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Diversity training initiatives are an increasingly large part of many organizations' diversity management portfolio. Little is known, however, about the effectiveness of such initiatives. In this article, we demonstrate how increased adherence to the principles of established social psychological theory can guide and make more coherent the development of diversity initiatives. Likewise, outcomes of diversity training can inform and make more practical social psychological theory and research. In short, both diversity trainers and academics would benefit from greater dialogue, as well as grappling with the tensions that naturally arise when theory and practice collide.
Diversity Training: Putting Theory into Practice

The workforce is becoming more diverse (Richard, Fubara & Castillo, 2000; Rogovsky & Sims, 2002; Tayeb, 2005). For example, Williams and O’Reilly (1998) estimate that in the forthcoming decade in the U.S., historically underrepresented groups such as women and ethnic minorities will fill seventy-five percent of all newly-created jobs. The consequences of increased workplace diversity that includes not only gender and ethnicity or race, but also work group affiliation, lifestyle, age, level of education, career history, sexuality, religious perspective, cognitive style and so on (Anderson & Metcalf, 2003; Jackson, Brett, Sessa, Cooper, Julin & Peyronnin, 1991; Triandis, 2003), will be complex to understand and to assess. The challenge for diversity trainers will be to find ways to maximize the benefits of diversity (Anderson & Metcalf, 2003; Gordon, 1995; Watson, Kumar & Michaelsen, 1993) when it is manifest in so many different forms.

When it comes to strategies for tackling diversity issues, there is something of a divide between theory and practice. A variety of theoretical approaches have been utilized to better understand stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Classic social psychological approaches look at the problem of bias reduction from a generally rigorous, theory-driven perspective (e.g., Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Dovidio, Gaertner, Stewart, Esses, ten Vergert, & Hodson, 2004; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961). Diversity management, a more recent endeavour, is grounded in “real-world” practices in organizational environments. Via a number of routes, (e.g., organizational ethos regarding recruitment and promotion procedures; staff training) the goal of diversity
initiatives is to achieve “full integration of members of minority social categories into the social, structural, and power relationships of an organization or institution” (Brewer, Hippel & Gooden, 1999, p. 337).

The goals of social psychologists interested in intergroup conflict, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination and those of diversity trainers are often similar. For example, both approaches were initially inspired by heinous acts of humankind toward those considered “different”. The social psychology of prejudice became a topic of great interest particularly after WWII and Nazi Germany, whilst diversity issues engendered great interest particularly after the 1960's Black Power movement in the U.S. As such, both have an underlying goal of improved intergroup relations. In spite of these similarities, though, they currently operate in a fairly separate fashion with limited dialogue. This article will consider how and why joint ventures between diversity trainers and academics can produce a more functional strategy for tackling stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination.

Our analysis falls into two main sections. First, we briefly set the scene with regards to diversity management. Our introduction to the diversity management literature will concentrate chiefly on one aspect of such management, diversity training (DT). Second, we consider some theoretical issues that can inform practitioners about practical approaches they could take in DT. Recognising the huge variation in such training programmes, our strategy is to highlight and discuss a few basic, generic approaches that underpin many of the different exercises and programmes that are commonly used. We hope that these illustrations will underscore our case for the benefits of mutual, interdisciplinary learning.
Residing primarily in organizational and management journals is a small but growing body of literature that considers the effects of DT on reducing workplace inequity. Although DT has many purposes, a primary one is to facilitate the integration of minority groups into the workforce, usually by attempting to confer on the entire workforce the skills, knowledge, and motivation to work productively alongside dissimilar others and/or to interact effectively with a diverse customer population.

Methods are varied and include a mix of didactic (e.g., education, persuasion, lectures, videos) and interactive (e.g., discussions, role playing, simulation, exercises) approaches.

In recent years, many employers have rolled out large-scale DT programmes. In fact, according to recent UK statistics, 69% of organizations have a diversity policy and 60% offer diversity training (Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development [CIPD], 2003). Moreover, 78% of respondents to the CIPD’s 2004 training and development survey think diversity training is at least “somewhat” important, with 32% seeing it as “crucially” important (CIPD, 2004; both reports were based on samples of training managers randomly selected from the CIPD's member database).

DT is promoted both as a resolution to problematic workplace relations (Naff & Kellough, 2003; Rynes & Rosen, 1995; Tan, Morris & Romero, 1996/2003) and as a medium with which to unleash the creative potential of diversity, such that organizational effectiveness is enhanced (Naff & Kellough, 2003). However, DT differs from the superordinate concept of diversity *management* in that it does not necessarily imply any background change in system-level structure, decision-making, or organization ethos (Richard et al., 2000; Wentling & Palmer-Rivas, 1999), an important point we return to
Hence DT might well be defined as any discrete programme, or set of programmes, which aims to influence participants to increase their positive -- or decrease their negative -- intergroup behaviours, such that less prejudice or discrimination is displayed toward others perceived as different in their group affiliation(s).

The process of developing good practices in diversity management, as with any relatively new endeavour, involves repetition and fine-tuning of both theory and practice. If we are to refine and develop a model or models of best practice, it is desirable to gain feedback as to the effectiveness of those bias reduction initiatives we implement. However, research into the effectiveness of DT is still in its infancy (Noe & Ford, 1992). In fact, DT sessions are often deemed “successful” even when assessment is missing entirely or limited to participants’ ratings of quality directly after attending (Driscoll, Kokini, Katehi, Wright, & Percifield, 2003; Garcia, Hudgins, McTighe Musil, Nettle, Sedlacek, & Smith, 2001).

Such situations arise because DT practitioners are, by necessity, pragmatic with regards to the level of rigour achievable in workplace-based research. Many DT practitioners do not have the background expertise in assessment and/or evaluation, or if they do, do not have the time or money for it. Despite, or perhaps because of such constraints, it is rare to find DT practitioners or evaluators who have aligned themselves with an established theoretical framework (Roberson, Kulik & Pepper, 2003; Triandis, Kuroswki & Gelfand, 1994); as a result, most evaluative studies to date have been exploratory in nature, and/or limited in scope. In this paper we demonstrate how DT practitioners might improve the product they deliver through a deeper appreciation of
social psychological theory and research at the design and (to a lesser extent) evaluation stages.

Some social psychologists studying stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have neglected real world phenomena in favour of doing laboratory experiments. Dubious generalisations made from lab studies to the real world by social psychologists have, at times, alienated DT practitioners attempting to apply social psychological research and theory to DT situations. What works well in theory does not always work well in practice. To give an example (to be expanded upon later in this article), consider the Implicit Attitude Test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This on-line test assesses individuals’ “hidden” or implicit bias (e.g., in terms of race, age or gender). The assumption is that by informing IAT takers that they may not always act in as fair and unprejudiced a way as their self-concept maintains, dissonance (discomfort) will result, and they will be prompted to monitor their behaviour and, over time, express less day-to-day bias (e.g., Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). Although such effects are found to some extent in the laboratory, a far more varied pattern of results obtains when used in diversity training settings (Driscoll, Pendry, & Field, 2004). In other words, under controlled laboratory conditions where stimuli are carefully presented and information often restricted, and where those taking the test are a relatively homogenous group, certain theoretical effects have been found that may not have been found under natural conditions where perceivers are a more heterogenous group and/or often have access to varied and complex stimulus information (see Baron, Byrne & Branscombe, 2005). Different, more powerful effects either mask the effect, or the effect does not
obtain because of element(s) in the natural conditions that are not, as yet, incorporated into the theory.

Thus, for the collaboration between DT practitioners and academics to work, academics need to be more cognizant of real world complications before generalising laboratory phenomena, pay more attention to the successful innovations of DT practitioners in training sessions, and then follow up by considering their utility for social psychological theory and research.

How Social Psychological Theory Can Help: Programme Design

There are many different strategies and techniques in the diversity trainer’s toolkit, but which methods work best and for which populations? Social psychology researchers have noted that it is about time we began to provide answers to such questions (Dovidio et al., 2004; Stephan & Stephan, 2001). Our goal here is to highlight a few approaches that are commonly used by diversity trainers, suggest some new approaches that capitalize on the social cognition approach to stereotyping (Driscoll, 1999), and seek a preliminary evaluation of their likelihood of success based upon our knowledge of the extant social psychological literature and their initial success in DT sessions. We have grouped approaches as follows: classic approaches (informative/enlightenment; dissonance/guilt inducing; social identity) and newer approaches (use of cognitive tasks to create awareness of own bias).

Classic Approaches

Informative Approach/Enlightenment

This first example is more a category of initiatives, rather than any one in particular. These programmes aim to inform participants, raising awareness of the
continuing existence of societal or workplace bias and on occasion emphasising particular
groups’ historic misdemeanours in this respect. There may be an emphasis upon
highlighting social norms of equality. Enlightenment may be used to encourage
participants to take the perspective of members of other groups, in an attempt to create
emotional empathy (Dovidio et al., 2004). Many of these types of programmes also detail
the benefits of having a more diverse workforce and employees’ legal responsibilities
under the latest anti-discrimination laws. In this way, such programmes aim to persuade
participants to welcome or “value” diversity, encourage more positive group relations and
adherence to anti-discrimination laws, and ultimately, decrease the risk of organizations
facing legal action over employee bias.

These are admirable objectives, but a social psychological analysis of the
informative approach would not be very optimistic about achieving all the
aforementioned outcomes. It is not easy to persuade members of traditionally advantaged
or disproportionately represented groups to change biased behaviour. Prejudice is often
based on incorrect information, but the idea that it can be stopped merely by providing
the prejudiced with accurate information has been shown to be naïve. Prejudice is
underpinned by positive or negative emotional reactions (i.e., a strong affective
component) and biased interpretation of information and experience (Dovidio et al.,
2004; Milton, 1972; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000), both of which serve to maintain or
strengthen entrenched stereotypical beliefs in the face of contrary evidence. Within the
attitudes literature, merely providing factual information has been shown to be often
ineffectual as a means of evoking attitude change, especially where the attitudes
concerned are affectively based (Shavitt, 1990).
Moreover, it may be difficult to evoke trainees’ sense of personal responsibility for bias via informational means alone. For example, claims with regard to the traditional advantage of Whites may be decried by Whites themselves, who explain ingroup advantages by favourably evaluating their own group, or by re-characterising their self-concept in terms of a different identity, thus averting negative impact on their self esteem (see Doosje, Spears, Ellemers & Koomen, 1999; Mussweiler, Gabriel & Bodenhausen, 2000). Thus, information alone - even information that clearly demonstrates bias - is unlikely to be useful for correcting discriminatory behaviour or prompting more socially equitable behaviour. What is often simultaneously needed is an impetus to accept and be motivated to change one's biased behaviour. In a practical sense, this finding suggests that diversity training programmes utilizing information/enlightenment might usefully add components to the training that evoke personal responsibility.

Another result of confronting historically advantaged groups with their bias is that it can incite their anger, contempt, or feelings of persecution (Driscoll, Pendry, & Field, 2005; Mollica, 2003), leading to backlash against diversity programmes to the detriment of intergroup relations (D'Souza, 1997; Von Bergen, Soper & Foster, 2002). For example, if individuals who identify highly with their “White” identity feel that it is being sullied or wrongly accused or attacked, they are unlikely to feel very guilty (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). They may instead affiliate more strongly with their group (Doosje, Spears & Ellemers, 2002) and/or take collective action to challenge the source of threat (Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1999) – here the DT practitioner and/or host organization.
Moreover, when highly-identifying members of a powerful group – for example highly identified White employees – see their integrity threatened, they are more likely to express anger and contempt towards outgroups (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000), contrary to the aims of DT. Finally, when diversity initiatives make demands on employees to overlook their group status and regard each other as individuals, or ignore group distinctions (i.e., the "Colour-Blind" approach), such individuals are motivated to regain their group distinctiveness in ways that include overt discrimination (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1999), or engaging in displays of outgroup hatred or disgust (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). This Colour-Blind approach, popular in the U.S. in the 1970's, has since been used to explain problematic race relations in various other countries (i.e., Brazil, South Africa, France, Canada) (Cose, 1997).

On a slightly more positive note, there is some indirect evidence to suggest that enlightenment approaches may work better when they utilize material that fosters emotional empathy via perspective taking. For example, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) demonstrated that participants asked to take on the perspective of an elderly individual relied less upon stereotypic information when writing about a day in the life of elderly individuals (an explicit measure). In another study using an implicit measure of stereotyping (a task assessing reaction times to non-stereotypic and stereotype-consistent words), perspective taking was again shown to result in less biased responses. Additional research suggested that these results arose because participants in the perspective taking condition were encouraged to see overlap in traits used to describe themselves and the elderly target. Perspective taking enables people to see ways in which others may in fact
be more like them than they ordinarily expect and as such, may be a good tool to use in DT involving awareness (Dovidio et al., 2004).

Whilst informative approaches are clearly appealing to practitioners, with the exception of some methods that evoke perspective taking or emotional empathy and factual presentations about legal issues, such material requires careful consideration, strategising, and finesse to deliver without triggering defensiveness, reactance and the associated problems discussed above. Thus to achieve DT goals, the effectiveness of informative approaches in isolation seems quite limited.

Dissonance or Guilt-inducing Approaches

Other DT approaches attempt to elicit trainees’ emotional reactions by using more confrontational and interactive methods, which increase the likelihood that an individual will feel dissonance or guilt and consequently take personal responsibility for inequity. Two approaches that have garnered some attention from social psychologists and have been frequently used by DT practitioners are the Walking through White Privilege Exercise (McIntosh, 1988) and Jane Elliott’s Blue-Eyed/Brown-Eyed simulation. We try to make it clear in the course of discussing these exercises how a conversation between social psychologists and DT practitioners would be mutually beneficial to maximize the likely success of these methods in training.

Walking through White Privilege (WTWP) exercise. This exercise was developed by McIntosh (1988) to raise whites’ awareness of invisible privileges extended to them and denied to people of colour. Participants in the training session line up on one side of a room and respond to a number of statements (e.g., “I can easily find a doll for my child that represents his or her race”) by taking a pace forward if they agree (i.e., have the
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privilege). Statements increase in severity regarding the consequence of the privilege. Typically white participants take many more paces forward than participants of other ethnic or racial groups as they acknowledge their privileges, thereby providing a spatial demonstration of what happens in society. After reading the final statement, DT practitioners ask participants to face one another and tell each other what they are thinking and feeling. Typically, there are some very strong negative feelings and thoughts expressed from those left behind (e.g., anger, tears, disbelief). Those on the other side of the room, predominantly whites, typically express the guilt that they feel about being privileged and/or anger at being blamed for privileges extended to them through no ‘fault’ of their own.

Hence, one can see that the exercise may not merely raise White awareness of privilege, thereby reducing negative inter-racial feelings. Instead, and as the established body of social psychological research noted above suggests, highlighting intergroup differences can backfire in terms of reducing positive intergroup feelings and behaviour (e.g., Gaertner, et al., 1993; Hewstone, 1996). For example, groups may become defensive and in doing so increase their cohesion by denigrating the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Some more recent research qualifies the above gloomy conclusions (Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). This paper assesses a portion of the WTWP exercise. In Study 1, white participants assessed several statements about racial inequality framed either in terms of White privileges or Black disadvantages. In Study 2, participants were asked to generate their own examples of White privilege or Black disadvantage. In both studies, researchers found that framing inequality in terms of “ingroup privilege” as
opposed to “outgroup disadvantage” led to greater collective guilt and correspondingly more positive associations towards blacks among white participants.

At first blush this sounds like the WTWP may work as a prejudice reduction training tool in precisely the way McIntosh intended. However, the authors note that there are some downsides to this emphasis on White privilege. For example, Whites may suffer a blow to their individual self-esteem when ingroup privileges imply that one’s status and resources are not due to individual abilities but rather, a social structure that is biased towards the ingroup. Also, this emphasis on framing inequality in terms of White privilege does not sit well with public discourse on the topic. One is more likely to encounter discourse that highlights Black disadvantage than White privilege. There may be resistance and defensiveness to interventions that frame inequalities in terms of ingroup privilege, when it runs counter to the prevailing norms on how disadvantaged groups are portrayed.

Additionally, in some related work, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer (2005) have provided preliminary evidence that identification level is an individual difference variable that can likely impact upon individuals’ reactions to the WTWP exercise (shown indirectly here by subsequent responses to a modern racism scale). Specifically, white participants with varying levels of white identification were asked to write down ways they have been privileged because of their racial group membership. As compared to a control condition (writing down life experiences), white participants high in white identification actually showed increases in modern racism (i.e., endorsing items such as “Discrimination is no longer a problem”). This supports the idea that thinking about ingroup privilege may not always work well. It may actually make one more negative.
towards the outgroup if one is already strongly identified with one's group. Modern racism levels only decreased for those white participants low in white identification. This highlights the inherent danger for DT practitioners using exercises that on the surface should teach a compelling lesson, but in actuality trigger more variable responses, not all of which bode well for improving intergroup relations (for related arguments about the role identification can play in intergroup relations see Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998; Doosje, Spears & Ellemers, 2002; Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1999; Mackie et al., 2000).

It is unlikely that DT practitioners would be surprised by the defensive responses of some participants. Rather, they would argue that it is the discussion after the exercise – with the DT practitioner competently facilitating the session – that results in participants learning the “correct” lesson. Having watched and facilitated this exercise numerous times, and in the light of Powell et al.’s (2005) preliminary empirical demonstration, we generally concur and think the exercise has training value. However, we would further suggest that diversity trainers might best employ the WTWP with more diversity competent participants (i.e., those experienced with diversity issues and interactions) or with participants that have facilitated an introductory diversity training session already (e.g. trainers). For example, when training a group of individuals who had themselves some experience of facilitating introductory diversity training sessions, this exercise has worked well according to evaluations administered afterward. These participants are likely to have worked through their anger and/or guilt response (see also Monteith, 1993; Stephan &
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Stephan, 2001; Tatum, 1997), and are able to understand that being uncomfortable is natural and even a constructive part of the process.

It has not, though, worked as well in sessions with less diversity competent participants. **With a less diversity experienced group of participants, responses were polarized.** What we **have commonly found is that participants** with no prior exposure to such diversity issues will often get “stopped” by their anger and/or guilt response, and such defensive responses make it difficult to progress, particularly in a group setting where those having such negative responses are likely to band together and resist any efforts to move forward and deal with the implications of White privilege. It is therefore better to begin with a less threatening way to examine White privilege or even begin with ways that bias still might be operating in society.

Finally, diversity trainers should evaluate the benefits or costs of the exercise for people of colour as they are not likely to benefit greatly from an increased awareness of invisible privilege and may incur more costs by having their non-privileged status highlighted for them publicly. People of colour typically already know and are aware of white privilege. They are regularly subjected to daily, minute insults, known as micro-insults (Bell, 2005; Pierce, 1992). These offensive mechanisms (nonverbal and kinetic) are designed to ensure that Blacks stay in the inferior, dependent, helpless role (e.g., when a White person asks a well-dressed Black male waiting in the hotel lobby to carry the luggage). A lot of the impact of the exercise is how it opens the eyes of whites about the inequity still in society (i.e., that there is not an “equal playing field” as they had thought). Thus, the exercise does not usually benefit people of colour in this way.
The WTWP exercise provides a clear example of how improved outcomes may be obtained by considering theory and research from social psychology. However, any conclusions about the success or failure of DT exercises need to be tempered by how DT practitioners employ the actual exercise and handle its aftermath. Consequently, conversation and information exchange between theorists and practitioners would clearly benefit trainers utilising the WTWP exercise.

Blue-Eyed/Brown-Eyed exercise. The Blue-Eyed/Brown-Eyed exercise was designed by Jane Elliott and has been conducted for over thirty years (Byrnes & Kiger, 1990; Stewart, LaDuke, Bracht, Sweet & Gamarel, 2003; Weiner & Wright, 1973). Although originating in the US, the exercise has been used on both sides of the Atlantic for DT purposes (see http://www.neishtraining.com/jane_elliott.htm) and indeed, one of Jane Elliott’s most recent UK simulations was featured in a BBC Radio 4 broadcast entitled “The business of race” (December 9, 2005). In one illustrative demonstration (Stewart et al., 2003), student participants were assigned to one of two treatment conditions: the experimental group (i.e., Blue Eyed/Brown-Eyed exercise) or a control group (who received a presentation on intergroup relations). The experimental group was further sorted into two groups by eye colour (Brown and non-brown/blue).

While blue-eyed students were taunted by the session’s facilitator (Jane Elliott), made to wear neck collars, and sent to an uncomfortable room for almost ninety minutes, the former group were given breakfast and asked to behave in a discriminatory way towards the other students, even if they found this uncomfortable. For several hours, blue-eyed participants were subjected to many discriminatory practices and personal attacks by the facilitator (and intermittently, by brown-eyed students). At least two blue-
Students broke down in tears as a result of the simulation, one of whom left the room and ceased participation.

On conclusion of the simulation, participants discussed the activity and were given follow-up activities and readings. They spent further time watching an anti-prejudice video, followed by a brief question and answer period. College counsellors held three optional follow-up sessions, which were attended by about half the original participants, to provide participants with opportunities to express their feelings and reflections upon the exercise. Following these three sessions, the facilitator returned to conduct her own follow-up discussion session.

Stewart et al. (2003) are the only authors to have examined the effects of the full, eight-hour exercise in reducing prejudice and discrimination (see Byrnes & Kiger, 1990, for evaluations of a shorter version). Degree of prejudice was assessed using three measures: the Social Desirability Scale, which is a scale assessing participants’ degree of comfort with various types of relationships with members of minority groups (SDS; Bogardus, 1925); the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay et al., 1981) and the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPR; Dunton & Fazio, 1997). Results (taken four to six weeks after the exercise) suggested that participants in the experimental group reported greater comfort with relationships with members of other groups (compared to control group). This effect was however, stronger for certain ethnic groups (Asian American, Latino/Latina) than for the African American group. There was no difference in MRS scores between groups (so, no evidence of less prejudice in the experimental group). For the MCPR, participants in the experimental group were more.
likely to report that they felt angry at themselves when experiencing a prejudiced thought or feeling.

While it is clear from these studies that the simulation certainly does elicit emotional responses from participants, on the whole such reactions are not positive (Byrnes & Kiger, 1990; Stewart et al., 2003). More troubling, it also seems that while this exercise has powerful and immediate impact, its long-term effect on intergroup attitudes and behaviours is unclear (Stewart et al., 2003).

From a social psychological stance, there are a number of theoretical issues that may shed light on the present findings. For example, many of the types of discrimination depicted in the exercise are very overt and extreme; it may be difficult for participants to identify with such behaviour, as “modern” prejudice and discrimination today tend to be much more subtle (Dovidio, Gaertner & Bachman, 2001; McConahay et al., 1981). Extreme behaviours may not always lead participants to relate the experience to their own life, and so it may be helpful to also include more subtle forms of discrimination (Dovidio et al., 2004). There may therefore be advantages to modifying the ‘full-blown’ version of the exercise in such a way that it focuses upon less extreme types of discrimination. As we saw earlier in this article, there are clear benefits that accrue from approaches that increase empathy or encourage participants to engage in perspective taking (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Less extreme illustrations of discrimination may work to foster increased empathy and the ability to take another’s perspective.

On the MCPR, participants in the experimental (vs. control) group felt greater self-directed anger at being prejudiced. Interestingly, these results were obtained after a delay of several weeks, suggesting the effects were not that short-lived. This state of
mind is suggested by the authors to lead to a sense of frustration. In line with the frustration-aggression hypothesis, they go on to suggest that the intense, long-lasting frustration induced by this inability to act in the desired manner could perhaps ultimately lead to an increase in aggression towards members of other groups, perhaps even those very groups whose discriminatory treatment the exercise was designed to overcome (see e.g., Berkowitz, 1989; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939).

More recent social psychological research would challenge such a pessimistic conclusion. Research by Monteith and her colleagues (e.g., Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993) and Dovidio and Gaertner (1999) would instead argue that the increased negative affect that arises when individuals are challenged to examine inconsistencies between their non-prejudiced values and subtle prejudicial thoughts and actions is precisely the conduit needed to drive these individuals to develop more positive intergroup attitudes. Stewart et al. (2003) acknowledge this possibility, but note that much of the past research in this domain has been centred upon the emotion of personal guilt, as opposed to the anger observed here. In models of self-regulation, as proposed by Monteith (1993), guilt is believed to induce a period of self-reflection, a desire to improve, and it is this process that ultimately fosters reduced prejudice. Stewart et al (2003) hypothesise that anger may work differently, inducing less self-analysis (and hence being less effective at reducing prejudice in the longer term).

Their views are echoed by others researching in this field (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2001). Even practitioners who have focused more positively upon anger as a prejudice reduction method (e.g., Tatum, 1997) have been obliged to highlight the potential harm that anger-induction methods can cause. Specifically, Tatum argues that
participants can experience a sort of freezing effect, getting almost stuck in their anger response, if they are not also provided with methods that lead them beyond their initial anger response. This highlights the need to view such approaches as simply a first step, one that needs to be followed up with (for example) workshops led by individuals who have experience in dealing with these sensitive issues. In such sessions, participants can process and deal with their anger more constructively, and discuss ways that might lead to more constructive action in the future.

Stewart et al. (2003) end their article by discussing whether the ends (modest reductions in prejudice towards certain groups) justify the rather traumatic means (severe stresses caused to facilitator, participants and the experimenters). Even where participants reported an overall positive appraisal of the exercise, many qualified this with comments that the exercise had been an extremely aversive experience.

To maximize the effectiveness of the Blue-Eyed/Brown-Eyed simulation in its present format, it would be mutually beneficial for diversity trainers and social psychologists to communicate and collaborate further in exploring its effects. In particular, it is still not clear what factors may moderate these results (e.g., whether participation is mandatory or voluntary, individuals’ prior exposure to different types of training, individual differences such as prejudice level, ingroup identification). Equally, as noted, researchers need to explore more closely the impact of a range of negative emotions (guilt, anger, distress etc) as mediators of results obtained. There are ethical issues that also need to be considered. Social psychologists adhere to a particular code of ethics (British Psychological Society in the UK, American Psychological Association in the USA) and these codes provide clear directions regarding protection of participants.
involved in potentially risky situations (e.g., http://www.bps.org.uk/the-society/ethics-rules-charter-code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct/ethical-principles-for-conducting-research-with-human-participants.cfm). Trainers considering using this type of exercise would be well advised to consider how such principles might impact upon the design, delivery and aftermath of the exercise.

The exercise may not even need to be delivered, as such. Some trainers use DVD presentations of the exercise to make many of the same points without necessarily obliging people to go through the exercise for themselves. Such a method is likely to minimise potential risk to participants although it remains to be shown, empirically, what the impact of this alternative approach is likely to be. Finally, there is a definite need to assess effects in the longer term, and to provide follow-up opportunities for participants to deal with anger responses in a constructive way that can hopefully counteract the very real possibility that diversity competency is harmed, as opposed to facilitated, by participation in such an emotionally charged exercise (Stewart et al., 2003).

Social Identity Approaches

This approach focuses on the "we" or group part of the self and how these groups influence one's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. An example of an exercise used within this approach is the "Who Am I?" exercise. The exercise asks people to list the social groups they belong to, select those they feel are most important to them, rank them in terms of relative importance to self and then discuss. It shows people that they differ not only in terms of which groups they belong to, but in terms of which they consider important to their identity. Often, the exercise has some interesting surprises. For example trainees from groups that appear to differ along core group dimensions (e.g.,
race, gender) may still show strong consensus in terms of the importance they assign to other group memberships such as work-place groups. Hence this type of diversity exercise increases the salience of co-workers’ common social identity (while allowing them to maintain other, personally relevant social identities). In social psychological terms, this process allows for recategorization (i.e., being able to think of someone as an ingroup member when categorized one way, but an outgroup member when categorized in another way; e.g., Dovidio et al., 2001). Recategorization is important because failing to construe the wider organization as an ingroup to which both of the former groups belong leads to less interdependent and cooperative behaviour. In contrast, diversity exercises which increase the salience of co-workers’ common social identity – while allowing employees still to benefit from other, previously important group memberships – may in turn improve cooperative behaviour among employees. Social identity researchers have already begun to make use of recategorization methods for diversity management, for example, the “ASPIRe” model (Actualizing Social and Personal Identity Resources: Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003).

More generally, it has recently been suggested that making salient the complexity of social identities can influence intergroup attitudes and behaviour in ways that minimize bias and discrimination (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). For example, more complex social identities have been shown to be associated with greater tolerance and positivity towards outgroups (Brewer & Pierce, 2005). These exercises work well in training sessions and the sound theoretical basis that underpins them leads us to be more confident that they may prove a beneficial tool in DT.
Newer Approaches That Create Awareness Of Own Bias

Thus far, our illustrations are drawn from fairly established approaches to DT. Throughout we have tried to demonstrate how certain social psychological perspectives can promote a clearer understanding of ways in which these approaches can work more successfully. Clearly, no one perspective is ideal in all situations. As the field of social psychology evolves, it may prove beneficial to consider other approaches which then, in turn, may be informed by other theoretical perspectives. One candidate here, we suggest, is the social cognition approach to stereotyping and prejudice. As noted by Driscoll (1999), there needs to be a symbiotic relationship between DT and social cognition researchers studying prejudice and stereotyping. Essentially, the study of social cognition promotes a better understanding of the mental processes that underlie human social behaviour (Fiske & Taylor 1991). As Fiske (2004, p. 122) explains, “Social cognition analyzes the steps in people's train of thought about other people.” Within the domain of stereotyping, recent social cognition research has highlighted a number of so-called automatic reactions and biases (for reviews see Bargh, 1999; Devine & Monteith, 1999). The basic thinking behind much of this research is that many of our reactions towards members of other groups can occur automatically, without awareness or intent. In our own training research, we have started to look at ways of using such demonstrations of bias in DT in an educational way. Although not all are 'established' or systematically appraised approaches as yet within the DT field, we have found them promising. In the spirit of this article, and in the hope that they generate new debate, we share some of these illustrations.
Implicit Association Test (IAT)

The IAT provides trainees with a tangible demonstration of their own biased 
behaviour (e.g., http://buster.cs.yale.edu/implicit). The IAT procedure has participants 
first check their attitudes towards two groups (e.g., in Race IAT, White Americans and 
African Americans). The IAT takers complete a reaction time task in which they are 
asked to differentiate between members of two targeted groups by pressing a key to their 
left if presented with members from one group (i.e., an African American face) and a key 
to their right if presented with members from the other group (i.e., a White American 
face). These trials are interspersed with trials in which participants differentiate between 
two concepts (positive or negative) by similarly hitting a key to their left or right. The 
idea is that the more closely associated a group is with a concept at the implicit level, the 
easier it is to respond when they are on the same response side. Hence, if White 
American and good are strongly associated by the participant, it should be easier to 
respond faster when both require hitting a designated key to the left.

The IAT score is then calculated and converted into an IAT result that suggests 
strength of association (e.g., “I moderately prefer White Americans to African 
Americans”). This is provided to test takers as a measure of their “hidden” or implicit 
bias. The assumption, as mentioned earlier, is that the discomfort that arises from 
learning of unintentional bias will impact in a positive way on future behaviour towards 
members of that group (e.g., Monteith, et al., 2001).

Already widely used by social psychological researchers as a measure of implicit 
teringroup bias, the IAT is increasingly being used as a teaching tool by those in DT.
This test is a compelling demonstration of implicit bias and seems promising as a DT
tool. This was certainly our initial reaction. More recently, though, informed by some data and many training experiences, we have been obliged to modify our initial reactions (Driscoll et al., 2004). We still believe it has great potential, but summarising our main points, we note the following:

*IAT methodology and theory are not easy to understand.* A full appreciation of how it works and what results mean requires an understanding of method and theory not always readily achieved by lay people (or even undergraduate psychology majors). First, the crucial distinction between implicit bias and being prejudiced is difficult to convey. Some IAT takers draw erroneous conclusions seemingly based upon their own lay theories of prejudice. Second, IAT takers sometimes misattribute their bias to some implausible methodological issue, whereas others don’t understand how their responses can actually indicate bias. In empirical studies, *Monteith et al. (2001)* also report such misattribution, and they recommend using this as a startpoint from which to confront supposedly non-prejudiced students that their behaviour may imply subtle racial bias. In practical terms, this may be difficult to achieve in a training setting. Although such an approach may work if there was one-on-one interaction with a diversity trainer, based on our combined experiences running numerous class demonstrations and diversity trainings we have not found this confrontational response works well with participants.

These more common types of misunderstandings about the IAT need to be addressed by trainers if it is to have positive effects in DT. It then becomes a trade-off between the time needed to explain the concepts or methodology (if possible) and how effective the IAT is for DT goals.
IAT prompts range of affective consequences (positive and negative). Social psychologists have frequently argued that awareness of bias and resultant compunction (guilt) is an important first step in instigating a cycle of self-regulation and diminishing prejudice (Monteith, 1993). In one of the only studies even indirectly researching this notion with regards to the IAT (Monteith et al., 2001), participants were given the opportunity to gain knowledge of their implicit racial biases, while researchers examined both participants’ detection of such biases, and their interpretations of and reactions to them. The majority of strongly biased participants detected that they were responding in a biased manner, and experienced guilt (in so far as they attributed such bias to race-related factors). Those with a lesser bias tended to detect their biased responding less well, and also felt less guilty.

Whilst this may be the end result, it is not inevitable. Our data also consider how individual differences in bias level impact upon negative affective responses. Our findings suggest a more varied pattern of cognitive and affective reactions (e.g., confusion, sadness, disappointment, anger, contempt, damaged self-concept) that need to be carefully handled by diversity trainers. As noted earlier, it may be premature to conclude that any negative affective response will instigate the same self-regulatory cycle (Stewart et al., 2003). Practitioners must be aware of the complexity of such negative affective responding, and duly consider those IAT takers who react more negatively and need guidance and reassurance about their IAT result and what it means for their future interactions with the targeted group members.

- We note also that it is possible, in certain conditions, for positive attitude change to result from taking the IAT. If test-takers do not react in a negative emotional manner (e.g., defensiveness, or being suspicious or hostile), then typically they understand it is not a
personal attack (i.e., they are not accused of being racist) or linked to how they respond when interacting with group members, but more a part of their cultural learning and input from the world that they live in it. Debriefing and discussion for such individuals may need to differ from that for individuals experiencing negative reactions (see below).

Our current position is that when used carefully, and with experienced, knowledgeable diversity trainers, the IAT may have the potential to help promote tolerance and an understanding of the power of unconscious stereotypes. We would like to reiterate, though, the vital part trainers can play in the debriefing process, clearing up misunderstandings and inaccurate interpretations of IAT test results. Debriefing becomes especially relevant and important because if the test is not appropriately explained, it can really backfire (Driscoll et al., 2005). In some related social psychological work, Blanton et al. (2005) have recently argued that the disclaimers provided on the IAT Website about what the test is really measuring are somewhat brief and may lack the force necessary to allow test-takers to modify their often extreme reactions to what they think the test is telling them (see also Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). The same argument, we suspect, is applicable to trainers failing to debrief test-takers adequately. Illustrations of why debriefing is vital in this sense may be apparent from some of the comments made by test-takers (“I did not take this test to have you force me to be negative about a group. This is wrong!”; “I was sad to be told that I have a preference for whites”; “I was alarmed to be told that I was biased”).

To more reliably safeguard IAT takers and to help prepare diversity trainers and educators to administer and explain the IAT responsibly, we recommend having diversity trainers go through a type of “Train the Trainer” programme for the IAT. The debriefing
session that we propose would be theoretically based and would be critical in re-directing any negative affect, inferences, or blaming of the targeted group (e.g., Devine, 1989; Monteith, 1993). Indeed, handled appropriately, it is possible to convey that many negative discrepant responses would almost be inevitable, especially in light of some of the more accessible empirical work in this field pointing the finger at history and cultural heritage and their collective impact upon automatic stereotyping (e.g., Devine’s 1989 work on automatic versus controlled components of stereotyping). Trainers may further allay test-takers' fears by noting that social psychological evidence is so far mixed as to whether IAT scores actually predict biased behaviour, so a strong ingroup preference will not inevitably result in biased outgroup behaviour (Karpinski and Hilton, 2001; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Having established these points, it is then possible to get test-takers to think clearly about the genuine consequences of such a result.

Where positive reactions ensue and an increase in awareness of bias is met with a desire to do better in future, providing information about ways to combat stereotypes and prejudice, as well as giving IAT takers an opportunity to formulate some behavioural intentions, would be a step toward the goal of the IAT to reduce prejudice. For example, trained facilitators could make targeted suggestions for a given IAT taker about “next steps” that may benefit them, and direct them toward literature or events that might help them to consider ways in which to change their feelings, beliefs and intentions to behave towards the IAT-targeted group (see Driscoll et al., 2004).

Father-Son Exercise

It is not clear where the Father-Son exercise originated, but the present version was adapted from the more dramatic version by Hofstadter (1985, p. 136).
Participants in DTs were given the following version of the problem to solve:

“A father and his son were involved in a car accident in which the father was killed and the son was seriously injured. The father was pronounced dead at the scene of the accident and his body taken to a local morgue. The son was taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital and was immediately wheeled into an emergency operating room. A surgeon was called. Upon arrival, and seeing the patient, the attending surgeon exclaimed, “Oh my God, it’s my son!”

Can you explain this?

Based on data from hundreds of participants collected over several years in various diversity training sessions, we find that in about 40% of cases, people do not think of the most plausible solution to this question (the surgeon is the boy’s mother; Driscoll, Pendry, Kelly, & Chapple, 2005). Instead, they are apt to generate a wide range of convoluted explanations. For example, in any given session, a diversity trainer is likely to hear answers, such as 1) the “father” in the car must have been a Catholic priest – the father dying, then, wasn’t the boy’s parent and 2) the surgeon is the real “biological” father of the boy and so it was the boy’s adopted father who died.

Why do participants have so much trouble and generate such complex explanations? Essentially, they find it hard to overcome the automatically activated stereotype (i.e., surgeons are generally men). In the ensuing training discussion, we use our knowledge of the social psychology literature to explain the cognitive underpinnings of this failure to spot the “obvious” solution (e.g., Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine &
Monteith, 1999). Participants are not surprised to think of a surgeon being a woman, but rather are shocked that they did not think of this answer, and instead generated much more obscure solutions. They are generally impressed with the power of the unconsciously activated association between surgeon and maleness which, without their intent or awareness, directed the search process away from a simpler, more direct explanation.

In training sessions, we find this type of exercise very powerful. It is simple to administer and to understand, but does not humiliate or upset participants. It generates discussion about all the other ways that occupational stereotypes may affect us and provides an appropriate lead-in to discussions of social role theory (Eagly & Steffen, 1984). The Father-Son exercise has the power to stun those individuals who do not consider themselves susceptible to the power of stereotypes. Those with supposed “exempt status” catch a glimmer of the insidious nature of stereotypes, and how they can influence us without any consideration of what our wishes might be about their influence.

It is also possible to broaden discussion to incorporate possible individual differences that may moderate the pattern of results. Some individuals “get it” and are able to solve the problem, whereas others really don't. Why is this? Does stereotype activation inevitably lead to bias? Recent research within social psychology has generated a number of answers that can be readily translated for discussion purposes. Devine’s (1989) research demonstrated that it is possible for stereotypes to be automatically activated because “the stereotype has been frequently activated in the past, it is a well-learned set of associations that is automatically activated in the presence of a member…of the target group…this unintentional activation is equally strong and equally
inescapable for high- and low- prejudice persons” (Devine, 1989, p. 6). Her research goes on to demonstrate that although activation may be automatic, this does not necessarily play out in how a person behaves towards a member of the target group.

More recent research has built upon these findings and may also be used in discussions to reinforce the point that whilst stereotype activation is a trap we may all fall into at some point, sometimes we do not. Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal (1999), for example, suggest that individuals may differ in terms of the extent to which they may be ‘chronic egalitarian’ versus ‘non-chronic’ (i.e., committed/not committed to being egalitarian, fair, tolerant and open minded). In their research, only non-chronics showed evidence of such stereotype activation. Participants with chronic goals failed to show this effect, leading Moskowitz et al., (1999) to conclude that stereotype activation is not inevitable. So, by reference to the relevant literature, trainers are able to reinforce the points made by the exercise and promote a deeper understanding of the processes involved.

*Intergroup Attribution Exercise (IAE)*

Past research has highlighted that we explain ambiguous behaviours differently depending upon whether they are performed by ingroup versus outgroup members (e.g., Duncan, 1976; Hewstone, 1989). In such studies, participants are asked to explain the behaviour of targets. One recurrent finding is that participants consistently favour the ingroup, either using more positive language to describe ambiguous behaviour, or explaining unambiguously negative behaviour in situational terms (see Hewstone, 1989). It is possible to adapt such a paradigm for use in DT (Driscoll, 1999).
Once again, across hundreds of participants over the years, we were able to routinely demonstrate bias in DT sessions. Participants are given a list of slightly positive and negative behaviours they may routinely encounter in the workplace (i.e., walks by without saying hello; offers to help you on a project). We ask participants sitting on one side of the room to explain the behaviours imagining an ingroup protagonist whereas those sitting on the other side were asked to imagine an outgroup protagonist. This can be done covertly – not letting the one group know about the other group – by handing out an exercise manipulating the protagonist unbeknownst to participants, or can be made explicit whilst encouraging the participants to help the diversity trainer demonstrate a point. The exercise has, almost without fail, shown the predicted bias. Moreover, the effects are stronger for the outgroup condition (i.e., ratings for this group are very negative, whereas for the ingroup condition, ratings are slightly positive) and the group of trainees typically report feeling some moderate discomfort at learning of their biased responding. Feelings of guilt at unwittingly falling into this attributional trap are often mentioned.

This exercise demonstrates bias so clearly that afterward, everyone in the room agrees how much better it is to be an ingroup than an outgroup member: a powerful point is made despite using fairly mundane behaviours. Such findings may then be discussed and related to the relevant social psychological literature on intergroup attributional biases (e.g., Hewstone & Klink, 1994; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974).

Aside from demonstrating bias of which trainees were hitherto unaware, what can this type of exercise offer DT? First, it can be used to reiterate and strengthen the basic
point – made initially with the Father-Son exercise – that we are often not aware of the influence that stereotypes have on our judgments of others. Second, and in line with some of the work reviewed earlier, it is possible that awareness of attributional biases, with the guilt that ensues, might ultimately lead to a more deliberative style of decision making which attenuates bias, or to an intention to monitor and regulate future output so that it at least appears less biased (e.g., Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 2000).

Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) classic research highlighted that many people have little or no access to their cognitive processes. Looking at other literatures, it has been shown that awareness of certain cognitive biases, in conjunction with appropriate retraining, can lead to their modification. Certainly within the social inference literature, it has been shown that educating people about common errors in reasoning (e.g., relying upon information gleaned from small, unrepresentative samples) can improve correct use of statistical reasoning procedures (e.g., Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986). In more clinical settings, faulty attribution processes on the part of individuals (e.g., overly pessimistic explanations for failure) can be greatly improved by reattribution training (Forsterling, 1985). Most notable in the present debate (and also of relevance to the Father-Son exercise outlined above), recent work on training participants to avoid activating stereotypes has met with some degree of success (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2005). In sum, across a wide range of disciplines there is at least preliminary evidence that certain cognitive biases can be diminished, provided participants are motivated to change and willing to undergo the required intervention procedure.
Note that these latter two approaches (Father-Son exercise; Intergroup attribution exercise) **have several advantages over many DT approaches.** First, the exercises are simple in formulation and easy to explain. Second, when combined with appropriate discussion which explains how we are ALL potentially prey to such biases, they are popular with participants, who do not feel persecuted for their seemingly stereotypic reactions (as can be the case with some more confrontational exercises). Participants generally react in a positive fashion and report that they are *now* motivated to think twice in the future. We are not so naïve as to argue that such insights alone will result in wholesale change; nonetheless, we believe exercises such as these – which derive from biases documented in the social psychological literature – have much to offer DT.

*A Caveat: Institutional Backing Is An Essential Component of DT Success*

Thus far, our discussion has targeted specific approaches that may be employed within DT programmes and has considered them in isolation from the organizational settings in which they take place. However, these approaches, whether alone or in combination, will only have a positive impact if they are incorporated in an organizational climate that both values and appropriately manages diversity.

Managing diversity refers to a variety of interventions at the macro level of organizations: the ways in which workforce policies, procedures and ethos serve to reinforce the values of encouraging and maintaining a diverse workforce. It is ill-advised to bolt on DT programmes in organizations where this macro level is incompatible. Such programmes are likely to fail or even heighten existing intergroup tensions.

Within social psychology, considerable efforts have been devoted to the topic of prejudice reduction (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Dovidio et al., 2004; Hewstone &
Brown, 1986; Sherif et al., 1961). Whilst different approaches will emphasize different methods for success, all generally agree upon principles that derive from the contact hypothesis (Amir, 1969; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Regarding the topic of workplace ethos, the contact hypothesis states that prejudice reduction is most likely where there are *social norms of equality*. What this means in practice is that the organizational climate creates and reinforces a norm of acceptance and tolerance in the workplace. This is, of course, not always the reality.

For example, employees might undergo training that aims to improve gender relations and improve equal opportunities. In the context of training, a pro-diversity stance may make sense and trainees may leave with good intentions and a feeling of unity. However, should they step back into a working environment where, for example, there are subtle but institutionalized pressures dictating that women should place career before children, or the converse, then equal opportunities have not in truth been achieved and – taking our lead from the sizeable social psychological literature on the contact hypothesis – it seems justifiable to suggest that the DT may be less effective as a result.

In sum, whilst it may be possible to improve some of the ways DT is delivered, effects may be hampered by an incompatible organizational ethos.

Conclusions and Future Directions

DT is big business. It remains a core aspect of diversity management initiatives for many organizations (Parker & Hall, 1993). In this article, we have focused primarily upon the role that social psychology can play in the future design of DT programmes, and we provide a number of suggestions for practitioners in this regard. The overarching point is that diversity trainers could improve their DT programmes if they thought about them...
in terms of what is known theoretically about prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination.
That is, does the DT programme incorporate what is known from the various perspectives
within social psychology, including newer avenues of research such as social cognition of
stereotyping and prejudice? Specifically, does the DT programme maximize those
variables empirically known to help achieve positive attitude change, as well as minimize
those variables empirically demonstrated to antagonize or exacerbate group differences?

As a final recommendation for future consideration, social psychological theory
and methods can also assist in the evaluation of DT programmes. Even though DT is big
business, as social psychologists have recently noted:

“Every year, thousands of diversity training programmes are conducted in the
United States and other countries, yet almost none of them is evaluated...the only
way to create successful programs is to determine, through systematic research,
what techniques are successful with what populations in which contexts” (Stephan

Social psychologists might, for example, reach out to diversity trainers and engage in
discussions about how the two disciplines could work together not only at the programme
design stage, but to develop some additional and innovative ways to assess such
programmes (see Goldstein, 1991; Ostroff & Ford, 1989).

Clearly, it is an unrealistic expectation to suggest that DT becomes a research-led
enterprise, replete with approaches appropriately derived from theory, control groups,
clearly-prescribed goals and a battery of appropriately developed measures administered
at appropriate times. We do not (yet) always practice what we are just beginning to
preach, and our own experiences of the realities of DT lead us to a more muted
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Conclusion about what is possible. Specifically, DT offers a splendid forum in which to act out and evaluate many of the premises that underpin mainstream social psychological approaches to the study of prejudice reduction. If more trainers began to think more systematically about how they might borrow and adapt ideas from mainstream social psychology, it would be a promising start. Moreover, it would be mutually beneficial if social psychologists would pay more attention to how their theories and research in the experimental laboratories actually play out in real world training sessions. Dialogue and partnership is needed between social psychologists and trainers, so that expertise from both sides may be developed (Anderson et al. 2001; Arnold, 2004; Morrison, 1995).

We would argue that more systematic approaches to programme development (and indeed, evaluation) could reap genuine rewards for trainers, who can be more confident of designing a product that delivers more of what it promises. The field as a whole would become more accountable, driven by sound empirical findings regarding how well which programmes "work" in a given situation and with which populations. Likewise, social psychologists would have the opportunity to collect much needed evidence of fruitful theories that apply to many situations and populations.

In conclusion, we have set out what we consider to be some of the ways social psychological theory and research could be used to improve DT programmes. We have, further, alluded to how social psychology could be improved by paying more attention to DT programmes and outcomes. It is our hope that the suggestions laid out help to galvanize the respective fields into collective action.
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Footnotes

1. In the present article, we use assessment as a more general term to mean the overall picture of what one wants to find out as a consequence of doing evaluation(s). Evaluation is intended here as a more specific term that refers to what is done to measure the effectiveness of an intervention/training.

2. Of course, it could benefit them in that they can observe how many white people are upset by the realization of white privilege still in existence, believe it is unjust, and are motivated often to try and correct inequities in their environment. People of colour may have thought that whites ignore or perpetuate such privileges versus being merely unaware of them. It would ideally require two trainers, though, one dealing with reactions of whites to their increased awareness of white privilege, and the other one attending to the people of colour and their realizations that whites are not always intentionally ignoring or promoting white privilege.