

**“Heightened Mindfulness” in Government Decision Makers: Antecedents and
Consequents During Crisis Management in the Emerging Interactive Information
Environment**

Sample Exhibits of Grounded Theory Research Operationalisation

The purpose of this Appendix is to give a glimpse of the research methodology operationalisation followed in the underlying thesis research. Over the period of months, while the researcher went over the news and media reports, voluminous notes and reports gathered from various sources, including, nearly 25 plus books exclusively covering the three crises case studies, besides others covering parts thereof, it required constant going back and forth, over and over again, to gather one’s thoughts and scribbled notes into some coherence, so as to finally emerge in the form of open, axial and selective coding results shown in the thesis report.

Illustrative extracts from this process for the Kandahar crisis are presented below, organised as under:

Open Coding

- (a) Chronological sequencing of crisis events and associated significant observations arrived at by triangulation method (upto arrival of IC-814 in Kandahar only).
- (b) Scheme for coding of level of information exchange between the government decision makers and the public/media.
- (c) Coding of level of information exchange between the government decision makers and the public/media through the major crisis stages.
- (d) Developing Categories in terms of their properties and dimensions (not shown here, but applied/discussed in the paper and incorporated in the framework)

Axial Coding

- (e) An example of a Paradigm Model (reflecting important linkages associated with the selected category).

Selective Coding

- (f) Integrating situational variations from within and across cases into a Conditional Matrix.

(g) Integrating “process”—An example of “Deviation Amplifying Mutual Causal Relationships.” (see Figure 2 in the paper; also, Figures 1 and 3 in the paper for other examples of this)

Chronological Sequence: IC-814 Kandahar Hijack 1999 Crisis
(upto arrival in Kandahar)

<u>Date & Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
24 Dec		
4.05 p.m.	IC-814 takes off from Kathmandu	
5.10 p.m.	IC-814 hijacked over Lucknow	Denied permission to land at Lahore; turns back to Amritsar; response of the CMG, NSG, Aerodrome Committees, and the Air Force
7.01 p.m.	Lands at Amritsar	Missed “window of opportunity”
7.49 p.m.	Takes off from Amritsar	Poor information dissemination to affected public; crisis management machinery fails to respond at all levels; responsibility disowned, “passing the buck”
8.07 p.m.	Lands at Lahore	Diplomatic level contact with Pakistan initiated
	Takes off from Lahore	Another possible opportunity lost, as dithering continues at the Government level; role of NSG/anti hijack forces?
25 Dec		
1.30 a.m.	Lands at Dubai	Diplomacy activated, but forced action options restrained by local government; some negotiations; 26 women and children released; body of Rupin Katyal handed over
6.30 a.m.	Take off from Dubai	Efficacy issues of international diplomacy; question of inadequate exercise of right to rescue Indian nationals?; contingency planning?; intelligence gathering?
8.30 a.m.- 9 a.m.	Lands at Kandahar	To negotiate or not to; limited channels of communication; attitude/approach to hijackers’ demands; international pressure activation; gathering of intelligence; proactive use of the media vis-à-vis easy awareness to the hijackers (through the media) of the government’s state of affairs/despondency?

Category: Information Exchange by the Government During the Crisis

Scheme for Coding:

Level of information exchange has been coded as shown below:

<u>Code</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Definition</u>
0	Nil	Absolutely no information exchange with the affected persons/media
1	Low	Low, i.e., inadequate information exchange, which is not enough to satisfy the questions raised by the affected people and the media; leaves dissatisfaction due to this shortcoming

2	Normal/adequate	People and the media generally agreed that information exchange meets their requirement; some questions and doubts may be left unanswered, but these cause no great dissatisfaction
3	High	Initiative on the side of the government, which is itself forthcoming with information; government wooing of the media and the people for transfer of information
4	Maximum	Out and out proactive efforts by the government to share information with the people and the media


Coding of Information Exchange during the Crisis*

<u>Period</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Level of Information Exchange</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Post-hijack— 24/12 (4.39- 7.49 p.m.)	Immediate period following the crisis	0	Rise of rumours, misinformation; hostages' relatives in anxiety; media hounding for information
24/12 (8.07p.m.)- 25/12 (8.30 a.m.)	Events at Karachi/Dubai, till arrival at Kandahar	0	Victims unable to authenticate information being beamed over the various media; uncertainty, fear increases
25/12 to 26/12	Period of no dialogue with hijackers; indirect communication only	1	Government crisis management process—invisible; media barrage and highlighting of victim's plight
27/12 to 28/12 (trigger for forced action by victims: 1 p.m. deadline)	Negotiations with the hijackers, after threat to kill hostages	2	Gate-crashing tactics by victims to draw attention; force government to attend to concerns; seek promises to resolve crisis satisfactorily
28/12 to 31/12	Terms of negotiation for ending the crisis—bargaining phase	1	Pressure of public commitment; government resolve weak; leads to tame surrender


* Note: Links to data files/references not shown here, which provided facts and basis for the coding.

An Example of “A Paradigm Model” (also referred to as a Logic Diagram)

In grounded theory, categories and subcategories are linked together in a “set of relationships denoting causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, action / interactional strategies, and consequences” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 99). The simplified model looks something like under:



An example with regard to the category “Information Availability to Stakeholders” is shown below.



Intervening Conditions

Structural Factors: Power:- Force projection capability; Special forces' preparedness; Intelligence

Diplomatic Standing:- Bilateral agreements of cooperation; Capability to leverage and apply pressure

Action/Interaction Strategies

Misreading of the developing crisis and stakeholders' feedback and concerns

Lack of empathy towards the crisis victims— deficiency in value terms

Lack of strong assertive leadership: To coordinate responsiveness, signalling effects, initiate 'sensemaking', come to grips with the crisis expeditiously, and exert positive control on the evolving situation

Consequences

Increased criticism in media due to slant of coverage—outcome of emerging technology and societal interface in form of infotainment; societal norms

Wider stakeholder generated pressure on government decision makers

Depiction of the Government as a 'soft state' in international geo-political context, as well as towards internal stakeholders

Subsequent developments related to the above category as Government begins to redress any further deterioration of situation:

Attempts to correct the above deficiency by:

Special 'secondary victims' and media briefings—reaching out

Projection of independent expert / analyst opinion in support of government actions, also incorporating them in advisory capacity

Simultaneous action to generate consensus with other major political parties

Orchestrated show of support to government crisis management by its supporters

Consequences:

Positive response from the secondary victims and reduction of bias in media coverage

Appreciation of the complexity of the evolving situation in interactions over the emerging ICT environment

Reduced pressure on government decision making

Environmental support to ongoing crisis management efforts

**An Example of Integration of Situational Variations from Within and Across
Cases to Formulate Theory**

	Government Response to the Crisis (in the immediate context)— Speed and Esteem	Government Response to the Crisis (in the subsequent context)— Esteem of Action Orientation	Responsiveness and Transparency	General Awareness of Crisis Context
Kargil crisis	Initially – Low Subsequently – Correction of error	High/Certain	Initially – Uncertain Subsequently – High/Slightly ambiguous	High
Kandahar crisis	Initially – Low Subsequently – Low/Neutral	Low/Confused	Initially – Low/ poor Subsequently – Forced, slightly better	Low