented (at 2.9) than the Czechs at (2.2). And that relative ranking holds true for the Czechs and Koreans on 4 of the five rankings.

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<td>Korea</td>
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However, what is most significant about this ranking is what it does not reflect. It does not divide the rich from the poor. The two poorest countries are located at opposite ends of the spectrum, and the two richest in the centre. And it does not divide the East Europeans from the East Asians. The most discontented pair consists of a rich Asian and a poor European. And the least discontented pair consists of a poor Asian and a rich European.

The overall spectrum of discontent reflects rates of growth and development rather than the level of wealth. Of course one element in that is economic growth itself. But the spectra of public concern about crime, corruption, inequality and ‘undeserving’ winners follow much the same pattern. The spectrum of perceptions of pollution and environmental damage differs from the general pattern only because the Czechs displace the Vietnamese at the contented end of the spectrum. Discontent is thus remarkably unambiguous – whether by coincidence or, more likely, because adverse economic trends, crime, corruption, inequality, ‘undeserving’ winners, and environmental decay hang together and reinforce each other.

Perceptions of cultural threat provide the one outstanding exception to this general pattern of discontent. That does divide the rich and the poor. But our focus group discussions suggest that the threat is as much internal as external and hint at a pattern of ‘willing victims’. Young people in the two more affluent countries seem intent on abandoning tradition and embracing a more international or (quite literally) polyglot culture.

#3 Protest and Resistance

The focus-group moderators set the scene for a discussion of public attitudes towards protest and resistance by reminding participants:

“In many countries throughout the world there have been protests against international organisations concerned with opening-up markets to foreign companies – protests against the WTO (World Trade Organisation), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank for example. And there have also been protests against international companies that have caused problems like polluting the local environment, taking land away from local people, paying low wages, forcing local companies to close, and bribing local officials. Often such protests are called anti-globalisation protests.”

#3.1 Visibility and support

Visibility

Two years before our focus-group discussions there had been large but peaceful demonstrations at the ASEM meeting in Seoul and violent demonstrations at the IMF/World Bank meeting in Prague. And the memories lingered on. So Koreans and especially Czechs were very conscious of such protests in their own countries. Both the Ukrainians and the Vietnamese were very conscious of such protests in their own countries. Both the Ukrainians and the Vietnamese were aware that such protests occurred in other countries though, they thought, not much in their own countries. The Vietnamese added that they did not pay much attention to such protests wherever they occurred. So
the spectrum of awareness (shown in Fig #3.1a ran from Vietnam, through Ukraine and Korea to the Czech Republic.

![Fig #3.1a: Awareness of anti-globalisation protests](image)

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The IMF and World Bank met in Prague 25-26 September 2000. That was roughly two years before our focus group discussions. Massive demonstrations and violent clashes between anti-globalisation protestors and the police surrounded the event however. It was not forgotten, especially in Prague itself – though Czechs saw the protests as in their country rather than by their countrymen. There were ‘just a few’ Czechs amongst them [C20]: the protestors were ‘professional demonstrators’[C21]; ‘directed and paid from abroad’[C22]; and only ‘here 10 days before and 10 days after’ the event [C21].

The third ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) took place in Seoul a month later, October 20-21, 2000. The Korean government mobilised 30,000 police, a fifth of the national police force, to deal with potential protests. But in contrast to Prague, the number of protestors was limited and they were mostly Korean. Most demonstrations took place some distance away from the conference centre and they were not as violent as in Prague. Nonetheless Koreans in our focus groups were also familiar with anti-globalisation protests within their own country. Ukrainians were aware of anti-globalisation protests in other countries – in South Africa, the EU, and America but it was certainly something ‘foreign’ to them: ‘in Ukraine, they do not manifest themselves loudly…they wield no significant influence.’[U28]

Vietnamese participants were unanimous that anti-globalisation protests did not occur in Vietnam. One noted that such protests ‘appear in other countries but not in Vietnam’[V31]. But most were scarcely aware of such protests outside Vietnam either: ‘Vietnamese people pay little attention to this’[V21]; they ‘pay attention to more realistic issues’[V19].

**Support**

We asked our focus groups what was their general attitude to such protests. In particular we asked whether local people were right to protest when international companies caused local problems or whether such anti-globalisation protests did more harm than good. Koreans were sympathetic to such protests. Ukrainians and Vietnamese thought they were ‘normal’ in a fully democratic state and rather envied places where protest was more frequent. Czechs too had some sympathy but especially those who lived in Prague had been alienated by the anti-globalisation riots two years earlier. They sympathised with some of the protesters ideas and they sympathised with the need for debate but they rejected the methods and behaviour of the protesters. Thus the spectrum of support or sympathy for anti-globalisation protests (shown in Fig #3.1b) ran from the Czech Republic through Vietnam and Ukraine to Korea.
The overwhelming majority of Koreans thought ‘there is no choice but protest’[K6]; ‘such protests are necessary’[K23]; ‘otherwise, we just let them do whatever they want’[K9, K15]; ‘to restore our rights, we have to organize’[K13]. And Koreans were willing to bear the costs of protest: ‘protest is justified even if it causes some loss’ [K7]…. ‘even if the company withdraws?’[moderator]… ‘Yes’[K14].

Vietnamese attitudes to anti-globalisation protests combined lack of experience and a feeling that they were a foreign habit, with a wish to emulate them: ‘Vietnamese people are different from foreigners – in Europe people are freer’[V21]; ‘such protests are normal and they are good for such countries because they prompt government officials and international organizations to review whether what they have done is right and suitable or not’[V4]; ‘I support such protests’[V12, V14]. One Vietnamese participant re-defined so-called anti-globalisation protests to make them in an important sense pro-globalisation and therefore legitimate: ‘we should protest if we do it for to ensure equality – but not if we do it to obstruct integration’[V31] – in other words, protests against the abuse and distortion of globalisation by foreign interests should be encouraged but Vietnam’s goal should still be global integration.

Ukrainians also had little experience of local anti-globalisation protests and viewed them with ironic detachment – but more with envy than hostility.

The group in Kharkiv, in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, displayed an almost Soviet quality of sceptical black humour. Anti-globalisation protests were ‘organised events’[U12]; ‘nothing but a performance’[U13]; ‘there will be about 20 per cent of fools there, and the rest is just a show’[U16]. There were explicit links to Soviet experience: anti-globalisations protests were ‘just like all those international forums of students and young people used to be – in the main the people there are youngsters – they know that there is a conference in America or in South Africa – they go there to have fun – someone pays them’[U13]. Indeed, payment figured prominently in the Kharkiv’s limited experience of such protest: ‘money was also paid for the rally against our McDonald’s restaurant – for carrying a poster 15 hryvnyas, for appearing on camera 30’[U15]… ‘it would just be interesting to find out who pays them’[U13]… ‘then we could take part too – there you have it, the Ukrainian mentality’[U16].

Elsewhere in Ukraine, attitudes towards anti-globalisation protests were much more positive. Ukraine was criticised for its unresponsive bureaucracy and its servile population. Protests were certainly regarded as a foreign phenomenon, but one that should be emulated, even if they would probably be ineffective in Ukraine: ‘in democratic countries such protests bring good – there, they listen to them – here, you may dance naked!’[U17]; ‘but let it be a voice in the wilderness…attention may be paid to it’[ U30].
The group in Kyiv were the most positive about protest, though as critical of their fellow Ukrainians as the Kharkiv group: ‘we should have such protests in Ukraine, and more often – our people are very inactive...scared, immobile – they should protest more often’[U4, U7].

And they could cite some small success locally: ‘even judging by a small action – we had a protest against the rise in transport fares’[U4, backed by U7]… ‘the action was not very massive but this protest apparently made the Mayor reconsider his decision’[U4]. But was this really an international issue? Apparently so, because of ‘IMF interference in the issue of raising transport fares – they dictate the rules of the game to us – however, they do not dictate that our government should provide jobs or increase our salaries’[U4, again backed by U7]… ‘if they dictate fares increases to our government, then let them dictate to us on rents and utilities payments, cuts in social subsidies, etc.’[U4].

Prague had been the scene of large and violent battles between anti-globalisation protesters and the police in 2000. There, anti-globalisation protesters were still regarded in late 2002 as ‘professional demonstrators’[C21], brought in ‘from abroad’[C22], and ‘paid’[C20]; ‘troublemakers’[C21], ‘permanent protesters … willing to protest against protesting!’[C18]. And the bill for damages had to be paid by Czechs [C22, C24, C18].

Prague participants agreed there were problems of globalisation – running from ‘enormous differences between the rich and the poor world’[C21] to ‘hamburgers’[C19, C18], but protesters ‘should protest in a decent way…not destroy Prague’[C19]. There was great scepticism about the protesters themselves who ‘make use of the benefits’ of ‘globalisation’[C24]. ‘They protest against all kinds of things and then they go home by metro and switch on TV and use mobile phones’[C18].

But that unqualified negative view of globalisation protesters was limited to Prague. Even in the rest of the Czech Republic views were more mixed. Some refused to take sides: ‘I did not side with anybody’[C11]; ‘I cannot judge who was in the right’[C14].

Others expressed complex views, combining positive and negative elements. In particular they distinguished

(i) between the protesters’ methods and their ideas
(ii) between the IMF and the police

The two distinctions were linked of course. Czechs tended to condemn the protesters’ violence but support their ideas, or at least support the need for the protesters’ ideas to be considered and debated. And while they supported the police in their hand-to-hand fighting with the protesters, they were more favourable to the protesters in their battle of ideas with the IMF or World Bank.

Participant who did take sides between the police and the protesters, were more sympathetic to the Czech police than to the mainly foreign protesters. They were on the side of ‘the police’ [C5, C7, and others]; ‘I was not there and the TV showed only the worst shots…so of course on the side of the police’[C2]. But some of these same participants then went on to insist on reformulating the question: ‘I am on the side of the ideas’ [C2, C8].

The ambivalence between attitudes towards the protesters’ methods and their ideas was sometimes expressed within a very short sentence: ‘I approve of peaceful rallies and in some areas they were orderly’[anon. Brno]; ‘let them stage rallies but do not let them destroy Prague’[C14]. Sometimes however it emerged over a series of contributions by the same participant. At different points in the discussion, one participant in Brno [C8] said: ‘you cannot toss rocks at people’; ‘we are for demonstrations even with slogans but not with violence’; but then ‘I am on the side of the demonstrators, I am for discussing’; ‘why should
they not voice their opinions – they should have opinions and defend them’ [C8]. Through these four interventions, the tone changes and grows warmer towards the protesters but the argument remains consistent though complex.

Occasionally ambivalence moved on from the contrast between methods and ideas to focus exclusively but ambivalently on methods themselves: ‘I hate violence but I have read something about the IMF and I agree that it is a criminal organization – but those who throw paving stones are downright nuts’[C26]… ‘You mean that stones should not be thrown?’[moderator]… ‘But without this violence I could walk there with a poster and they would take a photo of me and place it in a paper and that would be all – this would not change anything – I am afraid that violence is necessary in this context’[C26].

And outside Prague, some Czechs were firmly on the side of the protesters – at least in opposition to the IMF if not the police: ‘I am against violence but I must say that I was on the side of the protesters’[C12]; ‘If everything were all right, then they would not be there’[C-Brno]; ‘the IMF and the World Bank were established by people who thought it was the right thing to do, but I agree with the protesters’[C26].

#3.2 Attitudes towards local resistance

The political slogan ‘think globally, act locally’ reminds critics of globalisation that they should focus on both the global and the local. Globalisation is not just about world summits and obscure theoretical arguments about the ‘hidden hand’ but also about powerful international companies reaching into under-developed and easily manipulated backwaters to exploit local workers and local resources in a very concrete way. They may behave well or badly. They may be welcome or unwelcome. But if and when they do behave badly, how should local people react? Emphasising the conditional, we asked participants what should be done if and when an international company mistreated the local workforce or damaged the local environment.

Local resistance to bad employers

We asked participants to think about an international company that did not have safe working conditions in its factory, or paid very low and unfair wages. Would the workers be right to retaliate? In most (but not all) groups the moderators specifically asked about sabotage by doing as little work as possible, working badly, stealing, or damaging the company’s property or machinery. In general, participants felt not only weak and powerless – they also felt greatly constrained by their own moral sentiments.

Asians – both Korean and Vietnamese – were morally opposed to sabotage and advocated orderly resistance through ‘proper procedures’ involving collective action or the state. At the other extreme, Ukrainians had no faith in collective action and gave moral support to sabotage by individuals. They would be inhibited only by fear. Indeed they criticised the servility of their fellow citizens in this regard. Czechs also emphasised fear as the key restraining influence, though they were less favourable to sabotage than the Ukrainians. So the spectrum of attitudes towards sabotaging bad employers (shown in Fig #3.2a) ran from Vietnam and Korea through the Czech Republic to Ukraine.
Most Koreans felt that workers should oppose unsafe working conditions or low wages, but ‘only through laws’[K27], using ‘due process’[K9] or ‘proper procedures’[K4, K6, K23, K33]. A large majority opposed sabotage, emphasising the restraints imposed by both personal and national self-respect.

**Personal self-respect** was important to Koreans: ‘Would the workers be right to retaliate by stealing what they could from the factory?’[moderator]: ‘by no means’[K6]; ‘that is blatantly wrong’[K30]; ‘I am sympathetic but theft is not allowed’[K7]; ‘one should do one’s duty’[K23]; ‘one has to do one’s duty’[K30]… ‘only then can you claim your request legitimately’[K33].

More surprising was the way Koreans invoked the national interest and even national self-respect as a constraint on sabotage: ‘I do not think sabotage is justified – workers should claim their rights in a proper process – sabotage weakens our economic power’[K4] ‘if we consider it from the national perspective, if inferior products are exported to foreign countries (through badly done work), then that is a shame on our country – from that perspective, we have to make good products’[K14]. And in a more nationalistic or even racial comment, sabotage by ‘for example, screwing nuts only four turns when five turns are necessary’[moderator] was dismissed by one Korean participant as ‘South Asian’[K22].

Koreans were not unwilling to resist, but they had remarkable faith in institutions and ‘collective action’[K10 – supported by all other participants in the Taejon group]. ‘It is better for workers to demonstrate than to sabotage, even if they suffer bad conditions’[K11].

‘Sabotage is not allowed but there are two rights to resist, the right to build a labour union and the right to negotiate with an employer’[K26, K23]. And the ‘government’, ‘state’ or ‘Ministry of Labour’ should ‘not neglect these problems’[K23, K29, K32].

Typical of the most ‘wired-up’ country on the planet, one participant suggested using ‘internet anti-sites to disclose the wrong doings of a company’[K22] and another suggested that ‘internet-prompted boycotting is much better than breaking machines or stealing products’[K33] – though a third was ‘opposed to boycotts – if the products are not sold in market, there is no chance for the company to revive and the company cannot pay my salary’[K26].

In Vietnam participants were less outspoken but like Koreans they also condemned sabotage and had faith in collective action. Should workers retaliate by doing as little work as possible, doing work badly, stealing, or damaging the company’s property or machinery?: ‘they should not behave in those ways’[V19]; ‘it is not good to protest like that’[V13]; indeed, ‘workers retaliating is wrong’[V25]. But that did not rule out a more collective response: ‘we should negotiate through labour unions’[V15]; ‘It is true that there are joint ventures or foreign owned companies that ill-treat Vietnamese workers. But retaliating is not good. They should let labour unions and authorized agencies solve the problems. That is good for both the workers and the foreign partners’[V4, V5].
Sabotage was not put explicitly in three of the four Czech groups and none of the participants raised it spontaneously. They did discuss other strategies however: ‘protest – if everyone does it then it could be effective’ but only if it is ‘peaceful’[C-Brno], ‘a signed letter’[C-Brno]; or better, ‘writing to the newspapers, that is an effective weapon’[C2], or ‘switching to another job, that’s a solution’[C3]; ‘I would leave the job if they did not stick to safety regulations’[C30].

But many Czechs felt completely powerless: ‘people have to work even under these conditions – a it is not possible to do anything else’[C25]; ‘they cannot do anything because if they gripe, they will get sacked’[C14]; ‘my mum once expressed her dissatisfaction and she was the first to be sacked’[C-Prostejov]. Even collective protest was dangerous: workers ‘will never stage any joint protest – employers would sack them in an instant!’[C12]. Strikes were an option only for the indispensable like ‘doctors, or people in high positions’ who ‘are not within two years of retirement – they can afford it’[C7].

When sabotage was raised explicitly by the Czech moderator, it got no support. More significantly, it evoked the same fear of being sacked that had emerged in other groups: ‘what if the employees steal?’[moderator]… ‘then they would get sacked’[C18]… ‘they would not dare’[C-Prague].

Surprisingly therefore Czech participants, as employees, felt exceedingly powerless – too frightened even to contemplate a protest, a ‘gripe’, or a strike, let alone sabotage. And it is also significant that none of the Czech participants – unlike the Koreans for example – expressed any moral views: their lack of support for any kind of protest or retaliation against bad employers was exclusively phrased in terms of weakness and fear. There was a dark side to the superficially prosperous and relaxed Czech Republic which might be expressed with just a touch of exaggeration in the phrase: all fear and no morals.

In Ukraine too, such constraint as was expressed was based not on morals but merely on fear or ‘intimidation’. But Ukrainians went further than Czechs. They felt that sabotage was at least morally justified. There was much support for sabotage by working badly, stealing, or damaging machinery: ‘those protest actions would be very good’[U21] but while ‘they would be right, it is not allowed here – just open your mouth and they will tell you no one wants you here, go home’[U20]. In the Kyiv group everyone agreed that such sabotage ‘would be right’[U7 – supported by all others in the group]. One participant seemed to waver: ‘no, it is not right to steal’ but even that one then came back on track by adding: ‘but if working conditions are not safe then they should’[U3].

In Kharkiv too, several participants at first declared ‘there should not be any stealing’. But one then argued that ‘it depends on what those violations are, because the people’s patience is not infinite – if someone spent half a year working and his wage was not paid, he might well break something there – he would be justified in his own way – of course he would be punished for doing that – they will come and hit him with sticks, beat him’[U14]. Others then warmed to the idea of violent retaliation: ‘it seems to me that it is not the equipment that should be whacked – it is necessary to whack the manager – what does the equipment have to do with it?’[U16, U11].

No moral restraint was evident: ‘but if he hit the manager, the latter would report the incident to the militia’[U15]. So ‘the equipment should be cautiously unscrewed’[U12 – with burst of laughter from rest of group]… ‘then pocketed and carried away’[U16]. There was support for violent retaliation in another group: ‘let them smash those pieces of iron, provided that they do not hit each other…from the viewpoint of law they are wrong doing all that, but if the law does not protect them then one can understand their actions’[U28].
And in complete contrast to Korean moral restraint, Ukrainians lamented their fellow citizens’ servility and criticised them for it: ‘our people would not damage company assets, unless they were really upset’[U22]... ‘our people do not even go to demos’[U19]... ‘because the people are intimidated... afraid to get sacked’[U20]... ‘our people will bear and forbear’[U22]... ‘yes, our people are like that’[U21].

Local resistance to environmental pollution

An enterprise that pollutes the environment affects all the people in an area, not just the workers in the enterprise. Indeed the workers receive some compensation in the form of wages while everyone else in the area gets all the damage but none of the benefit. So the natural response, if any, might be more political and less industrial than in the case of ill-treated workers. We asked participants to suppose an international company was damaging or polluting the local environment. Would people who lived in the locality be right to retaliate by peaceful marches and demonstrations, by complaining to local officials, by damaging the company’s property or machinery, or in some other way?

In these circumstances, the Vietnamese again placed their faith in collective or even state action. Czechs too would rely on the state supplemented by the media. Koreans would rely on collective action – centred on negotiations and collective but peaceful protests. Koreans have developed a style of collective protest that makes great television but is at once both as disciplined and as dramatic as Italian Grand Opera. And once again Ukrainians opted for sabotage by individuals. So the spectrum of attitudes towards sabotaging polluters (shown in Fig #3.2b) ran from Vietnam through the Czech Republic and then Korea to Ukraine.

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Vietnamese participants emphasised collective or state action: ‘we should negotiate’[V13], ‘complain to labour union’[V31], ‘to local officials’[V21, V19], or ‘to the authorities’[V5]. ‘The best way is to deal with problems from the beginning – in the planning stage’ but ‘if the project is in implementation, we should complain to management authorities’[V4].

Czechs would also rely on the state, or the media rather than direct action. A demonstration ‘if orderly’[anon Brno]. But a demonstration at the factory gates? ‘not that’[C22]... ‘the company would then claim damages’[C18]. ‘Approaching the mayor’[C22] would be better. ‘Protest would not work without the state getting involved’[C17, C19]. Others suggested approaching ‘the media’[C8], using ‘bad publicity’[C21] through ‘Na vlastní oči, Štěepiny (a TV programme)’[C24, C-Brno].

The mild views of Czechs with regard to pollution should be set against the background of the perceived success (noted above) of the Czech authorities in actually improving the
environment and reducing pollution. So it reflects a widespread perception of (in this respect) effective state action rather than public resignation. The same could not be said of Vietnamese attitudes however since the Vietnamese felt pollution was a growing problem.

In Korea there was unanimous support in every group both for ‘peaceful marches and demonstrations by local people’ and for ‘complaining to local officials’ but overwhelming opposition to ‘damaging the company’s property or machinery’. Only five participants supported damaging property [K10, K15, K16, K20, K25] – and some of that support was conditional: ‘if other strategies do not work well, that is OK as an ultimate measure’[(K20, with agreement from K25).

Two Korean participants spontaneously suggested a globalized solution to problems of globalization: approaching ‘international collective bodies’[K9] or ‘environmental groups in foreign countries’[K13]. Other strategies volunteered by Korea participants were: ‘lobbying workers at the factory entrance when they go to work’[K7], a ‘radical demonstration’[K6], a ‘boycott’[K8] or ‘approaching newspapers’[K26].

Collective negotiations were important to Koreans: ‘negotiation should be the first option’[K27]; ‘negotiation – instead of denigrating the image of a company one should appeal to the labour union to negotiate with the employer – if that does not work, then strife and accusation are possible’[K30]… but ‘in a due process’[K32] through ‘legal measures’[K14]. But in rural small-town Yoju, where they put much stress on ‘negotiation’, participants felt local people were inhibited by being too ‘nice and moderate’[K32] which was ‘a weak point that hampers development’[K33]; ‘there is no population flow in this area, less chance here to come across strangers’[K32]; so ‘if I fight with someone, she may be a sister of my friends’[K27]. For the people of Yoju, negotiation was as much a necessity as a free choice.

Attitudes in Ukraine were the opposite, emphasising individual acts of disruption or sabotage. In some discussions there was a conditional response: ‘first it is necessary to hold peace talks with the entrepreneurs – if no agreement is reached, then comes the time for protests’[U25]. But in other Ukrainian discussions support for retaliation was unconditional. ‘Would people who lived in the locality be right to retaliate by peaceful marches and demonstrations, complaining to local officials and asking for their help, or by damaging the company’s property or machinery?’ asked the moderator in Kyiv: ‘Yes’[U5, with a unanimous chorus of support]… ‘and not only people who live in that locality’[U4]… ‘as Taras Shevchenko [the Ukrainian poet] once wrote, we have started to awaken the sense of freedom’[U4, and everybody laughs]… ‘remember that protest actions took place in Germany when radioactive wastes were brought there from France – people chained themselves to the rails – actions should be as radical as may be necessary for getting the right decision’[U8].

In a village in Zhytomir oblast (western Ukraine) participants specifically disparaged the value of complaints to local authorities: ‘local authorities have been bought (bribed, corrupted) already – they are not going to do anything’[U17, with unanimous support]. But they felt that ‘damaging the company’s property or machinery ‘can work’[U19, with unanimous support]… ‘young people can take such action’[U22, U20].

#3.3 Attitudes towards global resistance

It is natural that resistance to globalisation, or its excesses, should be global as well as local. Our focus-group discussion covered two specific aspects of global resistance: (i) foreign involvement in local resistance, and (ii) foreign boycotts in support of local people.
Foreign involvement in local resistance

We asked participants who should have the right to protest if an international company were causing local problems – anyone at all, only people from the country, or only local people from the affected area?

Koreans and Ukrainians would accept foreign protestors, though Ukrainians complained that foreigners did not care about Ukraine. The Vietnamese were divided but on balance opposed to the involvement of foreigners in local problems. The question was not put explicitly to the Czech groups, but their spontaneous criticism of foreign anti-globalisation protests in Prague (described below) indicated some antagonism towards foreign protestors. So the spectrum of approval for foreign involvement in local protests (shown in Fig #3.3a) ran from Vietnam, through the Czech Republic to Korea and Ukraine.

Vietnamese groups stressed local people and the state: ‘those who directly suffer those problems can protest’[V4]. One participant had a slightly wider vision though it did not extend beyond Vietnam and it also explicitly mentioned the state: ‘it is obvious that not only local people can protest – the state and people all over the country can interfere too’[V12].

Koreans generally accepted the right of people from outside the locality to protest – even if they were foreigners. In the Taejon discussion for example every participant accepted the right of people from outside the area, even foreigners, to protest against an international company that caused local problems: ‘foreign residents in Korea should have the right’[K32]… ‘if the company affects the foreign residents’[K18, K8]… ‘although they are foreigners, they are living in Korea now’[K10]. And even foreigners in foreign countries ‘also have the right – it is about affairs of human beings – if there is something wrong in foreign countries, we may blame them, so likewise’[K22, supported by K19, K20 though opposed by others in the Taejon group]. In the Yoju group all but one participant accepted the right of foreigners from abroad to protest, while even the remaining participant accepted the right of resident foreigners to do so.

Despite the question about which people should have the right to protest, the discussion in the village in Zhytomir oblast , western Ukraine, reverted to focusing on the state. But other Ukrainian groups did address the question directly and they supported foreign protesters. In Kyiv they felt ‘protest should not be limited to the specific locality – this should concern the entire Ukraine’[U3 with everyone else nodding agreement]. ‘The entire Ukraine?’ asked the moderator, ‘do you think it normal if people from other countries…join in our protests?’ ‘Yes, it is normal’[U3, U4, U5, U8 supported by everyone else]. Similar views were expressed in the village in Kirovograd oblast , central Ukraine: ‘Yes, let them join us – after
all, we are all human beings'[U25]… ‘I think so too, because it will reach our neighbours anyway'[U27 supported by all others in the group].

But while in principle they accepted foreigners’ rights to protest, the group in Kharkiv doubted whether foreigners cared. Protests should ‘first be local people – if no one listens to local people, then the whole of Ukraine'[U10]. But ‘people from other countries?’ asked the moderator: ‘none of them will join in’[U15]… ‘there is a Ukrainian proverb my home is on the outskirts (meaning: that is none of my business)'[U13]; ‘Ukrainians do go elsewhere and provide humanitarian or other help'[U10]… but ‘apart from verbal support, no one helped us cope with Chernobyl!’[U16]. Even within Kharkiv itself there was little public spirit: ‘for example, that dumping ground for garbage that people have been protesting against – do you support those people? do you participate in those protests? no, you do not – apart from those directly affected it is nobody’s concern'[U13].

**Foreign boycotts**

Some western critics of third-world exploitation have argued in favour of boycotting imported products that have been produced by methods that pollute the environment or are a danger to workers in the countries where they are produced. We asked participants to view this issue from the other side. We asked whether foreign countries should be permitted to restrict imports of goods from the locality if they are produced by methods that polluted the local environment or were a danger to local workers.

Koreans accepted such restrictions. The Vietnamese were divided but on balance opposed such restrictions. Czechs could not imagine such restrictions on their products and wilfully misinterpreted and inverted the question – so that they discussed banning imports to the Czech Republic rather than exports from it. But, in any case, they were opposed to such bans. Ukrainians revealed their uniquely suspicious mind-set by re-focussing the question on allegedly sub-standard Ukrainian products rather than products made in sub-standard ways and sub-standard conditions. They were highly suspicious of any ban on their exports, and totally opposed to it. So the spectrum of approval for foreign boycotts against local products (shown in Fig #3.3b) ran from Ukraine, through the Czech Republic to Vietnam and finally to Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Approve</th>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;-------------- ranking ---------------&gt;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
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</table>

Koreans generally accepted the right of foreign countries to restrict imports from Korea if they were produced by methods that polluted the Korean environment or were a danger to Korean workers. And in general Koreans did not think such restrictions would just be an excuse to exclude Korean exports. None of the participants in Seoul and Yechon for example, thought that ‘foreigners would take advantage of this restriction’ just to exclude Korean exports: ‘we should accept the restriction'[K8]… ‘we have to admit our faults'[K7 supported by everyone else].
Some Koreans emphasised reciprocity: ‘if other countries export such products to us, we cannot help rejecting them’[K18] and suggested ‘it might be a different story, if foreign countries themselves did not follow the rule’[K5] or ‘find fault with our products alone’[K4 supported by K8]. But others disagreed even with that condition: ‘even if they do the same in their countries too, we have to revise our faults – if there is environmental pollution, that is our damage, not theirs’[K6].

There was some mild scepticism: accepting such restrictions as ‘appropriate’ because the ‘fault was on our side’ was ‘true in terms of morality but in practice, it is more appropriate to regard it as an excuse’[K20]. Yet restrictions would be acceptable if they were ‘grounded on facts instead of excuses – we have to change so that we may export our products proudly’[K18]. ‘There must be reasons’[K14], ‘clear reasons’[K10], ‘proper reasons’[K14]. Yet restrictions would be acceptable if they were ‘grounded on facts instead of excuses – we have to change so that we may export our products proudly’[K18].

In Yoju most participants accepted such restrictions. If ‘a product is of good quality but is made in bad way’ then ‘there should always be restrictions whether we are exporting or importing – the world is in a process of globalization and humanization…those products should be categorically rejected’[K30]. And ‘reciprocity’ was no excuse on Yoju. Everyone agreed, when the moderator asked: ‘restrictions should always applied without any consideration of reciprocity – when our products are rejected for such reasons, then we should accept it?’

There was a sharp and illuminating contrast between Ukrainians and Koreans in the way they interpreted or rather misinterpreted the question. First, Ukrainians understood the question was exclusively about exports from their country and not about imports to it. Koreans had spontaneously widened the question to include, for example ‘soccer balls used in the World Cup that were made by children in Pakistan – that is a problem’[K27].

Second, Koreans understood the question was not about substandard products but about substandard production methods that damaged the country of production. But despite the question which stressed damaging methods of production, Ukrainian participants insisted on interpreting it as a question about sub-standard Ukrainian products: ‘if goods are low-quality then let them impose restrictions to keep Ukraine from doing it again, but if the goods are OK…’[U3]; ‘if it is an attempt to sell some products that really pollute the environment then that should be restricted – but if it is only an excuse on the foreign side not to buy from us something, then...’[U10]. This insistent focus on substandard products was reinforced by an example from abroad that was spontaneously raised by one participant in Kharkiv: ‘there was that mad cow disease in England last year – trade restrictions were a normal thing – that is how it should be’[U11]. Ukrainians were notably apprehensive about their product quality.

But what most set Ukrainians apart was their extreme suspicion and resentment about such potential restrictions: ‘it is only an excuse’[U28]; ‘to buy Ukrainian goods for next to nothing’[U25]; ‘to reduce our exports and to humiliate our Ukraine – we are humiliated far and wide!’[U32]; ‘how can our products be environmentally polluted? Our enterprises are at a standstill – fertilisers are not spread over the soil – the Chernobyl accident was long ago and it did not cause damage to this country alone – for some reason there is no talk of environmentally polluted products from Poland despite the fact that more regions suffered from Chernobyl in Poland than in Ukraine. It has been proved, there is scientific data indicating that our products are really environmentally clean but they are exploiting our dead-end situation to buy all those products from us for next to nothing’[U28, supported by U26, U29]. Ukrainians felt exploited by stronger powers: ‘that scandal around those CD disks –
our disks are not any worse than theirs...but those countries do not want the same product there so they put pressure on us – said they would block any import from Ukraine – Ukraine must obey'[U19]... ‘This just cannot be avoided’[U17 supported by U22, U24].

Ukrainians looked to the state rather than foreign consumers to protect them, but blamed the state for failing to do so: ‘above all it is the policy of the state (deep sad sigh) – if the plant in question is advantageous to the state and brings large profits to businessmen then that plant will go on functioning all the same – and as to how many people remain in that village, what is the health of the children born there, no one will be interested in such things’[U30 supported by U31, U32].

Like the Koreans, the Vietnamese fully understood that the question was about methods of production, not product-quality. And like the Ukrainians they fully understood it was about their exports not their imports. But Vietnamese opinion was divided and on balance opposed – though not so helplessly resentful as in Ukraine.

Vietnam has some very poor and underdeveloped hill regions where the whole family traditionally joins in domestic production – much of it craftwork by children. So some supported restrictions [V19, V24, V12] and gave reasons ‘yes, they should restrict – thus child abuse and deforestation could be limited’[V19]. But others, equally concerned, advised caution, and also gave reasons: ‘it should be considered carefully because we can create jobs for children with this production’[V21]. And others put the same case more aggressively: ‘it is nonsense to ban those products – it is a way of making things difficult for us – it is obviously not good to exploit children but it creates jobs’[V26]... ‘each nation should have its own policy...it is not good to ban goods like that[V31].

The moderator drew attention to American complaints against Vietnam ‘for selling catfish at a price lower than the real (American) cost, arguing that workers here in Vietnam get low wages’. But a Vietnamese participant rejected that argument: ‘the living cost here in Vietnam is not expensive and this payment is acceptable for Vietnamese fishermen’[V31]. Although they understood and recognised the problems, Vietnamese participants felt on balance that such restrictions were not helpful but ‘just an excuse not to import our goods’[V13], imposed by foreigners ‘to harm us’[V15].

Czechs saw the issue from the opposite side to the Vietnamese. Encouraged by the Czech moderator, they focused their discussion of import-bans around whether they should boycott shoes made for Nike by children in Thailand. As an ‘accession state’ to the EU there were more problems of competition from EU products flooding into the Czech Republic than problems of Czech products being excluded from world markets.

Yet although the Czechs and Vietnamese viewed the problem from opposite sides, their conclusions were remarkably similar. Czechs, like the Vietnamese, felt the problem should be ‘solved by the state where it happens’[C17, C18]. A boycott might not help the children: ‘they are glad to earn some money’[C17]... ‘what would children do if they did not do this kind of work?’[C18]... ‘I think they would not go to school’[C21].

In any case Czechs thought an import boycott ‘would not work here, not from the position of the customer’[anon. Brno]... ‘given that Nike is a well-known brand’[C19]... ‘people here will buy their goods anyway’[C17]... ‘if a mother is to decide between shoes that cost 500 or 200 crowns, she buys those that cost 200 crowns’[C8]. But no other strategy would be more
effective: ‘nothing much can be done about it – do you mean that I should walk around with a
poster? – that gesture would not solve anything’[anon. Prostejov]... ‘the Czech Republic is
too small’[C29].

#3.4 Ranking resistance

As with the cross-national pattern of discontent, there is a degree of consistency to the
five cross-national spectra support for protest and resistance. As a very crude summary
measure we can calculate the average rankings of protest-approval for each country.
(See Fig #3.4) That places Vietnam towards the ‘disapproval’ end (at 1.8), and Korea
towards the ‘approval’ end (at 3.2). Indeed Vietnam is at the ‘disapproval’ end on 3 of
the 5 rankings. Conversely Korea is at the ‘approval’ end on 3 of the 5 rankings.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Least</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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The Czechs and Ukrainians lie in-between – but the Czechs (at 2.0) are very close to the
Vietnamese and the Ukrainians (at 3.0) very close to the Koreans. And that relative
ranking holds true for the Czechs and Ukrainians on 4 of the five rankings.

Of course that is a very crude numerical summary. Although the Ukrainians and
Koreans score much the same on their overall support for protest and resistance the
kind of resistance they support is very different: Ukrainians favour individual sabotage
without much hope of success, while the Koreans favour orderly collective action with
considerable confidence of success.
#4 The Triumph of Development over Culture or Poverty?

There are some limited elements of commonality across the focus-group discussions: in every country focus-group participants expressed the view that crime, corruption and inequality were increasing. In every country except the Czech Republic, focus-group participants expressed the view that pollution and environmental degradation was increasing. And in every country except Ukraine focus-group participants feared that their national culture was being eroded amongst young people by the seductive counter-attractions of international culture. In every country focus-group participants were aware of anti-globalisation protests – in other countries if not always in their own. In every country except Ukraine focus-group participants condemned violent or disorderly forms of protest or resistance even if they supported the aims of the protesters. And in every country except Korea, focus-group participants were opposed to foreign boycotts as a method of resistance.

There were also limited differences within three of the four countries – though, significantly, not much variation within Vietnam – even if that may be partially explained by our failure to penetrate into the remote highlands. Within Ukraine, participants in Russian-speaking Kharkiv had mixed views about the increasing respect for Ukrainian culture. Within the Czech Republic, participants in Prague, which had suffered from anti-globalisation protesters, were especially vociferous in their condemnation of foreign protesters on their streets. Within Korea, participants in rural and underdeveloped Yechon wanted development even at the cost of environmental degradation.

Yet cross-national differences eclipsed these variations within countries. However, what is most significant about these cross-national differences is what they do not reflect. A two-way table (Fig #4a) shows that Rich and Poor countries score much the same as each other both in terms of discontent and in terms of support for protest and resistance. And though East Europe is rather more discontented than East Asia, both East Europe and East Asia score exactly the same as each other in terms of overall support for protest and resistance. So neither a crude European-versus-Asian culture model, nor a rich-versus-poor poverty model can contribute anything towards an explanation of the cross-national variation so evident in our focus groups’ levels of discontent or attitudes to protest and resistance. So neither ‘civilizational culture’ (European values versus Asian values) nor poverty do anything at all to explain the cross-national differences in attitudes towards resistance.
The two poorest countries are located at opposite ends of the spectrum of discontent, almost at opposite ends of the spectrum of protest or resistance, and certainly at opposite ends of the spectrum of support for sabotage. And one of those polar opposites is East European, the other East Asian.

By contrast, a simple linear table (Fig #4b) suggests that both the spectrum of overall discontent, and the spectrum of overall support for protest and resistance, reflect rates of growth and development rather than the level of wealth.

| Fig #4b: Three cross-national rankings |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                                       | Adverse Economic Trends | General Discontent (excl. econ trends) | General Support for Protest and Resistance |
| Vietnam                               | 1                    | 1.4 (1.6)                           | 1.8                                           |
| Czech Rep                             | 2                    | 2.2 (2.3)                           | 2.0                                           |
| Korea                                 | 3                    | 3.0 (2.9)                           | 3.2                                           |
| Ukraine                               | 4                    | 3.4 (3.3)                           | 3.0                                           |

Of course one element in the spectrum of discontent is economic growth itself. But it makes no difference whether economic despair and euphoria is included or excluded from the spectrum of discontent: the spectra of public concern about crime, corruption, inequality and ‘undeserving’ winners follow much the same pattern. The spectrum of perceptions of pollution and environmental damage differs from the general pattern only because the Czechs displace the Vietnamese at the contented end of the spectrum. Discontent is thus remarkably unambiguous – whether by coincidence or, more likely, because adverse economic trends, crime, corruption, inequality, ‘undeserving’ winners, and environmental decay hang together and reinforce each other. Perceptions of cultural threat provide the outstanding exception to this general pattern of discontent. That does divide the rich and the poor – and afflicts rich countries more than poor countries. Within countries it worries the old but is viewed rather differently by the young who seem intent on abandoning tradition and embracing a more international or (quite literally) polyglot culture.

The ranking of countries by overall discontent (with or without the inclusion of economic despair/euphoria) follows exactly the ranking by perceptions of economic growth. In turn, the ranking by general support for protest and resistance closely follows the ranking by discontent. Only the slightly greater support for resistance amongst the Koreans than the Ukrainians prevents a perfect fit between discontent and overall support for protest and resistance. And that slight imperfection reflects the Koreans unqualified support, and Ukrainians uniquely strong opposition, to foreign boycotts. On the more extreme forms of resistance – sabotage – support amongst Ukrainians is far greater than amongst Koreans.

So, if we were to extract a crude and simple conclusion from a mass of detailed and highly nuanced opinion, it would have to be that development triumphs over culture or poverty as an explanation of the most striking variations in support for protest and resistance that were evident in our focus-group discussions. Specific, detailed national
(but not civilizational) cultures and histories may explain slight variations from the general pattern that links resistance to discontent – and they surely explain the varying styles and forms of resistance that have greater support in different countries – ranging from support for sabotage by isolated and despairing individuals (in Ukraine) to peaceful and orderly but collective and even international action by confident citizens (in Korea).

Discontent and attitudes to resistance clearly do not reflect absolute levels of affluence, but they nonetheless seem to reflect adverse trends in economic development. At present the Vietnamese stand out as euphoric about economic development irrespective of their current relatively modest standard of living – remarkably contented, and much opposed to anything disorderly that might interrupt the smooth path of their development. But if we are right to conclude that development rather than culture determines protest and resistance, then such attitudes are not part of a permanent or slowly changing culture but contingent on continued economic growth. And government and business leaders should feel both the exhilaration – and the insecurity – of ‘riding the tiger’.
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1 These apparent cross-national differences are, of course, still to be confirmed statistically by large-scale representative surveys – which are currently in the field.

2 Our own surveys will do so however.

3 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “How about our country’s economy? Is it getting better or worse? Why? Who is most responsible for that?”

4 The letters C, K, U, V indicate participants in the Czech Republic, Korea, Ukraine and Vietnam. Within each country the numbers indicate specific participants, and ranges of numbers indicate specific focus-groups. Where a specific participant could not be identified from the video-recording, the location of the focus-group is used instead of the participant number. The participants in each focus-group were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ca-b</th>
<th>Prague</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Czech Rep</th>
<th>Ua-b</th>
<th>Kyiv</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ca-b FG</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Ua-b FG</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Ua-b FG</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca-b FG</td>
<td>Small-town</td>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>Ua-b FG</td>
<td>Small-town</td>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka-b</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
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<td>Va-b</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Rural area</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Va-b FG</td>
<td>Small-town</td>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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5 Based on focus-group responses to the question: “On balance, who has benefited most from recent economic changes in our country?”

6 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Do you feel that crime and corruption are increasing or decreasing? Why is that?” and “And differences between rich and poor? Are they increasing or decreasing? Why is that?”

7 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “And problems of pollution or environmental damage? Are they getting better or worse? Why is that?”

8 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Do you feel that [COUNTRY] language, culture and traditions are becoming more or less respected today? Why is that?”

9 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Have you heard of any such anti-globalisation protests here in [COUNTRY]? Or in any other countries? Where?”

10 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “What is your attitude to such protests? Are local people right to protest when international companies cause local problems? Or do such anti-globalisation protests do more harm than good for ordinary people in countries like ours? Why?”

11 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Suppose an international company did not have safe working conditions in its factory, or paid very low and unfair wages. Would the workers be right to retaliate by doing as little work as possible? Or by doing their work badly? Or by stealing what they could from the factory? Or by damaging the company’s property or machinery? Or something else – what?”

12 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Suppose an international company was damaging or polluting the local environment. Would people who lived in the locality be right to retaliate by peaceful marches and demonstrations? Or by complaining to local officials and asking for their help? Or by damaging the company’s property or machinery? Or something else – what?”

13 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Who should have the right to protest if an international company is causing local problems? Only local people? Or [COUNTRY] people from outside the area? Or people from other countries as well?”

14 Based on focus-group responses to the questions: “Should foreign countries be permitted to restrict imports of goods from [COUNTRY] if they are produced by methods that pollute our environment or are a danger to our workers? Or would that just be an excuse to exclude our exports?”