

Appendix

A1: Average share of *siloviki* as envoys (until 2000) / CFIs in the regions of Russia

Year	Share of <i>siloviki</i>
1991	16.46%
1992	20.25%
1993	24.05%
1994	21.52%
1995	17.72%
1996	21.52%
1997	21.52%
1998	22.78%
1999	24.05%
2000	48.10%
2001	49.37%
2002	51.90%
2003	53.16%
2004	53.16%
2005	54.43%
2006	54.43%
2007	55.70%
2008	56.96%
2009	54.43%
2010	50.63%
2011	50.63%
2012	51.90%

Note: regions with no envoy in the 1990s are counted as having no *silovik* envoy.





Figure A1.1. Share of *siloviki* as envoys or CFIs

A2: Distribution of Petrov / Titkov score

Year	25 percentile	Median	75 percentile
1999-2003	25	28	32
2000-2004	25	28	33
2001-2005	25	29	34
2002-2006	26	29	35
2003-2007	26	30	35
2004-2008	26	30	34
2005-2009	27	30	34
2006-2010	27	30	35
Average score, 2001-2011	26	30	34

A3: Spatial allocation of *siloviki* across Russian regions



Share of years a Russian region had a *silovik* CFI in 2000-2012



Regions with a *silovik* CFI in 2012

A4: Control variables

- Income per capita in the region (in 1995 prices, deflated using the Russia-level inflation indicator). This indicator measures the economic potential of the region, which could matter for both *siloviki* rent-seeking and the attention of the federal government.
- Population of the region. The size of the population is a proxy of the importance of the territory, which may influence the federal attention to the region.
- GDP of the region in 1995 prices, deflated using the Russia-level inflation indicator). This variable serves as another proxy of the size of the regional economy explaining both the importance of the province and the availability of the resources for rent-seeking.
- Share of urban population. This variable is important for measuring political preferences of the regional population, which could affect the willingness of the federal government to exercise a particularly tight control over the province.
- Share of the ethnic Russian population. The Russian Federation includes territories with a predominantly non-Russian population or where other ethnic groups at least constitute a significant portion of the population. Typically, these ethnic regions feature a markedly different political environment from other regions. Moreover, in the 1990s, ethnic republics frequently enjoyed higher status in the relations with the federal center. This all could matter for the appointment strategy.
- Share of the regional population holding a university degree. Again, this indicator captures the specifics of political preferences of the population. For example, modernization theory suggests that both education and urbanization should be correlated with a stronger demand for democracy, which may increase the willingness of the federal government to control the regions more closely.
- Distance between the regional capital and the city of Moscow. On the one hand, farther regions should cause more concerns for the center in terms of the possible loss of control, and thus warrant more significant monitoring. On the other hand, for envoys, appointment to a distant region could be associated with personal disadvantages and disruption of political connections, precluding subsequent career in Moscow. This could make them less willing to accept these jobs.
- Area of the region measured in square kilometers. Similarly to population and GDP, it could capture the importance of the region in the eyes of the federal government; furthermore, large regions are more likely to have more substantial natural resources, increasing their rent-seeking potential. For Moscow and St. Petersburg, the area is assumed to be zero.
- Share of regional acts contradicting federal law passed in the 1990s. This indicator is extracted from Libman (2010), who, in turn, used the information published by the federal government on the audit of regional normative acts in the early 2000s. As a result of this audit, the federal administration measured how many acts among those passed by the region by that moment contradicted federal law. As mentioned above, it was not unusual for the regions in the 1990s to ignore federal regulations in their lawmaking; in the 2000s, however, the central government put substantial effort into overcoming this problem. Therefore, it is conceivable that the federal government pursued an explicit appointment strategy to send envoys with specific backgrounds to regions that had been “more troublesome” in the past.

Urbanization, income per capita, GDP and population are available on annual basis. In the panel

data specifications and the annual cross-sections, we use annual data; in the averaged cross-sections, the average income for 2000-2012 is computed; in the annual cross-sections, again, income for the particular year is used. For education and ethnic composition, we use data published in the census of 2010. Because these data are available only as part of the census reports, we have included them in the averaged and annual cross-sections, but not in the panel data (because we do not have data on their variation over time). Area and distance from Moscow, as well as the share of acts contradicting federal law in the 1990s, obviously, do not vary over time, hence they are included only in the cross-sectional specifications. All data, if not stated otherwise, are from the official Russian State Statistics Service (Rosstat).

A5: Robustness checks

Our results are subjected to a large number of robustness checks, which are summarized below. All these tests confirm our findings.

- In the panel data specifications, to alleviate concerns over insufficient variation of the Petrov / Titkov score over time, we also run regressions without fixed effects (pooled OLS and simple logit), we also run regressions only with region fixed effects and only with time fixed effects. In addition, we replace time fixed effects by the time trend, given that, as mentioned, it appears that for the majority of periods in our sample the share of *siloviki* was going up.
- In the averaged cross-sectional regressions, because the dependent variable is bound between zero and one, we also estimate a generalized linear model with logit link function (using OLS with the dependent variable of this type could be associated with certain problems).
- In the averaged cross-sectional regressions, we undertake significant effort to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers (which may play a big role in the analysis of regional data; in the panel data regressions, the impact of the outliers should be less pronounced because of the fixed effects). We drop individual regions, which we suspect to possibly have followed a different pattern than the majority of regions in our data, as well as run the robust regressions (*rreg* routine in Stata), which are less susceptible to the impact of outliers. In particular, we drop the following regions and region groups: City of Moscow and St. Petersburg (the capital of Russia and the informal 'second capital', which may enjoy special status, privileges and federal attention); Tyumen (the region of Russia, where about 60% of the oil and gas are extracted); Ingushetia (region in direct proximity to Chechnya and without a clearly defined border to Chechnya in the early 2000s, which may also provide unreliable data); Chukotka (the only autonomous okrug we kept in our sample); Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha (had no envoys in the 1990s); Krasnodar and Stavropol (have several CFIs per region)
- In the averaged cross-sectional regressions, we control for the number of years the region had a *silovik* as an envoy in 1991-1999 (having no envoy counts as having no *silovik* envoy): it could have created path dependent effects in the appointment strategies of the federal government and at the same time influence regional political regimes.
- In the averaged cross-sectional regressions, since the CFIs were attached to the staff of the envoys in the federal districts. We also run regressions controlling for district dummies, to capture district-specific characteristics of appointment strategies (we apply seven districts; the North Caucasian district is treated as part of the Southern district, as it was in 2000-2010). This should also reduce the impact of the district-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
- In both types of regressions, we control for the amenities of life in the region. In this case, we hypothesize that the willingness of a CFI to attempt to get a job in the region could be influenced by the quality of life in the region, which could in turn be correlated with political regimes (however, the direction of the causal link is not clear). We acknowledge that the CFIs, due to their high status, could enjoy a comfortable life even in relatively less developed regions (the families of the CFIs could even continue residing in Moscow or abroad). Still, possibly, poor average quality of life in the region is a factor discouraging CFIs. In the panel data regressions, we control for four variables: air pollution per capita; quality of healthcare (population per doctor); housing space per capita; and retail trade per capita (all from Rosstat). In the averaged cross-sectional regressions, we also control for the average January temperature (climate could matter a lot in terms of making regions more or less attractive for life) and for the score regions

have in a ranking in terms of quality of life developed by RIA Novosti (<http://riarating.ru/regions/20170220/630056195.html>), which aggregates numerous statistical indicators and survey data.

- Similarly, in both types of regressions we control for the potential a region has in terms of generating rents. This, again, could be correlated with the sub-national political development (e.g., the resource curse argument, suggesting that rent-rich polities could have a lower level of democracy) and affect the interest of potential appointees. Numerous indicators in our baseline specifications (e.g., GDP) already can be seen as proxies for rents but we add two further indicators. In the panel data specification, we control for the total tax revenue generated by the region for budgets of all levels. One can plausibly assume that larger tax revenue could be seen as a proxy for a larger ability of the region to generate income for the political actors, including rents (though we acknowledge that rent generation could go at the expense of official taxation, so that the variable should be treated with a caveat). In the averaged cross-sectional specification, we control for the share of mining in the regional economy (average for the years of 2005 and 2011) since mineral resources (especially oil) are one of the crucial sources of rents for the regions of Russia.
- We also control for a proxy of the importance of the region for the federal government. Political regimes are merely one factor influencing whether the center believes the region requires more rigorous control, and greater attention of the center could also influence regional political development. We use three variables in the averaged cross-sectional regressions: (a) we apply the data of Schultz and Libman (2015) to control for the number of visits president of Russia conducted to each region in 2008-2011 (larger number of visits, arguably, is a sign for higher importance of the region); (b) we control for a dummy for border regions, which could be seen as particularly threatened and in need of greater control from the center; (c) we use the data on the Federal Targeted Programs (<http://fcp.economy.gov.ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/Title/>, data available since 2006) to construct a set of dummies for regions, which have been target to special programs of the central government aiming at their development (which clearly is a sign of their importance). In particular, we use three dummies: (a) regions of the Far East and the Baikal regions (including the Far Eastern Federal District, Chita / Zabaykalskiy kray, Irkutsk and Buriatia); (b) regions of the Northern Caucasus (ethnic republics, Stavropol and Krasnodar); and (c) regions, which have been targeted by programs directed only at these particular territories (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Sakhalin, Krasnodar (Sochi), Kaliningrad, Ingushetia and Primorsky krai (Vladivostok)). We also control for the number of military bases in the region, as reported here: <http://voinskayachast.ru/goroda>, which could be a further proxy for the importance of the region in the eyes of the center (in the averaged cross-sectional regression).
- Because the controlling functions of the CFIs depend on the characteristics of the regional bureaucracy, we also replicate averaged cross-sectional regressions controlling for two further variables: the overall number of bureaucrats in the regional agencies as of 2012 (i.e., agencies, subordinated to the regional government; we exclude regional branches of federal agencies) and the share of bureaucrats in the region with the tenure exceeding ten years as of 2011 (here we have to combined regional and federal bureaucrats since no more detailed information is available). Larger bureaucracies could be more difficult to control; bureaucrats with longer tenure become more entrenched and are similarly more difficult to control because of their extensive personal connections network.
- The fact that the regional CFIs are part of the staff of the envoys to the federal districts compels

us to implement a further test. The district level envoys also differ in terms of their background: some of them come from the *siloviki* group and some are not. One could hypothesize that the envoys from the *siloviki* group could be more sympathetic to the rent-seeking interests of other *siloviki* and thus our results could be driven by these regions. Thus, we add the interaction terms (to panel data specification) between the democracy (and democracy squared) and a dummy whether the district-level envoy is a *silovik* (we also control for the dummy district *silovik* as well). However, both interaction terms are insignificant. It means that the *siloviki* are equally capable of receiving attractive rent-generating positions under a *silovik* envoy to the federal district and if the envoy to the federal district is not a *silovik*. This could imply that the appointment of a *silovik* to a CFI is not due to the support of the district-level envoy, but of another powerful politician (possibly at the federal level), who manages to promote the particular *silovik* into position. Note that, interestingly, there is no significant difference between the share of CFIs with a *siloviki* background between districts run by *siloviki* envoys and other regions (to check this, we regress the dummy *silovik* CFI on the dummy *silovik* envoy to the region using panel-data and two-way fixed effects. This may be related to the rotation of bureaucrats appointed to the CFI position across regions, which is described in the main part of the paper.

- The appointment of a *silovik* CFI could also be linked to another type of threats Russian government is concerned about: the risks of terrorist activity, which require a more stringent governance of the region. To capture these risks, in the panel data specification, we exclude all ethnic republics of the Northern Caucasus, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions (because this is precisely the part of Russia where terrorism risks are particularly high and likely to affect the central governments' decisions).
- The appointments to individual regions within a district are not necessarily independent of each other. We could hypothesize that the federal government takes into account, whether there are already *siloviki* present among CFIs in the district or not. To check for it, we apply the tools of spatial econometrics (in the averaged cross-sectional regression). We estimate two sets of regressions:

$$y = X\beta + \rho W y + \epsilon$$

$$y = X\beta + \lambda W \epsilon + u$$

The first specification suggests that the outcome y in a region i is determined not only by the region-specific controls, but also by the outcomes y in other regions. The extent to which these regions influence the outcome in the region i depends on how 'close' they are to i geographically: this proximity is defined through the weighting matrix W , assigning regions, which are closer to i , higher weight. The second specification suggests that we observe a correlation in the error term: for each observation i , the error term consists of two components: a region-specific error term u and a weighted error term of other regions (using the same weighting matrix). The first model is the spatial lag model; the second is the spatial error model.

We introduce the simplest possible weighting matrix W , which treats all pairs of regions belonging to the same federal district as neighbors (i.e., the entry in the matrix takes the value of 1) and all pairs of regions, which are located in different districts, as not neighbors (the entry takes the value of 0). We then estimate both spatial lag and spatial error models using maximum likelihood for the averaged cross-sectional specification.

We also discuss two alternative explanations for the inverse U-shaped relation we report in the

paper:

- Possibly, the inverse U-shaped relation between sub-national democracy and the likelihood of appointment of a *silovik* as a CFI can be explained as follows. In non-democratic regions (frequently ethnic republics) the regional leaders are too powerful and effectively block the appointment of a *silovik*: the federal government prefers not to alienate the leaders of these regions. In very democratic regions (urbanized, with highly educated and wealthy population), CFIs with a *silovik* background find it more difficult to get accepted by the public (which rejects the strict hierarchical approach a *silovik* CFI represents), i.e., these regions have a political culture, which makes the work of the *silovik* CFIs very difficult. However, *first*, our results are obtained *ceteris paribus* income, education and urbanization. It means that in a poor region with low education and urbanization level, which, however, is controlled by fragmented elite and does not have a single powerful political machine of the incumbent (this is what the high value of the Petrov / Titkov index indicates), the *silovik* CFIs will still be less likely than in a similarly poor region with less fragmented elites. *Second*, our results hold in a fixed-effects specification, which controls for all time-invariant characteristics, including the political culture (a parameter most likely highly persistent over time, see Roland 2004) – i.e., precisely what would make the population reject a *silovik* CFI. Finally, *third*, we replicate our regressions controlling for an indicator extracted from a FOM survey conducted in 2007 and measuring the share of people in the region, who feel fully responsible for what is happening in their city (FOM 2007). This indicator can be seen as a proxy for how likely people are to yield to a (supposedly) more authoritarian management style associated with the *siloviki* and how difficult it will be for the *siloviki* to get accepted by the region. The results do not change. Thus, public attitudes towards the *siloviki* (indeed possibly more negative in the more modernized regions) and political culture do not drive our results.
- Another alternative is the following. The regions with high level of competitiveness or with highly established political machines (both high and low Petrov / Titkov scores) could be considered highly stable and thus difficult to change by the federal government. Intermediate regions can, however, be seen as having political regimes, which the central government could more easily manipulate: therefore the center would send *siloviki* to these intermediate regions, while pay less attention to other regions (the analogy would be that of swing states in the US elections, which attract more effort of the contestants than the states with a clear Democratic or Republican majority). This argument, however, is questionable for two reasons. *First*, the task of the CFIs is not to change the sub-national politics (for this purpose, the federal government would appoint a governor after 2005 or intervene in the gubernatorial elections before that). CFIs have to monitor the compliance with the federal law and federal directives. Throughout the 2000s, as Kahn et al. (2009) show, the federal government invested enormous effort in ensuring compliance with the federal law even in the most “difficult” regions governed by consolidated autocracies (e.g., systematic reevaluation of all regional acts in terms of their compliance with the federal law, changes in regional constitutions etc.). Hence, it is unlikely that it would behave differently in terms of appointing the CFIs. *Second*, throughout the 2000s, the Russian government appeared to be extremely concerned with the risk of the fragmentation of the Russian Federation or even secessions. In one of his early extensive interviews (Gevorkyan et al. 2000), Putin describes the task of preventing the dissolution of the Russian Federation as the most important one he faces. From this point of view, ignoring the regions with high secessionist potential (in the eyes of the Kremlin) appears to be an unlikely strategy. While the center may still keep old governors in office to ensure that the political machines run smoothly, it will most

likely attempt to monitor them as closely as possible, precisely through the appointment of the *silovik* CFIs.

A6: Annual cross-sections

In addition to the main specifications, we also run a series of cross-sectional regressions for each of the years of 2003-2010. We use a dummy for whether the region was run by a *silovik* or not as a dependent variable and the Petrov / Titkov score for the particular year and four preceding years as the explanatory variable. We refer to these specifications as *annual cross-sections*: unlike averaged cross-sections, which average all indicators for the entire Putin period we have data for, annual cross-sections look just at a particular year. We use them to see whether the regularities in how sub-national political regimes affect the likelihood of a *silovik* being appointed a CFI change over time.

As the Table A6.1 suggests, indeed, the Petrov / Titkov score mattered for appointments only for the early 2000s, until 2006, and ceased to be important afterwards. 2006 constitutes an important benchmark for the Russian federalism: this is the last year when the majority of regions were still run by elected governors (although the process of replacing them by appointed governors started already in 2005). Furthermore, in 2005 the Framework Regulation was passed, which also subordinated the CFIs to the Control Division of the Presidential Administration in Moscow.

This implies that after 2006 three important factors could have potentially reduced the importance of the rent-seeking logic for the CFIs. First, CFIs became less important in terms of coordinating federal agencies in the region: hence, the position gave smaller opportunities for rent-seeking. The CFIs kept their monitoring function though. Second, sub-national political competition or the lack thereof became a smaller obstacle for rent-seeking (since the governors now were appointees of the center themselves), and hence, the statistical effect we observed in the previous periods disappeared. Third, CFIs became more closely monitored by the federal government itself, which also constrained their rent-seeking opportunities.

In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, however, CFIs had more extensive options for rent-seeking (both because of the weaker control within the central hierarchy itself and because of the larger power of the office) and the regional politics was more important for influencing rent-seeking opportunities. This explains why we find significant results precisely for this period.

Table A6.1: Effects of sub-national political regimes on the origin of CFIs, annual cross-sectional data, OLS, 2000-2012

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Petrov/Titkov	0.137*	0.112	0.135**	0.135**	0.040	0.112	0.033	0.08
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.087)
Petrov/Titkov squared	-0.002*	-0.002	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)

Note: see Table 2. In all regressions, the following covariates were used: income per capita, urbanization, population (of the particular year), distance from Moscow, education (2010), share of ethnic Russians (2010). Results for these covariates are available upon request

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