ESRC One Europe or Several? Research Programme

Regional Identity and European Citizenship

L213252031

Full Report of Research Activities and Results

Background

European integration involves strengthening both European and regional levels of governance. The EU is sensitive to the charge that integration will lead to cultural homogeneity and political and economic centralisation. But it also wants to move beyond the intergovernmental model of governance that leaves political authority in the hands of the member states. By promoting regionalisation the EU is seen to support cultural diversity and economic development while strengthening a tier of democratic governance with limited (but increasing) autonomy from central states and the potential to contribute directly to EU decision-making.

However, this functional rationale for regionalisation is only part of the story. First, while greater regionalisation is evident (Committee of the Regions 2001, Keating 1998) there is no immediate prospect of a uniform tier of European regional government (Jeffery 1997). Indeed the strength of regional government and of regional identity in Europe is very uneven, so relations between Europeanisation and regionalisation vary widely.

Second, the EU also promotes popular identification with Europe and Europeanness, to enhance the legitimacy of the EU and democratic and civic participation in European affairs. We see this as a broad concept of European citizenship that goes beyond the limited rights associated with formal EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty. The development of this sense of European belonging is seen as an important prerequisite for the success of the European project (Shore 2000). European citizenship and belonging have traditionally been understood as either complementing or competing with nation-state citizenship and affiliation. Little attention has been paid to the relations between regional belonging and European citizenship. Yet this is an issue that must be addressed if the development of a
multi-tier European polity is to be legitimate and democratic. As the number and significance of territorial polities below the level of the state increases, so it becomes more important to consider questions of citizenship and political identity in terms of the relationship between regional governance and European integration.

Third, although many EU policies do promote regionalisation ‘from the top down’, it is in places where ‘bottom up’ regionalism is strong that regional identities and belonging are most marked. It is in these cases where the relationship between different ‘levels’ of identity and governance are the most complex, but also where evidence of new forms of multi-level identity and citizenship is most likely to be found.

Objectives

**Original Aim:** To investigate the changing interrelationships between citizenship, regional identities and the emergence of multi-layered governance in Europe and to assess their implications for the future development of European citizenship.

**Comment:** We are satisfied that we have met our aim in full by addressing the original objectives as follows.

**Original Objective:** Through novel empirical and conceptual research to add to our understanding of the relationships between citizenship, regional identity, and governance in Europe.

**Comment:** Our programme of case-study based empirical research has been successfully completed as reported below. Our conceptual interpretation of the empirical materials is continuing and will be elaborated in full in our forthcoming book (see ‘Outputs’ section below).

**Original Objective:** To investigate in detail how regional identities are constituted and shaped through institutional structures and processes and to consider the implications of this for citizenship.

**Comment:** Our case studies focused on the development of regional institutions and their reciprocal relationship with the formation and transformation of regional identities. We are in the process of analysing the implications of this for citizenship.
**Original Objective:** To generate new insights into the geographical variation of the regional identity/citizenship link and to investigate the causes of this variation.

**Comment:** Our case studies illustrate both the extent and the character of this geographical variation. Preliminary comparative analysis focusing on its causes has been completed and is summarised under ‘Results’ below. Further comparative analysis is underway and will be incorporated into our book and other published work.

**Original Objective:** To investigate the prevalence of, and scope for, ‘multi-levelled citizenship’ alongside the development of multi-level governance.

**Comment:** We addressed this objective through the regional case studies and related research with European institutions. Our findings suggest that at present multi-levelled citizenship remains a potential, rather than an established, phenomenon.

**Original Objective:** To assist in the development of new models of European citizenship in both the academic and public policy arenas.

**Comment:** We have addressed this objective by using our empirical case study research to develop critical commentaries on existing models of European citizenship, particularly those that rely on a unitary conception of European identity, and to elaborate a broad understanding of European citizenship that gives full weight where relevant to the importance of regional, as well as national, belonging but that recognises the dangers associated with more closed or exclusionary forms of regional attachment.

**Methods**

**Language**
The research team included fluent speakers of Catalan, English, Italian, Polish, and Spanish. The research used the appropriate language(s) for each case. Where necessary (e.g. for comparative analysis) translation was provided by the researchers.

**Literature Review**
We undertook a comprehensive review of the literatures on regional identity and regionalism in Europe and European citizenship and identity, and of the literatures on devolution and territorial identity in Catalonia, Scotland, Upper Silesia and the Veneto.
Interviews
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out with key informants (politicians, public officials, regionalist activists and campaigners, journalists and academics) in the case study regions and in European institutions including the European Commission, the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliament. Each of the 85 interviews was organized around the themes of most relevance to each interviewee, but within a common framework dictated by our objectives. The main issues discussed were: the sources and character of territorial identity; the character and progress of moves towards regional autonomy; the relationship between identity and institutional developments; institutional relations with Europe; the relationship between regional, national and European identities; the relevance of European citizenship to devolution and regional identity. A record of each interview was made using either detailed written notes, or audio tape-recording. Taped interviews were subsequently transcribed.

Documentary Sources and Archives
A wide range of documentary sources was consulted, including newspapers and periodicals; academic and research reports; parliamentary papers, reports, and legislation; government, EU and other official reports; the archives of political parties and other regionalist organisations; campaign materials; and popular publications relating to regional identity. In some cases (notably Scotland) the extensive availability of documentary materials allowed us to reduce the number of interviews.

Secondary Statistical Data
Where appropriate we drew on previously conducted and publicly available survey data on public attitudes to Europe and on popular senses of identity, including Eurobarometer surveys and published opinion polls.

Data Analysis and Interpretation
Interview and documentary materials were analysed using well established techniques for qualitative analysis. These included close reading of notes, transcripts and documents and the indexing of material in relation to the relevant research themes. Comparative analysis is being undertaken through the cross-referencing of the case studies in relation to the indexed themes.
Results

This section presents the main results from each of the four case studies and preliminary findings from the continuing comparative analysis.

Catalonia (Spain)

Catalonia (population 6.1m) is one of seventeen Autonomous Communities established in their present form in 1980. The Spanish constitution allows for devolution to the governments of the Communities; any matter not constitutionally vested in the central state can be devolved. Catalonia is also one of Spain’s three ‘historic communities’ reflecting its language and national identity and a long history of self-government.

During Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975), Catalan nationalism, demands for the re-establishment of autonomous political institutions, and claims for the preservation of Catalan identity and language were integral to Catalan demands for the democratisation of Spain. Despite current criticism and increasing pressure to confer special status on Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, the Spanish decentralisation model has facilitated the peaceful accommodation of regional nationalism after 40 years of dictatorship. Only 6.8% of the Catalan population favour a return to centralisation, while 70.2% either favour maintaining the current degree of self-government that Catalonia enjoys (34.3%) or support greater devolution (35.9%).

The re-establishment of a Catalan Government has undoubtedly contributed to the development of Catalan identity and redressed the decline of the language. Multilevel governance, exemplified in the Spanish devolution process, has strengthened regional identity in Catalonia and the other Autonomous Communities. The consolidation of regional identity has, in turn, contributed to the rise of multiple identities. In recent surveys, 80% of the Catalan population defined itself as to some degree both Spanish and Catalan while 58% identified itself as at least partly European. It is important to bear in mind that in 1975, 49% of the population of Barcelona was of non-Catalan origin.

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For over 20 years, the majority of the Catalan population has supported the non-secessionist brand of Catalan nationalism represented by Convergencia i Unió (CiU), with only a small minority supporting secession. However, according to a recent poll 35.9% of Catalans are now in favour of Catalonia’s independence, while 48.1% are against. This shift arises from the erosion of support for the CiU after 20 years in government and its alliance with the conservative Partido Popular (PP), the conservative centralist policies of the PP government, and the inability of the Catalan Socialists to present themselves as an autonomous party rather than an appendage of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). In this context, the secessionist discourse of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) may attract new supporters which could consolidate the party as Catalonia’s third political force and place it in a key position, particularly if neither the CiU nor the Catalan Socialists, were to achieve the majority in the forthcoming 2003 Catalan election.

Whatever the electoral implications, the centralism and Spanish nationalism of the PP threatens to alienate the Catalans, undermining the delicate equilibrium amongst various political tendencies on which the transition to democracy was based. Furthermore, Catalan nationalism is itself being re-examined. The 1998 Declaration of Barcelona and the 2001 Self-Government Report illustrate the desire for greater autonomy, at least amongst the Catalan political elite. (All Catalan political parties stand for greater devolution, except the Catalan branch of the PP). This debate, however, is by no means just about the relation of Catalonia to Spain; it also involves much thought about the status of Catalonia within an expanding European Union engaged in a process of political integration.

There is a strong sense of European identity in Catalonia, which has longstanding physical, historical and cultural links with the rest of Europe that continued throughout the period of dictatorship when people, ideas and books flowed across the border with France. In 1975, for many Spaniards, but in particular for the great majority of the Catalans, EU membership was perceived as a sign of status and a guarantee of democracy, and meant an open door into modernisation, economic progress and access to fresh political and cultural ideas.

One of the most pressing concerns of all Catalan political parties and civic institutions is the demand for Catalonia to have direct access to EU institutions, a matter strictly reserved to the Spanish government. Catalonia’s formal presence in the EU institutions is restricted to membership of the Committee of the Regions. The prospect of enlargement means that
independent countries which have a smaller population, territory and GDP than Catalonia will gain a seat in the Council of Ministers and other EU institutions while Catalonia will have none. Two major new initiatives focus on the future role of Catalonia in the EU and will advise the Convention on the Future of Europe: the Europa Futura Forum (sponsored by two major think tanks associated with the Catalan Socialist Party and the Catalan government), and the Catalan Convention (sponsored by the Catalan Government).

**Scotland (United Kingdom)**

The United Kingdom was a unitary state from its formation in 1707 until the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, which has legislative authority over a wide range of matters. Scotland (population 5.1m) has a distinctive national identity. It retained many distinctive institutional arrangements during the period of centralised rule.

To outsiders Scottish identity is typically understood in terms of folk traditions, other cultural markers, and mythologized historical narratives. However, contemporary Scottishness has distinctively modern and civic elements grounded in its separate legal and educational systems, political traditions, the welfare state, the arts, and the institutions of civil society. It is these civic forms of identity that have been central to the implementation of devolution. Surveys suggest that a slim majority of Scots support the present devolution arrangements, while about a quarter favour independence. Following rather critical appraisals of the early achievements of devolution, the Scots’ evaluation of their Parliament has become more positive; over half consider it has achieved ‘a little’ and a further quarter consider it has achieved ‘a lot’. A series of policy differences have emerged between Edinburgh and London (notably on education, health and welfare), reinforcing the view that devolution is making a difference.

We found that devolution has strengthened and reorientated Scottish identity. As Scottish politics increasingly happens in Scotland and has a greater impact on Scottish life, the public sphere has become more Scottish. In the media more attention is paid to Scottish affairs, major new histories have been published, businesses and civic organisations lobby Edinburgh rather than London and new forums for public debate have been established. While most respondents saw these as positive developments, some felt that they could lead to unwelcome introversion or even promote an exclusionary form of Scottish identity, particularly in relation to Scotland’s status as a multi-ethnic society.
Although a positive orientation towards the European Union is a notable feature of Scottish devolution, relations with Europe do not play the pivotal role evident in our other cases. Scottish devolution is concerned overwhelmingly with relations between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. The Scottish National Party campaigned under the slogan ‘independence in Europe’, to counter claims from its opponents that an independent Scotland risked isolation while other parts of Europe were becoming more integrated. However, claims that devolution would enable Scotland to become more European or get more from the EU were not important parts of the pro-devolution campaign.

At the same time, devolution, and the strengthened sense of Scottishness that it entails, do have an important European dimension. Formal European citizenship has little resonance in Scotland. However, we found that participation in European affairs is viewed very positively, and that Scotland is seen as more pro-European than other parts of the UK, particularly England. Foreign policy, and therefore relations with the EU, is reserved to the UK government. Nevertheless, direct links between Scotland and European institutions are developing and a majority of Scots believe that the Scottish government should negotiate with Europe on matters affecting Scotland.

One distinctive feature of the Scottish Parliament is its strong committee system. The European Committee has been particularly active, and at the forefront of discreet initiatives to forge more direct links between Scotland and the EU. Most recently the European Committee has conducted a major enquiry into the role of Scotland in the future of Europe. We are currently analysing the recently published report of the enquiry and subsequent Parliamentary debate.

In a more high-profile move, the Scottish government signalled its commitment to building connections with the EU by inaugurating ‘Scotland House’ in Brussels on devolution day in 1999. Scotland House is the Brussels base of the Scottish economic development agency, Scottish Enterprise, and home to its European arm, Scotland Europa. In many respects Scotland Europa is similar to the numerous other delegations to the EU that focus on economic development and lobbying. However, it has sought to go beyond that instrumental agenda through broader activities such as a debate on the future of Europe that formed part of Scotland Europa’s ‘Scotland Week’ in October 2001.
Upper Silesia (Poland)

Polish regional government consists of 16 voivodships established in 1999 to replace the 49 units inherited from communism. Our research centred on the new Śląskie voivodship (‘Silesia’) on the Czech and Slovak border. Modern Śląsk (population 4.9m) is the most densely populated Polish region, and contains the majority of the current population of the historic province of Upper Silesia, though not all its territory.

The Polish political elite sees decentralisation and regionalisation as symbols of both democratisation and ‘Europeanness’. The association of Europe with regionalisation is pragmatic as well as symbolic. Many EU financial transfers and agreements are administered at the regional level and institutions of regional governance are needed to take advantage of them. Another fundamental aspect of the post-1989 transformations has been the re-discovery of historical-cultural regional specificities suppressed during 45 years of communism. Such freedom of collective self-definition is seen as another fundamental step in Poland’s ‘return to Europe’.

The association between regional identity and Europeanness is particularly strong in Upper Silesia, the Polish region with the strongest claim to a distinctive identity. The re-assertion of regional community has proceeded symbolically and institutionally ‘through Europe’. It has relied on the revival of a regional ‘collective memory’ and the rediscovery of the region’s history and traditions. This (pre-communist) history is defined through differentiation from the rest of Poland and affinity with the broader European whole. The key trope within regional actors’ narratives is Silesia’s ‘natural’ place within a European heritage and the indivisibility of Silesian and European histories. Silesia’s participation in European industrialisation and its historical ties to German culture and civilisation are highlighted by regionalists as proof of the region’s ‘natural place in Europe’, and of its distinction from the rest of Poland. Upper Silesia, in the words of its leaders, is ‘a European Other within the Polish state’ and thus ‘by nature European’.

Those revindicating ‘Silesian nationality’ have turned to European institutions for support, such as the group of historians from the University of Silesia in Katowice who recently petitioned the European Court of Justice asking for the EU’s recognition of a ‘Silesian historical-regional community’. Local actors also look to EU institutions and funds to support region-building initiatives and cross-border co-operation. Strengthening contacts
with EU institutions and local and regional structures in member states is a priority. Silesian school students have been by far the most numerous of all Polish participants in EU youth programmes, while regional government employees were the first in Poland to seize the opportunity to travel to Brussels for EU training courses on the process of accession. Popular support for EU accession in Upper Silesia is among the highest in Poland. According to recent surveys over 69% of Silesian respondents saw EU membership as ‘positive for the country’, while 58% thought it ‘above all positive for their region’ – figures that are almost twice the national average. In the renewed regional imaginary, Silesia’s history as a multi-cultural, multi-national borderland makes it a perfect model of emergent European belonging, a place that has always been a ‘little Europe’, a plural community of diverse nations and faiths, where ‘everyone could belong’. European ideals of tolerance and diversity are thus intertwined with regional representation.

One particular aspect of this case has important implications for the study of regionalisms and territorial governance more generally: the disjuncture between the diffuse adoption of Upper Silesia as a locus of political, economic and cultural organising and the continuing lack of regional institutions to reflect this. Even after devolution in 1999, ‘regionalising’ activities have mostly proceeded outside of the formal structures of the new voivodship, and the new region’s functionaries are generally perceived as marginal to the processes of regionalisation. State decentralisation has simply provided additional ‘tools’ for on-going processes of regionalisation, tools most fruitfully put into practice not by the newly-constituted administrative region but by the municipalities. Municipal leaders have been the most active ‘regionalists’, promoting the idea of Upper Silesia through celebrations of regional heritage and the introduction of regional education classes in schools. Our findings thus suggest that we cannot simply ‘read-off’ regional mobilisation from institutional forms alone. In many cases the regional ideal – and regional actors – correspond only partially to the formal regional institutions and actors sanctioned by the state. This, however, makes them no less important – or effective.

**Veneto (Italy)**

Italy has 20 regions with elected regional councils, of which five have special status and greater autonomy. Veneto (population 4.5m) does not have special status. Although the

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3 Committee for European Integration of the Republic of Poland, 2000.
Italian constitution of 1948 provided for regional government, it was not until the 1970s that the ‘ordinary’ regions were established. They were granted few powers, however, and from the early 1980s calls were made for greater devolution. The first direct elections of regional presidents took place in 1999. A referendum in October 2001 further extended regional autonomies.

Contemporary regionalist mobilisation in the Veneto, promoted by the centre-right national political coalition that also governs the region, must be distinguished from earlier forms of regionalism, represented by the first Liga Veneta. Early regionalist movements in the Veneto were pluralistic and Europeanist in orientation, born in the romantic-federalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, with close ties to the Congress of European Federalists. Headed by local intellectual and cultural leaders, the first Liga Veneta focused its efforts on the re-discovery of the regional past and language of a ‘Veneto cultural space’, not limited to the territories of the current administrative region but, rather, encompassing all areas once under the influence of the Venetian republic. As our interviews with early regional activists reveal, this rediscovery of a regional collective memory was coupled, in the 1980s, with a reflection on the need for a local politics able to understand the unique territorial and social realities of north-east Italy. However, the turbulent years of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Italian politics left their mark on the Liga. The early autonomist movements coalesced into a number of parties, some allying with the emerging Lega Lombarda (later becoming the Lega Nord). Nonetheless, we found that it is very important not to conflate Veneto regionalism with the Lega, which claims to be its current political representative. Only one segment of the Veneto regional movement merged into the Lega – a segment holding opposite political views to those of the early Liga Veneta.

Our research shows that the present-day ‘revolt’ of the Veneto (and other Northern regions) against the national state bureaucracy is best interpreted not as the culmination of a long process of ‘regional awakening’ but, rather, as part of a broader attack on the institutions of the Italian state occurring at the national level. There is a symbiotic relationship between regional politics in the Veneto and the Italian national political sphere. Although clothed in regionalist rhetoric, the current regional leaders’ calls for devolution in the spheres of health care provision, education, taxation and immigration control are part of a nation-wide delegitimation of state functions and institutions by the Berlusconi coalition – and not simply the expression of regionalising impulses in the North-east. Similarly, the centre-right
coalition currently in power in Rome has adopted the rhetoric of autonomist and regionalist movements in the Veneto (and elsewhere in the North) with the same objectives. In the latest administrative and parliamentary elections in the Veneto (held in 2000 and 2001, respectively), the Lega Nord ceded seats to its coalition partner Forza Italia. As our interviews with regional political and economic leaders suggest, the Veneti feel that their interests can now be ‘better represented by the party in power’, as one Lega Nord Mayor informed us. The ‘usefulness’ of the regionalist rhetoric of the past thus appears to have been outworn. Claims to a distinctive regional identity have been largely replaced by calls for the withdrawal of the state from large areas of social welfare including education and health care and its replacement not by regional institutions, but by the private sector and the Catholic Church.

Veneto regionalism – which is just one expression of the reactionary force in Italian national politics today – is also profoundly anti-European. Our research suggests that it is a highly exclusionary construction that is critical of the state’s current institutions and tends to foster a populist reaction that contradicts the very goals of the European project of ‘unity in diversity’. The rhetoric and politics of current Veneto regional leaders – reflecting the general attitudes of the Berlusconi coalition – are inimical to a putative European citizenship, for they are deeply anti-institutional and anti-political, and based within a rejection of fundamental liberal democratic values of diversity and pluralism. The rejection of national state institutions in years past has been translated, in recent months, into a rejection of the European Union and its institutions as well: portrayed as a voracious ‘super-state’, reproducing the worst constraints of national administrations. The anti-European pronouncements of Lega ministers in recent weeks are but the most visible expression of these underlying tendencies.

**Summary of Preliminary Comparative Analysis**

Our comparative analysis of the case studies is continuing. The following is a summary of our preliminary findings.

First, our research reveals the fundamental importance of different national political contexts in influencing the progress of regionalisation, regional identity formation, and relations with Europe. The politics of the Berlusconi coalition in Italy has been a powerful influence on the recent development of Veneto regionalism. In Poland the transition to democracy and the
desire to ‘return to Europe’ have both accelerated moves towards regional decentralisation. Scottish devolution arose from a long struggle within the UK for a new territorial/constitutional settlement. In Catalonia, as in Poland, the experience of authoritarian rule led directly to calls for decentralised government and recognition of suppressed territorial identities, while more recently the alliance between the CiU and the PP has prompted a growth in support for Catalan secessionism.

Second, the relationship between regionalism and democracy is powerful, but contingent. In both Poland and Spain, decentralised government is perceived as a strong guarantee against a return to authoritarianism, and as symbolic of a European model of democratic governance. In the Scotland devolution is also seen as a democratising step, though for a different reason: Scotland will no longer be subject to a government elected on the votes of the English majority. However in the Veneto, contemporary regionalism is allied to moves to delegitimise the Italian state and the national political system in ways that many Italian commentators see as containing anti-democratic elements.

Third, there is a strong reciprocal relationship between the formation of regional institutions and the development of identity. This is most evident in Catalonia and Scotland. Both cases are best understood as nations, rather than regions, albeit nations without independent statehood (Guibernau 1999). Both now have strong autonomous governmental institutions. The reestablishment of self-government in Catalonia has had a strongly reinforcing effect on the development of Catalan identity and the preservation of the Catalan language. A strong sense of Scottish identity was strongly established long before the recent implementation of devolution, but there are signs that the moves towards self-government in Scotland are beginning to shape the future development of Scottish identity, with our research supporting claims of a reinvigorated and more self-confident Scottish public sphere.

Fourth, relations with the European Union are a key factor in regionalising process. This is despite recent reassertions of the power of the member states in European affairs and the failure of the concept of a Europe of the Regions to develop into a European-wide system of regional government. Europe is important symbolically, in that it legitimates processes of regionalisation. It is also an important practical influence in terms of regional funding allocations. In Scotland, Catalonia and Upper Silesia there is great interest in the development of direct relationships between regional institutions and EU bodies. The
position in the Veneto is somewhat different. Here, the Europe matters too, but in the currently dominant right-wing version of Veneto regionalism, the EU is seen in negative terms as a putative super-state imposing liberal values from outside. The preferred Europe of this reactionary regional imaginary is a conservative and Catholic Europe undisturbed by the presence of peoples of non-European ethnic and cultural origin.

Fifth, each case speaks to the conception of citizenship, but in differing ways. We adopted a broad understanding of citizenship encompassing not only legal rights, but also a sense of belonging and the practices of civic and political participation. In Scotland, we found that the formal notion of citizenship had relatively little resonance, perhaps reflecting the limited use of discourses of citizenship in UK public life more generally. This seems set to change with the implementation of citizenship education in Scottish schools. More generally, though, devolution is promoting a greater participation in Scottish civic life. There was little evidence of multi-level citizenship incorporating an explicit European dimension. This seems to reflect the origins of Scottish devolution in the debate over the changing character of the UK state. By contrast in Upper Silesia, the development of regional consciousness and regional civic institutions is explicitly associated with a process of becoming more European and with eventual accession to the European Union. Some aspects of Veneto regionalism serve to promote a sense of regional belonging, but this is couched largely in terms of cultural traditions and historical narratives, rather than an active encouragement to participation in civic life. Our research suggests that the dominant trajectory seeks to undermine the public realm and to shift responsibility for service provision onto the church, the family and the private sector - a shift legitimised by recourse to historical narratives of regional identity. Veneto regionalism is also inimical to notions of European citizenship which are grounded in liberal conceptions of rights and pluralist politics. Of all our case studies, Catalonia perhaps comes closest to the concept of multi-level identity and citizenship, with Catalans seemingly most at ease with the task of combining multiple identities (Catalan/Spanish/European). This reflects the strongly pro-European character of Catalan society as well as its openness and pluralism.

**Activities**

A highly successful *International Roundtable on Territorial Identity and Citizenship in Europe* was organized and funded as part of the project at the University of Durham in December.
2001. The event brought together scholars from a range of disciplines and a seven European countries. Researchers were invited from each of our case study areas.

In July 2000 we organised and led a one-day seminar on Citizenship, Identity and Statehood with participation from four research projects in the One Europe or Several? Programme and the Programme Director. In December 2000 we participated in the seminar organised by Judy Batt on central and eastern Europe. We have also participated in all the One Europe or Several? Programme plenary conferences and a number of training activities organised by the Programme Directors.

**Outputs**

In addition to conference presentations and publication in refereed journals (see REGARD return), the major academic output from the project will be a jointly-authored book on Regional Identity and European Citizenship. This will include a full account of the project findings and detailed comparative analysis, and will situate the research in its broader theoretical and policy contexts. We are currently in negotiations with Blackwell for a publishing contract.

Where we have verbatim transcripts of interviews, we are arranging for the deposit of electronic copies with the ESRC’s Qualidata Archive.

**Impacts**

Joe Painter presented preliminary findings to an audience of 50 practitioners and policymakers from across Europe at the Wilton Park Conference on ‘A Europe of the Regions’ (November 2000). He also acted as an informal advisor to the then Scottish Minister for Communities on questions of Scottish identity and exclusion.

Montserrat Guibernau has been consulted as expert by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. She is a member of the Spanish expert working group Europa Futura Forum to advise the 2004 Convention on the future of the EU. She is also a member of the Committee of Experts (13 in total) for the Convenció Catalana pro-Europa sponsored by the Catalan government on the future role of Catalonia in the EU.
Concerning the findings of the Upper Silesian case study Luiza Bialasiewicz has been in contact with: Anjoum Noorani, Assistant Desk Office for Poland, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Lawrence Fullick, Chair, Liberal Democrat European Group; and John Parry, Vice-President, Union of European Federalists; and Wanda Rapaczynski and Andrzej Stefanski of Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland’s best selling daily newspaper).

Future Research Priorities

1 The relationship between territorial and non-territorial identities. Further research could consider the relationship between ethnic and regional identities, and examine the extent to which regional identities can also be multi-cultural and pluri-ethnic.

2 The role of citizenship education. Interesting evidence from the Upper Silesian case study highlighted the role of citizenship education in constituting regional, national and European identities.

3 Our research focused on the institutional framework of citizenship and identity. Further work of a more ethnographic character is needed to examine the role of European citizenship in the everyday lived experience of regional identity.

References