

1 **INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT**

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4 FARM LOCATION (NUTS3): UKH14 (Suffolk)

5 *(First questions are based on the online survey we sent to UKIA members in*  
6 *December 2014)*

7 ***Interviewers (I)***

8 *Grower (G)*

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10 **I: What proportion of the farm could be irrigated?**

11 G: 100%

12 **I: Proportion irrigated in 2014?**

13 G: 50%. This will be a typical figure. Although the potential is 100%, due to crop  
14 rotations and other things, normally 50% of the land area will be irrigated.

15 **I: Which crops do you grow and their average yield?**

16 G: Potatoes (earlies and maincrop) irrigated, vegetables irrigated, cereals rainfed,  
17 sugar beet rainfed and irrigated. Grass rainfed, no forage.

18 Maincrop 55 t/ha, earlies 45 t/ha, vegetables (pasnips and onions) 50 t/ha, cereals  
19 7.5 t/ha, sugar beet 65 t/ha rainfed, 70 t/ha. This is due to a soil type issue, rainfed  
20 is grown in a more drought-resilient soil so yields tend to be higher. Sugar beet  
21 irrigated – we shouldn't be irrigating it at all - is there because of the rotation, very  
22 lighter soils. Grass, I could not give a yield. It is only grazed during summer months.

23 **I: From which water sources do you get the water for irrigation from?**

24 G: 50% surface water, 50% ground water

25 **I: What type of abstraction licence do you have?**

26 G: We have winter and summer licences.

27 **I: What irrigation methods do you use?**

28 G: Hose reels with rain guns 50%, hose reels with booms 25% and linear moves  
29 25%.

30 **I: How do you decide when to irrigate and how much?**

31 G: It is a combination of water balance and judgement, water balance supported by  
32 judgement. So it will be 90% water balance and 10% judgement. Or 85% - 15%.

33 **I: What is the final destination of your products?**

34 G: Maincrop and earlies potatoes for supermarkets; vegetables are processing,  
35 supermarkets and exports; cereals and sugar beet for processing.

36 **I: Was your production affected by past drought episodes from 1976 to 2010-**  
37 **2012?**

38 G: First of all, what is a drought? And what a drought episode? Let's try to put this in  
39 context. This presumably is a rainfall pattern that forces unusual irrigation behaviour  
40 is it?

41 **I: Yes. A simplistic think of a drought as a significant period of below average**  
42 **rainfall which then either could affect your business directly through**  
43 **droughtiness on rainfed crops or could affect you because you run out of**  
44 **water, because your licence is not big enough or could be that the Agency**  
45 **(EA) imposes abstraction restrictions.**

46 **I: Then make you take trajectories that are atypical from your schedule or**  
47 **your planning.**

48 G: I find this is a particularly interesting subject because we have found it very easy  
49 to be very superficial in how we talk about droughts and what drought means. And I  
50 remember somebody once said to me when I first came and farm in these very  
51 sandy soils in this part of East Anglia saying a drought is 3 weeks without rain. And  
52 actually that is not a bad statement.

53 In my farming career in this area, I have experienced situations which have caused  
54 quite a lot of difficulty but they have been within a year which was not regarded as a  
55 drought year. So for example, all I need is 6 weeks with very very low rainfall in May  
56 and June. And I am going to assume this is problem because I can keep up with the  
57 crops demand for water.

58 So you mentioned figures the other day about design parameters for irrigation  
59 systems. I usually work on 80% of what you might expect. So there is that kind of  
60 situation. So that is where you can very quickly run into a situation when the  
61 infrastructure can't keep up. And the next level of problem is when the water supply  
62 can't keep up. And I have experienced a number of times in summer groundwater  
63 situations when, in this part of the world, generally speaking, if you pump most  
64 groundwater sources for 3 weeks continuously at the licence rate the drawdown will  
65 be such that you start running into problems. So that is the next level of problem.  
66 Although I have got licence quantity and I am not exceeding my licence parameters,  
67 over the length of the season there is enough water in the aquifer per se. It is just  
68 that the right of this very spot where I am taking it from because I have drawdown  
69 the water more quickly than it can move in to replace it. So you get into that kind of  
70 short-term problem.

71 In terms of what we do about that, in the first level when we start overtaking the  
72 infrastructure, the first thing we do is: OK, where are the priorities? It is a simple  
73 priority thing. Which crops are more sensitive from an agronomic point of view? And

74 then almost by default or by definition that will translate into a problem, a financial  
75 implication as well. So usually the ones that are most agronomic sensitive,  
76 otherwise the most financial sensitive. That is not always followed, but generally  
77 speaking. So you have to do that kind of prioritizing, and wait until it rains.

78 If there is a drawdown problem with boreholes, then you have to stop. You just have  
79 to turn the pumps off and that is, in the short-term. In the longer term, you may look  
80 at your installation and say: OK, how can I organize my abstraction so then I can  
81 manage the pressure on the different abstraction points?

82 And I guess some of this conversation is going to lead to mitigation, isn't it? What  
83 we do about it?

84 **I: When that starts to happen, do you think of it as a drought?**

85 G: On this sort of soils the word drought is not always used that much because we  
86 have to manage water so actively anyway. The conditions doesn't have to change  
87 very much, so soil type and rainfall pattern and, even geographically, you don't have  
88 to move many miles away from here before the whole thing takes an slightly  
89 different perspective. In a way you are in the margin of being able to survive in  
90 rainfed situation. So you don't think of water stress in quite the same way. It almost  
91 the case of saying: well, I think it is a bit tight, I won't water that field this week, I will  
92 wait for 3 or 4 days and you probably won't notice the difference. On these soil  
93 types close to here, you can't cope with this stress here at all.

94 **I: So you are sort of implicitly working close to a drought situation anyway.  
95 You think the soils and droughty and in 3 weeks you can be in difficulty so  
96 you got it in your mind.**

97 G: I think yes. We will expect to be irrigating within these 3 weeks anyway. Is not  
98 such as if we think that in summer we don't have to irrigate for 3 weeks, we will  
99 have to be irrigating anyway.

100 So, this whole thing is about distribution of rainfall patterns, isn't it? If you look at the  
101 long-term averages in this locality, and if you say there is a rule of thumb, potato  
102 crop needs 600 mm of water to take it through the year (I think this rule of thumb is  
103 fair enough); annual rainfall is around here long-term average 650mm. So in very  
104 simplistic terms, you can say there is enough water landing on a particular square  
105 area to support the crops that we want to grow. The problem is the distribution of it.  
106 It doesn't arrive conveniently. Just to help thinking a little bit in terms of broad  
107 sustainability.

108 Broadly, from a sustainability point of view, there is enough rainfall arriving in this  
109 locality to support what we are doing. It is only when you start taking into account  
110 competing activities and legitimately competing activities. But of course we are not  
111 growing crops that require that level of water on every hectare every year. What we  
112 are doing is long term sustainable, is just how we manage rainfall patterns. So it is  
113 all about time scales and how you react and what you expect. If you have one  
114 occasion where you [overpar?] your infrastructure so you cannot getting on anyway  
115 and you run out of water because you drawdown the aquifer so there is physically

116 no water there. If that happens once, you put it down on experience. If this happens  
117 again you start thinking how long since it happens before? And then, it is risk  
118 management. At what point you are going to start seeing how I can ... what I do to  
119 cover this point. And one of the rationale elements of what I did there was adding  
120 irrigation reservoirs, adding stored aboveground water to support summer  
121 abstraction. One of the reasons was to increase spot application, the spot  
122 abstraction rate. So the Agency (EA) will determine how many cubic meters per  
123 hour I could take out of the ground. I say that is not enough, but my two irrigation  
124 reservoirs allow me to double that. So, one of the things stored water can do is to  
125 mitigate short-term shortages by securing a minimum instantaneous abstraction  
126 capability. And then what you got that in place, you can start managing that  
127 situation. So if you have a choice, today I can either take the water from the  
128 groundwater source or I can take it from the reservoir. Which one shall I do? If you  
129 look in the situation when you feel there is a risk that you have drawdown the  
130 aquifer too much or maybe you start to see the pressure on the aquifer, I will use  
131 the capacity from the reservoir if indeed is there. It is all in degrees. When you are  
132 on the continuum? Because there is going to be a day when you are going to need  
133 all the water from the aquifer and all the water from the reservoir. So you still get  
134 into the [model?], but where do you fix the parameters? Because what is not in the  
135 game is being able to store sufficient water to cope with a growing season where  
136 the is zero rainfall because that is the absolute, isn't it?

137 I had a conversation with another grower about 4 years ago, before the 2010-2012  
138 drought even started. And we were having a general conversation about irrigation,  
139 because his business is all about leafy salads and supermarkets contracts where  
140 non-supply is not an issue, it is not acceptable, he has to supply. So water is an  
141 issue for all these crops and he went to a programme to build a lot of storage  
142 reservoirs. And I said, how do you feel about that? And he said, I don't think we  
143 have ever needed our stored water. I sometimes look at it and think it is a waste of  
144 money. But he said it will come a year when I need it, and as far as I go I am gonna  
145 have it, because when that year comes, and I don't know when it will be, I will be  
146 thankful for the fact that we have been seating looking at all these reservoirs for all  
147 these years. And of course that year came in 2012. So his approach for risk  
148 management is completely different from mine here, which in turn is completely  
149 different from the guy in an arable farm. It is just worlds apart.

150 **I: What do you remember about those drought periods in terms of level of**  
151 **impact?**

152 G: 1976 I do remember as one of very high impact. I am old enough to remember  
153 that but I wasn't a farmer yet. 1988-1992, that was high impact of course because  
154 that run up to the formation of our Water Abstractors Group so that was pretty high.  
155 1995-1997, did it tend dry again then?

156 **I: 1995 is often called the hot dry summer...**

157 G: Ok, let's put as high then. Even a normal year has some impact.

158 **I: For the most important crops here, what was the yield reduction during the**  
159 **last drought?**

160 G: I would say the yield reduction was marginal because we were able to manage  
161 the situation. And also targeted to the most important crops and protected them. So  
162 for example in this farm the impact would have been on some parsnips and some  
163 onions because whatever else happens the potatoes get it. And they are very  
164 sensitive and in the long term they will be the most rewarding.

165 In this business the parsnip crop is very important because we do have direct  
166 commitments right through the value chain so we do want to protect our ability to  
167 service that. But I suppose, of the crops that we are growing, parsnips is more  
168 resilient.

169 In one way or another, our attitude towards risk is slightly different from the  
170 potatoes. We fall off a cliff with potatoes in terms of quality and its yield. We were  
171 having this conversation the other day that when it comes to drought impacts  
172 first...it was what it has done to the yield. But I need to translate that into marketable  
173 yield. Because actually is quality that is impacted first, and quality has a strong  
174 influence on my ability to satisfy my customer. So very quickly I can go from a  
175 position of yield being unaffected to yield being zero for my target marketplace  
176 because I miss the quality specification. I may have a physical yield, but for my  
177 target marketplace I have nothing. So it is then, what marketplace am I able to go?

178 If it starts cracking and splitting, with high levels of scab, even processors will turn  
179 this down...

180 **I: If there is no oversupply already**

181 G: Of course. In some years there would be an oversupply in that particular  
182 marketplace

183 **I: What about prices when there is a drought? Normally the prices tend to go**  
184 **up**

185 G: They tend to go up. But I think I would say now prices volatility is not what it used  
186 to be. Price has retained the ability to fall in years of plenty, but the ability to rise in  
187 years of shortage is nothing like it was used to be. And I put that down to a well-  
188 organized supply chain and international trade.

189 **I: Would you say it is less than 5% the increase in price? Could you give us a**  
190 **range? Maybe it depends on the crop?**

191 G: I would say it is between 5 and 30% or something like that. Most of us are more  
192 and more trying to secure our businesses and our margins by forward pricing, either  
193 by an absolute price or by a formula based price. So one of our ways of managing  
194 risk in a wider sense is to try and manage price volatility. So through that process  
195 we are reducing the ability to benefit from price spike. Generally speaking, those lifts  
196 in value are there for some crops.

197 **I: Do you split your expected output into trying to fix a separate proportion on**  
198 **the forward contracts and keep some of it for the open market?**

199 G: Yes. It depends on the product range in the marketplace. But generally speaking,  
200 within this business we try to use the... of the business, and give yourself the  
201 opportunity to take advantage of a bit of uplift if it comes. But that is because of the  
202 way this business is constructed in the market is targeting. For example, there are in  
203 the potato world, businesses that are entirely processing focused. And the likelihood  
204 is that by far the great majority of their crop will be fixed price. There is probably a  
205 yield cap, so only the unusually going over that yield cap will go into some kind of  
206 free market price.

207 **I: Talking about this, did you experience any contractual problems during a**  
208 **drought? Why was that, because of quality issues, not reaching the agreed**  
209 **production, ...?**

210 G: Yes. I think a number of things happen when things go wrong. And the same sort  
211 of things happens whichever goes wrong. In a drought year, looking at lower yield  
212 and poor quality, if that drought is a universal drought, then customers will tend to  
213 change their specifications to allow the product to go in. If there is a local drought,  
214 then you are dead, you are up against it. If you over-contracted, and that can  
215 happen although the best planning, then very often there are penalties for failing to  
216 supply the contracted volume. And some customers take a more flexible approach  
217 than others. So there is everything out there in terms of how people react.

218 **I: Now, we are going to talk about abstraction restrictions during droughts.**  
219 **Could you tell me if you remember in past drought periods what kind of**  
220 **restrictions if any was applied to your business?**

221 G: I cannot remember anything from 1976. But in 1992 there were mandatory  
222 restrictions, and that is what triggered voluntary restrictions.

223 **I: Also voluntary?**

224 G: Not in 1992 but in more recent events. So post 1992 we have seen a  
225 combination of voluntary and mandatory restrictions, and this depends on the  
226 sensitivity of the different water source. So, for example, on surface water we have  
227 two types of surface water licence: we have managed level surface water, and flow  
228 based surface water. So in rivers we have hands-off flows and section 57. And  
229 section 57 restrictions in surface water are coming very quickly. And the ability to  
230 use a voluntary approach in those situations is not well developed. I haven't come  
231 across examples of voluntary mechanisms to manage a low level situation in  
232 surface water. I have come across in manage water level situations. There have  
233 been dry years when there have been a voluntary code and it has usually being  
234 things like everybody agrees in irrigate at night for example. That reduces the  
235 number of hours of irrigation....

236 Groundwater is quite different and we have referred a number of times to 1990 and  
237 the formation of the Water Abstractors Group. That group still exists and it was  
238 formed in reaction to a mandatory ban on groundwater abstractions at a very

239 sensitive time of the year. It happened early August or something like that, it was  
240 peak growing time for potato crops. The EA, or National Rivers Authority at that  
241 time, did not engage with abstractors at all. They simply saw the aquifer level going  
242 down and decided that it was time to stop and just sent a letter out saying turn your  
243 pumps off. It was disastrous.

244 The WAG was formed to try to do something about it. And what it started doing, and  
245 has done from that day to this, is to engage with the EA and talk to them about what  
246 is happening in the aquifer and see if between us we can organize things so that  
247 abstractors do not face a total ban. And the way it manifested itself is in periods of  
248 groundwater stress abstractors have agreed to a voluntary restriction. The toughest  
249 one we had was 50% restriction, and the most relaxed one (well, the most relaxed  
250 one is zero, but when there was a restriction) is 20%. So between 20% and 50%.  
251 Over the years, I don't know how many times we went into voluntary ones, it is  
252 probably 4 or 5 times, and it was typically 20% reduction in applications.

253 **I: What about the information sources that you normally use to be aware of**  
254 **drought? Radio, newspaper, Met Office,...?**

255 G: Our own observations, EA and Met Office data. Our own daily observations or if  
256 it stops raining, our own observations just observing the flows in the rivers.

257 We are having a annual meeting of the WAG in about 4 weeks. So in early March  
258 we will be talking to them about the prospects for groundwater in our area. For  
259 example, in 2015 I am predicting the EA will come along and say: Look chaps, the  
260 recharge is going pretty well. We had average rainfall or better than average rainfall  
261 in these weeks. It is going to take an event that none of us can foresee to result in  
262 any kind of restrictions this year.

263 We are all bright enough to look at the numbers, have a conversation and say: OK,  
264 groundwater is gonna be safe this year. But the conversation in 2012 was rather  
265 different. In fact there were several conversations. That was a very tricky time. But  
266 interestingly we got through it, you know?

267 **I: Do you think in that 2011-12 period it was because it was a winter drought**  
268 **that it wasn't on the radar until it was, you know, it got quite serious?**

269 G: When you look at the figures, when you look at the rainfall curves and the aquifer  
270 level curves, looking back you think: Oh, come on, why on earth we didn't see this  
271 coming? But when you actually cover up you started you know, this is time going  
272 this way, and you cover that curve up. So what you can see is the actual to a  
273 particular point. So, what come on, if we cover that up, we cover that up, we cover  
274 that up...are we beating ourselves up a little bit here? Because you after ask you  
275 the question: What would have happened, how our view would change if we shifted  
276 from a below average rainfall to above average rainfall at any point? Just do it  
277 month by month. And if we shift it to average rainfall, average rainfall, average  
278 rainfall...we have been saying well actually, a little bit tight but.. finger crossed. And  
279 of course it didn't and didn't and didn't...so at what point you say: Oh shit! We  
280 seriously have to do something. And to that extent that is what curtailed us out. But

281 the other thing is ok, what should we have done about it? We couldn't foresee it so  
282 what should we have done about it that we didn't?

283 **I: Now, we have here a list of strategies that could be applied when there is a**  
284 **drought. If you could tell me which ones do you normally apply and what are**  
285 **the most important ones, like the top 2 of strategies?**

286 G: Make sure I am understanding this. So abstract to a maximum to get the water  
287 content up. Is that trying to build resilience in the soil itself?

288 **I: If you think the EA might be going to impose some restrictions, in that run**  
289 **up to that, get as much water onto the soil to build it up before you know**  
290 **things might be cut back.**

291 G: One of this is abstract to a maximum to get the soil water content up. There is an  
292 implication there, that I have some headroom in abstraction. And I gonna suggest  
293 that I've probably gone passed that point already. And also on these soils you buys  
294 you so little time...I can't think of soils where you may be happy to run a deficit  
295 down to 40 mm for example. In which case you might say OK, less get as close as  
296 soil capacity as we can, then at least I've got 40 mm in the bank. But it doesn't work  
297 like that around here because we are working to much tinier margins.

298 Irrigate a reduced area to the full potential...I think the next two go hand in hand.  
299 Irrigate a reduced area to full or full area reduced. Well, it depends a little bit  
300 on...well all depends...In potatoes, for example, I am gonna suggest it makes far  
301 more sense to irrigate reduced are to full potential, because you lose a lot. Other  
302 crops, like parsnips for example, I would say we would irrigate the whole area, but  
303 pull it back.

304 Irrigate at night...It depends on what we mean by that... Science tells us that the  
305 water will be more efficiently used, less evapotranspiration losses so it would be  
306 more effective if only applied at night. But there is an underlying presumption there,  
307 that I actually have the infrastructure, the capacity to do what I have to do in half the  
308 time. And I would suggest that certainly, in the farming systems that I have been  
309 involved, I have never had the luxury, the capacity of being able to say...So we are  
310 just up against it. So that is way down the list.

311 Renegotiate existing supply contracts. There are limited opportunities to do that. But  
312 I can think of one I was involved with. If you just want it for the story book...

313 Develop a drought management plan. I think when you get to that stage it is a little  
314 bit late.

315 Evaluate the water resource position. Bit late.

316 Personally negotiate with the EA. I wouldn't be doing that in a run up. Similarly work  
317 with WAG.

318 So the top 2...

319 **I: If there is anything else that is not there, please feel free...**



320 G: Is it relevant in this question that I would have already talked to the EA?

321 **I: The question is when you are starting to recognize that there is trouble**  
322 **coming, that the EA is likely to be thinking about mandatory restrictions or**  
323 **bans, and this might be some of the actions that you would do, either to stay**  
324 **off from doing that, or to position yourself ready for when these restrictions**  
325 **are coming?**

326 G: The top priority then is to work with local WAG and negotiate with EA. That is  
327 number one.

328 **I: After the last drought episode that you were affected by, is there any**  
329 **changes in the farm management in order to cope with drought risk? You**  
330 **have here different options...any others?**

331 G: I think the most relevant one is the development a drought management plan

332 **I: I was going to ask you...does your business have one?**

333 G: Not formally, we have an informal one. These are the sort of things we talk  
334 about...what happens if...? I think in this business we would now spend more time  
335 discussing things like headroom and water security than has been the case in this  
336 business before.

337 Within this business there has not been conscious decision that says: oh, because  
338 of the last drought the cropping has changed. If the cropping has changed is not  
339 because of drought. But what the business is doing is saying: OK, medium to long  
340 term there is an issue here...What are we doing? And it is things like getting  
341 involved in the regulatory reform process. So this sort of things, either to WAG,  
342 NFU, Defra, working Cranfield University, engaging in this kind of things...which is  
343 all helping to inform the business....Because this is the regulatory and cultural  
344 environment we are working in. So helping to shape that environment and use that  
345 knowledge to help developed our own drought...

346 **I: All these activities are part of the business plan to understand the risks and**  
347 **the implications of droughts and water scarcity.**

348 G: Yes, yes...This business doesn't feel that threatened in the short term. Or put in  
349 another way, it has headroom. But what it is saying is that this headroom is likely to  
350 disappear, one way or another. Either because we manage our farm more  
351 intensively so we are going to need that headroom. Or because weather patterns  
352 are changing and just the weather itself is going to take away the headroom. Or  
353 because the regulation process is going to take away the headroom. Probably is a  
354 combination of the three, isn't it? So we have to work out what we are going to do  
355 about that.

356 **I: What is your opinion about the management aspects that could be change**  
357 **to improve drought management in the UK? Here you have a list of things...**

358 G: My starting point is a much better understanding of the water environment and  
359 what this water environment is expected to deliver. So, by that I mean, if I at the

360 local level want to understand my catchment, how much water is in the catchment,  
361 and I want to know who are the legitimate users, and how much they need and why.  
362 And I think the big one on that is the environmental requirement. I am not making a  
363 value judgement on that at all. I just don't fully understand it. If I did fully understand  
364 it, then that is the key for me to fully understand the rest.

365 I have the sense, we know all about the precautionary principle. We know all about  
366 the protection being based on low flow...The big area for me that we don't  
367 understand is ecological resilience to stress. So we now seem to be lot in a process  
368 that avoids at all cost putting the ecology under pressure. And is that reasonable in  
369 the context of the UK economy and social and environmental ground? So I think  
370 there is evidence, but I would say the ecology can cope with this amount of stress.  
371 But we have to work out what level of stress this is. An also whether is defensible  
372 to say: Ok, there is this stress level that we could put under...let's define that, make  
373 it an objective process so we can then determine whether that releases more water  
374 to share among the other users, which is essentially public water supply, industry,  
375 leisure, agriculture, and any others...

376 **I: Navigation.**

377 G: Oh sorry, navigation. So we know what these categories are. And then agree  
378 some way of covering them up. And the starting point is for those other legitimate  
379 uses how they are covered up at the moment? It is natural justice that works here at  
380 the moment, or not...And section 57 plays an important part in that. Because that is  
381 the mechanism that says agriculture as a water user, let's put ecology to one side,  
382 but if you look at the other basket of water users, the thing that separates us from all  
383 the others is section 57. And there is a feeling within agriculture that, because of  
384 section 57, we are the safety valve.

385 That is the mechanism that protects everyone else and allows those systems to  
386 function. Drought, declaring a drought... or those sorts of processes. There is an  
387 underlying presumption that as industrial water user, because I can have this  
388 amount of water because my licence says I can have it, and there will be a long  
389 slow build up to me being told I can't have it any longer. Whereas with agriculture  
390 we face situations when potentially it is like that and we might or might not see it  
391 coming.

392 **I: On a scale of 0 to 10, how do you think drought is important to your  
393 business?**

394 G: 10...Is a hysterical reaction??

395 **I: I guess in the context of other risks.**

396 G: I am going to try to rationalize that. Of all the things that could go wrong which I  
397 have limited control, the one that worries me more is frost? Is hail?

398 **I: What keeps you awake at night?**

399 G: Yes, and I guess from time to time, is stop raining.

400 **I: Do you think droughts and water scarcity are likely to become more**  
401 **frequent in the future in the UK?**

402 G: Intuitively it is likely become a more frequent matter on two counts mainly. The  
403 demands that we are placing on the water resources are growing. So, forget about  
404 any change in weather patterns. There are more and more of us that want to live in  
405 this island. More of us want to jump in the swimming pool, more of us want to go  
406 sailing, more of us want to shower twice a day rather than once...there is a  
407 tendency for the need for water increase rather than decrease. And I don't want to  
408 go into much of a debate into climate change because I don't know. But the balance  
409 of probabilities, you look at the number of dry years, wet years, all that sort of  
410 things. And dry periods and very wet periods. It looks as if we are in a periods  
411 where these sort of things are more frequent. What I don't know is, when you see  
412 back through history you can see periods like this before. But I don't know if the  
413 trajectory is going that way or that way. The sort answer is yes.

414 **I: Which options are more relevant to your business in terms of rich**  
415 **management?**

416 G: First of all, modernization is a priority...? We can improve through modernization  
417 of equipment. We have on-farm reservoirs and quite a lot of our water is secured  
418 through that route. But it might be that we have to expand that. And certainly  
419 changing management practices. So I think it is a combination of these three.

420 **I: You mentioned that you had an anecdote about renegotiating supply**  
421 **contracts during a drought event.**

422 G: I think it was a reference to us negotiating water transfers. And I think that one  
423 was quite interesting at that time. I was working as a consultant and a strawberries  
424 grower rang me up. He was a trickle irrigator and, I can't remember why but he  
425 cannot trickle, because still these days there is no problem with it, no licence. And  
426 he was up against it. It was in 2012 and he said: I am really really desperate, what  
427 do I do? I need to get some water on the strawberries.

428 And we didn't talk about breaking the law, but I had a look at my list of abstractors  
429 for that water unit, and I found somebody who I fancied have a licence of right and  
430 wasn't using it. So I phoned him up, and said: Have you got this licence that you are  
431 not using? Yes I have and now I don't. And I said: are you interested in making a  
432 few [...]?

433 And the answer to it was, because you cannot transfer a sleeping licence, we  
434 actually got the Agency to accept, but this guy was going to abstract his water and  
435 irrigate this field on his account, not in the strawberries grower account but in his  
436 account. And it has done in 48 hours. But the biggest time-consumed was me  
437 convincing the licence holders land agent that what we were doing was legitimate.  
438 And it was also about with the Agency. If 2012 demonstrated anything it was just  
439 what the EA could do if they were minded to do it.

440 I thought that was interested. When really pushed against it. And I fully pleased for  
441 our local agencies during that period. It something could be done, they will make

442 everything to make it possible and do it quickly. So under normal circumstances  
443 even that little variation should have taken a couple of months, because of formal  
444 applications...but it was over the telephone, two emails and a phone call.

445 **I: Can I ask you a question about your appetite to risk. What is the businesses**  
446 **attitude to risk and where water fit into these risks? What are the big risks to**  
447 **agribusiness these days?**

448 G: It is market failure I suppose. That should be the biggest one. Discounting what  
449 we are talking about, what the priorities are...

450 Because we are farmers, maybe a lot of producers of things have a similar kind of  
451 mind-set. You are focus on production. That is our focus. So we are talking about  
452 risks, my tendency is to think more in things like, if animals more like diseases, with  
453 crops in water renewal and this sort of things. So casually forget we live in a world  
454 where price can tumble. And as I mentioned earlier we don't get the equal or  
455 opposite spikes any more. So it is pretty tough. This company has migrated quite  
456 significantly over the last 10 years. 10 years ago the biggest consequence of  
457 drought was a nice lift up in price. So we had that, thanks very much, and we  
458 banked it. Because, generally speaking, one way or another, over a run of years,  
459 you are better off...

460 **I: Because you have headroom...**

461 G: We can't afford to do that anymore. We have to be much more meticulous at the  
462 production level, and achieve our yield and quality targets.

463 So in terms of attitude to risk to things like water, how do we quantify that? We  
464 accept significant element of risk. We are not talking risk averse. Risk averse in  
465 water will be pulling back up production to be sure that we have sufficient headroom  
466 to cope with the very worst of conditions. Commercially this is very difficult for us,  
467 we can't afford it. So we have to accept a higher level of risk that we feel  
468 comfortable with. But we then think about mitigation, this business has being  
469 accepting in some years we might have to sacrifice that field of potatoes. I don't  
470 have enough water for you, and hope it will rain.

471 So there is anything we can say about drought, especially in 2012 as difficult as it  
472 was, it actually started raining. But if you look every other drought, at some point, it  
473 just actually start raining. And the only reason why 2012 will not be remembered as  
474 the 1976 is because in 76 it didn't start raining until the end of August whereas in  
475 2012 it started in June.

476 **I: After the UKIA conference**

477 G: I remember to sit in drought meetings in drought summits in London. But we  
478 didn't know that. It was incredibly serious at that time because we didn't know what  
479 was coming next.

480 **I: How does that risk translate through the rest of the supply chain? Do you**  
481 **think that the growers, packagers, processors..., do they try to lead on that?**

482 **And each part of the supply chain thinks, we are OK, there is no risk because**  
483 **no one wants to...**

484 G: Absolutely right. And all kind of things happen for all kind of reasons. And there  
485 are all kind of stories from 2012, which I think are pertinent to this kind of study. So  
486 there is the guy who looked at his situation and said: I am just not going to plant. I  
487 am reducing my area by whatever percentage point. And someone over the hill just  
488 did that, he was fairly public about it. He reduced his potato area quite significantly  
489 because he cannot run the risk of not being able to deliver.

490 I can think of another operator in the potato world, slightly different set of  
491 circumstances and a completely different attitude to risk. His view was: well, I will  
492 cut back my acres a little bit.. Well, if I don't plant I know I will not have any income.  
493 If I do plant, this is my state money, this is what I stand to lose, I am gonna take the  
494 chance. And of course the fact that it started to rain in June, he came out the  
495 winner.

496 Destabilizing customers is a very difficult one. I think it is actually more difficult that  
497 you imagine to hide information from customers these days. We all talk too much,  
498 they can see it. And I guarantee that when we were going in March 2012, do we  
499 plant or don't we? The number of conversations that were going on between  
500 packers and potato growers around the world to make sure that they do not run out  
501 of potatoes... That was happening.

502 And that is why we don't get the spike anymore, because the supply chains can  
503 respond. And it is much easier than it was. And most food supply chains they are  
504 incredible sophisticated these days. We are usually drawing from a number of  
505 points across the planet, of most things, at most times, for most years. You are  
506 doing business with Egypt, Spain... You just increase the magnitude of it.

507 **I: Can I ask you a little bit more about section 57? We are particularly**  
508 **interested in this thing. We want to know what information the EA provide you**  
509 **when there is some restriction, if you know which are the triggers for section**  
510 **57 being applied, if you have any ability to negotiate with the EA when**  
511 **restrictions are applied,...**

512 G: Let's separate section 57 in surface water and groundwater. What I don't like  
513 about section 57 is that I think it is unfair for agriculture. But it exists.

514 So section 57 surface water, I think a lot of us we can live with it conceptually more  
515 easily that we can with groundwater because you see the river flow go done, and  
516 you accept that something is gonna happen. But that said, I think in a more science-  
517 based world, maybe we do accept the concept of ecological challenge, I do not  
518 know or understand the basis on which the EA says now, section 57 on surface  
519 water. But I guess I kind of accept it, you know, because the river is dry so maybe  
520 they have a point. But I think I should be challenged about that, because I don't  
521 know what the indicators are, what it is actually happening and how good that  
522 science is.

523 S57 as applied to groundwater is very complex and as I understand it, the logic says  
524 that S57 is all about the ecological standards in surface water. It is all to protect the  
525 ecology of surface water. What it is saying is, that EA thinks, that what is happening  
526 in groundwater is of sufficient magnitude that is going to affect the surface water  
527 associated with it. Therefore, S57 is going to be used to restrict abstraction of  
528 groundwater. And for me this is the fundamental flaw. Because I think we don't  
529 understand the water cycle well enough, and I don't think the EA does either. But  
530 they have to be seen to be doing something, and that is fine.

531 I can well imagine, for example, within a particular catchment, intuitively you will say  
532 that a S57 restriction on a borehole, on a groundwater source adjacent to a river  
533 where there is an established connectivity, that trigger should happen before this  
534 guy over here who is 5km away from the river source, what he is doing is not going  
535 to have an immediate impact on the river. That is what seems logical for me, but is it  
536 true? I don't know. I want somebody to convince me that it is true. If we are all going  
537 to be treated the same. Because that is the habit. If there is a threat of S57 on  
538 groundwater everyone is treated the same. And this is partly because there is no  
539 mechanism by which people can be treated as individuals, and this seems to be not  
540 fair.

541 So I think part of your question was if we can do anything, or if we can negotiate.  
542 There is no doubt with groundwater and S57 we can negotiate, or we can enter into  
543 a dialogue. I think it is semantics, it is a dialogue. We avoided S57 restrictions in  
544 2012, it is a measure of the success of the dialogue. Or put it in another way, I  
545 believe dialogue has been a value, because we avoided S57 on groundwater in  
546 pretty sensitive areas in this part of England.

547 **I: Can I ask you a question. Particularly on the groundwater, who will you**  
548 **having this dialogue with? And were they able to enter into that dialogue**  
549 **because they have the knowledge and experience of the local area? Because**  
550 **EA has lost a lot of the senior groundwater people, so there is some loss of**  
551 **collective feet on the ground knowledge.**

552 G: You are kind of asking me to guess, which is always dangerous because I quite  
553 like guessing...A point of contact is a local licences officer. One of the things they  
554 are looking at is licence quantities and abstractions patterns. So in their dialogue  
555 with us, they are asking us questions as: we know what the abstraction pattern is in  
556 this area over a run of years. Do you think it is going to be different this year? How  
557 much is it going to be different? What impact is this going to have?

558 So I think we know, in this catchment, we only abstract 42% of our total licence  
559 quantity in agriculture. I cannot give figures for other sectors, but what this means is  
560 that agriculture has to change its habits quite a lot to have an impact on the  
561 calculations, bearing in mind that all calculations are based on licence quantity. So  
562 the risk calculation our local guys are going through is well...We are obliged to  
563 make a judgement of what theoretically could happen, but we are actually  
564 overlaying at what is more likely to happen. What is the gap between the two? How  
565 big is the risk we are taking? And my observation of the behaviour in 2012 compare

566 to other periods is the frequency of meetings went up. We were actually watching us  
567 week by week, both sides.

568 So your question was who are you talking to? I think we are physically talking to our  
569 local officers, but I suspect there are conversations going all the way up the chain.  
570 Because the EA wants to be seen as a responsible and competent licencing or  
571 regulatory body, and they want to be seen to be fair for all parties.

572 **I: Do you feel like you were speaking to people that actually know and**  
573 **understand your area? Or you were talking to people following a rule book?**

574 G: We are definitely talking to people who knew the stuff on the ground. From time  
575 to time we interface with the top people in the EA. People will sit across the table  
576 and say one thing, but then the decision is another...I felt through that process that  
577 we were talking to people that know and understand.

578 **I: For the next drought that comes along, what do you think could be done**  
579 **better? Or what could be improved about the way that abstractions are**  
580 **managed during drought? What is your personal wish list?**

581 G: Well, we can move up our position in the resilience scale. We have been talking  
582 about it, but the next step is doing. So, will we have done anything to protect us  
583 further? I don't know but I hope so. What lessons do we learn about observing the  
584 signs and doing anything about it? And if so, what? In terms of the dialogue and the  
585 way regulator behaved, that was hellishly positive actually. Giving the whole basket  
586 of things that were there, we couldn't expect much better.

587 I don't think there is a fundamental thing. But it would be interesting to see how  
588 some of the processes we are involved in will be delivered. What WFD does to  
589 make the risk more acute, which I think it has the potential to do. I don't know  
590 whether the abstraction reform will give us the tools to become more resilient. That  
591 is not known yet. I have mixed views about whether farming businesses should be  
592 (and I could make myself very unpopular in the farming sector) receiving grants to  
593 build reservoirs. I think those are commercial decisions. If there is a grant, I will take  
594 it but I am not sure... I feel happy about the tax break but is it a tax break a grant  
595 with another name? I don't know. The use of tax break is more a deferring  
596 mechanism rather than a gifting mechanism. So some kind of incentives...But I  
597 think that incentives should be driven by the general good.

598 Commercially, very few people can afford to invest in on-farm storage to protect  
599 themselves against an unknown event. And it could be that more and more it is  
600 driven out of production which would increase food imports. So commercially the  
601 market place says we can afford to irrigate in this country so we don't do it.  
602 Someone else may take the view that in the national interest this is unacceptable  
603 and if business can't fund that protection, then public purse has to fund it. And I  
604 think that is fair enough...