

A Helping Hand: US Interventions Abroad in Support of Civil Resistance Campaigns

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ABSTRACT

When does the United States (US) government support civil resistance movements in countries in which it has an extensive relationship? This thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the logic of when the US provides a helping hand to fledgling resistance movements abroad by examining the shared characteristics of cases of civil resistance campaigns that the US supported compared to campaigns that the US did not support. Drawing on prior literature, I theorize that the likelihood that the US goes against a country of extensive relationship is higher in cases for civil resistance movements that share two characteristics: (a) a demonstrated commitment to nonviolence and democratic values, and (b) is led by a viable alternative leader.

Whereas prominent recent theories the role of democratic patrons in nonviolent revolutions have largely been tested on Middle Eastern and Arab Spring cases, I test the theory on previously unexplored cases of US intervention and non-intervention in Latin America, particularly in the two countries of Peru and Bolivia. Whereas the US opposed the violent Tupac Amaru campaign in 1996, US support for the nonviolent Anti-Fujimori campaign in 2000 demonstrates how the United States only supported the removal of the Fujimori regime once a viable nonviolent democratic opposition mobilized. In Bolivia, the US supported civil resistance campaigns against a military junta in 1978 and it called for the reestablishment of Bolivian democracy, whereas the US did not support a civil resistance campaign against President Hernan Siles Zuazo in 1984 that occurred within an already established democratic electoral system. The qualitative case evidence largely supports the argument that the US intervenes to support democratic values, but will only do so when a viable, democratic leader and outcome is ensured.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the twentieth century, the United States (US) became a hegemon and major global player internationally, taking on a new role following World War II.¹ The United States' power and international stature has allowed the US to influence events and spread its values globally.² The end of the Cold War created a “unipolar moment” with US influence seemingly boundless.³ During most of “America’s Century”, the United States sought to cultivate an image of a “moral foreign policy” and its role of trying to promote liberal democracy, free markets, and peace.⁴ The United States increasingly adopted a Wilsonian policy of “global meliorism” promoting liberal democratic ideals abroad.⁵ In its quest to “make the world safe for democracy” and more democratic, the United States has sometimes – but not always – assisted democratic movements abroad.⁶ Through initiatives and programs the United States assisted many countries in their democratization, as “democracy promotion has been a long-standing element of U.S. foreign policy.”⁷ In its support of democracy, the US frequently has supported the initiatives of others in

¹ The United States' influence and dominance in the twentieth century became so monumental that prominent historians of US foreign policy call the last hundred years the “American Century.” Ambrose, Stephen Edward, and Douglas Brinkley. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*. New York: Penguin Books, 2011

² Following World War II, the United States increased its interventionist actions beyond the western hemisphere, increasing military capabilities and presence overseas. New idealisms were formed, as seen by President Carter, communicating the US's prioritization of human rights.

³The US was even described by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as the “indispensable nation.” Wohlforth, William C. "[The Stability of a Unipolar World](#)." *International Security*, no. 1 (1999): 5.

⁴ McFaul, Michael. *Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central, 79; The United States became a promoter of liberal values abroad, especially as President Woodrow Wilson took on liberal foreign policy and “believed that democracy, free markets, and arms restraints should be universally practiced.” Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Ideas That Conquered the World Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Public Affairs, 2003.

⁵ “Global Meliorism, the eighth U.S. tradition, is the socioeconomic and cultural answer, for it aims to make the world a better and safer place through the promotion of economic growth, human rights, and democracy.” McDougall, Walter A. "[Back to Bedrock](#)." *Foreign Affairs*, March 1997, 134-146.

⁶ Ibid, 14.

⁷ U.S. Congress. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. *Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?* By Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko. Cong. Rept. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007, 1.

its pursuit of democratic elections and structure, but in some cases the US has utilized military force to impose regimes abroad. However, given that foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) and military intervention has rarely resulted in successful democratic transitions, it is possible that other methods of intervention by the US could prove more effective to promote democracy.⁸

The United States has promoted democracy since World War I, with each administration taking a different interest or approach to doing so.⁹ The work of the US in supporting the democratization of other countries arguable facilitated the rise of liberal democracy over the twentieth century and the defeat of fascist and communist alternatives.¹⁰ US allies have been more likely to have a democratic transition than non-allies, at least before and after the Cold War.¹¹ From President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points to President Roosevelt's signing of the Atlantic Charter to President George W. Bush's "Freedom Agenda", the US has long expressed support for the right of citizens of other countries to be democratically self-governed.¹² Within a Wilsonian framework, US Presidents from both the Democratic and Republican parties into the 21st century have consciously pursued democracy promotion in their foreign policy.

As its values spread globally over the past two centuries, the United States frequently faced the question of whether to support democratic movements abroad.¹³ Drawing on its

⁸ Downes, Alexander B., and Jonathan Monten. "[Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization](#)." *International Security* 37, no. 4 (2013): 90-131.

⁹ Ibid, 2.

¹⁰ Narizny, Kevin. "Anglo-American Primacy and the Global Spread of Democracy: An International Genealogy." *World Politics* 64, no. 2 (2012): 341-73. Gat, Azar. *Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It Is Still Imperiled*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009, 14; Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man* New York: Free Press, 1992.

¹¹ Boix, Carles. "Democracy, Development, and the International System." *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 4 (November 2011): 809-828.

¹² Churchill, Winston, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. *Atlantic Charter*. 1943.

¹³ The debate over support abroad often includes one side arguing for Wilsonian beliefs, beliefs which say the "United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law." Mead, Walter Russell. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*. Florence: Routledge, 2002.

historical record of US support of democratization and liberalization, the US has sought to be seen pursuing “an ethical foreign policy by supporting valuable and good causes.”¹⁴ Yet as democracy became more prominent globally, the United States’ connections and relations with countries globally continued to expand, frequently with non-democratic countries. During the Cold War era, promoting American values through an ethical foreign policy increasingly came into conflict with military or financial interests.¹⁵ Some US strategists and policy makers openly advocated for a double standard for non-democratic (right-wing) client states,¹⁶ and thus strategic imperatives led the US to seek to avoid assisting actively “in deposing an erstwhile friend and ally and installing a government hostile to American interests and policies in the world.”¹⁷ During the Cold War, the US often valued relationships with its non-democratic clients and allies over democracy promotion as “some American strategists argued that the United States had to defend autocratic allies who helped the United States pursue vital national interests.”¹⁸

Nevertheless, the US has lent a helping hand to various civil resistance movements, even during the Cold War. Why? The major issue – and interesting puzzle – is whether and why the US will intervene to support or oppose an opposition movement in countries that the US has established relations with and economic and security interests in. Given the rise of nonviolent civil resistance movements over time,¹⁹ the US has increasingly been put in a position of putting its “moral foreign policy” on the line and deciding whether or not to support or oppose such movements in dependent states. Because the list of countries with connections to the US has also

¹⁴ McFaul, Michael. *Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can*, 50.

¹⁵ Realist foreign policy that has predominated under some Cold War US administrations as during the Nixon-Kissinger era “may meet other American interests but cannot be defended on normative grounds.” *Ibid*, 50.

¹⁶ Lindsay O’Rourke 2018. *Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War*.

¹⁷ Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. *Dictatorships & Double Standards*. Commentary. November 1979.

¹⁸ McFaul, Michael. *Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can*, 74.

¹⁹Stephan, Maria J., and Chenoweth, Erica. “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” *International Security* 33, no. 1 (July 2008): 7–44.

grown over time, the likelihood of a country facing a civil resistance movement and having an extensive relationship with US has only grown more likely. Even today, the Trump Administration has had to struggle with the question of whether and how to support the opposition movement in Venezuela lead by Juan Guaidó.²⁰ Moving into the future, the United States must reflect on when it will support a civil resistance movement for democracy and weigh such support against its other economic and security interests and relations.

The US has intervened in civil resistance campaigns dating back to prior 1960 and up to modern day. Of course, the US only selectively intervenes to support some civil resistance campaigns abroad. So, the question must be raised, *when does the United States (US) government support civil resistance movements in countries in which it has an extensive relationship?* Using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset of Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, we can identify the campaigns in which the US gave support/intervened. I use this data to identify the universe of cases. Four original case studies then examine the historical aspects and decision-making processes influencing the US decision to intervene or not.

This thesis proceeds as follows. First, in Section II, I address the previous literature relevant for evaluating civil resistance movements and the role of external support for those movements. Section II will additionally identify two principal hypotheses for why the US would choose to support a civil resistance movement. Section III describes the data utilized to identify civil resistance movements that have occurred in countries in which the United States is considered to have an extensive relationship. Section IV is the core of the thesis, presenting the four case studies, beginning with Peru: the 1996 MRTA Insurgency (Case 1) did not receive US

²⁰ Herrero, Ana Vanessa, and Clifford Krauss. "[Opposition Leader, and Oil, Become Focus of Venezuela-U.S. Struggle.](#)" *New York Times*. January 30, 2019.

support, whereas the Anti-Fujimori movement (Case 2) received US support. The second country examined is Bolivia. The 1978 Anti-Junta movement (Case 3) received US support, while the 1984 Anti-Siles Zuazo movement (Case 4) occurred without US support. Within Section IV there is a comparison of the cases for each country and Section V summarizes the findings and concludes with a reflection of their implications.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

Previous works of literature on the topic of resistance movements focus upon the characteristics of these revolutions and the internal political state of that country. The research expanded with time upon how all those characteristics interact with each other and specifically the policy implications for Western nations. The relationships the US has with other countries is of relevance to US decision making and has implications for civil resistance movements. In the *Iron Cage of Liberalism*, Daniel Ritter focuses on this relationship and the implications for the domestic regimes of the examined countries.²¹ From his work Ritter developed the theory of the Iron Cage of Liberalism, encompassing the idea that unarmed movements are more susceptible to make impact in countries that have extensive relations with the United States. The theory of the Iron Cage of Liberalism (ICL) focuses on the values and ideals that nations must be upheld as a part of their relations with the United States, resulting in what Ritter calls “façade democracy.” Though his theory is appealing, Ritter only applies his theory to three countries within the Middle East and North Africa region, leaving further opportunity to examine the theory within other regions.

²¹ Ritter, Daniel P. *The Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa*. Oxford (GB): Oxford University Press, 2015.

Michael McKoy and Michael Miller also examine this relationship through the patron-client relationship and the impact upon the strategies of the movements themselves.²² McKoy and Miller delve into the influences on a patron's support for a movement modeling the characteristics of the movement as they argue they will determine a patron's support.²³ McKoy and Miller distinctly acknowledge the interaction that can occur between the movement and the patron, as movements can plan for and appeal for the patron's support. However, despite the desire by some movements to have external assistance there are times when it is not beneficial as discussed by Chenoweth and Stephen. External state assistance is a "double-edged sword" that sometimes provides more disadvantages than advantages for insurgencies and civil resistance movements, causing movements to be delegitimized or undermined.²⁴ Chenoweth and Stephen's main argument clearly presents the advantages for resistance movements that are nonviolent, stating that nonviolent campaigns are twice as likely to be successful; however, there is little connection made to whether nonviolence impacts the decision by actors to provide external assistance.²⁵ Justification for providing external assistance was discussed by Dudouet through the conceptualization of the "right to be helped" and the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, establishing how the role of the international community has grown greater regarding civil resistance movements.²⁶ Dudouet expands on the abilities of external actors by presenting a wide range of mechanisms for how assistance can be provided, including: promoting, capacity building,

²²McKoy, Michael K., and Michael K. Miller. "The Patron's Dilemma: The Dynamics of Foreign-Supported Democratization." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, no. 5 (October 2012): 904–32.

²³ Ibid, 923.

²⁴ Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 20.

²⁵Ibid, 16.

²⁶ Dudouet, Veronique. *Sources, Functions, and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements*. In Schock, Kurt, ed. *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015, 173.

connecting, protecting, monitoring, pressuring.²⁷ However, Dudouet additionally recognizes concerns over the intentions of the external actors, a point that is raised historically about the actions of the United States.

Choi and James explore exactly that question, asking “why does the US intervene abroad?” and determined that the US has a “sustained interest in promoting human rights abroad,” greater than the interest in democracy and terrorism.²⁸ Choi and James look at the US’s actions historically and under what contexts in will intervene militarily, providing a unique approach as only military action was considered. The ability of the US to intervene in such a way is the result of its “hegemonic influence” that has grown over time and through its establishment the use of it by the US became a norm.²⁹ Schenoni and Mainwaring discuss how this influence was utilized by the US in Latin America’s democratization. The United States’ influence in Latin America was also discussed by Levitsky, who attributes the successful assistance by the US for Latin America’s democratization due to its linkage to the region.³⁰ Levitsky’s research showed that linkage increased and magnified the likelihood of US response, demonstrating the impact of linkage and therefore US interests.³¹ The region of Latin America is relevant to the ICL theory, as the US in its history held many relationships with countries in the region and therefore should prove the theory to be applicable. The prominent research done by Daniel Ritter provides an extensive assessment of cases in the Middle East but leaves opportunity for other regions and countries to be examined.

²⁷ Ibid, 177-185.

²⁸ Choi, Seung-Whan, and Patrick James. “Why Does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations, and Terrorism.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 5 (August 2016): 899–926.

²⁹ Luis L. Schenoni & Scott Mainwaring (2019) *US hegemony and regime change in Latin America, Democratization*, 26:2, 270.

³⁰ Levitsky, Steven., and Way, Lucan. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 131.

³¹ Ibid.

The United States government under various Presidential administrations made the difficult decision of whether to take action in support of a civil resistance movement in another country. With many theories why the US makes these decisions and how it fits into overall foreign policy objectives, it is evident that certain characteristics to a movement and the country are prevalent to the decision. Nonetheless, the US faces more widespread dynamics when there is an extensive relationship in place, as the administration must take into consideration economic and security relationships or interests within the country.

The literature just reviewed on the logic of US intervention leads to two testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis I: the US will intervene in support of cases of civil resistance movement when it is demonstrated to be nonviolent and is based on democratic electoral values.

Based on this theory the US should be more likely to support a nonviolent movement as there is more intentionality behind the movement's leaders who commit to methods of nonviolence, as seen in the methods of signaling by the movement to the US and other international actors.³² Additionally, under the assumption of the US's continued historical commitment to democratization, civil resistance movements should be most likely to appeal to the US's democratic values.

Hypothesis II: the US will only support a civil resistance movement when it calls to alter or replace a government only if it presents a viable alternative leader.

Historically there has been many countries with unsuccessful movements or democratization, the US is therefore mindful of where it intervenes and cases that include a viable alternative leader provide the best insurance of an ideal outcome. The contexts presented by these

³² McKoy, Michael K., and Michael K. Miller. "The Patron's Dilemma: The Dynamics of Foreign-Supported Democratization." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 5 (2012): 904-32.

hypotheses propose that the US will only use its resources, diplomatically or militarily, in cases it will be the most objectively helpful and implement democratic values.

III. METHODOLOGY

The case selection process for this project utilized the NAVCO 2.0 Data as a comprehensive, historical list of resistance movements globally.³³ The NAVCO data was restricted to the years 1950 to 2000 as it is the years included in the Hierarchy Data of David Lake, used to demonstrate the level of relations, hierarchy, a country has with the United States.³⁴ As result of the years restriction, there were 230 resistance movements within the years of 1950-2000 and 55 cases identified as having movement support from the United States. The hierarchy dataset has a quantitative measure for the economic and security of a country's measured hierarchy with the United States.³⁵ The NAVCO dataset of Chenoweth and the Hierarchy data of Lake were combined based on the provided country and year of the restricted NAVCO data list and the corresponding economic and security hierarchy variable values.

The Hierarchy data were used to provide a quantitative determination of what would be considered an extensive relationship with the United States, as the situations in which the US has more interests in that country are of more concern. David Lake defines hierarchy as the authority held by one actor over a second actor, resulting in commands and compliance from the former to the latter.³⁶ Lake expresses the Security Hierarchy (SH) as the “large range of possible actions make up security policy, all united by the goal of lowering the threat of foreign coercion.”³⁷ Economic Hierarchy (EH) is described as the connections that result from “all actions that affect

³³ Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis. 2013. Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(3), 415-423.

³⁴ Lake, David, 2018, [Replication Data for: Hierarchy in International Relations](#), *Harvard Dataverse*, V1.

³⁵ Lake, David A. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.

³⁶Ibid, 51.

³⁷ Ibid, 52.

the accumulation and allocation of resources... the incredibly diverse activities that are conceptually available to states at home and abroad for governing the economy.”³⁸ The resulting addition of economic hierarchy (EH) and security hierarchy (SH) variables allows for a quantitative threshold to be created for considering more extensive relationships, in which the United States comparatively has more of the described hierarchy connections in the respective categories. With that said, the listed EH and SH values were taken to find the resulting mean value and utilized as the threshold in which values above this level would be considered to have an “extensive relationship” with the US in that year.³⁹ Employing this threshold produces a case list of 65 movements that have a high hierarchy relationship, extensive relationship, with the United States in either the economic or security hierarchy variable, all of which are list in *Table 1*. Out of the identified 65 movements occurring in the countries with extensive relationships, the US intervened in only 16 of them. The resulting 16 movements were examined to identify countries in which the US intervened in one movement but did not in another movement. The selected countries for examination are Peru and Bolivia with two cases each, combining for a total of four cases of civil resistance movements.⁴⁰

The cases selected for examination were chosen based on the quantitative measurements of what is considered an extensive relationship with the United States and therefore countries in which decision-making would be more difficult. The extensive relationship countries therefore result in a regime facing a civil resistance movement while having a prior established relationship with the United States. This scenario leads to a necessary decision for the US

³⁸ Ibid, 56.

³⁹ Based on the included values, the threshold created for the Economic Hierarchy was based on the mean value of .0988 and for Security Hierarchy a mean value of .11439.

⁴⁰ The pairing of cases within each country were done with the intention to provide the most cohesion in relevant factors by attempting to include cases in similar timeframes. Therefore, each country’s cases have minimal time difference, respectively four and six years between the two cases.

between its established values and interests present due to the countries' extensive relationship. Additionally, the cases examined occur in Latin America, an area of future interest due to continued and increased extensive relationships present day with countries in those regions. Each case study qualitatively examines the government structure at the time of the movement, the country's relationship with the United States, a summary of the civil resistance movement, and lastly the US's involvement with the movement. The raised questions for each civil resistance movement case study provides a comparative structure for the analysis to follow each pair, scrutinizing the similarities and discrepancies of significance to US decision making.

IV. CASES

Having laid out my case selection strategy, I now present the case studies themselves.

PERU

The two civil resistance movements examined within Peru occurred in within a short time period of each other and were against the same Peruvian regime, President Alberto Fujimori. Despite both movements being against the same regime only one was identified by the NAVCO data as garnering the support of the United States, the 2000 Anti-Fujimori movement.⁴¹ The movement in 2000 would successfully remove Fujimori from power. The two movements had similar end goals in placing demands against the Fujimori administration and for removal, so differences in the strategies used by the movements to garner attention and communicated their values will be key in determining the distinguishing factors of the US decision making process.

Case 1: 1996 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

a) Peruvian Government

⁴¹ Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis. 2013. Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset, v. 2.0. University of Denver.

The country of Peru slowly shifted more into a democratic government following the end of the Cold War and end of support from the Soviet Union.⁴² The 1990 Presidential election was won by Alberto Fujimori and would remove the Marxist parties from the coalition government. Following his election, Fujimori took many steps in attempt to fulfill his campaign promise of economic reform, creating change for the banking sector and foreign investment in Peru.⁴³ Over the course of Fujimori's two terms as president, he would take steps militarily and politically to lead to what was defined as an anocracy or authoritative regime.⁴⁴ The Fujimori administration lead an autogolpe in the early 1990s and as a result the Polity Score for Peru would be considered an anocracy, non-democratic levels, for the entirety of his administration.⁴⁵ Fujimori utilized the threat from terrorist organizations and other security threats to solidify a stronger connection between the administration and the armed forces.⁴⁶ In April 1992, when the largest decrease in Polity Score occurred, the Fujimori implemented a palace coup in order to gain power over the other branches of government, "the Constitution was suspended, opposition politicians and journalists detained, with most of the Supreme Court dismissed as a prelude to purges throughout the judiciary."⁴⁷ The extent of influence held by Fujimori resulted in greater outcomes than his ability to run for a third term, but the ability to take measures to give him an advantage in the election of 2000.

b) US Relationship with Fujimori's Peru

⁴² McClintock, Cynthia. 2000. [*The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a Critical Caveat on Democratic Standards*](#). Dept. of Political Science, The George Washington University.

⁴³ Ibid, 9.

⁴⁴ Taylor, Lewis. "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru." *Government and Opposition*, no. 4 (2005): 568.

⁴⁵ Marshall, Monty G. "[Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Peru](#)." *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*, June 5, 2014.

⁴⁶ Caceres Booth, Julia E. 2013. [*The Persistence of the Fujimori Legacy in Peru*](#). University of British Columbia, Okanagan.

⁴⁷ Taylor, Lewis. "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru," 568.

As identified in the data provided by the work of David Lake, Peru has an extensive relationship with the United States both economically and militarily based on the hierarchy measures provided by the database.⁴⁸ Comparatively to other countries that experienced civil resistance movements, as identified by the NAVCO data, Peru's hierarchy levels in the years of the movements were higher than the mean level of all the identified years with civil resistance movements; therefore, proving Peru to have an extensive relationship with the United States. The hierarchy data for these years are justified by the connections and exchanges between the countries at that time. The US and Peru improved their previously negative relationship throughout the 1990s, as economic connections and collaboration that developed.⁴⁹ In the first half of the 1990s, during the first term of President Fujimori, Peru would open its door to foreign investment leading to international interests from companies of the United States and Japan.⁵⁰ The "U.S. remained Peru's most important trading partner" during the 1990s, as the US share of Peru's export and imports stayed at around 20 to 40%.⁵¹ Due to this level of engagement prior to the resistance movement in 1996, its evident as to why Peru would have an economic hierarchy level that would lead it to be identified as extensive.

President Fujimori hoping to establish his own presidency set out to create a foundation of relationships with the international community, particularly pursuing points of collaboration with the United States. "President Alberto Fujimori sought to collaborate with the U.S. government on most components of the bilateral agenda, including security threats, free-market reform, and narcotics control."⁵² It would be efforts from both President Fujimori and the United

⁴⁸ Lake, David, 2018, "Replication Data for: Hierarchy in International Relations."

⁴⁹ McClintock, Cynthia. *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a Critical Caveat on Democratic Standards*, 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 11.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 13.

⁵² McClintock, Cynthia, and Fabián Vallas. *The United States and Peru: Cooperation at a Cost*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2003, 1.

States that improved the relationship between the two countries, for example in the early 1990s “the Clinton administration also pushed an early normalization of relations with Peru.”⁵³ Despite original US resistance to the Fujimori administration and his rise to power, the two countries in 1990s would eventually be described as “once again marching together.”⁵⁴

In terms of the military and security relationship between the US and Peru, similarly to economic development, the military connections between the countries grew in the 1990s. “After the inauguration of Fujimori and the Peruvian government’s overall shift towards a closer relationship with the United States, the ties between Peruvian security personnel and the CIA were greatly strengthened.”⁵⁵ The US government began to work closely with Peru’s government at this time on national-security threats, often assisting on anti-terrorist initiatives with CIA financial and technical support.⁵⁶ Other individual relationships that developed was General Barry McCaffrey, Director of the White House’s Office of Drug Control Policy, and the Peruvian leadership.⁵⁷ Additional military collaborations between the two countries occurred around anti-narcotic trafficking, as the Pentagon provided equipment and resources to track and capture drug planes.⁵⁸ US engagement with Peru was also prominent in the fight to eradicate the narcotics trade, as the US had interests in representing the cultivation of drugs and the cocoa leaf. The US and Peru’s “cooperation on programs designed to reduce the production of, and traffic in, coca and cocaine paste not only remained high, but also gradually expanded.”⁵⁹ Through the

⁵³ Cameron, Maxwell A., and Philip Mauceri. *The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998, 219.

⁵⁴ Clayton, Lawrence A. *Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999, 9.

⁵⁵ McClintock, Cynthia. *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a Critical Caveat on Democratic Standards*, 25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 19.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 48.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 46.

⁵⁹ Palmer, David Scott. "Peru, the Drug Business and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34, no. 3 (1992): 65-88. doi:10.2307/165925.

evidence presented on the financial assistance and resources given by the US military, its apparent that US interests in the country led to the security hierarchy level declaring an extensive relationship.

The United States, while maintaining a positive relationship with Peru particularly economically and militarily, would take steps to criticize the political overreach of the Fujimori Administration. Following the autogolpe “the United States suspended \$164 million in new economic aid and \$39 million military assistance to Peru--a total of almost \$200 million.”⁶⁰ The US actions to this early seizure of power by Fujimori led to significant diplomatic action as “President Bush called Fujimori...Bush was reported to have told Fujimori that the U.S. was ‘disappointed with the measures taken by Peru,’ and urged Fujimori to move back to a constitutional government ‘as soon as possible.’”⁶¹ Despite all the criticisms coming from US leadership, the two countries by the end of 1992 had what was described as a normalized relationship; however, criticism on human rights from US officials would continue throughout the decade.

c) Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement: Campaign Summary

The civil resistance movement by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) is noted by NAVCO dataset to have begun on December 17, 1996.⁶² On the that day in December the MRTA would take hostages within the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to Peru; however, the work and aggression of the group began before this date. The threat of the MRTA was known to US intelligence well prior to its actions in December 1996, described as

⁶⁰ McClintock, Cynthia. *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a Critical Caveat on Democratic Standards*, 55.

⁶¹ Ibid, 55.

⁶² Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis. 2013. *Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset*, v. 2.0.

“one of the greatest terrorist threats to US interests in South America.”⁶³ The history of the MRTA includes its establishment as a Marxist-Leninist organization with intent to rid of imperialist forces, including the United States, from Peru.⁶⁴ MRTA began in the 1980s, like many other socialist movements at the time within Latin America, against the distribution of wealth and the worsening conditions of rural and poor communities.⁶⁵ The group is traditionally known for its involvement in activities such as “bank robberies, kidnappings, and extortion,” but often done with the intent to keep deaths and damage to a minimum in order to maintain support.⁶⁶ “MRTA perceives the armed guerilla campaign as the ‘groundwork’ necessary for establishing a government based on the leftist ideology.”⁶⁷ The actions of the MRTA was done not only with its objective to bring its own values and reforms to government, but additionally to bring light to the conditions experienced by the people of the Peru at the time.

During the 1990s the Fujimori administration had to face the efforts of the MRTA and the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) rebel group, which was known to be more brutal and deadlier.⁶⁸ The actions of the Peruvian government under the Fujimori administration created what was described as a civil war during which numbers were placed at around 27,500 killed and 5000 disappeared. The response and reacting efforts of the Fujimori administration to the rebel groups challenging it at the time produced a “authoritarian-style governance.”⁶⁹ Fujimori hope to rid of MRTA through many efforts, including the utilization of his security forces, capturing of

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. “[Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement: Growing Threat to US Interests in Peru](#)” (1991), 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Choi, Yoon. “[The Peruvian Hostage Crisis: Brief Review of MRTA.](#)” *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 21, no. 1-2 (April 1, 1997): 38.

⁶⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, “Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement”, 3.

⁶⁷ Choi, Yoon. “The Peruvian Hostage Crisis: Brief Review of MRTA,” 40.

⁶⁸ Panjabi, Rane K.L. “Terror at the Emperor’s Birthday Party: An Analysis of the Hostage-Taking Incident at the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru.” *Dickinson Journal of International Law* 16, no. 1 (September 22, 1997), 8.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 4.

leaders, and the offering of an amnesty program.⁷⁰ Fujimori always had a strong relation with the military because when he came to power there were not strong political connections with the legislature, forcing him to turn to the military.⁷¹ Fujimori's control of the military and its influence would expand through this civil war period, developing into 42% of the country to be under emergency rule.⁷² The efforts of Fujimori also focused on hopes to improve the country economically; however, while the economic plans assisted the wealthy and middle class, the poor was faced with "unemployment, chronic hunger, and severe deprivation."⁷³ The economic policies resulted in negative redistributions of wealth, as the top 10% control more of the economy while real wages decrease, resulting in half of the population to be in poverty.⁷⁴ These conditions experienced by the Peruvian people were turned into a rallying cry for the MRTA rebel group.

Efforts by MRTA were also done to give attention to the human rights issue generally within the country and also experienced by the many MRTA being held as prisoners. The violent response executed by the Army and the Fujimori administration led to many, including Amnesty International to call concern to the human rights violations that were being experienced within the country.⁷⁵ Levels of which are so significantly known that the United States Congress had actually decided to block US aid to Peru in the early 1990s.⁷⁶ Issues around human rights were particularly voiced about Peruvian prisons, many of which hold members of the group who were imprisoned for terrorism, a linkage that will be relevant to the demands of the MRTA. The

⁷⁰ Panjabi, Rancee K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 13.

⁷¹ Ibid, 22.

⁷² Ibid, 23.

⁷³ Ibid, 4.

⁷⁴ Choi, Yoon. "The Peruvian Hostage Crisis: Brief Review of MRTA," 45.

⁷⁵ The Christian Science Monitor. "[Peru Rights Abuses Threaten Aid Military Response in Guerrilla War Imperils US and German Help for Cash-Strapped Country.](#)" *The Christian Science Publishing Society: "The Christian Science Monitor* (1991).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

conditions within the prisons were so bad that US reports called it “particularly inhumane treatment.”⁷⁷ The prior global awareness of the human rights violations that were being experienced within Peru had implications for the MRTA in its attempts to gain international attention.

The MRTA, prior December 1996, acted in many incidents, “attacking Western embassies, robbing banks and kidnapping businessmen,” all of which were focused on generating propaganda.⁷⁸ The extremes of MRTA were seen in the January 1990 assassination of the Peruvian Defense Minister General and other high-profile kidnappings.⁷⁹ It would be on December 17, 1996 that the MRTA would act and start a resistance movement within itself, as identified by the NAVCO dataset, and would capture the attention of the world. December 17, 1996 would mark the taking of the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to Peru by 14 MRTA members and begin a 126-day hostage crisis.⁸⁰ The event held at the residence was one of prominence, celebrating the birthday of the Japanese Emperor, leading to many of “Lima's most important political and social figures, including the foreign and agricultural ministers, the President of the Supreme Court, six Supreme Court justices, five generals of the National Police and President Alberto K. Fujimori's mother, sister and brother.”⁸¹ Additionally, the party played host to a large amount other foreign ambassadors and diplomats to Peru and overall notable attendees.⁸²

Upon seizing the residence, the MRTA group members released all women and children hostages and over the course of the weeks following would release a majority of the rest of the

⁷⁷ Panjabi, Ranee K.L. “Terror at the Emperor’s Birthday Party,” 18.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 10.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 11.

⁸⁰ Canseco, Javier Diez. "[The Peruvian Crucible: Reflections of a Hostage.](#)" *NACLA*. September 25, 2007.

⁸¹ Schemo, Diana "[How Peruvian Hostage Crisis Became Trip Into the Surreal.](#)" *New York Times*. April 26, 1997.

⁸² Panjabi, Ranee K.L. “Terror at the Emperor’s Birthday Party,” 32.

hostages, due to medical issues and to place concentration on Peruvian officials, leaving only 72 hostages.⁸³ The MRTA announced the four conditions of the group's demands: "modification of economic policies for national welfare; release of all MRTA members in prison; payment of war taxes; and guarantee of a safe withdrawal route to the central jungle area for arrested guerillas."⁸⁴ However, it was evident from the beginning that their groups principal goal was to have their comrades release from the Peruvian prisons.⁸⁵ Through its positioning and posturing of their demands the MRTA showed they were willing to have negotiations with the administration and the likelihood of force or killings was not high.⁸⁶ The leader, Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, had set a deadline for when he would start killing hostages in attempt to encourage a meeting with President Fujimori; however, despite the deadline passing no hostages were killed by the MRTA.⁸⁷ In addition to the lack of violence against the hostages, the MRTA "reiterated its demand that the government improve the standard of living of Peru's poor, who constitute almost half the population."⁸⁸

Negotiations between the two sides began with representatives from both the Vatican and the Red Cross to play the role of mediators.⁸⁹ The negotiations did not happen productively and resulted in many countries offering assistance and advice. "The U.S., which can exercise a decisive influence on Latin America's foreign relations, publicly claimed its absolutely negative position for any negotiations with terrorists shortly after the MRTA's attack."⁹⁰ While the U.S. was against any concessions or negotiations with the MRTA, communicated to the Fujimori

⁸³ Jensen, Derrick. "Lessons from Peru." *Earth Island Journal* 12, no. 3 (June 22, 1997): 40.

⁸⁴ Choi, Yoon. "The Peruvian Hostage Crisis: Brief Review of MRTA," 44.

⁸⁵ Krauss, C. "[Peru Troops Rescue Hostages; Rebels Slain as Standoff Ends.](#)" *New York Times*. April 23, 1997.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 46.

⁸⁷ Schemo, Diana. "[How Peruvian Hostage Crisis Became Trip Into the Surreal.](#)" *New York Times*. April 26, 1997.

⁸⁸ Panjabi, Rane K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 38.

⁸⁹ Abraham, Lama. "[The Fujimori Government and the Mrta Play Ping-Pong.](#)" *Inter Press Service*, Jan 13, 1997.

⁹⁰ Choi, Yoon. "The Peruvian Hostage Crisis: Brief Review of MRTA," 47.

regime that it was against any risky rescues.⁹¹ Despite the hostage crisis occurring at the Japanese Ambassador's residence, Japan played a limited role in the crisis while pressing for a peaceful solution.⁹² Other countries were involved once the discussion rose of a possible third country taking the exiled rebels. Negotiations would continue over the course of the hostage crisis, as more hostages were released due medical reasons and prisoners were released in good-faith.⁹³ The government through different strategies including media, "undermined the negotiation process in order to set the stage for its military solution."⁹⁴ Through mediation a "concrete plan that included the liberation of the hostages, the safe passage of the MRTA operatives out of Peru, and subsequently, the opening of a negotiation process that could create the conditions for a political solution to the violence."⁹⁵ The proposed plans and other outcomes of negotiations were rejected by the Fujimori administration, a process that was described as a carousel with no clear end or product.⁹⁶ Cerpa and the rebels were willing to wait for a resolution through these ongoing negotiations, overtime decreasing the number of hostages in their hold, at one point releasing "all captives not linked to the Peruvian government."⁹⁷ The release of hostages was often used as a strategy by MRTA to encourage negotiations between the two sides.⁹⁸ However, for Fujimori it was clear from the beginning that his forces were to prepare for a counter-attack.⁹⁹ Negotiations and discussions would go on for quite some time into the new

⁹¹ Candiotti, Susan Candiotti. "[Peru Officially Silent on Hostage Crisis: Japan, Peru Hold Discussions](#)." *CNN - World News*. December 20, 1996.

⁹² Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council. "[Peru: Outlook for the Hostage Crisis](#)" (1997).

⁹³ Candiotti, Susan Candiotti. "Peru Officially Silent on Hostage Crisis: Japan, Peru Hold Discussions." *CNN - World News*.

⁹⁴ Canseco, Javier Diez. "The Peruvian Crucible: Reflections of a Hostage."

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Schemo, Diana. "How Peruvian Hostage Crisis Became Trip into the Surreal."

⁹⁷ Panjabi, Ranee K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 65.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 84.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 39.

year, with stalemates occurring intermittently; however, MRTA held true to wanting the release of its comrades while Fujimori held to the fact that that would be the one concession he would not consider.¹⁰⁰ Despite the people favoring a peaceful solution and the positives that many saw in the negotiations, as it “opened the possibility of a negotiated solution to the country's violent political conflict,” yet this was not what action was executed by the Fujimori government.¹⁰¹

As within the month of March 1997, negotiations collapsed multiple time resulting in the intensity of the situation to escalate.¹⁰² Mediators throughout this time continued to work on a proposal that would hopefully bring both sides together, only to have it repeatedly rejected.¹⁰³ The decision by Cerpa to limit medical access for the hostages in hopes to put more pressure on the government, gave Fujimori the justification to execute an attack he'd been planning for so long.¹⁰⁴ It was the afternoon of April 22, 1997 that Fujimori ordered security forces, in Operation Chavin de Huantar, to attack the Japanese ambassador residence and free the remaining hostages.¹⁰⁵ The military attack resulted in all 14 MRTA group members being killed along with two members of the armed forces.¹⁰⁶ The MRTA rebels in the end were unable to have any of their demands met as a result of the hostage situation, although resulting in prominent international media attention for the group and their cause.

The military operation by the government against the hostage crisis resulted in a boost of popularity within the country for Fujimori, nonetheless a wider range of recognition globally. President Fujimori's approval rating increased to 67% following the raid compared to the 38%

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 98.

¹⁰¹ Canseco, Javier Diez. "The Peruvian Crucible: Reflections of a Hostage."

¹⁰² Panjabi, Raneer K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 103.

¹⁰³ Panjabi, Raneer K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 109.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 114.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 114.

¹⁰⁶ Canseco, Javier Diez. "The Peruvian Crucible: Reflections of a Hostage."

approval rating prior to it.¹⁰⁷ The military operation was the only way to maintain President Fujimori and the military's reputation, as it took attention away from the security failure that was allowed and ensured no concessions were to be made to MRTA. The impact of "the successful rescue mission briefly made Fujimori a hero and, as briefly, created a military in which the public could trust and be proud."¹⁰⁸ The reaction to the actions by the MRTA were criticized by many as there was broad condemnation against the hostage crisis, as it was a continuation of the violence experienced by many in the past decade.¹⁰⁹ Although no demands were met for MRTA, the issues they were advocating for were still ongoing within Peru, as the economic and political problems that led to this hostility were still in place.¹¹⁰ The poverty and many issues faced by the Peruvian people were described as the "political Achilles' heel" for Fujimori.¹¹¹ A Peruvian Congressman even said that "armed hostilities within nations are expressions of deep political, social and cultural divides...result from the absence of legitimate democratic institutions to resolve political and social conflicts."¹¹² The wellbeing of Peru following the hostage crisis would have later implications for President Fujimori and his administration having survived the incident.

d) US Involvement in the Tupac Amaru Campaign

The United States from the beginning of the hostage crisis presented its loyalty to President Fujimori, but overall would stay uninvolved in the actions being taken to resolve the situation. The connections between Fujimori and the US was apparent from the beginning of the

¹⁰⁷ Panjabi, Rancee K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 122.

¹⁰⁸ Silverman, Helaine. "[Archaeology and the 1997 Peruvian Hostage Crisis](#)." *Anthropology Today*, no. 1 (1999), 13.

¹⁰⁹ Coletta Youngers and, Bill Spencer. "[After the Peruvian Crisis - Government Reform?](#)" *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb 07, 1997.

¹¹⁰ Panjabi, Rancee K.L. "Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party," 124.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 124.

¹¹² Canseco, Javier Diez. "The Peruvian Crucible: Reflections of a Hostage."

crisis as “Fujimori’s first public statement on the crisis consisted of a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton,” which ensured that he was taking care of the situation and would achieve a solution.”¹¹³ The US offered technical support for the military operation which was publicly turned down by Peruvian forces.¹¹⁴ President Clinton provided security advisors and the Delta Force hostage rescue team, who had experience with hostage negotiations, to assist in the Peruvian officials.¹¹⁵ US officials allowed for the Peru’s security forces to train within the United States during the four months of the crisis to prepare for the military assault.¹¹⁶ The US denied any involvement in the raid itself, as the US Defense Secretary said it “was entirely a Peruvian government operation.”¹¹⁷ Any other efforts of assistance or engagement from the US were rebuffed by President Fujimori who wanted to stay independent and maintain a reputation. President Fujimori would even visit Washington D.C. later in the crisis, around April, to see President Clinton and continue to ensure only “very narrow concessions” would be made.¹¹⁸ Following the military operations the US State Department Spokesman stated that the MRTA bears responsibility for the outcome and confirmed the US’s belief in the Peruvian government.¹¹⁹ Through the actions and support of the US government under President Bill Clinton, it was clear consideration was not going to be given to the demands and issues raised by the MRTA during the hostage crisis.

nCase 2: 2000 Anti-Fujimori

a) Peruvian Government

¹¹³ Panjabi, Rane K.L. “Terror at the Emperor’s Birthday Party,” 48.

¹¹⁴ Krauss, Clifford. "Peru Troops Rescue Hostages; Rebels Slain as Standoff Ends."

¹¹⁵ Candiotti, Susan Candiotti. "Peru Officially Silent on Hostage Crisis: Japan, Peru Hold Discussions." *CNN - World News*.

¹¹⁶ Jensen, Derrick. “Lessons from Peru,” 40.

¹¹⁷ Panjabi, Rane K.L. “Terror at the Emperor’s Birthday Party,” 128.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, 97.

¹¹⁹ Krauss, Clifford. "Peru Troops Rescue Hostages; Rebels Slain as Standoff Ends."

Implications for the 2000 Peruvian Presidential election began back in 1992 with actions by Fujimori in execution of an autogolpe, bringing him more political and military power. As a result of Fujimori's actions, "not only did the government suspend parts of the country's constitution and dissolve the congress, but it repressed opposition media and political leaders."¹²⁰ The 2000 election was prefaced by the 1995 Presidential election which resulted in many questionings the results and corruption within vote tabulation. Despite being endorsed by major observation groups the 1995 election brought a level of mistrust to 2000.¹²¹ Fujimori's reach of power continued throughout the decade as in 1996 "Fujimori's congressional majority passed a law permitting Fujimori to run for a third consecutive term."¹²² The US and many other international actors began to question and monitor the government of Fujimori in the latter half of the 1990s, culminating in a larger observational presence for the Presidential elections in 2000.

b) US Relationship with Fujimori's Peru at the end of the 20th Century

The United States maintained connections and relations formed in Fujimori's first term as president, continuing many into his second term. The economic relationship held in the Case resistance movement continued into the years proceeding this second case, as "the United States maintained extensive relations with the Peruvian government throughout the late 1990s. The United States by 1998 had an even larger measure of Peru's exports compared to the previously mentioned levels and maintained import levels."¹²³ The economic relationship between the two countries spanned further than traditional trade, as Peru was a frequent receiver of US aid. Particularly food aid, as Peru in the latter half of the 1990s received more food aid than years

¹²⁰ McClintock, Cynthia. *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a Critical Caveat on Democratic Standards*, 54.

¹²¹ Ibid, 59.

¹²² Ibid, 60.

¹²³ Ibid, 13.

prior and more than any other country in Latin America.¹²⁴ The military and security relations formulated between the two countries were maintained as the shared interest of preventing the narcotics trade was a priority for both countries.

A major discrepancy in the comparison of the countries' relationship between the two cases of civil resistance movements is the stance on human right issues in Peru. The United States became increasingly critical of the human rights situation within the country over the course of Fujimori's presidency, as "the tone of the U.S. Department of State became more critical over time."¹²⁵ The United States was taking action to create awareness of the human right violations as seen with initiatives like the US State Department Report on Human Rights in 1998 which was more critical than previous reports for Peru.¹²⁶ The issue and dialogue around human rights was just one caveat of the relationship between the United States and Peru, as for the Clinton administration, prior to the 2000 movement, "decided to try to maintain the U.S. partnership with Peru on free-market reform, security, and narcotics control despite the cost of lowering democratic standards for the country."¹²⁷

c) 2000 Anti-Fujimori: Campaign Summary

Following the unsuccessful resistance movement attempted by the MRTA, the President Fujimori continued as president of Peru into his second term. Objections to President Fujimori began prior to Peru's presidential elections set to be held in 2000, as Fujimori took steps alter the constitution and restrain Peru's judicial institutions to allow for him to run for a third term. The peak of protest against Fujimori and the 2000 Presidential elections was seen with the protest, March of the Four Suyos, that began on July 26, 2000 and would be identified as the start of the

¹²⁴ Ibid, 17.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 53.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 61.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 66.

Anti-Fujimori movement by the NAVCO dataset.¹²⁸ The movement would result in the resignation of President Fujimori following the protest and outcry against the corruption and unfair election led by the government. The objections to the Fujimori government began prior to the election, as the authoritarian efforts and control by the government in the decade prior continued after the defeat of the groups MRTA and the Sendero Luminoso.

In the years prior to the election, opposition to the Fujimori presidency was most prominently seen from students. As Fujimori had a major power grab years prior, his control additionally began in the early 1990s, because in 1992 “Mr. Fujimori suspended the legislature and judicial branches of government and declared himself in charge of an Emergency Government of National Reconstruction, he stationed troops on the campuses of several leading universities.”¹²⁹ These actions led to mobilization by students and a large volume of criticism calling the administration undemocratic.¹³⁰ Actions by Fujimori at this time also included stripping the media holdings of the political opposition, as the government controlled the majority of tv and newspaper holdings, intelligence surveillance, and even judicial pressures.¹³¹ Fujimori’s actions for control were just the beginning, “illegal legislative moves and ‘re-interpretations’ of the Constitution by the administration and Congress that will allow Mr. Fujimori to run for an unprecedented third term in 2000.”¹³²

The control and power grab by Fujimori continued into the election as he took action to limit the work of his opponents and even defy calls from the international community to delay

¹²⁸ Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis. 2013. *Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset*, v. 2.0. University of Denver.

¹²⁹ Chauvin, Lucien. “Students in Peru Channel Protests into a New National Party.” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 45, no. 42 (June 25, 1999), A55.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Adrian Karatnycky. "[The Americas: Don't Expect Fujimori's Foes to Play Dead.](#)" *Wall Street Journal*, Aug 04, 2000, Eastern edition.

¹³² Chauvin, Lucien. “Students in Peru Channel Protests into a New National Party,” A56.

the election.¹³³ Fujimori's actions against the candidates within the opposition parties were done with the aim "to discredit his opponents, so as to keep them on the defensive and prevent a groundswell of support."¹³⁴ Fujimori's work to hamper the progress of other candidates included methods like smear campaigns against the reputation and work of the opposition, utilizing corrupt methods and coercion to do so. Through assistance of one of Fujimori's top advisors, Vladimiro Montesinos, they were able to utilize payoffs and incentives to garner support in the election.¹³⁵ Fujimori would additionally attempt to bring light to issues he was successful on, which for the most part was only his work against the terrorist organizations and reducing violence within the country.

In the later months of 1999 and early months of 2000, the strategies of Fujimori worked well enough to hamper the progress of the opposition candidates. However, it was one candidate that was not targeted by the negative campaign strategies at the same level used against others, Alejandro Toledo, who was "able to capture a ground-swell of support" from the general populace.¹³⁶ Toledo developed into a viable candidate for the presidential election, especially because compared to Fujimori's Japanese ancestry Toledo's "Indian ancestry and distinctly Indian appearance give the charismatic Mr. Toledo broad appeal within Peru's Indian communities."¹³⁷ Despite efforts to discredit and negative portrayals of Toledo, he and others were able to turn it into a viable campaign with momentum for the election in April. Toledo was

¹³³ Clifford Krauss. "[As Protests Grow Violent, Peru Says Runoff Will Go On.](#)" *The New York Times: International*. May 26, 2000.

¹³⁴ Taylor, Lewis. "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Reeleccion' to Regime Collapse." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 70 (April 1, 2001), 5.

¹³⁵ Caceres Booth, Julia E. 2013. "[The Persistence of the Fujimori Legacy in Peru.](#)" University of British Columbia, Okanagan., 61.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 9.

¹³⁷ Adrian Karatnycky. "The Americas: Don't Expect Fujimori's Foes to Play Dead."

also able to structure the attacks against him to frame himself as the victim and get votes of sympathy.¹³⁸

Even prior to the first round of voting international observers were concerned with the legitimacy and fairness of the elections. The Carter Center and OAS had released reports prior to election that stated criticism on the overall process and campaigns being undemocratic.¹³⁹ The first round of elections occurred on April 9, 2000 despite many objections and criticism of corruption and undemocratic practices. The results of the election almost immediately caused suspicion and issues as different polling agencies were reporting a range of results, including many that put Toledo ahead of Fujimori; however, public suspicion didn't extensively occur until government owned news channels were not providing election analysis.¹⁴⁰ The National Office of Electoral Procedures for Peru had issues that resulted in resetting the system and announced results that inverted the figures previous reported by polling agencies.¹⁴¹ The released election results put Fujimori in the lead with over 48% and Toledo behind with 41%, with neither garnering more than 50% of the vote the presidential election would be determined by a runoff.¹⁴²

Objections to the election and accusations of fraud occurred almost immediately after the first round of elections. The reaction to the election would be both domestic and international, due to the prior established observers. Domestic protests began on the night of election, with a large-scale demonstration occurring in Lima that was led by Toledo marched upon the

¹³⁸ Taylor, Lewis. "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Reeleccion' to Regime Collapse." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 70 (April 1, 2001), 11.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 7.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 12.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 12.

¹⁴² Ibid, 12.

presidential palace.¹⁴³ While the street protests would grow in size, the international community became vocal with many raising objections to how the election occurred, so much so that criticism by US and UK ambassadors led to Lima's own diplomats to raise concern.¹⁴⁴ Despite attempts by Fujimori's government and security forces, the election outcomes were unable to get Fujimori to above 50% so a second round of the election was declared.

In the weeks following the first-round elections, details of election fraud continued to emerge and that opposition to the Fujimori administration and election officials remained and grew. Domestically and internationally there were calls to ensure that the second-round election would be fair and democratic. The demands from Toledo called for Fujimori to rid of negative campaign tactics, implement equal media coverage, hold presidential debate and to not use state resources.¹⁴⁵ Heading into the second election, international organizations and observers wanted to inspect the voting system, used in the previous election, to ensure it would be a fair count; an initiative that would require a delay of the election.¹⁴⁶ When this request was not fulfilled "the Organization of American States released a report [last week] saying, 'The Peruvian electoral process is far from one that could be considered free and fair.'"¹⁴⁷ Election officials would announce that the second round of elections would occur on May 28, 2000 therefore not allowing for election reforms or review to happen in time for the election.

When it became clear that Fujimori would not respect these requests nor change his negative campaign tactics, Toledo made the decision to withdrawal from the election.¹⁴⁸ Toledo

¹⁴³ Ibid, 12.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 17.

¹⁴⁶ Krauss, Clifford. "[Fujimori is Victor in Peru's Runoff as Protests Grow](#)." *New York Times*. May 29, 2000.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Taylor, Lewis. "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Reeleccion' to Regime Collapse." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 70 (April 1, 2001), 17.

explained his decision by stating “that he was not willing to lead his supporters into a fraudulent vote unless the election date was postponed several weeks to give international observers an opportunity to audit computer software designed to count ballots.”¹⁴⁹ Many members of the international community echoed and supported Toledo’s act of withdrawal, major countries like “the United States, France, Britain, Canada, Argentina and Costa Rica echoed his criticisms.”¹⁵⁰ As the criticisms grew Fujimori took steps to ensure legitimacy of the run-off election, creating the “Presidential Commission for the Strengthening of Democratic Institutions.”¹⁵¹ The election occurred despite the many vocal criticisms against it, Fujimori winning the majority of the votes and granted his third presidential term. The outcries against the election only escalated following the announced results, leading to the peak of protests and the beginning of what is considered the civil resistance movement.

The opposition to Fujimori’s electoral win began even before the end of voting, as demonstrators filled the streets in downtown Lima and various other cities.¹⁵² Toledo took advantage of this response by the people of Peru, organizing a national movement against the elections and calling for the “need to mobilize people across Peru peacefully.”¹⁵³ Toledo did as such and announced the March of Four Suyos to be held on the day of President Fujimori’s third inauguration, calling for individuals from across the country to come demonstrate in peaceful protest. Strategically Toledo planned for “peaceful protests and civic mobilization that he believes will convince the political, military and security backers of President Fujimori that he

¹⁴⁹ Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori is Victor in Peru's Runoff as Protests Grow."

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Taylor, Lewis. “Alberto Fujimori’s Peripeteia: From ‘Re-Reeleccion’ to Regime Collapse,” 18.

¹⁵² Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori is Victor in Peru's Runoff as Protests Grow."

¹⁵³ Ibid.

cannot govern effectively.”¹⁵⁴ From the date of the election to inauguration day, protests occurred throughout the country and continued to gain momentum.¹⁵⁵

Fujimori’s took extensive steps to prevent the protests, beginning with restrictions upon individuals traveling for the event and building up police presence. The initial days of the protests would result in violence between the opposing sides with fingers pointing both ways. As many felt “that Mr. Fujimori’s response, from ordering police to detonate tear-gas bombs to his phlegmatic rhetoric, indicates that the confrontational Fujimori is back.”¹⁵⁶ As Toledo, leading the March of the Four Suyos, felt that the Fujimori government planted individuals in the demonstrations to incite violence and stated “that the police also provoked acts of violence by using excessive force.”¹⁵⁷ Violence by the protest movement was documented with the throwing of rocks and sticks, bonfires, vandalism, and gasoline bombs.¹⁵⁸ The violence experienced in the protests was utilized by Fujimori to only try to discredit the movement and opposition further.¹⁵⁹ Following the protests around inauguration day, pressure by Toledo and the movement would continue, as described by a political analyst “people are outraged. The demonstrations will continue until Fujimori leaves office.”¹⁶⁰ On the day of the inauguration over a 100,000 people were documented in the protest.¹⁶¹ Pressure upon Fujimori following the inauguration was continued by many actors beside the protests movements, as domestic and international political figures continued their criticism.

¹⁵⁴ Adrian Karatnycky. "The Americas: Don't Expect Fujimori's Foes to Play Dead."

¹⁵⁵ Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori is Victor in Peru's Runoff as Protests Grow."

¹⁵⁶ Catherine Elton. "In Riot Aftermath, Peru Braces for Tough Tactics Arrests of Opposition Members could Follow After Six were Killed Friday in Lima." *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jul 31, 2000.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Krauss, Clifford. "[Fujimori Takes Oath as Protests Blanket Area in Smoke](#)." *New York Times*. July 29, 2000.

¹⁵⁹ "[La Marcha De Los Cuatro Suyos](#)." *Human Rights Watch*. April 17, 2015.

¹⁶⁰ Rachel Hays. “Peru's mass march - the upshot? some 300,000 marchers are set to protest this week against the July 28 inauguration of Fujimori.” *The Christian Science Monitor*, (July 26, 2000).

¹⁶¹ Krauss, Clifford. "[Tensions Build for Inauguration in Peru](#)." *New York Times*. July 28, 2000.

Members of Congress within Peru demonstrated their objections and protest against Fujimori beginning on the day of the inauguration. During President Fujimori's address on the day of the inauguration many members of Congress walked out in the middle of it and others wore gasmasks in protest.¹⁶² Those within government had growing opposition to Fujimori as more forms of corruption came to light. With many still demanding the democratic reforms requested during the electoral reviews, Fujimori worked to reduce the roles of those in government who continued to advocate for reforms.¹⁶³ The major corruption within the government came forth with the role of Vladimiro Montesino, leader of the National Intelligence Services and who previously worked for the CIA, who was exposed in his efforts to blackmail politicians in support of Fujimori.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, the largest revelation came with the exposure of Montesino's work to coordinate the military and intelligence services in rigging the election.¹⁶⁵ It would be shortly after these revelations that President Fujimori announced on July 20, 2000 his resignation to Congress during his trip to Tokyo.¹⁶⁶ The discovery of the many incidents of corruption, in addition to the already established protest movements against Fujimori, "undermined the government's legitimacy, producing a surge in opposition in 2000 that spelt the end of the regime."¹⁶⁷

In addition to the resignation issued by Fujimori, "the Peruvian Congress declared Fujimori morally unfit for office" and established an interim government.¹⁶⁸ During this transition, many were concerned over maintaining democracy due to the possible power vacuum

¹⁶² Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori Takes Oath as Protests Blanket Area in Smoke."

¹⁶³ Krauss, Clifford. "Tensions Build for Inauguration in Peru."

¹⁶⁴ Dickie, John. "[The People Triumph](#)." *The World Today*, (2001), 17.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Taylor, Lewis. "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru," 571.

¹⁶⁸ "[Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Americas - Peru](#)." *Human Rights Watch*. 2002.

that could occur. In the following year, new presidential elections were held with the civil resistance movement's leader, Alejandro Toledo, winning in the second run-off and investigations began into the corruption and human rights violations by the Fujimori administration.¹⁶⁹

d) US Involvement

President Clinton and United States officials most prominently supported the opposition movement executed by Alejandro Toledo in calls for a free and fair democratic election. The US vocalized its criticisms against the Fujimori administration following the objections by international organizations and the opposition candidate Toledo pulling out of the election. Following the requests and reluctance by Fujimori, the US issued criticism from various levels of government as the US Congress "passed a joint resolution calling for a review of all political, economic and military relations" and President Clinton had words of his own to offer.¹⁷⁰ President Clinton reemphasized the US commitment to democracy and the importance of it following Fujimori's decision not to delay the elections in order to implement reforms, stating "free, fair and open elections are the foundation of a democratic society. Without them, our relationship with Peru inevitably will be affected."¹⁷¹ Criticisms were also given by the US Ambassador to Peru in which he responded to the minimal effort by Fujimori stating, "cosmetic or superficial changes will not resolve the crisis of credibility."¹⁷² More than just harsh words were taken against Fujimori, as Congress took steps to withhold anti-drug money for Peru and promised to limit more if efforts for further democratization did not occur.¹⁷³ The symbolic

¹⁶⁹ "Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Americas - Peru." *Human Rights Watch*. 2002.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori is Victor in Peru's Runoff as Protests Grow."

¹⁷² Krauss, Clifford. "Tensions Build for Inauguration in Peru."

¹⁷³ "[The Americas: On the Edge](#)." 2000. *The Economist*, 36.

actions were represented through the decisions that “delayed delivery of \$42 million in foreign aid and excluded Peru from a recent \$1.3 billion antinarcotics package that primarily helps Colombia, but also Ecuador and Bolivia.”¹⁷⁴

The extent of impact by the actions and criticisms coming from the US were minimal, as Fujimori himself only made symbolic changes in attempts of appeasement and made little efforts to make structural democratic change. President Fujimori recognized what stake the United States had in Peru and their collaborative anti-narcotic efforts, because of this Fujimori believed the US wouldn't take harsh actions and welcomed continued investment.¹⁷⁵ Due to the multiple objectives held by the Clinton administration “United States policy makers also [found] themselves in a quandary, wanting to encourage free elections but also to support a government that has been a strong ally against terrorism and drug Trafficking.”¹⁷⁶ In addition to the caveat regarding anti-narcotics collaboration, the US needed to consider leadership alternatives for Peru, as they were advocating for free and fair elections, but never necessarily for the removal of Fujimori as president. The US supported Toledo and the opposition movement's demands for a democratic election and government, but it was reported that the US held “that the leadership of the opposition is too erratic to govern.”¹⁷⁷ Nonetheless the held concern by the US in the possibility of Fujimori or another leader creating a more authoritarian government and society, a familiar pattern within the region.¹⁷⁸ The United States remained involved and aware following the inauguration, but objectively did little to support the collapse and resignation of the Fujimori administration besides the previously stated pressure.

¹⁷⁴ Krauss, Clifford. "Tensions Build for Inauguration in Peru."

¹⁷⁵ Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori is Victor in Peru's Runoff as Protests Grow."

¹⁷⁶ Krauss, Clifford. "[Peru's Message: Not Class War, but Stability vs. Democracy](#)." *New York Times*. May 30, 2000.

¹⁷⁷ Krauss, Clifford. "Fujimori Takes Oath as Protests Blanket Area in Smoke."

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

Comparison of the Peruvian Cases

The two cases of civil resistance movements in Peru, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) Insurgency and the Anti-Fujimori Movement, occurred under the context of Peru having an extensive relationship with the United States. Peru, under the definition created utilizing the data from David Lake's Hierarchy, had an extensive relationship with the US both economically and security wise in the years of 1996 and 2000. In the time between the two noted civil resistance movements the economic and security relationship between the two countries grew larger as the hierarchy levels for Peru were actually higher in 2000. The relationship between the countries during both years can be justified due to the connections created throughout the Fujimori administration, as during this period Fujimori opened Peru up to more foreign investment and foreign support through anti-terrorism and anti-narcotic initiatives.

The consistencies of the time period for the two civil resistance movements includes the fact that the administrations for both Peru and the US were the same between the years of 1996 and 2000. As Peru's president was Alberto Fujimori from 1990 until 2000 and Bill Clinton was the President of the United States 1993 to 2001. The relationship for the two countries was therefore the relationship between the same individuals, so details about the movements themselves impacted the leaders – particularly President Clinton – to result in different decisions made between the two movements.

The MRTA and the Anti-Fujimori established different objectives in the demands of their movements, but overall both were against violations and atrocities committed by the Fujimori administration. The MRTA, despite having different methods of execution and foundational ideology, issued demands that brought attention and international awareness to the human rights violations and economic inequality occurring in the country. The MRTA established itself as Marxist organization willing to use violence to execute its objectives, therefore applicable to the

hostage situation, leading observers to assume that violent methods were an option for the resistance movement.

The United States was aware of both issues that the MRTA was attempting to address – human rights and economic inequality – as the State Department reportedly previously on the status of human right within the country and was providing economic aid to the country. The distinguishable factor of the MRTA resistance movement was the fact that the group was previously identified as a terrorist organization based on their ideology and methods of attacks. Understandably the US did not support the demands of such a group, as the group’s identifiable characteristics took it out of consideration for US support from the very beginning. The significance of the MRTA resistance movement is that the US disregarded any discussion of the human rights despite its awareness of what the Fujimori administration was doing at the time. US officials and President Clinton even offered support for military raids to end the hostage situation, despite countries like Japan encouraging negotiations between the two sides which would have allowed for issues of human rights to be addressed.

The actions by the US and the Clinton Administration were representative of the time period and their relationship with Fujimori.

The tone of U.S. Ambassador Alvin Adams, who served in Peru between 1993 and 1996, seemed indicative of the overall U.S. position: brief, mild criticism of the government's human rights performance amidst detailed praise for the Fujimori government's advances on free- market reforms, national security, and narcotics control.¹⁷⁹

The Clinton administration criticized the status of human rights within the Peru prior to the movement in 1996, demonstrating its concern for the issue. As in 1993, following the autogolpe in Peru which faced criticism, the Clinton administration previously conditioned funding to Peru based on improvements to the human rights situation, only later to decide to still provide the

¹⁷⁹ McClintock, Cynthia. *The United States and Peru in the 1990s: Cooperation with a Critical Caveat on Democratic Standards*, 60.

funding and be followed by increases in later years.¹⁸⁰ Therefore despite the United States' previously demonstrated vocal commitment to human rights, the Clinton Administration did not take action to an extent past threats to funding nor utilized the MRTA hostage situation to create discussion around the issues with international attention upon it.

The second resistance movement, although addressing similar issues, is very distinct from the MRTA movement especially as the movement was led by an established opposition politician. The United States is considered to have intervened in support of the Anti-Fujimori movement, the forms of intervention being vocal criticism and withholding financial funding. The United States and its officials while critical of the action of President Fujimori in 2000, the intervention was never extensive enough to jeopardize the relationship between the countries. The action that was taken by the Clinton administration, specifically around maintaining a free and fair democratic election, was more extensive comparatively than the 1996 MRTA resistance movement.

The context of the resistance movement was more encouraging for the United States to vocalize criticism as the opposition was demanding clear and measurable reforms for the election based on the requirements issued by international observers for a fair election. The context of the opposition movement additionally was only focused on establishing a fair, democratic election and not on the removal of Fujimori, for this reason the US could support democratic values while maintaining an established relationship with a world leader. Toledo when leading the March of the Four Suyos, took steps to communicate that the protest would be committed to a nonviolent demonstration; despite later escalation and violence during the protests. The Anti-Fujimori movement established a more grass-root movement, beginning in part from student initiatives in criticisms of the regime.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 58.

While the US did support and echo the demands put forth by Toledo and the resistance movement, the intervention did not span further than harsh words and threat of withholding financial funding. The extent of intervention feeds into the actions or lack thereof taken by the US against the Fujimori administration beginning prior to the first movement in 1996. The United States and Clinton administration took steps to maintain its relationship with the Fujimori administration and Peru within their anti-narcotics collaboration. Arguably due to this extensive relationship shared with Peru, the United States avoided taking actions to protect values it has previously prioritize or take limited action in cases of intervention.

BOLIVIA

Case 3: 1978 Anti-Junta

a) Bolivian Government

Bolivia was under the leadership of President Hugo Banzer Suarez at the beginning of the civil resistance movement against the military rule in 1976. Banzer Suarez came to power in a military coup in 1971 in which him and two other officers ousted the left-wing government of Juan Jose Torres.¹⁸¹ Banzer Suarez's, military authoritarian control of government created a norm for Bolivia in its last year of struggle to follow, as military leaders felt government operations were not executed properly and were compelled to seize power. This is compared to the previous century the norms were a constitutional government.¹⁸² The military rule of Banzer Suarez was the longest and most successful dictatorship for Bolivia.¹⁸³ Banzer Suarez successfully consolidated his rule and those below him, including government officials and

¹⁸¹ Associated Press. "[Bolivia Chief Quits after Brief Revolt: Junta Takes Over.](#)" *New York Times*. July 22, 1978.

¹⁸² Whitehead, Laurence. 1981. "[Bolivia's Failed Democratization of 1977-1980.](#)" *Latin American Program. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, 2.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, 7.

armed forces, through efforts of “militarization” of the government.¹⁸⁴ Throughout his time as president Banzer Suarez took steps to limit opposition, as he “outlawed representative organizations, sending the political parties into recess, replacing elected labor leaders with government-appointed coordinators.”¹⁸⁵ Additionally, Banzer Suarez banned labor union activity, which historically was a point of mobilization, and closed universities to prevent student revolutions.¹⁸⁶ The government became increasingly authoritarian under Banzer Suarez, in his early years of power he legally took steps to outlaw strikes, adding to the already curtailed union activity and limit political party through their suspension and jailing of leaders.¹⁸⁷

The Bolivia was fully identified as an authoritarian military government under the leadership of Banzer Suarez yet was considered more stable than most of the countries in the region.¹⁸⁸ Despite Banzer Suarez’s best efforts to restrict opposition, growing criticisms and calls for democratization occurred; therefore, Banzer Suarez took steps to follow constitutional restrictions. The constitutions limit presidential terms to six years so rather than violating the rule, Banzer Suarez declared the start of his presidential term to be in 1974 instead of the actual 1971 start date.¹⁸⁹ Banzer Suarez, after a few years in power, worked to establish democratization and commit the country to presidential elections, declaring in November 1977 for presidential elections to be held in July 1978, returning the country to a constitutional democracy.¹⁹⁰ One of Banzer Suarez’s Generals described his period of power as “six years of

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 8.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 9.

¹⁸⁶ McGrath, Elena. "[Housewives Against Dictatorship: The Bolivian Hunger Strike of 1978.](#)" *Nursing Clio*. December 30, 2016.

¹⁸⁷ De Onis, Juan. "[Bolivia, 5 Years Under Military, Takes a Step Toward Modernity.](#)" *New York Times*. December 16, 1976.

¹⁸⁸ Bolivia is identified as having a Polity Score of below a -6 and therefore is considered an autocracy. Marshall, Monty G. "[Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Bolivia.](#)" *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*, June 5, 2014.

¹⁸⁹ Whitehead, Laurence. 1981. “Bolivia's Failed Democratization of 1977-1980,” 9.

¹⁹⁰ "[Bolivian Leader Pledges Free Elections for 1978.](#)" *New York Times*. November 10, 1977.

nation-building.” Bolivia’s time as a military authoritarian government under Hugo Banzer Suarez would open the door to military leaders during the next decade.

b) US Relationship with Bolivia’s Military Regimes

Examining the data, the US relationship with Bolivia is considered extensive in the context of the security hierarchy data, in which the level documented in 1978 is a high level. The economic hierarchy level between the US and Bolivia is not at a significant level, but it is of note that it was at a level of significance during the 1960s. The US interest and involvements in Bolivia were present prior to the resistance movements of the 1970s and 1980s. The United States had interests in Latin America overall throughout various US presidencies and particularly during the third wave of democratization within the region. The actions taken by the US government during this time period are because of “Bolivia's strategic location in the heart of South America made it a top U.S. priority, particularly in the 1970's.”¹⁹¹ During the 1970s, Bolivia was led by President Hugo Banzer Suarez who took over the government through a military seizure of power in 1971. The US government denied their involvement in the seizure of power from the previous government that had control.¹⁹² Although many noted connections between the US and Banzer Suarez , as Banzer Suarez attended the United States Army's School of the Americas and trained in Texas.¹⁹³ The United States had “propped up Banzer Suarez with extensive military and economic aid in amounts far surpassing those logically dictated by the country's size.”¹⁹⁴ The United States maintained its presence in Bolivia due to its overall interests in the region with the growing left-wing revolutions happening in Latin America.

¹⁹¹ Katzin, Donna. "[Alliance for Power: U.S. Aid to Bolivia Under Banzer.](#)" *NACLA*. September 25, 2007.

¹⁹² "[U.S. Denies Bolivia Role.](#)" *New York Times*. August 30, 1971.

¹⁹³ Associated Press. "[Hugo Banzer, 75, Ex-Dictator; Guided Bolivia to Democracy.](#)" *New York Times*. May 06, 2002.

¹⁹⁴ Katzin, Donna. "Alliance for Power: U.S. Aid to Bolivia Under Banzer."

Due to the presented interests, the United States took steps to provide military support and funding in the early 1970s. At the turn of the decade, funding numbers show that the US significantly increased its military aid to Bolivia under the classification of military assistance and international military education and training.¹⁹⁵ Despite the military assistance provided to support US interests in the region, the relationship between the two countries wasn't strong, "Bolivia forced changes in U.S. policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s by nationalizing the holdings of a key U.S. company, Gulf Oil, and by expelling the U.S. Peace Corps."¹⁹⁶ Bolivia held negative sentiments towards the US, but the government also realized the benefits of the US's support and monetary aid.

c) Bolivia Anti-Junta: Campaign Summary

Protests against the Bolivian military rule and the military junta period began in 1976 with the organizing of many miner unions in protest against President General Banzer Suarez. Banzer Suarez maintained military rule from when he first seized power in a military coup back in 1971. Negative sentiments and criticisms against the Banzer Suarez regime began back with the establishment of his military junta; however, the identified civil resistance movement began June 9, 1976 as a result of a declaration of a state of siege. The emergency declaration was a response by the Banzer Suarez government due to the widespread strikes and student protests that occurred in the days prior.¹⁹⁷ The protests began following the government's decision to not "permit the body of Gen Juan Jose Torres, a former left-wing Bolivian President who was assassinated [the previous week] in Buenos Aires, to be returned to Bolivia."¹⁹⁸ Based on

¹⁹⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), [U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2017](#), (December 19, 2018), distributed by DATA.GOV.

¹⁹⁶ Siekmeier, James F. *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011.

¹⁹⁷ "[Bolivia Declares State of Siege to Balk Widespread Unrest](#)." *New York Times*. June 10, 1976.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

government orders army forces occupied six state-run mines and arrested union leaders, including the director of the Federation of Mine Workers, and student federation leaders.¹⁹⁹ In the week following the declaration 50,000 Bolivian miners went on strike to demand the removal of army forces and the freeing of union leaders.²⁰⁰ More and more strikes and protests would be implemented in show of support of the miners, including: students, factory workers, and bankers.²⁰¹ The state-of-siege declaration would begin a long period of civil resistance against the Banzer Suarez military authoritarian government and the military juntas to follow.

The government attempted negotiations with the strikers due to the economic impact, as the mines are state owned and their top export; however, their response to the strike with armed forces led to many clashes between the two sides and a growing number of arrests and deaths.²⁰² The popular resistance movement was exacerbated in 1977 and 1978 with the involvement of four women, wives of captured miners, who began a hunger strike to bring more attention to the demands of the strikers.²⁰³ The women were described as “sophisticated political activists who used their status as mothers and wives to cast personal experiences of oppression as universal pleas for political reform.”²⁰⁴ The women hoped to bring attention not only to the mines and captured union leaders, but to the economic policies hurting communities and violent response of the government.²⁰⁵ Support for the hunger strikers ranged domestically, the Catholic church, to internationally, the US Carter administration, leading to the release of the resistance leaders and

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ "[50,000 Tin Miners On Strike in Bolivia](#)." *New York Times*. June 15, 1976.

²⁰¹ "[Bolivia is Seeking to Defuse Strike](#)." *New York Times*. June 28, 1976.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ McGrath, Elena. "[Housewives Against Dictatorship: The Bolivian Hunger Strike of 1978](#)." *Nursing Clio*. December 30, 2016.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

recognition of the unions.²⁰⁶ The work of the hunger strikers led to the creation of the Housewives Committee, who collaborated with the Union of Bolivian Women (UMBO) and Bolivia's Permanent Assembly of Human Rights (APDH).²⁰⁷

President General Banzer Suarez in response to the protests and growing pressure announced that elections would be held in 1978 to allow for once again a constitutional democracy.²⁰⁸ Arguably of more significance was the government's announcement of the legalization of political parties, once again allowing Bolivians to be politically active. Banzer Suarez viewed the elections as opportunity to "constitutionalize" his rule, as he would later announce his candidacy and saw the election as a feasible win.²⁰⁹ The decision to allow democratization would be one of the most significant impacts on Banzer Suarez's control, as the political process gained momentum his influence faded. However, Banzer Suarez announced his resignation on July 22, 1978, transferring power to the senior generals of the armed forces and therefore designating General Juan Pereda as the government's candidate in the presidential elections to be held in July.²¹⁰ Once July elections results started to show the former President, Siles Zuazo, winning the majority of the votes the armed forces took action to militarily takeover and establish Pereda as the winner.²¹¹ Zuazo went into hiding as a result of the military takeover but still encouraged support for the strikes by unions against the junta.²¹²

²⁰⁶ Phalen, Anthony. "[Bolivian tin miners' wives fast, win amnesty, jobs, freedom, 1977-1978.](#)" *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. November 11, 2009.

²⁰⁷ McGrath, Elena. "Housewives Against Dictatorship: The Bolivian Hunger Strike of 1978."

²⁰⁸ "Bolivian Leader Pledges Free Elections for 1978." *New York Times*.

²⁰⁹ Whitehead, Laurence. 1981. "Bolivia's Failed Democratization of 1977-1980," 10.

²¹⁰ The Associated Press. "Bolivia Chief Quits After Brief Revolt; Junta Takes Over."

²¹¹ Zunes, S., 2018. The Role of Civil Resistance in Bolivia's 1977-1982 Pro-Democracy Struggle. *Middle Atlantic Review of Latin American Studies*, 2(1), 55.

²¹² "[Workers in Bolivia Said to Resist Coup.](#)" *New York Times*, July 21, 1980.

Following the military power grab the popular nonviolent resistance movement responded with a strike by mineworkers that lasted 48 hours.²¹³ The Pereda regime reacted with repressive measures against the movement and jailed many of the leaders; however, the resistance movement was able to get the regime to concede on ending Banzer Suarez restrictions on civil liberties and press freedoms.²¹⁴ Although further protests were planned, the Pereda military government was overthrown in 1978 by General Padilla and elections were planned to be held “in 1979 and 1980, but no presidential candidate won a majority of the popular vote and parliament chose to elect an interim president until new elections could be held within a year.”²¹⁵ The July 1979 election resulted in a tie between the candidates and resulted in Congress selecting a Senator, Walter Guevara, as the interim president.²¹⁶ Shortly after in November 1979, the government was once again overtaken by the military with the seizure of power by General Alberto Natusch Busch. Despite only just taking power, Natusch Busch attempted extensive measures to keep power including declaring Congress illegal and killing over 300 activists in two weeks.²¹⁷ Extensive general strikes were executed across the country against Natusch Busch, with the leader of the mine workers union stating, “the strike would continue indefinitely ‘until democratic processes are restored.’” Natusch Busch stepped down following only sixteen days in power to which Congress then stepped in to place Lidia Gueiler as President.

The popular resistance movement continued under the presidency of Gueiler taking substantial measures that “created a mobilizing force that constituted the largest and most radical

²¹³ Zunes, S., 2018. The Role of Civil Resistance in Bolivia’s 1977-1982 Pro-Democracy Struggle. *Middle Atlantic Review of Latin American Studies*, 2(1), 55.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 55.

²¹⁵ Kim, Rosanna. "[Bolivians Successfully Oust Military Regime, 1982.](#)" *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. September 23, 2012.

²¹⁶ Zunes, S., 2018, 55.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 55.

rural campaign since the 1952 revolution.”²¹⁸ The strikes were so successful that on December 10 they were able to shut down the country, leading to the government to call for an election July 1980. On July 17, 1980 armed forces led by General Luis Garcia Meza took over the government forcing Gueiler to resign, give power to the junta, and disband Congress.²¹⁹ Popular organizations and political groups, very shortly after the power seize by Garcia Meza, met to plan a response. Garcia Meza decided to attack the meeting location of the movement leaders, killing two individuals, demonstrating “that he saw organized popular resistance rather than established political institutions as the greatest potential impediment to his seizure of power.”²²⁰ Nonviolent resistance would once again lead a military regime out of power, General Garcia Meza, and in September of 1981 General Celso Torrelio took over as de facto president. Worker unions continued to organize and strike under the Torrelio regime, demanding recognition and negotiation. “Torrelio increasingly lost control as a result of a resurgent civil society.”²²¹ A major string of protests continued strikes and marches by unions and students building up into October to have the military regime under Meza step down on October 5, 1982 and hand power over to the civilian elected government of Hernan Siles Zuazo.²²²

d) US Involvement

The United States used constant methods of intervention throughout the period of military juntas and civil resistance. From the time prior to the civil resistance movement against Banzer Suarez, the United States communicated to Banzer Suarez the need to have democratic elections. The form of encouragement utilized by President Carter at the time was so much so

²¹⁸ Ibid, 56.

²¹⁹ Bonner, Ray. "[Military Chiefs Seize Power in Bolivia](#)." *The Washington Post*. July 18, 1980.

²²⁰ Zunes, S., 2018, 57.

²²¹ Kim, Rosanna. "Bolivians Successfully Oust Military Regime, 1982."

²²² Zunes, S., 2018, 60.

that Banzer Suarez described the pressure against his regime and the need to make changes.²²³ Once the strikes against the Banzer Suarez regime began, the resistance movement was effective in getting the attention of the international community through the use of hunger strikes, leading to the Carter administration to put pressure to have the demands of the strikers met.²²⁴ The resistance movement successfully got the scheduling elections, only to have military coups later ensue; however, the United States maintained the support for democratic elections that it previously communicated during the Banzer Suarez administration. The United States and the Carter Administration demonstrated its support for and encouragement of democracy during this period through economic assistance, an amount of \$200 million in 1980.²²⁵

Despite the support from the United States for democratization, it was made clear that the US's lack of support for the military coups were not preventing them from occurring. Following the seizure of power by General Natusch Busch "the United States announced Friday that it was cutting off \$27.5 million in military and economic assistance to Bolivia because of the takeover."²²⁶ The pressure from the United States in addition to the civil resistance movement led to the regime of Natusch Busch to be short lived and lead to another appointed leader to democratically rule until once again overthrown. The United States took extensive steps of intervention and vocal criticism following General Luis García Meza overthrowing President Gueiler, who was put into office by Congress, and prevented the scheduled democratic elections. In response to such a development, the United States recalled its ambassador to Peru and military aid to the country was cut off.²²⁷ The recalling of an ambassador is a "gesture of protest" used by

²²³ Mitchell, Christopher. "The New Authoritarianism in Bolivia." *Current History* 80 (February 1, 1981), 75.

²²⁴ Phalen, Anthony. "Bolivian tin miners' wives fast, win amnesty, jobs, freedom, 1977-1978."

²²⁵ Bonner, Ray. "[Military Chiefs Seize Power in Bolivia](#)." *The Washington Post*. July 18, 1980.

²²⁶ De Onis, Juan. "Bolivia, 5 Years Under Military, Takes a Step Toward Modernity."

²²⁷ DeYoung, Karen. "[U.S. Ambassador Recalled, Aid Cut In Bolivian Coup](#)." *The Washington Post*. July 19, 1980.

the United States at some frequency, in this case being Ambassador Marvin Weissman.²²⁸ At this time the Carter's Administration was quick to express extreme disapproval in attempt to "demonstrate the Carter Administration commitment to democratic change in the hemisphere and break the longstanding U.S. image of support for military dictatorships."²²⁹

While the military coups were ongoing in Peru, as General García Meza gave power to General Torrelio in 1981, the United States had its own presidential transition in 1981 with President Reagan taking over for President Carter. President Reagan would continue the pressure against the regime and would contribute to its demise, despite hopes by the regime for support for the new US presidential administration.²³⁰ The US and other members of the international community, including the IMF, were not willing to take steps of recognition for the Torrelio regime.²³¹ With the new administration in place for Peru, the United States continued to advocate for democratization becoming an "active player in promoting Bolivia's transition from authoritarian to formal democratic rule."²³² Torrelio responded favorably to the pressure coming from the US and the civil resistance movements taking steps to plan for democratization by agreeing to hand over power back to a civilian government.²³³

The United States remained vocal and active in standing up against the military coups occurring against Bolivia's democratization during this long period of back and forth. "The U.S. government has supported the efforts of this coup-prone, land-locked country of 5 million people to break out of the pattern of right-wing military rule that has dominated lower South America

²²⁸"Workers in Bolivia Said to Resist Coup." *New York Times*.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Zunes, S., 2018, 58.

²³¹ Zunes, S., 2018, 59.

²³² Kim, Rosanna. "Bolivians Successfully Oust Military Regime, 1982."

²³³ Ibid.

for most of this decade.”²³⁴ Through its utilization of intervention methods, including vocal criticisms and financial pressure, the Carter and Reagan administrations continued the support of the “United States model of democracy” in Bolivia and Latin America.²³⁵

Case 4: 1984 Anti-Siles Zuazo

a) Bolivian Government

Hernan Siles Zuazo took over the government of Bolivia in 1982 and would be the first democratic presidency for Bolivia after a long period of turmoil. His second time in elected office, Siles Zuazo returned to elected office under a loose electoral coalition with the Unión Democrática y Popular (UDP). Siles Zuazo came into power following this period but additionally under a “deteriorating economic stability.”²³⁶ In the early years of presidency, Siles Zuazo faced economic issues that developed as a result of the following period but by 1984 the country “was facing rapid declines in production in the mines and in agriculture, drought, food shortages, skyrocketing external debt, a devaluation of the peso, and the sixth highest inflation rate in world history.”²³⁷ Siles Zuazo, as president, took steps to try and attempt to address the economic conditions facing the country with the execution of “New Economic Policy” which had three main objectives: “1) market liberalization and price decontrol; 2) the opening of the economy to foreign trade and investment; 3) the liberalization of the labor market.”²³⁸ The economic issues facing Bolivia were only exacerbated when “the institutions of finance capital

²³⁴ Bonner, Ray. "[Military Chiefs Seize Power in Bolivia](#)." *The Washington Post*. July 18, 1980.

²³⁵ Valdivia, Fernando. "[The United States and Bolivia](#)." *New York Times*, October 10, 1980.

²³⁶ Burke, Melvin, "Bolivia: The Politics of Cocaine" (1991). *School of Economics Faculty Scholarship*, 65.

²³⁷ Krain, Matthew, and Begoña Toral Alemañ. "Hunger for Power and Order: Nonviolent Direct Action by a Bolivian Leader, 1956 and 1984." *The Latin Americanist* 51, no. 1 (2007): 74.

²³⁸ Rene Antonio Mayorga. "Bolivia's Silent Revolution." *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 1 (1997), 146.

restricted the flow of credit and began to impose highly exigent terms both for debt repayment and for the disbursement of further funds.”²³⁹

Politically in 1984, President Siles Zuazo faced difficulties due to the fact that his party lacked congressional majority, differing from when he previously was president.²⁴⁰ During the time of his presidency, political control was also threatened by the presence and force of Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), a political party, because “under the leadership of the Juan Lechín, became the principal political instrument of the labor movement.”²⁴¹ The labor organizations continued their historical prominence and influence, as “most Bolivians are low-income subsistence farmers, miners, small-scale traders, and manual laborers,” upon the Siles Zuazo presidency.²⁴² Siles Zuazo invited COB to be in a co-government following his election and gave shared power to the COB, a labor union political party, creating a center-left coalition between COB and UDP. The opposition and veto power of the COB made “the Siles Zuazo government appeared to be a mere tool of the COB. The government may have enjoyed all formal decision-making power, but real political power already lay with the union.”²⁴³ Bolivia and Siles Zuazo overcame many hardships in returning to a democratically elected regime, but the demands against Bolivia and its new administration had economic and social matters needed to be addressed.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ Dunkerley, James, and Morales, Rolando. “[The Crisis in Bolivia](#).” *New Left Review*, no. 155 (1986), 96.

²⁴⁰ Krain, Matthew, and Begoña Toral Alemañ. “Hunger for Power and Order: Nonviolent Direct Action by a Bolivian Leader, 1956 and 1984,” 76.

²⁴¹ Petras, James, and Veltmeyer, Henry. *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador*. London: Pluto Press, 2005. ProQuest Ebook Central.

²⁴² O'Neill, Blaine. “[Bolivian Workers Overthrow President, 1983-1985](#).” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. December 10, 2010.

²⁴³ Rojo, Enrique Ibáñez. “The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982–1985).” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 1 (2000): 175–205.

²⁴⁴ Burke, Melvin, “Bolivia: The Politics of Cocaine” (1991). *School of Economics Faculty Scholarship*, 65.

b) US Relationship with Bolivia's Last Military Regime

In consideration of the US hierarchy data, similar to the previous civil resistance movement, Bolivia in 1984 only had an extensive relationship in the context of security relationship. Within the documentation of US foreign aid, there is lack of data for military aid to Bolivia during the years of 1981 to 1984; however, economic aid continues during those years, including the programs under narcotics control.²⁴⁵ In addition to foreign aid, the United States' relationship with Bolivia is a continuation of the previously examined civil resistance movement, as the support provided by the US assisted in bringing Siles Zuazo to power. The United States and the Reagan administration continued their interest, due to their previous efforts, in ensuring Bolivia remains democratic. The US previously suspended all military and foreign aid as a point of objection to the various military regimes and coup that occurred during the previous decade. The election of Siles Zuazo shifted US policy, as it fulfilled US's demand for a democratically elected president for Bolivia, and therefore leading to the reestablishment of aid, "\$230 million, including \$7 million for the military and \$5 million for drug enforcement."²⁴⁶ The \$5 million was agreed upon between the two governments as a part of the anti-drug-trafficking program.²⁴⁷

Additionally, as established previously, the US maintained interest in the anti-narcotics in the region, including the cocaine production occurring in Bolivia. At the time, "Washington apparently [saw] the elected Government as its main hope of combating Bolivia's large-scale cocaine trafficking."²⁴⁸ The Reagan administration and other US senators executed pressure against the Siles Zuazo administration by making aide contingent on addressing the drug trade

²⁴⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), [U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2017](#), (December 19, 2018), distributed by DATA.GOV.

²⁴⁶ Simons, Marlise. "[Leftists Pose Little Threat to Bolivia's Government](#)." *New York Times*. August 12, 1984.

²⁴⁷ Simons, Marlise. "[Bolivian Plot Embarrasses the U.S.](#)" *New York Times*. July 17, 1984.

²⁴⁸ Simons, Marlise. "[Leftists Pose Little Threat to Bolivia's Government](#)." *New York Times*. August 12, 1984.

within Bolivia.²⁴⁹ US interests within Bolivia were therefore limited to anti-narcotics initiatives in the early 1980s and did not span much further into domestic politics of the state as seen in the years prior.

c) Anti-Siles Zuazo 1984: Campaign Summary

The civil resistance movement against President Hernan Siles Zuazo is noted to have begun on April 10, 1984. The movement began in response to economic measures taken by President Siles Zuazo to deal with the issues facing Bolivia at the time. “In the face of hyperinflation and a deteriorating economy, the Siles Zuazo administration tried unsuccessfully to implement economic stabilization packages eight separate times.”²⁵⁰ The power of the COB upon the Siles Zuazo administration repeatedly presented itself as “the COB used its power during 1983 to veto the government's attempts to introduce policies of economic austerity.”²⁵¹ President Siles Zuazo continued to work to an economic solution, as the situation was ongoing and deteriorating for the country, despite significant demands from the COB and unions for improved plans. On April 8, 1984 President Siles Zuazo announced a “package of emergency economic measures including devaluations, increases in prices and public utility rates and a reduction in the fiscal deficit.” It would be the following week in April that the labor unions announced a national strike in response to the presented policy, in which the unions described as “antipeople and antiworker economic policies.”²⁵²

In response to the multi-day strikes, the government and labor unions agreed to sit down for negotiations in May and resulted in the demands of the unions met with the temporary

²⁴⁹ O'Neill, Blaine. "Bolivian Workers Overthrow President, 1983-1985."

²⁵⁰ Krain, Matthew, and Begoña Toral Alemañ. "Hunger for Power and Order: Nonviolent Direct Action by a Bolivian Leader, 1956 and 1984," 78.

²⁵¹ Rojo, Enrique Ibáñez. "The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982–1985)," 188.

²⁵² UPI. "[Bolivia Workers Strike O A P.](#)" *New York Times*. April 15, 1984.

suspension of debt payments and wage increases.²⁵³ An action of this kind, by the Siles Zuazo administration was viewed as necessary, ceasing debt payments, in order to maintain “internal state operations.”²⁵⁴ The scenario of proposed policies, strike, and agreement was repeated in November 1984 and later placed the survival of the government in doubt.²⁵⁵ This was due to the fact that “each time, large-scale protests by labor forced the government to back down.”²⁵⁶ Prior to the May agreement between the two sides, the unions were able to execute extensive strikes, including bank employees, blocking streets and bring the industrial and financial sectors of the country to a halt.²⁵⁷ The exchange between the two sides, the Siles Zuazo administration and the labor unions went back and forth over the next year, each using various methods to bring attention to its side. “Ultimately, when the financially strapped government was unable and unwilling to grant wage increases to keep ahead of the accelerating inflation, organized labor turned bitterly against the government.”²⁵⁸

President Siles Zuazo took many steps to appease the protests but given the strength of the unions and influence of the COB in government, it proved to be quite difficult. Siles Zuazo made attempts to appease the protesters in addition to the agreements made, “a 40 percent reduction in taxes, a 30 percent raise in mine workers’ salaries, and the implementation of forced price reductions on basic necessities.”²⁵⁹ However, COB and unions’ nonviolent resistance strategies were effective, involving members from across society: “public sector employees,

²⁵³ "[Bolivia Faces New Pressures](#)." *New York Times*. June 11, 1984.

²⁵⁴ Dunkerley, James, and Morales, Rolando. “The Crisis in Bolivia,” 90.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 103.

²⁵⁶ Krain, Matthew, and Begoña Toral Alemañ. "Hunger for Power and Order: Nonviolent Direct Action by a Bolivian Leader, 1956 and 1984," 78.

²⁵⁷ "[Bolivia Faces New Pressures](#)." *New York Times*.

²⁵⁸ Morales, Juan Antonio, and Sachs, Jeffrey D. "[Bolivia’s Economic Crisis](#)." Cambridge, Mass., USA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.

²⁵⁹ Krain, Matthew, and Begoña Toral Alemañ. "Hunger for Power and Order," 78.

schoolteachers, industrial and oil workers, along with nearly all the local mining unions.”²⁶⁰ The movement’s methods “full repertoire of collective action (road-blocks, violent marches, occupation of offices and plants, sabotage, hunger strikes, etc.),” impacting the country economically, socially, and politically.²⁶¹ The movement and the various labor unions called for Siles Zuazo’s resignation, a call that continued even after a failed military coup attempt. On June 30, 1984, General Cayoja kidnapped President Siles Zuazo in a failed power grab.²⁶²

President Siles Zuazo resorted to more extreme measures to gain support for his policies and government, especially because September 1984 resulted in a defeat of UDP forces in Congress, resulting in more difficulties for Siles Zuazo gaining support from his own government.²⁶³ In response to the resistance faced by his administration overall, Siles Zuazo began a hunger strike on October 27, 1984 in order to “protest the congressional censure Wednesday of his decision to negotiate with cocaine smugglers in an attempt to end the country's drug trade.”²⁶⁴ Siles Zuazo would end his strike only five days later after what he himself described that “he had succeeded in ‘creating a climate of reflection and peace’ in Bolivia.”²⁶⁵ The Catholic Church was involved in the agreement that resulted in the end of Siles Zuazo’s hunger strikes, but would also bring together all political parties for talks beginning on November 14.²⁶⁶ The result of these negotiations lead to an early end to the Siles Zuazo presidency as he “agreed to step down a year early and to hold elections in June 1985.”²⁶⁷

²⁶⁰ Rojo, Enrique Ibáñez. “The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982–1985).” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 1 (2000): 193.

²⁶¹ Ibid, 193.

²⁶² O'Neill, Blaine. "Bolivian Workers Overthrow President, 1983-1985."

²⁶³ Dunkerley, James, and Morales, Rolando. “The Crisis in Bolivia,” 104.

²⁶⁴ United Press International. "[Bolivian Leader Starts A Fast](#)." *New York Times*. October 27, 1984.

²⁶⁵ AP. "[President of Bolivia Ends Hunger Strike](#)." *New York Times*. October 30, 1984.

²⁶⁶ Rojo, Enrique Ibáñez. “The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982–1985).” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 1 (2000): 198.

²⁶⁷ Krain, Matthew, and Begoña Toral Alemañ. "Hunger for Power and Order," 79.

The efforts by Siles Zuazo led to the moving up of elections but did not end the protests against his government, as opposition would continue through the rest of his term and continue to limit his efforts for the economic crisis.²⁶⁸ It was during the negotiations themselves that protests were ongoing, as “Bolivia was paralyzed by a general strike...and the opposition urged the Government to resign and call early elections.”²⁶⁹ The unions would end a 9-day strike, only to announce a new nation-wide strike because “the government announced steep increases in the prices of food and other products, and a 77.7 percent devaluation of the peso.”²⁷⁰ The situation would escalated in to March 1985, with no agreement made with the unions and the economic situation worsening. Within the first week of March the COB called for an indefinite strike and reiterated their calls for Siles Zuazo to resign.²⁷¹ The on-going strike during the month of March was costing Bolivia \$10 million a day, only to have the unions to continue to reject offers from the government, as often it would include increased wages but an increase in taxes, and demanded inflation adjusted wages.²⁷² By March 21st the general strike went on to its 13th day, in addition to the use of tear gas by police, Siles Zuazo ordered in troops but ensured they were “only to maintain order and that a state of siege would not be declared.”²⁷³ The general strike executed by the unions ended on the 16th day, March 24, 1985, when they accepted an offer by the government which would quadruple the minimum wage in exchange for the end of the strike.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁸ Ibid, 79.

²⁶⁹ Reuters. "[General Strike Brings Bolivia to a Standstill.](#)" *New York Times*. November 15, 1984.

²⁷⁰ Ap. "[Bolivians March as Nationwide Strike Begins.](#)" *New York Times*. November 29, 1984.

²⁷¹ Dunkerley, James, and Morales, Rolando. “The Crisis in Bolivia,” 104.

²⁷² Reuters. "[Bolivian Unions Spurn Offers to End Strike.](#)" *New York Times*. March 19, 1985.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ O'Neill, Blaine. "Bolivian Workers Overthrow President, 1983-1985."

While the ongoing general strikes occurred in March, preparation still occurred for the presidential elections that were later decided to be held in July 1985. The balancing of the strikes with the election was quite difficult for Siles Zuazo as he “was much less interested in standing up to the union and its wage demands, given that his one overriding concern was to ensure the holding of elections and a smooth transfer of power.”²⁷⁵ Siles Zuazo’s offer to the unions was therefore only done to prevent ongoing social unrest and to buy time until the elections in July.²⁷⁶ Additionally, due to the influence of the COB and the unions, Siles Zuazo had very little options other than to concede to their demands due “to the union's virtual monopoly of political power.”²⁷⁷ Siles Zuazo’s hope to utilize the 1985 to reinforce his power democratically was denied as he lost the election and Víctor Paz Estenssoro, of the MNR party, was selected as president.²⁷⁸ Despite the removal of Hernan Siles Zuazo as President, executing the first democratic transition of power for Bolivia in the longest time, the economic situation was ongoing leading the presidency of Estenssoro to address the issues.

d) US Involvement in Anti-Siles Zuazo campaign

The United States’ involvement in the Anti-Siles Zuazo civil resistance campaign was lacking, as the US did not vocalize support for the movement but did maintain economic interests overall during this time. US interests in Bolivia were maintained due to continued anti-narcotics program between the two countries, with investments and aide made by the United States. US action then included an “increase in the presence of US agencies of control...allowed the US to attach strings to the disbursement of further loans and aid.”²⁷⁹ While US interests were

²⁷⁵ Rojo, Enrique Ibáñez. “The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982–1985).” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 1 (2000): 198.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 199.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 204.

²⁷⁸ O’Neill, Blaine. “Bolivian Workers Overthrow President, 1983-1985.”

²⁷⁹ Dunkerley, James, and Morales, Rolando. “The Crisis in Bolivia,” 98.

upon narcotics coming out of the country there was little against the Siles Zuazo regime, a regime that owed a part of its victory to the US's boycott of the military regimes.²⁸⁰ The point of previous engagement in Bolivia was based on the US's hope "that the arrival of a civilian democratic Government would enable them to advance in their narcotics war."²⁸¹ Despite US awareness of continued corruption around cocaine in the military and a weak civilian government, there was no vocalization, separate from the narcotics trade, by the US to address issues within the country.

The US took no stance against the Siles Zuazo government, not supporting the calls of the resistance movements for his removal, as "there would be little gain in alienating or weakening the new civilian Government."²⁸² The US previously invested a large portion of time and support in establishing the new democratic Bolivian government and therefore seemed reluctant to address the concerns and issues raised by the resistance movement and unions. The worsening economic situation for Bolivia was further brought to attention through the movement's use of demanding improved economic situations for the workers, demands that went unaddressed for the US and international community. The concern presented by the US was not upon the movement's economic concerns for the workers but overall Bolivia's government interests, particularly on the issue of Bolivia's debts. Involvement at the time of the resistance movement was focused on the economics not necessarily on the people, as "international financial entities such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) insisted on the need for such measures and made loans dependent upon them," referring to the need for Siles Zuazo's economic plan. It was the demands of the US and international institutions that through

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Simons, Marlise. "[Bolivian Plot Embarrasses the U.S.](#)" *New York Times*. July 17, 1984.

²⁸² Ibid.

their focus on debt payments, although not directly, that objectively worked against the interests and demands of the Anti-Siles Zuazo resistance movement.

As the resistance movement against Siles Zuazo developed, it was evident the US was not going to support the movement over the regime. In fact, as the resistance increased and Siles Zuazo took action, the US demonstrated its faith in the regime when its response to the deployment of troops against the resistance movement was that it was “a sign that the Government was coping with the situation.”²⁸³ The United States during these years had only “influenced and arguably intimidated” the Siles Zuazo regime on the issues of economy and narcotics, never truly taking a stand around the nation-wide strikes and protests by the Anti-Zuazo resistance movement.

Comparison of the Bolivian Cases

The two cases of civil resistance movements in Bolivia, the Anti-Junta movement and the Anti-Siles Zuazo Movement, occurred under the context of Bolivia having an extensive relationship with the United States only in a security hierarchy. Differing from Peru, which had an extensive relationship with the United States both economically and security wise, Bolivia did not have an extensive relationship economically. Based on the hierarchy data of David Lake, Bolivia within the years of 1978 and 1984 had security relationships of comparative significance to the other movements and therefore identified as extensive. The level of security hierarchy relationship between Bolivia and the United States remained about the same level in the time between the two noted movements. The economic hierarchy relationship did experience a decrease in the time between the two movements, but in both years, they were not at levels to be considered an extensive relationship.

²⁸³ Chavez, Lydia. "[Troops Are Called Out in Bolivian Strike](#)." *New York Times*. March 21, 1985.

In the period between the two civil resistance movements there were changes that resulted in discrepancies domestically and internationally for Bolivia. In comparison to the two movements of Peru, which were against the same domestic regime, Bolivia experienced a transition of power as a result of the first movement and therefore had a different regime in power for each of the civil resistance movements. Additionally, due to the length of time between the two examined movements being longer than the cases for Peru, there was a transition of power within the United States, President Ronald Reagan taking over for President Jimmy Carter. The majority of the security relationship between the countries can be justified as the US continued collaborative efforts for the anti-narcotics program.

The United States when intervening in the cases of Bolivia, as they did in the case of the 1978 Anti-Junta, pursued similar methods to those executed under the 2000 Anti-Fujimori movement. As in both cases of intervention US officials utilized vocal criticisms and restraints on foreign aid to create pressures against the regimes. The methods that were used in 2000, were also used in 1978, as the US echoed calls by movement leaders against Banzer Suarez for the demands given by the unions to be met and later for the establishment of democratic power. The United States would maintain this stance and vocalization during the long and multitude of power transitions in Bolivia during this time.

The Anti-Junta movement, organized by union leaders including the Federation of Mine Workers, were able to coordinate multiple strikes during the movement's time. The movement throughout the various military and authoritarian leaders maintained and demonstrated its commitment to nonviolent resistance methods, consistently using general strikes and those targeted at the country's mines. Nonetheless the exemplary use of hunger strikes by the female protesters to garner monumental attention and international exposure. The position of the mine strikes was ideal for the movement as the mines and the many minerals that come from them

were significant to the Bolivian economy, costing the government millions per day. The combination of economic impact from the striking mine workers and the withholding of US aid placed major pressure on regime leaders that were already not faring well.

The movement itself was consistent with its demands against the various juntas, asking for democratic processes to be established or maintained. The original 1978 elections, the first attempted democratic election, presented Siles Zuazo as the winner of the election prior to the coup that would occur. The established results around Siles Zuazo, not to mention his previous presidency, allowed for the protesters to continue to point to him as a possible democratic leader as they fought against the various military juntas. Siles Zuazo was therefore established as a viable democratic alternative for the US to place support behind. The Anti-Junta formed itself to be a viable case for US support as it demonstrated a commitment to a nonviolent message and appealed to the democratic values of the US.

The same cannot be said for the Anti-Siles Zuazo movement, especially as the US previously worked hard to get Bolivia back to a democratic leader – Siles Zuazo. The movement against President Siles Zuazo was an extension of the previous movement by labor unions, as the unions expanded their role to political parties creating the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). Although the same nonviolent methods were utilized, industries targeted went beyond the mining industry, targeting both industrial and financial institutions. The commitment to nonviolent methods was once again demonstrated by the movement and proved to be effective in pressuring the government into negotiations.

The Anti-Siles Zuazo movement was specifically distinguishable in the context it was occurring, as the country was battling major economic issues and therefore the movement's demands were structured around such. The movement's demands focused upon the economic well-being of the union workers, demanding that worker wages meet the level of inflation and

negative economic plans to not be implemented. As Siles Zuazo was the democratically elected and established president the foundations of the movement's demands were not on democratic reforms or initially for his removal; although, later movement leaders would call for his resignation. Due to the movement's core demands not being placed democratically and the democratically elected president agreeing to democratic elections, the United States never received appeals based on democratic values. The United States did take steps to pressure the Siles Zuazo regime to make improvements economically and in the narcotics program; however, the US never directly supported the demands of the Anti-Siles Zuazo civil resistance movements.

Both the movements that occurred within Bolivia, the 1978 Anti-Junta and the 1984 Anti-Siles Zuazo, were done with a commitment to nonviolent resistance methods; however, only one movement resulted in the support of the United States government. President Jimmy Carter and its administration would intervene to support the Anti-Junta civil resistance movement. The support provided to this movement by the United States reinforced the theory that the US will intervene to confirm democratic values electorally.

V. CONCLUSION

America rose to global prominence in the 20th century, "America's Century," experiencing shifts in its foreign policy goals and values, every US president projecting a different approach. With this power and dominance, the United States had to grapple with how to utilize its role as a hegemon. How do US decision makers balance competing US interests with the Wilsonian impulse to offer a helping hand to civil resistance movements in countries where the ruling regime is aligned with or dependent on the U.S. In the comparative analysis of the cases studies within Peru and Bolivia, the 1996 Tupac Amaru, 2000 Anti-Fujimori, 1978 Anti-Junta, 1984 Anti-Siles Zuazo, the factors and characteristics that were factored into the US decision making process were considered. Each case examined the hypotheses, first, that the US will intervene in

support of cases of civil resistance movement when it is demonstrated to be nonviolent and espouses democratic electoral values, and second, the US will only support a civil resistance movement when the opposition has a viable alternative leader.

The case evidence generally supports the hypothesis that the US will only support a civil resistance movement when it calls to alter or replace a government only if it espouses nonviolence and democratic electoral values. In the two cases of US intervention, Peru’s 2000 Anti-Fujimori and Bolivia’s 1978 Anti-Junta, both of the civil resistance movement’s demands were around the call to hold democratic elections with an opposition leader already established. In addition to partial support, the US intervention only occurred in cases of nonviolent civil resistance movement but did not intervene in every case that was deemed nonviolent.

Table 2. A Summary of Case Research Findings

	Viable Leader	Commitment to Nonviolence	Commitment to Democratic Values	US Intervention
Tupac Amaru 1996 (Peru, Case 1)	No	Low	Low	No
Anti-Fujimori 2000 (Peru, Case 2)	Yes	High	High	Yes
Anti-Junta 1978 (Bolivia, Case 3)	Yes	High	High	Yes
Anti-Siles Zuazo 1984 (Bolivia, Case 4)	No	High	Low	No

Table 2 outlines the various factors identified within the civil resistance movements, viable leader, commitment to nonviolence, commitment to democratic values, and US intervention. The two cases that presented a democratic, viable, alternative leader did so because

of support for the leader through democratic mobilization in elections, as seen in the Anti-Fujimori movement, and the utilization of previous electoral results to emphasize an opposition leader, the Anti-Junta case. The use and commitment to nonviolence was consistent for many of the cases but was not the strongest factor regarding US intervention. Democratic values within a movement were consistent with the US's decision to intervene, specifically in the case of democratizing the countries away from authoritarian governments, the Anti-Fujimori movement fighting against an autogolpe and Bolivia's Anti-Junta with authoritative, military regimes. The US did not intervene in the other two cases, arguably because the Tupac Amaru movement's demands were not focused on democratization nor were representative of democratic values as a group and the Anti-Siles Zuazo movement demands were not based in democratic values despite calling for President Siles Zuazo resignation and elections. The case evidence helps explain when US foreign policy decision making in the late 20th century involved lending a helping hand to civil resistance movements. In short, the US will go against its extensive relationship with a country, and the interests and benefits that come from an extensive relationship, when it feeds into the priorities and values of multiple US presidencies – democracy.

Additionally, it is important to note a shared characteristic between the two cases of intervention, in that the methods utilized by the US were focused around vocal condemnation of the regime by US officials, ranging from the US President to US State Department officials, and the withholding or restriction of foreign aid to these countries. The ability of the US to create such influence with limited action and minimal cost only demonstrates the US influence and power during the time even more. The power and respect held by the US President, as the people of foreign countries and their leaders look to and listen to the words and guidance of the US Presidency. Nonetheless foreign aid creates US influence and serves as a course of pressure upon countries, effectively allowing the to act without the need of military force.

With this understanding established, it is important to recognize that these cases and action by the US occurred in the late 20th century, providing the US, through its hegemonic power, ability to intervene in these countries in such a capacity. However, with the turn of the century, the position of the US globally shifted, a decline in the American power and hierarchy once known within the 20th century is no longer present.²⁸⁴ It is possible that, even if the US commitment to democracy promotion does not fade, the methods the US has utilized in the past when it was more powerful prior may not be an effective or even useable in the future. More time can be spent to examine how the US has addressed demands of civil resistance movements globally within the new century under a new global community and following the examined period of democratization. This thesis is in part an invitation for US readers and leader to reflect on when and how best the US can support democracy and democratic resistance movements globally.

In future research, it would be fruitful to examine more cases closer to the modern-day period, as with the US's changing role in the world and decreasing hegemony create new questions on how the US will be influential in supporting the civil resistance movements of others. The cases examined show how US support can be effective and beneficial in defending the values it plans to protect. Policy wise, the US must reassess its current role in the world and determine how it wishes to defend and support these values globally as it once did.

²⁸⁴ Zakaria, Fareed. *The Post-American World* 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Extensive Relations Cases

	Country	Campaign	Year	Economic Hierarchy	Security Hierarchy	US Intervention
1	Argentina	Argentina coup plot	1987	0.003943	0.500125**	FALSE
2	Argentina	Argentina pro-democracy movement	1983	0	0.500122**	FALSE
3	Argentina	ERP/ Monteneros	1974	0.002704	0.500266**	FALSE
4	Bolivia	Bolivian Anti-Junta	1978	0.079424	0.500565**	TRUE***
5	Bolivia	Bolivian Leftists	1952	0.103241*	0.502114**	FALSE
6	Bolivia	Anti-Siles Zuazo	1984	0.029213	0.500442**	FALSE
7	Brazil	Diretas ja	1984	0.022635	0.500062**	TRUE***
8	Burundi	First Hutu Rebellion	1972	0.75*	0	FALSE
9	Chile	Anti-Pinochet Movement	1989	0.041104	0.500291**	TRUE***
10	Chile	Pinochet-led rebels	1973	0	0.500544**	TRUE***
11	Colombia	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberation Army	1964	0.080417	0.500654**	FALSE
12	Cuba	Cuban Revolution	1958	0	0.682629**	TRUE***
13	Dominican Republic	Dominican leftists	1965	0.170055*	0.502639**	FALSE
14	El Salvador	Salvadoran Civil Conflict	1977	0.352183*	0.500629	FALSE
15	France	Pro-French Nationalists	1960	0	0.245645**	FALSE
16	Greece	Greece Anti-Military	1973	0.25*	0.240417**	FALSE
17	Guatemala	Conservative movement	1954	0.894452*	0.501482**	TRUE***
18	Guatemala	Leftist rebels (URNG)	1985	0.076496	0.50044**	TRUE***
19	Guyana	Anti-Burnham / Hoyte	1992	0	0.501471**	TRUE***
20	Haiti	Anti-Duvalier	1985	0.465696*	0.500378**	FALSE
21	Haiti	Anti-National Governing Council (CNG)	1986	0.381342*	0.50037**	FALSE
22	India	Kashmiri Muslim separatists	1990	0.25*	8.62E-06	FALSE
23	India	Sikh insurgency	1984	0.25*	7.27E-06	FALSE
24	Indonesia	Anti-Suharto	1996	0.261187*	3.71E-05	FALSE
25	Lebanon	Anti-Shamun	1958	0.25*	0.830816**	FALSE
26	Lebanon	Lebanon leftists	1975	0.25*	0.001592	FALSE
27	Mexico	Anti-PRI	1997	0.467388*	0.500049**	TRUE***
28	Morocco	Ifni war	1957	0	0.192335**	FALSE
29	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF	1996	0.252809*	4.69E-05	FALSE
30	Nepal	The Stir	1990	0.25*	9.07E-05	TRUE***
31	Nicaragua	Contras	1981	0.105376*	0.500565**	TRUE***
32	Nicaragua	FSLN	1978	0.844014*	0.501179**	FALSE
33	Nicaragua	Anti-Somoza Strikes	1978	0.844014*	0.501179**	TRUE***
34	Pakistan	Baluchi rebels	1977	0.75*	7.88E-05	FALSE
35	Pakistan	Mohajir	1994	0.25*	4.56E-05	FALSE

36	Pakistan	Pakistan Pro-Democracy Movement	1983	0.25*	6.44E-05	FALSE
37	Pakistan	Anti-Bhutto	1977	0.75*	7.88E-05	FALSE
38	Pakistan	Anti-Zia al-Haq	1986	0.25*	6.65E-05	FALSE
39	Panama	Anti-Noriega	1987	0.883987*	1.270639**	TRUE***
40	Peru	Anti-Fujimori	2000	0.541644*	0.50282**	TRUE***
41	Peru	Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) Senderista Insurgency	1980	0.06299	0.500256**	FALSE
42	Peru	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) - Senderista Insurgency	1996	0.292279*	0.500185**	FALSE
43	Philippines	Moro National Liberation Front	1970	0.050953	0.606302**	FALSE
44	Philippines	New People's Army	1972	0.040593	0.567657**	FALSE
45	Philippines	People Power	1983	0.050318	0.54876**	TRUE***
46	Philippines	Second People Power Movement	2000	0.061751	0.500178**	FALSE
47	Portugal	Carnation Revolution	1973	0	0.531093**	FALSE
48	Somalia	Somalia militia insurgencies	1993	0	0.142773**	FALSE
49	South Korea	South Korea Anti-Junta	1979	0.900422*	0.176978**	FALSE
50	South Korea	South Korea Anti-Military	1987	0.422498*	0.182731**	TRUE***
51	South Korea	South Korea Student Revolution	1960	0.275496*	0.37663**	FALSE
52	South Korea	Anti-Roh Tae Woo	1988	0.438026*	0.184302**	FALSE
53	Spain	Basque Campaign for Self-Determination	1968	0.75*	0.047414	FALSE
54	Sri Lanka	LTTE	1982	0.25*	0.000101	FALSE
55	Suriname	Anti-Bouterse	1983	0.228143*	0.501358**	FALSE
56	Taiwan	Taiwan pro-democracy movement	1979	0	0.5**	FALSE
57	Thailand	Thai communist rebels	1966	0.761554*	0.142258**	FALSE
58	Thailand	Thai pro-dem movement	1992	0.54271*	0.000312	FALSE
59	Thailand	Thai student protests	1973	0.763614*	0.170798**	FALSE
60	Turkey	Kurdish rebellion (Turkey)	1991	0	0.518841**	FALSE
61	Uruguay	Tupamaros	1963	0	0.502649**	FALSE
62	Uruguay	Uruguay Anti-Military	1984	0	0.500683**	FALSE
63	Venezuela	Anti-Jimenez	1958	1.131266*	0.502444**	TRUE***
64	Venezuela	Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN)	1963	0.977932*	0.502183**	FALSE
65	Zimbabwe	PF-ZAPU guerillas	1982	0.25*	0	FALSE

*Economic Hierarchy variable value above the mean level, **Security Hierarchy variable value above the mean level, ***The United States intervened in support of the resistance movement.