Simulations of repeat jamming against anti-ship missile seekers which use Doppler beam sharpening modes

Introduction

Modern Radio Frequency (RF) seekers are becoming increasingly more capable of medium to high resolution target imaging capabilities. Doppler Beam Sharpening (DBS) is a technique that uses the relative motion between the target and the radar platform to resolve targets, or dominant scatterers, within the same target in cross-range by exploiting the Doppler effect [1]. In the scenario of an Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) attacking a ship, DBS can be used to differentiate valid ship targets and decoys from clutter such as waves or coastline [2] by using the changing Doppler frequencies which can be caused by the missile slightly changing course to create a range of Doppler shifts. Several possible missile trajectories for DBS were proposed in [3] and [4].

Repeat jamming against pulsed DBS

During the scenario, the missile transmits the first pulse at the origin and moves perpendicular to the target with a velocity \( V \) to transmit again. The transmitted wave will propagate along a distance \( P1 \) to the jammer located on 'T1' and will then be reflected or instantly re-transmitted back to the missile along \( P2 \).

To insert the false target FT1, the jammer needs to repeat the seeker waveform to have a delay time which reflects the propagation distances of:

\[
J_{T\text{total}} = \frac{J1 + J2}{c}
\]

The targets and seeker are assumed to be at the same elevation for the entire scenario. The required delay time at the point of transmission for each jamming pulse can be calculated by:

\[
J_{T} = \frac{\left[ P1 + (J1 - P1) + (J2 - P2) \right]}{c}
\]

Velocity estimation errors

The scenarios in this paper have been used to create false targets under the assumption that all the victim radar parameters have been perfectly estimated as well as the seeker velocity and trajectory. Based on the perpendicular trajectories used in this paper, the effects of incorrect velocity estimations are shown in figure 4. The location/point reflector of the jammer is shown as T1 and the intended location of the false target is at V. All other targets are shown to have errors in cross range. The targets shown in the figure have been separated in downrange for ease of presentation. The error of the velocity estimation directly translates into a cross-range error.

Jamming signal overview

The simulations in this paper used four separate single point targets with two pairs at the same ranges but separated in cross-range plus one inserted jamming false target. The transmitted waveform for the scenarios was a Linear Frequency Modulated (LFM) or Chirped waveform. This gives a transmitted pulse train of:

\[
s_{t}(t) = \sum_{m=0}^{M_{\text{max}}} A_{m} \delta(t - m \cdot P_{R}) e^{i2\pi f_{c}m(t)}
\]

It is assumed that the jammer knows the missile velocity, trajectory, bandwidth, pulse width, carrier frequency, chirp rate, PRF and therefore the PRI. If the jammer local oscillator is perfectly matched to the seeker carrier frequency, this will then give a downmixed signal of :

\[
J_{R}(t) = \sum_{m=0}^{M_{\text{max}}} A_{m} x(t - t_{m}) (t - m \cdot P_{R}) e^{i2\pi f_{c}m(t)}
\]

The downmixed signal is then processed to obtain the parameters of the victim radar and calculate the required delay times to create a desired false target:

\[
J_{T}(t) = \sum_{m=0}^{M_{\text{max}}} A_{m} x(t - t_{m}) (t - m \cdot P_{R}) e^{i2\pi f_{c}m(t)}
\]

Using this method and parameters in table 1, Figures 2 and 3 show that a false target can be generated in a DBS image.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrier frequency</td>
<td>( f_{c} )</td>
<td>( 36 \text{GHz} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandwidth</td>
<td>( B )</td>
<td>( 200\text{kHz} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulse width</td>
<td>( t_{\text{p}} )</td>
<td>( 200\text{ns} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirp rate</td>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td>( 2 \times 10^{13} \text{Hz}^2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwell time</td>
<td>( t_{d} )</td>
<td>( 0.1\text{ms} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulse repetition frequency</td>
<td>( f_{\text{PRF}} )</td>
<td>( 200\text{kHz} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulse repetition interval</td>
<td>( f_{\text{PRI}} )</td>
<td>( 5 \times 10^{-4} \text{s} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range resolution</td>
<td>( \rho )</td>
<td>( 7.5\text{m} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile velocity</td>
<td>( V_{m} )</td>
<td>( 270\text{ms}^{-1} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Signal variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>( 7.5\text{m} )</td>
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Figure 2: DBS image of four point targets with one false target

Figure 3: DBS image with masked target

Figure 4: Effects of velocity estimation errors on false target cross-range position with zero error in downrange

Conclusion

The simulations show that false targets further away than the location of the jammer can be inserted into a DBS image assuming the missile trajectories are known. In practice, the main challenge with jamming is maintaining accurate missile velocity and trajectory estimations to constantly change the delay time to create the perfect false target. The practical implementation of jamming with respect to Low Probability of Exploitation (LPE) waveforms has not been assessed in this paper but will be addressed in future work.

References


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Gareth Frazer and Alessio Balleri
Centre for Electronic Warfare, Information and Cyber, Cranfield Defence and Security, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, SN6 8LA, UK

George S. Jacob
The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

www.cranfield.ac.uk/cds