



**Eight Essays
on
Russian Christianities**

Edited by
Igor Mikeschin

Saint Petersburg Center for the History of Ideas

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To the memory of Sonja Luehrmann

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An Invitation to the World of Russian Christianities

Igor Mikeshin

Introduction

This book is a collection of essays on Russian-speaking Christianity, its diversity, multi-modality, and heterogeneity. The main goal is not, and could never be, to give an exhaustive description, much less a comprehensive analysis, of such a complex phenomenon. Every piece of this enormous puzzle spreading beyond frontiers in time, space, and language calls for scrutiny, clarification, justification, and scholarly debate. A study of Russian Christianity could never be condensed into one book, one public talk, or one academic course. This book, however, is an invitation into the world of Russian Christianity – the phenomenon (or, as I further claim, a plethora of phenomena) that at some point and to a certain extent changed, defined, and explained Russian history, culture, and language.

The initial idea of the book was to initiate a discussion on the unseen forms of Russian Christianity, to address what remains marginal, hidden, and unnoticeable. Yet even this task turns out to be unrealistic. Many significant themes that had a huge impact on Russian history and culture are left out of the discussion, one example being the Christianity of the Old Believers. This does not in any sense diminish what the book does contain. Our eight essays address Russian Christianity with reference to different cases, from different approaches, and with different goals. Every essay is about Russian-speaking Christians, but this simple attribution is, by and large, just a starting point for a general discussion.

The communities concerned could be regarded as different yet Christians, and at the same time as Christians but different.

The task of bringing even these eight accounts of Russian Christianity under the same umbrella concept or theory is beyond the purpose and scope of this book. The focus is rather on the diversity of Russian Christianity, and we invite the reader to explore eight different modes of perceiving, making sense of, and living by the Christian message and legacy. The authors give eight different and extensive responses to the question: What does it mean to be a Russian Christian? These responses vary even within the dominant discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church. One of the evident conclusions one can draw from reading the chapters written by Margarita Chubukova, Yulia Tsiryapkina, and Irina Gordeeva (the first two dealing with a more or less conventional form of Orthodox Christianity) is that even the Church under the umbrella of the Moscow Patriarchate is anything but a homogenous phenomenon. Despite the colloquial understanding of the term "evangelical Christian" (see, for instance, Bebbington 1989), this also applies to the Russian evangelicals, represented in the chapters written by Nadezhda Beliakova and Ekaterina Mironova, Tatiana Krihtova and Maija Penttilä, and Vera Kliueva. The remaining two stories, Svetlana Tambovtseva's study of the old-Russian anticlerical community of Doukhobors and Ekaterina Khonineva's account of marginal but authentic Russian Catholics, confirm this impression.

The editorial task has not been an easy one. The book is written in English, although the subject matter and the voices of the people that we study essentially reflect the Russian language. Although Russian Christianity in the fullness and richness of its discourses and contexts could almost be considered *terra incognita* among most Russian people, we aim in this book to contribute to the scholarly study of Christianity worldwide. Hence, most of the chapters, the theological, historical, political, cultural, ethnological, and sociological narratives and, most importantly, people's voices have been translated from Russian. Some of the contexts, overtones, and even the big ideas are inevitably lost or left aside. Nevertheless, the authors, and I as editor, have done our best to introduce the rich diversity of Russian Christian narratives to the world. The comments of the anonymous reviewers – top-ranked scholars in the discipline – and my editorial suggestions have intervened minimally in the stories told by the authors. I believe that the authors

have retained their own voices and scholarly and disciplinary standpoints while giving voice to the people they study.

Christianity and Christianities

As the book title implies, Russian Christianity, and most probably Christianity in general, is so diverse that it would be fair to regard christianities in the plural. As noted above, the authors of the eight essays talk about the Russian Christians. However, the focus on Christians does not seem that obvious in the scholarly study of Christianity. According to Joel Robbins, this focus may even be identified as the turning point in anthropology that led to the formation of the anthropology of Christianity (Robbins 2014). The tendency to trace the anthropological study of Christianity almost to the early days of the discipline is tightly linked to the practice of defining Christianity from the perspective of the anthropologists themselves rather than of the Christian people they study (Cannell 2005).

This book is based on the premise that the study of Christianity is first and foremost the study of Christians (Robbins 2003; Garriott and O'Neill 2008). The question, "What does it mean to be a Christian?" appears to assume the central position in all eight essays. However, it takes odd turns and twists in every one. What does it mean to be a Christian in a situation of social exclusion and seeking authenticity, for instance, for a Russian Orthodox believer in Uzbekistan (Tsyryapkina), for a Christian musician in a secular context (Chubukova), a Roman Catholic in Russia (Khonineva), a God-seeking hippie (Gordeeva) or a Bible believer in the USSR (Beliakova and Mironova, Kliueva), or a Russian Christian in a foreign country (Krihtova and Penttilä, Tambovtseva)? Although the authors do not always explicitly ask this question, it can be traced through their quest for Christian authenticity, self-definition, and tradition.

As I have noted earlier, emic and etic views on what Christianity is and who a Christian is oftentimes conflict, mostly on ideological grounds for the sake of theoretical argument. What seems more important is the person of the researcher herself (in our book, this politically correct pronoun is also factually correct), her relations, relationships, attitudes, and beliefs in her field of study. I am not in a position to discuss their personal convictions, yet I take the liberty to mention that the authors represent a full range of standpoints, from the dedicated

believer to the atheist. It is not simply a disclaimer to state that, nevertheless, they all remain objective, impartial, and critical. On the contrary, it is an enriching element of the field they study, a methodological challenge, and something that in any case makes the stories personal.

The discussion on the "methodological atheism" of students of Christianity and on the "cultural otherness" of Christianity as opposed to secular scholarship (see, for instance, Harding 1991), has already passed its peak and nowadays the diversity of backgrounds among researchers is not merely a reality, it is a significant component of methodology, and even a conceptual argument (Blanes 2006; Howell 2007; Bielo 2009: 29-40). Most studies of Christianity, and Russian Christianity is no exception, are self-reflective. It cannot be otherwise, because Christian theologies, ideologies, and practices directly deal with ontological, existential, and more practical and mundane life issues. It seems unproductive to discuss such issues without negotiating one's own take on them. All of us, as researchers of Christianity, are directly asked at some point about our own identities, affiliations, and beliefs.

What exactly is it that we study under the umbrella of Christianity? What are its limits? When do we say, or know, or think we know that the issue we are studying is no longer Christian? Who is a Christian and who is not? Christianity is an enormously complex historical narrative, which has been lived, practiced, followed, reflected upon, and studied for millennia, thus there is not one colloquial or conventional understanding of its limits, identities, and definitions. Clearly, too, scholarly approaches to studying Christianity and Christians are too diverse and simply too numerous even to review, hence my main challenge in this introduction is to identify the approach we adopt throughout.

This book is a collection of stories. They are all high-quality research papers, yet as is always the case with the deep study of Christianity, every consistent scholarly narrative reads like a real-life story of the peoples, communities, and individuals involved and, to some extent, of the authors themselves. Some of them concern conventionally Christian groups, some the less conventional, but even the chapters dealing with Orthodox Christians affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate (by Yulia Tsyryapkina, Margarita Chubukova, and Irina Gordeeva) consistently reach the edges and limits of Christian identity and self-identity. A Christian reader of this introduction might dismiss these topics as secondary and as distracting from the main

issue, which is ultimate salvation. However, I believe that even though the stories might not convert the reader to the ways of thinking that they analyze (just as they have not necessarily converted the researchers studying them), the logic and rationale behind their interpretation of the Gospel message and how it unfolds and is applied in everyday life are clearly visible.

The research essays in this book do not directly contribute to the debate on whether Christianity should be studied as a religion, a tradition, a phenomenon, or a performative and mundane practice (see, for instance, Orsi 1985; Cannell 2005; Marshall 2014; Robbins 2014). However, we believe that a healthy combination of all these approaches fosters coherent discussion on what difference Christianity makes (Haynes 2014). Given the nature of the argument and the complexity of the issue it is worth mentioning, without further specification, that our authors have backgrounds in history, sociology, social and cultural anthropology, philosophy, theology, the study of religion, cultural studies, and folkloristics.

What is Russian about Christianity?

Christianity in Kievan Rus was formally adopted in 988, and some of the leaders were baptized even before that. However, the relationship between the Church and the Russian people has always been complicated, and one of the reasons for this was the domineering status of the Russian Orthodox Church. Since its early days the officially recognized practices, institutions, and ideologies of the Church have tended to be at odds with unorthodox perceptions of piety, faith, liturgy, and lifestyle. The Church as a state institution could not address or embrace all the aspirations of a Christian believer in search of pious living, missions, and ultimate salvation. Hence, even the Orthodox Church in its conventional organizational form (which is nowadays represented by the Moscow Patriarchate) is inherently heterogeneous, despite its proclaimed adherence to immutable tradition.

The centralization of the Church and its claims to political and economic power led to the heresies, raskols, schisms, reforms, splits, and other ways of multiplying Russian Christianities. Old Believers and multiple sectarian communities, including Molokans, Doukhobors, Khlysts, and others, paved the way for the first wave of Russian Protestant conversion in the mid-19th century. This was preceded by

the long and controversial, yet later overwhelmingly accepted translation of the Bible into modern Russian (Tikhomirov 2006). The introduction of foreign versions of Christianity was met with hostility, especially when they aimed at converting formally Orthodox people.

The illegal Christian bodies formed during the Soviet period were being terminated and their leaders repressed, and the newly formed legalized ones were meant to serve political and administrative purposes concerning Church-State relations, yet they were repressed as well. The two most significant examples of this were the election of a new Russian Orthodox Patriarch in 1943 (there had been no Patriarch since 1925) and the formation of the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, the only legitimate and authorized evangelical union. Overall, Christians, along with many other groups, faced harsh persecution and anti-religious campaigns. However, Christian sentiments and cultural discourses later proved to have survived Soviet rule and the process of post- or de-secularization (Luehrmann 2005; Nikolskaia 2009; Kormina and Shtyrkov 2015).

The most recent wave of conversion occurred after the liberalization of religion during perestroika, in the mid-1980s. It embraced all kinds of religious movements, both from abroad and from within, and also significantly added to the existing communities. The great surge of religious sentiments gradually declined to a certain degree, but nowadays there is still an abundance of widely diverse religious groups and movements in Russia, even despite the recent political decisions banning, for instance, Jehovah's Witnesses.

This glimpse into the history of Christianity in Russia demonstrates why it is so diverse and heterogeneous. I have intentionally declined to mention the multiplicity of other religious practices and traditions, and even the political, cultural, and practical reasons for the timeline of Christianity. My aim is to defend the idea that Russian Christianities are contextually rich phenomena, loosely put under the same umbrella, and the eight essays in this volume, although brilliant, are just eight individual examples of the stories that constitute them. If not for the discipline, then for the sake of this volume, we see the study of Russian Christianities as a practice of scholarly storytelling. The stories are breathtaking, fascinating, touching, and oftentimes tragic. Nevertheless, telling these (and potentially many more) stories is a vitally important step towards understanding Russia's culture, history, politics, and everydayness.

It has been an unresolved challenge to define, identify, or even distinguish what we understand as Christianity, and having the word Russian in front of it does not make it easier. Our main subject is Russian Christianities. The plural form of the latter word, *khristianstva*, is not a problem in the Russian language. However, our choice of the former is ideologically, politically, and even theologically significant. Are Christianities Russian in the sense of *rossiiskie* or *ruskie*? We use the latter, *ruskie*, in the book because *rossiiskie* is too limiting and it secludes the subject matter within the boundaries of the modern state and nationality. *Ruskie* is still a tricky term. It may denote ethnicity, even to the point of nationalism. Although risky, we nevertheless use it with the emphasis on the Russian language. Although Russian Christianity in most cases embraces people beyond their ethnicities, nationalities, and places of residence, yet it is centered on Russian-speaking cultural, historical, political, and theological discourse. The communities and individuals may use their ethnic and national languages in making sense of their own lives and beliefs (see, for instance, Leete 2013), but the theology and convictions of faith and practice in the communities we regard as parts of Russian Christianities are essentialized in the Russian language, and oftentimes in the language of the Russian Bible.

In sum, our book is an introduction to the world of fascinating stories about Russian Christianities. We collected eight of them, and they illustrate the richness of the Russian Christian context representing various standpoints, geographic locations, and lifestyles. What unites all of them is their shared identity as Christian and as Russian. The latter term is understood broadly, with an emphasis on the Russian language rather than on the particular *ethnos*, state, or land.

Acknowledgements and dedication

A number of people and institutions made this book possible. First and foremost, the authors gave their commitment to this project and contributed with their brilliant pieces of research. I must say, I feel privileged to introduce the work of an "all-female panel." It reflects the very character of Russian Christianities, in that most adherents and members are women, and apparently, most researchers are women as well. The authors, in turn, are indebted to their interlocutors and informants, many of whom, as always happens, became their friends. It may seem banal and a cliché, but it is important to mention that the informants

shared the most sensitive and intimate aspects of their lives with the researchers, which we could never underestimate, and for which we cannot thank them enough.

Our anonymous reviewers dedicated their time and shared their expert opinions about the chapters. The comments they gave and their substantial experience and internationally recognized positions in academia reinforce our faith in the scholarly value of this book. We believe in the free distribution of ideas and in Open Access as the future of academic publishing: the book is therefore permanently available online, and free to share and download.

There are many people who deserve to be named personally in this section, but there is not enough space for that. Most of all, I would like to thank Mikhail Mikeschin, in conversation with whom the idea for it was born, Tatiana Artemyeva, Daria Dubovka, and Danila Rygovskiy.

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Finally, we dedicate the book to the memory of our dearest colleague, Sonja Luehrmann (1975-2019), a brilliant anthropologist of Russian religiosity, Christianity, and (post)secularity. Sonja helped with her valuable comments on one of the chapters and inspired me and many more students of Russian Christianity with her example as an outstanding researcher.

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ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITIES

Znamenny Chant as a Symbol of Orthopraxy in the Russian Orthodox Church (the Cases of Moscow and St. Petersburg Parishes)

Margarita Chubukova

Znamenny chant (*raspev*)¹ is an early form of the Old-Russian Orthodox chant. It first appeared in the 9th-10th century and historians and musicologists link its appearance to the spread of Christianity across Rus (see, for instance, Brazhnikov 1975: 4). It is conventionally believed that the *znamenny* chant tradition emerged during the pre-Raskol (Schism of Old Believers) time and was later replaced with Italian-style church music. It differed mostly in terms of European harmonization, as a trending polyphony was something substantially new for the Russian soundscape.

Since the 17th century, the replacement of one chanting style with another has been commonly associated with the Nikon's reforms and

¹ The spelling of the word *raspev* or *rospev* is a subject of debate among scholars and church ministers. For instance, Veronika Pereleshina uses *raspev* to denote "a fragment of a chanting structure" and *rospev* "when talking about one of the chanting styles (*znamenny*, *putevoy*, Kievan or other *rospevs*)" (Pereleshina 2008). As these details belong to the field of musicology, musical textology, and liturgy, and are not substantial in my article, I refer to the conventional form *raspev*.

contacts with Western Christians. Around the time of the Raskol, znamenny chant was no longer used universally and, hence, lost its significance. There is an understanding that it is predominantly an Old-Russian chanting legacy.

In such circumstances, especially during the Soviet secularization, the chant could cease to exist at all, or become an object of interest for the communities of Old Believers or the narrow circle of paleographers. However, such an understanding of the medieval history of Russian Orthodox music does not have much in common with reality. Nowadays, in the context of the reverse process – the post-Thaw desecularization (Kormina and Shtyrkov 2015; Kyrlezhev 2004) – there are rare but stable groups of musicologists, choir conductors, chanters, and church ministers who study, practice, and popularize the chant in the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This phenomenon attracts my interest the most. Why a "historical" tradition, which nowadays is presumably a subject to extensive "museification" (according to conventional views of Russian Orthodox worship music), is used again in practice? What is the place of the monodic (one-voice) znamenny chant as compared to polyphonic chanting in the contemporary church practice? How is it related to the ideological frameworks of believers?

In my article, I attempt to regard znamenny chant as a product of several social phenomena in and around the church in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Traditionally, such big cities as Moscow and St. Petersburg are centers of opportunity. There is supply and demand for all kinds of practices. "Znamennye" church services are rare in the ROC; yet, in both cities, znamenny chant is occasionally used. Moreover, in these cities, there are main research centers and schools of znamenny chant.

The anthropological approach to the study of musical practices has been formulated by the ethnomusicologist Alan Merriam. He has demonstrated how music, despite its symbolic character, refers to the specificities of the organization of society. Thus, the very observation of the practice of playing music becomes the means of understanding people and their behavior, and an instrument for analyzing culture and society (Merriam and Merriam 1964: 13).

Nowadays in the church context, there is a myth about the end of znamenny chant² in the Synodal era. The death of "live" tradition in that narrative is indicated in the late 17th century – the time when *znamena*³ were replaced or "transcribed" in the notes format (Pechenkin n. d.). At the same time, my field materials demonstrate that a few groups of performers and ideological proponents of znamenny chant attempt to overcome the Soviet-era legacy of the ROC:

...Because, generally speaking, those merry chants that were sung in the 90s, especially in the lay, well, in a sort of secular parishes, they were, like, surprisingly mannered, like, far from, sort of...[...] That was all pretty far from the meaning of chanting itself, from the text. Like that. So when "*Voskresenie Khristovo videvshi*" ("Seeing the Resurrection of Christ") was performed with some merry tune, it caused sort of a lot of questions. Like that. And naturally, there was a demand to restore what had been before all those perturbations, those scary enough, that the Church had to go through. (Interview 2)

On top of that, znamenny chant, as one of the elements of the Old-Russian Orthodox culture that refers to the pre-reform tradition, on the one hand, is characteristic of a fundamentalist project and, on the other hand, can be read in the context of the modernist discourse (or, conversely, of the "Orthodox modernism" – Agadzhanian 2011). Despite the differences in argumentation of the proponents of znamenny chant, the key characteristic of this practice is the contraposition of oneself to the secular world and a contemporary "canon," including the practice of chanting.

Another point of discussion is the public interest in the "medieval time." Western European culture is facing a similar rise of interest towards a church music of the Middle Ages (Kreutziger-Herr 1998). At

² A bright example was provided by a docent of the St. Petersburg Conservatory:

A few years ago, we were in the Theological Academy. [...] We came with the students to read a lecture, we asked for it, we had a teaching practice. [...] Our Theological Seminary, in Moscow, in Peter[sburg] (I know the Moscow one a bit worse, but I'm sure about the Peter one). Znamenny chant is studied [there] as some kind of a historical rud[iment]... "There was something of that kind..." I introduced us like that: "Well, there was that Old-Russian tradition, and here we are..." I don't quote word-for-word, but that was the idea: "Thank God it's over, so now we are..." I stood up and said: "There was that Old-Russian tradition and thank God we have a chance to take part in it" (Interview 1).

³ Symbols used for denoting musical sounds before the introduction of notes – *Translator's note*.

the edge of the 20th and 21st centuries, the Catholic Gregorian chant even acquired some traces of popular culture. Yet, interest in the chant faded and the music itself is still associated with the Church. The Old-Russian church music currently has not achieved the same popularity in Russian society. However, contemporary Russian performers recognize its existence beyond the church walls sometimes. Russian musicians familiar with znamenny chant oftentimes express their puzzlement over the fact that it is not popular. It is also significant to note that nowadays the Middle Ages are viewed through the prism of modernity, and hence the construction of the past defines its everydayness (Kreutziger-Herr 1998: 188, Gurevich 1993: 15-16).

I highlight the specificity of the contemporary practice of znamenny chant with my field materials, as well as printed and online publications by theoreticians and practitioners – musicologists, composers, and liturgists. During the preparation of my master's dissertation at the Faculty of Anthropology, European University in St. Petersburg from November 2016-April 2017, I conducted 23 interviews with church conductors, chanters, and ministers of Orthodox churches affiliated with the ROC, Moscow Patriarchate, and researchers of the Middle Ages, art historians, and composers. The selection of my informants was predefined by their professional and confessional identities. Additionally, I conducted observations at *znamennye* church services, conferences, concerts where znamenny chant was performed, *spevki* (rehearsals) of *znamennye* choirs, and classes.

The essence and types of znamenny chant

The tradition of znamenny chanting emerged with the spread of Christianity in Rus, the consequence of which was the translation of liturgical texts into the Slavic language and a special practice of reading and chanting them. Initially, the system of znamenny chanting inherited the characteristics of Byzantine and Bulgarian traditions and later developed independently.⁴ In this manner, *osmoglasie* (*Octoechos*), inherited

⁴ The question of the genealogy of znamenny chant is subject to a debate. During my interviews, I have learned that some of my informants reject the axiom of transmission, despite the fact that this version is universally accepted in musicology (Musical encyclopedia 1974) and it even successfully develops further. For instance, "The place of Rus in the transmission of chants is that being a firm preserver and keeper of traditions, she becomes, at the same time, a creator of new invented forms for the fixation and distribution of musical pieces that expressed adherence to the Christian ideals" (Velemirovich 2003: 5).

from Greece, lies in the basis of Old-Russian chanting tradition. As in Byzantium, the system of eight melodic modes includes the varieties of melodic chants of liturgical texts. These modes are repeated every eight weeks in a fixed sequence. The same system is also used in modern church services. It is important to note that not only the system of *osmoglasie* was borrowed but also the method of its fixation. The graphics of the *znamennaia* system originated in the paleo-Byzantine neumatic notation. The ancient chanting *znamennye* manuscripts are dated to the 11th–13th centuries (Brazhnikov 1949: 431). For the written recordings of chants that a *golovshchik* or conductor signaled to the chanters, certain symbols were used, such as the so-called *znamena*, or "hooks," in the popular language. That is why *znamenny* chant is referred to as "singing by the hooks."

Strictly speaking, the chant itself is not music. It is, most and foremost, a chanted text. The explanation of the essence of *znamenny* chanting refers to the way of reading (Vladyshevskaja 2011). *Znamenny* chant appeared and remained in the oral tradition thanks to specific chanters (they were also called hymnographers). Their practice was tightly connected to a canon and their work is often compared to the painting of icons. Chanting and registering of chants, like icon painting, was practiced by a selected few. It was accompanied by a prayer and fasting, i.e., it was linked to an ascetic practice (Vladyshevskaja 2006: 128–129).

Historically, hooks are placed above the words. Hence, the attention of chanters should be focused primarily on the text, rather than on neumatic symbols. *Znamena* impact the way the text is uttered (chanted); they add semantics to the uttered word.⁵ The following section will address how different groups of informants perceive the transcription of hooked recordings into notation. The appropriateness of this practice is subject to a debate among practitioners, for the notation presupposes autonomy of the chant and the possibility of separating music from a liturgical text. The "hooks" could not be chanted without a text, the notes could be chanted – it is easier technically – and the hierarchy of the texts could be violated. The practice of *znamenny* chant for many chanters is not equal to performing music. According to them, chant is not music but rather a way of articulating

⁵ Despite the common direct comparisons with the Greek neumatic notation, it is relevant to suggest that cantillation signs in Hebrew writings play a similar role.

the liturgical text and, consequently, using znamenny chant without a prayer is not possible.⁶

Another significant characteristic of znamenny chant is that it is originated in monody (one voice) and mostly existed in this form, being referred to as *stolpovoy* chant. The performers of *stolpovoy* chant simultaneously chant the same expanded non-harmonized sequence. In znamenny chant, one syllable is often chanted with several tones, which makes it plangent. Such characteristics as dynamic evenness (one fragment should not be louder than others) and the absence of a rhythmic pattern (which causes a lot of chanters' questions—Kazantseva 2015) are meant to maintain a specific prayer mood, necessary for uttering text.

In the context of the history of Old Russian chanting, it is important to remember that besides the monodic znamenny *stolpovoy* chant, in specific cases, early forms of polyphony were also used—*demestvenny* and *putevoy* chants. These are separate chanting systems with their own notations created based on the *znamennaya* system. It is also worth mentioning that there is such a para-liturgical genre as *dukhovny stikh* (cantus poetry). *Stikhi* are not a part of the liturgy but could also be performed in the *znamennaya* tradition. For the recording of *stikhi*, neumes were also used. It is important to understand that the key difference of these polyphonic chants from the customary European polyphony is that they exist apart from the traditional harmonic system. This, to a certain extent, makes the performance harder even today, if a chanter is not familiar with a tradition of the performance.

Perspectives of analysis

According to a conventional definition, music is sounds organized by a human. At the same time, there is the following opinion: the feelings that are woken by religious music emerge exactly because this music by its nature "goes beyond" the human cognition, for it is not created by humans and, hence, reflects the presence of spirit, cosmic unity, and so on. Thus, a reframing or even abolishing of the role of a human could take place during the performance of spiritual music. This ambivalence

⁶ As an example and evidence for this argument, a contemporary *golovshchik* (conductor) claimed: "Znamenny chant is after all a prayer. It is a prayer in music, a prayer in chanting" (Muraviev 2014).

is a central problem addressed by an American ethnomusicologist Jeffers Engelhardt (2012; 2014).

To explain the problem of coexistence of the secular and religious, he employs the concept of "secular enchantment." Referring to the work of Charles Taylor (2008) (and building on the idea of Max Weber), Engelhardt demonstrates the ambivalence of the contemporary practice of church chanting, using the example of Orthodox parishes in present-day Estonia. On the one hand, this practice is put in a shape that could be described, on the other, it is filled with meanings that are produced and read by certain groups of people in a certain way.

A researcher of religious music has to constantly balance between the position of a secular critique and of a believer. A strictly secular approach regards music as a form of power; in this framework, the stylistic specificities and its history are studied. God, in this case, as well as music, is created by humans. The opposite view perceives music as "sublime," a divine voice or divine silence could be heard. "The seculars," according to this standpoint, could be accused of anthropocentrism.

In this context, the issue of a researcher's position is raised. Engelhardt notes that he himself works in the secular critique paradigm, yet he remains a "sympathetic" researcher. He is involved in practices and feels empathy towards his informants, which allows him to understand them better. I have also attempted to stick to this principle in my study.

A spectacular example of the ambivalence of understanding chanting is Engelhardt's book "Singing the Right Way: Orthodox Christians and Secular Enchantment in Estonia" (2014), in which he speaks of his field experience (2002-2009) in great detail, including his participant observation. He notes that during his study of twenty parishes of the Orthodox Church in Estonia, being a professional musician, he was not always invited to sing. As Engelhardt explains, that was because of the so-called "poetics of the right singing."

In this context, the pragmatics of singing comes forward. The "right singing" oftentimes goes beyond the formal requirements to keep intonation in tune. In the soundscape of an Orthodox service, a human voice occupies a central position and that is why the indication of a performance quality is so significant. The voice metaphysics is tightly connected to the state of body and soul; hence, one of the central roles is played by "sincerity" and "purity" of performance (meaning the "purity

of heart"⁷) but not the ideal performance. The singing of an outsider musician, one not involved in the practice fully, cannot be regarded as authentic. The problem is that the musician's intentions, body, and spirit have not been properly "prepared" or "disciplined" through fasting and prayer. Hence, they could not adequately reproduce the meaning of words. To some extent, this problem can be addressed through the difference between the English verbs "to chant" and "to sing." The former appeals to a spiritual practice and the latter to the everyday and mundane.

At the same time, regarding the abovementioned dichotomy of the secular and religious, one could mention lots of researchers directly involved in the religious practice. Trying to meet the criteria of scholarly research, they face the problem of distancing from the community, its doctrine, emotional involvement in church services, and rituals. Not taking into account the strictly musicological studies, one can note there is substantial research on the Russian Orthodox Church chant conducted in this manner. Russian researchers consistently view the tradition "from the inside," without attempting to alienate themselves, rather affiliating with it (see, for instance, Martynov 1994; 2000; Nozdrina 2014), seeing their mission in identifying and constructing spiritual ideals of the past and contemporaneity (Kozhaeva 2005).

The experience of the "renaissance" and popularization of the "forgotten" musical tradition is not exclusively Russian. During my analysis of academic sources, two cases came to light. The first is linked to the resuming of the Old Byzantine tradition and the other with the Gregorian tradition. Although the former is Orthodox and the latter is Catholic, I am interested in tracing of what unites them and, secondly, to indicate the peculiarities of the existing epistemology.

Byzantine monody

The study of Greek materials by a Danish researcher Tore Tvarnø Lind is, to a great extent, similar to my study. Lind, an ethnomusicologist, studies the revival of the pre-reform chanting tradition in the Vatopaidi monastery, under restoration since the early 1990s, on Mount Athos in Greece (Lind 2016). According to the adherents, the tradition in its meaning is idiosyncratic to the understanding of "the real" or "authentic."

⁷ In Russian, *chistota* stands for both purity and clarity (of intonation)—*Translator's note*.

Building on the essay by Eric Hobsbawm on the concept of the invention of tradition (1983), Lind demonstrates how the traditional is reconstructed by "cultural insiders." It is a whole project aiming at the revival of values of the past to restructure the symbolic field in the modern. The "real" traditional, on the one hand, is contraposed to the modern and, on the other hand, is one of its elements. In the same way, Lind sees a two-fold goal of the revival of the old tradition of spiritual music. First, a "revived" church service is seen as a cultural opposition to the dominating understanding of proper singing. Second, the existing culture is "improved" by the means of introducing the new meanings and appearance of new syncretic forms.

In the tradition of the revival project, which Lind studies, "the real" is implemented on various levels: the level of the perception of sound, notation, and the understanding of the theory of music. The mechanisms of the "reinvention" of the Byzantine style that make the choir sound "old" are the special techniques. These include performing chants according to a pre-reform *echos* system, using the classical intonational system and *ison* (*isokratima*), and including recently deciphered chants.

In Lind's case, one could see two layers of the development of chanting practice, one of which is related to the past and another to the present. In the context of the revival of the use of znamenny chant at church services or concerts, one can notice the same tendency. Speaking of znamenny chant, one often emphasizes the succession and, at the same time, its violation. The present exists as a continuation of the past and confronts it at the same time. Such a situation fits into the general image of contemporary religiosity at the postsecular time. In this discourse, the "traditionalist marking" is used to denote the new boundaries between "friends and foes" while, at the same time, for re-reading of the emergent normativity (Krylezhev 2004).

Gregorian chant

The discussion on Gregorian chant, originating around the 6th century, is much wider. A Gregorian monody is a Roman Catholic legacy. A treasury of this revived tradition is Solesmes Abbey (*Abbaye Saint-Pierre de Solesmes*) in France. Since the 19th century, Benedictine monks have worked on restoring Gregorian music, conducting research, and

publishing the "Études Grégoriennes" journal. Among other things, Gregorian studies constitute the brand of that place.⁸

A wide discussion around the historical study of musicologist Katherine Bergeron shows interest in this problem is quite big (see, for instance, McGee 1998; Pasler 1999). In her book "Decadent Enchantments: The Revival of Gregorian Chant at Solesmes" (1998), originated in her dissertation of 1989, Bergeron directly investigates the restoration of the chanting tradition. Inspired by a so-called "culture theory," Bergeron addresses musical materials questioning the ways history is "written" nowadays. She regards music as one of the components of monastery life. The way history documented, to a great extent, defines the present. That "present" is not the one in which Bergeron lives. Rather, it is the "present" of monk intellectuals of Solesmes.

Emma Dillon refers to the Bergeron's work in terms of medievalism⁹ (Dillon 1999). According to her, Bergeron's book is focused on documenting the history of the emergence of musicology, studies of medieval music, and discusses the contemporary understanding of medievalism of the 19th century. In the same review, she notes that the Bergeron's study allows for not merely reviving the history but, what is more important, seeing how it is modeled and how the "organization" of the study of the Middle Ages comes about in the present day.

In a certain sense, the optics of medievalism allows for examining the practices and ideologies concerned with znamenny chant. In my study, I have observed medievalists working with a medieval musical material. I am interested in how they work with meaning, form their take on the Middle Ages, and position themselves in contemporaneity.

To this point, I refer to the reminiscence of one of my informants who worked with Maksim Brazhnikov, a founder of the Department of Old-Russian chanting of the St. Petersburg Conservatory Albina Kruchinina:

⁸ An abbey's website provides evidence for that. Tourists and pilgrims can find useful information there: <http://www.solesmes.com/history> (accessed on May 20, 2017).

⁹ Medievalism is not a widespread term in the Russian research context. It includes the "images of the Middle Ages, scholarly and popular, existing in contemporaneity; and also institutions that produce them or use them, including literature, cinema, computer games, and, even, as some studies have shown, sport, health services (the images of diseases as "the plague of the 20th century"), fast-food restaurants, and so on" (Savitskii 2015). Hence, a medievalist is the one who produces medieval images.

Well, when I came to Maksim Viktorovich [...] like all that pretentious, you know. All filled with scientific innovations. And so, well, we sat and studied as usual; he was telling me about the manuscripts of the 12th century, and then he said: "I wish we could vocalize all that." I said: "Maksim Viktorovich..." This was exactly the time when all these science-fiction books just came out. Isaac Asimov, Clarke, all these, it's clear that... I said: "Maksim Viktorovich, could you imagine we had a time machine! We'd then go to the 12th century at once. We'd hear everything, write down, come back and we'd know how to decipher it."

He looked at me that way. He was all calm and collected. [So] he looked: "No, — he said, — I'm not going." I thought, well, such a retrograde! He doesn't want to go to the 12th century. So I said: "But why?" Well, he explained to me very nicely. "You see, — he said, — it is not that we do or we don't have the [time] machine. To understand what was there in the 12th century you need to restructure your worldview." Like that. "Besides, you need to restructure yourself." I said: "Well, we can change [our clothes]." He said: "Well, that's not the point. They will see us, dressed up, at once. They are going to kill us right away" (He laughed). I said: "Well, if not this way then like..." He said: "Besides, with our worldview, our perception, you know... — he said — We wouldn't like it, the way they used to sing. Because our ear is not used to it. And there's a great chance we wouldn't get what they did there. Moreover, — he said — when we come back we are going to forget everything. Hence, there's no sense in that. Our time machine is our manuscript." And that was it. Since then I dreamt of the time machine no more. That's what happened to me. "I wish I could..." (Interview 3)

In this interview, an informant exoticizes her own experience and the material she studied. Furthermore, a researcher is in constant seeking, attempting to define her own relation to the era she studies, and her relation to the Old-Russian chanting tradition. The practice of the immersion into a medieval data and its performance can be perceived as "re-reading," "renovation," "revitalization," or "restoration" of the medieval data. The modernist game with the past turns medieval studies into art or adventure.

Working with the community of enthusiasts and performers of *znamenny chant*, one can notice an archetypal "newest" history of the chant and ecclesiology in which it belongs. The reference point in its chronology is the first discoveries of the scholar of medievalism, Maksim Brazhnikov, that later allowed to significantly develop the study and performance of *znamenny chant*. The way this story is constructed is remarkable. In one

of the reconstructed and summarized versions I introduce further, I also describe the network of *znamenshchiki*, which I outlined during my field-work observations of the community.

Church in the late Soviet time and the interest of intelligentsia to the Old-Russian art

An attempt to combine the research topic with contemporary history is not simply a scholarly enterprise or formal contextual reference, rather it is a necessity. The narratives of some of my informants, especially the older generation, are directly linked to the historical realities, and, in a certain sense, they illustrate the revival of "museified image of religion in a social imagination" anew (Kormina and Shtyrkov 2015: 34). The contemporary "natives" of the *znamennaya* tradition intentionally construct the history of the revival of this chanting tradition, in which they to a certain extent, create their own alternative history of the contemporary ROC. Supposedly, this largely happens because of total dissatisfaction with the contemporary universal "strategy" of the ROC development.

Chronologically speaking and based on the interview material, I attempt to recreate a historical line that seems significant to these people. Taking into account the research limitations addressed by the methodology of oral history (Orlov 2014: 351; Portelli 2005), one can form an opinion about the events of the recent decades that are significant for the narrow circle of the popularizers of the chant.

In the second half of the 20th century, on the official level, the perception of the old ritual, in general, and *znamenny* chant, in particular, changed. On the one hand, this concerns the adherents of ROC, on the other, researchers and kulturträger from the intelligentsia – philologists, art historians, and historians, many of whom later enchurched. Organizing the "contemporary history" of *znamenny* chant, one can notice the close co-existence of the (institutionally) ecclesiastic and secular everydayness.

Remarkably, the "short 20th century"¹⁰ in Russia became the era of the scholars of medieval time. Maksim Brazhnikov's book on musical

¹⁰ The historiographical model of Eric Hobsbawn, who suggested a time frame starting from 1914 (the beginning of the First World War) until 1991 (the collapse of the Soviet Union) – *Translator's note*.

paleography, in which he suggested a thorough study of neums (Brazhnikov 1949), became central in this context. Besides a clear periodization of written artifacts and restoration of the chronology of the system of *znamena*, he actively deciphered chants. Gradually, he attracted many followers.

An interest to the unpopular (as my informants claim, Brazhnikov "wrote for the drawer") and even ideologically dangerous study of the church art was not very wide. Conversely, during the 1970s, the success of the singing laboratory "The experimental ensemble of the folk music" affiliated with the Folklore Commission of the Composers' Union of RSFSR, the "folk movement" was on the rise. The immersion into that discourse allowed for "[getting] rid of this ideologized prose," (Interview 3) i.e., escaping the Soviet reality through romanticizing and exoticizing the past.

Parallel to this tendency is the gradual restoration of the Old-Russian music, the music ensemble "Madrigal" of Andrei Volkonsky, and the performance and popularizing activities of the choir conductor Aleksander Yurlov. Remarkably, for the rehearsals of his choir, he was given the premises of the Church of the Protection of the Theotokos in Rubtsovo, Moscow (nowadays, a Patriarchate center for the Old-Russian liturgical tradition is located there). At that time, the most important task of the researchers and popularizers of Old-Russian culture was to break the stereotype that the Russian Middle Ages were the "time of silence." This enterprise was largely successful.

Everything that was not in line with the Soviet way of life naturally contradicted the common order of the Soviet everydayness. Choosing the Old-Russian spiritual music as a subject, researchers and performers involuntary went "underground," hiding their practices one way or another. They followed the Old Believers' narrative of "persecutions." Performers of *znamenny* chant within the ROC still appeal to it up to this day.

Parallel to the secular events, the Church revised its course too. One of the proceedings of the Local Council (*Pomestniy Sobor*) of June 2, 1971, was the revoking the anathemas on the Old Believers and their liturgy, which practically retracted the decision of the Big Moscow Council of 1667. Thus, it was a step towards the overcoming of the Raskol and, respectively, the legitimization of the Old Ritual. Remarkably, this decision is also used in the contemporary church as an argument for the appropriateness of the old chanting.

Nevertheless, for the last third of the 20th century, the law "On preservation and use of the national heritage" (*Ob okhrane i ispolzovanii pamiatnikov istorii i kultury*) of 1976 was much more significant than council proceedings. In formulating article two of the law – "The aims of the Soviet legislature concerning the preservation and use of the heritage" – there is a directive on "the ensuring of its preservation for the current and future generations, effective use for the scholarly research, and propaganda of this heritage for the communist education of the working [class]." Hence, the work on medieval musical materials and their present-day performance was represented in the context of the preservation of heritage, though sooner or later it ends up in the church discourse. Presumably, the whole generation of art historians shifted their interest from the "form" (the technique of documentation and performance of znamenny chant) to the "content" (the liturgical meaning of the church chanting). As for the current state, during my research I have not met anyone unchurched among the contemporary scholars of medieval period and Old Russian music performers.

It is helpful to come back to the metaphor used by Jeffers Engelhardt. The analytical model that he suggested allows for understanding that during Khrushchev's era "secular enchantment" was equal to the alienation from everydayness. That was the case because not all of intelligentsia in the late 20th century was, at least to some extent, familiar with the church, rather on the contrary. The trendiness of the archaic in this sense could be interpreted as a need to fill one's life with the ideology alternative to the Soviet one. This raises even bigger interest to contemporaneity.

In the post-Soviet time, when Russian spiritual music is no longer deprived of its religious connotations, but rather gets a full liturgical meaning¹¹ and is interpreted in the context of Holy Tradition, Engelhardt's "enchantment" takes place. Music (or audial accompaniment) in religious action is again perceived as a mediator and it has a synesthetic effect on humans (Florensky 1996; Chudinova 2003). If religion is a doctrine, primary narrative, ritual, sincere belief, as a manifestation of power, or as something transcendental, then music is just the channel

¹¹ It is necessary to note that performers and tradition bearers would not perceive znamenny chant as music. It is caused by the immediate purpose of the chant predefined by its function. Znamenny chant could not be separated from the prayer and, as my informants claim, it is a prayer.

of transmission: a style. The sound itself is a manifestation legitimized by religion. However, demonstrating a one-sided communication between religion and music is impossible. These two spheres are inseparable and define each other.

This leads to the following argument. From the standpoint of musical ideology, *Pravoslavie* (Orthodoxy) in Greek means "the right teaching." The pair to Orthodoxy is orthopraxy, meaning "the right practice." If chanting is right, then the belief expressed through this chanting is right; and if the belief is right then the musical practice manifested in this belief is right. If ritual and belief or experience and "pure heart" are separated then the idea of "right" chanting is destroyed, because liturgy is, at the same time, performative and it unifies everyone present at the church service. Orthodoxy and orthopraxy mutually define each other (Engelhardt 2014: 11-13).

Although, as I have previously noted, officially there is no issue with a split, *raskol*, on the level of discursive practices, there are frequent speculations on the mismatch of monody and widely spread polyphony. "A new raskol" is not a real threat, but rather a figure of speech denoting social tensions in the contemporary ROC. Znamenny chant hence is an argument in various discussions. Oftentimes, the restructuring of the contemporary church everydayness happens in pursuit of the restoration of some ritual social purity that the ROC lost in the Soviet period.

A network of *znamenshchiki* in St. Petersburg: The Conservatory

The biggest *znamenny* center of St. Petersburg is the Conservatory. Any member of the *znamenshchiki* community of St. Petersburg either graduated from, or studies in the Conservatory, or, at most, studies with the Conservatory alumnus. Such scholars of medievalism and *znamennye* choir conductors get their education at the Department of Old-Russian chanting, founded by Albina Kruchinina in 1994. Since then, she is a translator of certain values. First and foremost, a professional is expected to be highly qualified:

Our students should not be ivory tower (*vysokolobymi*) scholars who don't know anything but books and manuscripts. This would be useless. This would be a Western type of learning, education, and research. Like that. But our students should be able to sing by the hooks, be able to

lead the ensemble, be able to decipher, but also to be able not to use a cipher. [They] should know a bunch of hums – To attend classes on humanities, general humanities. Like, iconology, Old-Russian [language]...Church Slavonic language and literature, what else did we have then? The Greek language, Latin. Hymnography. Then we had poetics, vocal training, a course on conductor training. Well, and all complementary conservatory subjects. All courses on history – of Western music, Russian music, polyphony, harmony, analysis, solfeggio. Everything in the world. (Interview 3)

Naturally, these are not just words, because the students confess the workload oftentimes is unbearable and requires total dedication to graduate at the Department. The Department itself stands out, for in the Conservatory "those in headscarves" are not understood. Kruchinina claims, "Our conservatory people do not like the Orthodox girls." The educational program is in demand, although not high. Oftentimes during the lectures, there are more externs (including also priests and monks) than students, although not because of skipping classes but rather because of limited admissions. The applicants, who first encounter the chant in the Church of Optina Pustyn' in St. Petersburg, and alumni are not numerous.

The whole subject of medieval studies is filled with "Russianness":

It is an authentic Russian national tradition. And if we want the Russian culture, Russian music to sound in the Russian church, then it is the Old-Russian chant. You see? It all depends on priorities. If we are the so-called cosmopolites, if we [...] run to the West, then praise be (*ispolat'*), sing this...Gregorian, I beg your pardon, Protestant chorale, you can put a pump organ there, and in the end even musical instruments, and jazz, and everything you want. It is, you see, a matter of choice. Who are we? If we are Russians, we should sing Russian music in church. If we are citizens of the world, then sing what you want.

I believe it's a matter of choice, after all. It is a question of one's national identity. The most important question. (Interview 3)

The contraposition to the West, seeking for and preserving an individual style, this is what is valued. Nevertheless, oddly enough, a "national project" goes along with the interest in experimentation:

You know, in Europe, I don't know how it is now, but the times when I started all this... Every year, there were these [summer] schools of church chanting organized. Either in Poland, or in Italy, or in Czech

[Republic], or somewhere else. Catholic schools. Well. And of course, it would be interesting to find such a school to introduce different singing traditions. So that a bearer of every tradition could teach representatives of other cultures. That would be great. That would be a true ecumenical liturgy. But I think it's so far... Nowadays, at least, it's like...a fantasy. It's impossible to put into practice. It's impossible due to these our divisions *po kvartirkam* (each in their own apartment). Yet, maybe someday it will be. (Interview 3)

Such an idea seems quite voluntary. "An ecumenical liturgy" even as an experimental project with Russia's participation is hardly possible within the domain of the contemporary canonical church. The reason for it being impossible is not even the abovementioned "division *po kvartirkam*," but rather the unpreparedness of the society, which still vividly remembers a recent negative experience of the past (Borisov 1994) and fears the accusation and stigmatization (Mitrokhin 2007).

A separate issue that needs to be examined concerning the activities of the Conservatory is the organization of the Conservatory church, which could serve as a sort of a training field for the newly grown *znamenshchiki* choir conductors. A graduate of the Department, an ordained priest Father Vitalii (Golovatenko), was offered to lead the reconstruction of the Conservatory Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Theotokos (the last service before 1996 was held in 1923). At present, the church does not operate regularly because of the unavailability of premises. When possible, the services are held in different parishes.

Nevertheless, despite the unstable position, the community that formed since the church existed remains. This community for the church presbyter was exactly the values that, according to him, are completely lost in the contemporary ROC.¹² On the parish website, one can find a list of the active parishioners. The role of *znamenny* chant, in this case, is quite transparent. Apart from the services serving as practice for students (this fact remains in the background), the chant is one of the instruments that allows for serving the liturgy right, i.e., all together, congregationally:

¹² According to Sergei Filatov, the formation of contemporary church communities that can act "as a subject of civil society" is a rare phenomenon that happens because of the activity of a charismatic leader (Filatov 2005).

The main thing is that everyone, everyone participates in that. So that nobody is an audience or a listener, but everyone is a participant. This is that old syncretism of art, every art, when there is no audience, listeners, and performers. All are together. All together. [...] The main thing is, who needs this "together" nowadays? These days everyone is together with gadgets. [...] I'm not laughing, because I see that it's already happening, the people are living apart. They exist together, but each one has their own gadget. So that...now, well, now it's already actual – do we need to be together at all, maybe it's easier to parish alone than together? (Interview 4)

People perish when alone, but get saved together, according to Father Vitalii's logic. However, in the modern world, people do not want to come together, remain in solitude, and perish. Apart from a communal singing, Gospel readings are organized in the Church.¹³ The unique characteristic of the parish is a symbolic remembrance of "the servants of God perfected (*prosiavshikh*) as Russian church singers." A *sinodik* (book of remembrance) was most probably also compiled by a presbyter. The history of the Church goes on and is to be developed further.

Yet another case indirectly linked to the Conservatory concerns the ensemble "Kluch razumeniia" in Fedorovsky church. While seeking the venue for rehearsals, a leader of the ensemble asked the Church presbyter and he agreed. In a short time, the Church hosted the first *znamennye* services. In a personal communication, a presbyter called the event (*znamennye* services, periodical performances of the ensemble, and the start of the *znamennaya* school in the Church¹⁴) a coincidence, but there was a certain logic behind this "coincidence." Fedorovsky Church is consistently positioned as an educational center, promoting the diversity of Christian culture. These activities, thus, often go beyond popularization in the framework of ROC canons. In this sense, this is the realization of the ecumenical project that Kruchinina was talking about. The parishioners familiarize themselves, for instance, with Byzantine and Serbian chanting cultures, immerse in them, and seek unity in Christianity without borders.

¹³ A communal reading as an element of "rational belief" is interpreted as a characteristic of the modernist project (Agadjanian 2011). This case can be regarded as analogous for it fits the Agadjanian's typology.

¹⁴ Professional researchers among *znamenshchiki* oftentimes educate enthusiasts. First, they see their moral obligation in doing so. Second, they henceforth popularize knowledge.

An alternative to Conservatory

Outside of the St. Petersburg Conservatory, the centers of the local communities more or less became other educational institutions or *znamenny* chant study groups that were ran by Conservatory alumni or ex-students.

During my communication with the curator of the study program "Russian singing art" at the Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities (RCAH) and further tracing the activities of Ekaterina Matveeva on social media, I noted how Old Russian culture, and *znamenny* chant in particular, became a business project material. Most probably, the project is not profitable, yet it demands marketing and skillful promotion.

The study program is for four years, there is a tuition fee, and it is taught at a bachelor level. The studies start from "the very roots," namely from the hooks. At the same time, for instance, at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, the students are not taught about that era at all¹⁵ (earlier, in the Interview 1, Natalia told me the same). It is implied that the students of RCAH eventually choose their own style of work – monody or polyphony. Therefore, as in the last case I analyzed, *znamenny* chant is one of many possible styles. Importantly, in RCAH, the students are taught to choose. The key difference of the "Russian singing art" from studies in the Conservatory is that it is focused on teaching practice, but not research.

Besides the administrative and teaching duties at RCAH, Ekaterina also runs a School for Vocal Mastery "*Vse pojut!*" (Everybody sings!), several other temporary projects (for instance, a family eco-camp of the same school¹⁶), she constantly gives concerts, and directs a choir in one of the parishes in a St. Petersburg suburb. An energetic young woman, she is sincerely affectionate towards folk singing, cantus poetry, and *znamenny* chant. However, she is good at converting her affections into profit, indicating the existing "trends," like the interest of a certain public to the old times, nature, children, and healthy lifestyle.

¹⁵ "I haven't encountered [*znamenny* chant] in my studies. In the practical course on church chanting, we only dealt with contemporary Octoechos (*osmoglasie*). In the theoretical course on church chanting, only with icon painting and architecture" (Interview 5).

¹⁶ This is a camp for parents and children. In its advertisement, the emphasis is put not only on singing, but also on "closeness to nature." Amongst additional attractors, there are eco-farm, yoga, and folk games. In this context, there is an environmentalist narrative.

The other local communities of znamenny chant enthusiasts in St. Petersburg are formed, as a rule, in educational institutions, besides the Conservatory and RCAH. The classes are held practically in every *znamenny* church by professionals, the Conservatory alumni, or their enthusiast students. For example, this applies to the Church of the Icon of the Theotokos *Vsekh Skorbyashchikh Radost'* (Joy of All Who Sorrow) and Church of the Icon of the Theotokos *Derzhavnaya* (The reigning one). On the same principle, the parish of Andronikov Monastery of the Savior in Moscow acts. The number of students can vary; yet, there is commonly a "core" of constant attendants. The learning process lasts for years, which requires a high level of discipline from the students. Sometimes, some of the chanters end up in a choir accidentally, and, at some point, they realize they are being taught to chant znamenny. However, some intentionally wanted to chant znamenny. Commonly, these are the members of the churches where the chant is used. Such activities are a form of leisure.

Notably, this year, there has been a pilgrimage to Serbia organized at the Fedorovsky Church for the study group of enthusiasts. The chanters conducted *znamennye* services during their visits to Serbian monasteries. Such an unusual "product" was suggested by the head of the *Znamennaya* School of the Church, a teacher Natalia Mosyagina.

A monastic culture

Besides the educational centers, the *znamennye* churches in St. Petersburg, as I have noted before, belong to monasteries. The ideologists of znamenny chant face, maybe not always consciously, a problem of raising "a new Orthodox person." Sometimes, a conflict with the "post-Soviet" Orthodox Christianity is articulated. As a rule, those who consciously engage in znamenny chant do not approve of the direction towards the secularization of the Church and simplification of religion.

Some informants associate znamenny chant with "spiritual things" and monastic life; hence, they perceive it as celestial. According to their perceptions, a spiritual experience, as well as a chanting tradition, is reconstructed by the books. Those who feel the need of reading the books (and "most of these books are written for the monks" – Interview 8) and sing old chants position their activities as elite. *Znamenny* choir conductor and chanter realize that they hold the first stage of priest-

hood and treat their spiritual pursuits with full responsibility. The contemporary populism and "pleasing the men" (*chelovekougodie*) (in the form of chanting in a usual form) can be regarded critically by them.

The work on forming the image (and contents) of the monastic culture that do not "make one feel ashamed," according to my informants, is going to take decades. Znamenny chant, as one of the instruments of disciplining the parishes, could help with the renovation. In this context, monody plays the role of "non-mainstream" culture. Henceforth, znamenny chant is rather a local landmark. If a pilgrim wants to hear unforgettable chanting, they can visit, for instance, a Valaam or Optina Pustyn Church in St. Petersburg.

Znamenshchiki in Moscow, a *edinoverie* project

According to my research materials, the structure of the local *znamenshchiki* communities in Moscow is different from the St. Petersburg ones. Naturally, thanks to their lower number, the activities of the staff of the Moscow Conservatory are less visible than those of their colleagues in St. Petersburg. On top of that, speaking of the practice of znamenny chant, special attention is attracted by a group of believers, not isolated, but integrated into the community of the ROC, Moscow Patriarchate. Firstly, the institutionalization of this community allows this as a result of the establishment of the Patriarchate's center for the Old-Russian worship tradition, oriented towards a dialogue. Secondly, my acquaintance with the community of Father Georgii (Krylov), a presbyter of the Church of New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia in Strogino, played an important role in my research. The community holds both new and Old Ritual services. This *edinoverie* (common faith) project presupposes the restoration of the Old Ritual and its reproduction and ends up in a dialogue with the New Ritual.

The specificity I managed to indicate while talking to contemporary *edinoverie* people is that some of them motivate their recent conversion to the Old Belief precisely with their adherence to the Old Russian chanting culture.¹⁷ This movement may be seen as a group of authenticists, not merely familiar with the specificities of musical performance,

¹⁷ "I'm from the other end at all. I mean, I'm from the Nikonian writing [tradition]... From the usual environment, New Ritual. Then, when I started znamenny chanting, already then, 'That's what I should sing. Why wasting time? (*Chego vsukhuju zanimat'sia?*)'" (Interview 6)

but also capable of a competent historical analysis and versed in the smallest historical details of the old time.

One could assume that the adherents of *edinoverie* – including professional conductors and chanters – are conservators. However, this is far from the truth. Not all of them politicize their activities striving for the restoration of the high medieval culture. Not all adherents with whom I managed to communicate during my fieldwork tend to discredit the contemporaneity or wish to arrange their lives according to traditional values.

Nevertheless, a discussion on proper reciting of liturgical texts and their performance is, to a certain extent, still heated for a long time. It is as heated as the discussion on the use of the Old Church Slavonic language, Bible translations, and texts of the Holy Tradition (see Bennett 2011: 64).

A concert version of znamenny chant

During contemporary concerts of the Old Church music, chanting ensembles perform both liturgical and paraliturgical music. The latter includes the kinds of music that do not belong in the liturgy, i.e., spiritual poetry.

Conditionally speaking, the concerts could be divided into academic and folk ones, which are mostly indicated by the "origin" of the groups performing znamenny chant. In reality, the style is formed not institutionally but rather based on the erudition and experience of chanters. The academic ones include the ensembles founded at the Moscow and St. Petersburg Conservatories, such as, "Asmatikon" (Moscow), "Kluch razumeniia," "Znameniiie," and "Lik," which consists of students and teachers of RCAH (St. Petersburg). Amongst the folk and experimental ones, there are "Sirin" (Moscow), "Drevnerusskii raspev" (Moscow), "Ex libris" (Moscow), "Eleon" (St. Petersburg), "Uzorika" (St. Petersburg), "Put'" (St. Petersburg), and so on.

The concerts of the singing groups from the Conservatories are primarily the outcome of laboratory work. They are focused on the presentation of the scholarly reconstruction to the wider audience, and their additional function is that of enlightenment. Every performance is followed by commentaries, sometimes with just a few, sometimes more

detailed to clarify the liturgical meaning of chants.¹⁸ Above that, along with the musicological commentary, concluding the Great Feast concert of "Kluch razumenia," Kruchinina explicitly stated the ideological context that she put in the performance of *znamenny* chant:

So, before I let our chanters perform this piece, I want to tell you that you have heard and will further hear melodies of amazing beauty and soulfulness, and of prayer spirit. And they should be performed not only in concert programs but also in worship services in all churches of Russia. And then, I believe, Russia will rise from her knees and revive again for the high, spiritual, [and] pure life.

In these words, there is powerful patriotism, and the contemporary state of the country is regarded as unsatisfactory. Old Russian music as an element of orthopraxy is capable of reviving Russia. Attributable to the relative shortness of this remark, it is impossible to trace the metaphorical death of the country. However, presumably, she referred to the pre-Revolution time.

In the repertoire of "Asmatikon," there are simultaneously *znamenny* and Byzantine chants, which is reflected in their style. The ensemble participants base their reconstruction on the materials of scholarly expeditions to the female monasteries of mainland Greece, archival entries, and theoretical guidelines of Byzantine chanting of different times.¹⁹ An academic style is characteristic of "Znamenie," while "Kluch razumenia" and "Luch" are more "folk" because their participants also work with the "live" tradition. Notably, the chanters of both ensembles have participated (and keep participating) in the master classes of Andrey Kotov, a founder of "Sirin," folklorist, and choir conductor.

¹⁸ Natalia Mosyagina explained why church chants are not appropriate for concerts, yet singing for the wider audience is a necessity:

I don't really like concerts. It's an enlightenment function, we have to perform it, yes. But I don't really like concerts, because this tradition is not for concerts. And, respectively, there is something false on scene, because in any case you try to make the best of it (*kakuju-to konfetku*). Again, I'm not saying that during the church service you can sing carelessly or somehow unprofessionally (Interview 1).

¹⁹ According to the description on the website of the Home Church of St. Martyr Tatiana (at Moscow State University): <http://st-tatiana.ru/2015/09/24/10087> (accessed April 20, 2017).

Undoubtedly, Kotov is one of the central figures for the certain group of *znamenshchiki*, primarily the "non-academic" ones. He inherited a tradition of Dmitry Pokrovskii and is well versed in the contemporary history of *znamenny* chant; he even became a part of it. He started off "like an enthusiast" and then "I longed for, I wanted to revive an Old Russian culture, well...with the Old Russian polyphony." Largely, because of his openness and frequent contacts with an academic community (Kruchinina, Vladyshevskaya) and with his colleagues—folklorists, collectors, composers, and popular musicians (Sergei Starostin, Vladimir Martynov, Leonid Fedorov)—he managed to create his own style, to put together a network of interested professionals.

Despite the substantial immersion into *znamennaya* culture and tight connections of his activities with the Church, Kotov sees himself as thinking beyond the framework of church experience. For him, as a concert performer of folk music, his creative aspirations and an ambition to create a performance, interesting for him and his audience, come forward. The chant for him is a great creative material.

Imagine you have a very well-preserved granny's robe in your closet that fits you very well. It suits you perfectly. Like that. You go outside and have it on you, don't you? You have a different relation to it, not like any other clothes. Don't you? And people refer to you not like you were in modern clothes. What's more, it is well preserved. And it functions. Yet, it is not what it used to be when a granny wore it. That's pretty much like it is with *znamenny* chant (Interview 7).

One can see in this case that the performer does not want to make the chant authentic. *Znamenny* text is, in some sense, a field for the author's interpretations, experiments, and self-expression. A similar way is chosen by colleagues of Kotov, a composer Aleksander Manotskov ("Eleon"), RCAH lecturer Andrey Fofonov, and a participant of numerous singing projects Daniil Sayapin, a researcher of *demessvenny* chant and leader of the "Ex libris" ensemble. The activities of such ensembles could be regarded from the positions of medievalism (Yri 2008). During the concerts, there is an imitation of medieval music, and for the construction of specific images, the elements of ethnic music of different peoples are used. This experience fits well into the context of the "World music" projects (Connell and Gibson 2004).

Among the ensembles performing folklore and exclusively znamenny chants, "Sirin" is an undoubted leader. Furthermore, it embraces many autonomous projects with similar esthetic and ideological foundations.

As we can see, the "concert mode" of the performance of znamenny chants serves several purposes. This format allows the demonstration of the academic research results or a graduation concert. A lecture concert equally serves for enlightenment and performance. Naturally, such events are a heritage of the Soviet era (Raku 2016). The performance of znamenny chant can be regarded as contemporary art that goes beyond the church life, and as good experimentation material.

Conclusion

A response to the question of why znamenny chant as an element of Old Russian culture has not disappeared in history, but ended up in church and even on stage, could be found in its reconstructed genealogy. In the Soviet time, working with medieval materials, preserving the neumatic writings of znamenny chant, was the way, as Aleksander M. Panchenko put it, "to emigrate to the Old Rus" (Panchenko 2005) from the Soviet reality. Nowadays, the chant, in some sense, refers to the alternative church life. Not every priest is willing to conduct a *znamennaya* liturgy. To do this, first, one should be familiar with znamenny chant (not every priest has studied it in the Church History course), second, respective performance and audial skills (an introduction of znamenny chant leads to a whole range of difficulties). One can see that znamenny chant often blossoms in the circles of creative intelligentsia. Its performance can be regarded as a way to establish the boundaries of small groups that embrace those who are capable of comprehending Old Russian music or those who can read neumatic notation. Such communities, oftentimes informal, can oppose both the secular world and "mass" Orthodox Christianity.

An Old Russian monody (or whatever is positioned as such nowadays) can be heard at services in Orthodox churches, concerts of chanting ensembles that perform folk songs, and amongst the scholars of the Middle Ages, who have founded several research centers and laboratories in the recent decades.

The performance of znamenny chant as a social phenomenon could be interpreted differently in various contexts. Thus, the use of spiritual

pieces based on the Old Russian musical monodic tradition as a part of a standard church service in the New Ritual parish can be regarded as a reference to the "roots." In the case when *znamennye* chants are the only ones in the repertoire of the parish choir, this phenomenon may be seen as a deviance from the standards of contemporary worship service. Hence, the performance of *znamennaya* liturgy instead of other more contemporary versions can be considered as something counter-cultural. Such a state of affairs can be motivated with striving to get away from the "Phantasy Rus" (*susal'naia Rus'*) and form a different image of contemporary Orthodox Christianity. At the same time, not as a counter-argument, one may aim at the reconstruction of the images of Old Russian asceticism (*podvizhnichestvo*), made obsolete by the events of several centuries of the Russian Church.

The study of the contemporary state of *znamenny* chant within the ROC, Moscow Patriarchate, attracted my attention to the existence of numerous communities of *edinovertsy* and those who consider themselves *edinovertsy*. *Edinovertsy*, along with scholars and New Ritualists, express their position within the community of *znamenshchiki* of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This relatively small group, as I can judge by the collected materials, is more than others concerned with authenticity of the performed chanting material (that is why, in this environment, there is a question of, for instance, the use of pre-Reform texts). A quest for "authenticity" largely legitimizes and explains the existence of *edinoveriye*. The case of *edinovertsy* is qualitatively different from other cases by the fact that Old Ritual service is impossible without the use of *znamenny* chant.

One more context in which *znamenny* chant is used could be referred to church art. The performances of the folklore collectors and folk and spiritual musicians reproduce the Old Russian music and they get inspired by it when composing their own music, incorporating the fragments of *znamennaya* monody. By the means of using *znamenny* chant, they construct and communicate the image of Russian Middle Ages.

The contemporary culture of *znamenny* chant is not homogeneous. There are many different readings. The typology of situations in which *znamenny* chant is used shows that chanting can become an attribute of various practices and ideological messages. The development of this topic is linked to the widening and deepening of any given cases: a monastery church parish, contemporary *edinoverie*, or ensembles of

spiritual music. One should, however, expect that more attention to an ethnographic material would open new perspectives. On the one hand, it would allow for distancing oneself from the discussion on the chant. On the other hand, it would enable the conversation on the specificities of contemporary church life.

Translated by Igor Mikeschin.

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List of interview materials

Interview 1 – Natalia Mosyagina, a professor in St. Petersburg Conservatory, an art director of the "Kluch razumeniia" ensemble, St. Petersburg.

Interview 2 – Aleksander, a conductor of the choir of the Church of Optina Pustyn' in St. Petersburg.

Interview 3 – Albina Kruchinina, a founder of the Department of Old-Russian chanting of the St. Petersburg Conservatory.

Interview 4 – Father Vitalii (Golovatenko), a presbyter of the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Theotokos in the St. Petersburg Conservatory.

Interview 5 – A student of St. Petersburg Theological Academy and Seminary.

Interview 6 – Veronika Grigorieva, a docent at St. Tikhon's Orthodox University, precentor of the Church of the Protection of the Theotokos in Rubtsovo.

Interview 7 – Andrey Kotov, a leader of the "Sirin" ensemble.

Interview 8 – Gleb Pechenkin, a founder of the Society of znamenny chant enthusiasts named after St. Job, precentor of a church choir, popularizer of znamenny chant.



Orthodox Christianity in the Islamic Context of Post-Soviet Uzbekistan: Religious Consciousness and Traditions

Yulia Tsyryapkina

**A theoretical and conceptual approach to studying "Russians" in
post-Soviet Central Asia**

The nation-building processes and forming of new identities in Central Asia during three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union are actively discussed within scholarly and expert communities. Most of this research is dedicated to forming new national identities, de-russification, rejecting the Soviet legacy, and, to a lesser extent, the legal standing of the Russian population, which appeared to be the biggest minority demographically, having substantial intellectual, cultural, and economic potential. Most published works on Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia is dedicated to analyzing the situation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where their share in the ethnic and demographic structure of the population is the most significant.

After Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has been considered the most closed post-Soviet republic in the informational and expert discourse. The "Russian question", as well as any other considerations on ethnicity and minorities in independent Uzbekistan, seemed quite sensitive because a new model of republican identity was adapted, the one resembling a late Soviet form of a nation-state (Daudov et al. 2018: 155), in the value hierarchy of which the "secularity" of the state promoting a harmony of social, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious relations was most emphasized.

This explains the fact that there were quite a few published works on ethno-demographic and ethno-social development of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The Republican authorities authorized the publishing of monographs and articles that communicated the official position concerning the inter-ethnic situation in the country (Murtazaeva 2010; Saipova 2015). The key message of such publications is concerned with the harmonic development of all ethnic groups in Uzbekistan, tolerance, and inter-ethnic concord that formed in the republic throughout the first years of independence.

Russians as a specific ethno-cultural group of the Uzbek society remained "in the shade." Most of the publications about them shifted towards the ethno-political discourse (Arutyunyan 2003). Even fewer works had an analysis of the important changes that occurred in the sphere of self-identification of Russians in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and of the seeking of their place in "nationalizing" Uzbek society (Abdullaev 2007; Tsyryapkina 2015a). In the last 20-30 years, there were no works published on the ethnography or anthropology of the everyday rituals of the Russian population of Uzbekistan, or on the dynamics of their cultural and religious traditions. Partly, this is related to the fact that Russians in Uzbekistan do not form a homogenous ethnic unity. They could hardly be indicated as an ethnographic group; hence, they are mostly indicated as the Russian-speaking population, which also includes Tatars, Koreans, Germans, Jews, and a part of an indigenous population of the republic that shares "European" sociocultural identity through the Russian language (Abdullaev 2007: 18). It is also important to consider that among the youth population of Russians in Uzbekistan, there is a high percentage of marriages and unions mixed ethnically and religiously, which makes identification in terms of ethnicity or affiliation with Orthodox Christianity or Islam difficult.

According to the official statistics, on the 1st of January 2018, of 32,656,660 residents of Uzbekistan, 739,684 (2.3%) were Russians (Statistics Uzbekistan 2019). In the last 28 years, the number of Russians more than halved, which also means a decline in the Orthodox population, because the life of Orthodox Christianity in the republic is historically linked to the demographic and factual presence of Russians. Orthodoxy is one of the forms of Russian-speaking Christianity and one of the ethno-cultural markers of Russians.

The development of Orthodox Christianity in post-Soviet Uzbekistan has not been systematically studied, with an exception of some publications (Statsenko 2010; Ryazantsev and Podlesnaya 2018). The specificity of the contemporary state of Orthodox Christianity in post-Soviet Uzbekistan has not yet become an object of a substantial anthropological study. The complexity of this research problem calls for an interdisciplinary approach and new data, namely, interviews and observations of parish priests, churchgoers, laymen, and common people. This chapter is based on published and unpublished sources stored in the Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Central 1-2), the Archive of Tashkent, and the Central Asian Eparchial Department (Eparchy 1-4). I also build on fieldwork materials, collected in 2012-2015 and 2019. The materials on specificities of a parish life of Orthodox believers, attitudes toward Orthodox Christianity, and its rites were collected as a part of the research program on the ethnocultural specificities of Russians in Uzbekistan in the 20th-early 21st century.¹ In total, 85 semi-structured interviews were collected with Russian-speaking residents of Uzbekistan. Among the interlocutors, there were self-identified Russians, Tatars, Germans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Koreans, and so on. During those years, I conducted five field trips in various cities and towns of Uzbekistan. Most of the respondents — thirty-seven — were interviewed in Angren (Tashkent region), twenty-four in Tashkent, nineteen in Fergana, five in Almalyk (Tashkent region), and one in Kagan (12 kilometers from Bukhara).

The historical context of Orthodox Christianity in Uzbekistan

Orthodox Christianity first appeared in the territory of contemporary Uzbekistan during the colonization of Turkestan (governorate-general of Turkestan of the Russian Empire) in the second half of the 19th century. Since the beginning of the colonization, Russian settlers had a unique position in the region, which impacted the formation of their sociocultural specificities. Analyzing various documentary

¹ The research is a part of two grants: The Presidential grant "МК-2516.2013.6" titled "'Русские' в Центральной Азии: особенности этнокультурных процессов в конце XX — начале XXI веков (на примере Казахстана и Узбекистана)", and the Russian Foundation for the Humanities grant # 13-31-01277/13 titled "Русскоязычные Узбекистана в 2000-е годы: этнокультурные процессы в условиях 'национализирующегося' государства (на примере Ангрена и Ферганы)."

sources on the Russian colonization of Turkestan in the late 19th-early 20th century, the following sociocultural features of the Russian society could be indicated: adherence to Orthodox Christianity, separate enclaves in the newly built settlements or a "Russian part" of the cities of Turkestan, alienation and non-consolidation of settlers, and "European" identity of the Russian settlers in Turkestan.

According to the "Statute for the Administration of Turkestan" of 1886, which set the rules for settling in the region, the Russian administration of Turkestan paid much attention to the settlers' religion – Orthodox Christianity. Predominantly Russian rural dwellers of the *Orthodox confession* were allowed to settle in Turkestan. The settlers were given pieces of free state lands according to the capacity of a particular locality, but no more than ten *desyatinas* (approximately 2 hectares) per worker (Palen 1910: 181). According to the 1897 census in the Syr-Darya region of Turkestan, the share of the Orthodox Christian population was 2.86%, Old Believers 0.19%, Catholics 0.2%, Protestants 0.13%, and other Christians 0.01% (Census 1905). Among the incoming population, Orthodox Christians were the majority.

Russian settlers from different regions of the Russian Empire, with different dialects and accents, household practices, traditions, and mentalities could most successfully consolidate around their belonging to the Orthodox community. Orthodox Christianity, as a state religion in the Russian Empire, connected settlers to the state in Turkestan, which was predominantly populated by an indigenous Muslim population (Tsyryapkina 2015b).

Besides Orthodox Christians, Turkestan was settled by limited groups of Protestants and Old Believers who mostly inhabited Transcaspia and Semirechye, though some of them also got to the major regions – Syr-Darya, Fergana, and Samarkand. In the Syr-Darya region, there was a notable case of Molokans who found a separate settlement in Tashkent county (*uezd*). State officials from Turkestan reported that Molokans, as a specific group of Russians, had stable and well-organized households. Molokans rejected Orthodox rites and considered eating pork and drinking alcohol sinful, which positively distinguished them among the Orthodox settlers. In Tashkent county, there were villages, where "Old Believers, Molokans, Baptists, Subbotniks, Jehovah's [Witnesses], and also adherents of teachings of L. N. Tolstoy" (Central 1: 46) lived together with Orthodox Christians.

Comparing the household practices of Protestants and Orthodox Christians, state officials acknowledged that the latter were less successful than "sectarians" in terms of morals and settlement economy. The major reason for that was an agrarian tension in European Russia that forced peasants with few or no lands to move while having only scarce resources they could get from selling their tools.

Despite that Molokans and Old Believers were Russians and were substantially more successful in their households, a military governor of the Syr-Darya region, Lieutenant General Mikhail Romanov, in 1910 reported to the Governor-General of Turkestan: "...sectarians...are not wanted in the region, for they do not merely lack one of the substantial elements of connection of the region with the State — *religion*, — but the closeness of their religion weakens even their tribal connections with the main mass of the Russian population" (Central 1: 46 — backside; the emphasis is mine). Later, in the 1910s, the authorities' attitude to the non-Orthodox Russian settlers changed towards greater tolerance and settling sectarians and Orthodox Christians in the region on common ground; yet, the principles of the migration policies did not change. From the economic point of view, German Lutheran and Russian Protestant households were more successful. However, the state supported the settlement of Orthodox Russians, thus attempting to consolidate a diverse Russian community by means of the state religion in a Muslim periphery of the Russian Empire.

Every Orthodox settler was automatically considered a Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) member. In 1871, the Turkestan and Tashkent Eparchy was established. From 1872 on, the Turkestan Eparchy operated in the city of Vernyi (now Almaty) with the arrival of Archbishop Sofoniia Sokolsky. In the settlements, houses of prayers were built and along with the improvement of the economic state, the communities could afford the construction of a church. Sometimes, a house of prayer hosted churchgoers from neighboring villages. A rare example of a church building constructed by the first Russian settlers is a late 19th-early-20th-century church in Kaufmanskoie, Tashkent county, Syr-Darya region of Turkestan, (now Derbisek, Saryagash county, Turkestan region of the Republic of Kazakhstan) preserved to this day. It is important to note that Orthodox Christianity was the most important identity marker of the Russian population in Turkestan, which was defined by the Empire and was a sort of a license to settle in the region.

In the Soviet period, because of sociopolitical changes, there was a transformation of identity markers of Russians. In the context of the state atheism as a cultural and moral policy of the Soviet government, Orthodox Christianity lost its significance as a religion for most Russians. The newly emerged identity markers of Russians became ethnic self-identification, fluency in the Russian language, sociopolitical "extra-territorial status," and "European" sociocultural identity.

Ethnicity became instrumental for Russians in the Soviet time; the children of mixed marriages were, most of the time, registered as "Russian." In any Soviet republic, even where the Russian population was low (as in Uzbek Republic), Russians felt free to use their native language and they were even more confident because of the operation of state institutions in Russian. Norwegian researcher Pål Kolstø defined this phenomenon as an "extra-territorial status" (Kolstø 1999: 613). Accordingly, in the USSR for all groups, excluding Russians, ethnicity (*natsionalnost*) was territorialized. In the Soviet time, Russians retained a "European" sociocultural identity, which, according to a researcher of Kyrgyzstan Natalia Kosmarskaya, essentially meant that "members of 'European' ethnic groups were united by a common historical fate and the roles they play in ethno-cultural contacts with indigenous groups" (Kosmarskaya 1999: 217). She fairly indicates the "European roots...of the worldview of the 'children of the empire' of different generations and migration waves who ended up in the East" (Ibid). Partly these claims were supported by an interview with A. from Fergana, a 64-year-old Russian teacher who holds the idea of a special mission of Russians in integration with European culture: "...European literature entitled Russians to feel European, hence we adopted this mission here; we did not merely institute within the local population some part of the civilizational, well, material culture, a medicinal one, but gave them an ability to feel European, introduced them to the external progress..." (Interview 13)

An Uzbek researcher and philosopher, Evgenii Abdullaev, indicates the characteristics of "Europeanness" of Russians in Uzbekistan, including an urban lifestyle, fluency in a European language (Russian in the case of Uzbekistan) and orientation to Western standards and values revealed in a greater individualism and criticism rather than characteristic of an autochthonous population of the region (Abdullaev 2007: 19). In the Soviet time, a "European" cultural identity was formulated as a

culture of a "big brother" and became a factor of legitimization in the discourse of the construction of Soviet identity around the Russian language. As I have observed, currently, a "European" identity of Russians and Uzbeks, especially the young generation, is revealing itself in their leaning to European values, European and Russian music, literature, dress, style, manners, and so on.

The Soviet period was the hardest for Orthodox Christianity. The Soviet state of the 1920s-1930s declared atheism as one of its goals. Orthodox Christians faced such challenges as the split during the Renovationist movement, the demolition of churches and cathedrals (in the 1930s in Tashkent, the Church of St. Sergius of Radonezh, the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, and Spaso-Preobrazhenskii [Transfiguration] Military Cathedral were demolished), and a reduction in the number of Orthodox parishes. All these led to a decrease in Orthodox believers and lowered the significance of Sunday and other Orthodox festivities. For instance, in the 1920s-1930s, a working day was organized on Easter Sundays and the weekend moved to Monday (Central 2: 10).

During and after the Great Patriotic War, the attitude of Soviet authorities towards Orthodox Christianity softened. In the cities that had big Orthodox cathedrals in the pre-revolution period, the Soviet government authorized the opening of parishes under the control of the Uzbek branch of the council for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church affiliated with the Council of Ministers of the USSR. According to a 1948 annual report on Tashkent and the Central Asian parish, in Tashkent, there was an active Uspenskii Cathedral, Aleksandr Nevsky cemetery church, and house of prayer of the Holy Trinity. Tashkent diocese included churches and houses of prayer in Yangiyul, Mirzachul, and rural areas next to Tashkent. In Samarkand diocese, there was a Pokrovsky cathedral and two houses of prayer in Samarkand, Jizzakh, Kattakurgan, and Kagan. In Fergana diocese, as of 1948, there was a St. Sergii church (opened in the building of the Polish church in 1946), Kazan church in Kokand, houses of prayer in Andijan and Namangan, and Kazan house of prayer in Termez (Eparchy 1). As for the human resources of Orthodox parishes, as of January 1, 1960, most of the priests were born between the 1880s and 1910s; they matured in the post-Revolution period and during the split of Renovationism. In 1960, only a small group of young preachers (born in the 1930s) was affiliated

with Uspensky Cathedral in Tashkent, including Deacon Pavel Adelgeim (1938-2013) (Eparchy 2), who would later become known for his critique of the Soviet regime.

While in Tashkent and Fergana the parishioners could manage to get Orthodox parishes restored, the situation was different in newly constructed Soviet towns. During the Soviet industrialization, new industrial centers emerged in the Tashkent region, like Almalyk, Angren, Chirchik, Yangiyer, and others. In 1958, the city of Navoi was founded in the Bukhara region with its mining and metallurgy plant as a city-forming enterprise. All new industrial cities were linked with the production of strategically important raw materials, uranium, and hard-rock ore. There was no place for religious life in new industrial centers, which were focused on technological progress. On the contrary, materialistic consciousness was cultivated. However, Orthodox communities consolidated even in new urbanized centers. For instance, in Almalyk (approximately 60 km from Tashkent), an Orthodox community existed since 1963, starting with the house of prayer founded by the local people without any state support (Interview 5).

The Soviet era contributed to changes in the development of Orthodox Christianity in Uzbek SSR; all of the parishes' activities were strictly coordinated by the Council for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church affiliated with the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Tashkent was, in a way, a "window to the East," where Soviet leaders brought foreign delegations, including the Western European countries, to demonstrate the Orthodox churches. Parish life was stable in Tashkent. In the newly founded cities, parish life was mostly illegal or nonexistent at all up until the late 1980s-early 1990s.

The political situation in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and its influence on the identity markers of Russians

After the Soviet Union's collapse, the Uzbek government shifted to the sovereignty of social and political life. I have noted earlier that the republic built a nation-state based on the idea of the core of Uzbek ethnos, its history, culture, and language, or, in other words, on the values of *o'zbekchilik* (Uzbekness). According to state ideology, the consolidation of the nation in post-Soviet Uzbekistan is based on the recognition of *o'zbekchilik* by minorities. However, the slogans that promote inter-ethnic tolerance, like "Uzbekistan is our home!" or "Uzbekistan is the

land of tolerance," are also mainstream. The state guarantees equal rights to all citizens of Uzbekistan, disregarding their ethnic origin and religious beliefs. In the religious sphere, the principles of religious freedom are proclaimed. This model of the nation-state, adopted by the government of the first president Islam Karimov, and a campaign against religious extremism in the 1990s did not allow the politicization of Islam, and it ended up in the everyday culture on the same conditions as in the USSR. Accordingly, Orthodox Christianity did not play an important role in the hierarchy of identities of secular Uzbekistan either. Evidently, during the presidency of Karimov, in 1991-2016, there was an anti-sect campaign against the preachers of *a Christian sort* (Full Gospel Church, Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and others).

How did the processes of sovereignty and migration of Russians impact their self-identification? For the 28 years of independent Uzbekistan, the Russians or, rather, the Russian-speaking population, have been choosing between two models of adaptation to the new social and political situation. The first is migration outside of Uzbekistan. Statistics show that the number of Russians decreased by 50 percent. The second model is a process of adaptation to life in a secular Uzbekistan, where "the secular" is understood as a synthesis of the traditional and the modern (Daudov et al. 2018: 153). Russians in Uzbekistan, as in other republics of the region, lost the privileges they have with their "extra-territorial status." Moreover, de-russification started in the country. The processes of sovereignty in Uzbekistan and the flow of migration of Russians and the Russian-speaking population led to changes in self-consciousness and, to a certain extent, to the ritual and cultural life of Russians.

Primarily, it is obvious that under the influence of nation-building processes, the Russian population of Uzbekistan tends to adapt to the Asian-Muslim environment together with shifting their identity markers. Most rapidly, Russians in mixed marriages have their *ethnic identity* blurred. This relates to the rise of inter-ethnic marriages since the late 1980s, or, most frequently, marriages between Russians and the indigenous people of the region (Uzbeks and Tajiks). Children of these mixed marriages have difficulties with their ethnic self-identification. In the Soviet period, the children of mixed marriages were registered as Russians if one of the parents was Russian. It involved no

religious association, or sometimes on a superficial level, as religion was not welcomed.

In the post-Soviet period, ethnic identity and religious affiliation became mandatory in Uzbekistan. Uzbek passports contain information about ethnicity, which requires self-identifying at the age of 16. At the same time, "ethnicity" in Uzbek passports does not directly refer to the ethnic and cultural self-perception of people. Self-affiliation with religion is mostly based on the religious tradition of ancestors, family, or other sources. There are examples of mixed families bearing traditions of Orthodox Christian and Muslim traditions at the same time. The natives of Russian culture and language, predominantly from mixed families, easily change their identity markers and adapt to the ethnicity of the religion of the majority. Oftentimes, this decision is made consciously and is instigated by the choice of the further strategy of living in Uzbekistan. O., a 39-year old Tatar in Tashkent, explained:

My mother was Russian, [and my] father a Tatar, but he always only spoke Russian. I went to a church at 16, wanted to get baptized, [but my] mother talked me out of it. At 16 [in 1990], I got a passport and was registered as Russian. At 24, I got baptized, I was long choosing between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Yet, at 25 [in 1999], when receiving a new passport, I registered myself as Tatar.

Yulia: Why did you register yourself Tatar in your passport?

O.: Living here, it's better to be Tatar! (Interview 15)

In this case, she relied on the intermediate status of the *European* and traditional national sociocultural identity. Most Tatars identify with Islam and have always been closer to Uzbeks.

I documented another example in Angren in 2015. V., a young woman of 18, from a mixed family – her mother is Crimean Tatar and her father is Russian – was practically raised by her paternal grandmother, a Russian. Yet, getting her first passport at 16, she took her mother's last name and chose to register as Tatar. Despite not being baptized, she remains with her grandmother in an Orthodox tradition. Her grandmother, T., a 69-year old from Angren, explained:

Yulia: Which religion does V. choose?

T. Well, she wanted to be baptized. Now she keeps silent, does not say anything. I say [to her]: "You are an adult now; you choose what you

need. You are eighteen already, it's your choice. You choose the faith you want."

Yulia: Do you celebrate Easter at home?

T. Well, we do, yes. We make pancakes, paint eggs, make roulettes, well, we bake or buy all these...paskas [*pasochki*], well. The Parents day is a must...every year we go to a cemetery to remember our relatives (Interview 18).

F., a 19-year-old informant from Almalyk, at the time of the interview could not even decide how to identify. She recognized being raised in Russian culture, with Russian was her mother tongue. She shared a *European* sociocultural identity but was hesitant to identify herself with one of the ethnic groups:

Yulia: How do you identify ethnically?

F.: I don't, I don't really, honestly, I don't, I don't. My mother is mixed, father is mixed, what am I gonna do? I don't know! In my passport, I am registered as an Uzbek.

Yulia: Really? Why Uzbek?

F.: What do I look like! Anyways, I have a Russian accent, Russian school; this is what it is. Who would say I'm Uzbek or Russian, I've been somehow defined by God, right? Well, for example, my grandmother, her father is a Tatar from Kerch [in Crimea], they are all from Kerch. When there was Stalin's repression, they all were under Stalin's repression and, accordingly, ended up here. A lot has been mixed. [My] father is a Kazak from Don with Tatar [blood], [my] mother is Tajik with something else. It's tough, it's really tough, my grandmother is mixed herself (Interview 6).

These examples illustrate that the ethnic and sociocultural identity of Russians in Uzbekistan goes well with other sorts of identity. A lot of situational factors related to family, environment, finding a partner, life plans, and strategies of further living in Uzbekistan or migrating abroad influence self-identification.

Orthodox Christianity and the Russian Orthodox Church in the sociocultural life of Russians in Uzbekistan

The principles of "secularity" of the Republic of Uzbekistan correspond with the ideas of harmonic development of all ethnic groups, including also different religious denominations. However,

it is important to note that the role of religion in the hierarchy of identities of the Uzbek population is small, compared to other components of these identities. Religion occupies its niche, yet not in politics, but rather in the everyday life of the population. This concerns Islam, as well as Orthodox Christianity.

In the 1990s, Uzbekistan experienced a religious renaissance with the rise of religious consciousness and the overwhelming trendiness of "spirituality." In every Uzbek city, ROC (Moscow Patriarchate) opened its parishes. As of 2019, there are 37 parishes in Uzbekistan, including five parishes in Tashkent and three in Samarkand. All Orthodox parishes of Uzbekistan are subjects to the Eparchy of Tashkent and Uzbekistan. The state regulates the activities and initiatives of the eparchy through the committee on religious affairs of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Positive changes in the religious life of Orthodox Christians coincided with the overall diminishing of the bearers of Orthodox culture — Russians — as a result of both natural decline and migration. The activities of ROC in the republic are regulated by the law "On freedom of conscience and religious organizations" in the edit of May 1, 1998. The Orthodox priests, as well as representatives of other denominations, are not recommended to engage in missionary work outside of parishes and churches. The ministers of ROC have an opportunity to work with the part of the Russian population that historically identifies with Orthodox Christianity and attends the churches and houses of prayer. The archival materials demonstrate that Vladimir (Ikim), a Bishop (later Metropolitan) of Tashkent and Central Asia, already in the 2000s, revisited approaches to working with the youth and called the local priests to actively engage and keep the congregants in parishes. The instruction of Metropolitan Vladimir to all assistant bishops (*blagochinnyie*) of the Eparchy of Tashkent and Central Asia, dated May 17, 2002, states: "Most of the eparchies of Russian Orthodox Church begins to actively return the traditionally Orthodox peoples under the Church domain. A devastating state of our work with the youth led to the winning of various sects over us in this issue" (Eparchy 4). It is important to once again emphasize that the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan authorized an "anti-sectarian" campaign because of the tight financial and ideological connections of their regional branches with Western countries, primarily with the USA and South Korea. As a part of the campaign

against the sects that violated the law "On freedom of conscience and religious organizations" the most, concerning the prohibition of any missionary activity in public spaces, ROC, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims, and other religious bodies acted together with the Committee on religious affairs of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

In 2011, Father Vikentii (Morar) was appointed a Metropolitan of Tashkent and Uzbekistan. He continued to work to attract Russians into churches. In the interview, a priest A. cites the Metropolitan: "According to statistics, there are 400 thousand Russians living in Uzbekistan. Where are they? Why they are not in churches? Drag them out of sects" (Interview 7). In general, Metropolitan Vikentii has actively engaged in the work of ROC in Uzbekistan in many directions. One of them is catechesis. In Uzbekistan, as well as in Russia, ROC employs the practice of catechetical talks, introduced by the Archbishop Council in 2013 "On religious educational and catechetical ministry in Russian Orthodox Church". According to the rules, twelve catechetical talks should be conducted with the baptized and their godparents who take part in the sacrament. All the priests I interviewed in Uzbekistan believe the practice of catechetical talks positively influence the engagement of Orthodox believers in church and allow the priests to better know their congregations and consolidate the Orthodox community. For Orthodox Christianity in Central Asia, it is a life-saving measure to make the baptized real churchgoers, rather than *zakhozhane* (formally adherent infrequent churchgoers). However, there are different degrees of enchurchment. The average number of active believers among the population is significantly lower than the number of potential Orthodox adherents (among Russians). For instance, the article of Hieromonk Iustin (Mikhail Larionov) from Ust-Kamenogorsk (Kazakhstan) notes that among the general Russian population only 0.5-1.5% are active believers (Larionov 2013: 13).

In certain cities and towns of Uzbekistan, there are specificities of the Orthodox consciousness of believers. It is caused by many factors, primarily with demographic features of Russians and the socio-economic situation.

Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Tashkent is the capital of Uzbekistan. Most of the Russian population of the republic lives there. As of January 1, 2018, there are 339,581 Russians registered, which makes 13.8% of the city's population or 46% of the whole Russian population of Uzbekistan (Statistics Uzbekistan 2019).

Historically, Tashkent is home to the biggest Orthodox cathedrals and churches in Uzbekistan. There is the Spiritual and Administrative Center of Tashkent Eparchy, which hosts the Uspensky Cathedral and an Orthodox theological seminary. Besides the Uspensky, in Tashkent, there is also the Church of St. Aleksander Nevsky (based on the city cemetery #1, the Botkinskoie), the Church of the Holy Martyr Hermogenes, and the Church of St. Prince Vladimir Equal-to-the-Apostles (Dombrabad cemetery). Along with worship ministries, Tashkent parishes also engage in charity, social, and humanitarian ministries. The biggest one is Uspensky Cathedral, which holds from 2000 to 5000 people on the days of feasts. There is a Sunday school, catechetical talks and courses, and organized pilgrimages to the neighboring countries and overseas (to Russia and Israel) in the Cathedral and a Spiritual and Administration Center. In October 2019, there was a center for the study of the Russian language opened in the center for everyone.

In 2014, the assistant bishops indicated the demise of the number of churchgoers and private services, yet in Tashkent diocese, the most crowded Orthodox parishes are in the capital. In Tashkent, Uspensky Cathedral has the most attendance. The presbyter or the oldest church in Tashkent – the Church of St. Aleksander Nevsky – protohierus S. notes: "There are 170-200 baptisms in the church, but note that the Church is situated on a cemetery. A superstitious fear that many people have does not allow them to go get baptized. If it was a church in the city limits, in the habitual city limits, it would be 2-2.5 times bigger" (Interview 19). As for the age, there are just 3-4% of young people of 15-25, middle-aged of 25-50 constitute 80%, and the elderly around 16-17%. As statistics show, the church has a high number of middle-aged congregants, but most probably it is a feature of the capital city. Protohierus S. emphasized yet another feature of the congregations in Tashkent parishes and around the Republic. Orthodox Christianity is chosen by the children of mixed marriages, and there are also rare cases

of converted Uzbeks. Analyzing the list of the first-year students of Tashkent Theological Seminary, S. concludes that half of them have Muslim surnames and there is the same tendency among the converts in Orthodox congregations. "This tendency becomes more evident every day, every year, and every time it grows. There are more mixed people [*metisyl*]. They make approximately half of the seminary, Uzbeks or mixed, they constitute around 30 percent of the Orthodox congregation in our churches. They cannot overwhelm due to old, elderly people, who entered one day, well, arrived in Russia during the formation of the Soviet rule, on Komsomol selections. So, this generation will die out and the people with Muslim surnames will be the majority." Prothiereus S. believes that the children of mixed marriages, whose mothers are Orthodox and fathers are Muslim, will most probably choose the religion of their mothers. Such a population can further become congregants of Orthodox parishes.

In 2019 in Tashkent, I interviewed a well-educated man of 52, who was born and grew up in a Tashkent family of culturally Russian Uzbeks. He considers himself formed in Russian culture and a native Russian speaker. He grew up reading Russian classics and admires Fedor Dostoevsky the most. At the age of 32, he got baptized into Orthodox Christianity and he emphasizes his long preparation for the sacrament:

Yulia: How do your relatives feel about you being baptized?

B.: Well, honestly speaking, they do not really know. My parents naturally know, but they are open-minded. I cannot say they were excited: "Well, okay." This was my choice. As for the other relatives, we don't really reveal it because I know I would be misunderstood.

Yulia: You don't wear a crucifix?

B.: I used to wear one, now I don't. But I need to. Yet I can't say I'm some kind of a devoted churchgoer, I rarely go there. It's some sort of an internal state for me (Interview 21).

Angren, Tashkent region, a house of prayer of the icon of the Theotokos "Vzyskaniie pogibshikh"²

The share of Russians in the city of Angren constantly diminishes. According to the statistics of January 1, 2015, the Russian population was 3,901 (2.6%) (Statistics Uzbekistan 2015). January 1, 2018, data

² Seeker of the Perishing — *Translator's note.*

demonstrate that there were 2,926 (1.6%) Russians left in the city (Statistics Uzbekistan 2019). The diminishing was caused by moving to Tashkent, outside of the Republic, and natural decline.

However, in the Soviet period, a substantial part of the Russian population lived in Angren. Right before the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to the last all-Union census of 1989, there were 43,218 (31.4%) Russians in Angren (Census 1989: 8). In Angren in the 1990s, the industry was destroyed and the citizens, most of whom were factory workers, engineers, and industrial specialists, left the Republic on economic grounds. This led to a more than tenfold decline of the Russian population.

The Russian population of Angren was impacted by its experience of living in an industrial city. A house of prayer was constructed there late, in 1992. One of the private houses built in 1977 was reconstructed into a house of prayer by communal efforts. In 2018, on the same land, the construction of a new church began.

A presbyter of the house of prayer, Hiereus A., appointed to the Angren parish in 2009, told me in 2014 in an interview that there are around 150 baptisms a year and Sunday services are regularly attended to by 50-60 people, which demonstrates the active work of the Angren parish among the potentially Orthodox population (unchurched Russians, Koreans, and others) and towards the "return" of Russians from sects. Moreover, an Orthodox population of the big rural settlement Nurabad (30 km from Angren) attends the Angren house of prayer. After the introduction of catechetical talks before baptism, most of the baptized become active churchgoers (Interview 7). In 2019, A. mentioned that the Sunday service is attended by 20-30 people, among which 15 to 20 take communion, which means the number of congregants diminished almost twofold in recent years. This is related to substantial migration from the city. In Angren parish, there are children under nine who attend services with their parents, but few young people, which is significantly impacted by the employment situation in the city. This relates to the youth and middle-aged people, whatever their ethnic origin is. Yet, in the parish, there are children of mixed marriages who chose Orthodox Christianity as their religion.

Hiereus A. believes that the choice of religion for Russians is directly linked with the group affiliation: "When I ask during the catechetical talks 'Why have you decided to baptize your child?' They respond:

'Well, I'm Russian! I have to be Orthodox and my children too'" (Interview 7). This interview emphasizes the important feature of the ethnic identification of Russians – Orthodox Christianity. It is the way to be a group member, to somehow fulfill the traditions of ancestors.

Besides this brief account of the local priest, during my fieldwork in 2012-2015 and 2019, I interviewed the informants self-identifying as Orthodox. Among the nineteen Russian and Ukrainian interviewees, there were no active churchgoers. Ten interlocutors were baptized but they all did not live a church life of the Angren parish. Rather, they came to the church when needed, lit candles, or requested a prayer service. However, all the respondents claimed that they celebrate the Orthodox feasts, namely, Christmas and Easter; especially on Easter, they bake or purchase *Kulich*³ and paint eggs. E. in the interview fairly noted that presently the religious meaning of the Orthodox feasts almost vanished: "I can see our girls [co-workers] are like: 'Oh, Christmas! Girls, are we gonna celebrate?' So it's a dinner [*zastolie*] for them. But not for me!" (Interview 9) In this case, my informant indicates the loss of religious meaning of the kermesse that turns into a ritual of having a good time together.

Three respondents expressed the idea that the Angren house of prayer does not resemble a church. For instance, it does not compare to the Uspensky Cathedral in Tashkent. N. said in an interview: "Well, the church in Tashkent is magnificent, and here it's like a cabin" (Interview 1). My interlocutors mostly acknowledge the church's decoration, rather than the ritualistic aspect of Orthodox Christianity. Nobody mentioned the frequency of the parish priest conducting services in Angren, if there is a possibility of confession, communion, and so on. The interviews I collected in Angren demonstrate that the interviewees are either unchurched and passive churchgoers (remembering, though, of the church feasts, observing Easter, and commemorating their dead), or atheists. As N. stated in an interview: "We commonly all celebrate Easter. Even Tatar and Uzbek children [in the class N. teach] bring eggs to school" (Interview 1).

For U., who grew up in a mixed family with a Russian mother and Tatar father, the self-definition concerning religion was "I'm free," which in this context means "undefined." However, she mentioned that

³ A traditional sweet version of a consecrated Easter bread – *Translator's note*.

she attends church occasionally, because "when your kids are sick you feel some kind of a relief when you stand under a church dome" (Interview 2).

Some of the interviewees wore crucifixes. However, I could not trace the Orthodox consciousness and appreciation of Christian canons (a prayer life, fasting, regular confession, Holy Communion, and so on) in any of the respondents, which by no means signifies there are no en-churched Orthodox believers in the city.

Beliefs of one of the interlocutors, baptized in her youth but not an active churchgoer of the Angren house of prayer, were significantly impacted by delusions of her environment. She was convinced that she could not baptize her daughter: "My daughter is from a Muslim father. They say I can't baptize her, but I don't want her to become a Muslim" (Interview 3). The low level of Orthodox consciousness can be partly explained by the fact that the Russian population of Angren is impacted by living in industrial areas, formed in the Soviet time, where there were no houses of prayer and the principles and dogmas of the materialistic worldview were enforced.

Almalyk, Tashkent region, Church of Dormition of the Holy Theotokos

Compared to Angren, at the time of my fieldwork in 2013-2014, Orthodox Christians in Almalyk were more active because of a bigger number of Russian inhabitants. Yet, the Orthodox community in Almalyk has the same characteristics as in Angren – the church attendance of the population is low, which is related to the mining and metal industry in the Soviet time. According to one of the respondents, since 1963, there has been a house of prayer unifying all Orthodox believers of Almalyk (Interview 5).

Since 1988, there has been a Church of Dormition of the Holy Theotokos in Almalyk (Picture 1), which was built specifically according to the needs of the Orthodox community. Almalyk in the post-Soviet period, managed to retain the major industries. That is why migration from the city was not as significant as from Angren. As of January 1, 2015, of the total population of 121,097, 30,266 (25%) were Russians (Statistics Uzbekistan 2015). On January 1, 2018, there were 127,468 inhabitants, 27,831 (22%) of whom were Russians (Statistics Uzbekistan 2019). The Sunday school in the church positively influences Orthodox

activities. The church presbyter, Hiereus I., claimed that he conducted 700 baptisms in 2012 (Interview 4). In 2013, 60-80 people regularly attended Sunday services. Besides, there were lots of opportunities to work with the Orthodox population in Almalyk. In the interview, I. noted that one of the challenges of attracting the unchurched inhabitants to Orthodox Christianity was their mixing of the Christian worldview with occult beliefs, which led to the prohibition of selling candles to be used outside of the church (Interview 4). In his interview, the priest added that a superficial understanding of Orthodox canons and traditions by congregants calls for a lot of work from local priests, especially in cities like Almalyk, formed in the Soviet time.

In late 2013, Hiereus I. had to leave for Russia for health reasons. In 2013-2015, the presbyter of Almalyk, Hegumen G., combined his work in the parish with the ministry in Tashkent and Uzbek Eparchy, hence visiting the congregation on weekends and church feasts. In Almalyk, I interviewed four respondents, two of whom are Muslims, and two are elderly and inactive in the church, which did not allow me to evaluate the understanding of Orthodox Christianity by the people.

Fergana, Diocese of Fergana, Sergius of Radonezh Church

The city of Fergana was founded under the name New Margelan in 1876 as a military and administrative center of the Russian Empire. Before the Revolution, there was a Church of Aleksander Nevsky with a capacity of 700 people, which was demolished in 1936. The specificity of the city's construction and its industrial base impacted the demographics of the city, namely, the high proportion of the Russian population. The Soviet statistics of ethnicities in Fergana is unavailable. Yet, there is data of the all-Union census of 1926, when there was 14,275 inhabitants registered, of whom there were 7,942 Russians (55%), 3,011 Uzbeks (21%), 667 Ukrainians (4.6%), 728 Tatars (5%), 388 Armenians (2.7%), 111 Germans (0.7%), etc. (Census 1926: 148-149) Fergana was a young city back then. A cultural capital of Uzbekistan, it hosted a Russian drama theater, its own football club, and the University of Fergana, which had a flow of human resources from the best universities in Moscow and Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War. The city had a spirit of internationalism (Flynn et al 2014). In 1946, the Soviet government authorized the opening of Sergius of Radonezh Church (Picture 2). In the Soviet Fergana, there was a unique Orthodox environment.

Sovereignty and worsening of the social and economic basis of the city in the 1990s-2000s radically changed an ethnic proportion of Fergana. Most of the Russian and Russian-speaking population left Fergana. According to the statistics of January 1, 2015, the population of the city was 268,064, among whom there were 244,317 (91.1%) Uzbeks, 7,973 (2.9%) Russians, and 1,864 (0.6%) Koreans (Statistics Uzbekistan 2015). According to January 1, 2018, data, there were 278,510 inhabitants in Fergana, among whom there were 6,552 (2.3%) Russians. Accordingly, Sergius of Radonezh Church lost both its active congregants and potential churchgoers. However, there were substantial measures proposed for the consolidation of the Orthodox community in Fergana.

From 2000 up to the end of 2016, the presbyter of the Church was Protohierus V., who initiated the formation of the Youth School that did not solely include Sunday school. In the Youth School, there were also sport and dance classes and many others where not merely congregants' children were admitted. The Sunday school constantly organized children's festivals. The presbyter managed to find funding for the trips to Moscow for the children. Most probably, Protohierus V. aimed at raising a new generation of Orthodox Christians creating conditions for their direct and indirect participation in church life, Sunday school, and the Orthodox environment as a whole.

Deacon P. who served at Sergius of Radonezh Church in August of 2014 informed me that there are 30-40 people on the evening service every Saturday, and the Sunday services are attended by around 100 people. The Easter services have much more attendance, around 300 people, including also non-Orthodox. "Muslims are interested in Easter and Orthodox rites. They come on Easter to exchange kisses with girls (*khristosovat'sia* [Easter acclamation])" (Interview 11). Deacon P. also noted that with the introduction of catechetical talks, the congregants changed their attitude to the sacrament of baptism. They could reflect more deeply on the canons of Orthodox Christianity and Orthodox rites. "The congregants used to come like to a grocery store, they got quickly baptized and left. Yet, thanks to the classes, we have new people. If on Sundays there used to be 10-15 people baptized, now there are 10-15 people baptized a month, but they constantly come to the Church" (Interview 11).

In July-August 2014, in Fergana, I interviewed 15 Russian-speaking respondents among whom 11 identified themselves as Russians. They all

identified with Orthodox confession, yet only three went to church in Fergana. One of the respondents, S., Russian, 68 years of age, was deeply devoted. She knew and obeyed all the Orthodox canons. Her relative, Protohierus V. (he died in Kokand at 91 years of age) was a long-time presbyter of the Church of the Kazan Icon of Theotokos in Kokand. Two of my respondents said they rarely go to Fergana Church because of the strict rules established by Protohierus V. These rules are mostly related to attending the catechetical talks for three months before baptism. "Here *batushka* [holy father] requires going for three months to catechetical talks. This is hard for a working person" (Interview 12). On the other hand, the congregants explained the sharp position of Protohierus with the need to enchurch the population. In his interview, A. explained the situation with strict rules in the church: "Our *batushka* is very good, intelligent, smart, yet he is a kind person, but strong-willed and emotional. He knows the liturgy perfectly; he understands people. He's decisive, when needed...When our *batushka* is around—I knew six or seven *batushkas* before him, maybe five—nobody speaks. He disapproves of that strongly. There is absolute silence in church" (Interview 13). According to my sources, Deacon P. passed away on August 12, 2014, a week after our interview, and Protohierus V. moved to Russia in 2016.

In late 2016, Hierus I. was appointed to the Sergius of Radonezh Church. In his 2019 interview, he informed me that on Sunday, there are 70-75 attendants; 45-50 take communion but there are fewer people in summer because of the vacation season and extremely hot weather in Fergana. In 2018, there were 88 baptisms, three marriages, and 254 funerals in Sergius of Radonezh Church (Interview 20), which illustrates that most requested private services are related to death, which, to some extent, reflects the demographic trend of Russians in Uzbekistan. Hierus I. notes that Orthodox believers and infrequent churchgoers see the church as a "ritual bureau." Besides, the priest faces many superstitions. There is still a Sunday school in church, operated by *matushka* [presbytera] L. Children groups stage various concerts for religious and state holidays. The Sunday school is attended by children of different ethnic groups, there is a group of a mixed origin, and occasionally there are children from Uzbek families.

The priestly activities in Fergana parish are one of the examples of the consolidation of the Orthodox population in Fergana in the context of the decline of Russian and Russian-speakers.

Kagan, Church of St. Nicholas

The town of Kagan was founded as New Bukhara in 1888 as a Russian settlement of the Transcaspian railroad system. Remarkably, the Church of St. Nicholas is situated in Kagan next to the mosque. Kagan was a base for Russian imperial authorities in close proximity to Bukhara. Hence, the Church existed since 1882. Its current building was constructed in 1968. Its main feature is the iconostasis, which is a part of the historical iconostasis in the Church of Transfiguration of the Lord, closed and demolished in Moscow in 1964 (Picture 3).

The official statistics on the Russian population are not available. The presbyter of the church, Hierieus S., said that there are 45,000 inhabitants in the city, of whom 3,000 are Russians. 15-20 congregants, mostly elderly, participate in all services and feasts. There are around 60 baptisms a year, and a part of the baptized leave for Russia on economic grounds. "The number of congregants declines, but we keep the average. One can see on Easter, whether it is less or not. Even the lazy ones come on Easter. The people used to crowd in the yard on Easter, but now they can freely stand" (Interview 14). There is a Sunday school in the Church, but there is almost nobody to attend it, for there are few congregants with children. In St. Nicholas Church, the catechetical talks are held and 3-4 sessions are enough. Besides, according to Hierieus S., the pre-baptism catechetical talks were held even before 2011, i.e., before their official introduction.

The situation in five different Orthodox parishes of Uzbekistan demonstrates that Orthodox Christianity is directly linked to the share of the Russian population, which is regarded by Orthodox priests as *potentially Orthodox*. The conditions and activities of parish life are impacted by the economic situation in cities and towns, employment, and personality of a presbyter. The priests play a very important role, they preserve the Orthodox religion and rites in Uzbekistan in the context of the lack of priests, the weak tradition of the enchurchment of the Russian population, and so on. It is also important to note that for the most part of my informants, their attitude towards the church rites, which in fact constitutes the essence of the Church, is superficial. This corresponds to the fact that the traditional faith did not get the role it used to have before the revolution, despite the support of major religions, including Orthodoxy, by Islam Karimov's government in the 1990s-2010s.

Orthodox Christianity in the Islamic context of Uzbekistan

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in Uzbekistan, religion became "trendy." Everyone was expected to identify with one of the denominations. While in mono-ethnic families of Russians choosing religion was painless and the children were mostly raised in the tradition of their ancestors – Orthodox Christianity – religious self-identification became blurred in mixed families. The children born in the families mixed ethnically and religiously make a substantial group in present-day Uzbekistan. Commonly, it is a union of an Orthodox woman and Muslim man and, in every particular case, the process of choosing a religion for their children becomes a difficult issue in the post-Soviet context. One of the possible solutions becomes such a phenomenon as *religious syncretism*, a mixture of Orthodox and Muslim traditions. In mixed families, the rites of Orthodox Christianity and Islam are both observed. Oftentimes, religious practices have a ritualistic character. As my informant V. put it:

I married a Tajik, we raise a son and daughter. We speak Russian, though [our] son and daughter are both fluent in Uzbek. We celebrate all religious holidays, Easter, Eid [Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha]. On Easter, my husband brings all the eggs to his family, his parents. We don't discriminate against religion or ethnicity. I'm being told: 'V., you've got a holiday, the weather is bad, hence you shouldn't do any work.' Uzbeks give us pilaf on Eid while you give them *kulich* on Easter. I baptized my kids, baptized my son in the Quvasoy⁴ church. My husband arranged it with *batushka*, but we will also circumcise our son (Interview 12).

The case of this family demonstrates that the family recognizes both Orthodox and Muslim holidays and traditions. Both parents are superficially involved in Muslim and Orthodox ritual tradition, which allowed the husband not to insist on his wife changing religion and agree to both baptize and circumcise their son.

Another example is F., in whose family there is a stepbrother aged four. "My brother has different parents, his mother is a Muslim and father a Christian, and there are no conflicts. Yulia: What faith will your

⁴ Quvasoy is a town in Fergana region in close proximity to the Kyrgyz border.

brother choose? F.: He will decide himself when he grows up, but his father said he can be circumcised" (Interview 6). Even if the boy gets baptized in the future, according to his parents, circumcision will not be an obstacle to engage in Orthodox rites.

E.: Muslim holidays are much more valuable for my parents. I love holidays, various *Eids*, already since my childhood tradition, just because you can come together with your family and there are few opportunities for that in a megalopolis. As for the Orthodox holidays, we don't celebrate much, though, first, our family – we grew up in Russia after all, we painted eggs as kids on Easter. There was no religious context for us...Now we have a sister-in-law in our family [who is] Russian. She wears a crucifix, goes to a church. She, by the way, bakes *kulich*, consecrates them in church, we gather at hers on Easter and consume all that. These, most likely, are not at all religious things, but rather mundane ones. Well, just such holidays when there is a ritual, there is no religious meaning in it.

Yulia: Which religion are your brother's kids going to choose? Am I getting it right that he is a Muslim?

E.: My brother has a son and a daughter. They haven't been baptized yet, and they are not Muslims either. Though his son is circumcised. Yet, his parents made a decision that choosing a religion should be their children's conscious decision. I can't say my brother is religious, that he really considers himself a Muslim. His wife is more traditional in terms of religion (Interview 16).

It is crucial to note that in this last example, one can trace a "European" sociocultural identity of the interviewee's brother and his wife and the same lifestyle. These identity markers are much stronger than the religious differences of each parent. Religious syncretism in mixed families leads to the adaptation of religious rites of both Orthodox Christianity and Islam. All these demonstrate that religious traditions have, chiefly, a ritualistic superficial nature, without much reflection of the ritual aspect of Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In his article, priest Sergei Statsenko (Tashkent Theological Seminary) notes that "mixed-family children, undefined with their religious identity, can, in the future, still not make a choice in favor of one of the religions and keep observing Muslim rites along with crossing themselves and saying Christian prayers" (Statsenko 2010: 311).

In 2014, in Angren, there was a conflict between parents concerning their daughter's religion. In his interview, V., a 21-year-old Russian, told me that he married a woman with a "European" identity from a mixed family, whose mother was half Tatar, half Uzbek, and father was from a Jewish-Russian family. His future wife frequently emphasized before the wedding that she was an atheist. The first conflict on religion started after the birth of their daughter: "I came from work. My mother-in-law brought some grannies, like, to read Muslim prayers to [my daughter] so that she becomes a Muslim. I yelled at them and kicked them out: 'Why do you decide for me who my daughter becomes? I'm going to baptize her!'" This is when I found out that my wife is not an atheist after all but a Muslim. I told her: 'If you're a Muslim, go mop the yard' (Interview 8). Again, this case may not be considered typical just for the reason that marriage between a male Christian and female Muslim was a rarity even in the Soviet time, because ethnic identity and religion are taken from the father. More traditional Uzbeks and Tajiks tended not to give their daughters to Russian husbands. In this case, both the mother and father of the girl share the "European" sociocultural identity and speak Russian. The conflict around the child's religion does not have a religious ground. It is mostly a struggle for traditions in which their daughter would be raised.

Priest Sergei Statsenko notes that there is a phenomenon of religious ambiguity when children from mixed families stand for the idea that "there could be different faiths, but there is one God." It is mostly characteristic of Tatars by reason of their inclination toward European culture and values and yet their choice of Islam (Statsenko 2010: 311). As support for this idea, I refer to the interview with O.:

I was in the Church on Botkinskii for the communion. So I took the communion, then grannies and *batushka* invited me for breakfast. They have the church workers eating there after communion; one can only get there by invitation—to the kitchen. Very good cuisine, there was a delicious Guriev kasha and the like. So we sat there and ate. There was an Uzbek across from me eating, we all chatted. We talked to a granny who invited me and I told her: 'I'm going to have a hard summer, there is my granny's wake coming up, I should manage all that somehow, it's tough. And this is that Muslim...it's all fallen on *Uraza* [Ramadan fasting]. We organized it in the evening, so after *Iftar* [evening meal in Ramadan]. So this man looked at me and asked: 'So you're a Muslim?' I said: 'Well, my

granny was a Muslim! I was baptized, but my granny – she was.' I said: 'Now I need it too, I've prayed for all of my [family] in a Christian church, now I need to go to a mosque.' He said, 'Do you want me to read for you?' I was taken aback, like, 'How come?' He then said: 'Well, I'm a mullah!' I said: 'Mullah, really?' It was probably all written on my face. He laughed and said: 'What do you think, each one has their own God? There's one God'" (Interview 17).

This case also demonstrates the level of tolerance and religious freedom in Uzbek society between the priesthood of Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Conventionally, it is believed that the internationalism of this region's population had been developed even before joining the Russian Empire. In the Soviet period, Tashkent and other Uzbek cities become a melting pot of ethnicities, traditions, and layers of culture. In Uzbekistan, the representatives of different cultures learned to live together. In this last interview, there is also this idea of "There is one God" mentioned. It is criticized by Orthodox priests for giving ground for religious syncretism and merging the observance of both Orthodox and Muslim canons.

Another important feature of Orthodox Christianity that I discovered during my fieldwork is the interest of the indigenous population of the region to the Orthodox rites and sacredness. In every parish, there are cases when Muslims (mostly women) light candles for the health of their relatives and ask a priest to pray (for instance, for a husband who is a working migrant in Russia).

Hiereus A. (Angren): "Uzbeks come and ask for holy water" (Interview 7). Hiereus S. (Kagan): "Uzbek women come and ask to pray for them. I tell them: 'Come and pray to St. Nicholas the Wonderworker' and they come. They constantly ask for holy water, send their children to get it. They need it even more than us" (Interview 14). The interest in Orthodox Christianity and Orthodox sacred objects is partly linked to working migration and raising the status of Russia in Uzbekistan in the 2000s. For instance, in April 2012, a part of the holy relics of St. Matrona of Moscow arrived at Uspensky Cathedral in Tashkent. This was met with great excitement in Tashkent and the whole Republic. Not merely Orthodox but also other believers came to worship the relic.

In every church, there are singular cases when Muslims got baptized. It happens very rarely because of the strict traditions of big families. Furthermore, ROC does not aim at missionary work among the

Muslim population. During my fieldwork, I interviewed a 42-year-old Kazakh woman, married to a Russian, who converted to Orthodox Christianity in the Church of St. George the Victory Bearer in the Holy Trinity male Monastery in Chirchik (30 km from Tashkent). She, however, had to hide this fact from her relatives in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

All these facts call for further study and reflection, but it is already worth noting that they contradict the notions declared by many Russian media outlets on total radicalization and Islamization of the population of Central Asian republics, including Uzbekistan. I would like to also make yet another note. The Uzbek people, without rejecting their own religion and traditions, are very receptive and tolerant towards other cultural traditions, including religious ones. An Uzbek woman from Fergana, R., told in her interview: "On Easter, I baked *kulich* for Russians. You know how fast they were all sold!" (Interview 10) In Angren, on the Easter day of April 20, 2014, Uzbeks were buying *kulich* to symbolically join the celebration or congratulate their Orthodox relatives or neighbors.

What delays the development of Orthodox Christianity in Uzbekistan is a constant diminishing of the Russian population and such factors as a lack of religious education, superficial knowledge of rites and canons, and predispositions toward occultism. To a greater extent, these tendencies reveal themselves in small towns where the share of Russians declines promptly, the churches are attended by elderly congregants, and the youth lack motivation and time to engage in Orthodox rites fully. Hieres I. said in his interview: "They come to church and ask: 'Teach me how to light a candle so I'm lucky [*chtoby mne fortilo*]!'" (Interview 20)

The children of mixed families dwelling in small towns in the Muslim environment gradually come closer to identity markers of the Muslim majority. Both Uzbeks and Russians willingly promote the idea that as a result of Muslim influence, Russians in Central Asia are resistant to alcohol, as compared to their compatriots in Russia.

All the presbyters I interviewed noted that the practice of catechetical talks allows them to conduct individual work with congregants and engage them in Orthodox rites and values. This enables the consolidation of Orthodox communities through common holidays, events, and support of community members in tough situations.

Conclusion

During my fieldwork in 2012-2015 and 2019 in certain parishes of Tashkent and Uzbekistan Eparchy and archival work, I witnessed that Orthodox Christianity and ROC in Uzbekistan fulfills the worship, catechization, social, and other functions. The priesthood and clergy in Uzbekistan keep serving their ministry, despite the lack of human resources and the diminishing number of congregants in certain parishes. The demographic processes among Russians linked to the aging population and migration of the youth and middle-aged people to a certain extent impacts the private services ordered in churches. However, according to the statistical averages of dioceses reported by Tashkent and Uzbekistan Eparchy in 2014, one of the biggest dioceses – the Tashkent diocese – including several of the biggest cities in the Tashkent region, apart from the capital itself, 5,982 baptisms, 282 weddings, and 3,721 funerals were conducted (Eparchy 3).

In fact, my research indicates three different views on the development of Orthodox Christianity in Uzbekistan: the Orthodox priests' position based on the condition of parishes and issues of catechization activities among congregants, views of enchurched laymen, although they are always a minority, and unchurched laymen who often adhere to the canons of Islam and Orthodox Christianity at the same time, or to occultism.

The presbyters share the opinion that in Uzbekistan, the state has created favorable conditions for developing Orthodox Christianity. Religion for Russians is an extension of their ethnic identification, tradition, and customs of their ancestors. Every year, the number of children of mixed marriages in parishes grows. The experts among the Orthodox priests believe that they will further make a significant part of the congregants in Orthodox parishes. This leads to the situation when the unchurched Orthodox believers observe the Orthodox canons superficially, as a part of a tradition. Orthodox Christianity is regarded as a part of the culture necessary for belonging to a group. The consequence of all this is that most of my respondents attend church irregularly and have no holistic knowledge of sacraments and canons of Orthodox Christianity.

To conclude, Orthodox Christianity in Uzbekistan is historically linked to the destiny of the Russian population. Further development

of Orthodox parishes in the cities and towns of Uzbekistan will depend on the migration activity of the Russian population and the processes that go on with the identity markers of "Russians" from the mixed families or Russian-speaking citizens of the Republic. Fluency in the Russian language and "European" sociocultural identity play a major role in the present time. Ethnic identity and religious affiliation are secondary, especially for the children of mixed marriages. The Orthodox parishes in the near future will most probably exist, though getting smaller yet turning into tight-knit communities.

Translated by Igor Mikeshein.

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Christian Samizdat on Religious Seeking of the Soviet Countercultural Youth in the 1970s to mid-1980s

Irina Gordeeva

"Religious renaissance" of the 1970s-1980s as a problem of historiography

With few exceptions, the problem of "religious renaissance" (Pazukhin 1993) of the late Soviet period has been raised and discussed by the participants alone, and mostly as opinion pieces. There are some scholarly works on this topic, though their small number sharply contrasts with the richness of sources recently made available or produced by the method of oral history.

The participants of unofficial culture, where this "renaissance" became most visible, remember that time as "a fundamental civilizational shift or break" (Martynov 2010: 167) — a gap between the old and new world, manifested by a turn towards new values, a change of self-perception, the emergence of "new religiosity," and a "culture of spiritual resistance" (Pivovarov 2010: 230-231). Memoirists often emphasize the following characteristics of this movement: its connection with cultural movement, higher concentration of intelligentsia, the predominance of youth in it, the social "outsiderness" of the adherents of this "new religious consciousness,"¹ religious and cosmological eclecticism, the combination of the most diverse and unconventional religious and philosophical ideas, the absence

¹ "Like the members of the Leningrad seminar, the members of the Moscow seminar were social outsiders... The atmosphere at the sessions of the seminar was largely defined by those who came there: bohemians, some of them alcoholics and drug addicts, habitués of the famous 'Saigon' cafe on the corner of Nevsky prospekt and Vladimisky prospekt. The sessions sometimes turned into 'happenings': attendees were drunk or high on drugs. Quite often, simply insane people showed up" (Pazukhin 1995: 62).

of dogmatism, and the free, often unchurched, and deeply personal nature of religious seeking.

The numerous metaphors suggested by contemporaries to describe their spiritual experience of the 1970s-1980s are still subject to scholarly conceptualization. At this point, the pressing issue involves introducing new historical sources into the research agenda. The existing memoirs allow for the reconstruction of events concerning the religious seeking of the youth, though it is hardly illuminating for the study of the worldviews of the participants of "religious renaissance." The aim of my paper is the study of Christian samizdat, uncensored and illegally distributed by the Soviet countercultural youth. It reflects the specificities of the worldview of the youth and specificities of religious and social processes that were occurring in that environment. Mostly, I am focusing on texts linked to the history of the ecumenical community of Sandr Riga (1971-1984)² and the seminar community of Alexander Ogorodnikov (mid and late 1970s).³ As supplementary sources, I used documents of a Riga⁴ hippie Mikhail Bombin (late 1970s-1980s) and Leningrad hippie and Tartu University student Alexander Karev (late 1970s), as well as more formally conventional and substantially unusual materials.⁵ A considerable number of these documents reveals the Soviet countercultural youth and, precisely, the hippie community was the social environment in which the religious awakenings of the 1970s-1980s were large-scale and systematic.

In his study, Nikolai Mitrokhin claims that among hippies in the 1980s, there was a mass conversion to the subculture of the "enchurched" (Mitrokhin 2006: 55). Olga Chepurnaia also demonstrates that hippies frequently became participants or even organizers of

² A series of samizdat journals titled "Prizyv" (copies of issues archived in Keston College), the "Alternativa" samizdat almanac, and secondary sources from personal fonds of Sandr Riga (archived in the University of Latvia Academic Library and Hoover archives), entries from "Archive of samizdat." In this chapter, the citations refer to the typewritten issues of "Prizyv" archived in Keston College and numbered sequentially, unless otherwise stated.

³ Materials of the samizdat journal "Obshina," preserved in fonds 169 of Memorial, and entries in the "Archive of samizdat."

⁴ Here and elsewhere, for the city of Riga the original Latvian spelling is given in order to distinguish it from the alias of Sandr Riga — *Translator's note*.

⁵ Personal correspondence of Karev preserved by Victor Rezunkov, hippie manifestoes, and "Bulletin' khristianskoi obshchestvennosti" (Bulletin of Christian community) (1987-1989).

Christian groups (Chepurnaia 2004: 97). Currently, there are some memoirs containing considerable data on religious seeking of hippies. The members of this community called themselves "the System" (Furst 2016). In several episodes of Alexander Arkhangelskii's documentary "Zhara" about the religious uprising in the early-1970s USSR, this youth subculture and the name of its leader, Yura *Solnce* (Sun) (Yuri Burakov, 1949-1993), were also mentioned. Solnce's name was mentioned by an ecumenist Sandr Riga. The visual sources – photos, amateur movies, and amateur art of the hippies themselves – demonstrate a wide spread of Christian symbols among them.

"The System" as a space for religious seeking

In 1986, very young Roman Yashunskii (born 1966), alongside his hippie friends, hitchhiked to the Georgian Orthodox cathedral called Betania. As Roman reminisced, when the young men approached the gates, they were met by a tall man in his fifties dressed in a cassock. As they would learn later, it was Hegumen Ioann Sheklashvili:

– So, who are you all?

– We are hippies.

– But there are no real hippies anymore. We are the last ones (Yashunskii n. d.).

"Honestly, we were puzzled by such self-definition of the hegumen," recalled Roman (Ibid). Later, they would learn that the hegumen had been a criminal authority and after prison became a believer and a monk. In Betania, at that time, there was also a real ex-hippie – "Misha Desimon, nicknamed Bonifatsii, who went through the party life in Moscow, drugs, and the like, in such a psychic state that he felt like he could not talk to anyone at all, and he started looking for a place where he could hide from everyone and heal his spiritual sores. When he heard of a lonely monastery, he came there for a winter and stayed there forever, becoming Lazar Abashidze" (Ibid).⁶

Roman and his friends belonged to the second generation of countercultural God-seekers (Picture 4). The first wave of mass interest to religion of the youth occurred in the mid and late 1970s. Valerii Baidin recalled that in 1974, he met "hippie-Christians" at father Dmitry Dudko's: "The main values of the System – love and freedom – they

⁶ I am thankful to Roman Yashunskii for sharing with me his unpublished memoirs.

combined with their faith, yet they wholeheartedly rejected its two major evils – drugs and *frilav*.⁷ In those years, hippie-Christians were undoubtedly the most open, educated, and spiritually flexible among the youth. They absorbed everything new, bright, and appealing. They dressed neatly, but not sharply, called their communities *obshiny*, not *tusovki*, communal celebrations *agapy*, not *kvartirniki*, and each other brothers, not *piply* (people)" (Baidin 2018: 72).

One of the traits of a growing interest to faith among the Soviet youth at that time was the unthinkable popularity of a rock-opera "Jesus Christ Superstar." Written in 1970, it was staged on Broadway, released as a soundtrack, and as a musical movie in 1973. Both in the West and in the USSR, the opera initiated a religious and mystical discourse among countercultural youth (Zhuk 2013). Ogorodnikov recalled, in his interviews, a similar impact a movie by Pier Paolo Pasolini, titled "The Gospel According to St. Matthew," had on him. He watched the movie at the private screening at Belyie Stolby in 1972 (Bulchuk n. d.).

In the late 1970s, the hippie community in USSR became explicitly religious seeking. "We never sat down to have lunch before figuring out whether God exists," Maria Remizova recalled (Mata Hari 2008: 104). She went on: "A curious thing: everyone around us thought we were lazy bones and fools... However, I have never met such open-minded people interested in *abstract matters*. It is untrue that counterculture counterfeits culture. It never does! Only against a rotten one, extremely formalized, deprived of passionarity [*passionarnost'*] (or not having it at all) – the *worst part* of it. Counterculture integrated everything new, lively, and creative, amputating the pus tissue. Counterculture piled off the shells to get to the true core and get a grip of it, without fear of burning, because fire does not burn those who are burning themselves" (Mata Hari 2008: 81).

The interest in religious and philosophical topics presupposed an active quest for facts unavailable in the USSR, reading and reproducing illegal or inaccessible literature, and the creation and distribution of samizdat. Religious samizdat circulated among the youth on a large scale. It included not only literature on religious dogma, but also

⁷ A Russian transliteration of "free love" is a conventional term for "a practice of making love freely. Whenever and with whomever one wishes," widespread among the hippies (McCleary 2004: 193).

half-banned and rare works of Russian religious thinkers of the early 20th century (Chepurnaia 2004: 112-135; Baidin 2018: 72-75).

What were the outcomes of those seekings? In the 1970s, Eastern religions, occult movements of different kinds, the Society for Krishna Consciousness, Sufism, and Buddhism became widespread. There were also Tolstoyans, neo-pagans, followers of Grigori Skovoroda, Nikolai Roerich, Daniil Andreev, and Porfirii Ivanov; occasional Protestants (Baptists and Methodists), Catholics, and members of The Children of God. However, the number of Orthodox believers in the countercultural circles grew steadily, including priests and monks. Moreover, if in the 1970s a choice in favor of Orthodox faith was being made not in the Church, but rather through the religious and philosophical circles, then in the 1980s, freedom of religious seeking became replaced by "enchurchement."

Vasilii Boyarnitsev described the turn of Moscow hippies towards the Church in the following manner: "It started when my pal Misha Pavlov suddenly disappeared from Moscow and went to the then unknown monastery called 'Optina Pustyn' to work as a restorer. Then, all of a sudden, there was a package from Gosha 'Terrorist' from the same place, with the works of Saint Ignatius Brianchaninov and The Life of Theotokos...Then Pavlov's ex-wife – Viktoriia – was also about to go there, inviting [us] to visit her in a small house next to the monastery given to her. So we went, mostly out of curiosity. Then we liked it there, and visited more frequently. Besides, we were surprised by numerous meetings with old friends who happened to be there as well...Viktoriia, the ex-wife of Misha Pavlov – who would later become Father Macarius – not Viktoriia anymore, but rather nun Ksenia. She received her tonsure in some monastery in Ivanovo region... In Shamordino convent, Mother Sergiia also was running around Father Sergii in Optina, all covered in bracelets [*fenechkakh*] and other clothing [*prikidakh*]" (Evseeva n. d.).

Maria Remizova remembered those events in a totally different manner: "We matured. Our old friends [*frendy*] one by one passed it on and stopped responding. We lost the ardor and passion of our arguments on truth, and the more we met, the more we came down to discuss an absolute dogma of the Orthodox faith. One by one, they became enchurched, started talking about saints and Church feasts, started getting married in Church [*venchyatsya*], shortening their

hair [*khaera*] and lengthening their skirts, quit smoking, put anathema to the weed, and started drinking more and more" (Mata Hari 2008: 148-149).

Many hippies became Orthodox priests or monks. For instance, there was Laimi (monk Veniamin – Aleksei Frumkin, born 1958), Bonifatsii (archimandrite Lazar Abashidze – Mikhail Desimon, 1959-2018), Razvei (protoiereus Boris Razveev, 1949-2011), protoiereus Andrei Lemeshonok (born 1956), Yura Terrorist (hegumen Sergii Rybko, born 1960), Tseppelin (ieromonk Izidor – Sergei Kosolapov, 1961-2011), protoiereus Andrei Garanin (1956-2017), Ishtvan (iereus Anatolii Gainuk, 1964-1999), protoiereus Nikita Panasuk, Kolyok (protoiereus Nikolai But'ko, born 1962), protoiereus Aleksei Uminskii (born 1960), protoiereus Aleksei Yasterbov (born 1970), Zhenia Borisov (hegumen Tikhon), and Roma Gluk (Roman Yashunskii, monk Iona in Russian Orthodox Church, and, later, Bishop Nektarii in the Church of the Genuine Orthodox Christians of Greece, born 1966). An active role in the Orthodox community was played by laymen and ex-hippies, such as Alexander Ogorodnikov, Alexander Dvorkin, Valerii Nikolskii (Yufo), Sergei Chapnin, Vasilii Boyarintsev (Long), and Kirill Frolov (Kazya Bazya).

Ecumenical community of Sandr Riga: The youth in search of "universal brotherhood in Christ"

The history of Sandr Riga's community can be put into several contexts: the history of "religious renaissance" in the USSR and the history of unofficial ecumenical and popular peace movements, yet no less important context is the spiritual seeking of a Soviet cultural underground.

Sandr Riga (real name Alexander Sergeevich Rotberg), born in Riga in 1939, assumed the name of his favorite city, where he grew up and spent his youth, as an alias. He was an artist and a poet, lived a bohemian lifestyle, combining aesthetic and intellectual seeking with binge drinking and other compulsive habits.

In his anthology of avant-garde poetry "Blue lagoon," Israel Maler (1943-1997) remembered Riga in the 1950s as the one falling off the sidecar of the motorcycle while trying to flee from a police officer. According to Maler, at that time, Riga was "a provocateur, originator, actor –

sort of a Jurenito⁸ from Rīga" (Maler 2011: 55-56). At the same time, his relatives and close friends remembered him as an "honest man, kind, very helpful, and having a very rare ability to be concerned about the troubles of others" (Rotberg 2011: 18).

Me, I did sports, wrote poetry, teared it apart and published, painted, read philosophers, but my main job was to sit in a cafe and brag with random people about genius and politics, telling jokes, and create and act out various mystifications. I was a fan of dilettantism and black humor. One day I was dressed like a dandy, another day – barefoot, munching bread crusts at the boulevard corners. Oftentimes, I took long trips. I shamelessly hurt my mother, lived off of her, though I felt sorry for her (Prizyv 1974c: 142-143).

In 1964, he moved to Moscow and planned to start his studies at the faculty of philosophy. Going through the spiritual crisis, he did not pursue higher education, but engaged in the independent study of religious and philosophical issues, reading everything he could find on these topics in the open press and samizdat, and communicating with other outcasts like him.

By the early 1970s, his religious interests took over all other ones and ecumenism became Riga's religious and ethical choice. He was often perceived as a Catholic or Baptist, yet he called himself an *ekumen* (ecumenist) or a free Christian (interview with Riga, 2015).

On October 13, 1971, in the room of the communal apartment where Riga lived, there was the first meeting of his ecumenical circle. There were nine Christians of different denominations present, mostly young men of artistic occupations. "One could call them a bohème," Irina Yazykova, a member of Riga's circle of late 1970s-early 1980s recalled. "However, it was not precisely true, for their spiritual seeking that led them to the idea of ecumenical brotherhood was brought about by something directly opposite to bohemianism – to find a purpose, mission, salvation, and to contrast aestheticized decay and dying with a new life in beauty and creativity" (Yazykova 2011: 40).

Riga understood and loved his friends – artists, poets, and hippies. He admired their individuality, creativity, rebelliousness, and their aspiration for "breaking into the world of the supernatural" (Prizyv

⁸ Jurenito is a character of Ilya Ehrenburg's novel "The Extraordinary Adventures of Julio Jurenito and his Disciples" (1922), a demonic antichrist personality – *Translator's note*.

1991/1992: 8). Yet, at the same time, he saw the deadliness of their ways: "the sweet-soul hippie ideals—we want love, we don't want war—unfortunately soon turned into alcoholism and drug addiction" (Riga 2005: 334-335). He was one of those who tried to make a protest against the Soviet reality positive, to offer a spiritual alternative to the Soviet system.

In Riga's circle and around it, there was naturally much counter-cultural youth. For instance, in early August 1972, Tallinn city *operativnyi otriad* (People's Volunteer Squad) together with police units performed a raid against hippies and apprehended the members of Riga's circle—around 30 people who were on a pilgrimage to Tallinn. During the apprehension, the police confiscated religious literature, samizdat, icons, and several books published abroad (RSACH: 24-25).⁹ The list of the youth apprehended for the verification of their identities by the law enforcement and Komsomol voluntary units included the organizer of the trip, Sandr Riga, a Moscow hippie Anatoly Binshtok, a leader of the Moscow "System" Yuri Burakov (*Solnce*), his friend, a rock musician Valery Varvarin, Riga hippie Oktai Bairamov, and others (RSACH: 27-35).

They were gathering not merely to study religious literature, but "to learn to live communally, where intellectual and spiritual self-perfecting were the means to strengthen brotherly love and mutual support" (Yazykova 2011: 40-41). The youth gathered at Riga's home for the fellowship and prayer and attended churches and houses of prayers of various confessions to pray and listen to sermons. Oftentimes, they organized trips to other cities and towns for the interdenominational fellowship, baptisms, and missions (Picture 5); Riga also attempted to fight the drug use among hippies. Besides Moscow, small ecumenical groups also appeared in Riga, Zhytomyr, and Vilnius.

The circle published a "Prizyv" journal—a fully underground samizdat journal, made with a typewriter. The editor of "Prizyv" was Riga himself while the authorship of articles was anonymous. The journal was secretly distributed among the religious youth and intelligentsia, students, hippies, and other members of the cultural underground.

In "Prizyv," the *ekumens* published the main principals of their faith: "Our aim is universal reconciliation in Christ through ecumenization,

⁹ I thank Juliane Fürst for the copy of this document.

liberalization, [and] evangelization of the world... with the consequent rule—in necessary things unity; in secondary things liberty; in all things love" (Samizdat, # 2626). They understood ecumenization as "a unity in the most general sense of the word;" liberalization as "a principal rejection of enforcing the views and societal organization by the means of violence," and evangelization as "a diffusion of the Kingdom of God in people's hearts" (Prizyv 1977: 200). In "Prizyv," there were historical notes on ecumenical movement, confessions of recent converts, the circle's daily matters, ecumenical opinion pieces, accounts on ecumenical and missionary trips around the country, and information on friendly movements abroad. The journal also regularly published confessional life stories of converts, oftentimes from hippie communities. Many of them went through drugs, alcohol, and suicide attempts.

The main worship service of the *ekumens*, which they called *agape* according to the ancient tradition, contained a call to reconciliation and forgiveness and reminded about the universal relationship of all people. Ideologically, they associated with teachings of Vladimir Solovyov, protoiereus Alexander Men, youth ecumenical movement Taize, the center of which was in France, the Italian catholic group "Comunione e Liberazione," and with the common spirit of the youth "Jesus Revolution."

The *ekumens* considered themselves participants of *the youth religious and social movement* and aimed towards a gradual construction of the "coordination center of the union of those interested in religious and moral renaissance of the society" (Prizyv 1974b: 7, 165) based of their community. They had far-reaching goals, counting on the continuous spiritual awakening of the whole Soviet society based on mutual love, free religiosity, tolerance, openness, and non-violence. All of their hopes were put on young people, "boldly reconsidering many values, open- and globally-minded, rejecting all rigidity and religious egoism" (Prizyv 1971: 33). They believed that the youth should take responsibility for the religious and moral renaissance of society.

The *ekumens* solidarized with similar movements abroad, both historical and contemporary. Especially spiritually close was considered the Taize movement, which also was known as a youth movement founded by hippies. The Riga circle wrote a letter to a "Brother Roger"

(Roger Louis Schütz-Marsauche, 1915-2005), the leader of the movement, and received a response (Prizyv 1973: 133-143). In the early fall of 1974, Taize organized a youth Council, which attracted a huge crowd of young Christians from 120 countries. Members of the Riga circle considered themselves participants of the Council *in absentia*. "Prizyv" dedicated one of its publications to that event: "For three days lasted that incredible gathering. Young people in blue jeans, hairy, with guitars, in couples and big groups, came together under a giant tent, which expanded above them like an autumn maple leaf. They reflected and prayed, had discussions, [and] exchanged their experiences of faith in the quest for a response to an eternal question: peace or war?" (Prizyv 1974a: 158-159)

A text titled "All power to Christ!" became the *ekumens'* manifesto of a certain kind. It was published in Issue 3 of "Prizyv" in 1972 and explicitly emphasized the idea of a global spiritual revolution, which is to be made by a believing youth. The article discussed the recent mentions in the international press, radio, television, and show business of the youth coming back to Christ, of "hippie in Christ", and a new "spiritual world revolution." The symbol of that youth movement on various continents was a great success of the rock opera "Jesus Christ Superstar." Those new countercultural Christians overcame their escapism and came out to the world in order to "sow the good news of our salvation." The article concluded with the call "to defeat a satanic ecumenism (global union in nuclear threat) with the godly ecumenism full of love and grace" (Prizyv 1972: 59-61).

A like-minded message to Riga's circle was presented in an article by American Baptist pastor Billy Graham (1918-2018), titled "The Jesus Revolution." That article was discovered in some American journal by a Baptist pastor Sokolov, who brought it to *ekumens*. They translated it and published in "Prizyv." The article discussed spiritual awakening among the American counterculture. Graham claimed that faith fully transformed the youth life: "The radically oriented students, only last year throwing bombs to state institutions, nowadays preach non-violence and turn the other cheek if there is a conflict with the police" (Prizyv 1974d: 81-83).

The closest friend of Riga was Zen Baptist (Vladimir Teplyshev. 1949-2009). He got his nickname for professing various religions. In

1976, Zen Baptist compiled a samizdat collection titled "Alternativa,"¹⁰ which included the best articles on the youth subculture and spiritual life of the Western youth from the Soviet and foreign press and excerpts from the texts significant for the Christian youth. He was especially interested in such topics as spiritual revolution, "new Christianity," and alternative communities. The collection had drawings of Zen Baptist himself, and its cover was decorated with a sign that combined a Christian cross and peace sign. In her interview, Irina Yazykova claimed that it was this samizdat almanac that in the mid-1970s, when she was a Moscow State University student, attracted her to Christianity (interview with Yazykova, 2015).

As an introduction to the reprint of the texts, Zen Baptist addressed hippies, writing:

Alternativa is not a book, it is a collection of opinions, contradictory views on the protest movement: *HIPPY*; *FLOWER-CHILDREN*; *JESUS-REVOLUTION*... Those who were running around the "street" [*strit*], gulping "pills" [*kolesa*], hanging out at a "spot" [*psikhodrom*] will understand. ...I dedicate this volume to them. To all who saw their life as a protest and struggle against violence, standards, and respectability. All of those who dreamed of freedom, happiness, and ultimate triumph of love. In the memory of those who are forgotten and disappeared from this world, [who] drank themselves to death or killed themselves. All of those who is defeated and suppressed by a crowd I want to help to understand that the "street" does not end at "Elisei,"¹¹ but goes much further...to the horizon...to eternity. All those who, while protesting, failed to realize that protest is an internal way of life, not clothing. Understand, a protest is the beginning of seeking for God, God of love, of poor... (*Alternativa* 1964-1976)

Sandr Riga was arrested in February 1984. In August of that year, he was convicted under Article 227 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for the organization of an unregistered religious group, the activities of which

¹⁰ The title page, as is tradition of a countercultural "discontinuity" (Yurchak 2006), had the following masthead: "Alternative/Альтернатива. San-Francisco-Москва, 1964-1976." There were just three copies made: one copy was lost, the second one is kept by Zen Baptist's widow in his personal archive, and the third one is in the Sandr Riga fonds in the University of Latvia Academic Library.

¹¹ "Elisei" refers to the notorious elite Eliseevsky grocery store in Moscow (also one under the same name in Leningrad), which had a significantly wider assortment (including, for instance, rare brands of alcohol) than any other store — *Translator's note*.

"were linked to infringement of the personal and citizens' rights," publishing of the "Prizyv" journal, and "knowingly disseminating the speculations that damaged the image of the Soviet state and social regime" (Samizdat, #5626). Diagnosed with slow progressive schizophrenia,¹² he was involuntarily placed in a special psychiatric hospital of Blagoveshchensk. Simultaneously, several other members of the ecumenical group from different cities were convicted for their religious and social activism. Only in March 1987 was Riga transferred to the psychiatric hospital of Riga and soon freed.

"A seminar on the problems of religious renaissance": Christian youth and coming revolution of consciousness

In March 1973, two young Orthodox men, Alexander Ogorodnikov and Vladimir Poresh, founded a "religious and philosophical seminar on the problems of religious renaissance," also known as "Ogorodnikov seminar" (Ellis 1990: 158-165). The movement oddly combined the characteristics of a hippie brotherhood, human rights activist group, and the Christian community (Picture 6). Ogorodnikov formulated the aim of their circle as an organization of a "lively religious community" (Pimonov 1999: 109) and Poresh amended: "to establish a zone of free living in an unfree society" (Poresh 1993: 95; Samizdat # 2602).

Aleksander Ioilievich Ogorodnikov was born in 1950 in Chistopol. A consistent idealist, in the context of the Soviet thaw he was an adventurer. At first, his biography developed in Komsomol in a heroic way – at 17, he worked as a machinist at a factory and was actively engaged in public activism and sport. He and his friends organized an independent Komsomol unit to fight crime. Their job was very dangerous but efficient.

During his studies at the Faculty of Philosophy, Ural University in Sverdlovsk, Ogorodnikov was already critical towards the Soviet ideology. His independent behavior and reading of samizdat led to his expulsion from the university. His home was searched and a criminal case was opened against him. In 1971, while under KGB supervision in Chistopol, Ogorodnikov escaped and enrolled in All-Union State Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) at the faculty of screenplay and cinema studies (Interview with Ogorodnikov, 2014).

¹² A conventional diagnosis in the Soviet psychiatry, presumably used for political reasons as a repressive method against dissidents – *Translator's note*.

At the same time, Ogorodnikov joined the hippies, got the respective appearance, hitchhiked, and worked as a handler and street cleaner. "His range of acquaintances is enormously wide" (Bulchuk n. d.). There were hippies, drug addicts, dissidents, and artists. In 1973, when Ogorodnikov already became Orthodox, he gathered a circle around him, the participants of which called themselves "Jesus people" (Ibid). He was detained several times by the police and KGB during his trips across the country.

In October 1973, Ogorodnikov was expelled while in his third year at the Institute. As the "*Khronika tekushikh sobytii*" [Chronicles of current events] bulletin reported, one of the reasons of his expulsion could be his attempt with fellow students to shoot a documentary on the unofficial spiritual life of the Soviet youth (Khronika 1976). About the same time, Ogorodnikov was planning to compile a volume of testimonies titled "How I came to believe," "in order, on the one hand, to summarize the existing experience and reflected upon it, and, on the other hand, to proclaim to the whole world of Russia's coming religious renaissance. Dozens of people agreed to contribute to the volume, yet the work was not completed" (Shchipkov 2003).

Further addressing his disagreement with the Soviet system, Ogorodnikov explained that he did not come to terms with the Marxist philosophy of self, where a human being is perceived solely as a "small screw in a political and economic system, mechanically conjoined with a huge flywheel of the state, that has no right to live according to its convictions" (Pimonov 1999: 108-109). According to Ogorodnikov, Marxism transformed from a scientific theory into a religion with the attributes of a cult: "with flags instead of church banners, portraits instead of icons, 'holy' remains instead of relics, and political instructions instead of the Bible. As a false religion, Marxism struggles most of all against religion, destroying the highest state of a human as an image and likeness of God" (Ibid). According to him, this manner of resisting the system he and his friends saw in a different formulation of the question of man, of conception of self, which is given in the Christian teachings (Ibid).

At that time, Ogorodnikov met a philologist from Leningrad, an employee of the Library of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Vladimir Poresh. Their first meeting in 1973 became a legend: "Vladimir Poresh was at the Nevsky prospekt. [He had] a beard, jeans, and long hair.

Along comes Ogorodnikov. [He also had] a beard, jeans, and very long hair. He straight out asked: 'Are you anti-Soviet [*antisovetchik*]?' – 'Yes,' Poresh answered to a stranger, slightly confused. 'Can I sleep over at your place then?'" (Shchipkov 2003)

Vladimir Poresh (born in 1949) was from Smolensk. His father was a rector of Smolensk Institute and his mother was a lecturer of political economy there. Trained as a philologist, Poresh worked as a junior researcher at the Leningrad branch of the Library of the Academy of Sciences, conducting research. He got baptized in October 1974. Together with Ogorodnikov, he became a leader of the seminar, simultaneously taking part in Leningrad Christian seminar. His friend, a poet named Oleg Okhapkin (1944-2008), referred to him as "full of virtuous beauty, deeply believing, pure, honest, and highly talented" (Samizdat # 4022: 19).

One of the participants of the Ogorodnikov seminar was Boris Razveev (1949-2011) – a Ufa hippie Razvei. In Ufa, there were stories that in the early 1970s, he went to a Soviet demonstration with a pig on a leash and, instead of a wristwatch, he had an alarm clock tied to his leg. He remembered that in 1972, while listening to Bach, he had experienced a vision that he would regard as a first encounter with the "metaphysical world," after which he would become interested in philosophy and religion (Lewis 2001: 166). On June 26, 1975, Razveev was baptized in his kitchen by Father Dmitrii Dudko. He sang on the kliros of the Cathedral of Ufa, frequently traveled across the country, aimed to become a priest, and faced persecutions.¹³

As Alexander Shchipkov, a seminar participant, reminisced, initially the seminar was organized for self-education: "It was the first step that attracted a lot of people, for we had no place to study. So we read lections to each other. All that was, at first, amateurish. One reads a book and, like at the university seminars, presents it to his fellows. Yet, in reality, that was not the main issue in our seminars; that was just a form. The main issue was fellowship, sleepless tea parties, [and] getting closer to each other. In reality, we were involved in

¹³ In 1984, Razveev was sentenced to four years of maximum-security prison for "the organization of a group that causes harm to the citizens' wellbeing" (Criminal Code article 227). In April 1986, he was blackmailed to make a confessional statement on the TV about his "attempt to organize an anti-Soviet underground under the religious coverage...under direct instructions [*po ukazke*] of the West." Soon after that, he was released from prison. In 1992, he was ordained a priest.

the process of organization of a Christian community, and at first, we could not realize it ourselves" (Shchipkov 2003). According to Poresh,

A community [*obshchina*] is a specific sort of interrelations in a small group between people tightly connected through some common experience and common destiny. That experience for us becomes a newly acquired faith, which unexpectedly opened us new horizons, unheard of. Faith was regarded as a gift of enormous freedom transferred by the Orthodox Tradition, Russian religious philosophy that disclosed Orthodoxy for us, an experience of ascetic monks, [the works of the] holy fathers, though mostly in someone's interpretation, all those called for creative thinking and action. No one saw the Church as a ready-made response to all problems, rather as a new life, in which everyone should find answers themselves. This is how we understood a Church Tradition: as principally open to what is new and hence existent (Poresh 1993: 94).

Approximately once a month, all the seminar participants, counting up to 30 or 40 people in different times, came together from different cities (apart from Moscow and Leningrad they came from Chistopol, Ufa, Kazan, Smolensk, Minsk, Riga, Kishinev, Grodno, and Lviv) to the meetings that were held in private apartments in Moscow, or rarely in Leningrad or Smolensk. Those were mostly young people, no older than 30. The meetings were high-spirited, with some elements of theater characteristic of the hippie culture: "In the janitor room on prospekt Mira, where Sasha [Ogorodnikov] lived and worked, his ballet 'Lenin super star' was staged. Negroes with machine-gun bullet chains on their waists represented Bolsheviks. They danced with *Bolshevichkas* dressed in red pantyhose scattering heavy smoke with *Belomor*.¹⁴ The public saw the *pas de trois* Lenin-Krupskaia-Dzerzhinsky as absolutely hysterical, and the final carrying of the leader's body was accompanied by a dispersion of hydrogen sulfide from specific bubbles. I've heard that this is how Hell smells" (Shchipkov 2003).

Most of the community members were from the congregation of Father Dmitrii Dudko. However, Father Dimitrii was rather concerned about their politics, activism, and spiritual independence.

¹⁴ *Belomorkanal* is the cheapest, strongest, and most popular Soviet brand of filterless cigarettes (*papirosy*). They often play a role of a cultural marker of everything Soviet – *Translator's note*.

Viewing the Church as liberating, the young people avoided "obedience," (*poslushaniie*) feeling that Father Dimitrii wanted to "subordinate [them] in the name of obedience." They left him and "perceived that as a relief of another burden" (Poresh 2018: 37-38). They were also in fellowship with Father Alexander Men, who attracted much of the youth those days, yet, according to Ogorodnikov, the community of Men was considered too elitist for them. An old-generation Orthodox dissident Anatoly Levitin-Krasnov admired them (Levitin-Krasnov 1981: 482-483). Later, archimandrite Ioann (Krestiankin) became a spiritual father of Ogorodnikov.

Among the attendees of the seminar, there were also foreigners, for instance, a member of an Italian Christian movement *Comunione e Liberazione* Leonardo Paleari. The seminar participants wrote a letter to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, asking him to connect them to American young Christians (Samizdat # 4022: 10) and attempted to connect to France and Czechoslovakia (Poresh 1993: 95). Shchipkov remembered that "around the seminar there were lots of temporary people, occasional and strange: snitches, tramps, catacomb Christians from the True Orthodox Church, [or] reformed Baptists. In those times, we discovered an enormous religious life in Russia" (Shchipkov 2003).

Since 1976, the seminar participants were constantly persecuted by the police and the KGB. They were detained on the streets, assaulted, involved in provocations, fired from jobs and expelled from educational institutions, their homes searched, and religious literature confiscated. Fighting for their rights, the seminar participants cooperated with the Christian committee for the religious rights in the USSR.

Just like *ekumens*, the seminar participants aimed towards the organization of the youth religious public *movement*. They considered themselves representatives of the religious community, i.e., active laymen, concerned with political and public issues. The seminar participants were certain that laymen should take control of renewing the world order for the sake of its renaissance based on the highest convictions of a Christian life. They did not merely study the religious and philosophical problems of their interest in a theological and historical manner, but also sent open letters defending the Church and its persecuted members.

Concerned with the problems of the recovery of a parish life, they attempted to implement the principles of communal living "on the ground" (Shchipkov 2003) in the manner of a hippie utopia, for which

purpose they bought a house with support of monks from the Pochaevskii monastery, located next to Redkino station in Kalinin region. "We dreamt of raising a tricolor Russian flag and declare a small autonomy on 1500 square meters where we would live by ourselves. Here's our house, our fence, our shed, summer garden, raspberries, and here we gather for our seminar. Since then, we only gathered in that house" (Shchipkov 2003).

The seminar participants saw themselves living in unusual and breaking time. "The 'new time' is a concept that we introduced to denote the beginning of a new religious era, the roots of which we traced up until the early Slavophiles time. We were confident that the era of new religious organic culture of new middle ages is coming" (Poresh 1993: 95-96). A new epoch was supposed to be "a time for the flourishing of the self, but not individualistic, rather a spiritual [*sobornoi*] one in an organic societal cosmos, pierced with meaning from top to bottom" (Ibid). The young people "believed that Orthodoxy contains a possibility of a new Christian civilization" and they believed "a communist regime would last for two or three years more" (Ibid). That reconstructionist societal and political mood was characteristic of the Ogorodnikov seminar, as compared to the Leningrad Christian seminar, which was more of an artistic kind (Ellis 1990: 180-181).

The logical conclusion of the seminar activities was an attempt to publish a journal titled "Obshchina." In the editorial to the second issue of the journal—the only one that has its materials preserved as a result of the reconstruction after confiscation—it was claimed that "[i]n our journal, we are focusing on the problems that our life creates for the contemporary Christian consciousness. Russian Orthodox Church reveals for us enormous creative energy, but, unfortunately, it is not always implemented. The journal is made by laymen, the freest people in the Church... We want to express on these pages the experience of the young and ailing generation that came to the Church to heal its wounds. Our generation does not only protest, but strives for positive action" (Summa 2002: 73).

The journal started from the "Bulletin # 1," compiled with active participation of Poresh in March 1977. The bulletin existed in a single copy and was found under Ogorodnikov's mattress and confiscated while he was in the hospital (Summa 2002: 74). It contained materials dedicated to the history of the seminar, religious seeking of the youth, persecutions of the seminar participants, direct repressions and campaigns against them

in the press, petitions in their support, materials on organization and activities of the Christian committee for the protection of the rights of believers in USSR, chronicles of Christian movement, and so on.

The next issue was titled "Obshchina" and was indicated as # 2. It was directly aimed at the wider circle to "support a spiritual renaissance of Russia, organization of the Community (brotherhood), deepening of Christian self-consciousness, and consolidation of independent Christian society" (Samizdat # 4022: 7). It was printed approximately on 300 pages in several copies and copied to a photo film. The printed copies were confiscated on May 21, 1978, by the prosecutor's office and the KGB during the search of the apartment of Tatiana Shchipkova – Shchipkov's mother, and a seminar participant (Samizdat # 4022: 3). That issue was eventually reconstructed and transferred to the West, after which all those working on the issue were arrested.

The journal began with an article titled "Roots and hopes," signed by Ogorodnikov, which was rather a result of a collective creation and was considered a "Declaration" of the seminar. In the harshest terms, it characterized the consequences of a socialist experiment with Russia and the destruction of Christian culture: "a horrible moral decline of the people, alcoholism, and a wave of barbaric criminal and delinquent terror that filled the night streets of Russian cities and towns with fear are the outcomes of socialist experiments... We wander like damned in the stench of big cities across the cemetery and burning remains of our Motherland. The poisonous smell, cynicism, and irony, offered to us by the world as normal kind of relationships and means of survival, corrupt our souls." The Soviet experiment, according to the authors of the "Declaration," resulted in the destruction of individuality and sociality at the same time: "The state practice bases on the assumption that a human being is silly, dumb, unable to conduct themselves, and needs strict regulation. We are being told what to read, what to watch, what to sing, and even whom to sleep with" (Poresh 1993: 97). Further in the text, it is discussed that the world is at the edge of a new consciousness and the youth is expected to construct a community as an independent world, capable of creativity and full of love and meaning (Ibid).

A further detalization of the concept of "new consciousness" was provided in Ogorodnikov's article "The culture of catacombs: On experience of the history of a generation" (Memorial, 169-2). The article began with the historical account describing the negative consequences of

the Bolshevik revolution and forceful secularization of the population. The current state of the country was regarded as the time of a total crisis of the Soviet system, which "already lost its living force and is only stapled by the means of army and bureaucratic apparatus" (Memorial, 169-2: 70). Ogorodnikov pointed out the beginnings of new dispositions that opposed the Soviet system and which were manifested in the works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the protest of Andrei Sakharov against nuclear tests, readings of Vladimir Mayakovsky on public squares, the emergence of a "democratic movement," and so on. As a result of those initiatives, in the space of all-encompassing control, blind spots arose – "the circles of people rejecting dead ideological forms and coming back to the lively human self" (Ibid). According to Ogorodnikov, in those blind spots, in the underground of a Soviet reality, a type of consciousness arose that led to a "second cultural reality," and by the 1970s, it had fully formed. That reality was capable of not merely opposing the Soviet system but also "blowing it up" from the inside.

"The second cultural reality' shapes a human being with non-Soviet thinking and way of life," claimed Ogorodnikov (Ibid). He argued that it is the youth that bears this new consciousness, with which it breaks the limitations of Soviet thinking and goes beyond the Soviet system. Hippies, according to him, is the infantile, yet the most spectacular expression of that escape. The hippie movement in the USSR was the most massive youth movement. "Due to the shady forms and sporadic nature it includes left radicals, black-market speculators, drug addicts, and the golden youth [*tsentroviki*]. Yet, hippie [movement] is a sporadic protest against vulgarity and forceful manufacturing of the human self, and it is in the hippie consciousness that religious seekings arise from a metaphysical anxiety and unfulfillment" (Ibid).

Ogorodnikov admired that outsiders appeared in the Soviet society, who left the jobs they were used to, their everyday comfort, rejected their social careers, and started working as night guards, janitors, and stokers. Rejecting the false and vulgar existence, they welcomed life less socially significant, yet morally pure. Ogorodnikov considered that kind of youth as participating in a spiritual and moral revolution, the essence of which was "Live not by lies," as in Solzhenitsyn's call. "Our revolution is a revolution of consciousness, revolution of spirit and values" (Memorial, 169-2: 75).

In the fall of 1978, Ogorodnikov was convicted under the Criminal Code Article 209 (social parasitism [*tuneyadstvo*]) to a year of correctional labor. Six other participants of the seminar were arrested the following year: Tatiana Shchipkova (a lecturer in philology at Smolensk pedagogical institute), Vladimir Burtsev from Moscow, Viktor Popkov from Smolensk, Sergei Ermolaev, Lev Regelson, and Vladimir Poresh. In 1979, right before the expected release from prison, Ogorodnikov was convicted for the second time under Article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) to seven years in prison and five years of exile.¹⁵ In 1985, he received a new sentence under Article 180 for three years. He was released in 1987.

Poresh was arrested less than a year after Ogorodnikov, in 1980. He was sentenced to five years in maximum-security prison and three years in exile (article # 70-1, Criminal Code of the USSR). In October 1984, he received a new conviction – three years of maximum-security prison – for the "persistent disobedience to the administration of the correctional institution." He was granted amnesty in 1986.

When Ogorodnikov was already in prison, Poresh compiled an address "Young Russia to young America," the text of which was published in samizdat after his arrest with the signatures of the seminar participants that were still free: Burtsev, Popkov, Shchipkova, Regelson, and Sokolov. The address started with the word "Brothers!" In the manner of "The culture of catacombs," young Soviet Christians proclaimed: "In spiritual seeking and battles of contemporary humanity, we and you have taken the most dangerous and ungracious role – to become leaders of a new world that is coming at the edge of the decisive turn of history." The address discusses the coming spiritual uprising and appearance of a "new hero, new actor, new type of human sociality" (Samizdat # 4021: 1).

Authors wrote that the youth in USSR felt gratitude to the American youth for

the spirit of liberation that went through the holes of the customs barriers and infernal uproar of radio jammers... Thanks to your example, dozens and hundreds of thousands of young people in our country have

¹⁵ Alexander Dvorkin, an ex-hippie who converted to the Orthodox faith in emigration, participated in the Christian solidarity campaign in New York in May 1980. It involved a one-day hunger strike and a prayer meeting next to the UN building (Dvorkin 2013: 340).

already broken free from the choking garrote of totalitarian ideological enforcement. They become outcasts and outsiders, they form an unbroken stream on the roads and small paths of our Motherland, recovering the bloodstream of her enormous and almost dead organism. They sing your songs, wear your clothes, and welcome your life values. The major ones are freedom, sincerity, humanity and love for the Earth. The hippie movement that spread from yours to ours in several years transformed the image of the young generation in our country. In Russia, the Christian youth finds refuge from total lies of the Soviet culture in the Church, and the way to liberation and brotherhood in Christ. They know that Christ is a liberator, not a lawgiver, and he strives to build the world independent and free in the inside, capable of creativity and development, the world full of Love and Meaning (Samizdat # 4021: 2-6).

Spiritual revolution as a myth: Mikhail Bombin and Alexander Karev on countercultural youth movement

It is difficult to verify whether the conceptions of spiritual revolution or revolution of consciousness were widely supported among the Soviet hippies. Samizdat and personal archives only demonstrate singular testimonies of how certain participants of the "System" persistently described the hippie community concerning religious and public movement attempting to change reality, which hardly matched the ideal situation.

After release from prison in the late 1980s, Ogorodnikov was publishing a journal "Bulletin of Christian youth," one issue of which contained an article by Mikhail Bombin (1951-2011), one of the informal leaders of the Soviet hippies, titled "Looking for a City" (*Vzyskuiia Grada*).¹⁶ Bombin stood out among the apolitical Soviet hippies because of his civic engagement, an overt strive to turn the community into a movement – anti-Soviet, pacifist, religious, and public. From the early 1970s, he read and spread samizdat, including the religious one (Samizdat # 5797; Samizdat 5798; Silins 1986), and was in contact with dissidents. Already in the mid-1970s, he became Orthodox. In the 1980s, he sang in the church choir of a Pokrov Church in Rīga.

Primarily, because of Bombin's efforts, Latvia in 1978-1993, became a traditional summer campsite for hippies (Picture 7). Bombin called those "pacific camps." Summer tented camps of hippies were situated

¹⁶ Hebrews 13:14: "For here we do not have an enduring city, but we are looking for the city that is to come" (NIV) – *Translator's note*.

in the area of forest lakes between the railroad stations Gauja and Līlaste. Around 200 people from all of the country went through the camp every summer, 30 people or more could be there at the same time. The participants remembered that in the late 1970s, Bombin brought a priest to Gauja, Father Nikolai, who held baptisms¹⁷. No less than five campers later became priests.

In his article, Bombin attempted to represent a hippie movement as an unconscious longing for Church, imitating Christ and first Christians. "Hippies of the 60s-early 70s were in a way 'catechumen.' As a matter of fact, those were the people, who neither loved the world nor what's in the world, looking for another Kingdom, another City" (Bombin 1987). According to him, there are characteristics that allow considering hippies to be, though peculiar, yet a spiritual movement. "These are seeking for better human relationships and striving for brotherhood, for community ('that is, unconsciously, for Church'), rejecting the social environment, and striving for truth ('maybe not always successful, yet almost always sincere seeking for truth'). Poverty and asceticism made a rule, 'childishly naive, genuine, and even a heroic overt imitation of Christ,' and 'constant, and even to an extent tense readiness to answer the call: 'Follow me!'" (Ibid).

In the article "Looking for a City," consciously idealizing the hippie movement, Bombin described a hippie summer camp as pacifist and Orthodox: "Peace camp on Gauja [river]. You end up in a different world. It may not be smooth, but under the pine trees lit by the dawning sun a prayer never stops: 'Our Father in heaven...' Many travelled here for thousands of kilometers...' Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come...' Holding hands these, maybe different, people are now as one: 'Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven...'"¹⁸

A Tartu University student Alexander Karev (1958-1981), in the late 1970s, was a hippie and considered himself a Tolstoyan. He grew up in Leningrad, was friends with Viktor Rezunkov (1958-2017) from the school years, was close to the circle around the poetess Kari Unksova

¹⁷ I thank Juliane Fürst for the information, which she received from Mikhail Bombin. Most probably, the hippie "Baptism" on Gauja River in 1978 was not performed by a priest, but rather by Konstantin Skrobotov, who was a reader (*psalomshchik*) of the Elokhovskii church and became a priest later.

¹⁸ Matthew 6:9-10, NIV – *Translator's note*.

(1941-1983) and hippies in Tallinn, loved rock music, and experimented with drugs.

According to the memoirs of Rezunkov, "Karev became interested in Tolstoy already when he studied in a shipbuilding institute... Right after school, Karev started his national-religious seekings. He tried – and it lasted up to the end of his life – to self-identify precisely in religious terms" (Gordeeva 2017). "But you're Russian, Vit'ka," Karev told him, calling him up to get into Tolstoyism, which he characterized as a kind of a national religion of freedom. He described it as follows: "Love your God, and all the rest will be given to you. You need this basis, otherwise, the enjoyment of the sweetness of theosophy will be corrupted and superficial. Tolstoy didn't 'scratch the surface,' he got himself into NOT LYING for his own comfort, as it has been, is still, and will be done by the millions of presumably good people, who took art apart from canvas, a building with towers and weathercocks apart from its basement, and religious jolly and holy secret apart from one's own necessary revival" (Rezunkov 1978: 4).

In his correspondence with friends, Karev frequently mentioned Tolstoy and jokingly claimed that Tolstoy supported the countercultural youth. His own marginality and marginality of the community he belonged to did not bother, but rather inspired him: "A mess is closer to God than a similar rule-abiding beauty. He is, I'm positive, gracefully looking at us, looking for *our own* way towards Him – with an attitude! God will help us! He says: 'An explosion is freedom!'" (Rezunkov 1979b) In September 1978, Karev was amongst the countercultural pilgrims who came to Yasnaya Polyana for Tolstoy's anniversary.

In 1978, Karev started his studies at Tartu University and became a student of Yuri Lotman. In the university, because of his own religious and philosophical preferences, he began studying the topic of national religious movements in Russia. In his study notes, preserved by Rezunkov, there are summaries from the literature and other sources on the history of Tolstoyism – "free Christianity," old-believers, dukhobory, and other Christian-anarchist movements.

Karev's interest to sects and Tolstoyism was combined with the ideas of psychedelic revolution. He borrowed them from Charles A. Reich, who, in his book "The Greening of America" (1970), introduced a notion "Consciousness III" or "New Consciousness." This book was notorious among young people because of mentions in the

works of Soviet philosophers and sociologists. Karev's correspondence with his friends in the late 1970s was full of hopes that as a result of the "revolution of consciousness," the "countercultural" Consciousness III would replace the individualist bourgeois Consciousness I and corporative bourgeois Consciousness II. "The way out of the present is necessary. The culture that surrounds us, the concentration camp culture, is on its deathbed; the crowd next to its bed cold-bloodedly observes more and more symptoms of the terminal illness. Our consciousness is being raped every day (and we only occasionally notice it!). It is being raped by those who have no right, no knowledge, no dignity even to the one-thousandth of what they are doing. I repeat, if not us, who will do everything possible to fight against it?" (Rezunkov 1979a: 4)

Karev argued that a "moral tension" or "cultural discontent" had arisen in the country. It embraced "more and more people, and those people whom we used to regard as 'great guys' [*vumatnyie shtrikhi*]" (Rezunkov 1978: 4-5). Considering himself and his friends "representatives of a 'narco-mystical wing of the youth subculture of protest,'" Karev was confident that he lived in rupture times: "all 'cool' [*nishtyaki*] and 'swell' things [*vumaty*],¹⁹ which I considered unconnected to each other (what could be in common, I used to think, between the early Christianity, Salvador Dali, and the Beatles), come together in a sort of harmonic unity. It is a world of a different reality, different life plan, different culture" (Rezunkov 1979a: 7). The signs of a coming uprising he saw in the notorious protest of the youth on July 4, 1978, on the Dvortsovaya Square in Leningrad, against a cancellation of the concert of Santana, and in a spontaneous gathering of the hippies at Yasnaya Polyana on the anniversary days of September 1978²⁰: "WE ARE PLENTY!! Believe me. I have never thought this is possible. A moral tension (you couldn't think of anything better now), a confidence that something needs to be done right now, with no hesitation, is in the air and spreading to an unimaginable lot of people!.. The almanac (15-20 authors, poetry and prose) is in print already—it is *our almanac*, we own it. The exhibitions of *our artists*, *our concerts*, *our theaters* are organized. The people unite—this is what is most important now. Have we ever dreamt of such happiness?" (Rezunkov 1979a: 7)

¹⁹ In the slang of drug users, these mean great and pleasant things.

²⁰ Tolstoy's 150th anniversary — *Translator's note*.

Karev realized that his expectations did not go well with reality:

Let it be a myth. Yet this myth makes us like the early Christians waiting for the second coming, who saw Christ in beggars on the road, who looked for the testimonies of the coming reign of Antichrist everywhere. So what, didn't they live to see a grand uprising?

Let it be a myth, but a myth that goes under one's skin and creates an undefeated COMMONNESS. Myth that gives confidence and feeling of coming changes. Lastly, it's a myth that IMPACTS THE PRESENT, prepares one to fight against the existing. I believe, and I'm ready to give up everything for that (Rezunkov 1979a: 7-8).

Alexander Karev died on June 22, 1981, committing suicide after getting to a psychiatric hospital.

Thus, the study of Christian samizdat of the countercultural youth of the 1970s to mid-1980s reveals that in Christianity, the youth was mostly attracted by the forms of sociality alternative to the Soviet ones and accomplished in a Christian community. The leaders of a Christian social movement linked their hopes to form such a community with specific, non-Soviet features of the countercultural youth consciousness. The most radical Christians, who came from the youth counterculture, counted on the youth Christian movement to become a sociocultural foundation for the future revolution of consciousness – spiritual and religious and moral revolution. The generation of a Christian youth of the late 1970s-early 1980s was confident that such a revolution had already begun, and Russia and the whole world stand at the door of a global spiritual change and great spiritual works.

Translated by Igor Mikeslin.

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PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITIES

Invisible Pastorship under Persecutions: Women in Evangelical Communities of Post-War USSR

Nadezhda Beliakova, Ekaterina Mironova

Introduction

At the end of 1962, the Officer of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) of Tambov region¹ received a "report note" (*dokladnaia zapiska*) from the senior pastor of the community of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (ECB) of Tambov, Vasilii Gorulko. The note stated:

This is to inform you that as appointed to me by AUCECB², according to letter #1401, dated October 9, 1962, I attended the Rasskazovo community of Evangelical Chr[istians] Baptists on the 8th of November, this year. As I arrived, I witnessed the following: the community consists of approximately 20-25 members aged 30 and older. The senior pastor is formally Zheltova Anna Ivanovna, and all the community issues are dealt with by Terekhova Antonina Trofimovna. Terekhova orders the holding of church services and she also arranges the newcomers members and excommunications. Moreover, in late June of this year, without any permission, Terekhova herself performed a water baptism of the factory youth from Tambov in the river, including Tuev Vasiliy Grigoryevich, Mukin Gennady Stepanovich, Kuznetsov Anatoly Alekseevich, and others. A. T. Terekhova, following the example of her husband, is

¹ Central Russia, approximately 500 km southeast of Moscow – *Translator's note*.

² All-Union Council of ECB – *Translator's note*.

hostile towards the current legislature on religious cults and does what she feels right (Terekhova's husband has been convicted for anti-Soviet activities) (Tambov 1).

This brief message introduces us to the peculiar world of Soviet Baptists during the times of Khrushchev's antireligious campaign. In our paper, we concentrate on the nuanced issue of gender relations in Evangelical communities of the Soviet period, commonly overlooked by researchers. We look into the extent to which the distribution of social roles and functions within religious communities was determined by gender, and how the contemporaries perceived and described male and female roles in the Evangelical Baptist communities of the post-War period. We focus on one case involving the female leader of the Baptist community in the small town of Rasskazovo, one of the regional centers of the Tambov region.

We use the materials on Terekhova from the archival fonds of the Office of the Council for Religious Affairs of the Tambov region. Some of the documents used in our study are taken from correspondence between the *Upolnomochennyi* (officer) and the all-Union CRA; others from the registration files of the Rasskazovo community. The third category of papers result from the activities of local authorities involved in anti-religious propaganda and control of the emergent religious life of ECB in the Tambov region. In addition, the data on Terekhova and her successor and co-worker, Zheltova, is taken from biographical interviews with believers of the Tambov region, conducted by Nadezhda Beliakova in 2014 and Ekaterina Mironova in 2015-2016. We managed to extract significant data from the materials of a so-called ethnographic expedition of A. Klibanov, stored in the archives of the Institute of the Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences. Moreover, in December 2018, Mironova conducted an interview with a direct participant of the expedition – Ella Liagushina (married name Komissarova) – who conducted her participant observations with her colleague Irina Malakhova in the ECB community of Rasskazovo in 1959. The crucial materials for clarifying the situation within the Union of ECB are deposited in the archives of the contemporary Union of the ECB. Access was courteously granted by Aleksey Sinichkin. The photo archives of the Moscow ECB community confirmed the "official status" of the photograph of the Rasskazovo community, which we place in our chapter.

The town of Rasskazovo: Local religious context

The Tambov region, as well as the Central Black Earth Region, was one of the centers of active religious life, attracting even Soviet scholars of religion. They were mostly interested in numerous adherents of the True Orthodox Church.³ However, there were many different religious communities, and the materials that we take from the local archives break the stereotypes of various denominations held by the scholars of religion.

As for the Evangelical communities that we study, at the beginning of the Khrushchev's antireligious campaign, there were four registered ECB communities in the Tambov region: in Tambov, Rasskazovo, Nizhnee Ustye, and Alkuzhinskiye Borki of the Morshanskii raion. As the officer of the CRA reported, there were unregistered groups in at least eight villages.⁴

The small town of Rasskazovo, mentioned in the documents cited at the beginning of the chapter, was traditionally a Molokan⁵ center, and even in 1946, Molokans compiled a list of 389 people, collected the necessary documents, and attempted to register their community. The archive of the local CRA officer even contains the message from the believers of that denomination (who called themselves Spiritual Christians [Molokan] Evangelizers) on their relation to mandatory military service, forwarded to the local Party committee on the 7th of May 1946: "Our active participation in the Great Patriotic War proves that our old beliefs and teachings, expressed in the following conviction: 'do not give oaths or vows, do not bear arms, do not fight the enemy,' we now consider incompatible and wrong. We reassure our government that like our fathers and forefathers, we will serve our beloved Motherland with a pure Christian faith based on the law of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Tambov 3). From the archival documents, we learn that in 1946, the

³ A community that separated from the dominant Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in the early Soviet period — *Translator's note*.

⁴ The officer mentioned the following villages: "There are unregistered, yet active groups in the villages of Moiseevo of Uvarovskii raion, Fedorovka of Lamskii raion, Turmasovo of Michurinskii raion, Vyachka of Kirsanovskii raion, Rysli, Pogorelovo, N. Tomnikovo of Algasovskii raion, Vorontsova of Morshanskii raion, and other places" (Tambov 2).

⁵ Molokans are the old Russian Christian community, also known as Spiritual Christians, regarded by the Russian Orthodox Church as heretics — *Translator's note*.

officer was considering the possibility of an official union of the Raskazovo Molokans and Baptists, but when he referred to this initiative to the CRA in Moscow, he received the following clarifications: "The Council for Religious Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR hereby clarifies that Evangelical Christians-Baptists and Spiritual Christians (Molokans) are substantially different religious movements. Unlike Evangelical Christians and Baptists, Spiritual Christians (Molokans) totally reject water baptism and breaking of bread, i.e., Holy Communion. Due to critical disagreements in their teachings, there could be absolutely no union of the two religious groups that you mentioned. Evangelical Christians-Baptists have their religious center in the city of Moscow, which manages all the local communities through the power of regional Officers; the Spiritual Christians do not have their presiding religious center and do not consider this issue as a part of their agenda" (Tambov 4). The attempts to register a Molokan community in Rasskazovo in 1946, either as independent or as a union with local Baptists, were unsuccessful. The state-level officials stuck to the argument against the state registration of Molokans based on their presumed radical pacifism.⁶ However, Molokans continued gathering for common prayers and held Molokan weddings in Rasskazovo even in the 1960s.

Female leader(s) of the Evangelical Christian-Baptist community in Rasskazovo

Nevertheless, an ECB community was registered in Rasskazovo. Nowadays, it is clear that the registration of ECB all over the USSR had been possible because of the formation of the all-Union organization – AUCECB – which basically became an umbrella structure for the Evangelical Christian communities of a different kind (Beliakova 2019). The leaders of the Rasskazovo community managed to prepare

⁶ This is confirmed with the case of Molokans from Rasskazovo. As a continuation of the cited documents, the reasons to ban the registration of the Molokan community in Rasskazovo, more sufficient than the difference between the convictions of faith of Molokans and Baptists, are mentioned: "Accordingly, it is necessary to note that amongst the ten commandments of the teachings of Molokans, there are the ones such as: do not give vows or oaths, do not bear arms or fight the enemies with arms. Naturally, if the Rasskazovo group adheres to these commandments, it cannot obviously be registered" (Tambov 5).

the documentation in a brief period before the fall of 1947, when the registration of religious organizations abruptly stopped.⁷ Already in the documents of 1946, there was an emerging narrative about the leader of the Rasskazovo Evangelical community ("a cult leader," according to Soviet terminology), which does not fit the conventional Soviet pattern: it was a woman. The Tambov officer had to request permission from the central bureau of the CRA to appoint Antonina Terekhova as a presbyter. The officer characterized Terekhova as follows: "The deaconess of Rasskazovo ECB community, Terekhova, was born in 1895 in the town of Rasskazovo. Never convicted. Barely literate. She has one son serving in the Soviet Army, her daughter works as a teacher in Ural. In conversations with her, Terekhova repeatedly claimed that neither her daughter nor son has ever attended a congregation; and they saw the practice of any religious belief negatively. T. herself is superstitious up to the point of fanaticism. She's capable of defamation if it serves to strengthen the community and its influence" (Tambov 6) (Picture 8).

The response classified as "secret," signed by the deputy chairman of the CRA Yu. Sadovskii, contained the following directive: "The ECB communities can only have a man as a presbyter. AUCECB has been informed about the situation in Rasskazovo ECB community, where 100% of the congregants are women, in order to take all necessary measures. However, the prayer meetings in the community could be allowed, with the appointment of A. T. Terekhova as a chairman⁸ of the community. She (Terekhova) can also lead the services without the right of giving a communion and baptism of new members" (Tambov 7: 25).

Taking a close look at the materials in our possession, one may notice that there were two women leading the Rasskazovo ECB community, which is apparent from the document cited at the beginning of the chapter. One of them is Antonina Trofimovna Terekhova, whose fate remains mostly unknown to us. It is established that Terekhova is her married name from her husband Pavel Vasilievich Terekhov (an ECB minister in Rasskazovo in the 1930s), who was sentenced in 1937 to 10

⁷ We know that the registration of communities was stopped by the order of the Council of Ministers of USSR #4055-1626c, dated October 28, 1948, withdrawing the order on opening the houses of prayer (State 1).

⁸ Here, a "chairman" (*predsedatel*) instead of "chairwoman" (*predsedatel'nitsa*) is used in presumably neutral meaning — *Translator's note*.

years in prison and posthumously rehabilitated in the second half of the 1950s.⁹

The other female leader of the community was Anna Ivanovna Zheltova, who had a Molokan background. That is why, in our study, we specifically mention the Molokan context of the ECB community and the strong influence of the Molokan background on the everyday life of the Rasskazovo Baptist community. Zheltova's baptism was negatively met by the neighboring Molokans and led to the distancing of their relations. However, nowhere in the criticism of Zheltova's behavior was her gender articulated and no attempts were made to influence her through patriarchal family structures. According to the recollections of her daughter, Olga Aleksandrovna Smolianova, Zheltova was one of the official initiators of the registration of the ECB house of prayer in Rasskazovo after the War, and her status of a large-family mother¹⁰ made her more immune to the oppression from authorities: "Mother told me that when they started arrangements to open a house of prayer in Rasskazovo, she was detained by the KGB for three days. Yet, because she had a bunch of kids, she was set free. It was in the 1940s. There was nothing of that kind afterwards, but she was under constant control" (Interview with O. Smolianova, cited by Chernov and Pronina, 2013: 306). According to Zheltova's daughter, female leaders consecutively replaced one another in the community. "At first, Aunt Tonya Terekhova was a presbyter [...] and when she died, my mother became a presbyter. At that time, my mother was the only woman in the Baptist union." Moreover, she subscribed to the "Science and religion" journal and "some Baptist journal from Moscow" (Interview with O. Smolianova, cited by Chernov and Pronina, 2013: 305). This information was revealed by Zheltova's daughter in the interview in order to emphasize the extraordinary qualities of her mother as a preacher, known and recognized in the capital, a true religious virtuoso in a Weberian sense. However, the question of the extent to which these women handed over the ministry to each other remains open.

Nowadays, we cannot determine the distribution of authority between these women with certainty. However, it is absolutely clear that

⁹ According to the E. Liagushina (Comissarova)'s data, Pavel Terekhov was executed in 1939 (History 1: 39).

¹⁰ An official status of *mnogodetni* (having multiple children) with considerable benefits was and still is awarded to mothers or families with three or more children—*Translator's note*.

at least for two decades, they structured the activities of Evangelical Christians in Rasskazovo around themselves. They also were under constant hostile supervision by the local authorities.

Thus, Anna Zheltova was a married large-family mother, whose husband, later in the after-War period, was baptized "by faith" in the Evangelical community. Antonina Terekhova was a widow; she had two adult children and grandchildren. Sources point out that both women were pious, gave sermons during services, and generally loved to speculate on biblical topics. Zheltova's daughter shared: "Mother only had three years of school education, but she could talk for hours and discussed everything. She always prepared for the sermons: opened her Bible, read, and reflected. She often discussed biblical issues with my father after his baptism (he was a Molokan). For her, the prayer meetings were the top priority" (Chernov and Pronina 2013). Zheltova's daughter said that after the death of Zheltova's husband, the meetings could be held simply in her home. The sermon was important, and probably the major calling for both women.

The persuasiveness, brightness, and imagery of Antonina Terekhova's sermons is represented in the field diaries of other women—I. Malakhova and E. Liagushina (Komissarova), who observed the religious life of Rasskazovo from the other side—as representatives of the secular power. Liagushina and Malakhova ended up in Rasskazovo as a part of the notable expedition of A. Klibanov to the Tambov region in 1959. It was them, the young doctoral students of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who conducted participant observation of the everyday practices of the ECB (professor Klibanov was more interested in the adherents of the True Orthodox Church). Observing the services in Rasskazovo, Ella Liagushina described the specificity of Terekhova's sermons in her diaries: "All these biblical tenets a female preacher (Terekhova) intertwined with life imagery (stroke through, replaced with "examples"), and she very gently switched to other subjects" (History 1: 31). In their diaries, the researchers often noted the eschatological expectations in Terekhova's sermons: "Christ forgives his children, their sins, but to a certain point in time. The time is not indicated, but Christ is coming very-very soon! [...] This will not merely be the greatest day for believers, but the day of ultimate judgment for non-believers" (Ibid: 30). "Very-very soon (we all know that) Christ is coming", "...soon Christ is coming, and we must be prepared" (Ibid: 28).

It is difficult to indicate the pertinence and specificity of eschatological sentiments in Rasskazovo's religious setting, as we realize the researchers mostly indicated, in their diaries, the issues politically relevant to them. However, a different thing is important for us here: the secular interviewers emphasized the persuasiveness and significance of Terekhova's preaching. For instance, when E. Liagushina compared her to a visiting preacher from Tambov, she noted he was "no match for her" (Ibid: 32). Another time, she wrote of Terekhova: "She is a very smart woman, radically different from the rest of believers; she's very authoritative" (Ibid: 31). Her colleague, Irina Malakhova, also noted the unorthodox qualities of this Baptist activist: "A smart, collected woman; and, although her speaking is not very smooth, it is lucid, expressive, [and] attractive to listeners. She is of a different world than the whole congregation" (History 2).

In the interview, recorded by Ekaterina Mironova in December 2018, Ella Komissarova (Liagushina), reminiscing about her experience with the Tambov expedition, highlighted the story of a "Rasskazovo presbyter." The image of Terekhova is so vivid to this researcher that even after six decades, she literally reproduced her own field diary discussing the female minister from the Tambov region: "I really liked it in Rasskazovo. The Baptist leader there was a woman. A woman exactly. And a very smart woman, very calm and collected. She was a very sympathetic woman. A very calm, I'd say, a very intelligent woman. I don't remember any other Baptist women as clearly. The presbyter — yes, a woman. I do remember her. Why do I remember her? Her sermons? Her manner of communication? The way she talked, the way she behaved — I say! She was a wonderful leader and a strong personality" (Interview of Liagushina by Mironova, December 6, 2018).

Irina Malakhova, a colleague of Liagushina, described in her field diary a church service led by Terekhova on the 5th of July 1959: "There were 34 people present at the prayer meeting. There were wildflowers on a table, a home-baked round white bread between them, covered with a cloth with 'Do this in remembrance of me'¹¹ embroidered on it. There was a jar of wine next to it. The sermons were ordinary, more on the Passion of Christ, with the emphasis on the betrayal of Christ by Judas. 'Who betrays, it would be better for him if he had not been

¹¹ Luke 22:19 — *Translator's note.*

born,¹² a call for strengthening the faith, the end coming soon, special prayers for the blood and body of Jesus [...] Then Terekhova prayed before (illegible – "before" or "upon") this 'awesome act' and proceeded to breaking of bread. She made holes in it, broke it in two, and crumbled it into the bowl. Then she gave a warning that the bread could only be taken by the baptized and those who had no doubts in their faith. Three people didn't take the bread" (History 2: 38). The field note cited here contains the description of the Holy Communion in the Rasskazovo ECB community, which normally occurred once a month. The description reflects a typical structure of this sacred act. A researcher, Malakhova documented this event without any special analysis of the situation, having seen nothing unusual or uncharacteristic for the "Evangelical cult." However, according to sources of state origin, the question of the performance of rites in the Rasskazovo community was the subject of a discussion between state institutions in the early 1950s. In his letter to the chair of the central CRA I. Polianskii in Moscow, a local CRA officer A. Zavorykin reported¹³:

In my letter #5/c on the 28th of March 1950, I asked you to inform me whether it is possible to permit monthly visits to a presbyter of Tambov ECB community Ugadov, in order to perform the rites which are not permissible for a woman, as in the Rasskazovo community the ordained one is a woman. At the Council meeting, that took place on the 4-8 of April, which I attended, you and comrade Zadorozhnii instructed me not to allow Ugadov's visits, but to find a presbyter from the local men, or to arrange with a presbyter Zharkikh a transfer [of a minister] from Voronezh. Previously, I instructed Zharkikh to transfer a presbyter to the Rasskazovo community from Voronezh. [...] As for me, I consider the permission to the visits of Ugadov to Rasskazovo impossible, for it increases the position of Ugadov not only in Tambov, but also in Rasskazovo communities. Secondly, the Rasskazovo community will obviously activate. And thirdly, he agreed to transfer a presbyter from Voronezh, but they consider the community weak and unable to pay a salary to the presbyter transferred from Voronezh. Hence, the Rasskazovo community intends to covertly strengthen itself and then to develop its activities (Tambov 8).

¹² Indirect quotation of Matthew 26:24 – *Translator's note*.

¹³ Here and further the authors' punctuation and orthography (in the Russian original – *Translator's note*) is often problematic.

This document clearly shows that Terekhova's ministerial activities seriously concerned the local officer and he repeatedly attempted to attract the state department's attention to her affairs. The Officer's take on "the woman question" was not stable. It depended on the context. For instance, the visits of the ministers from other communities to Rasskazovo for the monthly breaking of bread were totally rejected by the officer. In 1958, the Officer reported to the CRA in Moscow: "...the deputy presbyter Bulgakov raised a question about a possibility of sending one brother from preachers of Tambov community to perform the breaking of bread in Rasskazovo community, for according to the article in the last issue of *"Vestnik bratstva,"* women cannot perform the breaking of bread. I responded to him that either he, or the journal is wrong! Up until that moment, a woman could perform the breaking of bread, and then it suddenly became forbidden. These issues are not that simple. Obviously, there should be a big meeting – a council of the Baptist representatives – and at this council such issues could be resolved. The community has been registered with a deaconess, hence she can perform the breaking of bread. The representative from Tambov has nothing to do in Rasskazovo. Both communities are independent" (Tambov 9).

The main line of the officer, represented in this document, is absolutely clear: he did not want to allow visits of ministers from the other communities of the region, for it could stimulate the religious life in Rasskazovo. We are, however, intrigued by this document for it shows the ambitions of the officer to act as an expert in ECB dogmatics and to form the patterns of decision-making. In this regard, the officer's line manifested his support of Terekhova. As a matter of fact, the precedent of performing the breaking of bread by Terekhova legitimized her performance of this rite. However, it is obvious the officer was not so much supportive of Terekhova leading the church services, rather, he was encouraged by the discrepancies and instability of the community's religious life. Terekhova's leading position, according to his logic, made marginalization and decline of the community more likely.

Apparently, in the early 1950s, the officer attempted to abort the registration of the Rasskazovo community because of the absence of the community's "regular worship practice". He tried to cancel its registration, labeling the community as "declining" (most of the religious

communities in rural areas were stripped of their registration with this formulation). In that context, the passivity of Terekhova, meticulously documented, was beneficial to him: "Due to the fact that in the registered ECB community, all rites are not performed, there are hesitations among the believers, [and] the uncertainty of the full scale of their activities" (Tambov 7: 59). Even in the later years, the officer reported on the decreased activities of the Rasskazovo community because of "ineffective" female leadership. He reported that "Presbyter Terekhova is mostly busy as a grandmother with her grandchildren, who are often sick. As she wants to support her children in their misfortunes, she stays close to her grandchildren. In fact, the community is presently without an inspirational leader." (Tambov 10); "Presbyter Terekhova is much busier with her grandchildren, the children of her daughter, who works as a teacher at school. Probably, there is an influence from this daughter, a member of the C[ommunist] P[arty] [of the] S[oviet] U[nion]. Anyways, it's apparent that Terekhova is not as active as she used to be" (Tambov 9).

Nevertheless, we are inclined to presume the Officer forcibly exaggerated the instability of the community's religious life. According to different sources of the mid-1950s, Terekhova was a registered community leader and she ensured the full-fledged religious life of the community, which is reflected in the excerpt from Malakhova's field diary cited above.

The female leaders of Rasskazovo community in the structure of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists

It is necessary to reconstruct the official position of the church authorities, for the Rasskazovo ECB community was a part of a centralized structure – AUCECB.

The registration of Evangelical communities in the USSR since 1944 was only possible with authorization by the leadership of AUCECB. A presbyter was issued certificate of registration as a "minister of the cult" (*sluzhitel' kulta*) (See State 2; Baptist 1). In practice, the legitimization of the communities' leadership was performed by the head presbyter locally (in 1944, they were called officers (*upolnomochennyye*), but then AUCECB retracted this title not to confuse it with the structure of

CRA).¹⁴ In the more recent literature, there was a claim that AUCECB became a firm hierarchical structure, where the head presbyters were given the authority of bishops, which included a mandatory ordination of the local presbyters by them (Savinskii 2001: 192).

The emergence of the leaders of the ECB movement occurred in the late 1920s-early 1930s, when women took theology courses, actively preached, and even initiated a discussion on a place of women in the Evangelical movement. In her book, Heather Coleman mentions a small-scale conference in Moscow in 1926, organized by an "initiative group of sisters." The participants discussed the role of women-Baptists in family and church life and came to the conclusion that "the only limit to women's spiritual equality with men was that they could not aspire to be presbyters" (Coleman 2005: 172). Coleman discovered that the same year, the journal "Baptist" published an article of E. V. Iagubiants-Tarasova, in which the author claimed that Apostle Paul's command "Women should remain silent in the churches" (1 Corinthians 14:34, NIV) does not fit into the context of the rest of his heritage and only reflects a very specific situation with the Church of Corinth, for the Holy Spirit does not discriminate between a man and woman, and the Bible gives a woman the opportunity to evangelize on equal ground with a man (Iagubiants-Tarasova 1926: 15-17). Then chair of AUCECB, Ilia Goliaev (his son Mikhail Goliaev was elected a deputy chair of the first AUCECB) (Ivanov and Sinichkin 2012: 148) provided a critical response in the following issue of the journal, arguing for the subordinate state of a woman because of the fact that she was made of a part of a man and her role in the fall. At the same time, he recognized that as a consequence of Christ's atonement sacrifice, women as well as men can receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the form of prophecy and call to a

¹⁴ The CRA interest in the centralized hierarchical structure for various communities and movements of Evangelical Christianity in the USSR is articulated in the 1947 report of the Officer of the Ukrainian CRA (which contained the biggest number of Evangelical communities). AUCECB was expected to do away with "democratic tendencies," which used to be a characteristic trait of the ECB communities: "As opposed to the previous one, the current structure of the sect puts forward the presbyters as the head leaders of not merely spiritual, but the whole community life, becoming closer, in this case, to the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. [...] The current structure totally gets rid of the vague "democratic tendencies" in the sect when it comes to the leadership, passing the whole fullness of power in communities to the AUCECB Officer, regional presbyters, and presbyters of communities. Hence it eases the selection of the presbyters and the regulation of their activities from the Officers of CRA" (Ukraine 1).

deaconess ministry, which is somewhat close to presbytership (Goliae 1926: 20-21). Remarkably, another text on the same page calls women to evangelize actively with the quote from Psalm 68:11: "The Lord announces the word, and the women who proclaim it are a mighty throng" (NIV) (Rostovtseva 1926). Naturally, in the context of harsh persecutions and official prohibition of the church activity for women,¹⁵ a reasonable theological discussion of this problem could not happen. Yet, although a resolution on the leadership of AUCECB reflected a strong influence on the Baptist union's opinions—more hierarchical and conservative in its positions (for instance, there was a mandatory norm of ordaining of ministers by head presbyters)—nevertheless, women were not excluded from the leadership of the Union at the highest level. Thus, of 45 delegates in the meeting of October 1944, there were eight women. The welcoming address was read by a "sister"—Aleksandra Egorovna Mazaeva—one of the two oldest members of the Church. In the following year, the journal "Bratskii Vestnik," which became an official herald for AUCECB for the believers (the articles from this journal were read by the congregants during the prayer meetings), published a major article calling for the activation of women in ministry and questioning traditional roles for women, reduced mostly to marriage (Bratskii Vestnik 1945: 47-49).

Thus, at the highest level of AUCECB, the possibility of women to participate in the highest leadership of the Church, evangelizing, and deaconess ministry was recognized. How did the Church leaders then perceive a particular head of the Rasskazovo community? As we see it, the comprehensive answer to this question could be given by the photograph from the early 1950s that we publish here (Picture 9).

This picture is an official photograph, documenting a visit of the "brothers from the leadership" to the community, first and foremost, the head presbyter acting as a bishop. Those visits were very important to the local communities. The visiting preachers diversified the sermons, brought a choir with them, resolved conflicts between the community members, participated in the legitimation of the community leadership, or, on the contrary, reelected the presbyters, and resolved disciplinary issues. The first person from the left in the second row is a

¹⁵ An All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars' decree "On religious unions" dated April 8, 1929, contained an explicit ban of specific forms of woman and youth activities.

head presbyter of the Voronezh and Tambov regions. Ilia Fedorovich Zharkikh (1884-1963) was one of the leaders of the rising Evangelical movement in Voronezh Governorate. He was a founder of the community of Evangelical believers in Voronezh, the first chair of the All-Russia Union of Evangelical Christians in the region, which, before the War, included Voronezh, Tambov, Kursk, and Orel oblast (For Evangelical Faith! 2010). In 1946, he was elected a presbyter of the united community of Evangelical Christians and Baptists of Voronezh and, at the same time, appointed by AUCECB as a head presbyter of Voronezh, Tambov, and, later, Ryazan oblast (he served in that position from 1947 until 1955) (History of ECB 1989: 557).

The photograph that we publish is the only picture of the Ras-skazovo group (it has been preserved in the archive of the Tambov community, and its copy has been discovered in the archive of the Moscow ECB community, and there are several copies in the home archives of the believers of Tambov). It reflects the existing hierarchy of the relationship. In the second row, between two visiting older "brothers" sits Antonina Terekhova, which demonstrates her status as a full-time master of the community. The photograph confirms that the leadership status of Terekhova in the community did not meet with any objections from the leaders of the ECB structure.

Terekhova considered herself a full-time community leader, called to perform political functions too. Hence, signing a telegram to the local party committee on the occasion of the death of Joseph Stalin, she uses the title of "leader Terekhova"¹⁶ (Tambov 11).

It seems the position of a head presbyter to recognize a woman as the leader of a community was not a unique characteristic of head presbyter Zharkikh. Nadezhda Beliakova discovered a note in the archive of the Russian Union of ECB, written almost two decades later by the head presbyter of the Orlov oblast Aleksei Krainii, titled "On the ministry of women-sisters." In it, he described in detail the then-existing practices of a female ministry in his region (see further). He suggested legalizing the practice of admittance of women to a presbyter ministry, claiming that "the request of believers on the admittance of women-sisters to a ministry should be decided on the all-Union level" (Baptist 2).

¹⁶ The title *rukovodiashii* is put in the formally neutral masculine form here – *Translator's note*.

The fate of Terekhova in the context of the Khrushchev's antireligious campaign

By the end of the 1950s, the conditions for the ECB community in Rasskazovo, and for Terekhova personally, considerably worsened. The Khrushchev's antireligious campaign directly affected the fate of Antonina Terekhova, who was a nuisance for the local administration of Rasskazovo and for a new CRA officer of the Tambov region. Aleksei Illarionovich Zavorykin's career coincided with the unfolding of an extensive Soviet antireligious project (Picture 10). This state official, holding office at the CRA from 1950 until 1961, had not authorized a single request for the registration of a house of prayer, but then he closely followed the everyday life in communities and the private life of certain members (Tyumen 1). He considered himself a progressive professional, and he frequently came up with propositions on the modernization of scientific-atheist propaganda in the region. Hence, according to him, along with traditional "atheist corners" in libraries and schools, amateur theatres, and lecture programs, every local citizen should be provided by authorities with the opportunity to purchase a TV, for which he even prepared a special financial plan, in which he calculated different sizes of loans for the workers with different wages (Tambov 12).

In his 1959 report to the CRA, he labeled Terekhova as "a strong-willed persistent fanatic" (Tambov 13: 131). At the same time, he reported: "Approximately in the month of July, some Party officials began ordering Terekhova's daughter, son, and son-in-law to come to the city committee and city executive committee and advising them to influence their mother, to force her to give up presbytership. [...] Terekhova came to me and demanded: 'Either you protect or discharge me.' I responded with: 'Protect you from whom or from what?' She said: 'My children are constantly disturbed, and they in turn attack me, push me to withdraw from presbytership.' I told her: 'If you are troubled with something, resign from your presbyter position and you will be relieved.' Terekhova declared that she would never resign and voluntarily give up her presbytership" (Ibid: 120).

Exactly in 1959, the officer managed to discharge Terekhova from the presbytership. The excuse the officer used to revoke Terekhova's registration certificate he described in great detail: "I have established

that A. T. Terekhova with her brother in faith Reshetov, visiting from the Tambov community, in the month of July arranged a reconstruction of her house with the labor of believers from the Rasskazovo ECB community. Terekhova was provided with timber by: Dunaeva, Kozhevnikova, with workforce by Dunaeva, Kozhevnikova, Yagoditsina, Kovnikova, Berezina, Zhirova, and others, i.e., the community engaged in the illegitimate activity. The community performed duties of a support group or construction company. [...] The communities of believers are not entitled to charities, are not allowed to provide material support in any form. However, Terekhova neglected my advice and collectively, with believers, reconstructed her house. Considering such state of affairs, a violation of the government decrees, conducted by Terekhova, I revoked A. T. Terekhova's registration certificate on the 20 of November 1959. Therefore, she could no longer perform the duties of a presbyter" (Ibid: 122).

The episode of the reconstruction of Terekhova's house does not seem unanticipated. As a matter of fact, the community had to rent premises for the prayer meetings (and these premises had to conform to certain regulations). During the time of Terekhova's presbytership, the community searched for a new place over seven times, and one more attempt to put the house in order was used as a reason to revoke her registration. However, the official dismissal of the Rasskazovo ECB community (which was the ultimate goal of the authorities) failed, and female presbytership continued as well. The position of an official leader of the community was assumed by Anna Ivanovna Zheltova. Unfortunately, we are unable to trace the further fate of Antonina Terekhova. In 1962, she was still active in Rasskazovo, as stated in the document cited in the beginning. According to oral history, she later left to help her daughter, who moved to the Urals. The fact that Zheltova was a presbyter of the Rasskazovo community in the 1970s was remembered by Tatiana Mikhailovna Nogotkova, the daughter of a presbyter of the Tambov community Mikhail Tsvetkov and the wife of a current presbyter of the central Tambov ECB community: "Zheltova, she was a presbyter. Well, there were mostly sisters. There was one brother, disabled, and also an elderly one. There were no more brothers there, I believe. It was a loving community, they loved it when someone came to them. So, we did our best to visit them" (Interview with Nogotkova by Beliakova on the 27 of April 2014).

The specificity of female leadership in the Evangelical community of the USSR

To what extent was female leadership in ECB communities of Central Russia unique at that time? Should one regard the case of Terekhova and Zheltova as unusual and peculiar? As we have repeatedly mentioned in our research, in the post-War period, Soviet officials took notice of a predominantly female composition of the registered ECB communities (see Beliakova and Dobson 2015). The predominance of women was characteristic of urban, as well as rural communities, and this tendency remained up to the end of the Soviet era. A female religiosity attracted attention and concerned officials responsible for framing religious life within a "legislation on cults"; and female "fanaticism" was in the focus of attention of Khrushchev's antireligious campaign as well. The dominance of women remained a characteristic trait of rural communities even by the 1970s. However, to what extent female presbyters or "leaders," as they were titled in official papers, could allow for a full spiritual life of a community? We have found in the papers of the officer of the Tambov region references to the lack of "ritual" component in the Rasskazovo community as a result of female leadership.

Now, let us turn to the description of female presbytership emerging within a religious environment. It is represented in a note of the abovementioned head presbyter of the Orlov region (in 1972), who described the way religious practices in regional communities were determined by gender:

In the Verkhovie community, sister Marfa Andriianovna Poniatkova performed the ministry of a presbyter. What did it contain? She led the services, preached the Word of God. She is especially gifted in words, prayers, conversations, and she's been successful in winning souls, especially of women, for the Lord. The spiritual sacraments – baptism and communion – she didn't perform. The community has up to 30 members. The sacraments were performed by the visiting presbyter of the Livny community, brother Ya. P. Zarochentsev, and in the fourth quarter of 1972, a young brother M. I. Zaytsev was elected as a candidate for a deacon, and to offer the breaking of bread to the sick. In the Zolotarevo community, after the presbyter's death, the leadership was assumed by sister Olga Konstantinovna Minaeva, an old maid of almost 60 years of age. To offer the breaking of bread, one of

the brothers, appointed by a head presbyter or on his own accord, visits, while sister O. K. Minaeva carries around bread and a cup of wine. There are no brothers in the Church, except for one elderly, and even he lives far away and does not attend the services (Baptist 2).

Thus, by the 1970s, in the communities of believers, there was a transformation of appropriate and inappropriate gender roles. The formation of the understanding of the limits of what is permissible was based neither on theological foundations, nor on the confession of faith, but rather on some other sources. For instance, in ECB communities, there was the breaking of bread and baptism that women did not perform, but the visiting outsider men did. The head presbyter reported: "I, as a head presbyter, repeatedly received a request from the Lugovoy group to permit the breaking of bread to a sister, whom they trust greatly, and on top of that she is unmarried, although she is more than 50 years old" (Ibid). This message seems significant, for in the regular communities of believers, there was the perception of the importance of personal qualities of the candidate for the presbyter's ministry, among which their gender did not play a dominant role. It was important for the Lugovoy group of the Orlov region that the congregation trusted the one offering the breaking of bread and that the person was pious.

However, by the late 1970s, the Evangelical community of the USSR faced a clear transformation of the perceptions of ministries and the formation of narratives of roles and appropriate forms of ministry, determined by gender. The most spectacular reflection of these tendencies took place in the communities of the Council of Churches,¹⁷ although also visible in the communities of AUCECB. The increase of determination by gender is indicated in the letter of an elderly Evangelical Christian, a widow of one of the leaders of AUCECB, Irina Motorina, a junior contemporary of Antonina Terekhova. She lived through different regimes of perception of gender in the Evangelical Christian environment. She studied theological courses in 1920s, was a successful tailor in Moscow after the War, and a spouse of one of AUCECB leaders. It seems that her letter reflects the changes of gender discourse in the Evangelical environment of the

¹⁷ A union of unregistered ECB communities formed as a consequence of the 1961 split of ECB over the issue of state legislation and union leadership — *Translator's note*.

USSR, which began to dominate among the new generation. This phenomenon on a scale of the Soviet society calls for further reflection.

Most of our church members are women. Yet, they are not supported in their ministry and work in the Church as deaconesses, as evangelizers... In the Council meetings, there are also just a few sisters. It would be good to clarify the position on sisters in the Church at the coming meeting. What are their rights according to the Word of God? What is implied in their labor in our churches? For there are different opinions. One leading brother said: 'In Ukraine, we don't allow sisters to talk, for many brothers are against it. It is written that they should be silent.' At this point, I remember a cherished worker, an elderly brother Vasiliï Ivanovich Dolgoplov, who heartened my gift of evangelism. He unexpectedly offered me an opportunity to share the word, and, therefore, he kept me prepared and inspired.

One brother said that women do not have the gift and talent to witness about God. Some jealously claim that women do not belong [on] the pulpit, let them deal with the home-making and attend a Church. Talking to A. V. Karev once, he said: 'Christ himself paved the way to them.' Women can be evangelizers too. Yet, it should be said, among the brothers, there are often misunderstandings, problems, and on top of that, there are also concerns with the sisters. How did Mary Magdalene, who saw Christ, and the women with her felt when the disciples didn't believe them? What do the sisters, who believe in the resurrection, who are called for ministry, and gifted with inspiration, feel when being told: "Women should remain silent in the churches"? Or maybe there are no such active sisters in our churches? (Motorina, 1979)

This reflective letter does not merely conclude our study, but rather suggests new directions for the research on post-War religious communities and emphasizes the transformation of gender roles in them during the so-called "stagnation" of Brezhnev's period.

Conclusion

The contemporary neglect of the female pastorship in the first post-War decades is not an accidental "white spot," but rather a much deeper and complex process, which was being reshaped for several decades. The roots of this process are clearly shown in the first document cited at the beginning of our study. A man – an occasional figure in the leadership of the regional ECB community – writes a report of a

political nature with the accusation of anti-Soviet activities committed by a woman without official status in a provincial religious community, yet performing religious “rituals.”

The motives of that report are clear: young men, in fact, the working youth of Tambov, by receiving a water baptism became full-time “sectarians,” and they would most likely join the Tambov Baptist community. At the same time, the elderly timid presbyter of the Tambov community, who received a registration certificate from the local Officer (or even did not receive it at all) and reported every insignificant event in the community in detail, would be rebuked for the activities of that neophyte youth. Moreover, he would be formally reproached for the expansion of the community. And on top of that, the newcoming young men would probably assume the leading positions in the community and take over after him. To avoid such state of affairs, or at least to escape responsibility for taking part in that, a religious figure would set up a repressive mechanism of a state system towards his fellow believers,¹⁸ whose activities do not fit the Soviet legislature on cults. This document demonstrates the work of the institution of registered “cult ministers,” which, according to the Soviet state officials, implied exclusively men. It is seen that control over the “human resources of the cult ministers,” constructed in the framework of a totalitarian system, begin functioning within the religious environment. It seems the system of “normalization” of Evangelical movement through the construction of a hierarchical structure within a movement, offered by the CRA, was well justified. It is seen that at a certain stage of the struggle for influence, male leaders — as both representatives of the atheist state and “official” structure — act against a female leader together. However, this is a sociological description of a Terekhova affair.

Let us now look at this conflict within its environment. The believers, who started a public ministry and assumed the so-called representative positions in the community, did not regard their status as

¹⁸ According to the testimonies of believers from Tambov, including Ekaterina Petrovna Chislina (a spouse of the first community leader of the unregistered Baptists of Tambov; interviewed by Ekaterina Mironova on the 22nd of February, 2015), Vladimir Gennadievich Mukin (a son of Gennadii Stepanovich Mukin, one of the members of the mentioned youth group; interviewed by Ekaterina Mironova on the 16 of May, 2019), this document, above all, is a clear defamation, for according to their sources, the youth group of Baptists from Tambov received their baptism in 1961 in Voronezh region from the leader of the unregistered community of Voronezh, Aleksei Melsitov.

honorary, powerful, and significant. It was the way of self-sacrifice, the beginning of the way of the Cross, not at all authoritative or honorable. Those ministers faced constant supervision and pressure from the authorities, which is well reflected in the cited documents. Zheltova's daughter reminisced that as soon as her mother attempted to register a community, she was taken to the KGB, but was set free thanks to a big number of underage children. The combination of traditional female roles – caring for children and home-keeping – with the organization of the life of worship in the community was not an easy burden for those women, because of constant pressure from the outside world, enforced by Khrushchev's antireligious campaign. However, it was precisely female pastorship that paved a way for the further generation of active ECB, shaping the core or leading in the 1970s both registered and unregistered ECB communities of Tambov.¹⁹ A generation change, stimulated by Khrushchev's antireligious campaign, helped (though it is still unclear how) to enforce the gendered determination of roles, the increased significance of the male component through institutionalization. The inclusion of post-Soviet Baptists in "cultural wars" pushed the reflections on the phenomenon of female pastorship to the ideological sphere.

Translated by Igor Mikeschin.

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¹⁹ Gennadii Mukin became a presbyter and led the Tambov ECB community from 1982 until 2007. He was elected a head presbyter of the Tambov region in 1993 and assumed that position until 2005. He had four children, whom he brought to the community. Vasilii Tuev became a deacon of the unregistered community, had five children of whom four became members of the community. Anatolii Kuznetsov became a regent of the choir of the unregistered community.

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Soviet Pentecostals: The Exclusivity of the Excluded

Vera Kliueva

In contemporary historiography, the almost total exclusion of Soviet believers from the social space of Soviet society is uncontested (more on this in Sawatsky 1981; Boobbyer 2010: 93-94; Gordeeva 2010; Beliakova and Dobson 2015). However, the analysis of behavioral practices and inclusiveness of believers into everyday life overthrows this claim. The coexistence of two, allegedly mutually exclusive, identities—religious-orthodox and secular-Soviet—is represented in a paradoxical formula of "Soviet believers." The concept of "Soviet believers" was suggested by Andrew Stone, who pointed out that believers "participated in both religious and Soviet activities as part of their daily lives" (Stone 2008: 311).

The existence of a "Soviet believer" could be set out with the sociological concept of marginality (see more on this in Simmel 1994; Simmel 2008; Park 1928; Bankovskaya 2014). Believers in the USSR occupied a stable position on the periphery of the system of social interrelations and interconnections. As for any other marginal groups, they were inclined to "recognize the combination of different cultural patterns and their conflict" (Bankovskaya 2002). Being religious, they never identified themselves fully with the irreligious majority of the country. However, when needed, they appealed to their rights as legitimate citizens of the state. Marginality is especially evident among Soviet Protestants. In that case, marginality takes the form of *exclusion*, i.e., "as *lack of participation* (in various social institutions, in material

production, in the process of political decision making, in distribution of symbolic resources, etc.), as exclusion from social structures, [and] pushing out of their limits" (Ibid).

In the mid-1940s, Protestants, along with other denominations, were allowed to legalize their activities. They founded an organizational structure (the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists – AUCECB) that for the first time, united various evangelical groups under a centralized structure in the scope of the whole Soviet Union. Naturally, the forced unification did not make the evangelical community homogenous. Their theological closeness coexisted with specific explicitly historically conditioned everyday practices and traditions. The artificial nature of such a union led to the formation of new features and the development of various strategies of survival of Soviet evangelical communities. Soviet scholars of religion interpreted the foundation of the union as a grassroots initiative necessary for preserving the number of evangelical believers and organizing a new form, suited "for the active religious, [both] legal and illegal ([going] around the existing legislature) propaganda and recruitment of believers" (Fedorenko 1965: 162). Further, believers themselves understood the artificial nature of such a union, though they needed legalization and being mostly law-abiding citizens, they were ready to "play by the rules," to keep their ability to openly confess their faith. The state, in turn, openly abused the registered union as a means of pressure on Soviet Protestants.

All evangelicals were subject to double pressure. From the standpoint of the state, they were politically immature bearers of the religious worldview: "...it is necessary to distinguish between honest Soviet people who due to their political immaturity fell under the influence of reactionary elements, and dishonest people, abusing the ignorance of believers in their own interests. The adherents of pervert and anti-state sects should be patiently shown the reactionary nature of religion, including sectarian teachings, explained why the Soviet legislature prohibits activities of those sects, [and] those who under the cover of religion promote their hostile anti-Soviet activities should be exposed" (State 1). For the latent Soviet religious majority, members of evangelical churches were also alien. Yet, according to their choice of denomination: "They say, well, you've traded your God and you're going there. And I say: but you neither know yours, nor mine, you could

at least know some [god], for you don't know any" (Interview 1, female). "...We've received a document [stating] that you've been in a sect. I said: 'So what's the big deal? There's a freedom of conscience after all. Everyone has the right to confess any religion.' – 'Well, not really. Unless you were an Orthodox" (Interview 2, male). For the secular habitually atheistic population, their choice in favor of religion also placed believers outside of family boundaries: "When my sister converted after myself, her husband told [her]: 'You'd better drink, fornicate, [and] sleep around, for how is it that you got to believe in God?'" (Interview 3, male).

Accordingly, evangelical believers had to organize their internal space with its specific ways of communication, regulation of communal life, and the construction of meaning for (non-)participation in the everyday life of secular society and Soviet practices. Evangelical Christians-Baptists (ECB), Mennonites, and Pentecostals all have similar perceptions of normativity and implemented them in their own way. In this chapter, I will focus on Pentecostals. I have not chosen them by chance. It was they who stood out in the evangelical community with their religious practices that caused strong emotional reactions in other people. On top of that, they held an isolationist position towards society, more explicitly than ECB. That is why Pentecostals serve an example of double exclusion—societal and religious—while remaining, however, typical "Soviet believers."

Most Pentecostal communities were unregistered and, hence, regarded as illegal. Their unstable place in society and constant, often repressive, supervision resulted in the variability of their modes of existence in the Soviet system, both within the ECB communities and separate communities under the rule of the Kiev episcopate.

At first sight, the history of Soviet Pentecostal churches plays a significant role in contemporary religious studies (Diachenko 2003; Nikolskaia 2009; Kliueva 2010; Odintsov 2012; Egorov 2015; Dudarenok et al. 2018; and others). The history of Christians of Evangelical Faith¹ (CEF) is included in the account on the evangelical community and, more widely, the whole religious landscape of the Soviet and post-Soviet period. However, the holistic picture of Soviet Pentecostalism has not yet been formed, presumably because, in each period of Soviet

¹ An official and conventional identity for Russian Pentecostals – *Translator's note*.

history and in each region, Pentecostal communities offered different answers to life questions. Local churches had a consolidated opinion on certain topics, often of theological or liturgical nature (e. g., on spiritual gifts and baptism of the Holy Spirit or washing of the feet). However, there were always flexible limits of permissible behavior concerning internal regulations or everyday life and interactions in secular society, for instance, concerning military service, emigration, and prophecies. In those cases, the opinion of a presbyter or common practice within a particular community could have more weight.

My study is based on ego-documents, oral history materials, and, first and foremost, interviews with Pentecostals. I collected them in the 2000s in urban and rural communities of European Russia (Moscow, Krasnodar, Maloyaroslavets), Ural (Perm and Chelyabinsk), Siberia (Tyumen, Yalutorovsk, Zavodoukovsk, Ishim, Nizhnevartovsk), and Kazakhstan (Petropavlovsk). For this chapter, I employ 15 interviews with active believers and religious leaders (presbyters and bishops). Their religious upbringing occurred in the late Soviet period (the 1960s–1980s) or in the early post-Soviet time (early 90s). The interviews are biographical narratives, emphasizing the life of a believer in a country with atheistic ideology. They are supplemented with both published and unpublished memoirs of Pentecostals from the communities of Chelyabinsk and Perm.

Building on existing sources, I will address the following questions: Why were Pentecostals active in their evangelizing activities and how did the evangelical community react to it? Can we speak about the exclusion and self-marginalization of Pentecostals in a secular society? Which practices consolidated the Pentecostal community?

Wolfs in the sheepfolds: Active minority within a minority

In 1976, in the "*Nauka i religii*" (Science and Religion) journal, an article on Pentecostalism was published. It was concluded with a notable claim: "Pentecostalism is a relatively small religious movement that is in a state of a crisis. Yet it exists, it has its own, though not numerous, adherents" (Grazhdan 1976: 26). Naturally, Pentecostals were a minority within the evangelical community. As they were not registered, their quantity is approximate. The exact number of Pentecostals, as well as other believers in the Soviet Union, was unknown even to the state

agencies. More often, the number of Pentecostal churches was known better than the number of congregants in them.

Let us address the statistics that show how low numbers of Pentecostals were and whether it was actually so. It may seem the formation of a registered evangelical structure should have brought about a spiritual awakening or, at least, "coming out of the shadows." Yet, the data testifies that the number of evangelicals was rather stable. For this reason, Alexei Sinichkin shows the data from the correspondence of AUCECB and the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA): "In total, as of the 1 of January 1948, in AUCECB there are 2,766 communities with a total number of members of 183,734, including 20,953 CEF. Then as of the 1 of January 1958, in AUCECB there were 2111 communities with a total number of members of 196,550, including 23,292 CEF" (Sinichkin n. d.). However, in this case, it should be noted that the numbers represent an official church membership, i.e., the baptized ones. It is known that the Baptist leaders sometimes refused to Baptize the youth (primarily, students), and thus followed the confidential directive of the controlling organs.

The number of Pentecostals that merged into AUCECB after the August agreement (see more in Nikolskaia 2010; Kliueva 2015) is known. As of 1948, there were 20,953 members (State 2). According to the CRA, in this period, the number of Pentecostal communities in the USSR reached up to 600, of which "at least 300 communities and a considerable number of small groups, not recognizing the agreement, do hold their services...partially going underground and, at the same time, doing their destructive work in the communities of Evangelical Christians-Baptists" (State 3).

The results of a single-time count in 1962 were an attempt to consider all the categories of Pentecostals, both those included in the ECB communities and those who were illegal. "According to the registration in early 1962, on the Soviet Union territory, there were 994 unions of Pentecostals indicated with the number of believers of 26,231. Among those, there are 391 societies and 603 groups. It is important to note that this data is quite approximate. First, we do not have data from some of the regions of the country. Second, even the data mentioned may raise doubts... With these corrections in mind, let us consider that there are more than 1000 of Pentecostal unions. They list more than 26,000 people. If we add more than 22,000 Pentecostals united with ECB, there are

more than 50,000 believers. Compared to the pre-war statistics, there is a trifold growth" (State 2). It was this data that a representative of Pentecostals in AUCECB, Petr Shatrov, referred to, claiming that "there are around 50,000 Pentecostals in the country, most of them are members of a common Union and can freely hold their services and their activities" (State 4). It is worth noting that Shatrov's claim was wishful thinking and there were more unregistered believers than officially counted. The ambiguity of counting is also emphasized by the fact that in the materials of human-right activists (1970s), the number of Pentecostals is from 200 to 500 thousand (See Moscow Helsinki Group 2006). In reality, the whole evangelical community could be of that size. Yet, it is very doubtful.

In 1973, according to the CRA, there were more than 60,000 Pentecostals in the country. Among them, in registered communities, there were 28,000 and 32,600 acted independently (Odintsov 2012: 430). Unfortunately, it could not be exactly determined whether independent communities are churches of underground Kiev episcopate or autonomously registered ones. By mid-1986, there were 843 registered communities (Ibid.: 434). According to Lev Mitrokhin, the number of Pentecostals remained the same as in the 1970s (Mitrokhin 1997: 457). It seems plausible, for the growth of Pentecostal churches had already started in the post-Soviet period.

Pentecostals comprised about 10-15 percent of registered evangelicals. However, they compensated for their small numbers with an active ministry among evangelicals.

"Sects, as well as other religious movements, could not avoid the influence of the Soviet way of life... While some of the sects faced an inevitable collapse, the others experienced short-term sparks of activity; it happened that there was even a growth of certain communities, mostly due to proselytes, who were seeking for 'true faith,' going from one sect to another," claimed one of the Soviet atheistic propagandists (Belov 1978: 56). Setting aside the ideologically loaded connotations, this is an accurate description of the evangelical community of the late Soviet era.

The claim that Soviet Protestants, despite the prohibitions, actively evangelized was commonplace in the arguments made by the authorities. In his 1958 report, "On some issues of the Soviet state policies regarding religion and church and the goals of the Council," Alexei Puzin

stated that "[n]o religious movement situated on the territory of USSR is as actively engaged in missionary work among the population as sectarians. In order to reach their goals, they use various means, showing exceptional flexibility propagating their teachings" (State 5).

Additionally, such a description can be applied fairly to Pentecostals (CEF), for whom spiritual "expansion" was the norm. They used the forced union for "missionary" work, which enforced the conflicting side of their fellowship. This conflict was determined by the theology of Pentecostals, emphasizing not as much repentance and the transformation of one's life after establishing personal relationships with God, but rather the transformation of certain features of human nature that occurs after Baptism "in Spirit" and receiving "the gifts of the Holy Spirit" (see more detail in Beliakova and Kliueva 2019; Beliakova and Kliueva 2018b).

The explicitly destructive activities of Pentecostals towards the communities of Evangelical Christians and Baptists were well known already since the late 1920s. Pentecostal leaders did not try to hide their tactics. Ivan Voronaev wrote in regard to his fellow believers: "For naturally, when these 'shakers' in the power of the Holy Spirit get into the communities of Baptists or Evangelical Christians, they shake their communities to the ground, leaving only scraps and pieces. Their hay and straw foundations burn out (1 Cor[inthians] 3:12), for they are built without a power of the Holy Spirit" (Voronaiev 1928a: 23). The Pentecostal leaders Gavril Ponurko and Afanasii Bidash, discussing a prospective inclusion into AUCECB, expected the strengthening of the Pentecostal wing in that case: "[M]any Evangelical Christians and Baptists under the influence of 'more spiritual' Pentecostals are going to soon begin 'praying in spirit' and speaking 'in tongues'" (State 6).

The phenomenon of "spiritual baptism" for Pentecostals is still a foundational principle and a conclusive step for the salvation of a believer. Simultaneously, it becomes a stumbling block or an apple of discord for the whole Protestant community (see more in Beliakova and Kliueva 2019; Beliakova and Kliueva 2018b). Thus, CEF who considered themselves "spiritual Christians" (*dukhovnyie khristiane*) claimed their exclusivity among evangelicals. Even their small number was evidence of that, for there could not be a lot of those who received a spiritual baptism.

Exclusion and/or self-marginalization: To be or to appear?

In Soviet public discourse, all evangelicals were aiming at social exclusion. However, the issue of exclusion and its initiators is still subject to discussion. Even in the Soviet period, there was no universal opinion on this issue. Most of the professional "anti-religious warriors" sought a balance between the claim of exclusion of believers and their need to evangelize others. A typical explanation was the following: "[O]ne can speak about the closeness of sectarian communities, about a strive of some believers to self-isolation... Believers willingly establish contacts with adherents of different faiths and even unbelievers, aiming towards quite specific goals. Yet, they obviously seek for certain degree of isolation, concentrating on the narrow circle of issues within their community" (Belov 1978: 83).

Human rights activists pointed out the problems believers faced interacting with the state and society: "In the newspapers 'sectarians' are often accused that they don't let their youth live a social life, do not allow them to go to the cinema, dances, etc. In reality, the Pentecostal youth is doomed to live in isolation not due to religious prohibitions, but rather to the superstitions of others: the appearance of young Pentecostals in public places is often followed by bullying up to the point of assaulting" (Alekseeva 1992: 154-155). As one can see, both sides, despite a different standpoint, use the concept of isolation, i.e., they emphasize the impossibility of mixing secular and religious norms.

A stereotypical set of perceptions about the limitations practiced in the religious sphere formed. It is Pentecostals, who are referred to as being "called to reject participation in public life, visiting cinema and theaters, reading books and newspapers, [and] engaging in sports" (Moskalenko 1966: 124). Those limitations were interpreted as a "direct infringement of the person or rights of citizens."² Believers, in their official statements, preventively rejected a long list of limitations ascribed to them: "All the laws made by the government of our country we recognize and obey. Our children go to school, they are not barred from becoming pioneers and komsomolets. We use medical aid both at home and in hospitals. We work in factories, manufacturers, or in the offices honestly. We serve in the Soviet Army in the time of peace, as well as

² Article 227 of the Criminal Code — *Translator's note*.

during the military action. We recognize baptism in the Holy Spirit if one has one of the following gifts: a word of wisdom, or healing with prayer, or new tongues [*inyie jazyki*], or prophecies, but everything should be done in a fitting and orderly way"³ (Grazhdan 1976: 25-26).

A standard accusation in the 1970s and later was the absence of TVs in the families of believers. However, in reality, there were TVs in Pentecostal families. "We had a TV, our mother (an active Pentecostal – V. K.) watched something educational" (Interview 4, male). An unusual purpose for the electronics was mentioned in the analytical note of the CRA: "In Krivoy Rog, Pentecostals started purchasing TVs... The music of TV shows should silence the prayers" (State 2).

Believers themselves explained their behavior with the following: "[M]any believers, whatever their confession is, avoided those 'sources of enlightenment' (cinema and media – V. K.) not due to their 'wild ignorance',... but rather due to their strict rejection of this technology of spreading lies, slander, perversion of reality, [and] technology of 'brain-washing'" (Franchuk 2003: 608). In this particular case, it is important to indicate the context and time when this was written. The author lives in the US and the text was written in the 1990s. Hence, one can observe his willingness to distance himself from the Soviet way of life. In the same manner, but with different wording, the church leaders interpret the contemporary prohibitions: "Even in the present television is all bad. While then there was one extreme – there was always a war, communists were building [the future], someone counterfeited, they fought back. Yet today, there is nothing but harm. And hence we do not [allow it] in the same way" (Interview 2, male).

The most spread explanation was a reference to material hardships: "G. K.: Back then, big families did not have a TV at all because they were poor. A. K.: In our hallway, one had a small TV. And so we gathered there, at his place. Oh, it's nine o'clock, it's time to go home, but [I] so want to watch till the end" (Interview 5, female and male). However, there are mentions of the adults' opinion, for instance, a presbyter father's decision: "[I] always wanted to watch a TV. Vera: You didn't have one? V. O.: No, our father was principally against it, but not to the extent of barring us from attending theatrical performances. Some movies at school, he was also [OK with that], since it's in a school program. If

³ 1 Corinthians 14:40 (NIV) – *Translator's note.*

it was a part of a school program, otherwise he disapproved of that. Well, we sneaked, we went, we were looking for that, though he never punished us. But he always said: Bad company corrupts good character"⁴ (Interview 2, male).

As we can see, evangelicals knew and tried to overthrow the existing perceptions of self-marginalization. "These stereotypes, that they are suppressed and don't smile, that was ideology. [My] mother told the teachers: here, see how suppressed they are! Sometimes she was called to school, for we misbehaved. Well, that's [what you call] suppressed, she said" (Interview 5, male).

Most of the reminiscences include the narratives on reading books by children, holiday trips, and going to the movies. "[Our] mother approved of going to a cinema with our class but didn't approve of a circus, because there could be hypnotizers... If we divide the literature into useful and useless, like we do now, we just read everything, yet didn't read anything useful... We also read propaganda books, because it was interesting. [Sometimes] you read, and you think: 'Well, that's a fantasy, eh'" (Interview 6, female). One could argue that the stress on childhood memories is linked to an opposing narrative about the prohibitions to participate in a secular cultural life for children and the youth.

The borderlines of prohibitions were unstable and transparent. "It is important to note that in some Pentecostal families of Nakhodka, there are subscriptions to the federal and local newspapers... and even 'Pionerskaia pravda' for children. Some of them participate in the socialist competition, putting their signatures under the conditions. Some are awarded 'Winners of a socialist competition'" (State 7). Such cases, though involving Baptists, are mentioned by Catherine Wanner (2007: 79-80). These are cases that reveal the Soviet doublethink, which allowed the citizens (not necessarily believers), using the predefined "official rules of the game" and superficially showing obedience to the regime, to keep "traditional local practices and forms of the collective life, the system of personal connections, and the ways to use the state for one's own benefit, actual everyday actions, related to the protection from the omnipotence, and persecutions from the state" (Firsov 2008: 65).

This doublethink was especially evident when it came to military service. The state understood that, though they refused the right of

⁴ 1 Corinthians 15:33 (NIV) — *Translator's note.*

young Pentecostals to make decisions themselves, implying that the decisions were made for them by the community leaders. "Oftentimes, believers are not barred from serving in the Soviet Army, but they are instructed to not take an oath of allegiance and to keep away from arms, seeking for working at the kitchen, various workshops, construction units, etc." (State 7). The CEF's views on military service were formed back in the late 1920s: "Each Christian of Evangelical faith must recognize his country, Soviet rule, and conscription equally to all other citizens of the country" (Voronaev 1928b: 78). However, throughout the whole Soviet period, the decision was made by a believer himself. Such an approach was derived from the religious leaders' position on the necessity of living the life of common Soviet citizens to a maximum extent.

I should clarify that military service had a double meaning for evangelical believers. On the one hand, that was a confirmation of their law-abidingness and could be further used as an argument for legitimization of the difference of their worldview. On the other hand, for the believers themselves, it was a kind of a "test" of their faith: "We realized and focused on [the fact] that army was a weapon, not a kindergarten and not a school. There could be harsh questions. It could happen that one had to die there. For me, going to the army was like that – either live or die. I prepared myself that God only knows what [I am] destined to" (Interview 7, male).

Most young Pentecostals went to the army voluntarily and consciously. The situations when they had unexpected delays led to disappointment and disbelief, rather than relief. "There was no choice, I went to serve. Back then, *voenkomat* [military commissariat] issued a lot of stays. I couldn't comprehend that, why those delays. You shaved your head bald, [you prepared] ... and they'd say [wait] till autumn again. Then till spring, then till autumn. There were lots of stays... [I've been drafted] at 21.⁵ And then I realized why all those stays... *Voenkom* [military commissar] told me exactly that – I thought, he'd correct his ways so I could send him to some good forces" (Interview 8, male).

Before the army, a believing conscript could receive a water baptism, thus becoming a member of a church. In that case, he should not take an oath, for there was an unwritten ban on taking an oath: "But I tell you, do not swear an oath at all...All you need to say is simply

⁵ An age of conscription started at 18 – *Translator's note*.

'Yes' or 'No': anything beyond this comes from the evil one" (Matthew 5:34-37, NIV).

Some Pentecostals of the conscript age tried to receive baptism before going to the army in an attempt to legitimize their choice between the secular and religious. "I wanted to go to the army as a responsible man, a church member. That was it, the turning point" (Interview 2, male). Yet, in cases when they feared not being able to bear pressure, they went to the army unbaptized. However, public opinion amongst Pentecostals rejects any kind of pressure on young men of the respective age. Moreover, there was no punishment for taking the oath by a church member. However, in most conservative Pentecostal communities, such soldiers were punished up to the point of excommunication. "There was some Pentecostal from a different unit. He took [the oath]. He was so confused, and he kept saying: 'How am I going home now?' What was awaiting him? Excommunication, most likely. It could have been decided differently in church. Well, yes, he could have been excommunicated for some time" (Interview 8, male).

Although Pentecostals sought to demonstrate their inclusion in public life, at the same time, they demonstrated avoidance of it. Oftentimes, they excused themselves, saying that they would not be "allowed," "permitted," or "accepted." A spectacular example is the claim that believers could not get a degree. They were set up to the impossibility of getting to higher education institutions, which initially appeared because of a discrimination of believers on admission. It became a certain philosophy in the community that constructed an ideology against higher education, against a high risk of losing faith as a result of the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, scientific atheism, etc. Hence, many have not even tried to get into a university. "There were lots of cases in the universities when they saw a believing student and expelled them. I was, myself, a witness of that many times. We formed that opinion...In Moscow, Kishinev, there were such cases, so we hadn't even tried; it was useless. In a college, when we talked, I've been told: 'If we knew that you were one of those, you'd have never been admitted.' Straight out. 'And now, come on, you shut your mouth and keep it quiet'" (Interview 2, male). However, some did go to the universities, yet not everyone could graduate because of the problems with exams on "Scientific atheism" or so-called "Lenin exams."⁶

⁶ Tests on "political literacy" and the fundamentals of ideology passed by members of Komsomol – *Translator's note*.

The behavioral strategies of Pentecostals did not presume unconditional isolation from society. Predominantly, their everyday life is described by Yuri Levada: "The public situation cannot be ignored, yet it can be contested, condemned. One could look for 'gaps' in it for the more comfortable and ascetic existence (in practice, one should pay a 'price' for these gaps)" (Levada 2011: 151). Naturally, Pentecostals found their "gaps," which allowed them to exist with a different degree of comfort (Belyakova and Kliueva 2018a). Despite the exclusion of believers on the ideological level and the limited access to intellectual and governing resources, they were well adapted and integrated into the Soviet everydayness.

Practices of community consolidation

Many practices of Pentecostals could be described with the concepts of "Us" and "Them" (Bauman 1996; 25-27). For the stable existence of the group, the practices of consolidation should be performed in it. Such practices were represented by religious practices that identified the borderline between CEF and various "them." At the same time, "Them" could be both other evangelicals and a secular society and the state.

A certain signifier to distinguish between "Us" and "Them" was a prayer in tongues (glossolalia). My interlocutors repeatedly gave me examples of how they were received differently after praying this way: "I dressed sharply. Back then, there were trendy shoes with a cut, I remember, red socks, there were those checkered pants, a collarless shirt...I had a big bag, but it was meant to be empty. I only had my Bible there...So I said: 'Hello, I'm a believer.' [A woman] looked at me and—bam!—she closed the door. I couldn't get it, what was wrong? I rang the door, thinking, there should be a password, a code of some kind... [A man opened the door] I said: 'I'm a believer, I have come to you. If you are believers, why don't you let me in, why don't you accept me?' And he said: 'Bible says about the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Do you believe in the baptism of the Holy Spirit?' I said: 'I do not just believe in the baptism of the Holy Spirit, I have been baptized in the Holy Spirit.' 'Well, come on then.' We entered the hall, kneeled down, and started praying. As soon as I started praying in tongues, he started crying: 'Oh!' They hugged me then: 'Brother! Welcome!'" (Interview 9, male)

A compulsory element of the religious practice of Pentecostal churches involved a baptism of the Holy Spirit with receiving gifts of the Spirit. However, in many Pentecostal churches, local religious practices formed. For the vast majority of Pentecostals, baptism of the Holy Spirit means receiving power: "They look at Luke 24:49 and Acts 1:8 where Luke records Jesus' last instructions to His followers: 'You shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be My witnesses'"⁷ (Wyckoff 1994: 449). The most frequently mentioned gifts are speaking in tongues, interpretation of tongues, prophecies, and healings, although in Pentecostal theology, there are nine gifts listed⁸ (Lim 1994: 457-488).

For the Soviet legislature, a religious practice of spiritual baptism was the reason for rejecting the registration of a community: "As the performance of Pentecostal rituals causes physical and moral harm to people, such communities in our country are considered as non-registerable" (State 2). The external manifestations of baptism and glossolalia served as a common illustration of a religious "abnormality" or "inadequacy" by the Soviet antireligious propaganda. Russian researcher Alexander Panchenko claims that this kind of "religious defamation" was needed by the state so that those kinds of believers could be perceived as politically disloyal: "A body possessed by the Holy Spirit, granted holy gifts of prophecy, healing, or 'new tongues,' is not subject to political disciplining by definition" (Panchenko 2013: 241).

Within the evangelical community, an understanding of spiritual baptism, and especially glossolalia, was also wary. A theological debate between Pentecostals and Baptists on whether gifts and signs of the Holy Spirit, first observed on the day of Pentecost, are for today had lasted for quite a long time (Beliakova and Dobson 2015: 146-149). No wonder that one of the conditions of the August agreement was a mutual compromise: the CEF gave up public prayer in tongues and Baptists acknowledged the baptism of the Holy Spirit (Mitskevich 2007: 303-304).

It is important to add that within Pentecostalism, there is a difference of opinions on the manifestations of glossolalia during the baptism of the Holy Spirit (Hollenweger 1984: 406). Moreover, although it was

⁷ Acts 1:8, cited by Wyckoff from NASB — *Translator's note*.

⁸ The other five gifts are the message of wisdom, the message of knowledge, faith, miraculous powers, and distinguishing between spirits (Lim 1994: 464) — *Translator's note*.

a compulsory element for the spiritual development of Soviet Pentecostals (Voronaev 1928a), yet public glossolalia was not mandatory. "The one who speaks in an unknown tongue can speak to the whole church only in the presence of an interpreter [*istolkovatel'*]; and, in the absence of an interpreter, one should be silent in church, but speak to himself and to God" (Fedorenko 1965: 258). This is exactly the conviction that was used to legitimize a possibility of common prayer meetings in evangelical communities.

One of the important gifts that was only available to the chosen ones among Pentecostals was the gift of prophecy. The significance of prophecies was supported (and is still supported) with the scripture: "But the one who prophesies speaks to people for their strengthening, encouraging and comfort" (1 Corinthians 14:3, NIV). A prophecy could be sent once through any believer (who would be called the one who prophesies [*prorochestvuiushchii*]), but there were also those who received a gift of prophecy (prophets [*proroki*]). Everything that was being said had to be thoroughly (and publicly) interpreted by "others," i.e., by the church (1 Corinthians 14:29).

A presbyter of Petropavlovsk community (Kazakhstan) explained to me a mechanism of verification of prophecies as follows:

A prophecy, it's in the language that is clear to people. It is directly taught by a church. Speaking in tongues, which is—is a prayer, when one prays with God in new languages, he is being taught himself, he's good. Or [when] one speaks to the people, it's like a prophecy but in new tongues. Then that who interprets should interpret. If there's no interpreter, then don't, keep quiet; the people won't understand anyway. It's going to be just empty words. Like in the Bible an order of a spiritual ministry is described, that's how it should be. *And how do we test it?* There are several options. Well, let's say, asking secret questions... It is recommended that when I ask God I have those questions, they could even be in the end. Because I need to know the will of God directly, and those who prophesy [say it] according to their faith. [If] there's not enough faith, they may [say] according to their mind... And so, of course, there are questions through other vessels, the tested ones, sometimes in three, five points the same thing is [asked about] to come to know. Because there is a great danger of getting into revelations and falling astray (Interview 10, male).

Most prophecies are known among unregistered Pentecostals. It was a good chance for believing women to reveal their leadership skills within a community. The role of the prophesying "vessels" was uncontested. Female prophetesses were informal leaders of a community. There was one case in Adler (Krasnodar region) in the late 40s: "Someone Verkienko in st[anitsa] Troitskaia, a Pentecostal leader, continues his illegal activity, visiting groups of Pentecostals directed by prophetesses who lead him... Kulinich, Karvonina, Mikhailiukova were barely literal prophet[esses]. They prophesy 'on marriage,' 'on sons, husbands gone missing,' 'on cattle deaths,' etc. More literate Galetova, who graduated from a seven-year [school], with disabled legs, speaks on Turkey, Iran, on Japan and Chinese Kuomintang and, through them, on the preparation of sieging of the USSR by America, and other world events[,] and [she] shows 'concern' on the fate of the USSR leaders" (State 8).

In a conflict situation of choice-making, a prophetess could play the role of a decision-maker who turns the situation around to her own benefit. For instance, there was a conflict situation in the registered community of ECB in Kalinin, during which a prophetess, "young girl, looking 17-19, Luba, raised her hand and with a yell 'People of God, stand firmly in faith, [there is] one God, not three gods. Separate yourselves, holy people of God, from the ungodly. What fellowship can light have with darkness?' She caused an ultimate division in the community" (Baptist).

The prophecies could be diverse and on any topic. They could concern eschatology, the situation in church, the situation in the life of a particular believer, or even the political situation in the country. A typology of Pentecostal prophecies was suggested by Tatiana Nikolskaia (2018). She divided and analyzed prophecies according to their directions: predictions about the future, teachings and encouragements, reprimands, and calls for action.

As I see it, considering Pentecostal theology, one should distinguish between prophecies and revelations. A prophecy is a verbal manifestation of "acts of Spirit"; it should always be said aloud. A revelation can occur in various ways, for "it is a common expression that includes oral prophecies, written prophecies (for instance, the Revelation to John), visions, dreams, actions. Most often, there are prophecies (the oral ones)" (Interview 11, male). According to this

interlocutor, "[a] revelation is a more precise thing while prophecies could be fulfilled, as well as there could be false prophecies." However, in everyday language, the word "prophecies" is commonly used. The reason for that is that prophecies could be heard and translated by a stranger while revelations remained intimate and private.

Receiving a revelation or prophecy and their fulfillment allowed CEF to feel that they were doing the right thing. The most notable example is a prophecy about an ark or white ships, after which a wave of emigration of Pentecostals started (see more on that in Nikolskaia 2009: 135-143; Ostrovskaia 2013; Kliueva 2018).

Other prophecies are known from the reports of CRA officers. For the most part, those are eschatological ones. For instance, in Kolpashevo, in the Tomsk region, just in 1960 several prophecies were documented. One of them called for the destruction of passports. Another one witnessed about the coming Last Day: "The Last Day came, and all the community members should be raptured to Heaven. Consequently, after one day, the Holy Ghost would come down on a cloth and take those present to the Heavenly realms" (Akhmetshin 2017: 65-66). This kind of revelation occurred in different regions. For instance, in 1956, in Belorussia, believers were preparing themselves for the second coming of Christ (Moskalenko 1966: 183). In the 1960s, there were several prophecies on the destruction of Karaganda and encounters with Christ (Interview 10, male).

Eschatological prophecies did not merely give hope, but also created an isolationist discourse. Believers separated themselves in their groups from interests and temptations of the sinful world. It was also easier to cope with disappointments with false prophecies together. There was an importance to keep the perception of their commonality.

The prophecies directed to the church, or a particular believer, were almost never found in the sources. They were related to personal struggles and were not vocalized. However, with a certain degree of openness, even a secular researcher can be provided with an example of a personal revelation, yet without much detail: "This woman, a sister, was a passerby, like a vessel of God, through which the Lord spoke what I didn't fully comprehend and realized. Vera: Was it a prophetess? Vl. D.: Yes. And through her, there was a prophecy. And for me, there was all my life from the beginning. The way the Lord would lead me,

where I would face obstacles, stumbles, scraps, and those advantages and blessings of the Lord – almost all have been fulfilled! Well, there are some left, we're waiting... Vera: So you remember it all? Vl. D.: Yes, it left a print; it became unforgettable" (Interview 12, male).

Although prophecies and revelations are an important part of the religious practices of Pentecostals, there is a cautious view on such manifestations of the Spirit among them. As I have said earlier, the practice of testing prophecies formed. As for the accusations of human sacrifices, which allegedly occurred after receiving the prophecies, they unified the churches and allowed them to protect themselves (see, for instance, Beliakova and Dobson 2015: 151-153; Moskalenko 1966: 183-184). Also worth noting are notorious accusations against Ivan Fedotov in a documentary titled *"Eto trevozhit vsekh"* [This concerns everyone] (1960). In more detail, the issue of "bloody defamations" was analyzed by Panchenko (2013).

Conclusion

The behavioral practices of Soviet Pentecostals demonstrate that they well reflected on their exclusivity as the ones saved through the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Yet, to a huge degree, they were themselves an object of exclusion, both within the evangelical community and, especially, in a secular society. As a result of a difference in theological convictions, the CEF was potentially threatening for Baptists. Hence, presbyters tried to safeguard believers from the Pentecostal influence. It should be noted that presently, there is the same kind of uncompromising relationship between conservative and "new" Pentecostals. For the most part, they reproduce the situation of the late Soviet period that took place in registered communities of the ECB. The secular society, in turn, pushed believers out to the "margins of life." However, most Pentecostals, fortunately, combined the religious and secular in their everyday lives. One can claim that a high level of integration and adaptability was characteristic of Pentecostals, as well as of other evangelicals. They, however, were never able to forget about their alienation. This alienation revealed itself in the difference of worldviews, ethical positions, and values. Furthermore, what was alienating (moral principles, religious views, etc.) for the secular society brought them closer to other evangelicals. Speaking of the marginalization of Pentecostals, it

mostly revealed itself on the ideological, much less on the everyday level. They managed, however, to turn it to their own advantage, preserving and protecting the unity and wholeness of society.

Translated by Igor Mikeshein.

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Interview 2 – V. O., male, Perm.

Interview 3 – V. G., male, Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan.

Interview 4 – Yu. Ts., Male, Zavodoukovsk, Tyumen region.

Interview 5 – G. K., female and A. K., male, Chelyabinsk.

Interview 6 – T. M., female, Perm.

Interview 7 – V. V., male, Perm.

Interview 8 – V. M., male, Perm.

Interview 9 – Vas. V., male, Nizhnevartovsk, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous district, Tyumen region.

Interview 10 – Vas. D., male, Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan.

Interview 11 – E. Sh., male, Yalutorovsk, Tyumen region.

Interview 12 – Vl. D., male, Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan.



A Minority within a Minority: Russian Evangelicals in Finland Negotiating Their Identity and Establishing Their Presence in Society

Tatiana Krihtova, Maija Penttilä

Introduction. Russian speakers in Finland

Since 1990, the number of Russian speakers in Finland has grown. Whereas at the end of the 1980s there were between 2,000 and 5,000 Russian speakers living in the country, by the beginning of 2018, the number was 77,177 (Statistics Finland 2018a). The biggest wave of migration to Finland from the Soviet Union – and later from Russia and other independent states – began in 1990 when descendants of seventeenth-century Finnish emigrants to the St Petersburg region got permission to return to Finland. The definition of a Finnish re-migrant was based on Finnish identity, which was thought to consist of knowledge of the Finnish language and customs and acceptance of the Lutheran faith. In practice, the group of re-migrants was ethnically, linguistically, and culturally heterogeneous (see e.g. Davydova and Heikkinen 2004: 176, 177; Davydova 2009).

Today, Russian speakers are the largest foreign-language group in Finland, constituting approximately 21 percent of the country's immigrant population (Statistics Finland 2018a). Most of them have moved to Finland from Russia and Estonia (Statistics Finland 2018b). Russian speakers are a heterogeneous group: they have various ethnic backgrounds and come from different countries (including Russia, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). Originally, a considerable portion

of the Russian speakers in Finland were ethnic Ingrian-Finnish re-migrants and their family members of various ethnicities, but today, work, family and studies have become major reasons for Russians to move to Finland (Migri 2019; see also Varjonen et al. 2018; Mähönen and Yijälä 2016). In recent years, the number of Russian speakers has increased, with between 2,000 and 4,000 persons arriving annually (Varjonen et al. 2018).

The Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland is the majority church, with approximately 70 percent of people officially being its members. The other national church is much smaller: just over one percent of the population (Statistics Finland 2018b) are members of the Finnish Orthodox Church (Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople). Both churches have the same rights and equal position before the law, including the right to levy taxes from their members.

Russian-speaking migrants have different religious identities. People with Russian or other Slavonic self-identity often consider themselves Orthodox. At the same time, ethnic Ingrian Finns were supposed to be Lutherans. In practice, however, most Russian speakers in Finland have no religious affiliation: 77.5 percent of them are not members of religious organizations registered in Finland. Some 13.5 percent of those who define Russian as their native language belong to Orthodox churches (Moscow and Constantinople patriarchates) and slightly more than 8 percent belong to the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland. Less than one percent belong to other registered religious organizations (Statistics Finland 2017, Email communication). Official statistics, however, do not reveal how one identifies oneself in religious terms. For example, in Russia, regarding oneself as Orthodox does not necessarily mean official belonging to a church institution, as one does not need to officially register church membership. It has also been estimated that there are more than 10,000 migrants in Finland who attend the Finnish Orthodox Church – mainly from Russia and Eastern Europe, but also from Oriental Orthodox countries – but they have not registered themselves officially (Metso 2017). The statistics also do not reveal affiliation to religious organizations registered outside the borders of Finland.

All in all, Russian speakers in Finland are more likely to identify with Orthodoxy than Protestant or Evangelical faith. Russian Evangelical Christians in Finland are a small but interesting phenomenon.

In Finland, the word "Evangelical" is easily associated with the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland and one of its local revivalist movements, the Evangelical movement. However, there are not so many Lutherans in Russia, and in Russian, like in English, "Evangelical" usually means a set of younger Protestant churches including Baptists, Conservative Pentecostals, Neo-Pentecostals, and Adventists. Quite often it is not easy to define any church as Evangelical based on its theology and organizational structure; churches usually identify themselves simply as "Christian". Because of the historical situation in post-Soviet countries, such churches are friendly to each other. There are three main church unions and several unregistered churches in Russia, (see Lunkin 2014), but in fact belonging to the same union does not mean close relationship between churches. Sometimes churches which are friendly to each other can belong to different unions but have common projects because of friendship between their clergy. In Finland, such churches usually belong either to the Evangelical Free Church of Finland or the Finnish Pentecostal Church, but there are also an increasing number of independent Evangelical and Charismatic churches in Finland which are only unofficially linked with other churches and act as registered organizations – since in Finland it is much easier to found a registered organization than a religious organization (see e.g. Religions in Finland 2019; Ketola and Sohlberg 2011).

The churches investigated here have characteristics which Timothy Larsen (2007) has defined as typical for Evangelical churches: (1) Protestant fundamentalism, (2) belonging to a network arising from the eighteenth-century revival movements, (3) ascribing the Bible with pre-eminence and the final authority in matters of faith and practice, (4) believing in the idea of reconciliation with God through the atoning work of Jesus Christ on the cross, and (5) believing in the work of Holy Spirit in the life of individuals.

The Russian speakers living in Finland who belong to Evangelical minority churches are a unique and absorbing topic of study in relation to ethnic, language and religious identity as well as the sense of belonging and understanding of space in Finland and the global Christian church. Like all Russian speakers, their identity is a complicated issue, because they have common native language but ethnically they are heterogeneous (Statistic Finland 2012). Evangelical churches have one

more identity characteristic: these are not regarded as traditional but marginal, both in post-Soviet countries and in Finland. In this situation, their members are in a doubly marginal position: in relation to both other Russian-speaking migrants in Finland and to Finnish society.

Identity formation and migrant social action

The case of Russian Evangelical Christians in Finland shows how moving to a new country and integration are reflected in the identity formation of believers, and how religion influences finding one's place in a new country, reflected here as establishing a grassroots organization for one's own linguistic group. Anthropologist Helen Kopnina (2005) studied Russian migrants in London and Amsterdam, showing that they are highly diverse (both socially and in adaptation strategies) and reject the idea of their belonging to a "community." They rather form "sub-communities" or groups based on social, ethnic, class, interest and other distinctions (both inclusive and exclusive).

Roger Brubaker and Frederic Cooper (2000) have summarized the main uses of identity in the social sciences: (1) a ground or basis of social or political action, (2) a collective phenomenon, sameness of a group or a category, (3) an aspect of individual "selfhood," (4) a product of social or political solidarity, or (5) the product of multiple and competing discourse. This means that identity is an ambiguous term which every researcher needs to clarify. Daniel Innerarity (2008), for instance, argues that identity is not the final destination of personal development; it is always a process and people are looking for their own identities all the time. The migration process is even more multifaceted: moving to live in a different country causes migrants to review their identity.

In this article, identity is comprehended broadly as an individual's sense of self, that is reflected in individual narratives and behaviour. From a sociological perspective, identity is constructed in a certain environment. Belonging to a particular place may be central to one's identity and may provide a shortcut through diverse identity labels to define who we are. The more complex a society is, potentially the more fluctuating identity is (Häger 2018: 195). According to Somers (1994: 613-614), people construct their identities – although multiple and changing – by locating themselves or being located within a highly varied, yet limited repertoire of available social, public and cultural narratives. The narratives are stable but mutating, since

transcultural encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings as well as diasporic diffusions are part of the present (e.g., Casanova 2006). Thus, individual identity always reflects time and place, the social and societal context in which the individual lives (e.g., Giddens 1991). Society's reactions shape the experiences of Evangelicals, too. Thus, by studying them, we also broaden the understanding of Russian speakers in Finnish society. Individual identity reflects not only their current home, but also their former home country and the transnational space in which migrants act. The Evangelical communities and their identity talk are reflected in individuals' identity narratives.

Ethnicity is another form of identity. Eriksen (2001) defines ethnic identity as a phenomenon when members of a group or community believe that they descend from the same tribe or from the same ancestors. This belief may be based on myths rather than facts and is often difficult to prove. For Eriksen, ethnic identity is influenced by language, self-designation and historical memory. Schöpflin writes that an ethnic group can define itself through a huge number of values (history, territory, mentality), yet language is the central marker of ethnic identity. For people from Eastern Europe, the significance of language is particularly strong: ethnicity is primarily determined by language, which is much more important than citizenship. For ethnic minorities, language becomes a simultaneous tool and goal (Schöpflin 2000).

In this article, we study social action and identity together. Identities guide actions and are manifested in behaviour; in this particular case, how Evangelical believers constitute their presence in Finland. People construct their identities by attaching to cultural and institutional formations that are larger than a single individual; they also affiliate to intersubjective networks, institutions and macro stories (Somers 1994: 619). Thus, we aim to study how migrants act in society to organize themselves in their new home country using religious and ethnic meanings, and what kind of identity they negotiate in this situation.

Focus, materials, methods

The article analyses selected Evangelical Russian-speaking worship communities in Helsinki. The research task is addressed through three questions:

1. How were these churches founded in Finland?
2. How do they negotiate their identity as Russian minority churches in Finnish society?
3. How have they acted to establish their existence and space in society?

The data used here come from interviews, participant observation and texts that Russian-speaking churches have produced. The main sources were participant observation and interviews with ministers and congregants. Other sources include the churches' Internet presence (websites, Facebook and Instagram pages, online services) including testimonies of members' faith stories, sermons, online prayers and historical reviews. Between 2012 and 2015, Tatiana Krihtova conducted participant observation of divine services, Bible-study groups, communication of congregants, street evangelization and other activities. Participants responded positively; some of them told the researchers that the situation in their community was interesting and that studying it would improve comprehension of the situation and legal consolidation of these churches in Finland. They were ready to be interviewed and cooperate in other ways. All of the informants participated fully voluntarily and knew they were talking to researchers of either theology and sociology of religion (Maija Penttilä) or cultural anthropology (Tatiana Krihtova). Participants were informed about audio record keeping and field diaries. All the recording equipment was visible during the interviews. The methodological benefit of this article is that different sources of data were collected by two researchers. We have sociological, theological and anthropological expertise and we take a multi-method approach.

Founding Russian churches in Finland

The focus here is on two churches in Helsinki: The Russian Free Church in Helsinki Ark of Salvation (*Russkoiazychnaia svobodnaia cerkov g. Khelsinki Kovcheg Spaseniia*) and the Power to Change (*Sila Peremen*). They are not the only churches for Russian speakers in Helsinki but are rather representative ones.

Ark of Salvation is nowadays the biggest Russian-speaking Protestant congregation in Helsinki. It was established by Russian-speaking migrants in 2000, to provide an opportunity for all Russian-speaking Christians from different Protestant denominations to

worship in their mother tongue. This church has its own building in the centre of Helsinki which they bought in 2015. They have a youth group, Sunday school, and praise group. Every summer they organize camps in the countryside for different age groups. Members gather for worship and prayer four times a week and they have home cell groups (We believe n. d.).

According to its own official film (Ark of Salvation Church, Helsinki, 2011), the church identifies itself with the community of "Russian Fellowship of Evangelical Christians in Finland" which was created in Helsinki by evangelist Maria Smirnova (Nichols 2011: 147). This church operated in Helsinki from 1907, when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russian Empire, to 1918. Many of its members left and moved to Russia after Finland's independence, during the civil war in 1918. Those members who stayed registered their movement in 1921 as the "Russian Evangelical Church in Finland" (Nichols 2011: 146). However, there is no "genetic" relationship between this community and Ark of Salvation. Most likely, this connection was negotiated in order to emphasize the legitimacy of their historical presence in Helsinki. Furthermore, there is a Baptist church in the Greater Helsinki area called Bethany (*Vifania*), which now has some 20 members and also claims to be a successor of Smirnova's community. In 2017, they celebrated the church's 110th anniversary (see Russian Baptist Church n. d.).

In 2012 Ark of Salvation had nearly 130 members. In 2014, there were nearly 150 churchgoers, and in 2016, they officially had a list of 129 adult members, not counting children. The numbers were cited in several interviews and visual observation confirmed them.

One feature makes Ark of Salvation unique. In their home countries, all members of the congregation belonged to different Evangelical denominations. The minister of the church, Petr Potapenko, told that there are people from seven or eight different Evangelical denominations. Most of the congregants are from Baptist and Pentecostal churches but there are also people from other Evangelical denominations. According to our observations, worship on Ark of Salvation (music, appearance of parishioners, mode of speech) looks like the worship of a Conservative Pentecostal or Baptist church. This situation is particular because these congregations differ in their teaching and rituals. One of the disagreements concerns the

phenomenon of glossolalia (speaking in tongues), which is common practice in Pentecostal churches, but unacceptable among Baptists. Glossolalia is an emotional personal experience which, according to Pentecostal teaching, is received for the first time in what is called the baptism to the Holy Spirit. After that, they may "speak in tongues" during personal and common praying. They explain it as a communication with the Holy Spirit. Glossolalia sound incomprehensible, but Pentecostals have explained it as an ability to speak in a foreign language, either a real one or the "angels' language". Usually Pentecostals claim that while speaking in tongues they edify themselves, pointing to the biblical text: "One who speaks in a tongue edifies himself; but one who prophesies edifies the church" (1 Corinthians, NASB). Baptists reject glossolalia in their practice. Usually they explain it as hysterics or even as demon possession (Porublev, 1957).

In Ark of Salvation, the Pentecostals are encouraged not to speak in tongues from the stage but may speak quietly during common prayer. The minister of the church explained that congregants try to deal with this issue as well as possible and especially Sunday services reach a compromise so that everybody tries to respect practices of different denominations. However, some congregants regarded this as a current issue which caused contradictions.

Power to Change mainly consists of a group of former members of Ark of Salvation who felt the need to found a church of their own. Its history goes back to 2013, however, when a group of Russian-speaking young people from the north-eastern Estonian town of Jõhvi moved to Finland to establish a church. In the beginning, it was a new branch of the Estonian Methodist Church. In 2014, the youth minister of Ark of Salvation, with a group of 20-30 young believers and some families, left Ark of Salvation and joined this new church, which they now started to call Power to Change. The new church got its blessing from the Estonian Methodist congregation in Jõhvi.

In the beginning, services were held in the United Methodist Church building in Helsinki, with a separate service in Swedish. Then the community moved to another building because of scheduling problems. This move is seen as the beginning of Power to Change as a separate church.

The new church had an active vision and mission. They had a plan to protect all initiatives of Russian-speaking Evangelicals throughout Finland by establishing a network of friendship churches. Power to Change declared its own responsibility for establishing Russian-speaking churches in other regions, aiming to have a "Russian community in every city of Finland" (Sila Peremen 2016).

Based on the style of text, music and behaviour of congregants, this church was mostly oriented to young people. It looked more like the big youth Charismatic churches in Russia and elsewhere, which are not very like Methodist ones in terms of visual image or ritual.

Power to Change has two worship services during the week: on Sunday in the church building and on Tuesday an online service, Praying Hill, during which active church members meet on Malminkartano hill in Helsinki and pray about current topics. It is the only Russian Evangelical church in Finland to broadcast both its regular services online. Furthermore, it has home groups for Bible study and other purposes, such as language teaching and sports. Power to Change has some social projects: concerts in nursing homes and voluntary cleaning services. The church has groups in social media networks, following marketing principles. It is obvious that they try to make these groups popular: besides the worship schedule and quotes from the Bible, they also share facts from the personal life of congregants, many photos, information about life in Finland, interesting facts about the Bible and Christianity. The website of the church is very limited, and all the activity happens in social media networks.

The church video team works hard and, as was seen in the observations, this is a trend in contemporary youth groups of these Evangelical churches. They not only broadcast from church meetings but also make music videos for praise groups and other Christian singers as well as video advertising.

Power to Change still belongs to the Estonian Methodist Church, but this fact is not emphasized in the group's activities. The minister, Andrei Hinkonen, explained it like this: "We are under the protection of the Methodist Church but we do not advertise it much. Because we work mainly with unbelievers who do not know anything about the churches or denominations. Our church is called Power to Change and we are a simple Evangelical Protestant Church" (PC_1, November 2015).

Establishing a new church was an opportunity for these people to create a community with their own vision of church, an active mission and social work among different kinds of people (not only migrants from Russia), modern music and light shows, strong communication with Finnish and Russian churches, and an international purpose. They obviously felt they could not realize these tasks in Ark of Salvation.

Negotiating identity

In this part, we analyse the ways in which the congregations and their members negotiate their identity. The issue of personal identity is extremely important for Russian Evangelical Christians in Finland. They talked about it often: in sermons, in personal conversation with each other, and with the researchers. It became obvious that they need to understand their own place in the country, in the Christian world, and in their own ethnic group.

A lot of members of the churches are Ingrian repatriates and their family members who have moved to Finland via the repatriation programme. Nevertheless, the informants did not mention Ingrian self-identity very often. They might use this construct to talk about official issues, but not as their ethnic origin and identification. In her article on relations between diaspora and ethnic identity among Ingrian Finns, Helena Miettinen highlights common traits that characterize Ingrian people: Finnish native language, Lutheran faith, a common homeland and tragic past. The Lutheran church members were united in its view that Finnish identity was inseparable from language (Miettinen, 2006: 110). The only identity characteristic on this list shared by the Evangelical believers studied here is "tragic past." However, this tragic past was more likely perceived as the common past of Russian Evangelical Christians. This identification was highlighted in the interviews, in memories of the persecution of Evangelical Christians during the Soviet anti-religious policy. Some interviewees remembered that "atheism was a hidden religion" and was illustrated in every lesson at school. Many congregants were children of Soviet dissidents (e.g., Baptists and Pentecostals). Often their teachers, classmates and neighbours knew that their families were believers; thus, they were viewed negatively as sectarians. The interviewees were not directly persecuted, but slightly discriminated against.

In contrast, the Soviet period was also remembered as a glorious time when, despite hostility, people became believers and were baptized secretly. Thus, the interviewees viewed their underground, dissident faith as exemplary for everyone. Some believers still held the ideals of underground religious traditions and dissident identity, making them somewhat sceptical of both today's "liberal" Russia and Finland. Researchers are rather united on the fact that renewing and strengthening homeland identity is a central factor in migrant worship communities (Stepick, Rey and Mahler 2009: 7). This was evident in Ark of Salvation through reproducing the former homeland's dissident religious tradition which, for some, became a central identification factor. Furthermore, building one's identity on one's own religious background may also be a counter-reaction to the liberalism of the new home country (see also Furseth and Repstad 2006: 165-179).

Some of the informants came to Finland from Estonia. Most identified themselves as Russian while they lived in Estonia. A woman in the church even mentioned that she lived in a "region for Russians" in Estonia. The Finnish and Estonian Evangelical churches have very strong ties: they often visit each other's Christian conferences and other events. In some families, one of the spouses migrated from Estonia. Children visited the Estonian summer camp, Gideon, every year, but they did not speak Estonian. Congregants of Ark of Salvation often go to an Estonian food shop in Helsinki because it is situated on the next street to the church. They said they missed these products. When some people from Ark of Salvation left this church and became congregants of Power to Change, established by Estonian missionaries in 2013, ethnic identity was not the main reason.

Two interviewees from Ark of Salvation said that they were from Belarus and had moved to Finland because they were married to Ingrian women. They appreciated their ethnic identity and shared stories about their life in Belarus. During the worship, or example when preaching, they used Belarusian words.

Furthermore, in Ark of Salvation, one informant identified herself as a Tatar. This girl mentioned that originally only her mother was a Tatar, but she felt her "Tatar blood" and liked this culture; however, she could not speak the language. She spoke Russian and knew just few words in Tatar. She came to Finland in 2013 from Kazan (the capital of

the Tatar region in Russia), because her father got a job in Helsinki. She seemed well integrated in Finnish society. She was on summer vacation before her last school year. At the time of the interview, she already had a job in a charity shop where she spoke Finnish and future plans for higher education. Moreover, she said that she had friends not only at the church, but in her school too. All of them were Finns or migrants from other countries. Nevertheless, her Tatar identity had an emotional meaning for her.

The same can be said about Ukrainian emotional identity. On 24 November 2015, during the fieldwork, a memorial for the Ukrainian national tragedy, the Holodomor, was observed after the Power to Change worship. People from the church wore traditional Ukrainian shirts (*Vyshyvanka*) and sang a national song. At other times, they had no tensions with Russian people in the church.

Some people in the churches came to Finland from Russia with work or study permits. They identified themselves with Russia and the Russian language. For them, changing one's country of residence to improve one's standard of living did not mean changing ethnic identity. Some of them mentioned that they were proud of their ethnic identity as Russian and did not want to be anyone else.

It seems that, since there are so many ethnic backgrounds in these churches, ethnic questions are sensitive. Nevertheless, some informants mentioned that they try to avoid talking about subjects that might divide people. Congregations also attempted to treasure their communion. Ethnic and national diversity was not underlined but the things which united the members were emphasized, as the following conversation shows:

Maija: What kind of relations do the Ukrainians and Russians have?

Ilya: Difficult. [They] are even at war [laughing].

Alexandra: But the churches are not at war.

Ilya: In the church, we have better relations. I have heard about an emigrant church, maybe it was in America, where people stopped talking to each other. We have different opinions on the conflict but...

Alexandra: In the church, at least in our church, politics does not come to church. We try.

Ilya: We pray for peace. [...] In the church, there are different opinions, so we don't talk about it, because it may break us. We don't talk about stuff that may break us, at least at the church.

Aleksandra: Because it doesn't help. We more try to pray about it.
(AS_11, AS_12, April 2015).¹

For many Evangelical believers, religious identity is more important than national commitments. Spiritual values and meaning are seen to rise above the conflicts of nation states. Additionally, in Ark of Salvation, the idea of gathering people together is that no matter what congregation people belonged to in their homeland, they were all in Finland now and could pray in Russian together. Ark of Salvation does not have clear doctrines, because people are from different denominations. It is a church with its own vision and comprehension of different issues which is united by the Russian language.

Congregants mention that besides a shared language, people are united by something that they were calling a mystical Russian soul or Russian mentality, which made them completely different from local Finnish people. Some people said the churches helped them to maintain a stable identity, to stay themselves in the reality of a new country. In a Russian church, they could get something more than in the Finnish churches, as one member of Ark of Salvation mentioned. "Mentality is, of course, the most important thing. Naturally, our church is an emigrant church. It is understandable that people come here, and they create their own [church]" (AS_10, June 2015).

Belonging to a Russian-speaking church was also regarded as a sign of faith and spirituality, as more important for the true believer than finances and social position which could have been achieved better by joining the Finnish churches. One member explained:

I know one thing: if you want to study Finnish well, you will go to the Finnish church. However, in your heart, you want to be a friend with people with a Russian soul. Some people go to the Finnish church because of career or language. Alternatively, some people do not like Russians. Nevertheless, in the last days Russian people want to be with Russians (AS_5, 17 June 2012).

The interviews also implied formation of identity through identification and commitment to Finland. A common identity with fellow citizens was also promoted through representing the majority confession in Finland – unlike in their former homeland. "I don't feel that we

¹ Names of the interviewees are pseudonyms.

would have been regarded as a sect; because a sect is a minority, and the minority is Orthodoxy in Finland, Protestants are the majority" (AS_9, December 2014). Identity talk also includes instrumental negotiations of identities. It is significant and of practical advantage to be recognized. This was expressed in the fact that Power to Change was officially a Methodist church, as one of their members mentioned:

We have relationships with the Methodist Church in Estonia and everywhere. Somehow it just happened that we also became a Methodist congregation, [but] we don't think so much that we are a Methodist [church], but just, let's say, a Protestant [church]. That we do like it is said in the Bible and if we have to choose, we are a Methodist congregation just because we have good relations with them [...] It is also good to be a Methodist here [...] they are evidently respected in Finland (PC_2, June 2016).

The interviewees also shared Finnish public narratives about building Finnish identity and emotional commitment to Finnish stories. For example, the connection between Finland and the Soviet Union and the fact that Finnish believers smuggled Bibles and other Christian literature from Finland into the Soviet Union were meaningful (see more about Bible smuggling in Latvala 2008). This activity was mentioned in many interviews. It is worth pointing out that this was mentioned to the researcher who is a Finn. The Russian speakers' attention to the Finnish Bible smuggling showed a close connection with Finland and obviously was a public Finnish Christian narrative, intertwining here with identity formation as a Finland Russian. The very positive manner of recounting this reflects a desire to appeal to Finnish people. In Power to Change, the aim was also to form an identity as Finland Russians:

Many in our congregation have lived in Finland for a long time, and, thus, you necessarily try to adjust to Finland more than to keep holding onto something that is in Russia. Maybe our vision is more to be Russians in Finland and adjust to Finnish culture (PC_2, June 2016).

The community of Russian speakers does not build on similarity – unlike many other migrant groups – since often, the only shared attribute is the Russian language (see, for instance, Kopnina 2005; Davydova 2009). We can see diverse forms of ethnic identity among the

congregants: (1) implied but not used (Ingrian people), (2) territorial (Russian people who moved to Finland from Estonia), (3) emotional (Belarusian, Ukrainian and Tatar), (4) symbolically uniting (the Russian "soul") and (4) leaving ethnic origin behind and joining Finnish narratives. This diversity in ethnic identities encouraged the researched communities to consciously build their feeling of togetherness and identity through compromises. This fact indicates their own understanding of their heterogeneous nature. The congregations tried to take into account their various ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Language is important, but not the only reason for uniting them. The idea of a primordial difference between mentalities is strong and exists parallel to their own ethnic identity. Furthermore, the fact that these churches prioritized religious togetherness and identity over national or ethnic identity is building Russian-speaking communality in a new way. In their identification, social, class and ethnic factors were not as relevant as shared faith.

Establishing their presence in society

Examining Russian-speaking Evangelical Christians in Finland contributes to broadening the understanding of migrant life in a new society – a topic that is closely linked with multifaceted formation of identity. How have the Russian speakers acted to establish their existence and space in society?

First of all, these communities may offer integration to their members simply by being organized, having official status and contacts. "When the immigrants start to organize themselves officially, they become a subject for the local authorities and for national legislation" (Martikainen 2004). The communities may become buffers between the individual and society (see also Bauman 2014). Both church communities had at least formal contacts with Finnish-speaking congregations. Ark of Salvation is an official member of the union of Free Churches in Finland but has no strong connection with Finnish-speaking churches. Power to Change, in contrast, has a lot of contacts in Finland. Their new homepage mentions that the community works with other congregations and cannot fulfil its tasks alone (Sila Church 2018). Officially, Power to Change is a registered organization in Finland. It is not part of any Finnish religious organization; its succession and spiritual blessing come from the Estonian Methodist Church. Ark of Salvation is the

only Russian-speaking Protestant congregation in Finland that has its own church building, making it publicly visible in a local setting. Power to Change also plans to expand its public visibility by buying a church building of its own.

The role of church communities was also evident in their concrete efforts to support integration, through helping with bureaucracy and offering information, language courses, and psychological help. The churches and their members promoted integration in society in very practical ways. These efforts were even higher up the churches' agenda at the beginning of the new millennium, when the majority of Russian speakers, especially those with Ingrian-Finnish roots, had moved to Finland. There were not so many cultural programmes in Russian in Finland then, and churches were offering everyone an opportunity for social gathering.

Many believers from both churches evangelize and go every week to talk to people in shopping centres. Thus, their efforts are directed outward, to other people, communities and society outside their own (see also Elisha 2011: 222). They seek to make their ideas public in local settings; thus, their agency includes attempts to establish their being in a place (see also Caraccioli and Wright 2015: 152).

Social participation in a new country was more difficult for the newcomers. Earlier studies also show that migrants usually only become active after years of adjustment to the new environment (Caraccioli and Wright 2015: 152). The newcomers in the data found it difficult to know how to make their ideas public in the local context: "I don't know how one should evangelize here. In Russia, I would know. I need more time" (AS_11, April 2015). Individuals and society in Finland were seen as more distant, individualized and secular. It appears that the length of time lived in Finland does help social agency.

At the same time, the church community offered a safe place for people and they actually did not need to be active in Finnish-speaking society because they had many things within their own Russian-speaking community: friendship, mutual help, social networking. The church had become a kind of diaspora for them. The fact that Ark of Salvation did not have many outside connections was also justified with religious reasons:

We are traditional believers, we are sceptical about relationships with people who do not belong to the church. They have a different set of

interests: concerts, disco... In addition, we said that it is not good if our young people will participate in these. It is not normal (AS_1, May 2012).

For Ark of Salvation, the lack of local connections was a challenge. It lost its most active group who left and founded a church of their own. Many people from Ark of Salvation did not participate actively in Finnish society. They did not speak Finnish very well, they did not have Finnish friends or professional growth in Finland. Church members mostly worked as maintenance personnel and cleaners; some of them had been trained for several years on the courses to have these jobs. Some had real difficulties with getting a job because of their age, qualifications and the general situation in Finland, but others were satisfied with their position (on average life was better for them than for people on a similar social level in Russia). The congregants had limited communication with other, non-religious, Russian organizations. This meant that the church was their only source of communication and assistance. Sometimes they said a phrase that seemed funny to them: "I forgot Russian, but I still cannot speak Finnish". This describes their situation in the country incredibly accurately. The church offered them an opportunity to create a comfortable environment where they not only pray, but also have social life, recreation, education and assistance in difficult issues. This social agency has also created a self-identity for them as emigrants, living in their own emigrant reality. For some of the congregants, their congregations were an island for their own culture and language where they did not need to struggle in a new environment with a non-native language.

However, for others a migrant church was "a liminal point between the past and the future" (AS_12, April 2015). The congregants felt comfortable there, but for some, it was not the best idea to stay in this Russian migrant space; they were interested in learning a Finnish way of life. Many of them had moved from migrant churches to Finnish ones. For others, a movement towards Finnish congregational life would have meant losing their own language, the other people and communion, which were keeping them in the migrant community.

Ark of Salvation provides Finnish translation for attendees' family members although Finnish-speaking spouses of church members do not often visit this church. At present, however, the churches still mainly have Russian-speaking programmes, which indicates the importance of

native language in their identity. "I always say that for Finnish people the best church is Finnish church where the Word of God is taught in their own mother tongue (AS_10, June 2015). The churches did not (yet) focus on other minorities but the common linguistic identity was still a strong connecting factor when contacting or helping other people.

However, during the research period, the vision of language and contacts began to alter slightly in Power to Change. Namely, in 2016, the vision of Power to Change was to "support the life change among all Russian speakers in Finland" (Sila Peremen 2016). The official website of the church then stated that "the vision of the church is to spread the Gospel through the Russian-speaking population in Finland, using home groups, personal relationships with people, services and other activities" (Sila Peremen 2016). Then, the minister said he believed that someday the church would become international, and the worship would be translated into other languages. Two years later, they had broadened their vision to create revival in Finland and Europe as a whole. Their new website states that they have already "brought thousands of Russian speakers to Jesus all over Europe based on media and various church activities" (Sila Church 2018). The community's vision is that in the near future it will open its doors to speakers of other languages, especially Finnish speakers, and help marginalized groups. The church has already started Bible studies in English and plans to start Finnish services. The pastors also dream of having a strong influence on a larger Europe, by establishing an international Bible institute for Europeans (Sila Peremen 2018).

Both churches have a lot of international contacts. Ark of Salvation used to have more contacts in Russia, but these have started to decrease after cultural conflicts with Russians, as the following example shows. The Ark of Salvation organized regular summer camps. Usually in summer they held four camps: for male and female adults, youth and children. But in August 2015 the camp was unusual. That May, the youth minister of the church talked about it as a big achievement for their international work: the church invited people from the Light to the World church, which is located in the Russian town of Kamensk-Uralsky. This is a small town in the Ural region, 100 kilometres from Ekaterinburg (the regional capital and nearest airport). Light to the World is a conservative Pentecostal

church. Women of all ages wear skirts and scarves all the time, they do not use electric guitars during praise, and all of them speak in tongues. More than 20 people of different ages (mostly youth, the minister with his wife, and several other adults, but no children) came to Helsinki in their own bus. The trip to Finland took them five days, since it is more than 3000 kilometres from Kamensk-Uralsky to Helsinki, and five more days to get back. For all of these people it was the first (and for some of them probably the only) visit to the European Union. We need to clarify that for the trip all of them obtained international passports, visas and permission to travel, which is rather expensive for people from a small Russian town.

Summer camp and a Sunday worship in the church building were the only events that they visited in Finland. They came in the evening before the camp on Wednesday and returned to Russia the day after the end of the worship, on Sunday, a total of four nights in Finland. They did not walk in Helsinki or visit any museums or see the seaside (some of them had never seen the sea). However, they did not look disappointed. They said that communication and common worship were the main aims of the trip and it seemed true for them. The members of Ark of Salvation needed Russian-speaking friends and like-minded people. The three-day summer camp was held on a forest campsite near Lahti. It included worship, sports, sauna, fishing, table games and music making. During the camp people from Russia led all the worship and praise with their own musical instruments. For the Finnish youth it was an unusual situation. Only few of them were able to play instruments or preach.

One important reason for Light to the World to visit Finland was mentioned as the "fiancé issue." Light to the World is an old church facing a typical problem for a closed marginal group – inbreeding. The church members honestly said that they came to Finland to find some girls to marry young men from their church. During the informal communication they talked a lot about advantages of life in Kamensk-Uralsky: beautiful nature, organic food, comfortable houses and opportunities for Christian employment, for example the church has established several agricultural and construction enterprises where only its own members work. This situation was like a weird joke for female members of Ark of Salvation, who had a Finnish education, spoke more than three languages, were integrated well in the local society and had plans to make a career in Helsinki.

They said to each other that they could not understand how it is possible to live in the Ural region. No-one from Ark of Salvation moved to Kamensk-Uralsky.

After that, Ark of Salvation stopped holding international summer camps. It seems the camp in 2015 was an initiative of the Russian church. Ark of Salvation is open for communication, but quite passive for organizational work.

Power to Change, in contrast, saw the change in their agency and position in relation to Finland and other Western countries. After *perestroika* and the liberalization of the Soviet religious policy, Western missionaries founded new churches in Russia and other post-communist countries (see e.g. Pelkmans 2009; Wanner 2004; Penttilä 2014). Now Russian speakers have founded churches in Finland and the direction of transnational movement of values and religious views may be said to be changing: believers from Russia and Eastern Europe now influence Western societies. This implies active agency in the transnational role of Russian-speaking churches in Finland. For example, Power to Change has organized the Hope Festivals, Russian-speaking evangelizing events, in 2015 and in 2016 in the centre of Helsinki. Believers from Russia and Eastern Europe helped to make the festivals happen. This was clear from their video:

We remember a time when American, European preachers came to the Soviet Union to spread the Gospel in English, which needed to be translated into Russian. Today we are seeing a reverse picture. And to be honest I am proud that today Russian-speaking people from the former Soviet Union, or the former Eastern bloc, communist countries, now go to spread the Gospel on the streets of Europe, and need translators to translate it into the local language, Finnish (Hope Festival 2016).

Power to Change has international plans, as mentioned before, to open a Bible institute for Europeans. They are also trying to find sponsors from abroad, for example from rich Methodist congregations in the United States. However, since they do not see their community through any denominational lens, they have contacts with Pentecostals, Hillsong Church and many neo-charismatic and Evangelical churches around the world.

Conclusion

The article reveals that the theology and identity formation of communities influence the behaviour of believers in migration situations. Religious togetherness and belonging may become more important than national identifications. Russian-speaking Christian life in Finland is not very active and diverse, but the existing churches form different types of Evangelical community. Evangelical Christianity is heterogeneous: people establish churches with their own preferred structure, representation and relationships, so each church can find its own type of congregants. In this situation, migrants from post-Soviet countries to Finland have an opportunity to choose not only Russian or Finnish speaking congregations but a community that meets their ideal of a full spiritual life. Based on his or her religious needs and the position which he or she wants to take in the new country, a new migrant can choose either the more conservative Russian Evangelical alternative or the one focused more on social outreach and social integration into Finnish society. Moreover, a new church can be born as a response to a situation in an existing congregation.

The theological differences between Ark of Salvation and Power to Change are not large. One area in which their members do differ markedly is their attitude to the past, that is, whether to maintain their former identity and an emigrant church life or to change and assimilate in the society to which they migrated. This was why a new church was founded in our research period. Members of the new church, Power to Change, called themselves "Finland Russians" an expression comparable to the name for one traditional Finnish national linguistic minority, the Finland Swedes. This choice of name shows that they are well integrated in Finland.

The identity of Russian-speaking people is in many ways a complicated topic. Like all Russian speakers, the congregants have a common native language but ethnically they are heterogeneous identifying, for example, as Russians, Ingrian Finns, Ukrainians, Belarusians or Tatars. They also come from various countries and denominational backgrounds. Furthermore, the concept of a primordial "Russian soul" or "Russianness" unites congregants in both churches, despite their native language, country of origin, religious denomination and personal feelings.

One interesting peculiarity is (some) informants' opinion that Russianness creates an opportunity for pure worship and communication with other Christians. Conservative theology in combination with Russianness is seen as very trustworthy, offering a feeling of familiarity and even ultimately bringing salvation. This vision partly contributed to their distance towards the Finnish society around them. For some, joining the majority Protestant denomination in Finland signals a change in their identification from being in a minority in Russia towards feeling part of the majority in Finland.

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List of informants

Tatiana Krihtova:

AS_1 – Male, 61, minister of the church.

AS_2 – Male, 23, youth minister.

AS_3 – Female, 60.

AS_4 – Female, 26.

AS_5 – Male, 35.

AS_6 – Female, 57.

AS_7 – Female, 32.

AS_8 – Male, 52.

PC 1 – Male, 32, minister of the church

Maija Penttilä:

AS_9 – M, 35.

AS_10 – M, 65.

AS_11 – M, 26.

AS_12 – F, 28.

PC_2 – M, 26.



MARGINAL CHRISTIANITIES

"Almost Orthodox": Religious Self-Identification of Transcaucasian Doukhobors in the Post-Soviet Context

Svetlana Tambovtseva

Introduction

In 2013, "Voron" production studio and St. Petersburg Documentary Film Studio released a film titled "Yes, yes; no, no,"¹ dedicated to Transcaucasian Doukhobors. The filming takes place in the village of Gorelovka and features a cheese factory, communal noodle making, and an Easter service. The film centers on the juxtaposition of footage of Gorelovka with scenes staged in St Petersburg. A highly-ranked state official reads a report on Doukhobors living in Georgia, their history, and their religious dogma. More precisely, he browses through it in his office and on his way to "the committee" and Legislative Council. He pauses his reading to watch footage of televised parliamentary debates and to answer his phone calls. Meanwhile the voiceover continues reading excerpts from a report, which the character in question has just read. He reads an article about Doukhobors not going to the manmade churches, not worshiping icons, and not recognizing earthly authorities. In one of his phone conversations, he expresses some interest in

¹ "Let your word be 'Yes, Yes' or 'No, No'; anything more than this comes from the evil one" (Matthew 5:37, NRSV).

the fate of "Russians abroad" and promises to raise the issue at the next meeting. This somewhat schematic and staged interpretation of life in a distant Transcaucasian village is contrasted against the imaginary "backstage" of Russian national politics, building on two dramatic extremes. I will reflect on the ethnographic insights that the film's director and screenwriter Andrey Redkin provides in his interpretation of the abovementioned screenplay.

What symbolic resources and mechanisms of adaptation do Doukhobors employ to construct their religious tradition when they move from Transcaucasia to Russia? What is the role of their oral tradition in this process? What is the combination of religious, ethnic, and nationalistic elements in their rhetoric of self-identification? Rejecting the normative approach and dogmatism characteristic of the research into the Doukhobor religious tradition, this chapter offers a more consistent approach that reveals ethnic categories and identifies the emic classifications and self-identifications of my informants. The historical context allows for the tracing of a shift in religious categorization and its connection with global tendencies that characterize religious life in the post-Soviet space.

Transcaucasian Doukhobors as an ethno-confessional group

Transcaucasian Doukhobors are commonly described as an ethnic and confessional group, a community formed in the emigrational context, localized in an alien confessional and ethnic environment, and self-identifying primarily with their religion. Based on these features, Doukhobors are often compared to Mennonites (Nikitina 2013: 53), yet the closest similarity would be Transcaucasian Molokans. Serafima Nikitina, author of works on the self-identification of Old Believer, Dukhobor, and Molokan communities, suggests the term "confessional group," "referring to [the fact] that separating from the dominating confession in different ways, they share common features. The major one is the consolidation of faith and culture (I understand faith and culture as ontologically different entities)" (Nikitina 2017: 77). Such a differentiation, I believe, is too dogmatic and essentializing and indicates the "varieties of Christian faith," such as folk Orthodox Christianity and folk Protestantism. Although Nikitina mentions the theory of Fredrik Barth, discussing the application of his ideas on the dependence of ethnic self-identification on

confessional identity, these theoretical discussions do not seem to feature in her further analysis.

The inhabitants of Gorelovka and nearby villages use the name "Doukhobor" to indicate their ethnic identity. In the same manner, this name is used by their neighbors – Armenians and Georgians. This causes a paradoxical situation when Doukhobors juxtapose themselves with Russians:

Svetlana: [Women] all used to marry locals then?

G. B.: No, there were those from other villages too. Yet, not of other nations, that was rarely the case. But then they started marrying Russians, and marrying Armenians, and Georgians (Interview 1).

This dialogue demonstrates that Russians could be identified as the "other nation" and marriages between Russians and Doukhobors could be described as inter-ethnic.

Svetlana Inikova sees the reason for such a persistent juxtaposition in the synonymic usage of the words "Russians" and "Orthodox [Christians]" in the 18th and 19th centuries (Inikova 1998). According to Inikova, the affiliation of the state's titular nation with Orthodox Christianity drove the Doukhobors to seek an alternative ethnic identity, and it was a cause, rather than an effect, of their migration and isolated settling first in Tavria province, then in Transcaucasia. "Not being Orthodox [Christians] and claiming they were not Russians either, including into [their] sect a considerable number of Ukrainians and some Mordvins, Doukhobors considered themselves a distinct people and regarded a confessional [title] 'Doukhobors' as an ethnonym" (Inikova 1998: 84).

The formation of Doukhobors as an ethno-confessional group calls for more scrutiny. I also have to note that the "ethnogenesis" of Doukhobors, as Inikova sees it, does not look realistic in the historical context. I agree that the semantics of the word "Russian" (denoting "Orthodox Christian") played a significant role in the construction of the emic classification of the early sectarian communities. However, it is important to point out that this process was a result of the imperial nationalities policy: "The primordial religion for Russians was Orthodoxy, just as was Judaism for Jews and Islam for Tatars. <...> Moreover, like many other multinational empires, Imperial Russia applied a corporatist approach to religious diversity –

tolerating non-Orthodox confessions as communal groups rather than allowing freedom of conscience to individual believers. In consequence, the parameters of Russia's policies of religious toleration were broadly constructed around corporatist, national notions of religious affiliation. As deviators from their ascribed ethno-confessional community, there was little place for Russian sectarians in this approach to religious diversity" (Breyfogle 2005: 22). As Nicolas B. Breyfogle notes in his research on Russian sectarians in the Caucasus, their role as colonizers on the remote frontier was crucial for the dramatic reshaping of their group identities (Ibid).

I am particularly interested in focusing on the interpretations of contemporary informants, because it allows for the indication of the relevant components of self-representation:

In 1841, [they] came here, I know it for a fact... [Others] joined [them] on their way, and they are probably called Doukhobors because they are not of the same nation. There are Cossacks, and Ukrainians, and Tatars among Doukhobors – various nations. And when they all united, well, they went against a priest, they disobeyed a priest, and they were resettled from there. Not exactly against the church, right? Exactly against a priest (Interview 2).

This narrative of the Gorelovka villager is remarkable in several aspects at the same time. The name Doukhobors is linked with the heterogeneous ethnic body of the group, initially united by a social protest. The religious nature of disagreements with Orthodox Christianity is devalued and replaced by an anticlerical rhetoric as the primary impulse for the creation of this movement. In this context, it is worth considering the process that could be called, using the terms of Aleksander Etkind, an "internal colonization" (Etkind 2011).

Sectarianism and the idea of "primitive communism"

The interpretation of the Russian Raskol movement (the schism in the 17th century) and sectarianism in the terms of the emerging self-identification of the exploited class, which formed the "undeveloped" religious protest, is more or less commonplace in the Soviet historiography. Sometimes, it is a convenient discursive practice for "legitimizing" research on this topic (see, for instance, Klibanov 1965). However,

I focus on a different phenomenon directly linked with the self-identification of the community. The idea that Doukhobors founded the first Kolkhoz even before such an institution appeared elsewhere in USSR, as reflected in the early Soviet literature (see, for instance, Tugan-Baranovskii 1918), is still narrated by my informants in their interviews up to this day. The same way as Tolstoians "discovered" the facts supporting their teachings in the Doukhobor tradition, all whilst making efforts to reshape it (Inikova 2000), social democrats saw Doukhobors as a sort of "primitive communists" (Etkind 2011: 208-213). Most probably, that period was the initial stage of placing the small religious groups into a nationalist logic. "The notion of a Russian historical affinity with communism also satisfied nationalist sentiment, which the fantasy of world revolution never managed to suppress" (Etkind 2011: 213).

A nationalist context would seem even less surprising in the context of the sectarian sympathizers', in particular, in the social democrats' dreams of Russian reformation (yet, unnecessary in case of revolution) (Etkind 1996: 301). This reformation would be historically linked to the nationalist uprising, and an idealized commune (*obshchina*) as a form of social organization. However, the hopes that political dissidents had about the religious ones were not fulfilled and, as Etkind notes, the trial of the Weberian Reformation scenario on Russian soil did not succeed. He suggests a Durkheimian one instead, pointing out a resemblance of mystic sects with a revolutionary movement (Etkind 2003).

Caroline Humphrey touches upon this subject, but what interests her more is the intrinsic perspective of a revolutionary dynamic within the groups of Old Believers (Humphrey 2014). The Doukhoborism is close to Old Belief in many aspects that are crucial to Humphrey's analysis. Both seem to draw inspiration from the charisma of martyrdom, messianic pride, and eschatological anxiety; and their similarities to the Protestants are even more tangible because they reject icons. In a place of essential truth, or true faith, Doukhobors have their *Zakon* (Law) — initially a reference to the Five Books of Moses, unacknowledged by contemporary informants, penetrating their life deeply in a form of rites and everyday practices. Social novelties, such as communal organization or women leaders, have been introduced throughout Doukhobor history.

The Schism reiterated in Doukhobors: by the end of the 19th century, the whole community split. The Bigger Party (*Bolshaya Polovina*)

left for Cyprus and then Canada, where they went further, and such radical groups as *Svobodniki* appeared. It would seem that those who stayed in Georgia found other ways of managing their intragroup conflicts, but the community has split three times over the last 35 years (mostly, during three resettlements). Humphrey regards these chains of disruptions in dissenter communities as a liberating process releasing social creativity. Although Doukhobors do not debate religious topics much these days and are far more concerned with the economic impact of the conflicts, their way of dealing with these issues can be similarly understood.

Ethnic framing of the local tradition

In the course of same interview with G. B., I indicated contexts that replace "the ethnic" with "the national" and in which self-identification is influenced by the official representations of the Soviet institutions of power:

Svetlana: However, the people here, do they consider themselves Russians? Do they say "Doukhobor" rather than "Russian"?

G. B. Well, in [our] passports, [in our] documents it says "Russian" (Interview 1).

In modern Georgian passports (as well as in Russian ones – some of my informants are Russian citizens), the nationality of the bearer is not indicated. Such a reference to the officially recognized ethnic affiliation dates back to the Soviet times and is still relevant in the community.

Speaking further of the Doukhobor practice to marry "in their traditional dress... with no veil," which was maintained up until the late 20th century, G. B. reduces the juxtaposition of the Doukhobor and secular aspects of wedding to the juxtaposition of the local and traditional, on the one hand, and the standard and universal, on the other, eliminating the religious component. The idea of "the national" forces my informants to conceptualize the differences in dialects as almost separate languages, which results in claims of a distinct idiom:

There's a celebration...we are getting ready. We hang our – how to put it – *rushniki* (ritual cloth), but we call them *utirki*. In Doukhobor – *utirki* (Interview 1).

The emphasis on the ethnic component and ethnographization of the Doukhobor everydayness revive such a stylistically marked notion as "national costume" in the reference to the traditional Doukhobor dress:

We put on a national dress, a costume. That's the way we call it, a Doukhobor ritual (*obriad*) (Interview 1).

It is no coincidence that it is with the decoration of her house with *utirkas* that G. B. starts her narrative of the holiday and thus it indicates its important role in her story. A tendency to emphasize the attributes of the ritual is often discussed by the Gorelovka Doukhobors. For instance, when one of the local women allegedly said to a journalist that the Doukhobors "worship *utirochki*," it was considered outrageous because this claim was seen as a misinterpretation of the Doukhobor teachings. The only male chanter² in the community tends to interpret this in gender categories: "Well, if you talk to women, [they are like,] a headscarf should be like this. Just like an icon.³ I don't [need] mediators" (Interview 3).

Seemingly contradictory opinions on the Doukhobor tradition in the same interview:

Doukhobors are pure, open, [and] harmless people. [They] maintain [their] traditions, unlike Molokans⁴ (Interview 4).

At the same time, O. talks about the "clumsiness" of Doukhobor traditions, costume details that were unclear or alien to her, thus partly motivating her choice in favor of Orthodox Christianity:

I saw this hat with flowers on her shelf. I said: Granny, is that your *pi-lotka* [side cap]? No, it's a hat, we wear it under a headscarf. Well, I thought, this was kind of clumsy...

[...]

I believed that that cross helped me, like, supported me, I considered myself stronger with it...A search for something spiritual, [something]

² Chanters sing in a choir that perform Dukhobor psalms on prayer meetings.

³ For M. T., the centrality of the rite is in some way idolatrous and contradictory to the Doukhobor creed.

⁴ My informant refers to the rural Molokan communities that at the time of my interviews, practically ceased to exist in the neighboring regions of Georgia.

bigger, if you can't find it around, you then seek it in something else (Interview 3).

The Doukhobor ritual culture sometimes fails to satisfy the informants' seeking for spirituality, while Orthodox Christianity or New Age religion provide other options.

The gap can be illustrated with the Efremovka villager who refused to hold a Doukhobor funeral, aiming at juxtaposing himself with the chanters from Gorelovka, who "monopolized" the ritual tradition:

No borsht, no noodles.⁵ It's time to knock their hats off.

I. G. comments on his actions in the following manner:

Not in a Doukhobor [manner], not in Armenian – they buried [him] just like that (Interview 4).

Thus, the funeral rite is reflected on in ethnic terms (during the Soviet time, the Doukhobor rite was maintained), which are impossible to go beyond, hence I. G.'s perplexity.

The "unsuccessful" "religious renaissance" of Doukhobors: A normative approach

The interpretation of religion in terms of cultural heritage, characteristic of the late Soviet period (Kormina and Shtyrkov 2015: 7-46), is worth analyzing on two levels, the representation and self-identification of informants and the rhetoric of the scholarly reflection of the events and processes of the recent decades in Doukhobor communities. There were remarkable attempts of institutionalization, such as Doukhobor councils and unions back in the 1990s. At the all-Union council of Doukhobors held in 1991, there was a call to "actively restore traditions, customs, and rituals of Doukhobors," a negotiation to found a "Vestnik doukhobortsev" (*Doukhobor Newsletter*) journal, and to produce audio recordings with psalms. In 1996, a council of the Union of Doukhobors of Russia took place. In that council, a decision to organize a Sunday school in the village of Arkhangelskoie (Tula region, Chern' district – the site for the first mass settlement of Transcaucasian

⁵ These are the necessary meals in the Doukhobor funeral tradition.

Doukhobor migrants) was taken. A Sunday school was to be made based on a regular secondary school. Inikova comments on these events in her article: "It is planned that the kids will learn psalms and rhymes, yet in reality it is not about engaging the children in the spiritual life of the community, but about teaching the cultural heritage of [their] ancestors. All the Doukhobor activities result in such cultural studies... It is impossible to revive culture, traditions without religion, otherwise the whole enterprise ends up in the organization of folk ensembles, [and that's] exactly what we see now" (Inikova 1998). Inikova compares Doukhobor communities to diasporas and discusses the secular character of the organizing bodies of the councils, concluding that the mechanism of the unification of Doukhobors is broken. She summarizes: "The opportunity given by history remains unused" (Ibid).

As can be seen in the quotations above, the idea of the "renaissance" of some pure Doukhoborism outside of history becomes common for Doukhobors and researchers. A semantic component of incompleteness of knowledge and tradition brings together the terms that Serafima Nikitina uses to describe the mainstream processes in the religious culture of Old Believers, Molokans, and Doukhobors. Both of these terms, in the context of her work, are illustrated with ethnographic materials on Doukhobors:

It is important to note the possibility of a *defective* self-identification. It is a demonstration of external identification signs, while the explanation of their confessional meaning is insufficient, for instance, to explain the significance of a belt or a meaning of baptism (of Old Believers) (Nikitina 2013: 60-61, the emphasis is mine — S. T.).

A *reduction* of the confessional tradition...when the local culture, representing the confessional territorial element, loses or nearly loses dogmatic knowledge and most of the ritual cease to function (Nikitina 2013: 78, the emphasis is mine — S. T.).⁶

Such a scholarly approach could presumably be compared with certain self-identifying narratives of Transcaucasian villagers. For instance, V. K. claimed that Gorelovka is inhabited not by Doukhobors,

⁶ Interestingly enough, in the late Soviet time, Georgian Doukhobors have practically never become a subject of scholarly attention, as soon as Canadian Doukhobors (presumably, more "distant" and exotic) were often described in the popular journal "*Nauka i religiia*" (Science and religion) (see, for instance, 1998, issues 2, 4, and 5).

but rather by the "descendants of Doukhobors" (Interview 5). He thus points out the loss of a certain ontological component of the Doukhobor identity. This relatively persistent characteristic is echoed by Lubov Goncharova, who informally headed the Gorelovka community in the mid-1990s and organized its transfer to Bryansk. In her book "Little Siberia – Doukhoboriia" (2012), she, on the one hand, shares her family reminiscences and provides a genealogy, relevant to her relatives and acquaintances, and on the other, she attempts to represent Doukhobors, their history and traditions, in the big Russian context. According to the author, her book is dedicated to what "is no longer a religious movement, the origins of which are at the beginning of Christianity, but much more a way of life of the ethnic group of Russian people from the central Russia, the Volga region, Siberia, western and eastern Ukraine" (Goncharova 2012: 48). As the blurb also claims, it is aimed, among others, at "everyone who loves the Russian people and strives to learn its culture deeper." Goncharova interprets Doukhoborism in a polemic manner: the Transcaucasian settlers were met with hostility towards "sectarians" by the local population:

This is not a religious movement with roots in early Christianity anymore, this is much more – a lifestyle of an ethnic group of the Russian people from the central regions of Russia, Volga region, Siberia, west and east Ukraine... Eventually, there is no closed religious group ([or a] sect), Transcaucasian Doukhobors have never been sectarians..., although some "genius" scholars have made such conclusions. [The community] was full and lively up until 1886; there have been, and there are still, some communities established, but all these are revived descendants of true-Dukhobors (no offence intended) (Goncharova 2012: 48).

The death of the leader Lukeriia Kalmykova and the split that followed at the end of the 19th century are thus regarded as the end of the Doukhobor community. Thus using Durkheimian terms, we could say that the informants themselves sometimes tend to consider their community to be based on mechanical solidarity, and aim for organically unified.

Weakening of institutions and moral interpretation of religious tradition

In her interview, P. B. claimed that the protest of Doukhobors was directed "Not exactly against the church," but "exactly against a priest," which demonstrates her ambivalent perception of the church as, on the one hand, an institution of power and hierarchy, and on the other, as a territory of moral values, a rejection of which could be regarded negatively. The choice is made in favor of the latter:

Well, the difference is...here I got it — [we] don't go to church and don't cross ourselves. Otherwise, [we have] the same commandments, for us they are more or less the same as for you (Interview 2).

It is also important to note that we did not discuss my own religious affiliation, but P. B. presumed I was Orthodox, thus defining the religious affiliation on the ethnic principle.

Such an interpretation of the Doukhobor tradition is linked with the large-scale weakening of institutions that affects the religious life of various denominations in a secular and postsecular world (Hervieu-Léger 2006). Reflecting on the differences between Doukhobors and Orthodox Christians, the chanter from Gorelovka, M. T., emphasized the ritual distinctions in the context of the common moral code:

Doukhobors? Well... why... "[I] worship and bow to God by the spirit!" That's how [it is], in my opinion. Live honestly, live normally, by your own labor (Interview 3).

N. K. offers her version of the list of commandments, in which some of the points correspond to the Decalogue and the others refer to the axiological system of the community.

Well, that's the faith, [we] pray by the spirit, and I don't need anybody. You shall not murder, you shall not steal, visit the sick, feed the hungry, so you don't steal, [you] work, don't deceive (Interview 7).

However, the very structure of the list refers to Orthodox Christianity as the closest tradition oriented towards a written text of the Bible.

The use of the insider form of the word *doukhobor/doukhoborets* (as M. T. did in his interview) is oftentimes employed in informants' self-identifying narratives. Here, the *doukh-* root (meaning 'spirit') is used to justify the absence of material mediation.

O. O., while responding to the question of whether the former villagers of Gorelovka who moved to Russia observe the Doukhobor rituals, puts it the following way: "Well, they observe, for sure, yet we have similar ones, like the Russian ones, all those, the church ones" (Interview 8). O. O. does not state what is exactly similar in a religious sense between Doukhobors and Russians, meaning Orthodox Christians, the rituals, festivities, or prescriptions. Yet, in the absence of a noun, "the church one" (*tserkovnyi*) is used as an adjective to express belonging to a common tradition.

In this context, most of my informants tend to attribute all Doukhobor psalms as taken from the Bible: "They are from the Gospel" (Interview 4); "These are psalms of David" (Interview 3). A corpus of Doukhobor psalms has different sources besides the Bible, among which there are cantus poetry (*dukhovnyie stikhi*), apocrypha, and sermons. However, their biblical pseudo-attribution becomes a significant representation.

On the level of practices, there is a kind of continuity of the popular Orthodox tradition. It often takes forms contradictory to the Doukhobor teachings:

T. S.: There are lots of Tatianas, yes. They are sort of get borne, it happens. Around Tatiana day⁷ or just like that.

Svetlana: Well, apparently, Doukhobors venerate the same saints as Orthodox [Christians]? Say, Khrol (Florus), he is venerated by Orthodox [Christians] too, isn't he?

T. S.: Well, we...of course, it should be like that, together (Interview 9).

The hesitation of T. S. while answering my question about the veneration of saints highlights that this question is not reflected upon in the community under study. Doukhobors did not reject some of the Orthodox practices, characteristic of a peasant community, though those practices could contradict the Doukhobor teachings. For instance, every

⁷ A holiday venerating St. Tatiana celebrated by the Russian Orthodox Church on the 25th of January – *Translator's note*.

Doukhobor village has its own "church feast" (*prestolnyi prazdnik*) (for example, in Gorelovka they celebrate *Khrol*, or *Frol*, i.e. the St. Florus and Laurus day), rooted presumably in the festivities held before coming to Georgia. These feasts are significant for rural communities and, hence, this tradition has been maintained and included in the calendar cycle of Doukhobors, while obviously there are no churches consecrated to honor any saints in their villages. "In autumn, there is that, like, our Doukhobor holiday named *Frol*" (Interview 7).

At the same time, Doukhobors had no practice of naming their children according to the church calendar (*Menologium* – *svyattsy*) and the emergence of Tatiana Day was a relatively new and specific phenomenon. Remarkably, my informants frequently use the word "saint":

We visited the graves (*mogilochki*). Our, like, prophets, the saints are buried there (Interview 8).

If you go straight, there's a hill, rocks, and a hole. Some saint was hiding there. So it is said that he's buried there and his stone – there is a big stone there – is like someone put it there. I read in the calendar that exactly on the first Monday, [people] are going there, exactly for the Holy Spirit only. Here we worship Father, and Son, and the Holy Spirit. Exactly the first Monday after the Trinity [day] (Pentecost) is dedicated for the Holy Spirit. Well, our [people] visit *Dedova Nora* (Interview 9).

The former quotation refers to the veneration of Doukhobor leaders of the 19th century, deeply rooted in popular religiosity, and remarkably expressed in the terms of sainthood. Yet the latter combines a folklore component – the local legend – with T. S.'s attempt to interpret the custom of visiting *Dedova Nora* on the first Monday after Trinity day as a local version of the widespread and institutionally established practice.

Svetlana: I am also interested, what if someone comes from here and his ancestors are Doukhobors, but he decides to get baptized or switch to some other faith, or he doesn't believe in God at all, is he still a Doukhobor?

G. B.: Well, he is. But I think, well, there's little difference whether he's baptized, because everyone believes in God. We read psalms, the cross is also mentioned there, I think, there's nothing wrong if someone gets baptized.

Svetlana: So, he still remains...?

G. B.: Well, he was a Doukhobor anyway, it makes no difference if baptized, there's nothing wrong with it. I don't know, it's my opinion (Interview 1).

Remarkably, G. B. responds to the question about baptism—the most crucial question for the villagers of Gorelovka, who faced several cases of baptism in Doukhobors during the post-Soviet period. This forced them to develop their own attitude to such a phenomenon. Naturally, not all of the community members were that tolerant. A child's baptism could become a cause for family conflict. In one case, a grandfather was informed of the baptism of his granddaughter several months late. In another case, a young girl, who was getting ready for her baptism, kept it secret from some of her family members. My Gorelovka host I. G., who converted to Orthodox Christianity, describes the reaction of the community as follows:

Some [of the people] who got baptized before me, they didn't come out, because they feared judgement...Different things were told about me, some said that I converted to some kind of a sect (Interview 4).

Doukhobors that consider Orthodox Christianity to be a sect sounds like ironic inversion of the conventional picture. This wording can be attributed to a late- and post-Soviet sentiment of suspicion towards "sects," which probably caused this hostility towards the unconventional manifestations of religiosity amongst Gorelovka villagers. Clearly, the main objection concerns rejecting the ancestors' traditions. A baptized informant of mine recalls her grandmother's response when, during the fast, she asked to use oil instead of butter for the fries: "What is that—a fast—it is not given to our people, Doukhobors have never fasted" (Interview 4).

An inherited religious affiliation is perceived as predestined, as "given," and any religiousness that goes beyond is seen as breaking with tradition and self-righteousness. The role of Doukhobor families in the compact isolated village impacts the clan, rather than the ethnic organization of their community. It is in this family context, presumably, that reference to the ancestors should be understood.

Svetlana: So, for instance, if we say that someone is a Doukhobor, this means that he is from here or means that he goes to *Sirotskii dom*?⁸

G. B.: Well, his ancestors were Doukhobors, so a Doukhobor he is (Interview 1).

The Doukhobors' "ancestors" are not the same as imagined "ancestors", addressed in the traditionalist discourse. They have particular referents in the history of every clan in a relatively close historical perspective. Some families managed to restore their genealogy (with the help of researchers) since their move to Georgia in the mid-19th century. The communal solidarity based on family ties and "inherited" religious affiliation was sustained based on *Gemeinschaft*. The relations of Doukhobors and Orthodox Christianity in the post-Soviet period seem worth interpreting exactly in this context. In G. B.'s statement, cited above – "Well, he was a Doukhobor anyway, it makes no difference if baptized, there's nothing wrong with it" – the term Doukhobor could be seen as a characteristic ascribed to a person from her or his birth. However, the next remark – "there's little difference whether he's baptized, because everyone believes in God. We read psalms, the cross is also mentioned there, I think, there's nothing wrong if someone gets baptized" – implies the religious understanding of this term that makes Orthodox Christianity and Doukhoborism closer. Two religious identities, thus, can merge with each other as if the principle of exclusive religiosity stops working. The research on Tula Doukhobors confirms this tendency: "Currently, there is mass conversion to Orthodox [Christianity]: a rite of baptism is sometimes observed by whole families, at the same time, many still consider themselves Doukhobors" (Nikitina 2013: 94). The local significance of the Doukhobor identity is more or less obvious in interviews with the locals cited above. As for the solidarization with Orthodox Christians, I presume it is characteristic of the post-Soviet period of Doukhobor community and is tightly linked with the social change that informed it.

⁸ *Sirotskii dom* (Orphanage) is a house of prayer in Gorelovka. It used to be a mansion of Doukhobor leaders. It also served as a communal treasury and a shelter for orphans and lone community members unfit for work.

Inter-ethnic tensions and the category of "Us"

The post-Soviet period was the time of resettling of many Georgian Doukhobors to Russia. The first exodus to the Tula region was organized back in the Soviet time – in 1989 – and the other waves of migration occurred in 1998 and 2007, to the Bryansk and Tambov regions, respectively (Inikova 2015). The changes that occurred in the community during the recent 30 years became commonplace in the informants' narratives. One of the most notable results of the resettlements is a reduction in the Doukhobor population in Georgian villages. The houses left by the departing villagers were taken by Georgian foundations that gave them to Armenians (for instance, from the Poga village nearby) and Adjarians from the mountainous regions hurt by landslides. As a result, a remaining Doukhobor population was forced to build inter-ethnic relations within the village. According to my informants, before the 1980s, in Gorelovka, there were only two Armenians by approximately 2500 Doukhobors. In the context of the radical change in the social and economic processes in the post-socialist countries, the local economic relations within Doukhobor villages and kolkhozes were changing too. A standard nostalgic narrative of stability and prosperity of the Soviet times employs the categories of "clean" and "unclean" that become relevant in interactions with neighbors of other ethnic and religious affiliations. Almost every informant mentioned neat houses that were whitewashed every year, dressed up people crowding in the village on Sundays, clean streets, and clean rivers where people could swim and do their laundry. This is juxtaposed with the current view of Gorelovka with ruins, ex-Doukhobor houses that are not well maintained by their current inhabitants of different ethnicities, a lot of dung on the streets, dark clothing of Adjarians, and the habit of new villagers to throw the waste of their livestock and their haslet into the river.

In defining the borders between insiders and outsiders, it is remarkable how Doukhobors use the pronoun "Us," which can have different referents. Besides referring to the members of the Doukhobor community (or its ex-members who moved to Russia), they use it for three groups – Russians (most frequently), Georgians, and Molokans:

P. B.: We love Russia too, we [never] forget it. Like always, when there's Olympics [on the TV]—"Oh, our [guys], our [guys]" (*Nashi, nashi*)...⁹
Well, [we cheer] for Georgia too (laughs).

Svetlana: So, "Our [guys]" are Russians anyway?

P. B.: Yes (Interview 2)

When [we] cheer "for football"—"for our [guys]"—that's the way [we] say—"our [guys]" (Interview 8).

What is remarkable in these formulations is not that watching the sports for Doukhobors implies an undisputable solidarization with Russians, rather that they have a certain perceived distance, a need to explain it to an interlocutor, and express their love to Russia as a compelling argument. Simultaneously, international sport competitions provide one of a few cases when Doukhobors consider themselves a part of Georgia—a country of their residence and citizenship (for most of them).

O. O., when telling me of her trip to Tbilisi, mentioned seeing "our [people]" there; my further inquiry revealed that she meant Molokans:

We went through a marketplace, and so our people [were] clearly distinct—in [their] headscarves...Those were, like, in such Russian headscarves, in *platochki*. Tied up in front, like I wear here, like this. And right there, right there they were and [we] said—there, some of our [people] are there. Well, and [the way they] speak, of course (Interview 8).

Although there is no communication of the informants, I managed to interview with Molokans, their common naming as "(cousin) brothers" is worth mentioning. This kinship metaphor is because of a common history, roots of their teachings, and, most of all, ethnic origin and similar material culture. Remarkably, O. O. recognized the Molokans by the details of their costume, precisely by the "Russian headscarves." This means that the basis of comparison is not religious, but it is rather linked to the Russian cultural tradition expressed in costume and language.

The significance of trans-ethnic relations for the contemporary community in Gorelovka should not be underestimated. This theme plays a central role in narrations about the village life of most of my informants. The tension grows because of the global political processes (first

⁹ An informant echoes this thought in the "Yes, yes; no, no" documentary almost verbatim.

and foremost, in Russian-Georgian relations). Svetlana Inikova discusses the growth of nationalistic movements in Transcaucasia as a stimulus to the "growth of ethnic self-consciousness" and "seeking for new identities," which she observes among Georgian Doukhobors of the 1990s, and as a precise reason for moving to Russia (Inikova 1992; 1998). This claim is hard to deny – a wave of Georgian nationalism during the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia my informants single-heartedly saw as a threat to their lives and well-being. Lubov Goncharova mentions in her book the challenges of administering the ethno-confessional villages of Samtskhe-Javakheti in the 1990s. According to her, the members of Georgian parliament were hostile and accused Doukhobors of being the "fifth column" (Goncharova 2012: 5).

The decline of community in Gorelovka and its new shapes in Russia

I frequently refer to the Gorelovka villagers of Doukhobor descent as a community. However, the migration processes of the last 30 years have changed it dramatically. 2016 probably became the last year of the local agricultural cooperative (which my informants still call a *kolkhoz*), which used to be prosperous and is currently deep in debt. Already this year, it was planned that all the *kolkhoz* livestock is to be sold, and Doukhobors were seeking other job opportunities (for instance, in private cheese dairies owned by Armenians). The school also experiences hard times. There are fewer students every year, and several years ago, because of the lack of students, the school in the neighboring Spasovka was closed.

The religious life of the Doukhobor population of Gorelovka is also more of a separating than consolidating factor. The authority position is held by a woman, who represents the most financially successful Doukhobor family. Those few people who observe weekly prayers and Doukhobor celebrations concentrate around her (up to the point that a pilgrimage could be canceled if she is not present). Some Doukhobors do not participate in prayer meetings, being hostile towards their organizers. Even amongst the participants, there are serious conflicts (given that on regular Sundays their number is rarely more than seven people in *Sirotskii dom* and a few more on a prayer trip). This is why the religious disagreements (over the texts of psalms, proper chanting, the

practice of performing pilgrimage on cars or on foot, and so on) are referred to in order to legitimize the social ones. Sometimes, the Gorelovka "opposition" attends prayer trips, but they might go there separately and act independently.

It is also worth mentioning that the number of Doukhobors, after most of them left for Russia, reduced so significantly that the remaining villagers frequently recall a Doukhobor prophecy that "Gorelovka will burn out some places," interpreting it as referring to low numbers and isolation of the remaining families and households. As a result of the Doukhobor migration, the villagers themselves describe the community's recent hardships in terms of crisis and decline.

Although nowadays the Doukhobors, according to one of their prophecies, are scattered again, the community still exists, yet in a different capacity. Once an isolated local colony now functions as a virtual village, all of its former inhabitants keeping in touch daily, giving and receiving calls from the Georgia, Moscow, Tula, Bryansk, Tambov, and Stavropol regions. A majority of Doukhobors went online. They use mostly messengers like Viber and WhatsApp and social networks like Odnoklassniki (more than 2000 members of Doukhobor community use it) and Facebook.

Besides family matters like weddings and funerals, or health and money issues, there are lots of other developments in dispute. Every time after worship, they need to know how many people came to pray in each Doukhobor settlement, who could make it and who could not, what psalms they sang, and for how long. Every local community tries to keep up with others, but Doukhobors from Gorelovka are recognized as guardians of tradition. Nevertheless, singers from Georgia often seek advice from their older mentors who live in Russia.

Another pressing topic is the news and gossip exchange, and direct interventions with personal questions. There can be different matters in question, from judgments on the height of somebody's fence to checking if one ignored someone important while sending New Year greetings. "If I was writing a book [on Doukhobors], I would have written about these phone calls," my Doukhobor host once said. A reflection on the recent changes encouraged this authentic anthropological remark of hers, as she attempted to see the Doukhobor community from the outsider point of view, and more likely, she was gradually becoming an outsider herself.

As the group in question is the first generation of migrants, it is notably too much pressure for the younger and middle-aged people, and they are eager to adapt a more independent life and communication style. Some told me they would not fancy and could not even imagine returning to their old village routine and even did not understand how they had managed to survive back then. The Doukhobors are proud of being tough, diligent, and persistent; and they discuss their adaptation in these terms. The reason people keep finding Doukhobor solidarity important is the bounds of mutual help from which no one can be excluded.

Pro-Russian orientation: the context of media

In this context, a quest for the mechanisms of solidarization with the social entity, that would be perceived positively by my informants and could functionally replace the disintegrating local community, seems legitimate. It would be adequate to suggest an interpretation of the tendency of solidarization with Russian Orthodox Christianity in this way. Gorelovka villagers are willing to associate themselves to a certain extent with Orthodox Christians in order to feel engaged in Russian society.¹⁰

In this context, the role of television is noteworthy. It functions as the main source of information and a form of leisure. The community members' fluency only in Russian limits their choice to Russian-speaking broadcasting and watching Russian TV plays a significant role in their everyday life. This practice goes along with pro-Russian and pro-Putin sentiments that Gorelovka villagers actively express on different occasions. My informant once interrupted the interview to express his admiration for the presents that Vladimir Putin gave to the Russian Olympic team. Besides, he kept watching TV even during our talk. Many villagers are specifically proud of the visit of the adviser to the Russian President, Vladimir Tolstoy, to Gorelovka that took place several years ago. Each of the participants of that meeting

¹⁰ At the same time, their attitude to Georgian Orthodox Church is radically different. This is one of the few cases when Doukhobors almost single-heartedly demonstrate a true Protestant rhetoric, directing all of their anti-clerical outrage towards the Georgian clergy. They accuse them of nepotism, corruption, luxury life-style, and suspect they are connected to the law enforcement. This is a convenient and "close" subject of condemnation and distant Russian Orthodox Christianity remains beyond their scope.

emphasizes their role in its organization or communication with the guest. Further, there are two significant aspects of this visit, a connection to Leo Tolstoy (Vladimir's great-great-grandfather) – an important figure in Doukhobor history – and to the Russian Government ("He's now a Putin's Adviser").

Gravitation towards global Orthodox Christianity: from an ethno-confessional group to a moral community

Henceforth, at the time of the community crisis, a central tendency becomes a "re-invention" of the Doukhobor tradition, uncontradictory written into the common Orthodox context. This orientation toward Orthodox Christianity as a more prestigious religious affiliation becomes evident through such a characteristic trait of modern religiosity as the reduction of Doukhoborism to a set of commandments – a moral code. It is through this code that Doukhobors attempt to engage with the imagined, or to use Anthony Smith's terminology, moral community – a nation (Smith 1983). The ethnographization of the local tradition, which is represented as variation of a national one, serves the same purpose, and the description of Doukhobors as an ethno-confessional group from this position calls for further reflection. In this case, it is worth contrasting the neo-Durkheimian logic of Smith, who is fairly criticized with essentializing national and ethnic communities (Malešević 2004), with more flexible models that both relativize the concept of a group (Brubaker 2004) and, following Max Weber, contextualize the perceptions of religion.

Several examples can be found to illustrate the way minorities choose the strategies of self-identification according to their orientation. This orientation could be both negative and positive, yet formed concerning other, bigger communities. In her book, Agnieszka Halemba analyzes Greek Catholic villages in Transcarpathia, which become a part of the global Catholic network because of the development of the infrastructure of pilgrimage, thus preferring Catholicism to the undesirable convergence with the Orthodox Church (Halemba 2015). Jeanne Kormina, in her review of the book, noting that Halemba develops the argument of Brubaker on the rejection of essentializing understanding of "groups," points out that these observations could be confirmed with the fieldwork among Orthodox Christians and other religious communities (Kormina 2019: 182-183).

The same phenomena can be observed on a larger scale too. Sergey Shtyrkov suggests regarding traditionalist movements in North Ossetian society in a Weberian logic, which Clifford Geertz used to analyze the rationalization of religion in Bali (Shtyrkov 2013). In this context, the interaction with the dominating religion becomes an impulse for the "catechization" of traditional beliefs and its doctrine presupposes a direction for the quest for a "common language." Doukhoborism has repeatedly been subject to outside reflection: besides the abovementioned Tolstoians, there were also freemasons and social democrats. It can serve as an example of some sort of simulation of catechization that goes along with the Spiritual Christianity since its recognition as an unorthodox local movement.

A historical context of the formation of Doukhoborism is remarkable in this case. For the Orthodox Christianity, the late 17th–18th century became undoubtedly a period of catechization, related, in particular, to the assumption of the key church positions by graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, which was oriented toward the Western educational system. A Doukhobor catechism is a peculiar phenomenon. It used to be and still is among the orally spread psalms, that were learned and recited by heart, although, unlike cantus poetry, fragments from Gospels and compiled psalms, the Doukhobor catechism was not sung. The specificity of "question and answer" psalms is in the allegorical interpretation of Orthodox dogma and rituals. This hermeneutics legitimizes, for instance, the replacement of sacraments with their "spiritual" interpretation. At the same time, this attempt of interpretation of tradition in the terms of a dominating religion lied exclusively in the sphere of language and text. Further, in an agrarian culture that gave birth to Doukhobors, text functioned completely differently, unlike in the literate context. The formation of dogma would imply a set of procedures, namely "atomization," abstraction, and decontextualization of key-concepts (see Ong 1982). A prescription of a new meaning and interpretative technique occurs syntagmatically rather than paradigmatically. The word or narrative structure transforms, de-automatizing their persistent use.

Svetlana Inikova, in her article on the adaptation of Doukhobors who moved to Russia from Transcaucasia, quotes a dialogue, remarkable for the re-actualization of catechistic psalms in communicating with an outsider:

"At first we were being watched with suspicion," a woman from the Novyi village recounts. "So I sat in the post office and a man asked me: 'Why are you called Doukhobors?' I said: 'Because we are the kindest people.' Well, how do I know why am I called [like this]! 'But why don't you [all] wear anything on your neck?' And I said: 'We wear [our] pure soul.' He [asked]: 'Why are you [all] not baptized?' '[Who says] we're not baptized?!' I even know myself, although a small psalm, I know, learned in my childhood, when I was little. 'Who baptized you? – Father and mother, the third grace.' I just don't cross myself with my hand. 'I am baptized – I said – I know such psalms, I even heard, this Kirill...' 'Uzrekh' (When I saw Thou), that's how the psalm is called. He also read the psalm. We're the same. 'Do you have Easter?' – 'Why, don't we have Easter?' What is this! They probably thought we have tails, horns, and jump around on trees". (Inikova 2016: 19)

Remarkably, the informant mentions Russian Orthodox patriarch Kirill. The psalm "*Uzrekh*," one of the most important psalms in Doukhobor rituals, refers to the Beatitudes (see psalm #184 of "*Zhivotnaia kniga*" [The Book of Life] – Bonch-Bruevich 1909: 170-171). That is why the mere fact of reciting this psalm by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church is not a surprise. However, for the Doukhobor informant, it represents key evidence of the unity of two religious traditions.

The "ecumenical" logic of Doukhobor argumentation¹¹ is also interesting. Common texts and major holidays make them a part of a big Orthodox Christian world and the local context is less interesting for them. Their participation in the Orthodox tradition is meant to unify them with the Russians that surround them, serve as a sign of "humanness" and "civility," separating them from ethnically and confessionally "alien" groups, which are regarded in zoomorphic categories, and, finally, not to stand out in the new environment. Orthodox Christianity, thus, is valued for the inclusivity of the dominant religion.

Living compactly, Doukhobors, however, do not form any stable parish. The value of their orientation towards Orthodox Christianity lies in a discursive field. This reminds us of the "virtual" adherence to Orthodox Christianity characteristic for a significant part of the

¹¹ Many examples could be also found in the abovementioned book by Lubov Goncharova: "The common Christian principles lie in the basis of the Doukhobor creed" (Goncharova 2012: 29); "Since the ancient times and until the present day, the Christian holidays are celebrated" (Ibid: 30).

Russian population (Filatov and Lunkin 2005). Practically, this is an orientation to a more global imagined community of Russian Orthodox Christians.

Nowadays, this process could be observed in different stages. In Gorelovka, a baptism is observed by a few people, and some of them are still afraid to publicly come out about it. Amongst the Doukhobors who migrated to Russia, it becomes a mass process, especially among the youth, but not exclusively. For instance, an informal leader of Tambov resettlers took baptism by oath.

Unless specifically stated, the above-quoted words are of the Gorelovka villagers, who have not left Georgia yet. Naturally, their self-identifications could be distinguished from the ones observed among the resettlers in Russia, yet they differ mostly in scale. Transcaucasian Doukhobors speak more confidently about their Doukhoborism and make judgments, often maintaining the implicit polemics with those in Russia. Their communication with Russian villages is intense and it is prioritized much more than relations with their neighbors of Armenian and Georgian origin. Allegedly, Georgian Doukhobors make significant effort to "reconcile" Doukhoborism and Orthodox Christianity in the framework of common Christian morals. Hence, as it could be noted, they have to combine two strategies, according to the circumstances. First, a confessionalization of their own tradition regarding a "dominating" religion, and, second, a differentiation of Doukhoborism and Orthodox Christianity in ethnic and religious categories, respectively.

Conspiracy theories and eschatology of post-Soviet Doukhobors

Such a situational use of self-identification with Russians is not unique. Sergey Shtyrkov describes the same in the Subbotnik community, which also migrated from Transcaucasia to Russia (Shtyrkov 2003). This identification implies its emotional elements, first and foremost, fear. Oddly enough, it unites both Georgian Doukhobors and resettlers, although its object can change. Just as in Gorelovka there is a fear of Armenians from Poga, in the Tambov region, there is suspicion towards the unfriendly locals. This is an undeniable similarity of Doukhobors with Subbotniks, analyzed by Shtyrkov. Small religious groups relate to their neighbors with suspicion and distrust, which causes conspiracy thinking. The Gorelovka villagers believe (maybe not

without reason) the telephone lines of the candidates for Russian citizenship are listened by the Georgian administration of the region, and resettlers in Tambov in the village Novyi attract the attention of the officers of anti-extremist agency to the gatherings of local Baptists, to whom, typically and paradoxically enough, most of anti-sectarian anxiety of the population is directed.

The more Doukhobors leave Gorelovka, the more noticeable the activation of specific eschatological prophecies becomes. One of the most relevant topics of prophecies for my research is the return of Doukhobors to their fatherland. A theme of reunification of all of the community members, who left Gorelovka and neighboring villages, is linked to the image of a future "catastrophe," and the way back is seen as torturous and full of hardships and misery.

There was also about Doukhobors that...well, what it was. It is said that sooner or later you will be coming back here. On your knees, it is said, you will come back, you will only have your collars on your necks, and the rest... You will have nothing else (Interview 6).

An inversion of center and periphery, characteristic of the eschatological prophecies (Akhmetova 2010: 93-108), is remarkable in this case. It places the Georgian villages on the hopeless edge of the world relevant to the community.

Women's chanting as a mechanism of the integration of resettlers

Not less remarkable is the repertoire of the feast songs that reconciles the local patriotism with the phantom nostalgia for Russia¹², combining the songs with lyrics about "The native Gorelovka" (lyrics written by the Doukhobor poet Egor Vlasov) Soviet popular music, and songs from TV song contests (For instance, "*Skazhi, predsedatel*" [Tell me, chairman] of Jury Krasnoperov). The practices of communal chanting could play a substantial role in the socialization of Doukhobors resettled in the Tambov region. The performances of the female

¹² Many of my informants regard resettlement as coming back to their "historical Fatherland." Tambov region, as R. S., one of them, claims, was chosen chiefly for these reasons. In the mid-18th century, the first Doukhobor communities were "discovered" there. Some of the media outlets reported on the story in this manner. See, for instance, <https://rg.ru/2008/01/22/chernoz/duhobory.html> (accessed on January 17, 2020).

choir are regarded as moments of success and recognition by the locals. In all likelihood, the familiar repertoire became a convincing indicator and allowed for recognizing the new neighbors as "Ours." Svetlana Adoniev and Lora Olson in their book on three generations of rural women of the 20th century regard the practices of choir singing as a powerful mechanism of solidarization inside the community and, simultaneously, self-realization in the outside (Olson and Adoniev 2016).

Considerably, the informants met me and my colleague with communal singing when they gathered to welcome us and to give us the first group interview, and the informal leader of resettlers proudly demonstrated the newspaper with photos of the choir performance on a village holiday. It was one of the rare occasions when the local press expressed empathy towards Doukhobors. Interestingly, the repertoire did not meet the expectations of ethnographers, because Doukhobor singers chose not to chant psalms, which are central in their ritual tradition, but rather the hits of the late Soviet popular music.¹³

In that case, it is important to point out the factor of the ethnographers' origin, which impacted the communication with informants. Although there were various reactions towards Moscow and St. Petersburg, generally it was influenced by the central status of these cities juxtaposed with the peripheral Gorelovka. In the quotations above, references to the "Russianness" of ethnographers are explicit, a habitual suspicion of informants, which can occur during the fieldwork, could take new forms. For instance, the informants mentioned the names of high-ranking Russian officials, presuming the fieldwork had been assigned by them.¹⁴

¹³ However, there has been an unsuccessful attempt to collaborate with folk choir in Stavropol region, where local singers found Doukhobor songs to be boring and monotonous.

¹⁴ At the same time, there could be a different, yet just as typical, reaction—a hope for help. Attributing to their ancestors a persistent saying: "Our law is in [St.] Peter[sburg]," the informants interpreted it as a confirmation of their right to the land, rearranged after the elimination of the kolkhoz not in their favor. They also counted on the researchers to find in the archives of St. Petersburg the original copy of the contract of sale.

Conclusion: religious "migration" of Doukhobors in the post-secular context

In a certain sense, the director of "Yes, yes; no, no" follows the self-representations of his characters, building his story on the sequence of the footage from Gorelovka and staged administrative routine of the "metropolis," where the fate of the Transcaucasian villagers is decided. The explicitly open ending is presumably meant to leave viewers with a mixed feeling of hope and uncertainty – it is hard to see the future of the report on Doukhobors left on the backseat of the car.

It is hard to imagine the intersection of these two realities, because of their stylistic incomparability. In her book, Lubov Goncharova speaks about the addresses of Doukhobors to the Russian authorities and media publications on the life of the community. One of such articles was published in April 22, 1994, in the "*Krasnaia Zvezda*" [Red Star] newspaper by Ivan Sergeev, titled "For the first time in a century and a half, Russia sends help to the compatriots in the distant Javakheti." He describes the humanitarian project of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Doukhobors received petrol and diesel fuel needed for the spring agricultural work. In the introduction, the article informs on the tonnage, distances, and routes, but concludes with an emotional description: "And finally, after six days of travel, we reached our compatriots – Russian Doukhobors. [It was] bright [and] sunny noon. All the villagers came out to meet the column. Some old lady hugged a tired young driver and in tears said what many were thinking: 'We've been waiting for you for so long! The whole 150 years. [We] thought Russia forgot about us...'" (Sergeev 1994, as quoted in Goncharova 2012: 547). Such a scene could be easily imagined as an alternative and logical continuation of "Yes, yes; no, no" if the film was based on a fictional collision, rather than on actual chain of events.

The title "Yes, yes; no, no" refers to the Gospel according to Matthew and it writes the Doukhobor villagers into the context of Christian piety. Another meaningful contrast of the documentary juxtaposes the language of an official and dogmatic report with the informants' words – discrete, friendly, and mundane – and their silence, which the camera follows with long panoramic shoots. Paper icons, black and white graduation photos, rural interiors, and views of Akhalkalaki Plateau are shown. The ethnographic potential of the documentary is employed by

the means of playing with different "viewpoints." The scenes with a state official are a little comic in their naive schematism. They visualize an imagined collision of Doukhobors with the imagined world of state power. They feel their presence in it along with abandonment.

Having the same set of resources for the construction of their religiosity, the same set of values, and the same post-secular principles of their "combination," Transcaucasian Doukhobors are much more understandable as post-Soviet citizens, rather than an ethno-confessional group. The ways of their religious "migration" are largely linked to more general processes of the post-Soviet "renaissance" of national and religious identities.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to represent a post-Soviet religious landscape as homogenous and the processes as universal and erasing the borders of group specificity. Doukhobors living in an isolated village are perceived as a spectacular and peculiar group, and their common memory and ritual tradition could not be seen as insignificant for the self-representation of its members. Conversely, in a paradoxical way, the religious seekings and searching for the strategies of self-identification call for a retrospective legitimization of the decline of the community by its inclusion into the surrounding confessional majority, to which Doukhobors largely relate because of the common Soviet experience. This coincidence is underestimated both inside the community and from its Russian neighbors outside.

It is fair to say that during the rise of nationalism in Caucasus, Doukhobors gravitated to the Russian "imperial" project, which implies the orientation towards Orthodox Christianity. The entrance fees were high—the narratives on traumatic integration were the favorite topic even of those whose experience of resettlement was relatively successful. The Gorelovka villagers, who are used to the visits of journalists, photographers, and documentary filmmakers, enthusiastically present Doukhorism as ethnographic project within a universally Christian frame, which erases the inter-confessional differences and obstacles for the access to the Orthodox world. Doukhobors recently resettled in Russia, in turn, sacrifice their "cultural heritage" and act according to their strategic setting to "not stand out." The ethnographic exoticism, in that case, is a source of challenges and conflicts, for instance, the funeral service sometimes provokes competition between Orthodox priests and Doukhor chanters. This, most

probably, explains the indifference and helplessness of elderly Doukhobor women, who sell their traditional dress, inherited and brought from Georgia, for meager sums of money to second hand buyers.

Such a political orientation points out to the adaptation of the "official" Russian ideology in relation to Orthodox Christianity. Although there are cases of Doukhobors converted to Baptism (which is seemingly closer to their teachings), these cases are marginal, compared to the tendency of solidarization with Orthodox Christians. There is a certain logic in this – a religious nationalism offers a new model of merging of "the religious" and "the ethnic", the opportunity to orient towards the Russian society instead of the declining local community by means of folklorized and ethnographized traditional Doukhobor manifestations of religiosity. Doukhobors have found their own creative way of mending the disruption between heterodoxy and orthodoxy by distinguishing rite and belief, *zakon* and private faith. "We are almost like Orthodox," a lead chanter from Gorelovka said in response to the questions on Doukhobor creed. Besides the representation itself, this idea suddenly highlights the post-secular context common for Doukhobors and Orthodox Christians, which makes such a comparison possible.

Translated by Igor Mikeshein.

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Interview materials

Interview 1 – G. B., female, born in 1966.

Interview 2 – P. B., female, in her 60s, retired.

Interview 3 – M. T., male, in his 50s, choir chanter.

Interview 4 – I. G., female, in her 30s, teacher.

Interview 5 – V. K., male, in his 50s.

Interview 6 – L., female, in her 60s.

Interview 7 – N. K., female, in her late 60s.

Interview 8 – O. O. female, in her 40s, milkmaid.

Interview 9 – T. S., female, in her 50s, choir chanter.



The *Rational* and *Magical* in the Missionary Projects of Traditionalist Roman Catholics of Russia

Ekaterina Khonineva

It is somewhat bitterly ironic to begin the discussion on contemporary Catholicism by first mentioning Protestantism. The fate of academic studies of Catholicism in the process of the discursive formation of the concept of religion in the field of its study is such that, with rare exceptions, it acts as an antipode, a kind of the "other" for a seemingly more interesting subject of Protestant cultures. Despite the calls from several researchers to broaden analytical horizons by including Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism, anthropology of Christianity is still inherently an anthropology of Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism (Bialecki, Haynes, and Robbins 2008; Cannell 2005; Robbins 2014). As Birgit Meyer notes in her commentary on one such call in a recent edition on the anthropology of Catholicism (Norget, Napolitano, and Mayblin 2017), such dualism, although defined by well-known historical circumstances, rather distances ourselves from understanding contemporary Protestant and Catholic practices (Meyer 2017). The notion of Protestantism as a "mental," rational ideal type of modern religiosity, and of Catholicism as a ritualistic, bodily oriented type, and as "a sacramental magic" (Thomas 1971) still dominates the imagination of the researchers (and not only them). This "Protestant lens" is a legacy of Max Weber's works on the social consequences the Reformation had on secularization processes and the affirmation of the authority of

science (Weber [1905] 1930; Merton 1938). It furthermore largely keeps the research focused on the questions of meaning rather than form, and reason, rather than senses. In other words, it is often assumed that being modern (and thus rational) means being a Protestant, and vice versa.

This approach does not allow for noticing the fact that modern Protestantism is as much focused on carnality, aesthetics, feelings, and other seemingly non-rational ways of religious experience (which is convincingly demonstrated by some studies¹) as Catholicism. In turn, I argue that the same is true for the latter. The image of "baroque" sensual Catholicism, rooted in ritual practices, sacramentalism, and veneration of religious objects, ignores the rational dimension of the contemporary Catholic imagination and those modernization processes that deeply affected a traditional Catholic practice. Even Birgit Meyer's witty criticism and her invitation to use the "baroque lens" in anthropological research reveals a reduction of Catholicism to its main stereotypes and some anachronism. The image of medieval and post-Reformation Catholicism, which serves as a prototype here, does not reflect ethnographic realities (including those related to material and rational aspects of religious life) that were the result of large-scale political changes in the Catholic Church of the 20th century.

It is hardly possible to discuss contemporary Catholicism in isolation from the central event of these changes – the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). The purpose of this Council was the so-called renewal (*aggiornamento*) of the Catholic Church: to revise a wide range of provisions and bring them into greater harmony with the challenges of modern times, reflected, among other things, in the liturgical reform that followed the Council. Those who comment on the reforms from the conservative perspective often interpret them in terms of the *protestantization* of Catholicism. What do they mean by this? Indeed, the reformers' decisions seem to have been based on the notion that the traditional Catholic paradigm of symbols and practices no longer fully adheres to its objectives, namely to attract people to the bosom of the Church and strengthen them in the true Catholic faith. The most striking example of this idea is the reform of the ritual – the icon of Catholic rigidity and formality. As a result

¹ See, for instance, Coleman 1996; Morgan 1999; Engelke 2005; De Witte 2009; 2011; Brahinsky 2012, and many others.

of this reform, the Mass was visibly simplified and shortened, with a greater emphasis on spontaneity and flexibility in the actions of clergy and the flock. Post-Vatican II changes were aimed at modernization of the religious life of Catholics, facilitating access to the truth of the Catholic faith for as many people as possible, and placing greater emphasis on mystical experience, on the one hand, and religious literacy and ethics, on the other. Weber can once be praised for his foresight – even the classical example of traditional religiosity, i.e., Catholicism cannot and does not resist rationalization.

However, the rationality of modern Catholicism can be seen not only in the Church's modernization policy. The high level of generalization of Weber's schemes, which will be discussed in more detail below, dulls the sensitivity to ethnographic nuances – the specific cases of the implementation of programs to rationalize religion and their main actors and opponents (see examples of combining the ethnographic perspective with Weberian logic in Geertz 1973; Shtyrkov 2011). If we take post-Vatican II Catholicism as an example, the revision of traditional Catholic practices was not accepted by everyone with enthusiasm or humility. Some conservative Catholics, the so-called Traditionalists, harshly criticized the resolutions of Vatican II and the liturgical reform and defended the seemingly *magical* foundations of traditional Catholic religiosity – its deep symbolism and expressive power of ritual, the value of non-rational perception of divine meanings. At the same time, the way they argue their own position is of paramount interest directly concerning the question of rationality. Catholic Traditionalists are often ascribed to a fixation on form at the expense of meaning, and a kind of magical religiosity; they, in turn, are forced to formulate their position in the clearest detail in defense of non-rational dimension of religion and codified ritual practice as an antagonism of protestantization. In other words, Vatican II has created unusual ethnographic conditions for the actualization of intra-group reflection and discussion about rational and ritual/traditional/magical. The way representatives of the rationalized modern religion – Catholic Traditionalism – manipulate the images of the *magical* and *rational* in their missionary projects will be discussed in this chapter.

This question will be considered based on the ethnographic material gathered among Russian Catholics during the fieldwork in different Catholic Traditionalist parishes in St. Petersburg and Moscow, the two

biggest cities in Russia, in 2017–2019. What attracts my attention in the Russian case is the specific historical and cultural conditions that make the Traditionalist Catholic ideology so persistent among the originally non-Catholic population. The phenomenon of Russian Catholicism in such a condition that we can observe today has been existing since the beginning of the 1990s – the time usually associated with a religious revival after the period of State atheism in Russia. This period is characterized by the construction and reconstruction of Catholic churches, parishes, and monasteries. At the same time, the first conversions to Catholicism and receptions appeared and the missionary activities of priests and members of different monastic congregations began. Most of these priests, monks, friars, and nuns were mainly socialized in Poland and Belarus where the innovations of Vatican II were fully implemented during the second half of the 20th century. However, in the large capital parishes of Moscow and St. Petersburg "ethnic Catholics" are clearly far short of a majority.

My interlocutors were those who have been coming of age within a secular culture and for whom Catholic socialization was the end-point in their spiritual quest. Although in Russia few Catholics are familiar with the way spiritual life was organized before the Vatican II reforms, there is still a certain division based on assessing the conciliar politics. Apart from many enthusiastic supporters of the modern post-Vatican II religiosity, some of the conscious converts find themselves unsatisfied by what the modern Catholic Church offers on the liturgical, dogmatic, and pious levels. They try to live their religious experience according to Traditional Catholic canons, despite the fact that Russian mainstream Church authorities have little to do with encouraging and facilitating Traditionalists' views and practices.

Catholic Moderns?

What exactly can frustrate Traditionalists and, thus, intrigue social researchers about the large-scale reform of the religious life of modern Catholics? It should be noted that a precise theological and liturgical analysis of what happened in the Catholic Church in the 20th century before and after Vatican II is a task for a whole monograph, probably more than one, but this is not what I aim for in this chapter. An anthropological commentary on the conciliar politics of piety may claim that

one of the main goals of the Council was to rationalize the faith of Catholics. Here rationality is regarded in Max Weber's terms mentioned above, rather than in the modality common for anthropological discussion on the demarcation of religion, magic, and science (Tylor, Fraser, Malinowski, and Lévy Bruhl; see Tambiah 1990); the specific, different from the modern scientific paradigm, rationality of magic (Evans-Pritchard 1965; Jarvie and Agassi 1967; 1973; Beattie 1970); and the rationality or irrationality of beliefs (Sperber 1984; Lukes 2007). This analytical move is determined by the fact that Vatican II reforms are the case when rationality and irrationality are not understood as predicates of beliefs but believers themselves (Lukes 1967: 292).

Weber proposed an evolutionist scheme for the development of religion as a type of social imagination and social praxis. The relationship between the former and the latter in traditional religions (or *magical* in Weberian terms) is congruent and has an interpenetrating character. The connection between religious beliefs and everyday life in rational religions, on the contrary, is not apparent. In religions of the rational type, these are separated into different spheres, and consequently, their logical and actual conjugation demands a certain kind of reflexivity and political manipulation (Weber [1922] 1978). This reflexivity also implies verbal formulation—both of religious notions themselves and their relation to everyday practical experience, i.e., the formation of a certain type of knowledge. Rational religions create complex systems of meta-description and, to a certain extent, require a conscious mastery of this vocabulary and the ability to intelligently formulate religious dogmas.

At the same time, according to Weber, the rationalization of religion occurs in no small part as a result of the alienation from the ritual elements characteristic of simpler traditional forms of religiosity with their magical ways of persuasion, in favor of ascetic and mystical ones. Material forms of religion, including rituals,² venerated objects, and other various aesthetic components are thus seen as an obstacle to the resolution of the "problem of meaning" and rationalization at the individual and institutional levels. However, one can find an interesting paradox in Weber's theses. Even though rational religions tend to neglect the form and ways of influence through the magical efficacy of artifacts,

² The positioning of the ritual as an antipode of rationality is also characteristic of other research models (see, for instance, Goody 1961).

they are also characterized by a desire for mass dissemination and emotional impact through a systematic appeal to the sphere of aesthetics. In other words, there is no total alienation from aesthetic experience, instead the pragmatics of using such material forms is changing. First, the manipulation of form becomes rational. Second, in the long run, it serves the more important task of spreading meaning (Weber [1946] 1970: 340). Regarding the case of Protestantism, the example of modern Pentecostalism depicts how the aesthetic dimension of the Christians' lives plays a prominent role in the political agendas of religious leaders (see Meyer 2010; Martin 2006).

In the light of Weber's reasoning and consideration of some prerequisites, regulations, and consequences of Vatican II, the Constitution of the *Sacrosanctum Concilium* suggested that "the rite of the Mass is to be revised in such a way that the intrinsic nature and purpose of its several parts, as also the connection between them, may be more clearly manifested, and that devout and active participation by the faithful may be more easily achieved."³ The revision of the rite has eventually resulted in the liturgical reform (1969) and the following mandatory implementation of the new rite of the Mass (*Novus Ordo Missae*) that completely replaced the Traditional Latin Mass (or, as it is also called, the Tridentine Mass). Undoubtedly, this idea was not expressed within the framework of the Council for the first time but was one of the consequences of the development of the Liturgical Movement, whose representatives in the 19th-20th centuries were seeking opportunities to reform the rite of worship with the aim of providing a more conscious participation of the people and liturgical education. Even before Vatican II, the so-called "dialogue masses" (which revived the early Christian scheme of an interaction between the faithful and the priest during the liturgy) were spreading, and the abovementioned Constitution formulates the main recommendations aimed at increasing the degree of personal engagement and creating conditions for a deeper, i.e., rational, understanding of what happens during the Mass by lay people. Such recommendations include regular use of modern vernacular languages,⁴ a

³ See the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy *Sacrosanctum Concilium*: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html (accessed March 9, 2020).

⁴ As a result of the liturgical reform (1969) the traditional sacred language for Catholic worship, Latin, was fully replaced by vernacular languages.

more abundant reading of the Holy Scripture, encouragement of the sermon, restoring the "prayers of the faithful," and the communion of two kinds for the lay people. The aesthetics of the ritual were also reformed: the "baroque" style gave way to a more democratic, egalitarian, and less symbolic one. Apparently, the reformers saw a problem in the Traditional rite that led the faithful to take part in the divine service as if on a hunch, i.e. irrationally, attributing to them the features of magical religiosity. All these proposed changes were intended to ensure the laity not only practices its Catholic faith and participate in the liturgical mystery, believing in its magical efficacy, but also reflect on its theological foundations.

Thus, Vatican II sought to erase the sharp line between religiously literate experts and authorities and seemingly illiterate practicing people. This goal was also to be achieved through establishing a universal vocation for the apostleship and holiness, through the active involvement of lay people in various services within the Church, the creation and revival of multiple spiritual movements uniting priests, monks, and lay people, through the active universal catechesis (for both children and adults⁵). In other words, the Vatican II project assumes that practical knowledge, or *knowledge-how*, using Gilbert Ryle's terms (Ryle 1949), is not at all sufficient to experience the faith. Believers before Vatican II and liturgical reform are represented in this perspective as children who already know how to speak correctly but do not know the rules of grammar well enough. *Knowledge-how*, which is bodily in nature, must be framed as a set of propositions about oneself, i.e., it must be supplemented by *knowledge-that* – intellectual, rational, and, importantly, verbalized.⁶

The Traditionalist criticism of this large-scale pastoral project (that is usually referred to as "modernism") is a position that does not necessarily require precise formulation and reflexivity in order to do something correctly. It requires sufficient practical knowledge, acquired primarily through the Traditional ritual. For Traditionalists, it

⁵ However, this does not mean that the practice of catechesis began to spread after and as a result of Vatican II, this is certainly not the case. Before that, though, the catechesis was mainly an educational activity for children and adolescents preparing themselves for the First Communion.

⁶ In the Christian context, this dichotomy can also be considered in terms of belief: *believe that* as a propositional knowledge opposed to a fundamentally different, emotional form – *believe in* (Ruel 1982; Lindquist and Coleman 2008).

was before Vatican II that a consistent universal catechesis was not necessary: people practiced their faith unconsciously but regularly, and according to the established norms. The Vatican II reforms, according to Traditionalists, led to distortions in Catholic laymen's confession of faith, as well as a reduction in the number of vocations and attendance of masses. Traditionalists blame the carelessness of modern catechists, who do not properly communicate the Traditional Catholic spirituality and dogmatics. In this perspective, it turns out that because of a "modernist" policy, the laity have become dormant and religiously illiterate as never before. While missionary activity was previously supposed to be directed at non-Christians, now Traditionalists see an extreme need to convert and catechize Catholics themselves, seemingly totally disoriented by the pastoral and liturgical reform efforts of the Church experts. I further explain what Russian Catholic Traditionalists do to correct such a situation.

It is also worth noting that even though Traditionalists attribute a passive cognitive position to the "common people" participating in the Traditional divine service, they, being lay people themselves, demonstrate a surprisingly high level of liturgical and theological literacy, the presentation of which constitutes most of their speech repertoire. At the same time, some of them tend to idealize the unreflective, theologically unsophisticated "people," recognizing artificiality and non-authenticity of their own activities. One of my interlocutors once complained that Moscow's Traditionalist congregations are more like conservative clubs than simple territorial parishes, as it should be in the pre-Vatican II ethnographic reality: people merely came to the Tridentine Mass because the church where it was served was the closest. Next time, also in Moscow, after the Traditional Latin Mass, I found myself in the company of parishioners in one of the cafes in Krasnaya Presnya, where one of the meeting participants began insisting on making a regular practice of tea drinking after the Mass to be like a regular "ordinary parish." Another participant of this meeting responded vividly to this proposal: he remembered his friends who, in his words, "are not trying to be theologians twenty-four hours a day" and gave the example of one of them, who is in favor "of the Mass and everything orthodox but has absolutely no knowledge of theology. He knows that it is possible to go there and he goes there." In other words, Catholic Traditionalists, being representatives of a modern religion,

are somewhat burdened by their inconsistency with the idealized traditional, or magical religiosity. This remark applies not only to the Catholic but also to the other forms of religious and ethnic traditionalism. If one learns all the traffic rules, will one be able to drive? Contemporary traditionalism faces the questions of the same kind (which distinguishes it from tradition in the classical and common sense): how to transform *knowledge-that* into *knowledge-how*?

For the rest of the chapter, I highlight two specific cases illustrating how the categories of the *rational* and *magical*, as well as *knowledge-that* and *knowledge-how*, are constructed in political programs of both open and latent critics of Vatican II, with whom I have been able to interact during my fieldwork.

Catholic Traditionalism in Russia

Almost every Sunday for the past decade, two of Russia's largest cities have held masses in the Traditional Latin rite. It is not, however, served in the usual places. In Moscow, one can see people dressed ceremonially, going down to the basement, the crypt of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception of Virgin Mary, which can be found, most likely, only by those who are familiar with this place. On Sunday morning, some of Moscow's Catholic Traditionalists travel beyond the Moscow Ring Road to the Vvedensky Cemetery, where they rent a chapel for the Tridentine Mass service. In St. Petersburg, the Traditional liturgy can be regularly attended, strange as it may seem, not in Catholic churches but in the Chapel of the Lutheran Church, where, in addition to the Tridentine Mass and Lutheran services, hipster swaps, fairs, and gospel festivals are held. Previously, to participate in the Traditional Mass, devout Catholics had to rent hotel conference rooms. And only once a month since 2019 the Traditional Mass has been held in the "mainstream" parish—the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes, the only Catholic church that functioned in the city during the Soviet years and has preserved the traditional altar.

Catholic Traditionalism is a global phenomenon. After Vatican II, conservative Catholics, motivated by varying degrees of radicality in opposition to the Church politics, united in a number of Traditionalist organizations throughout the "Catholic world." These included the best-known Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX), founded in

1970 by the French Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, with an unregulated canonical status, and those organizations that are in full communion with the Catholic Church, officially recognizing Vatican II as valid but having consistently advocated for the regular service of the Traditional Latin Mass on a par with the Novus Ordo Mass. At the level of declaration (which often does not coincide with the reality), they recognize the new rite to be valid but note that the Traditional Mass is much better in terms of theological depth, symbolic richness, and gestures of piety.⁷

In Russia, the Traditionalist movement in the Catholic Church is represented by three groups.⁸ The SSPX or, as they are often called, Lefebvrists, were invited to Moscow for the Tridentine Mass service back in the early 1990s,⁹ and these were rare and brief visits by the Society's priests. It was only since 2014-2015 that the service became more or less regular when the Russian Traditionalists signed agreements with Society representatives from Kaunas (Lithuania) – Father Thomas, Father Hugo, and Father Fernando¹⁰ – who, in turn, come to Russia to visit SSPX adherents in St. Petersburg and Moscow. These masses were and still are not sanctioned by the Church authorities.

Second, in the mid-2000s, a representative office of *Una Voce* – an international movement of Catholic laymen supporting the Traditional

⁷ See "The Ottaviani Intervention." <https://www.fisheaters.com/ottavianiintervention.html> (accessed March 9, 2020).

⁸ Some Traditionalists try to emphasize that "Russia resisted the longest" because the directives relating to changes in the rite of Mass were implemented in Russia quite late. Back in the 1980s and early 1990s, in small open churches of Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Mass was served facing the altar, and the divine service was conducted partly in Latin. In Catholic European countries, for several decades, the Mass was served exclusively in vernacular languages, and the Gregorian chant was being increasingly replaced by pious singing to guitar. Old residents of St. Catherine's parish in St. Petersburg tell that in the 1990s, the laity knew both prayers and chants in Latin. The sound of their Mass did not cause any surprise or criticism, as it happens today. Nowadays, Latin is not used in Catholic churches in Russia, with rare exceptions.

⁹ Here I am guided by the witnesses' stories about this period, as well as the article by Dmitrii Puchkin (Site: "Crusader." Subject: "A Brief History of the Catholic Traditionalist Movement in Moscow." <http://crusader.org.ru/kratkaya-istoriya-katolicheskogo-traditionalistskogo-dvizheniya-v-g-moskve.html>), perhaps, the most famous Catholic Traditionalist in Russia, the informal leader of Moscow SSPX adherents, who stood at the origins of the Traditionalist movement in Russia.

¹⁰ The names of all people mentioned in this chapter have been changed according to the ethical considerations.

Latin rite, opened in Russia. Third, in 2010, a young German entrepreneur, Karl, established a new Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, whose primary mission was to organize and provide the necessary infrastructure for the Traditional liturgy. Representatives of both communities serve the Tridentine Mass in the small crypt of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception (Moscow). The St. Petersburg Church of Our Lady of Lourdes was the last location to provide Catholic Traditionalists and those interested in "legal" access to the Traditional Mass, authorized by the Church. I further discuss how this became possible.

Catholic Traditionalists in Russia are urban intellectuals, mostly young professionals (whose age rarely exceeds 40 years), often with a degree in humanities from prestigious universities (among Traditionalists, there are many graduates and researchers of St. Petersburg State University and Moscow State University, historians, linguists, and interpreters). The overwhelming majority of Russian Catholic Traditionalists are men. Many of the most prominent enthusiasts of Catholic Traditionalism in Russia have joined the Catholic Church already having experience of varying degrees of intensity in other religious traditions—Eastern Orthodoxy, Orthodox Judaism, Old Believers, and Islam. However, what is most important is that Russian Catholic Traditionalism, with one or two exceptions, is a community of people who are not directly related to the Church hierarchy. All the initiatives, implemented or not, to serve the Traditional Mass in Russia have always had the character of grassroots activism.¹¹

It should be noted that the reputation of local supporters of the SSPX is hardly impeccable, and the shadow of their bad reputation also falls on representatives of other "legal" Traditionalist groups. In the everyday talk of both clergy and laymen, the term "Lefebvrist" is definitely

¹¹ The representatives of Russian Catholic Traditionalism can hardly be called guided by charismatic priests. As compared with the observations of Michael Cuneo, a researcher of American Catholic conservatives, this group is different from American Traditionalists. Cuneo indicates the hierarchy of Traditionalist communities in the United States and the significant role and high social status of priests in these communities. Traditionalist lay people sometimes see priests as persons of superhuman nature, and they receive a credit of trust and loyalty comparable to what gurus or prophets can have (Cuneo 1997: 117–118). Russian Traditionalists, most of whom do not have regular access to the Tridentine Mass and are content with short-term visits by Traditionalist priests, do not usually have such close ties to the clergy.

pejorative. SSPX adherents are condemned for their radical views on the life of the Catholic Church and their manifestations of political preferences. The overwhelming majority of them are sympathizers of the "strong leaders" of old Catholic world, and some have consistently argued for a return to theocratic monarchy. The priests of the SSPX from the United States and Europe see Russia as one of the last hopes of Traditionalism, admiring both the policies of the current president and the conservatism of Russian Christians. In particular, SSPX adherents of St. Petersburg are also notorious for their favorite form of community entertainment – long drinks after each mass in various bars, accompanied by inspired, but sometimes quarrelsome theological disputes. All this leads to the fact that even those lay people who sympathize with the Tridentine Mass tend to hide this fact, so as not to be automatically associated with the group of SSPX adherents.

It would, however, be over-simplifying the matters to argue that some skepticism about Traditionalism in the Catholic environment was formed only by observing representatives of local Traditionalist communities. Strictly speaking, this prejudice is a product of more global ideological processes that have taken place since Vatican II. Most priests serving in Russian Catholic parishes formed as clergy in seminaries and parishes of Poland and Belarus in the second half of the 20th century, a period when active resistance to and contempt for the Vatican II reforms came mainly from SSPX adherents opposed to the Church authorities, who served exclusively for the Tridentine Mass, neglecting the new rite. The Traditional form of Mass was cemented by a strong association with protest activism. Not only the Tridentine Mass itself but also the more harmless things associated with the style of the divine service may land in the field of suspicion and mistrust, such as the choir's desire to perform more songs in Latin or initiatives to restore the pre-revolutionary (and thus pre-Council) appearance of the altar; some priests outright refused to even talk about the Tridentine Mass. Catechesis courses, according to witnesses, do not dwell in detail on the Traditional rite, limiting themselves to commentary on the Old Mass that did not correspond to the challenges of time and was replaced by the *Novus Ordo Mass*.

This catechists' policy, coupled with the monopoly of the unsuccessfully reformed liturgy, causes extreme discontent among Traditionalists, and leads to a negative reaction towards them. The emphasis is put on the promotion of Traditional Catholic ritual practices while at the same time parallel mainstream educational missionary activities are conducted.

Traditionalist mission and the (new) technologies

Media technologies (once writing, then printing, now computer technologies) play a significant role in catechesis and missionary activity. Russian Catholic Traditionalists can be considered great enthusiasts in using modern technologies for missionary purposes. While it is not uncommon for members of religious cultures to relate the spread of technological innovation to certain eschatological expectations (Akhmetova 2010; Panchenko 2017), such enthusiasm can hardly be regarded as an exception or a paradox. For example, despite the apparent importance of the problem of mediation for the historical narrative of Christianity, it was Protestants seeking to have direct contact with God who were most open to new media in regard to their religious practices (Meyer 2011). The Internet and social media hold a special place in the adoption of new technologies by representatives of religious groups (see, for instance, Eickelman and Anderson 1999; Miller 2011: 88–98). The Internet became the reason not only for the fact that religious authorities but also the "silent majority" (Gurevich 1990) finally found a voice and gained access to express their position and communicate it to a broad audience. This observation is particularly true for the apologists of stigmatized knowledge and groups marginalized by institutional religious power.

Concerning the latter, Catholic Traditionalists in Russia mainly carry out their missionary activities in social networks and on specialized websites for the simple reason that the Catholic hierarchy seeks to limit Traditionalists' access to public speaking and the extensive Tridentine Mass service by providing them with clearly defined zones. Priests commonly try to reason with the believers that express clear sympathy for the Traditionalist movement, and if it fails, they try to prevent the enthusiasts from making their conservative positions known publicly. Official Traditionalist organizations, even those recognized by the Church, are never allowed to write

about their activities on the official websites of the Archdioceses. In other words, to be heard, Traditionalists have to explore spaces free from censorship. Social networks and online messengers have proven to be convenient for this purpose.

In the 2000s, the central platform for like-minded people to communicate and address those who thought differently were various online forums, of which the most famous are the forum "*U Zagloby*," as well as "*Ruthenia Catholica*," where many of the modern activists of Catholic Traditionalism met, and blogging websites such as "LiveJournal.ru." Today, groups and group chats in the social network Vkontakte and Telegram messenger are primarily used instead. The communication of Traditionalists with each other and with ideological opponents is often characterized by a rather high level of verbal aggression. Because of such behavior, some of those who are interested in Catholic Traditionalism, according to their feedback, are afraid to inquire about their interests and enter in constructive dialogue with Traditionalists and thus find themselves in social isolation. Indeed, for some Catholic Traditionalists most active in Internet discussions, this kind of missionary activity has nothing to do with compromise. Sharply and boldly, they refute any opinion that discords a consistent Traditionalist position, which is not always directly related to the religious sphere (if we consider religion in the normative perspective). This position suggests a particular view on several ethical (family and romantic relations, appearance, the sphere of professional employment, etc.) and political issues. Generally speaking, Catholic Traditionalists' anxiety about proper behavior can reach heights that strike the imagination of an unprepared observer. During my first visit to the St. Petersburg community of SPPX adherents, at the meal that followed the collective reading of the Rosary in Latin, I witnessed a conversation, the subject of which, as one of its participants, Gregory, put it, was *pious scrupulousness* (*blagochestivaia skrupuleznost*). It was a question of what should be the next step in case a person who had just received the communion threw up for any reason. As a secular person and not yet used to this kind of debate, I was certainly discouraged by both the original wording of the question and the hypothetical illustrations given by the participants. Later, I discovered examples of such *pious scrupulousness* in other areas of Traditionalists' reflection,

especially in online chats, where topics are raised for discussion of various acuteness: from the question of the necessity of corporal punishment for children to the legitimacy of any sex poses other than missionary; from the appropriateness of vegetarianism in the Traditionalist's diet to the legality of blended wine consumption. The inconsistency of views on these and other issues often leads to rather harsh criticism from Traditionalist Internet users, which is not to everyone's liking.

Nevertheless, Internet technology is one of the key channels in the dissemination of Traditionalist ideas. One of my interlocutors called SSPX adherents a "Catholic KGB." This witty comparison also occurred to me. In the course of my fieldwork, I also had the idea that when a person takes part in an online discussion and demonstrates his or her sympathy for the Tridentine Mass, they immediately become a subject of missionary attempts of activists. As one of the coordinators of the SSPX mission in St. Petersburg used to say: "Our people can be found in all major cities of Russia." "Our" does not necessarily imply full or even partial agreement with the main SSPX positions. The main thing is adherence to the Traditional rite while the rest of the ideological statements, it is assumed, can be learned in the future through a deeper acquaintance with the Tradition of the Church and the Traditionalists themselves.

Since the regular Traditional Mass was served and continues to be served only in Moscow and St. Petersburg (apart from one-time visits by Traditionalist priests to Kazan and Kursk), for most Traditionalists, the first Tridentine Mass in their lives was a mass recorded on video and posted on YouTube. Moreover, for many, such YouTube mass remains the only opportunity to get acquainted with Catholic Tradition. According to a sarcastic remark made by one of the Moscow SSPX adherent, Ignat, Catholicism¹² is going online in Russia because "a person cannot go into it, there is no [Traditional Catholicism] in the parishes." Therefore, there are many cases when, as a result of regular online communication with St. Petersburg and Moscow Traditionalists, residents of other cities have changed their life trajectories — leaving work or study and moving with their families to Moscow or St. Petersburg in order to communicate more

¹² Traditionalists sometimes use "Catholicism" and "Traditionalism" interchangeably, implicating the belief that post-Vatican II Catholicism is not Catholicism.

closely with people who share their beliefs and to participate fully in the Traditional liturgy.

Naturally, most modern Traditionalists were born much later than the implementation of the decrees of Vatican II and the liturgical reform. They never saw or knew what it was like to live in the "Catholic world" before the reforms. Unlike, for instance, Belarus or Poland, where some older people, guided by children's memories of the old form of Mass, choose in favor of Traditionalist parishes, in Russia, with a few exceptions, there is no such continuity. Once, one of my acquaintances, a Traditionalist, said: "Who are we, speaking about Tradition? We were born in the 1990s; we only have the Tridentine Mass and the rest of the Traditionalist's life on the Internet. What do we know about real life before Vatican II?" The mediation of technology often poses the question of authenticity to religious actors. However, Catholic Traditionalists usually think of their immersion in a technologically mediated reality as more of a resource for their mission and an advantage.

An important rhetorical device used by the members of the movement is to point to the rapid aging of the clergy and flock of the post-Vatican II Church while Traditionalist communities, on the contrary, are full of young men and women. Traditionalists also draw attention to the number of vocations, almost the main indicator of an evolving religious tradition for Catholics. Whenever possible, those of my conservative-leaning interlocutors emphasized that while "modernist" seminaries in Europe are on the verge of being closed, Traditionalist seminaries have the fullest possible range of ordinations each year. Youth is associated with progress and the future, and old age is associated with something that requires change or even replacement. According to popular notion of traditionalism, it is a project that demonizes modernity and seeks to reconstruct the past (albeit often through modern means) that was destroyed by the process of modernization. However, Catholic Traditionalists believe that it is their opponents, the so-called modernists, are the ones who are not modern. The opposition between Traditionalists and the modernists is based on this very characteristic:

The point is that in the new realities of life, without sliding into the Middle Ages, without throwing technologies out of a window, without going into a wild forest, we can actually continue to profess our faith. We

can continue serving the Tridentine Mass. Living according to the teachings of the Catholic Church. That is, tradition is not like obscurantism [...] And we don't want to be considered as a group frozen in its development, as many from the New Church usually think. In fact, we actually do not freeze in development at all. We regularly do something new (Michael, Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus).

This "new" refers to attracting participation in the Tridentine Mass and spreading awareness of Traditional teachings. Russian Traditionalists produce an impressive amount of texts.¹³ Many of them are professional linguists who translate influential Traditionalist Catholic texts into Russian and publish them on the Internet, as well as specialized Traditionalist printed periodicals. Among these are the representatives of Russian *Una Voce*¹⁴ who are notorious for their educational efforts through translations. In 2019, a monumental project to translate and publish the Documents of the Council of Trent into Russian by *Una Voce* with the financial support of sympathizers of the Traditionalist movement was completed.¹⁵ Besides, the Russian-language Traditionalist online sphere already has two translations of the Vulgate, not to mention countless small articles translated from Western Traditionalist Internet resources and official documents of the Church, devoted to liturgy and liturgical reform, social Doctrine, Church history, and many other topics that concern the heart and mind of a Traditionalist believer. With some regularity, Traditionalists hold their own conferences, as well as record video debates on current topics and post these videos on social media and YouTube. All these activities are aimed at making Traditional Catholicism accessible to a wide audience. It is not difficult to assume this kind of activity requires considerable intellect and time, which an average Catholic can hardly afford. As mentioned before,

¹³ However, this catechization strategy does not seem to be universally accepted. For example, the Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which organizes the weekly Tridentine Mass in the crypt of the Cathedral in Moscow, is skeptical about the educational activities of its social neighbors from *Una Voce*, believing the main efforts should be directed precisely to the proper organization of the regular traditional liturgy.

¹⁴ "Vulgate in Russian. The New Testament" translated from Latin by Dmitry Puchkin (https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Ieronim_Stridonskij/vulgata-na-russkom-jazyke-novyj-zavet, accessed March 9, 2020) and "Russian Vulgate" (<http://vulgata.unavoce.ru>, accessed March 9, 2020) translated by Eugene Rosenblum.

¹⁵ <http://trent.unavoce.ru> (accessed March 9, 2020).

the social specificity of the Traditionalist environment is that it mainly consists of intelligentsia. Many work as freelancers, which allows them to devote considerable time to careful study of doctrinal and liturgical nuances. Moreover, the enlightenment pathos of Traditionalist work is also based on the lack of education in history, religious philosophy, and foreign languages ascribed to the unsophisticated "people":

There is also a correlation with a specific skill that may be necessary, well, as a prerequisite for being a Traditionalist. If you don't know English well, you're in trouble here. No, well, if you know Latin, of course, it's easier but... So I don't know if it's... if the availability of Traditionalist materials were different [...] But it's a lot easier for us now than, let's say, for the traddies¹⁶ in the '90s. Because you can read any of the manuals. It's all there now. So there is hope (Ignat, a parishioner of the chapel of the SSPX in Moscow).

Thus, presently, the target audience of the Traditionalist Catholic mission is not an uneducated villager engaged in agriculture but, for instance, a clerk or a manager who does not know English well enough (that is often the case for Soviet and post-Soviet generations), who participates in the Novus Ordo Mass, and learned the basics of faith in mainstream parish catechetical groups. Despite the belief in a high catechesis potential of the symbolism of the Traditional rite sufficient for proper practical knowledge of the Catholic faith, in the circumstances of the widespread service of the "distorted" Novus Ordo Mass and poor quality centralized catechesis, Traditionalists are forced to enter into the same game and initiate an alternative program of rationalization, focusing on intellectual reading and continuing education and self-education.

Traditionalist grassroots activism: aesthetics as a resource

My second case is about a lay initiative in St. Petersburg, the purpose of which was to organize the "legal" Traditional Mass within the Catholic Church in Russia. This idea dates back to 2016 and originally belonged to one person, Ivan — a parishioner of the Basilica of St. Catherine of Alexandria in St. Petersburg, a bachelor of religious studies, an

¹⁶ The informal name of Traditionalists used by Catholics in Russia.

English language teacher, and a former Old Believer who joined the Catholic Church in 2013. Although the protagonist of this story has a confident theological explanatory apparatus and is a well-known and respected figure in broad Traditionalist circles, in positioning, declared goals, and legitimization strategies, his project differs significantly from the political programs of both radical SSPX adherents and moderate Traditionalists from *Una Voce* and the Society of Sacred Heart of Jesus. Both of these Old Church heralds, seeing their mission to spread and assert the Tridentine Mass as the basis of the liturgical life of any Catholic believer, are in one way or another in opposition to the Church mainstream. A specific position for Ivan's project is an accentuated respect for the Novus Ordo Mass and recognition of the provisions of Vatican II as valid. However, this declaration is not enough to break the associative link between the image of the Tridentine Mass and the often accompanying radical confrontation with the Church. Here it is necessary to elaborate concerning Ivan's search for additional resources to position and legitimize this Traditional Mass project. I base this account on my observation of the development and fate of this grassroots initiative for more than two years, and numerous and lengthy informal conversations with the organizer of this project, with whom, it should be noted, I have established a close friendship that determines some frankness and use of the "reduced" register in our conversations that he kindly allowed me to rely on in my research.

For himself, Ivan explained the need to implement this project in terms common with mainstream Traditionalists. Firstly, the Church has problems, and these problems have to do with the wrong interpretations of the decrees of Vatican II, as well as the arbitrary treatment of the rite of mass, low theological literacy of the clergy, and an unsatisfactory level of catechesis of lay people. However, Ivan consistently cuts off the concept of Tradition ("big T") "overgrowing" side connotations and associations. Conservative values, ethnocultural sentiments, and political views – all that in different combinations is peculiar to the Traditionalists of the SSPX and other movements, as well as to the traditionalism of another version the local priests of a Polish descent represent – fall into this area. This project is based on the desire to return, if one can put it this way, to a positive understanding of Tradition and traditionalism, defined not through opposition to the "modernism" but through orthodoxy. A symbol and, of

course, an integral part of this Tradition is the Tridentine Mass, for which one is called to struggle.

Inspired by the idea of serving the Tridentine Mass as part of regular parish life within the Church, Ivan turned to one of the most famous Moscow Traditionalists and coordinators of *Una Voce*. He brought himself together with four other people who attended Traditional Mass back in the late 2000s – Marina, the precentor of the choir of the Cathedral of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Fedor and Nikita, parishioners of the same church, and Faina, the precentor of the Gregorian choir of the Basilica of St. Catherine of Alexandria. None of them were members of any Traditionalist organization at that time. Together with Ivan, they drafted an official letter to Metropolitan Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Mother of God at Moscow Paulo Pezzi, asking him to agree to the possibility of having the Traditional Mass in St. Petersburg and to provide them with a priest and a space for it.¹⁷ Other 18 people from the parishes of St. Catherine of Alexandria and the Assumption of the Virgin Mary signed the letter. It is noteworthy that some of the signatories have never been to the Tridentine Mass before in their lives. Moreover, they are almost unfamiliar with the current theological discussion around Vatican II and the liturgical reform. The letter was solemnly handed over to the Archbishop in March 2017. Some time afterwards, the signatories were answered that the Archbishop had nothing against serving the Tridentine Mass, but they would have to find a priest to serve it. This is how the story of searching for and convincing the priests of the legitimacy of this venture began, and it did not succeed until two years later.

To show what kind of problems the heroes of this story faced in this search, I give one example:

We've come to ask him [Father Gennady, the priest] for the Tridentine Mass: "Serve us the Tridentine, Father." "The Tridentine to you? I'll

¹⁷ In this request, they were guided by the provisions of Article 5 as formulated in the Apostolic Letter of Pope Benedict XVI *Summorum Pontificum*: § 1 ("In parishes where there is a stable group of faithful, devoted to the preceding liturgical tradition, the abbot may willingly accept their request to serve the Holy Mass by the order of the Roman Missal of 1962 edition") and § 7 ("Where there is any group of faithful laypeople, about whom see Art. 5. (v. 5, § 1,) will not receive from the abbot what they asks, let the diocesan bishop be informed of it. The bishop is urged to take their wishes into account"). See: http://www.unavoce.ru/docs_summorum_pontificum.html (accessed March 9, 2020).

give you the Tridentine..." Well, he said we were fools, we wanted something exotic... And I understand him very well because I know how many of these Traditionalists with these crazy eyes he had to communicate with. There you go. But... you still have to deal with each person individually after all. "Oh, do you like the Tridentine Mass? Well, then you're like this, this and that." You fit in with all the stereotypes. Do you like the Tridentine Mass? So you want something exotic. Do you like the Tridentine Mass? Go to Greek Catholics. All this beauty, all this – go to Greek Catholics. Sacred? Get lost, all of you. Well, that kind of thing. "Do you know Latin?" – he asked us. We were like, well, we know the rite... He said to us, "Well, what is it?" and quoted from the Gospel of John what is read at the end of the Mass. [...] I answered, "This is from John." He says, "That's right. Anyway, I don't know why you want to do that. You don't know Latin, what are you going to do at Mass? It's magism!" And as a religious scholar, I responded immediately, after all magism is my term. I'm like, "Father, what do you mean by magism?" "Well, they're reading some spells there." [...] I tried to explain... some excursion to the Tridentine Mass, what it's for and what it is. He didn't listen, he must have been in a bad mood. He wasn't really listening. Then I said to him: "Listen, Father, do you think that before the Second Vatican everyone was engaged in magic?" He didn't even hesitate: "Yes." And I know, I know for sure, he doesn't think so. I guess [he thought], the Lefebvrists came again (Ivan, an organizer of the grassroots initiative).

Therefore, Latin, integral to the Traditional Mass that used to be the basis of protest activities and rather harsh public criticism of religious authorities by conservative Catholics, is perceived as an obstacle to the pastoral approach and active conscious participation of lay people in the ritual event. Father Gennady reproached the enthusiasts of the Tridentine Mass for their adherence to formal attributes that create a magical effect, suggesting that it is the seeming incomprehensibility of Latin that allows them to experience the Traditional Mass as supernatural, which the priest pejoratively calls "magism."¹⁸ As already mentioned, the advocates of the Traditional Latin rite are often blamed for seemingly magical foundations of their religious practices and beliefs. Notably, this, in many ways, determines the self-presentation of Traditionalists as rational individualists.

¹⁸ On the language ideologies and social functions of the ritual unintelligibility see Wirtz 2007.

Traditionalists consistently emphasize that their commitment to the Catholic Tradition and the Traditional Mass have a rational basis, that is, it was born out of a serious theological reflection. My interlocutors seek to prevent a possible interpretation of their experience as an quasi-magical aesthetic sympathy, and such an impression may indeed arise at the first approach, since one of the intensely discussed topics of conversation among Traditionalists is the degradation of liturgical art in the *Novus Ordo* Mass, turning it into a "circus" with guitars and "pop songs" that categorically do not correspond to the spirit of a traditional Catholic aesthetics.¹⁹ To illustrate this, I quote a toast by one of the members of the SSPX community, Vladislav, who said when everyone once again raised their glasses of beer as a part of the Easter celebrations: "I would like to drink to the Tradition that gives beauty, and beauty is very important. But it's not just any form, I would like to drink to the fact that the form is full of content. Because harmony is when beauty and content are inseparable. To the revival of Tradition!" (Fieldnotes, 1.04.2018). In the Church, Traditionalists are often denounced at best as judgmental or, at worst, as "ritualistic," which means the material form for them is seemingly more important than the spirituality itself. This is the reason for such frequent appeals to intellectual pursuits and the leveling off of the affective influence of the aesthetic appeal of the Mass and the image of Tradition on their choice:

It was a very important step for me, an important choice, it was very... I guess... I don't want to brag in any way, you can even turn [the recorder] off, or don't turn it off, whatever you want. I can tell you that I actually consciously bracketed out anything personal off, I bracketed out any sympathy for people, for the rite,²⁰ I tried to bracket it out. My choice had to do with what I thought, prayed for. <...> It was a choice, informed

¹⁹ At least in the Russian context, this concern can be considered exaggerated. Most parishes are conservative regarding the stylistics of the liturgy. For example, when in the parish of St. Catherine of Alexandria, the group that gathers at youth meetings decided to accompany the Mass and picked up the appropriate popular repertoire and guitar music, after the first such experiment, the parishioners turned to the priest protesting against such liberty. In the Traditionalists' reasoning, however, the stylistic design of the new rite often appears as a kind of variation on the theme "Jesus is my friend" by the American Catholic group Sonseed (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-NOZU2iPA8>, accessed March 9, 2020).

²⁰ Here, Gregory's statement refers to the frequent neophyte reasoning of the conversion to Catholicism, which refers to taste preferences and sympathies. Compare, for example, with the replica of Anastasia, a parishioner of the Basilica of St. Catherine of Alexandria: "Of course, they are all [Russian Catholics] attracted by Western aesthetics, otherwise why did they come here? They would have stayed in the Russian Orthodox Church" (Fieldnotes 5.02.2017).

by both faith and prayer, and at the same time rationality, as far as the Church allows to be rational.

...aesthetics is secondary, ideas come first. First ideology, then aesthetics. Aesthetics is an expression. [...] I talked too much about aesthetics, I get it. You might have gotten the wrong idea that we value aesthetics more. No, we don't. Most of us are ideological. Aesthetics is just connected. [...] Another point is that we know what it means, yes. It's important, we are always asked: "You don't understand, you are just mumbling." Yes, we know what it means, we know all these prayers by heart, we know their full translation into Russian. When we pray in Latin, we understand their meaning completely. Absolutely, that is not mumbling but conscious prayer. And in general, we have most of the people... well, for everybody, it's consciously chosen this way. Consciously. Absolutely, definitely... Of course, of course, consciously (Gregory, a mission coordinator of the SSPX in St. Petersburg).

In addition to the emphasized rationality of his Catholic faith, in the discourse of one of the St. Petersburg's most famous SSPX adherents, Gregory, one can also find a typical contrast between *prayer* as a characteristic of rational religion and *spell* as a property of magical religiosity, rooted in Protestant theology and later also adopted by academic scholars of religion, Edward Tylor and James Fraser (Tambiah 1990: 19). This dichotomy, still relevant to the religious imagination of our contemporaries, is rejected by Catholic Traditionalists as untenable: the formula and use of the sacred language instead of the vernacular one do not automatically mean the prayer represents an unconscious magical act. Lack of semantic transparency is compensated through other semiotic resources and sensory modalities that make it intelligible enough. Rationality and form in the traditionalist model are not mutually exclusive things. Nevertheless, Gregory insisted that he and other SSPX adherents learned translations of all prayers by heart and rationally (not just on the sensory level) comprehended their full meaning, thus preventing possible accusations of their unreflective "magism."

The rationality of faith as a rhetorical figure is also represented in the Traditionalist reasoning in connection with the religious experience of the "people." These very people of God are not inclined to refine a theological reflection but are guided by their feelings, sympathies, and tastes. The people may not understand anything about scholasticism, the problem of free will, and predestination (which is, by the way, often considered a miss of catechists), may not know Latin, yet they strive for

the Tridentine Mass as something beautiful, intuitively understanding that it is the true Tradition:

Yes, by the way, I am convinced, this is my subjective opinion that the percentage of people is high right now, I can say about St. Petersburg and also about the whole of Russia, that if just Latin was returned everywhere now, well yes, the divine service would be tougher, the liturgy would be stricter, most Catholics would support it, the laymen, I mean. They will come because that's different... where else would they go? We [the SSPX parish], for example, are suspicious, we are bad at all, "don't go to them," they say. That's how it is, that's how it is. If there were reverse "conservation," they'd be happy to support it (Gregory).

Here, Gregory unconsciously acts as a Wittgensteinian, attributing a ritual instinct to a human as a ceremonial being. Thus, a given instinct pushes a person not only towards a ritualized behavior in general but also towards a proper ritual form, which in this case is the Traditional Latin rite). Furthermore, in line with Wittgenstein's reflections, Traditionalists relieve the tension between the intellectualist and expressivist claims about ritual as an instinctive behavior that underlies the reflexive actions (Wittgenstein [1967] 2017; De Lara 2000; 2003). According to Gregory and other Traditionalists, a person naturally needs a ritual, but this does not contradict rationality. At first, emotional and aesthetic understanding comes that is then followed by reflexivity.

Like other Traditionalists, the proponent of the considered project, Ivan, postulates the necessity of intellectual (i.e. theological) understanding of Tradition. Moreover, just like other Traditionalists, he uses the image of people, who gravitate towards the Traditional liturgy at the level of feelings or instinct. Ivan notes that most of those who signed up the letter for the introduction of the Tridentine Mass hardly have the right notion of Tradition. I see the statement, in which Ivan discusses the aesthetization of Catholicism, as important in this regard:

That is, people have some awareness, but they somehow do not connect the two together. That is, there is a need for it, so I understand people who come to Mass and see *this*.²¹ But that's not the problem because

²¹ This refers to the Novus Ordo Mass with its eclectic style of worship or, as they sometimes say, provincial or "local" Polish character (most of the hymns performed in a divine service are translations of Polish hymns, quite simple in musical form and textual content), as well as low theological level of sermons, according to intellectuals and Traditionalists.

people don't realize that when they talk about the Tridentine Mass, they usually mean things that aren't related to the Tridentine Mass at all. Dressing up, singing, I don't know, anything else. Latin! So, Novus Ordo? Okay, now the priest has turned around, I'll put a little more candles on the altar, put it on the right clothes and tell him: say everything in Latin. It's like that. All of your Tridentine Mass affairs will end right away. So they... a lot of people think they like one thing, that's not what they really like (Ivan).

In this case, part of the signatories of the letter, and others who sympathize with this initiative, as Ivan noted, indeed consider the primary goal of this project to preserve the richness of the liturgical tradition of the Catholic Church – the Gregorian chant, the Latin language, gestures accompanying services, traditional vestments. They are far removed from current theological discussions and are unlikely to be able to theologically justify the Tridentine Mass as something better than the Novus Ordo Mass. Thus, one of the people who signed the letter for the Archbishop, the chorister of the Church of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Veronica, met Ivan because of me. Ivan asked me if there were any Catholics among my informants who would be aesthetically attracted to the stylistics of "old Catholicism" and who could be invited to sign a letter in support of the Traditional Latin Mass. I immediately remembered my recent conversation with Veronica and her statement:

Why are we reviving the Byzantine rite and ruining the Traditional Latin rite, why? [...] It's a difficult question because I understand that I can't explain [why the Tridentine Mass is needed]... it's the same Mass, I admit [...] Again, some Traditionalists don't recognize the Novus Ordo as a Mass, they think there's no sacrament. I accept the Novus Ordo as a Mass and all that. I don't know, it seems to me... I don't know how, it's kind of irrational. Well, I would, if I had a choice to go to the Tridentine Mass or Novus Ordo, I would go to the Tridentine Mass. I don't know why, it's just that... (Veronica, a chorister at the parish of the Assumption)

For Veronica, the interest in the Traditional Mass was not aroused by theological knowledge. However, for Ivan, this fact does not present a challenge because the attractiveness and aesthetic appeal of the Tridentine Mass, in his opinion, can become an effective tool for catechesis.

In other words, if one turns to Max Weber again, the aesthetic potential (Weber would call it magical) of the Tridentine Mass can be consciously used to spread rational knowledge about the Tradition:

Intellectual orthodoxy requires too much. Like reading, learning something there, it's not for the masses, you know. So how are we supposed to push people... you know, thoughts about orthodoxy and something else? In various ways, including the aesthetics and traditionality of Mass. There's this Old Mass. And where is it from, what is it, why, what is the Trent Council, and what did the Trent Council teach? People will start exploring the role of the Tridentine Mass somehow (Ivan).

Such a strategy has one more advantage. As the success of this project largely depended on how convincingly lay people demonstrate that they are not engaged in overt opposition towards the Church, using the image of people who do not understand but "feel" the Tradition is quite convenient. Yet despite all the eccentricity of the Traditionalists' demonstrations, their high competence in theological issues is noticeable and well-known, and against this background, simple human sympathies for Gregorian chants seem quite harmless.

However, Ivan and other participants of this grassroots initiative have never managed to find a priest who would agree to serve the Tridentine Mass for them. They have encountered rejection at every attempt – sometimes for ideological reasons but more often because the priests who studied in seminaries after the implementation of the liturgical reform simply do not know how to serve the Traditional Latin Mass and do not see for themselves a sufficiently convincing reason to learn it. As a result, Ivan abandoned his efforts and, after a while, started to attend a Greek Catholic parish in St. Petersburg. This project had to be completed by the representatives of *Una Voce*. Eventually, they managed to invite a Dominican priest from Vitebsk (Belarus), known for his Traditionalist views, who also regularly came to Moscow to conduct so-called spiritual exercises for representatives of Traditionalist parishes. On January 27, 2019, Father Mikhail served the first "legal" Tridentine Mass in St. Petersburg in the last five years. It was attended by the signatories of the letter, St. Petersburg SSPX adherents, the representative office of the Moscow branch of *Una Voce*, by Greek Catholics, and those simply interested in the ancient Catholic Tradition.

Conclusion

Reform efforts to rationalize religion in the Catholic Church of the 20th century have indeed borne fruit, although, as is often the case, not only those that were expected. Many Catholics, not only religious experts but "ordinary believers" did immerse themselves in the rational foundations of their faith, and, as a result, did not endorse the reformative changes proposed by the Church. "We are all Protestants now," once an Eastern Orthodox interlocutor said to the American anthropologist Webb Keane (Keane 2007: 201). To their regret, some Catholics also discovered the same thing and decided to challenge such state of affairs. Traditionalists deny the Protestant-centered opposition of ritual and rationality, consistently including the latter in the semantic potential of the concept of tradition.

As we see from the case discussed above, in order to assert their ideals, Traditionalists may try to outplay modernity on the field of rationality, as well as consciously appeal to images of irrational faith and play magical religiosity to achieve their goals. At the same time, Catholic Traditionalists are not shy about being modern: they emphasize their rationality and individualism, several of them willingly admit to using certain "tricks" in presenting the Traditionalist agenda and their projects.

It is difficult to say to what extent Catholics actually practiced their faith unconsciously and irrationally prior to Vatican II and how magical that faith was. However, *rational* and *magical* as categories of religious imagination were and still are relevant. They can be used to explain certain elements of social life, used in the rhetoric and the practice, that leads to particular social consequences on macro- and micropolitical levels. The way this happens is worthy of anthropological reflection, and especially in connection with the study of contemporary religious traditionalism that combines the idealization of the non-modern (and even anti-modern) and rationalized political activity.

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Краткое содержание на русском языке

ВОСЕМЬ ЭССЕ О РУССКОМ ХРИСТИАНСТВЕ

Православные формы христианства

Знаменный распев как символ ортопраксии в Русской православной церкви (на примерах московских и петербургских приходов)

Маргарита Чубукова

Центральный сюжет, лежащий в основе публикации — возрождение практики исполнения знаменного распева представителями современной Русской православной церкви. Неоднозначность инициативы, которой проникнуты стремления исследуемых групп, объясняется целым рядом причин.

Знаменный распев — ранняя форма древнерусской певческой традиции, возникшая в IX-X веках. Принято считать, что ее расцвет произошел именно в дораскольное время. Со временем стилевое разнообразие православного аудиального ландшафта существенно расширилось, а распев перестал использоваться повсеместно, утратив свою прежнюю значимость. Существует представление о том, что несколько веков подряд о нем вспоминают преимущественно как о наследии древнерусского певческого искусства. При подобном стечении обстоятельств, в том числе вследствие советской секуляризации, распев мог бы быть утерян или остаться предметом внимания общин старообрядцев и узкого круга специалистов-палеографов. Однако, такое видение перспектив истории средневековой православной русской музыки имеет мало общего с действительностью.

Сегодня существуют немногочисленные, но устойчивые группы занимающихся изучением, практикой и популяризацией распева в Русской православной церкви. Именно этот факт и вызывает исследовательский интерес: почему "историческая" традиция, казалось бы, подвергшаяся полной музеефикации (согласно широким представлениям о российской православной богослужебной музыке), вновь начинает использоваться на практике? А также: какое смысловое место одnogолосное знаменное пение занимает относительно наиболее распространенного многоголосного в современной церковной практике, как оно соотносится с идеологическими установками верующих?

Специфика современного знаменного распева выявляется на основе работы с полевыми материалами, а также с печатными и интернет-публикациями по соответствующей тематике, которые обычно принадлежат теоретикам и практикам — музыковедам, композиторам и литургистам. В период с ноября 2016 года по апрель 2017 года во время написания автором магистерской диссертации в Европейском университете на факультете антропологии были проинтервьюированы 32 человека. Среди них — регенты, певчие и священнослужители московских и петербургских православных храмов, относящихся к РПЦ МП, а также исследователи-медиевисты, искусствоведы, композиторы. Круг информантов определила их профессиональная и конфессиональная принадлежность. Кроме того, представленные выводы сделаны в результате наблюдений, проводившихся в ходе "знаменных" служб, конференций, концертов с исполнением знаменного распева, спевков (репетиций) знаменных хоров и обучающих занятий.

Современная культура исполнения знаменного распева не является однородной. Существует немало разночтений. Типологизация ситуаций, в которых используется знаменный распев, показывает, что пение может становиться атрибутом самых разных практик и идеологических посылов.

Использование духовных произведений, написанных на основе древнерусской музыкальной монодийной традиции в ходе стандартного богослужения в новообрядном приходе, может пониматься как отсылка к "корням". В случае, когда знаменные песнопения являются единственными в исполнительском репертуаре приходского клироса, феномен может быть расценен как

отклонение от "стандартов" современного богослужения. Современные "носители" знаменной традиции формируют собственный образ современного Православия и могут преследовать цель воссоздать образы древнерусского подвижничества, изжитые событиями последних нескольких веков истории Русской церкви.

Исследование современного знаменного распева внутри РПЦ МП заставило обратить внимание на наличие ряда единоверческих общин и тех, кто себя причисляет к единоверию. Небольшую группу единоверцев, как можно судить по собранным источникам, больше остальных заботит вопрос аутентичности исполняемого певческого материала. Случай единоверцев качественно отличается от других кейсов тем, что старообрядная служба невозможна без использования знаменного распева.

Еще один контекст, в котором используется знаменный распев, можно отнести к сфере церковного искусства. Выступления собирателей фольклора, исполнителей народной и духовной музыки воспроизводят древнерусскую музыку, черпают в ней вдохновение, сочиняя собственные музыкальные произведения, в том числе инкорпорируя фрагменты знаменной монодии. Ими посредством использования знаменного распева конструируется и транслируется образ русского Средневековья.

Православие в исламском контексте постсоветского Узбекистана: религиозное сознание и традиции

Юлия Цыряпкина

В главе рассматриваются процессы государственно-религиозного регулирования православия в постсоветском Узбекистане, особенности религиозного сознания и традиций той части населения, которая причисляет себя к православию. Автор делает экскурс в историю православия в дореволюционном Туркестане и в советский период в Узбекской ССР и выявляет, какую роль занимало православие в системе этнокультурных ценностей русских в изучаемые эпохи. Дается характеристика общественно-политической ситуации в постсоветском Узбекистане и её влияние на идентификационные маркеры русских, исходя из которой автор пришла к выводу, что в светском Узбекистане религия не занимает заметного места в иерархии республиканской идентичности, и это относится как к исламу, так и православию. В главе выявляется, что

происходит с религиозным сознанием и традициями православных в условиях проживания среди мусульманского большинства "светского" Узбекистана.

На основе статистического, архивного и полевого материала автором проанализирована ситуация в четырех православных приходах Узбекистана в городах Ташкент, Ангрен, Фергана и Каган. В ходе проведенных в 2012-2015 и в 2019 г. полевых исследований по отдельным приходам Ташкентской и Узбекистанской епархии и проделанной архивной работы в Архиве Ташкентской и Среднеазиатского Епархиального управления (г. Ташкент) автор пришла к выводу, что для русских в большинстве случаев православие рассматривается как часть культуры, которая является необходимой для приписывания себя к этнической группе. В Узбекистане наметилась тенденция, когда к православию тяготеют выходцы из этноконфессионально смешанных браков с "европейской" социокультурной идентичностью. В главе демонстрируются три разных взгляда на развитие православия в Узбекистане: позиция православных священнослужителей по состоянию приходов и вопросам катехизаторской деятельности среди прихожан; взгляды воцерковленных мирян, а также маловоцерковленных мирян, которые зачастую разделяют каноны ислама и православия одновременно, либо являются приверженцами оккультизма.

Настоятели приходов сходятся во мнении, что в Узбекистане государством созданы благоприятные условия для развития православия. Религия для русских является продолжением этнической идентификации, традиций и обычаев их предков. С каждым годом в приходах увеличивается количество прихожан из смешанных семей и союзов. Эксперты в среде православного священства считают, что в дальнейшем они и составят значительную часть прихожан православных приходов. Эти обстоятельства приводят к тому, что православные каноны маловоцерковленными верующими выполняются поверхностно, в силу обычая. Это проявляется в виде нерегулярного посещения церкви, отсутствия прочных знаний о Таинствах и канонах православия и т. д.

Дальнейшее развитие православных приходов в городах Узбекистана будет зависеть от миграционной активности русского населения, а также от тех процессов, которые происходят с идентификационными маркерами "русских" из смешанных семей или

русскоязычных жителей республики. Среди идентификационных маркеров русских на первый план в настоящее время выходит знание русского языка и "европейская" социокультурная идентичность. Значение этнической самоидентификации и отождествление с религией (православие) является второстепенными, особенно для выходцев из смешанных браков и союзов.

Христианский самиздат о религиозном поиске советской контркультурной молодежи 1970-середины 1980-х годов

Ирина Гордеева

Глава посвящена изучению религиозно-общественных идей и деятельности тех участников "религиозного возрождения" 1970-х — середины 1980-х годов, которые были тесно связаны с сообществом хиппи и, шире, с советским (контр)культурным андеграундом. Специфика этого сообщества состоит в том, что большинство его представителей были сознательными социальными маргиналами в советском обществе, но, тем не менее, для многих из них итоговым духовным выбором стало христианство в самых различных формах: от свободного христианского исповедания до "воцерковления" в Русской православной церкви и принятия духовного сана.

Работа выполнена в жанре конкретно-исторического исследования междисциплинарного характера, с использованием методов и концепций социальной и интеллектуальной истории. В исследовании использованы материалы самиздата, хранящиеся в архиве Института Открытое общество (HU OSA, Будапешт), библиотеке Международного Мемориала (Москва), цифровые коллекции самиздата Keston College (США), подшивка журнала "Община" из архива Международного Мемориала, неопубликованные материалы личных архивов представителей сообщества хиппи, включая фотографии, широкий круг недавно опубликованных мемуарных источников и интервью с участниками событий.

Исследование христианского самиздата, созданного участниками экуменического кружка Сандра Риги (журнал "Призыв"), религиозного семинара Александра Огородникова и Владимира Пореша (материалы журнала "Община" и самиздат правозащитного характера), а также документов, освещающих идейные искания хиппи Михаила Бомбина и Александра Карева, помогает

прояснить проблему религиозно-общественного содержания духовных поисков контркультурной молодежи. При всех отличиях этих кружков, их участников объединяло отсутствие социального эскапизма, наличие идей, которые носили социально-критический характер по отношению к советской действительности, а также стремление к глобальной, транснациональной постановке религиозно-общественных проблем, к общению с зарубежными единомышленниками.

В 1970-х — середине 1980-х гг. контркультурная молодежь в христианстве искала прежде всего новые формы социальности, альтернативные советской, идеал которой нередко виделся ими воплощенным в форме христианской общины. Надежды на формирование такой общины лидеры христианско-общественного движения связывали с особыми, несоветскими качествами сознания контркультурной молодежи. Самые радикальные христиане, пришедшие из молодежной контркультуры, рассчитывали на то, что молодежное христианское движение послужит социокультурной базой для будущей революции сознания — духовной, религиозно-нравственной революции, революции сознания. Поколение христианской молодежи конца 1970-х — начала 1980-х годов было уверено, что такая революция уже началась, и Россия и весь мир стоят на пороге глобальных духовных изменений или больших духовных свершений.

Протестантские формы христианства

Невидимое пасторство в условиях преследований: женщины в евангельских общинах послевоенного СССР

Надежда Белякова, Екатерина Миронова

Эта глава вводит читателей в мир провинциальной общины евангельских христиан-баптистов (ЕХБ) в послевоенном СССР и ставит вопрос о том насколько гендерно детерминированным было распределение ролей и функций внутри религиозных сообществ и как современники событий воспринимали и описывали мужские и женские роли в евангельско-баптистских общинах. Сюжет главы разворачивается вокруг руководительниц баптистской общины районного центра Рассказово (исторически традиционного молоканского региона) Антонины Тереховой и

Анны Желтовой. Интерес исследовательниц к фигурам женщин-руководительниц возник во время сбора материалов устной истории в 2015–2016 гг., когда верующие старшего поколения упоминали этих женщин более чем 60 лет спустя. Однако толчком к проведению отдельного исследования послужил найденный в архиве Уполномоченного Совета по делам религий по Тамбовской области за 1962 г. донос на руководительницу Тамбовской общины Антонину Терехову, написанный, что не очень характерно для баптистской среды, не просто баптистом, а пресвитером значительно более крупной общины в Тамбове. Тогда возникла гипотеза о гендерном конфликте, связанном с распределением полномочий между руководителями общин ЕХБ, например, по вопросу о крещениях.

Развернувшиеся в евангельском сообществе современной России культурные войны не оставляли нам шанса на интерпретацию гендерных отношений внутри среды ЕХБ в 1950–60-е гг. через материалы устной истории, поскольку наши респонденты анализировали прошлый опыт через современные стереотипы дозволяемого для женщин, и акцентировали внимание на экстремальной ситуации и "отсутствии братьев". Зато доступ к внутреннему архиву Российского Союза ЕХБ позволил нам найти и официальную фотографию общины, и материалы, касающиеся обсуждения женской темы в евангельской среде, которая, как оказалось, была гораздо более многомерной. Наша систематическая работа в архиве уполномоченного по Тамбовской области добавила новое измерение феномену женского лидерства: мы получили источники, показывающие на микроуровне "нормирующее" влияние на повседневную жизнь религиозных сообществ, оказываемое государственными чиновниками атеистического государства. И именно эти источники скорректировали нашу гипотезу: к женскому лидерству нетерпимее всех были мужчины-чиновники. Еще одной ценной категорией источников стали материалы экспедиции А. И. Клибанова, сохранившиеся в архиве Института российской истории РАН. Там были обнаружены дневники молодых сотрудников экспедиции, проводивших включенное наблюдение в Рассказовской общине ЕХБ и оставивших описание богослужений, совершаемых Антониной Тереховой, и содержащие эмоционально насыщенное женское восприятие наших героинь. Мы увидели,

что женщины были харизматичными и много проповедовали, что занятие лидерских позиций в евангельской общине в условиях преследований было связано с колоссальными рисками и жертвами, но не с властью и почетом. Совмещение традиционных женских ролей, заботы о детях и содержании дома, с организацией богослужбной жизни общины давалось этим женщинам нелегко из-за постоянного давления внешней среды, усилившегося в ходе разворачивания хрущевской антирелигиозной кампании. Однако именно женское пасторство дало путевку в жизнь следующему поколению актива евангельских христиан-баптистов. В дальнейшем смена поколений в общинах, усиление значимости мужской институциональной составляющей в общинах ЕХБ в процессе нормализации движения и постепенное лишение женщин права на проповедь привели к тому, что опыт женского лидерства оказался незамечаемым. И более того, сознательно вытесненным на периферию памяти современного сообщества ЕХБ.

Советские пятидесятники: исключительность исключенных
Вера Ключева

Глава посвящена советским пятидесятникам. Пятидесятники относятся к позднепротестантским движениям, возникшим в начале XX века. Их отличительной чертой является учение о Дарах. Теологическая доктрина пятидесятничества провозглашает необходимость для верующего не только покаяния и установления личных отношений с Богом, но и крещение Духом Святым и получение вследствие этого духовных даров (глоссолалия, пророчество, истолкование, исцеление и прочего). Пятидесятнические общины в Советском Союзе находились на нелегальном положении с конца 30-х и до конца 80-х годов XX в. Часть верующих-пятидесятников участвовали в богослужениях зарегистрированных церковью евангельских христиан-баптистов. Большинство верующих собирались нелегально.

Работа написана на полевых материалах, собранных в городских и сельских общинах европейской части России, Урала, Сибири и Казахстана. Основным методом работы был сбор биографических нарративных интервью. Полученные нарративы были дополнены документами органов власти (отчеты, информационные записки, аналитические справки региональных

уполномоченных по делам религий) из центральных и региональных архивов и эго-документами верующих (свидетельства, воспоминания, письма и заявления).

В главе поставлена следующая гипотеза: советские пятидесятники смогли сохранить целостность своего движения в советские годы, будучи объектом двойной эксклюзии (социальной и религиозной), потому что ощущали свою исключительность по отношению к светскому обществу и другим протестантам. Ключевые исследовательские вопросы: Почему пятидесятники были активны в своей евангелизационной деятельности и как на это реагировало евангельское сообщество? Можно ли говорить об эксклюзии и автомаргинализации пятидесятников в светском обществе? В чем проявлялись практики, консолидирующие пятидесятническое сообщество?

В результате исследования автор приходит к выводу, что несмотря на эксклюзию верующих на идеологическом уровне и ограничение допуска к интеллектуальным и управленческим ресурсам, они были достаточно адаптированы и интегрированы в советскую повседневность. Миссионерская активность пятидесятников вызывала конфликты среди советских евангеликов, и объяснялась тем, что евангельское сообщество было более доступным и подготовленным к принятию "духовного крещения". Давление со стороны государства, общества и других евангеликов сплотило пятидесятников, ощущавших свое доктринальное единство, и заставило выработать особые практики консолидации, основанные на "проявлениях действия духа святого".

Меньшинство внутри меньшинства: как русские евангелики в Финляндии обосновывают идентичность и свое присутствие в обществе

Татьяна Крихтова, Майя Пенттиля

Глава рассказывает про сообщество русскоязычных евангельских христиан, проживающих в Финляндии. Русскоязычные мигранты — это самая большая по величине группа мигрантов в современной Финляндии. Большинство русскоязычных мигрантов принадлежат в Православной церкви, либо не исповедуют никакую религию. При этом мигранты, которые до переезда в Финляндию посещали протестантские церкви, после переезда стали

создавать собственные русскоязычные. В нашей главе описаны две из них: "Ковчег спасения" и "Сила перемен". Обе церкви действуют в Хельсинки, их посещают представители разных протестантских деноминаций.

Случай русских евангельских христиан в Финляндии показывает, как переезд в новую страну и интеграция отражаются на личности верующих, и то, как религия влияет на поиск своего места в новой стране. Эта глава рассказывает о взаимодействии социальных действий и идентичности. В этом конкретном случае идентичность влияет на то, как евангельские верующие осмысливают и выражают свою жизнь в Финляндии. Таким образом, в этой главе мы задались вопросом, как мигранты самоорганизуются в новой стране, используя религиозные и этнические идентичности.

Исследование отвечает на несколько основных вопросов:

1. Как эти церкви были основаны в Финляндии?
2. Как прихожане церквей осмысливают свою принадлежность к финскому обществу?
3. Что они предпринимают для утверждения своего места в финском обществе?

Данные для исследования были взяты из интервью, наблюдений и документов, созданных прихожанами церквей: свидетельства о вере членов Церкви, проповеди, онлайн молитвы и исторические обзоры. Методологическая особенность нашей главы заключается в том, что два исследователя независимо друг от друга собирали данные в двух церквях. Мы применяем социологический, богословский и антропологический анализ.

Мы показываем, что религиозное единство может стать более значительным для мигранта, чем национальное. Русскоязычная христианская жизнь в Финляндии не особо разнообразна, но существующие церкви образуют различные типы евангельских общин. Евангелическое христианство многообразно: люди создают церкви с удобной для себя структурой, богословской повесткой и типом общения, поэтому каждая церковь может найти своих прихожан. В этой ситуации мигранты из постсоветских стран в Финляндию имеют возможность выбирать не только русскоязычные или финноязычные общины, но и сообщество, которое соответствует их идеалу полноценной духовной жизни. Исходя из своих религиозных потребностей и положения, новый мигрант может

выбрать либо более консервативную альтернативу евангельского сообщества в России, либо ту, которая больше ориентирована на социальную интеграцию в финское общество.

Менее распространенные христианские группы

"Почти православные": религиозная самоидентификация за-кавказских духоборцев в постсоветском контексте

Светлана Тамбовцева

Закавказские духоборцы — представители движения религиозных диссидентов, до недавнего времени компактно проживавшие на территории Грузии (край Самцхе-Джавахети, Ниноцминдский район) в нескольких горных деревнях. Духоборчество сформировалось в рамках течения духовного христианства, возникшего в середине XVIII века в южнорусских губерниях и Слободской Украине. Его приверженцы отказывались от поклонения иконам и мощам, от церковных таинств и участия священников в богослужениях, однако их ритуальная и текстуальная традиция укоренена в массовой религиозной культуре России Нового времени.

В начале XIX века духоборцы были переселены сначала в Таврию, а затем, в 1840-е годы, в Закавказье, на границу империи, где их изолированное положение сочеталось с колонизаторскими функциями. Спустя полтора столетия, в поздне- и постсоветское время, жизнь духоборческих деревень необратимо изменилась после трех массовых переселений в Россию. Меняются и те стратегии самоидентификации, к которым прибегают духоборцы. Многие из них переходят в православие, и при этом не готовы отказаться от принадлежности к собственной традиции. Глава основана на полевых материалах, собранных с 2016 по 2020 год в местах проживания духоборцев в Закавказье и России.

В фокусе главы — риторика самоидентификации современных духоборцев. Какие символические ресурсы конструирования коллективной и индивидуальной идентичности оказываются актуальны для духоборцев, переезжающих из Закавказья в Россию? Как перемены в жизни духоборческих деревень отражаются в фольклоре? Как устроена герменевтика адаптации, позволяющая репрезентировать духоборческую традицию в новых условиях?

Формирование самоидентификации современных духовборцев рассмотрено с опорой на концепцию внутренней колонизации. Исследование ставит под вопрос аналитическую ценность понятия этноконфессиональной группы, закреплённого за духовборцами в российской исследовательской традиции. Отказ от мышления в категории группы, вдохновлённый теоретическими подходами, предложенными в рамках антропологии этничности, позволяет вписать духовборческую самоидентификацию в более широкий контекст постсоветской религиозности.

Обнаруживая несостоятельность нормативного подхода, рассматривающего эти изменения как признаки упадка и утраты религиозной культуры духовборцев, можно увидеть в ней характерную для их традиции креативность, позволяющую примирить стремление к интеграции в "моральное сообщество" и национальную общность российского православия с приверженностью духовборческой культуре.

"Рациональное" и "магическое" в миссионерских проектах российских католических традиционалистов

Екатерина Хонинева

Глава посвящена католическому традиционализму — протестному движению в Католической церкви, которое представляет собой консервативную реакцию на ряд изменений доктринального и литургического характера, реализованных после Второго Ватиканского Собора во второй половине XX века. Комментируя эти реформы, традиционалисты зачастую интерпретируют их в терминах "протестантизации" католицизма, то есть пеняют реформаторам на их попытку сместить фокус с традиционной католической парадигмы символов и практик на более рационализированную, чтобы облегчить доступ к истине католической веры для как можно более широких масс. Представление о протестантизме как о "ментальном", рациональном, идеальном типе современной религиозности и о католицизме как о ритуальном, телесно-ориентированном типе до сих пор доминирует в социальном воображении как представителей религиозных культур, так и исследователей религии. Иными словами, зачастую предполагается, что быть современным (и, соответственно, рациональным) — значит быть протестантом, и наоборот. Католики-традиционалисты выступили с

жесткой критикой постановлений Второго Ватиканского Собора и литургической реформы в защиту "магических" оснований традиционной католической религиозности — ее глубокого символизма и экспрессивной силы ритуала, ценности нерационального восприятия божественных смыслов. В главе на материалах включенного наблюдения в ряде традиционалистских католических сообществ в Москве и Санкт-Петербурге, а также интервью и онлайн-публикаций, рассматривается, как представители католического традиционализма манипулируют образами *рационального* и *магического* в своих миссионерских проектах.

Опираясь на аналитическую модель Макса Вебера, различающего "магический" и "рациональный" типы религиозности, в частности на его замечание о рациональном использовании "магической" эффективности эстетики в современных религиях, автор анализирует два направления миссионерской инициативы католиков-традиционалистов в России. С одной стороны, традиционалистами делается акцент на организации более широкого служения Традиционной латинской мессы, с другой — ведется просветительская и катехизаторская деятельность, параллельная мейнстримной приходской практике. С точки зрения традиционалистов, именно до Второго Ватиканского Собора последовательная повсеместная катехизация была не нужна: народ практиковал свою веру несознательно, "магически", но регулярно и в соответствии с положенными нормами. Если раньше миссионерская деятельность должна была быть направлена на нехристиан, то сейчас традиционалисты видят крайнюю необходимость в обращении и катехизации самих католиков, дезориентированных благодаря литургической реформе и пастырским усилиям церковных экспертов.

Образ "народа", на уровне ритуального инстинкта и эстетической симпатии тяготеющий к традиционному обряду, используется также и в стратегиях легитимации одной низовой инициативы по организации служения Традиционной мессы в Санкт-Петербурге. Такой риторический ход и сознательное разыгрывание роли "простого народа" призваны разорвать устойчивую ассоциативную связь между традиционным ритуалом и радикальной конфронтацией в отношении современной политики Католической церкви. Поскольку успех этого проекта во многом зависит от того, насколько убедительно миряне продемонстрируют

свою непричастность к оппозиционному движению, апелляция к образу народа, который не понимает рационально, но *чувствует* Традицию, оказывается довольно удобной.

Таким образом, Второй Ватиканский Собор создал удивительные этнографические условия для актуализации внутригрупповой рефлексии о рациональном и ритуальном/традиционном/магическом. Для утверждения своих идеалов католические традиционалисты пытаются переиграть модерное на поле рациональности, а также сознательно апеллируют к образам нерациональной веры и "магической религиозности", чтобы достичь своих целей. При этом католические традиционалисты не стесняются быть модерными: они подчеркивают свою рациональность и индивидуализм, некоторые из них охотно признают за собой некоторую хитрость в презентации традиционалистской повестки и ее проектов. В своей риторике и практике традиционалисты последовательно отрицают протестанто-центричное противопоставление ритуального и рационального, включая рациональность в семантический потенциал концепта традиции.



**Orthodox Christianity in the Islamic context of post-Soviet
Uzbekistan: Religious consciousness and traditions**
Yulia Tsyryapkina



Picture 1. Sunday school of the Church of Dormition of the Holy Theotokos in Almalyk. 2013. Photo by the author.



Picture 2. The interior of the Sergius of Radonezh Church. Fergana, August 2014. Photo by the author.



Picture 3. The iconostasis of the Church of St. Nicholas, Hieres S. 2014.
Photo by the author.

**Christian Samizdat on Religious Seeking
of the Soviet Countercultural Youth in the 1970s to mid-1980s**
Irina Gordeeva



Picture 4. Monk Iona
(Roman Yashunskii),
Leningrad, August 1989.
Personal archive
of Roman Yashunskii.



Picture 5. Sandr Riga performs a wedding ceremony of Andris Grinberg and Inta Jaunzema, Tsamnikava, Latvia, August 1972. Personal fonds of Sandr Riga, University of Latvia Academic Library.



Picture 6. Alexander Ogorodnikov, Father Dimitri Dudko, Vladimir Poresh, and other Christian Youth, spring 1977.
Keston Digital Archives.



Picture 7. Hippie summer camp at Vitrupe, Latvia, June 1979.
Personal archives of Georgii Meitin.

**Invisible Pastorship under Persecutions:
Women in Evangelical Communities of Post-War USSR**
Nadezhda Beliakova, Ekaterina Mironova



Picture 8. Antonina
Terekhova.
Approx. late 1920s-early
1930s.
Fragment of a group photo of
the ministers of Tambov
and Voronezh regions with
their wives.
Photo provided by Vladimir
Popov.



Picture 9. The Rasskazovo community. Archive of the Moscow ECB Church.



Picture 10. Aleksei Illarionovich Zavorykin.
Photo provided by his son, Igor Zavorykin.