Where do new practices come from? Despite the seeming consensus in organizational theories about the centrality of the interplay between processes and structures in the creation of new practices (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1986; Romanelli, 1991; Daft and Lewin, 1993; Aldrich, 1999), there is less agreement about how shifts in the structures occur, what the role of agency is in mobilizing processes, and what the place of processes is in the creation of new practices. While transaction cost theories (Williamson, 1979, 1981) stress efficiency considerations in the creation of new practices, organizational ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1986) and evolutionary theorists (Aldrich, 1999) place new practice creation within the framework of environmental variation, retention and selection, either as an organizational response to environmental change or as an emergent process of resource partitioning and niche development. Institutional theory provides a rich body of ideas about how new practices acquire taken-for-granted status through isomorphic pressures and diffusion (Scott, 2007). However, until recently, little work in this tradition has focused on the processes that give rise to new practices. According to Lounsbury and Crumley (2007), institutional theory has tended to treat practices as “objects that are either adopted or not, essentially leading to the ‘black-boxing’ of practice” (p.993). The criticism of the structuralist tradition within institutionalism has centered on the lack of attention given to the role of actors in institutional change (DiMaggio 1988; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; Schneiberg 2007), and has introduced the notion of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ – states, agencies or professions, as actors capable of reshaping the social organization of fields and establishing new practices (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; see Leca, Battilana & Boxenbaum, 2006 for a review). Yet, the
focus on powerful individuals or single agencies within fields has detracted from the examination of the diverse actors and varied processes as sources of new practice creation.

More recently, a fruitful integration between social movement theory and institutional analysis (see Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008) has come to underscore “contestation, collective action, framing and self-conscious mobilization for alternatives to conceptual repertoires of legitimation, diffusion, isomorphism and self-reproducing taken-for-granted practices” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008: 649). It follows closely theorizing about agency proposed by Seo and Creed (2002), who have elaborated on the challenge of the relationship between structure and agency by suggesting that institutional contradictions are at the root of the mobilization of interests and agency, and that praxis is the core mediating mechanism of institutional change. By positing actors as “challengers and champions of alternatives, and social structures as outcomes of competing logics, studies linking movements and institutionalism are more deeply rooted in structural perspectives… plac[ing] greater emphasis on politics and collective mobilization as motors of change” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008: 649), rather than attributing substantial casual efficacy to individual institutional entrepreneurs.

This strand of theorizing more systematically addresses the perennial question of how actors embedded within institutions can change them, the degree to which institutions limit change, and how a wide range of actors draw on the elements of existing institutions to institutionalize new practices. Integrating social movements with institutional analysis allows the re-assertion of the centrality of structure and path-dependent nature of institutionalization, while the treatment of structure as a contradictory social construction whose change rests on the relative ability of collective actors to achieve an injection of new logics through contentious politics (Tarrow, 1998) avoids some of the limitations associated with the ‘mutual constitutiveness’ arguments of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984).

The perspective on new practice creation proposed in the present paper seeks to follow the theoretical developments in social movement and institutional analyses by constructing a more systematic framework that conceives of the institutionalization of new practices as a dialectical process of institutional contradiction and praxis (Seo and Creed, 2002) mediated by a multi-level process of competing logics mobilized by social movements (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Rao, Morrill & Zald, 2000; Schneiberg, 2002; Schneiberg and Soule, 2005). It follows recent efforts to build a more robust theoretical bond between practice and institutional theories (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). However, it differs from these attempts in one key respect: we pay particular attention to contentious political processes and the institutionalized power structures of the state, treating the latter as both the social shapers of the boundaries of collective action and the products of the relatively autonomous competing institutional logics (Clemens 2005; Mattingly and Hall, 2008).

To help develop this more comprehensive approach to new practice emergence and institutionalization draw on an intensive qualitative study of the activities of the movement of occupied and recovered enterprises in Argentina (MORFEA).1 The takeovers and recovery of factories by workers in Argentina began to take place in the late 1990s, a decade of unprecedented economic stability, but also of rising

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1 The acronym captures the politically and ideologically diverse grouping of social movement organizations (SMOs) that belong to this particular social movement industry (SMI). For distinctions between Social Movement Organizations, Social Movement Industries and Social Movement Sectors see Soule and King, 2008.
unemployment, growing social inequality and escalating poverty. Isolated cases of takeovers and recovery were a result of workers’ fear of unemployment, as employing companies experienced financial hardship or faced bankruptcies. The isolation and uncertainty characteristic of this period was replaced by the significant increase in factory takeovers following the 2001 financial crisis. Responding to widespread bankruptcies, job losses, company closures or abandonment by owners, workers mobilized, occupied the enterprises and continued production, often in the face of possible eviction or violence. By 2002 a wave of factory takeovers spread across the country in the face of mass bankruptcies or defaults, with workers putting the factories or enterprises (F/Es) to productive uses as self-managed cooperatives. Yet, only two years after the upsurge, which saw extensive media coverage of indignation, political campaigning, and legal wrangling between the workers, the owners and the government, the contention and radical objectives of workers’ solidarity, autonomy and self-management of the preceding period had all but vanished. Paradoxically, this did not mean the end of the impetus behind or interest in reclaiming bankrupt or abandoned enterprises – the rate of takeovers kept increasing over the same period, tapering off to a lower figure only by 2006 and remaining constant since. Rather, new practices, affecting the characteristics of organization founding, design, management, inter-organizational relations and the shape of the field, were being institutionalized, shaped as much by the radicalism of those involved in the takeovers as by formal government policies, emerging legislation, and technical and financial assistance programs.

The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. In the following section we present our theoretical motivations. In section three, we present the research context and design. In section four we present the qualitative study by focusing on the role of MORFEA in the emergence of the ‘new cooperatives’. Adopting a field analytic approach we subdivide this section into three nodal points in a political-temporal continuum – the late 1990s, 2001-2002 and 2003-present. In the first part we provide an analysis of the enabling conditions of the creation of new practices – specifically, the effects of neoliberal reforms on labor markets, public policy and politics as these led to the emergence of factory takeovers. In the second part, we discuss the spillover effects of financial and political crisis of late 2001 – the rise in the level of contentiousness of Argentine politics – which saw the rise in the number and variety of movements and movement-like organizations embracing new values and principles of autonomous governance and practices at a variety of levels. We, thus, focus on the processes of contestation, mobilization, framing (McAdam, McArthur and Zald, 1998) and theorizing alternatives (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007) as antecedents of change. In the third part, we analyze the results of the previous nodal point through an analysis of the laws, programs, policy initiatives and forms of collaboration between different stakeholders which produce diffusion and institutionalization of new practices. Finally, in section five we discuss the significance of the results in light of the key theoretical concerns outlined earlier in the paper, and draw some conclusions and contributions.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE CREATION OF NEW PRACTICES
Institutional contradictions, social movement praxis and institutional change
In response to criticisms of institutional theory for being overly structuralist, several strands of recent theorizing and research have focused on the sources of institutional change. Three aspects of this work can be identified as particularly useful for
understanding the creation and institutionalization of new practices. The first concerns individual and organizational awareness of legitimacy. Thus, notwithstanding technical superiority and financial efficiency of existing models of practice, newer practices may be perceived as “desirable, proper or appropriate” (Suchman, 1995: 574). The second aspect links new practice creation with institutional changes based on shifts in institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2000; Lounsbury, 2001). Institutional logics provide “guidelines for practical action” (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003: 795), and encode the “criteria of legitimacy by which role identities, strategic behaviors, organizational forms, and relationships between organizations are constructed and sustained” (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005: 38). As logics change, institutional changes in a variety of fields, organizations and intra-organizational processes ensue (e.g. Covaleski, Dirsmith & Rittenberg, 2003; DiMaggio, 1988; Galvin, 2002; Lounsbury, 2002; Oakes, Townley, and Cooper, 1998; Schneiberg, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2002). The third aspect suggests that the structure of language and the use of language as symbolic action forms part of the way in which social actors come to perceive and act on the world. At the same time, strategic use of language (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004), communication and discourses (Phillips and Brown, 1993) or rhetoric (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) can initiate or extend changes in institutional logics as a possible conduit to new practice creation.

One of the problems with these prominent strands of thinking within institutional analysis has been the distant (sometimes implied) treatment of agency in institutional change. Often invoking the notion of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988), they have tried to address the key theoretical paradox of how agents embedded within institutions can transform the institutions which are constitutive of their actions, intentions and rationality. Various exogenous conditions – “jolts” or changes in status mobility within fields or organizations (Meyer, 1982; Lounsbury, 2002), changes in technology and regulation (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994; Fox-Wolfram, Boal & Hunt, 1998), and political realignments (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Fligstein, 1997), have been proposed as favorable for the emergence of institutional entrepreneurship. But there is little clarity about the sources of these exogenous conditions. An important attempt to clarify the sources of institutional change and the make-up of the exogenous conditions which can bring these about has been through the introduction of a dialectical perspective (Seo and Creed, 2002). A four-stage model of change has been suggested, in which social construction, totality, ruptures or inconsistencies, and praxis must act in concert as the basis of institutionalization of new practices. Regarding the conditions under which “socially embedded, unreflective actors become conscious of the social arrangements in which their interests are unmet, mobilize other similarly situated actors, and take collective action for change” this perspective holds that:

...the likelihood of praxis increases as contradictions within and across social systems develop, deepen, and permeate actors’ social experience. Although actors can become reflective at any time, the likelihood of a shift in collective consciousness that can transform actors from passive participants in the reproduction of existing social patterns into mobilized change agents increases when actors continually and collectively experience tensions arising from contradictions in a given sociohistorical context (Seo and Creed, 2002: 230).
Thus, the dialectical framework conceives of institutions as not only being constantly produced and reproduced by social interaction and overlapping logics, but that their shape is fleeting – a temporarily objectified settlement between logics and actions. The ongoing, multilevel processes of social construction produce a variety of overlapping (though often incompatible) institutional settlements, which provide a source of constant contradictions within and across institutions (Seo and Creed, 2002: 223). Not only does this view projects institutions as temporary fixes to the constant experience of contradictory reality, but the latter shapes the consciousness of different institutional actors, who might, in some circumstances, act in ways that radically transform the institutions governing them and the reposition themselves, their identities and subjectivities – what the authors call praxis. Finally, the dialectical framework underscores the centrality of political struggles between multiple social constituencies with different interests and unequal power, and how the more powerful constituents leave more firm imprints on and actively strive to reproduce those aspects of the institutions that benefit them (Benson, 1977).

From this follows our first proposition that the emergence of new practices will flow from the ways in which praxis (understood as ‘political action embedded in a system of interconnected institutional arrangements’) facilitates the ‘active and artful’ exploitation of institutional contradictions by social actors (Benson, 1977). Yet, while this framework evokes process and highlights its political nature due to the power asymmetries of actors, it does not specify how “active and artful exploiters of institutional contradictions” might go about their business. Our qualitative study of the activities of MORFEdA aims to provide this detail and return to the theory a more complete understanding of the process of political activity that underlies new practice creation. For this we turn to social movement theory.

Our second proposition, consistent with much of the social movement literature, the collective institutional entrepreneurship activity pursued by social movements depends upon their ability to exploit the configurations of political opportunities, mobilize political constituencies and frame interests in a manner that injects new currents of theorizing and introduces or fuels competing logics in the social structure. In particular, what we posit to be a constitutive process in the creation of new practices is the way in which social movements can give birth to new logics in domains of social life that were governed by pre-existing logics (Haveman, Rao and Paruchuri, 2007). Collective vehicles through which alternative logics and currents are injected (in and against the social structures) may be obtained through the work of (different) social movement organizations (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), as well as work and neighborhood organizations and informal networks (Tilly, 1978).

Our third proposition, consistent with the tenets of institutionalism, the perspective advanced here suggests that the creation of new practices is fuelled by interests and demands for legitimacy as the basis for attracting resources and becoming viable (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio, 1988; Fliigstein, 1996; Powell, 1998).

The creation of new practices is best understood in the context of systems of relations between different players in the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1991) or organizational communities (Aldrich, 1999) – suppliers, consumers, regulators, the state and mediators of different sorts. Therefore, new practice creation is not only a contested process, but the shape of emergent organizations is contingent on the balance of power in that contest; in particular, the balance between the state and social movements, to the extent that the former tends to dominate the trajectory of collective action and social organization (Clemens, 2005;
Mattingly and Hall, 2008). In this framework, new practices can be seen as objectified compromises between unequal powers.

**Research Questions**

Several research questions guided our objective of developing a more comprehensive approach to new practice emergence and institutionalization. At a higher level of analysis, we hoped (1) to assess the extent of institutional change provoked by collective action in the face of social constraints exerted by institutions; (2) to understand the role of collective action, politics and contention in the creation of new practices; and (3) to capture the processes by which apparently radical objectives become institutionalized as routine practices governed by norms, regulations and cognitive taken-for-grantedness.

At the operational level of analysis, we aimed to understand (1) what are the enabling conditions for the translation of temporarily frozen institutional contradictions into tensions igniting collective action?; (2) how do framing processes emerge from enabling conditions and fuel the visualization and creation of political opportunities?; and (3) how does political interaction between movements and the state sets into motion the creation of new practices? How are these new practices institutionalized?

**METHODS**

This paper draws on a qualitative case study of new practices in and around occupied and recovered factories and enterprises (F/Es) in Argentina. The aim is to use the case to revise and extend the current theoretical attempts to understand the institutionalization of new practices (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007) using a more exposed social movement lens, focusing on the dynamics of contentiousness of the political processes involved in institutionalization.

Case studies have been shown to be essential for deriving grounded theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby, 2007), providing inferences on causal relations and specifying regularities of behaviors and relations within and between organizations (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and providing useful descriptions of organizational processes and structures rarely captured in multivariate analysis (Simon, 1947). Numagiami (1989) has noted that case studies provide a useful way of identifying unique or new insights, while Koza and Lewin (1998) argue that they allow for the understanding and interpretation of subjective experiences to be translated into meaningful theories.

Given the emergent nature of the social movement around factory occupations, the shifting links between different actors and the changing nature of organizational practices, the case is especially suitable. It allows us to examine poorly understood phenomena and ill-structured links among actors (Marshall and Rossman, 1995), providing “(a) contextualization, (b) vivid description, (c) dynamic (and possibly causal) structuring of the organizational members’ socially constructed world, and (d) the worldviews of the people under study” (Lee, 1994: 43). The context within which new practices emerge is especially well captured in qualitative case study research, providing the field-level view of change, which is the perspective adopted here.

**Research Context**
Factory takeovers in Argentina began to take place in the late 1990s in response to the unfolding neoliberal policy reforms and changes in political institutions. Takeovers were not a new phenomenon – waves of worker protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s sometimes incorporated factory occupations as part of a wider radical political agenda spearheaded by militant trade unions. The thing that distinguishes the takeovers covered in our period of investigation is their ad-hoc and piecemeal processual nature; that they have been led by impromptu groupings of workers without the direct involvement of trade unions and lacking a coherent ideological agenda; that they have been motivated by reactive goals of job preservation, overdue wage settlements and redundancy payments. As the financial and political crisis in Argentina worsened, the emergent strategy of the earlier period was being shaped to a greater extent and in a more coherent manner by the political mobilizations and framing of issues affecting the wider community.

Thus, ideas such as the rejection of existing forms of corporate control dovetailed with the rejection of existing forms of political control, giving rise to cooperativism, self-management, autonomy and solidarity as both ideological and practical goals. The simultaneous growth of the MORFEA and the number of ‘new cooperatives’ paralleled the efforts of other social movements to project the values of autonomy, self-management and social enterprise, theorize alternative logics by constructing a public discourse linked to these values, and form strategic and tactical alliances with political organizations and personalities. The defensive nature of the takeovers has not prevented certain sections within this SMI from seeking to fit them with a more radical (even revolutionary) vision and strategy of socio-economic change. And, in the development of the process of contestation, framing and theorization of alternative logics, this became an important variable in the measurement of logics selection (Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000).

Data Collection

The primary source of data was in-depth, semi-structured interviews with participants, such as leaders and workers within different occupied enterprises, leaders of the MORFEA, as well as members of unemployed workers’ organizations, which have been one of the main supporting organizations for MORFEA and individual occupied enterprises. Similar interviews were also carried out with senior government functionaries and civil servants involved in policy making in the areas of employment, social policy, and local and regional development. Additional data comes from official statistics and surveys (in particular on founding rates, industry coverage, and employment and sales figures of occupied and recovered enterprises); policy documents and research reports from the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Social Development and Ministry for Local and Regional Development; pamphlets, reports, minutes of meetings and other publications from the MORFEA and individual factories; and secondary data from academic research.

The initial stage of the research, carried out from 1997 to 2000 and based predominantly on interviews, focused on the actors involved in isolated factory occupations. Forming part of one of the author’s earlier research on the changes in the subjectivities of workers within the context of employment reforms, the occupied factories formed one of a number of cases. At this stage the movement did not exist and there was no coherent understanding of this emerging phenomenon either by its participants, those within the field, or the researchers. However, the data clearly capture the subjective aspects of those who decided to occupy enterprises, the reasons
why occupation was seen as a salient option, and the ideological and practical aspirations (theorizing) for their new projects.

The second stage of the research, carried out from 2002 to 2003, consisted of interviews with actors in both the occupied enterprises and those in a number of other, newly emerging movements which sprang up following the financial and political crisis of late 2001. The focus was on forms of contestation, mobilization, and framing, and in this context the aim was to capture the emergence of alternative logics, their articulation through the work of different social movement organizations (from across different social movement industries), and the confluence of interests and agency in political processes. Thus, the emergence and political activities of the movement of recovered enterprises were surveyed alongside that of the organizations of the unemployed, neighborhood assemblies and sections of the trade union movement to determine how the new movements came to enunciate particular values (autonomy, solidarity, self-management), what alliances were sought as consistent with these values, and how these were translated into specific repertories of action. With the exception of one government program – “Male and Female Unemployed Heads of Household” – no social programs emerged during this period that reflected the demands of the social movements in the policy domain. Thus, the data from this stage of the research was limited to the political processes.

The third stage of data collection, carried out from 2004 to 2006, focused on the emerging outcomes of the political activities of the movement. The focus was on the official policies and procedures initiated by the federal and regional governments, and the involvement of the MORFEA in the formulation, implementation and management of various policy initiatives. By looking at the interaction between the movement and the state through the prism of the interaction between mobilizing, political opportunity structures and framing provided us with the opportunity to examine processes of institutionalization of new practices.

**Data Analysis**

The data analysis comprised three stages. In the first stage we developed a narrative account of two parallel processes – on the one hand, the three macro-political phases which define the period since the initial emergence of F/E occupations; on the other hand, the three phases in the emergence, development and activities of the MORFEA (see Table 1). During the late 1990s, on the brink of a deep economic crisis, many enterprises became bankrupt or were abandoned by their owners. Although the takeovers commenced during the late 1990s, the financial collapse of December 2001 accelerated the process. Even more factories or enterprises (F/Es) were closed, in many cases overnight, leaving in their wake unpaid wages, pension contributions, debts and obsolete machinery. In response approximately eight thousand workers from around 170 F/Es began to occupy or recover factories and enterprises in hopes of resuming operations. From the outset, the takeovers received explicit support from other social movements, but were viewed with suspicion by official political parties and the political establishment. The formation of the movement of occupied and recovered F/Es followed a number of meetings between leaders of various factories or enterprises, with the establishment of coordination, information sharing, and legal assistance committees. Several different options or models of cooperativism were present at this stage, and differences between different ideological and practical paradigms continue to be the basic feature of the movement. Immediately following the crisis of 2001, the authorities sought to
dismantle the takeovers in a clear attempt to re-establish order amidst a general atmosphere of political unrest and mobilization. Workers responded by simultaneously resisting ejection by the police and initiating legal procedures to establish the status of the takeovers and their jobs. Elections, which brought in the left-leaning president Kirchner, occurred in May 2003, signaling the not only a rhetorical shift in direction, but the eventual launching of a new program in 2004 directly and indirectly supporting workers efforts in the occupied and recovered F/Es.

In the second stage of data analysis, we juxtaposed the sequence of events in the development of new practices with the official statistics and surveys on the founding rates, industry coverage, and employment and sales figures for occupied and recovered F/Es. This allowed us to make some basic arguments about the extent of their diffusion. But it also allowed us to test our initial view about the parallel processes discussed above. We used two additional research publications (Rebón, 2007; Lavaca, 2007) to construct a database which linked the basic official statistics on organizations with more detailed descriptions of their foundings, the processes and personalities involved, the changes which occurred at different points in the existence of the organizations, and their status by the end of the research period. Again, this allowed us to make important links between different periods and moments in politics, movement dynamics and new practice emergence.

In the third stage of data analysis we assessed the nature of change in the field as a result of the new practices of enterprise funding, registration of business units under the new program, and the use of legal mechanisms in the establishment and operation of businesses. In this stage we perused interview transcripts containing different actors’ (within occupied F/Es, in the government and in other organizations in the field) evaluations of what they considered to be expedient and legitimate practices. We were able to confirm two significant aspects of change. First, it was clear that what had previously been impromptu interactions between the workers and different levels of state bureaucracy had become centralized, structured, and regularized under the auspices of the new program and the legal framework. Second, the logic of the practices contained in the newly established program and the legal regulation reflected both some of the movement’s early radical visions and the state’s pragmatic views on the need to maintain practices within the boundaries of order.

THE MOVEMENT OF OCCUPIED AND RECOVERED FACTORIES AND ENTERPRISES IN ARGENTINA

Enabling conditions: The neoliberal era

We will now refer to the socio-economic and political factors that strongly influenced and facilitated the process of factory takeovers. As previously argued, institutionalization of new practices emerge out of contradictions and praxis (Seo and Creed). The enabling conditions explained below unfolded within the context of significant transformations marked by the implementation of stabilization policies inspired by the Washington Consensus (WC), achieved by the execution of free market open economy policies (FMOEP) (Richards, 1997). There are at least two that are significant for our purpose: first, that the achievement of economic stability was combined with increasing unemployment, growing social inequality and rising poverty. Secondly, that political stability and the consolidation of democracy was marked by both the ‘de-politicization’ (Silva 1999) and disillusion with democracy and the progressive politicization of society in the form of collective survival strategies (e.g. barter) and non-institutionalized forms of protest and mobilization by
those affected by the reforms (unemployed workers, public and informal workers, the ‘poor’, human rights fighters).

None of the following conditions are sufficient to explain the complexity of such a process of factory occupation. Our aim is to contextualize the takeovers and point at those processes which ‘facilitated’ them.

The first manifestly necessary condition for the takeovers to take place is the process of factory closures, bankruptcies and their abandonment by owners which commenced in the late 1990s and precipitated at the moment of the financial crisis of 2001.

The emergence of mass unemployment and casualization of labor as a result of privatization of state owned-companies, public sector reforms and deregulation of the labor market are the second enabling conditions for the takeovers. These structural changes made the ‘outside’ i.e. labor market uncertain, insecure and unsafe, and threatening. To many of those engaged in factory occupations the takeover was their ‘last’ opportunity to remain ‘included’: ‘after this, there is nothing’ (worker cited in Rebón 2007: 49). The core of the neoliberal reforms was undertaken during the 1990s, under the umbrella provided by the dollar-peso parity –convertibility- plan. In the context of tight monetary policy advised by the IMF, the reforms consisted of privatization of 93 state-owned enterprises, reduction of public expenditure and decentralization of health and education services, deregulation of healthcare, financial system and the labor market, privatization of the pension and safety at work systems, and implementation of strict provincial economic adjustments. These ‘stabilization’ policies stifled inflation but fostered destructive labor market conditions. By the second half of the 1990s unemployment in Argentina acquired a structural form, something which was unprecedented. As mentioned, the rates of unemployment increased from 6 percent to 18 percent in only six years, accompanied by the growth of the informal economy and the actualization of work (Galín and Novick, 1990; Feldman and Murmis, 1999; Marshall, 1995; Tokman, 1996). The main problem was an explosive combination of unemployment with underemployment and informality. Workers in the informal sector had come to constitute a large portion of the Argentina labor force. Participation in the informal sector increased from 47.5 percent in 1990 to 52.5 percent in 1994 (Feldman, 1999: 106). By 1997 there were four million workers in the informal economy.

The social structure was deeply transformed and poverty emerged as a ‘new social issue’ (Rosanvallon, 1995). The ‘vicious circle’ of unemployment and related poverty (Lozano, 1997) accentuated income instability (Beccaria, 2001), social vulnerability (Castel, 1997) and the development of a dual society (Boron et al, 1999; Feletti and Lozano, 1997; Beccaria and López, 1996; Minujin, 1996; Peñalva and Rofman, 1996).

The collective perception of this scenario as threatening was far from wrong, and was complemented with two more facilitators of the takeovers (third and fourth): ineffective or absent social policies to support unemployed and other disadvantaged people, and the lack of support from the unions. Whereas the government presented unemployment as a ‘new and significant state affair’ (MTEySS, 1995), it simultaneously treated it as a temporary phenomenon without considering its social costs (Di Leo 2005). The rationale behind institutional changes and employment policies was to solve a seeming ‘paradox’ of successful economic policies and increased unemployment (Dinerstein, 1999) However, it soon became apparent that rather than a negative side-effect, unemployment and actualization of labor provided the basis for better economic performance at least until 1997. In other words,
productivity levels were increased by the rationalization of labor, reduction of labor costs, mostly without any significant investment in new equipment (Bustos, 1995), the expansion of the informal economy, the actualization of work, underemployment and increasing vulnerability of those at the margins of the labor market. At the core of employment policy reforms was a new employment law which introduced an unemployment benefit as well as active employment programs. Whereas the former only covered those unemployed workers who had previously been employed, the latter were inadequate as they did not tackle the vicious circle of unemployment and poverty: the competitive disadvantages of those already socially excluded to be reinserted into the labor market (Feletti and Lozano, 1997).

Considering the lack of universal unemployment benefit, the neoliberal reforms left many without social protection. Focused policies recommended and financed by the World Bank intensified the negative features of social policies in the country, i.e. fragmentation, dependence on negotiations with corporations and reliance on the mobilization capacity of disadvantaged sectors (Barbeito and Lo Vuolo, 1995; Lo Vuolo, 1990; Lo Vuolo et al, 1999; Lindemboin and Danani, 2003). They ‘naturalize’ inequality (Grassi et al 1994) and reinforced clientelistic relations (Rock, 2002; López, 1997).

In addition, workers from abandoned, closed or bankrupt factories rarely found support in their trade unions: most of the takeovers were led by workers who opposed the union bureaucracy or non-unionized workers. This is explained by the transformations suffered by the hitherto powerful labor movement in two ways. On the one hand, the reaccommodation of the Workers General Confederation (Confederación General del Trabajo) (which implemented the strategy of ‘business’ unionism, including the establishment of union firms participating directly in the process of contracting out during the privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as the deregulation and privatization of social security, pension funds and health and safety insurance) disentangle them from their bases and reinforced grassroots opposition. On the other hand, unemployment and flexibilization of labor changed the composition of the union membership. The men expelled from the labor market, now women, young people and children, where the breadwinner was unemployed, entered

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2 In 1996 50.8 percent of the ‘economically active population’ (PEA) was underemployed and 41.2 percent of the PEA of Greater Buenos Aires had employment problems (Lozano, 1997). The participation in the informal sector of the economy increased from 39.4 percent in 1980 to 47.5 percent in 1990, and to 52.5 percent in 1994 (Feldman, 1995). The rise in the number of workers seeking employment was explained by unemployment itself, low wages and poverty produced by stabilization policies. The worsening of working conditions would have forced women, pensioners and children to try to enter the labor market and some workers to seek second jobs (Beccaria and López, 1996). In addition, there was an increase in the flow of migrant workers from neighbouring countries, attracted by the over-valuation of the peso (Lindemboin 1995).

3 …leaving out women entering into the labor market for the first time, the young and those who work in the shadow economy. This new unemployment benefit (Sistema Integral de Prestaciones por Desempleo) is a contributory system which entitled all unemployed workers that worked under the LCT to 50 percent of the best wage of the last six months for one month to one year maximum, depending on the contribution they had made during their work-time. Only for state, construction, rural and domestic workers.

4 The lack of social protection for those outside the formal labor market is explained by the historical features of social and employment policy in Argentina: since the 1940s, and with the exception of education and public health, the ‘worker’ rather than the system had been the focus of most social policies in Argentina. Paid employment was intrinsic to the concept of citizenship; the latter had been subsumed under the former. Social justice was linked with workers’ rights, rather than with universal citizen rights (Barbeito and Lo Vuolo, 1995) The reforms deeply altered the labor markets and with it this institutional arrangement
the informal economy in tasks of low qualification and casual work which is also reflected in the increase of both unemployment and activity rates, but remain unrepresented.\(^5\)

Finally, the significant changes in the forms of collective action and protest during the 1990s, when regional, decentralized and consistently non-institutionalized ‘repertoires of action’ became increasingly predominant in the politics of Argentina, can be considered the fifth facilitator of the takeovers. The environment of civil disobedience and resistance that characterized the late 1990s was inaugurated by the patchy protest against city councils by public sector workers demanding overdue wages and the end of rationalization in 1993 and 1994. By 1997, this new environment was made more perceptible by a wave of roadblocks organized by unemployed workers with support from their communities. This institutionalized a new form of protest in the south and north of the country (Dinerstein 2001), which reached an apogee in the transformation of politics by the time of the crisis of December 2001.

The fissure

The formation of the movement began in 1997, when the Argentine Metallurgical and Plastic Enterprise (Industrias Metalúrgicas y Plásticas Argentinas, IMPA), was unnoticeably taken by its 136 workers in 1997, when the managers of the cooperative declared bankruptcy and closed its doors without consulting the workers (partners). The takeover entailed a political, financial and legal struggle which was not supported by the union but by the neighbors and other social movements.\(^6\) Successfully, IMPA workers manage to form a new cooperative, reorganise themselves, resume production, eliminate wage differences and introduced industrial democracy within the factory.

The National Movement of Recovered Factories (Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas, MNER) was formed in October 2001 when workers from 14 cooperatives met at the IMPA factory to discuss joint strategies. They discussed the bases for the implementation of ‘a shared response to factories closures based on their occupation and further recovering by their workers’ self-management’ The meeting reflected divergent views in terms of organization basically between new and old forms of cooperativism (Minutes of the meeting, 27/10/01 in Rebón 2007: 118).

From fissure to fracture: adequate framing, opportunity structures, organization and expansion

IMPA and other very few early experiences became the kernel for the making of promoters gathered in several organizations now able to diffuse their repertoire of actions, share experiences and ideas. The majority of factories takeover occurred during 2002 as a collective response to a wave of bankruptcies or abandonment that

\(^5\) The exception has been the Argentine Workers Central, Central de Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA, created in 1992 aimed at organising these fragmented struggles against unemployment and for welfare provision and becoming the main pole of opposition representing workers and the marginalised and technically ‘socially excluded’

\(^6\) IMPA workers opposed to the union bureaucracy of the Metallurgic Workers’ Union (Union Obrera Metalúrgica, UOM). Workers established close links with neighbours and social organizations which helped them to survive during the period of takeover and at the beginning of the reopening of the production system (IMPA Interview 2, 27.6.02).
reached more than 170 factories involving around 10,000 workers by 2005 (see Appendix 1).

The process of takeover was both incremental and far reaching and embodied the Janus face of the crisis: the economic and political crisis and the rebellious mobilization. On 19/20 the country’s economy collapsed producing the biggest default in world economic history. The collapse -triggered by the IMF refusal to give Argentina an informally agreed loan of $1.26 billion- had its root in long term processes which cannot be addressed here. Suffice it to say that the structural adjustment had facilitated the concentration of capital, the destruction of national industry and a climate of impunity in which many entrepreneurs operated during the 1990s, including financial speculation, corruption, bribery, flouting of labor legislation and the law in general.

On 19/20 mass protests forced the resignation of national authorities and initiated a cycle of protest which was to intensify for the next six months. The re politicization of the social field and the collective engagement in protest had as its main protagonists ‘people’, that is those who were not engaged in political or labor activism before and that were now rejecting institutional, hierarchical, mediated politics (this including the political left and trade unions), on behalf of radical, direct, concrete and democratic forms (Dinerstein 2008b)

The idea of taking the factory over felt by workers was promoted by leaders of the newly created organizations in the context of the policies undertaken by the transition government in January 2002 directed to stabilize the financial system. Among them we find the cancelling the Bill of ‘Economic Subversion’ (Subversión Económica) that was in place to ensure the legal prosecution of those responsible for the flight of capital leading to the financial collapse, the amending of the Bankruptcy Code in order to ‘protect enterprises from creditors for a certain period of time as well as give time to reschedule company debts’ (Cibils et al 2002) and the achieving a compromise with the provincial governors to reduce deficits by 60% after agreeing with the IMF that the institution was prepared to ‘unlock funding’ for social programs to help recreate a sound fiscal framework to restore the confidence in the banking sector (IMF SURVEY 2003: 1).

The devaluation of the peso coupled with the conversion of the value of debt previously pegged to the US dollar into newly devalued pesos (known as “pesificación”) and tax exemption produced two antagonistic but inextricably linked effects: on the one hand, favored concentrated economic groups and, on the other hand, deeply affected popular sectors. Whereas Duhalde’s ‘rescue plan’ in June 2002 allowed AEA to save millions of dollars (Basualdo et al 2002 mimeo), the devaluation of the peso produced inflation hence perpetuating the tendency towards regressive income distribution and increasing poverty and unemployment. As a result, unemployment national rate for February 2002 was estimated at 21.8 percent (i.e. 3,200,000 people). The rise of 10.4 percent in the consumer prices index and 19.4 percent for wholesale prices in April 2002 (MECON, 2002: 2) perpetuated the decline in workers’ incomes and increased poverty. As an absolute record, almost seven million people fell into poverty between October 2001 and October 2002. There were twenty one million people out of a total population of thirty seven million below the poverty line, out of which ten million are considered extremely poor (Dinerstein

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7 E.g. The new Association of Argentine Entrepreneurs (Asociación de Empresarios Argentinos, AEA) constituted by forty-seven executive members of the most important financial, industrial and service enterprises.
Politically, the Duhalde period was characterized by a repressive policy of state aimed at harnessing ‘wild’ social movements’ action. Inspired in the US and UK ‘war on terror’, and the Bush administration’s concern with the ‘volatile region’ of Latin America (La Nación 7.2.2003), a parliamentary project sent to the National Congress aimed at discussing the participation of intelligence services in repression of ‘domestic terrorism’, defined as ‘all those activities that take place within the national territory’ involving ‘groups or individuals who use force to achieve political, social, religious, economic or cultural objectives’ (Verbitzky 2003; see project 5-02-2239, HCDN). In this spirit, many movements suffer repression and persecution: the Peasants Movement in Santiago del Estero (MOCASE), the neighbors’ assemblies the movement of the unemployed.

Whist economic and political factors influence workers’ decision to take action to recover their future, the wave of takeovers in 2002 was the result of the action of new organizations which promoted them. The inspiration for the takeover ranges from the struggle for overdue wages and redundancy payments to preserving the job and as a struggle inherent in the workers’ culture of resistance (Rebon 2007). But these new organizations, in particular de MNER articulated: (1) specific workers’ needs in a particular enterprise (e.g. the need to keep their job, overdue wages, overdue redundancy payments, fear of unemployment); (2) the existing knowledge of similar experiences constituting informal networks acting as ‘solidarity and communication facilitating structures’ (McCarthy cited in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1998: 142), and () transforming inspiration into a concrete action.

The MNER offered information, links and legal support and political lobbying to deal with company debt, the establishment of cooperatives out of bankrupt companies, and strategies for resisting former owners’ use of the police and the law in attempts to evict workers from the factories. After the initial kick off in October 2001, the movement grew into several organizations. The Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores, MNFRT is a split from MNER due to opposition to the political attitude of MNER and for the defence of workers’ rights. The Work Cooperatives Federation (Federación de Cooperativas de Trabajo, FECOOTRA) is a traditional cooperative organizations created in 1988, seeking to incorporate the new cooperatives into existing structures. The National federation of Work Cooperatives and Converted Enterprises (Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Trabajo y Empresas Reconvertidas FENCOOTER) is a split from FECOOTRA led by the Yaguane factory

All organizations which constitute the ‘movement’ embrace and defend workers self-management, autonomy as well as condemn capitalist speculative behavior and state repression. Yet, they differ in the framing of the takeover. By framing we understand ‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (Snow cited by McAdam et al 1996: 6). The framing leads to the defense of a specific legal form adopted by the factory (cooperative or workers self-management with state ownership) with further implications. The dispute for the meaning of the

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8 The criteria to establish the level of poverty and indigence by INDEC is based on the value of the family basket, estimated at 193.77 pesos per adult for the city of Buenos Aires and its outskirts in April 2002.

9 See further information and analysis on the massacre of the unemployed and the murder of Kosteki and Santillán in Dinerstein 2003b; 2003c
takes developed out of the antagonistic relationship between the movement and the government, which held an hostile attitude towards social movements in general and the different position within the movement. Until the 2003 elections the transitional authorities sought to dismantle the takeovers following a general repressive policy towards new movements (e.g. the Peasants Movement in Santiago del Estero, participants in neighbors’ assemblies and the movement of unemployed workers who suffered a massacre in June 2002. The massacre forced the government to call for elections marking the transition towards another stage (Dinerstein 2003b).

From divisions within the movement emerged distinct political approaches and legal solutions that could empower workers. At least two approaches towards formal takeover and recovery are prominent: those which embrace the new cooperative movement and those which utilize the takes as a tool for the development of workers autonomy within a broader political strategy of liberation. The symbolic or emblematic takeovers like Zanon (now Fasinpat, Factory without patron) or Garments Factory Bruckman, put forward a strategy of statization of the company, i.e. workers self management accompanied by pressure for ownership by the national or local governments, promoted by those who perceived the takeovers more as a tool for the development of workers autonomy within a broader political strategy of liberation. The proposal of self-management and workers’ control with demands for state ownership was seen as a transitional measure which aims to accompany a wider process of liberation, as art of a wider revolutionary strategy, a wider struggle for socialism, which believes in the demand of workers’ management with state intervention, the implementation of a ‘non-reformist reform’. Workers’ control allows the experience of self-management but reflects the assumption that there is no possibility of real control unless the capitalist social relations of exploitation are altogether eliminated (Martinez, 2003). On the other hand, silent takeovers embraced the idea of ‘recovering’ coined by the leader of the MNER to emphasize the importance of resume production, preserve jobs and defend workers’ dignity’ (Rebón 2007: 121). Those who belong to the new cooperative movement consider the recovering of factories as a strategy for job preservation. As for the organization of production and the administrative and legal form adopted, the cooperative represents for them the best as it allows independence from the state and the development of self-management at the work place.

In an attempt to differentiate themselves from the ‘traditional cooperative movement’, which would have contravened solidarity principles by transforming the companies into public limited companies, advocates of this new cooperativism claim that recovered factories are ‘tools of resistance’ The new cooperatives lies in that it is accompanied by micro ventures with other social movements such as the Movement of Unemployed Workers, aimed at the creation of an ‘economy of solidarity’, autonomous from the state. The take is seen as a learning process based on cooperation, democracy and equal distribution of income, which has the potential to lead to the creation of new institutional and social relations. The cooperative and workers’ self-management are ends in themselves. They also reject the confusion which associates the cooperative movement with self-employment and subsistence production, the latter being survival strategies rather than tools for social change.

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10 During 2002 until the 2003 elections the transitional authorities sought to dismantle the takeovers following a general repressive policy towards new movements (e.g. the Peasants Movement in Santiago del Estero, participants in neighbours’ assemblies and the movement of unemployed workers who suffered a massacre in June 2002. It was the massacre of the Piqueteros which forced the government to call for elections marking the transition towards another stage (Dinerstein ? ).
According to this sector recovered factories allow the development of solidarity relations. The takeover is seen as a learning process based on cooperation, democracy and equal distribution of income, which has the potential to lead to the creation of new institutional and social relations.

Fixing the fracture. Contested institutionalization of new practices

The period that started with the election of President Néstor Kirchner in May 2003 shows significant changes in the political landscape and the relationship between social movements and the state. The government’s intention to reestablish a more sound relationship with civil society and to ‘repair’ the damage caused by neoliberal reforms followed similar developments in the rest of Latin America. The election re-energized populist sentiments and the belief that policies will tackle the problem of unemployment and informal and casual work, poverty and the deterioration of labor market conditions. This required a renewed dialogue with non-governmental organizations, among them workers involved in factory occupations and recovering, as a pre-condition of political stability and economic growth.

May 2003 signals the beginning of a process of institutionalization of the takeovers. Institutionalization is not necessarily equivalent to demobilization and does not necessarily involve the end of state coercion and sources of conflict between workers and the state are eradicated. Since the takeovers took place, workers and supporters have been (some still are) simultaneously involved in resisting ejection and repression by the police and in legal procedures about the status of the occupations and workers’ jobs situation. The instruments of coercion remain latent in the state’s monopoly on force, so ‘workers consent because they are always coerced’… (Hoffman, 1984: 85). By institutionalization we mean:

‘the creation of a repeatable process that is essentially self-sustaining …; it is one in which all relevant actors can resort to well established and familiar routines. For political movements, institutionalization denotes the end of the sense of unlimited possibility ….it means the end of the uncertainty and instability that can result when unknown actors engage in uncontrollable forms of action’ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998: 21)

There are three dimensions to this multilevel process of institutionalization (Schneiberg and Soule, 2005) within a wider political climate and policy framework. First, the takeovers were reframed, emphasizing the defensive/social aspects of them over the radical/political. On the one hand, the takeovers have been defensive. The above illustrates how the takeovers were semi spontaneous (Rebón 2007) organised by the shop-floor representatives of the workers of individual enterprises, usually non unionized or unrepresented and motivated by the preservation of jobs, with workers entrenching themselves in factories and physically occupying them, resisting ejection by the police, often in the face of imminent or actual closure. In those circumstances, workers have had to develop cooperative relations, engender solidarity and seek autonomy as a result of practical needs, rather than a predefined ideological or political strategy. They have had to face difficulties such as appalling working conditions, to establish new industrial relations and management, to establish minimum conditions for production and decision making, to overhaul the space, machinery and equipment, re-establish services that were cut off, as well as settle legal arrangements and negotiating with the government and creditors, clients and suppliers.

On the other hand, the takeovers have had an expansive political edge, inspired by ideas of autonomy produced by the struggle against neoliberal reforms in the 1990s
and the crisis of December 2001. This was so in two senses. The first one is the general anti status quo workers’ attitude. The second is more specifically connected to those which regarded the takeovers as a tool for the development of workers autonomy within a broader political strategy of liberation. As mentioned above, emblematic cases like Ceramics Zanón led by workers in opposition to the official trade union and in unison with left-wing activists, proposed workers’ control of the factory together with demands for state ownership as a transitional measure within a wider struggle for socialism. Workers’ control allows the experience of self-management but reflects the assumption that there is no possibility of real control unless the capitalist social relations of exploitation are altogether eliminated (Martinez, 2003).

The reframing of the takeovers under Kirchner subordinates the latter to the former. Workers’ radical action entailed in the takeovers is no longer projecting them as unusual, reserved for times of crisis, but as embedded within the state agenda. Workers actions are seen in concurrence with government’s goals. The de radicalization of workers’ actions takes place in exchange of their political recognition and institutional help for workers to secure financial and technical support in order to pursue their stated political objectives of solidarity, autonomy and self-management.

It must be noted that this process was not a top-down imposition but the outcome of the interaction between social movements and the state as well as among different organizations within the movement President Kirchner’s approach to having a ‘dialogue’ was not completely rejected by many of the groupings within social movements but rather a concurrence emerged with regards to policy. This led to new realignments among them and divisions between those which held a positive yet cautious attitude towards the new government and remained firmly attached to the idea of self-management and those who prioritize the revolutionary project entailed in the experience of the factory without patron (e.g. ZANON).

All but a few of the occupied factories resumed their production under the form of workers’ cooperatives, under the umbrella provided by the MNER. It is clear that in the name of the movement: national movement of recovered enterprises, neither ‘factory’ nor ‘takeover’ appear. But the cooperative form was also encouraged by the government’s new approach to social movements. As we will see later, the policy framework encourages the ‘culture of work’ and solidarity within a context of unemployment, informality and crisis of union representation at the workplace, emphasizing interests in job creation, elimination of unregistered work, fight against businesses’ irresponsible behavior.

Secondly, the process of institutionalization entailed a new policy ethos which incorporated implicitly the communitarian and solidarity principles and social practices that underpin the various productive and cooperative projects undertaken by social movements and NGOs. The new programs celebrate local state intervention, promote bottom-up decision-making processes and encourage principles of the ‘social economy’ (MDS, 2004) and self-management.11

In the particular case of the takeovers, this attempt at incorporation qua institutionalization extended to the provision of technical and financial support to the

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factories. The financial and technical support to new cooperatives was implemented through the Program for Self-Managed Work was launched by the Department of Employment in March 2004 (Decree 194). The PTA is an outcome of several meetings between the MTSS and leaders of the different groupings within the movement and works within the framework ‘Plan for the Promotion of Employment: More and Better Jobs’ (Plan Integral para la Promoción de Empleo: Más y Mejor Trabajo).

In addition to ameliorating the effects of unemployment and creating jobs, PTA managers argue that the program will help cooperatives to defend ‘dignified work’ and recover skills in trades being threatened with extinction (such as glass making)’ (MTEySS, Interview 1, 16.8.05). The program promoted bottom-up decision-making processes and the encouragement of the principles of the ‘social economy’ (MDS, 2004; MDS, Interview 1, 5.9.05) embraced by the takeovers: ‘we are thinking of policy from below… taking on board the social knowledge of the population’ (MDS, 2005: 15; see Dinerstein, 2006).

The PTA is regarded by senior managers as an ‘institutional response to a diversity of demands by employees of enterprises and factories involved in the process of recovering of plants’ (MTEySS, Interview 1, 16.8.05). To program managers, the PTA has the intention to strengthen self-management by providing a range of services from advice to technical and financial assistance to concrete projects to be achieved in the short and medium term (MTEySS Interview 1, 16.8.05).

The program provides allocates 500 pesos per worker (maximum of 50,000 pesos) to the ‘productive unit’ for (i) technical assistance and training; (ii) the purchase of raw material, inputs, tools, equipment or repairing or put in motion old machinery; (iii) technical assistance with installation of equipment and machinery; and (iv) support for the expansion of the F/Es and their consolidation in the market.

In order to enjoy the benefits of the program, the F/Es need to be included into a register of Unidades Productivas Autogestionadas por los Trabajadores (Productive Units Managed by Workers) (MTEySS, n/d, leaflet). The creation of collective projects is encouraged by a recently created register (Registro de Efectores de Desarrollo Local y Economía Social), which allows workers involved in cooperatives or collective projects to be exempt from taxation for two years to help low income workers in vulnerable situations (MTEySS, Interview 3, 18.8.05).

Two assessments by the MTEySS (2004 and 2005) show some of the effects of the program. Among other things, they illustrate that program managers consider it to be successful. According to them, the PTA must act primarily as an institutional articulator, in order to solve specific situations that come up in each case. Progress was made in liaising with public and private bodies which would be able to provide technical or financial assistance to F/Es. The program helped workers to reorganise production and the labor force, assisted them in the preparation of business plans, repairing inadequate old machinery and refurbishing buildings in order to meet legal requirements, to increase production levels and commercialization of products, to improve quality and reduce costs by purchasing new equipment, to diversify production to reinvest in capital assets such as equipment to improve safety at work and environmental conditions within the factory.

The agreements constitute the tool through which the MTEySS and the F/E in question engaged in a venture with the purpose of implementing the project proposed by workers, previously approved by the PTA. Tables A2.1, A2.2, A2.3 and A2.4, included in Appendix 2, describe the distribution of agreements by region and sector, and the use to which the funds were put in 2004 and 2005.
By October 2004, 28 agreements had been reached between the F/Es and the state for 29 F/Es (two enterprises sharing the same productive unit), 17 percent of units identified. These agreements affected 24 percent of F/Es, or 1,726 workers (MTEySS, 2004b). The program spent 615,460.96 pesos, i.e. 55 percent of the amount assigned to 2004, and 39 percent of the total program budget of almost three million pesos (MTEySS, 2004b). More agreements were concluded during the following year. By the end of 2005, 38 percent of the 175 F/Es (that is 67 units) reached an agreement with the state, incorporating 3,907 workers (that is 49 percent of the estimated total of workers involved) (MTEySS, 2005a).

The assistance offered by the government was used to reorganize production and the labor collective, the preparation of business plans; repairing of old machinery and refurbishment of buildings in order to meet legal requirements; increase production levels and commercialization of products; improve quality and reduce costs by purchasing new equipment; diversify production; reinvest in capital assets such as equipment; improve safety at work and environmental conditions within the factory; liaising with public and private bodies who would be able to provide technical or financial assistance to F/Es.

The program also supported workers in the course of resisting ejection and so between the states of employment and unemployment. These workers might be awaiting (with no income) the legal resolution of the takeover in a tent located outside the F/E what was described in a research interview as ‘workers in standby’ (MTEySS Interview 1). Support consists of 150 pesos (£30) to individuals without any other benefit for a maximum period of six months.

Dissemination of the factories’ activities included the organization by the PTA of the ‘National Exhibition of Factories and Recovered Enterprises’ organized by the program on April 29, 30 and May 1 2005 in Buenos Aires, with the participation of 89 F/Es and more than 6,000 workers. The exhibition was sponsored by the city council and consisted of a series of conferences, business rounds, and stands where each cooperative could show their products, and speak about their experience. The idea was to ‘facilitate the dissemination of the F/E activities, contribute to their commercial development and help them to make contacts with potential clients.’ (MTEySS 2005c)

Thirdly, the process of institutionalization of takeovers embodied in the new legislation is aimed at both favoring the workers’ cooperatives and punishing speculative behavior by investors at the expense of the workers. The reform of the Bankruptcy Law allows workers to resume production after bankruptcy (Art. N° 190, Ley de Concursos y Quiebras no 24.522). The process of factory takeovers challenged existing legislation as it made apparent the existence of a legal vacuum. The problem emerged when workers from abandoned factories became no ones’ employees (Echaide 2006: 58) The new legislation establishes that magistrates can allow workers to continue with the production of goods and services of the enterprise at stake until the legal declaration of bankruptcy, on condition that workers present a project and organization plan under the form of workers’ cooperatives. So, as mentioned, although all forms of workers’ management are welcome, the majority of the ‘assisted companies’ became cooperatives. According to the MTEySS report, there are two possible reasons for this: first, cooperatives are ‘more compatible with the need to reach consensus and set common goals, as well as manage expectations and go ahead with the decision making process in difficult and unusual conditions’ (MTEySS, 2004). Second, as mentioned, this legal form is encouraged by a new legislation on bankruptcy (Art. N° 190, Ley de Concursos y Quiebras no 24.522) (see above) It is
important to mention though that the term ‘cooperative’ is used here in both juridical and organizational sense. In other words, despite some factories adopted a juridical form of society de facto, or liability companies, the adopted a cooperative form of organization i.e. horizontal decision making processes, solidarity, equality in the distribution of profit. Whilst the juridical form is the outcome of negotiations, the cooperative organizational form is useful to the aims of the new labor collective constituted with the takeover (Echaide 2006)

Expropriation demanded by workers has also been the government’s concrete tool to institutionalize takeovers into new cooperatives. Although some of the F/Es genuinely became bankrupt, many others staged fraudulent bankruptcies (quiebras) and drained factories of a variety of resources. Whereas in the former case the bankruptcy is the culmination of a process of deterioration and indebtedness – a normal consequence of the crisis – in the later it is the culmination of a process of emptying of the company by seemingly accumulating debt with fictitious creditors, non-declaration of assets and asset stripping, destroying of inventory by bribing functionaries in charge of accounting control (Fajn, 2003: 34-35), all of which is achievable in the climate of impunity in which entrepreneurs operated during the 1990s. In the latter cases, the magistrates have ruled in favor of workers’ cooperatives the expropriation of the F/Es, furniture, machinery and installations, by declaring the F/Es and their assets as ‘public goods.’

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

In examining the dynamics of the emergence, development and institutionalization of new practices we have tried to build a more comprehensive view of the role of social constraints, collective action, and the routinization of apparently radical objectives. We have addressed three specific aspects of these dynamics – their emergence through institutional contradictions, contentious political struggles over the logics which would define new practices, and the contested legitimation which lies at the core of their institutionalization. By following the case, we have shown that the creation of new practices follows the dialectical path, allowing new practice creation to be analyzed in terms of the ways in which praxis (i.e. ‘political action embedded in a system of interconnected institutional arrangements’) facilitates the ‘active and artful’ exploitation of institutional contradictions by social actors (Benson, 1977). Following this, institutional change was treated as ‘a [temporary] outcome of the dynamic interactions between two institutional by-products: institutional contradictions and human praxis’ (Seo and Creed, 2002: 222).

Our first research question concerned the enabling conditions for the translation of (temporarily frozen) institutional contradictions into the kinds of tensions that can ignite collective action. We examined four intertwined enabling conditions which resulted from the long term neoliberal reforms in Argentina – mass unemployment, casualization of labor and income poverty, lack of social-integration policies able to ameliorate the effects of structural adjustment, and ongoing transformations of the

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12 Expropriation does not mean workers’ ownership directly and there are also variations in the extent and degree of expropriation, which covers the property of the F/Es in some cases and only the assets in others. In November 2004 Buenos Aires City Council passed a law Nº 1529 which declared buildings, equipment and brand names of 13 F/Es in the city a ‘public good’, and made them subject to expropriation, some with the assistance of the program. Property rights on building and equipment expropriated by the City Council were conceded to workers’ cooperatives, giving them a mortgage over the property and equipment.
institutions of labor (such as progressive change of the activities of trade unions from centralised and highly institutionalized to decentralised and de-institutionalized). However, as we showed, the political, social and economic “structural vulnerabilities” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1998) created by the reforms were not sufficient to lead to collective action by new movements.

Our second question tried to deal specifically with the non-sufficiency of the enabling conditions, by analyzing how framing processes emerged from enabling conditions to fuel the visualization and creation of political opportunities. In much of social movement literature movement efficacy depends on its ability to exploit the configurations of political opportunities, mobilize political constituencies and frame interests in a manner that injects new currents of theorizing and introduces or invigorates the competition between logics. With regards to process of new practice creation, social movements can give birth to new logics in domains of social life that were governed by pre-existing logics (Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003; Haveman, Rao and Paruchuri, 2007). What we called “fissure” was the transition between the enabling conditions and the formation of the movement, which opened the space for a search for adequate framing of issues that united disparate occupied F/Es, which was spearheaded by a core group of “promoters”. The takeovers expanded massively as a result of the action of the “promoters” in the context of deep financial, economic and political crisis and high levels of mobilization (December 2001) and policy making which did not favour actors involved in the takeovers (January 2002). This led to the deployment of the existing knowledge of organizing and mobilizing people politically – what Bagguley (1991: 46), in response to resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978), has called “organizational resources as forms of action”.

The process of framing of the takeovers, which was made simultaneously with the actors’ own search for its meaning, was placed by the promoters as one of the components of wider framing by newly emerging movements. On the one hand, there was framing internal to the movement, which involved two main propositions: (1) the takeover as an end in itself, which was seen as part of a regeneration of the cooperative movement; and (2) the takeover as an aspect of wider social and political change. On the other hand, the search for the meaning of the takeovers was formed simultaneously with the framing processes undertaken by other movements, leading us to the conclusion that solidarity, autonomy, self-management and participatory governance were part of the wider framing by the social movements.

Our third research question concerned the manner in which political interaction between movements and the state sets in motion the creation of new practices and their institutionalization. We began by examining the emergence of new practices in the context of systems of relations between different players in the organizational field or community (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1991; Aldrich, 1999), and proceeded by treating the process of factory occupations as being akin to a “battlefield” which connects “structure (how actors are allied), institutional logics (values beliefs held by actors) and power relations (degree of dependency or autonomy of actors)” (Reay and Hinings, 2005: 354). Recent engagement between social movement theory and organizational analysis has underscored how the creation of new practices can be seen ‘as a political process in which social movements play a double-edge role… des-institutionaliz[ing] existing beliefs, norms and values embodied in existent forms, and establish[ing] new forms that instantiate new beliefs, norms and value (Rao, Morril & Zald, 2000: 240).
An important aspect of this question was that new practice creation is fuelled by legitimacy seeking as the basis for attracting resources and becoming viable (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1996; Powell, 1998). We showed that this was an important element in both the framing activities by the MORFEA aimed at its own constituency and the broader social framing of its objectives and the construction of an alternative social imagery. An aspect of this has to do with the extent to which political opportunity structures can be treated as a dependent variable – whereby movements create opportunities, reshaping the alignments of the polity (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The reciprocal processes through which workers engaged with various players in the field and the government engaged with the movement through regulatory processes enables us to grasp both the ways in which collective action shapes state policies and the new ways through which the state ‘filters’ social mobilization and action. We demonstrated that the legal and policy outcomes of the sequence of events was only possible after some of the more comprehensive or radical values of the movement (e.g. nationalization of failing or bankrupt enterprises) had been moderated by wider political dynamics, confirming Rao’s (1998) thesis on ‘logics selection’. We showed that the attainment of policies and institutionalization of the values and actions of the movement changed the nature of the movement itself and shaped the resultant practices in line with this change. By highlighting contradictory nature of the relationship between the movement and the state, we illustrated that new practice creation was not only a contested process, but that the shape of the practices was contingent on the balance of power in that contest and has to be seen as a hybrid, bricolage and objectified compromise between unequal powers.

**Limitations**

The study has four main limitations. (1) The research scope is too wide to capture the further detail which can contributed more fine grained data – the movement is heterogeneous, which means that each factory/enterprise may have undergone unique experiences within the factory (e.g. organizational design, relations between those in different roles), in relation to the different SMOs within MORFEA, relations with other movements within the wider spectrum of the movements which have emerged as a result of the crisis in Argentina; and in relation to the state. (2) In a related vein, due to the fact that the diversity of the cases would have prevented us from building a more coherent analysis of new practice creation at a meso- and macro-level we have left out of the internal organization of the occupied and recovered factories. Yet, these processes feature prominently in the framing which has been at the centre of new practice creation and, vice versa, the re-framing and settlement on new practices, as reflected in policies, laws and regulations, has had a profound effect on the way organizational principles were selected (out) and relations within factories/enterprises subsequently developed. (3) We have controlled for the involvement of other emerging movements in the creation of new practices. Since there was considerable interaction and interdependence between the different movements in the formulation of political objective, joint action, shared meaning construction in the process of framing, and framing interdependently reliant on the logics of associated movements. (4) In relation to the case being based within a Latin American context, more adequate attention could have been paid to the possible limitations that the theories built upon in our paper may have on making better sense of the case. They may have limited power or fail to capture the historically conditioned nature of the actors,
associations and collective behaviour, as well as the potential for innovative practices in conditions where social structures are under radical pressures for change.

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TABLE 1
Chronology of events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Macro-political event</th>
<th>Movement event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late 1990s</td>
<td>Increased structural unemployment.</td>
<td>Isolated cases of takeovers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Financial collapse and political unrest. Government attempt to dismantle the takeovers</td>
<td>Emergence of new movements (unemployed workers, human rights, neighborhood assemblies). Several organizations are created by leaders of the early takeovers. The MORFEA comes into being. Rapid expansion of takeovers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>President Kirchner elected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>New policies, laws and programs launched</td>
<td>Institutionalization of the takeovers commences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Mapping the takeovers

Research carried out by the Department of Employment identified and mapped out 161 F/Es at the end of 2004 and 175 in 2005. The MTEySS classified them according to localization, type of activity and branch of industry, legal form adopted their assets and labor conditions (MTEySS, 2004). From the available data we can summarise the following (from Dinerstein 2007):

*Geographical location:* Most of the F/Es are located in areas where industry traditionally has been concentrated, the two key areas of which are the province of Buenos Aires (56 percent) and the city of Buenos Aires (16 percent).

*Industry:* Approximately half of the F/Es are concentrated in four main sectors: metallurgy (including machine building and electromechanical), food processing, meat packing and printing industries.

Table A1.1: Distribution of F/Es by jurisdiction (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of F/Es</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Buenos Aires</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Buenos Aires</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre Ríos</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note:* * Chubut 3, Corrientes 3; Chaco, 2; La Rioja, 2; Neuquén, 2; Río Negro, 2; San Juan, 2; La Pampa 1; Mendoza, 1; Tierra del Fuego, 1. Source: MTEySS, 2004b

**Whether F/Es currently in productive activity:** Only 73 percent are currently producing goods and services. Of these, most operate at only a fraction of the full capacity (in relation to the volumes produced before the crisis), primarily as a result of a lack of capital investment, poor labor utilization and/or the weaknesses of management. In addition there are difficulties in the marketing of the products and capacity to compete in national markets (MTEySS, 2004b). The efforts are directed at establishing new minimum conditions for production and decision making, overhauling of the space, machinery and equipment, re-establishing services that were cut off, as well as settling legal arrangements and negotiating with the government and creditors, clients and suppliers.

**Table A1.2: Distribution of F/Es by industry, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Branch of industry</th>
<th>Number E/Fs</th>
<th>% of the total of F/Es</th>
<th>Workers Employed</th>
<th>% of the total of workers employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgic</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat Packing</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,135</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS 2004b

**Table A1.3. Distribution of F/Es by whether currently in productive activity (2004)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whether Active</th>
<th>F/Es Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Active</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Data Available</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS, 2004b

**Legal form adopted:** Most F/Es adopted the legal form of a cooperative (147 out of 161 identified by the MTEySS).

**Table A1.4: Distribution of F/Es by legal form adopted after the takeovers (2004)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Form Adopted</th>
<th>F/Es Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS, 2004b
Legal forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal forms</th>
<th>Number of F/Es</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ cooperatives</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ cooperatives (in process)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forms of cooperatives</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Liability</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Liability and Cooperative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal process not initiated yet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data available</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS 2004b

Ownership of and access to takeovers assets: Access to premises, administrative resources and information, and the use of working equipment depended on negotiations between owners, magistrates and workers in each F/E (MTEySS 2004b).

Table A2.5: Distribution of F/Es by assets (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets (situation)</th>
<th>Number of E/F</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject to expropriation</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers are the owners</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers are the tenants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeover de facto</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not occupied</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other *</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data available</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This includes agreements with previous owners or magistrates which gave workers comodato or the right to look after the place and equipments. Source: MTEySS, 2004b

Wages and working conditions: Many of the F/Es face appalling working conditions including: (i) a variety of risks derived from the bad state of the buildings and equipment due to years of neglect, absence of investment or asset stripping. Workers’ incomes have varied according to the profits of and wage distribution within the enterprises. In many cases wages are below those established by the Collective Agreements in the respective branch of industry, although in some cases they parallel the norm. The majority of the occupied F/Es have adopted an egalitarian wage structure but with only a few exceptions, workers do not enjoy social insurance and security.

Appendix 2: The effects of PTA

Distribution of agreements between F/Es and the State (2004 and 2005)

Table A2.1: Geographical distribution of agreements (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount of E/F Agreements</th>
<th>% of FEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

35
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>identified by the PTA</th>
<th></th>
<th>identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires City</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaco</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chubut</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordoba</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrientes</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entre Rios</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Pampa</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuquén</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Negro</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tierra del Fuego</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS 2005a

### Table A2.2: Distribution of agreements according to industrial activity (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Activity</th>
<th>F/Es</th>
<th>With Agreement</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgic and metal mechanical</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat packing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry and services</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journals and graphics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2.3: Distribution of agreements according to type of assistance required (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of assistance required</th>
<th>Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Help (Individual)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs and/or purchasing of equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>raw material and other inputs</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconditioning of infrastructure</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS, 2004b

Table A2.4: Distribution of agreements by use of funds (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of funds</th>
<th>E/Fs</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual financial help (only)</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual financial help &amp; productive investment</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive investment (only)</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MTEySS, 2005b