

**The Development of Police/Community Relations Initiatives
in England and Wales Post Scarman and Their Relevance to
Policing Policy in Turkey**

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Abstract

The primary concern of this thesis is to examine changes in policing practice with reference to police/public relations in England and Wales in the light of evidence of a deterioration of the relationships between the police and the public. The secondary aim is to examine the implications for policing policy in Turkey of the lessons learned from the experience of such experiments and changes in the development of policing policy in England and Wales. The thesis argues that a community-based model of policing is the ideal for policing of modern liberal democratic societies; and community policing practices are transferable to countries striving to develop modern democratic systems such as Turkey.

The thesis assesses the prognosis for the achievement of this ideal in both countries. It emphasises that community policing has become the new orthodoxy for the police in England and Wales, as well as in other countries around the world. Although the movement's philosophies and practices are spreading rapidly, much of the debate is carried out at a rhetorical level and little is known about the range of ongoing activities, the components of these experimental initiatives, the problems and challenges encountered, and the level of success in achieving objectives.

There are fundamental differences in the historical development and political position of the police forces in these two countries. However, police services are under pressure from diverse interests and constituencies to change their styles of policing in order to secure legitimate law enforcement in the light of rapid social change. The reasons for this pressure for change will be examined in both countries. Firstly, the British experience will be analysed notably with reference to the historical antecedents which secured a broad legitimacy for a consensual style of policing which it may be argued is in existence despite serious outbreaks of urban disorder. However, the thesis shows that the gulf between the police and some sections of the community is widening, resulting in a substantial proportion (notably of the black population) lacking confidence and trust in the police. Interest has also focused on the apparent failure of some police forces to control crime. Secondly, the history of the current Turkish police tradition is analysed and rationales for change explained with fluctuations in police/public legitimacy traced and accounted for. Pressure for change to enhance police legitimacy and public relations is identified and the possibility of lessons being learned from the British experience assessed, notably with reference to initiatives to present the police as a service to communities. The thesis concludes that, both for England & Wales and Turkey, the success of community policing initiatives is heavily dependent on the commitment and participation of both sides, the police and the community in both countries.

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List of abbreviations

AGIT	<i>Avrupa Guvenlik Isbirligi Teskilati</i>
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
BCS	British Crime Survey
CBT	The Communist Party of Turkey
CMUK	<i>Ceza Muhakemeleri Usulu Hukuku</i>
DISK	Turkish Acronym for the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Un.
EU	European Union
ETK	<i>Emniyet Teskilati Kanunu</i>
ETUC	European Trade Union Congress
GLC	Greater London Council
HBO	Home Beat Officer
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
JP	Justice Party
NACRO	National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders
NAP	Nationalist Action Party
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAYC	National Association of Youth Clubs
NSP	National Salvation Party
NW	Neighbourhood Watch
PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984)
PCA	Police Complaints Authority
PEP	Priority Estates Project
PCC	Police Consultative Committee
PF	Police Federation
POA	Public Order Act (1986)
PRP	Performance Related Pay
PSI	Policy Study Institute
PSU	Police Support Unit
PVSK	<i>Polis Vazife ve Salahiyetleri Kanunu</i>
RPB	Republican People's Party
SPG	Special Patrol Group
TUSIAD	Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen's Association

Introduction

The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse and account for the development of police/community relations initiatives in England and Wales in the period since the Scarman Report (Scarman 1982) and to assess their relevance for the development of policing policy in Turkey. The thesis suggests that the way in which both English and Turkish societies are policed has been the subject of growing public and political concern. This has mainly been due to a general lack of understanding by police administrators and politicians that the maintenance of law and order involves far more than simply catching offenders. Police/public co-operation is essential in police work both to prevent and detect crime. Police officers often experience some difficulty in operating as both a community-based / preventive, *and* emergency reactive service.

In Turkey, for more than three decades, especially since the 1960 military coup, it has become apparent that police/public relations, while by no means being at their lowest ebb, leave a good deal to be desired if they are to be regarded as befitting a country claiming democratic status. Since 1950 (the end of the Single Party era), a wide range of social problems has been witnessed in Turkish society. This awareness has emerged on the Turkish political and policing agenda for a number of reasons. The Turkish police are not only exercising their regular basic function, but are also following particular codes required by international agreements. Confirming the conditions of these international agreements, especially of those that associated with Human Rights, Geneva Convention of 1950, and the AGIT (*Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teskilati*: European Security and Incorporation Council), emphasises the importance of considering the police role even more thoroughly. Because of the sensitivity concerning the nation's international reputation an affirmation of democratic practice is required if Turkey is to be accepted into the community of democratic nations.

There is little doubt that the English (English and Welsh police are governed by same legislation and policy, and 'English' will refer throughout to England and Wales) police services retain, externally at least, an enviable reputation as model to inform democratic practice. For instance Banton (1964) has argued that the English style of policing depends on a relatively homogenous society in which the expectations of the police and the policed rested on widely shared standards of conduct. It has also been claimed that the British police are the most accountable in the developed world (Local Government chronicle, 15 December 1978; in Rhind 1981: 42). As Brearley has argued:

...the British police have immense kudos abroad because of the community and the constitutional arrangements (Brearley 1994).

It is, therefore, appropriate that if lessons are to be learned for the development of the police in Turkey, so that they can serve the public rather than merely reacting in a punitive manner to justifiable or unjustifiable threats to the status quo, then the English police would be an admirable institution to study.

What soon becomes clear is that the development of the English police has not been as unproblematic a process as might be suggested both by traditional historians and by current external mythologies. The careful compromise that led to the so-called 'Golden Age' of the 1950s, has much to be said for it as a desirable model for the development of a sustainable police 'service', as British forces are increasingly coming to be termed. The successful legitimisation of this form of policing is based on a number of important background factors: 1) representative democracy, 2) operational commitments to minimum force, 3) accountability. The founding axioms of impartiality, accountability and minimum force appear to be important prerequisites for the establishment or maintenance of public legitimacy. That there is significant debate about what these terms really mean in contemporary practice does tend to exaggerate the level of current contention. That these attributes should have been possessed by the police is largely uncontested in public debate in England and Wales — a situation which does not necessarily pertain in many other jurisdictions. This is an issue which makes formal comparison with practice in other countries problematic in terms of the economic, political and social context of policing.

Research suggests that over the last decade policing in England and Wales has undergone a substantial programme of reform (Scarman 1982, Reiner 1992a, Benyon 1984, Morgan 1987a). Although it is difficult to say whether it is real or just rhetorical — or a mixture of both — this process has been based on an agenda developed both by the police and the government, who share a common objective of improving the quality of the police service and 'customer' satisfaction. The current process of reform can be traced back at least as far as the riots in Brixton, London, in April 1981, which stimulated a substantial reappraisal of the nature of the relationship between the police and the public. This included an official inquiry set up by the Home Secretary and chaired by Lord Scarman to look into the causes of the disorder. The report (1982) concluded that some of the cause of the riots in Brixton lay with the police: in particular, unnecessarily 'hard' policing in sensitive, multiracial areas and failure to consult the local community over policing matters. The report

recommended that statutory liaison committees should be established in all police force areas in order to guard against making the same mistakes again (Scarman 1982).

The widespread belief (stimulated in part by the Brixton riots and others in England and Wales during the early 1980s) that public confidence in the police might be declining was confirmed in a supplementary report of the 1988 British Crime Survey (BCS) on the public's view of the police (Skogan 1990). The report noted that public confidence in the police had declined successively across the last three British Crime Surveys. The surveys of 1982, 1984, and 1988 reported, respectively, that 92%, 90%, and 85% of respondents thought that the police were doing a 'good' or 'very good' job.

Additional information has been included in recent publications to attempt to confirm the apparent relatively high level of, but declining trend in public confidence. Evidence from a survey conducted by the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962 showed that at the time 83% of people interviewed said that they had a 'great respect' for the police and most respondents said that their opinions had not changed over the last 10 years (HMSO 1962). A recent public survey, on the other hand, conducted by an independent research company (MORI) in 1993 revealed that 46% of respondents reported that they had 'great respect' for the police (*The Times*, 12 October 1993).

This thesis pays attention to debates concerning how the founding axioms of British policing could be maintained and developed in line with changing requirements and needs, an issue starkly illustrated by the developments in public debates and policy practice that have occurred since the urban disorders of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. It was clear that the meaning attached to the founding axioms demanded rigorous scrutiny in the light of changes caused by economic decline, social diversification and fragmentation, and the proven mobility of established institutions to respond to such changes — a series of processes that some have seen as marking a disillusionment with the ideas and institutions which have developed during the 'modern age'. That modernism is an unachieved process in many jurisdictions, including Turkey with its nominal adherence to the modernist Atatürk legacy. This is a further point of contention making the deployment of formal comparative analysis problematic. If my study in England and Wales was merely to reveal new levels of 'impossibilism' in terms of the development of policing practice then I really would have little to report other than that the inevitably contentious nature of policing offers little hope for the development of the maximisation of a harmonious social order.

What remains to be done, however, is to adjudicate on the nature of the potential, thus far only firmly rooted in theory, for the further development of representative democratic policing. Many commentators (Alderson 1979, 1984, Scarman 1982, Morgan 1987a) have asserted the desirability of developing the British policing model by applying local, or more properly, 'community' responsiveness and accountability. These commentators show only anecdotal evidence of success in achieving policing goals. This thesis, therefore, accepts the validity of the evaluation analysis methods suggested by Pawson and Tilley (1993): the *mechanisms* by which community styles of policing are designed and proposed to work can be adequately tested and located within their theoretical *context* in order adequately to judge their potential for transfer in other economic, historical and political contexts, such as Turkey.

Evaluation research is basically in the business of making casual claims about the impact of a programme on persons or places undergoing some particular treatment. It suffers from unreliable results, non-replicability, biased argument and on top of these, lack of cumulation. The reasons for this lack of certainty in evaluation research are incompetence in implementation, death by political cross-fire, insufficiently articulated goals, as well as some downright bad ideas in the conception of programmes. Pawson and Tilley argue that it is high time for an end to the domination of the *quasi-experimental* (or OXO) model of evaluation (Pawson and Tilley 1994: 292). They suggest:

...the *quasi-experimental* is a fine strategy for evaluating the relative performance of washing powders or crop fertilisers, but it is a lousy means of expressing the nature of causality and change going on within social programmes. The pressing need is for the incorporation of a *scientific realist* strategy into evaluation. Realism, as a philosophy of science, insists that the outcomes unearthed in empirical investigation are intelligible only if we understand the underlying *mechanisms* which give rise to them and the *context* which sustain them. In evaluation language, this is equivalent to saying that we need to know why and in what circumstances programmes affect potential subjects *before* we can begin to say if they work (Pawson and Tilley 1994: 292).

Scientific realist strategy starts with a theory of what makes programmes work and a theory of the circumstances in which such ideas are likely to be efficacious. Sherman (1992) suggests that failure to consider rival hypotheses in general will limit police efforts to solve crime problems, allowing self-deception about police effectiveness. This is because each quasi-experiment is essentially an anecdote and, therefore, it is not possible to generalise very far from the results (Sherman 1992: 161). Scientific realism seeks to avoid the limited explanations which quasi-experimental evaluations of policing strategies provide. It does this by focusing on the process of individual

and / or institutional channel which shape the potential success and functions of new policy interventions.

If we consider the delivery of a police/public relations programme to its reception within a community, the quasi-experimental conception is deficient. The quasi-experimental method lacks in understanding the character of the community into which a programme is introduced (Pawson and Tilley 1994). As mentioned in Chapter V communities differ in terms of experiencing and responding the problem of crime and they have attributes, such as cultures (for example religious beliefs), structures (for example employment patterns) and relationships (for example contacts between ethnic groups) that are not reducible to those of the individual members. A particular programme will only work if the contextual conditions into which it is inserted are conducive to its operation, as it is implemented (298).

The thesis takes the following direction:

Firstly, the development of the British policing tradition will be analysed, noting the contention that existed concerning the establishment of a police force appropriate to the 'modern world' and the subsequent problems and debates that have emerged as the democratic process in Britain has served to 'demystify' policing practice (Reiner notes this in the academic and rather less so the public debate in *The Politics of the Police* 1992a). The importance of examining the origins of this tradition is supported by Layder:

... a historical dimension may contribute to the originality of the analysis and the theoretical ideas that are generated directly or indirectly through the research. However, this does not necessitate that our historical materials be newly discovered or original. This parameter, so to speak, has the effect of keeping the research within manageable and practicable proportions. What is of paramount importance is that we utilise as much relevant data as we can in order to achieve as rich an analysis as possible (Layder 1993: 179).

Secondly, the thesis proceeds to examine the contextual imperatives that have shaped an awareness that many of the guiding principles which legitimised the British police from its modern inception were heavily stretched in their practical, operational implementation in the light of changes in social context, most notably illustrated by outbreaks of urban disorder in the 1980s. The thesis suggests that disorderly events prompted a desperate search for solutions to the 'crisis in policing' and that a number of potentially conflicting solutions and accommodations were raised.

For example, there was a problem of how to meet relatively severe crowd disturbances with efficient and effective force, leading to substantial reviews of public order maintenance potential including new equipment, training and legislation (Public Order Act 1986). There was the energetic deployment of effort to re-establish a 'world we have lost', conjuring up the somewhat romantic notion that policing had, as an institution and at some vague point in history, been largely consensually accepted and community responsive. This tradition had already been lost in the pursuit of a misdirected, modernist, technological revolution intended to increase formal efficiency which has slowly given way to a barrage of rhetoric which aims to 'restore' community responsiveness and sensitivity. It may be seen that the energy directed towards the development of 'community policing' initiatives may represent an attempt to further the implementation of the ambitions of the founding axioms of British policing.

Thirdly, having established that community policing initiatives are a discreet line of development from the para-military initiatives designed to counter a readily perceived threat, and devoid of the pure Machivellianism suggested by the critical criminologists, the nature of their deployment and implementation will be examined in contemporary context. Movements towards community policing are not new in the international context, especially in the United States (Rosenbaum 1986, Skolnick and Bayley 1986, Greene and Mastrofski 1988). In the English context, however, there are indications that citizen involvement is essentially a means of co-option into the agendas and perspectives of official state agencies. Prime examples are Neighbourhood Watch, police-community consultation, multi-agency policing and sector policing. In addition to that, the objective of apparently devolving responsibility from official agencies to citizens has proceeded alongside an apparent counter-trend towards increasing central government control over the criminal justice system itself. In policing, for example, there has been a tendency towards national centralisation with the increase in the role of the Home Office in developing, shaping and funding crime prevention initiatives. Moreover, the strength and power of central government continues to grow. The rationale behind this strategy lies in the perceived need to secure value for money through effective managerial and financial accountability, and to ensure a co-ordinated response to national and international problems and pressures (Sheehy 1993). The conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that the theory of community policing cannot put into practice effectively in the current political context, and that the potential of community policing is limited by the much used, but variously understood use of the term 'community' in contemporary context.

Fourthly, the multitude of ideas which have been deployed to capture the concept of community will be examined in order to demonstrate how complex a terrain is opened up by attaching the prefix 'community' to any initiative. While the rhetoric surrounding policing developments suggests something positively democratic by attachment of the term 'community', it is by no means clear precisely what is meant by the term in practice and what implications it has for the deployment of resources and operational policing. It is this contention over the nature and potential of the term 'community' that underpins many of the divisions in policing today. How far does British experience conform to Scarman ideal? Can it give an indication of good practice to achieve the ideal? Can it demonstrate problems of how the ideal might be achieved and provide lessons for how the ideal may be transferred between countries?

The final section assesses how far Turkish policing is from conforming to the ideal democratic style outlined and assesses potential for change and acceptance of lessons that may be learned from the British experience. Can the English experience of police/community relations initiatives be used to introduce new policing policies in Turkey in order to improve policing practice and the public satisfaction of the police? I shall examine policing in Turkey, assessing the relationship between the police and the public, and the reasons behind the apparent alienation of the public from the police. I will show that the relationship between the police and public is generally less harmonious in Turkey than in England and Wales. Given changes in Turkey's external relations, for example the political ambition to become as a member of European Union, or to be recognised as a 'democratic state' in the international forum, policing methods must generate an improvement in the relationship between the police and the public. Turkey's record on human rights has been subject to many criticisms from the West. This is one of the reasons for the exclusion of Turkey from European unity and development. One of the reasons why the European Union turned Turkey down as a prospective member was 'violations of human rights', especially bad policing practices (Aslan 1991). It seems obvious that traditional Turkish policing methods are far from likely to produce harmonious relationships between the police and the public, on which to base anything approaching democratic policing practices. Recognising Turkey in the category of 'unstable democracies' (Ozbudun 1988), I shall raise two questions: Could 'community policing' work in the Turkish police organisation? Should the Turkish Police Organisation be changed to accommodate this policing strategy?

Although the mechanisms by which they are assumed to effect these changes are substantially ill-explored and unproved, in conclusion, the thesis recognises the limits of evaluation of community policing programmes, but points out that existing studies

suggest that they at least reduce fear of crime and increase public confidence in the police. Finally, I will argue that in order to introduce community-based policing policies, enabling the people more participation in policing matters, Turkey should improve her democratic status, and clarify the vague articles in the Police Cod (*PVSK*), General Security Organisation Code (*ETK*), and the Constitution in order to facilitate the introduction of a clear code of police practice.

Chapter 1

Conceptual framework

Until comparatively recently, studies of policing have tended to focus on research into police behaviour to examine the ways in which activity may fail to achieve formal goals and requirements. Such studies have generally been informed by sociological 'theories of the middle range', such as symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology and phenomenology (Merton 1938). These have achieved a great deal in 'demystifying' police activity 'on the ground', but they provided only a limited base for accounting for the broader social and economic circumstances that contribute to the setting of either formal or informal agendas and priorities.

The welding together of middle range theoretical approaches with broader structural analyses in the light of radical developments in the study of history and the social sciences in the 1970s has done much to identify the macro structures in which policing policy is shaped and functions. These approaches are important for any study that attempts to compare and contrast the policing function and experience over time and in different countries and jurisdictions. The role of the state and the social and economic conditions that it both generates and responds to, are of vital importance when considering the systems that it produces to effect social control at different times and places. Hence whereas Packer (1968), Cain (1973), Wilson (1968) etc. provided us with a great deal of knowledge about interactions between the police and the public and police personnel, they did little to offer explanations of how these relationships were shaped in broader historical, political and organisational contexts. This exercise was left to historians such as Hay (1980), Thompson (1985) and Rude (1970) who explored the relationships between economic circumstances, political and social change and power, more recently, sociological writers such as Hall *et al.* (1978) attempted a contemporary analysis of such relationships. Out of these studies came a realisation that the state has a crucial role in setting policing agendas and that the activities of the state itself are shaped by the circumstances to which it both responds and contributes.

Writing from a broadly Marxist perspective, commentators such as Hall *et al.* (1978) and Brogden (1982), see policing as a state function which has been a source of domination in the most advanced of liberal democracies where the police have frequently been seen by critical commentators as a source of disgrace. Evidence abounds of police and their partners in criminal justice system destroying, rather than improving the liberty-assets of ethnic and racial minorities, of women, of homosexuals and other socially marginalised groups (Brogden *et al.* 1988: chapter 6). Widespread identification of the existence of such a problem has provided impetus for extensive programmes of police self-improvement (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 4).

Underlying these programmes is a phenomenal convergence around an analysis — to be found in the knowledge of practice as in explicit expositions — that identifies the centralisation of policing (as a state function) as a principal source of the problems that have confronted contemporary policing (Johnston 1992, in Brogden & Shearing 1993: 4). State influenced, or directed, policing has become separated from the people whose peace it is supposed to be protecting. The exercise of police power has become so distanced from those it claims to be safeguarding that caring for communities, through ‘community policing’, has become a central plank of the reform agenda for state police in many parts of the world. The isolation of the police from the public is more pronounced in Turkey, where the police have had little awareness of the distance that separates them from the majority of the Turkish people.

The widening gap between the state police and communities has given rise to two substantial changes in policing: one peaceful, by silence (Stenning and Shearing 1980: in Brogden & Shearing 1993: 4), the other much noisier and more triumphal. The quieter of these developments has been the rise of corporately-organised private policing through which the middle and upper class of society have taken a direct responsibility for elements of their own protection. In reducing their reliance on the state as a guarantor of the peace, they have taken control over the ways in which their worlds are secured. In sharp contrast, however, the poor, who have little if any access to corporate policing, have remained largely dependent on the state police for their security.

The second, and much more publicised change in policing, is to be found in a range of initiatives being promoted for or by the state police under the rubric of ‘community policing’. In various guises, and with prominent audacity the concept of ‘community’ has been appropriated by the state and returned to citizens in a format dictated by it (Balbus 1978). As a result, community policing has come to represent not the defence of communities, as the term implies, but a form of policing that permits the police to keep a better watch over the community (McConville & Shepherd 1992).

The purpose of this research is to examine the development of police/community relations initiatives in England and Wales following the influential Scarman Report and their relevance to policing policy in Turkey. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework of the study and the procedures employed for collecting and analysing the data, including a statement of analytical techniques and other methodological concerns. The significance of this research in the light of existing work in the field will be explained and the theoretical models and research hypotheses employed will be described.

Theories and definitions of community policing

In England and Wales, since the inner city disturbances of 1981, the concept of community policing has dominated public discussion of policing policy resulting in demands for more accountable and socially sensitive styles of policing. Such a notion has been captured by all political parties as a 'cure-all' for solving the problem of public confidence in the police.

Another important factor in the growth and spread of community policing is the extent to which policing is subject to central influences and direction (Weatheritt 1988: 156). Lord Scarman in his report on the Brixton Disorders (1982), held to the belief that there is a need to 'modernise' police methods and to provide the police themselves with a positive social role to counterbalance their increasingly negative, coercive image (Bunyan 1981: 182). One main reason for this is that the current British Conservative government has advocated a policy of minimal government with an expanding role for the private, voluntary and informal sectors in the provision of a variety of public services (Mawby 1990). According to Hope and Shaw (1988: 11) and Brake & Hale (1992), there is an increased awareness of the social problems created by fear of crime and the damage such fear can wreak on community life. There is also a widespread belief that crime prevention is not only the business of the police, it is everybody's business. In these circumstances, it is argued that community policing is an ideal strategy to bring the police and the public together in the interests of preventing crime and improving police / public relations.

In examining the nature of police/public relations, Alderson (1979) argues that the main casualty has been the confidence and trust that the community places in the police, as the police and people are increasingly only likely to meet in situations of conflict. Criticising the 'technological cops' who rarely meet their public outside conflict or crisis, he suggested the introduction of 'pro-active' policing, as distinct from policing which is reactive, or even that which is merely preventative. Pro-active policing carries all the components of preventive policing but goes beyond it, setting out to 'penetrate' the community in a multitude of ways... to build up social discipline and shared trust (Gordon 1987: 132).

Alderson (in Bunyan 1981: 168) argues that successful pro-active policing involves an 'open and trusting relationship with the media, coupled with the breaking down of barriers between the police and other agencies — social and probation services and education departments'. Therefore, community policing frames a very high degree of

co-ordination and co-operation with all other agencies of government from the top administrative level to the bottom working level in order not just to control the 'bad' but to activate the 'good'. The police, by virtue of their 'unrivalled knowledge of crime and social awareness' are 'ideally placed' to provide the necessary leadership (*Communal Policing*, op. cit. p.31; in Gordon 1987: 132).

In England and Wales PACE 1984, set up a network of Police Consultative Committees to receive information about crime and police problems, and to represent the public interest. There also exists, inter-agency co-operation involving the police, often dedicated community constables, social services, probation, education, health, youth organisations and planning and housing services, as well as the voluntary sector. At a national level, Alderson suggested the formation of a government Department of Community Affairs jointly sponsored by what he has called 'Five Ministries of Law and Order' — the Departments of the Environment, Education, Health and Social Security, Employment and the Home Office. The objectives of this system are explained as follows:

Real criminal elements can be better isolated from those striving to live orderly lives. The flow of information improves. The negative attitude of a community towards the criminal process turns positive... When in such a setting the police have to use force and or exercise their legal role they are better understood and, in their turn, feel less alienated (*Observer*, 28 March 1982; in Gordon 1987: 132).

Although some commentators¹ are cynical of the application of this conception of community policing in current circumstances, starting from the central importance of public co-operation, innovative tactics of policing have been emerging on the policing agenda following the publication of the Scarman Report (1982). 'These community-oriented strategies became the central post-Scarman orthodoxy in Britain' (Reiner 1992a: 154).

Apart from England and Wales, community policing schemes have proliferated in the 1980s in several American cities under a number of police chiefs, whose promotion of the concept has led to their being labelled 'progressive' (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986, 1988). While there have been some notable success stories, assessments of these initiatives has been quite uncertain and variable (Trajanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, Greene and Mastrofski 1988).

1(e.g. Paul Gordon (1987), in *Law, Order and Authoritarian State*)

Despite manifest uncertainty over the specific meaning of the term, an attempt at identifying the essential dimensions of community policing has been outlined by Lord Scarman: consultation and accountability are for him the key elements. They are, he argues:

..the mechanism upon which we rely to ensure that the police in their policies and operations keep in touch with, and responsible to, the community they police. Of the two, accountability is the more important as it is 'the key to successful and socially responsive policing' (Scarman 1982: 147).

It will be argued in Chapter IV that the question of consultation is inadequately addressed and the question of accountability is to a large extent neglected. As will be explained in Chapters III and IV, community policing proposals which do not include consultation and accountability on the full range of policing issues are an inadequate response to the problem they are designed to solve. Without them there is little reason why people in areas where disaffection with the police is high should accept community policing, nor is there any reason why community policing should necessarily have the beneficial consequences claimed for it.

Despite Scarman's pronouncements, in the British experience of community policing, Alderson (1979) articulates the concept most systematically. Alderson suggests that the first duty of the police is to maintain the 'Queen's Peace', not to enforce the law. The police must use their discretion to enforce the law in such a manner as to maintain public tranquillity and prevent crime (Alderson 1979: ch. 3). He suggests that the police alone cannot maintain social order through external regulation. Order can be maintained by the community itself, through introducing acceptance of communal values and standards of proper conduct (Alderson 1979: 35-36). Efficient maintenance of order must always be with the consent of the community, for this is the prime influence. The police officer must be a part of that community, a 'citizen in uniform', not an alien force, otherwise the potential for tyranny inherent in policing would quickly be realised (Alderson 1979: chapter 3).

The notion is that 'policing by consent' has been the tradition of the British police. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapter V, increasing industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, cultural pluralism and professionalisation has led to the distraction of the moral consensus, and undermined the communal basis of social life (Alderson 1979: 24-5). The reliance of the police on technology, specialisation and mobility has separated them from those they serve. 'Reactive policing' has replaced the concept of 'preventive policing'. As social problems grow, this dependence on reacting to trouble produces an emphasis on the means of repression,

by officers whose only contact with the public is conflictual, which further alienates the police from the policed (Alderson 1979: 41-2).²

Alderson suggests that crime can be prevented by reawakening the tradition of policing by consent and maintaining the 'Queen's Peace'. Nevertheless, this cannot be achieved by reaffirming a moral consensus. In a multi-cultural society the police must accept and be acceptable to reinforce those influences which promote the maintenance of order and the prevention of crime (Alderson 1979: 46-8). To promote a positive influence on non-conflictual relationships with members of the community, local permanent beat officers are one solution to the problem of alienation of the police from the public. The police should take into consideration that they must work on behalf of the community and should not be a conflicting presence. The police must be aware of and accept the community's definition of the police role (Alderson 1979: 176-9).

The essence of 'community policing', as Alderson (1979) argues, is that there is a need to ensure that the police engage more directly in dealing with the substantive problems of concern to the communities they serve. This is why the suggested method of ideal policing can be called 'community oriented policing'. Full development of community-oriented policing will require responses to a number of questions (Goldstein 1987: 6). The main concern for community policing is that it constitutes an opportunity for greater domination. What is valuable and attractive about these community policing initiatives is their potential to develop the successful fight against crime through an emphasis on 'problem-solving' (Goldstein 1979). Community policing programmes also provide communities with an opportunity to 'watch the police' (McConville & Shepherd 1992).

As we have seen, a fascinating feature of community policing is that it is not easily definable (Manning 1984, Goldstein 1987). This could be attributed to the fact that the terms 'community', 'police' and 'community policing' are all open to numerous definitions (Mawby 1990: 170, Ryan 1994). Bearing in mind the problem of definition, it is suggested that partial definitions always seem to ignore some aspects of which community policing is supposed to be about, or fail to provide certain operational terms that allow comparative fulfilment and assessment.

² Most people (70 per cent) think there are few police officers patrolling their neighbourhood, according to a survey carried out for the review by the Harris Research Centre (*The Guardian*, 8 February 1992).

Manning (1984) argues that the concept of community policing has at least three meanings. On one level, it is an ideological system of beliefs which asserts that communities in history have been more unitary than today; that police in former times were a more legitimate and accepted part of communities; that crime and disorder were once better controlled through co-operative effort, and that social control on the whole was tighter, more coherent and pervasive.

A second meaning of community policing is programmatic. As Alderson (1983) points out, police have created community programs as well as police strategies and have made efforts to refashion their position in relation to the public. This meaning for the concept of community policing entails programmes with broad political aims, intended to restore police 'closeness' to the community. These programs are proactive activities which seek to encourage the 'common good' through involvement in the community at various levels and through diverse programmes such as community meetings, school liaison, sport programs, etc.(Alderson 1983).

A third meaning of community policing is pragmatic and contrasts with current police practice. Weatheritt (1983) argues that community policing, as seen in British policing practice, does not aim to react quickly and uniformly to all types of citizen demand 'fire brigade' policing, does not intend to abrogate all responsibility for crime control, and does not seek exclusive control of definitions of crime. The new pragmatic police eschew one-way, top-down communication to citizens about the nature of the crime problems in a community. Programmes are responses to perceived citizen discontent with police organisations that are bureaucratic, impersonal, focused on specific incidents, 'professional' crime-focused and centralised.

For John Alderson, community policing provided a radical alternative to the 'fire-brigade' response to incidents which, he argues now dominates police operations (Alderson 1979). His reorganisation of the Devon and Cornwall force emphasised community-based policing: more direct involvement by the police in the day-to-day affairs of the community and the police more personally visible. By putting the police back into the community and giving individual officers a regular beat, the community would come to know 'their' officers, bringing mutual trust and friendship. The police needed to show greater interest in the daily affairs of people and also to become more directly concerned with the formal and informal workings of neighbourhoods. They needed to build strong relationships with other key workers in the community, to maintain partnership between youth workers, community service workers and others committed to developing the quality of life in the community. Helping in youth clubs and organising social activities were two examples of such community work.

The idea of shared responsibility for the social life of the community also appeared in Alderson's plan for inter-agency co-operation. He proposed that all agencies involved in the 'care' and servicing of communities should come together more formally in a joint programme. The collective strength of the professional presence in a community could be used to the benefit of any individuals, families or groups with particular problems. Social workers, doctors, community workers, teachers, academics, voluntary organisations and other specialists would meet together with the police in order to identify problems in the community and through shared information and collective enterprise, would respond in the best interests of clients. The program would rely on frank and open relationships between agencies.

Alderson (1984) argues that the rise of individualism in Western societies has placed a strain on the social order as people assert their human rights, their right to choose their own moral standards and so on. There is a need therefore to see each person not just as a member of society but as an individual as well. He also points out that because of these changes in society, it is vital that the police enter into different cultures in order to try to understand them and gain their support and respect instead of adopting a 'blanket approach' to policing the community, treating each social group in the same way and observing them from a distance without recognising their individual identities.

The vision Alderson has of how the community should be policed involves a network of community forums each of which should attempt to tap the resources of its neighbourhood and bring people together in situations where these resources can positively benefit the locality. The scope of the forums would be confined to local matters and would be concerned with the full range of neighbourhood welfare such as housing, local planning and social services. In this way the young would be educated to question their environment and experience participation in a decision-making process hopefully resulting in the adoption of a responsible civic attitude. The police of course would be indispensable in this process and would assist in school schemes, youth support schemes and so on, all of which would theoretically lead to a reduction in crime and the emergence of positive links between the police and all sectors of the community.

Alderson (1979) also suggests that the social order in any society depends on the healthy state of many and differing institutions. When those institutions weaken, the police and the criminal justice system are brought into play on a much higher level of social control. When this social condition prevails and is further compounded by

apparent injustices, alienation and marked division, society ceases to be cohesive and crime and disorder, accompanied by heavier and more omnipotent policing responses and demands for increases in penal severity follow. Societies which develop these conditions become less attractive and less civilised. To avoid the drift towards such societies, a movement in the direction of communitarianism offers much to those prepared to understand and create it. He also suggests that, preventive policing goes beyond the mere physical aspects of that term, such as recommending physical security in terms of locks etc., towards tackling crime prevention at its roots thereby evolving the concept from the authoritarian views of the early pioneers towards a more modern concept of 'activating the good' in society (Alderson 1984).

The ideas of commentators like Alderson are, without doubt, very interesting and valuable in the sense that they show the direction in which police/community relations might head. However, it can be argued that theorising is of little use if it does not help produce practical reform. The lesson is that community policing only makes sense if constables believe that there is more to the practice of policing than enforcement by a legally sanctioned force.

Although numerous community policing schemes exist, Gordon (1987) argues that defining the term is not at all simple. Gordon notes that, at times, it seems that there are as many definitions as there are people talking about it, or chief constables saying that they are doing it. What community policing encompasses in practice is virtually everything from putting officers back on foot patrols, programmes of community relations, juvenile liaison, community involvement, through the all-embracing theory of John Alderson, (Alderson 1979) to the 'multi-agency' or 'corporate', approach to policing developed by Sir Kenneth Newman. What all these approaches and practices have in common is that they involve attempts by the police to deal with people whose support appears to the police to be weak or non-existent, and which therefore requires bolstering, or even creating. In attempting to define community policing it is therefore necessary to examine each of its components parts.

Some chief constables have described community policing as 'old wine put into new bottles' (Reiner 1991). Whether or not this description is fair, it does seem to be another example of the police introducing something apparently new without defining what that something is, or what it is intended to achieve. In an effort to 'turn back the clock' to what is complacently thought to have been a 'golden age of policing', for most police forces, and much of the public, community policing means no more than putting more police officers back on foot patrols (Gordon 1987: 133).

Weatheritt (1983) and Greene & Mastrofski (1988) claim that community policing means many things to many people. Goldstein (1987) describes community policing as an 'umbrella' arguing that this term has been used as descriptive of much of what is happening because new policing programmes often have one or more elements associated with the general concept of 'community policing'. Goldstein identified several conceptual elements common to a variety of programmes all bearing the name of community policing. These elements include the notion of broadening the police role to extend beyond law enforcement and the detection of crime and the idea that the police are important catalysts in promoting the common welfare of a community and in motivating the public to bring about social change.

Skolnick and Bayley (1986) argue that community policing programmes typically include community-based crime prevention, non-emergency patrol activities, increased accountability to the public, decentralisation of command, and civilianisation. Morris and Heal (1981) suggest that community policing refers mainly to the process whereby responsibility for the control of crime within the community is shared between the police and the public.

Irving *et al.* (1989) suggest that community policing is seen as a possible route back to the original concept of policing: one centred on crime prevention rather than reactive detection, and with 'helping behaviour' as a core activity. By providing services to the public on a pro-active basis, it is argued, a relationship can be forged with communities through which crime rates and perhaps fear of crime can be reduced.

One of the most useful conceptualisations of community policing has been outlined by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990). The core of their argument is that community policing can be viewed as a philosophy, an organisational strategy, and a tactic. They argue that community policing is in essence a philosophy of policing which proposes various principles covering police service delivery. Some of these principles have been described by the authors cited above and include such ideas as a police-public partnership and closer contact and communication between the police and the public. The practice of community policing lies in the strategies and tactics that are employed by the police to realise this philosophy.

Brown (1989) suggests that there is some agreement that community policing involves a return to a co-operation between the police and community. Although, as we shall see (historians have shown us) it is by no means clear that, there is anything necessarily positive to 'return' to. It is therefore clear that the foundations of

community policing may be suspect. Supporters of community policing often summon up memories of peaceful days in which the British bobby was said to be distinguished and defended by the majority of the public (Alderson 1979). Walker (1983) describes such a view as 'pure fantasy'. Several writers, as I shall explain in Chapter (II), provide evidence that since their inception, the British police have been subjected to opposition and cynicism from particular sections of the public (see Storch 1975, Critchley 1978, Bowden 1978).

Regarding the advent of a new, professional police force in the mid-nineteenth century, Storch (1975) has shown that the imposition of the modern police was largely often violently opposed as the police came as 'unwelcome spectators into the very attachment of urban neighbourhood life' (Scraton 1987: 122). On the other hand, these allegations should not be seen out of proportion. As I shall also discuss in Chapter II, Reiner (1985) accepts that the British police have received varying degrees of support from the public, reaching the high point of their legitimacy in the 1950s.

Whether or not the 'good old days' of British policing actually existed, the idea of community policing is still bound to a highly conventional view of society. Although it is difficult to understand exactly what he means, Alderson (1979) argues that community policing can exist where all components of a community identify the 'common good' and operate together to produce a social atmosphere in which real harmony and universal happiness can prevail. Alderson describes a community as a group of people living in sympathetic proximity. Although he appreciates that there may be hostility between inhabitants of a common area, Alderson plainly argues that where a community exists it should be strengthened and where it does not exist it should be created. Alderson proposes a multi-agency approach to achieve this social reconstruction. He suggests (1983: 3) that crime prevention initiatives can result in success by enacting pro-active measures focusing on education, social welfare, environmental planning and socialising influences. Goldstein (1987: 7) defines community policing in terms of a number of key elements:

Most common among these are the involvement of the community in getting the police job done; the permanent assignment of police officers to a neighbourhood in order to cultivate better relationships; the setting of police priorities based on the specific needs or desires of the community; and the meeting of these needs by the allocation of police resources and personnel otherwise assigned to responding to calls for police assistance.

It can be seen therefore, that neither academics nor the police offer a rigid definition of community policing. However, an enduring theme tends to involve dedicating

officers to particular beats which they patrol on foot, in order to develop closer contact with local people. These beat officers should forge relationships with 'community leaders', workers belonging to other agencies, local businesses and ordinary residents, to get to know their views. Officers at different levels might participate in the meetings of different bodies representing aspects of the community. The objective of building relationships between the police and the public is not simply to boost the public image of the force. It is intended that communication will be enhanced and that the public will share the responsibility for crime prevention (Evans 1975). However, Morris and Heal suggest that in divided communities it may only be possible for the police to develop a harmony with groups who already associate with their values. Mawby (1990: 175) offers a table summarising the potential dimensions of police/community relations:

Table 1: Dimensions of police/community relations:

Police involvement in community

Physical location of police within neighbourhoods
 Police officers have some affinity with neighbourhood
 Police involvement with other agencies at local level

Police role within community

Problem-solving prioritised over law-enforcement
 Emphasis on local generalists not central specialists
 Community-oriented role valued by officers and management

Community involvement in policing

As police auxiliary
 In organised groups liaising with police about crime control
 Structured mechanisms for making police accountable
 Evidence that police policies and practices are influenced.

Friedmann (1992: 4) consolidates these different dimensions into one workable definition offered as follows:

Community policing is a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police service and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime-cosign conditions. It assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater

public share in decision making and greater concern for civil rights and liberties.

The failure to clearly define community policing can cause excessive attention to be paid to service aspects of the work of the police and deflect attention away from crime control to such an extent that the role of the police in detecting crime and maintaining order is almost forgotten. The main emphasis behind community policing is that an effective working partnership between the police and the community can play an important role in reducing crime and promoting security (Skolnick and Bayley 1986). Community policing is designed to allow the community to nominate problems and focuses on what the police can achieve in partnership with the community to deal with the nominated problems (Moore 1992: 126).

From these various definitions, one might suggest that community policing is a style of policing that can improve relations between the police and those they are designated to serve by attempting to hold police accountable for their actions. Discussions of community policing suggest that it differs from traditional policing in that the latter is primarily 'reactive', concentrating on activities such as responding to emergency calls, whereas community policing takes a more 'proactive' stance towards crime such as identifying and tackling the causes of crime.

From the common elements of community policing, it is understood that its implementation requires a degree of consultation between the police and their communities. In his report on the Brixton disorders, Lord Scarman (1982) recognised the need for more formal consultation methods with all sections of the society. As will be examined in detail in Chapter III, Scarman recommended the nation-wide introduction of local consultation committees. He proposed that statutory liaison committees, or something similar, should be established at police divisional or sub-divisional level (Scarman 1982: para. 5.55-5.71). The recommendation subsequently became part of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Regarding a multi-faceted and fundamental reorientation of police thinking, the Scarman report on the Brixton disorders can be nominated as the focal point in the history of the British policing. However, Scarman failed to recognise that the 'hard' or 'militaristic' elements in police strategy are essentially incompatible with community policing. It would be impossible to maintain consent with coercive policing measures. Therefore the Scarman report is, in some respects, contradictory.

Aiming at the stimulation of greater public involvement, and the 'multi-agency' approach to social control, Scarman influenced the re-orientation of policing on a wide front. Scarman's theories first had a practical impact on Sir Kenneth Newman's strategy for policing London after he became Metropolitan Commissioner in October 1982. Similar programmes were implemented around Britain (Reiner 1992a: 258).

We can see that there is confusion surrounding what community policing is and is not. As Dunleavy points out:

There are many conditions where people can produce a notion, agreeing that it applies in some cases, but in other situations disagreeing whether it applies or not (Dunleavy 1986: 71).

Unlike the physical sciences, the humanities and many social sciences do not have a separate sphere of 'scientific' discourse in which meanings are single-valued and unambiguous. On the contrary, they work with ideas taken from common language. These 'everyday' terms almost invariably have more than one possible meaning. In ordinary communication and other common usage, there are mechanisms for managing the flow of ideas with various interpretation. The language being used frequently associates with an immediate context of 'encountering' (Dunleavy 1986: 66-67). For example, as is illustrated in Chapter V, one study counted 95 separate senses in which social scientists used the term 'community', many of them similar or overlapping, but others quite plainly contradictory (Hillery 1955).

Cohen (1985: 114-6) argues that politically motivated change in the structure of modern social control is characterised by powerful reform rhetoric that conveys to its audience conflicting, indefinite and unclear words and concepts. As an ideological construction, community reform is characterised by 'contradiction, anomalies, and paradoxes'; as a theoretical concept the meaning of community is blurred so that 'almost anything can appear under the heading community and almost anything can be justified'.

If the community concept is generally questionable, then its definition problem is further compounded when it is applied to the equally ambiguous concept of policing. The terms 'community policing', 'community based policing', and 'community oriented policing' convey a variety of metaphorical, ideological, programmatic, and pragmatic meanings (Manning 1984). In addition to debates about ideological and political implications of community policing (Kinsey *et al.* 1986, Taylor 1983, there has been growing concern about the lack of conceptual clarity and empirical validity of many its assumptions (Weatherit 1986).

Manning (1984: 213) argues:

There are at least ten assumptions which seem to lie behind the use of the term 'community policing' and the arguments advocating its worth. These assumptions are largely untested and untestable; are unspoken yet matters of tacit agreement; reflect the political aims of policy; derive from some general sentiments or feelings about the nature of society, of social relations, of hierarchy and authority, and of the nature of policing as a representative of state authority. These ideas arise from a political context. All such assumptions are factious. Evidence supporting them is mixed, at best.

I now offer a brief synthesis of the reform assumptions and prescriptions implicit in the community policing literature and attempt to identify a number of operational propositions. The literature on community policing generally claims that the most effective basis of order and control in society is community-based. Communities hold varying degrees of social stability and control which, it is argued, the police should reinforce and utilise (Wilson and Kelling 1982). However modern communities, for a variety of sociological reasons, have ceased to play an active role in formal social control (Kelling 1985). Modern police have removed themselves philosophically, organisationally and operationally from the community (Moore and Kelling 1983). The resulting marginalisation of the police from the community has produced less effective policing and increasingly disorderly, criminogenic, and fearful communities (Kinsey *et al.* 1986). The literature suggests that in order for the modern police to be an effective and efficient source of order and control in urban communities, they must re-integrate their organisational policies and operations to respond to the community's collective policing concerns and priorities (Goldstein 1979). A community-based policing organisation can, it is presumed, mobilise the community's dormant desire for social order and control and co-operate to create a more secure, stable and orderly environment (Trojanowicz 1982).

The advocates of community policing argue that communities have unique and distinctive policing problems that are not addressed by conventional police organisation and response. People want to see police officers in their local areas of residence and business on a regular and casual basis. The more police they see, the more they will be satisfied with police practices. This requires urban policing to be organised and operated at the community or neighbourhood level. The advocates of community policing also assume that community consensus should guide the police response to the crime and order problems of the community (Murphy 1988: 395-6, (Manning 1989: 11, Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux 1990: viii).

These assumptions are ideologically based and wishful extensions of a political and moral perspective. They represent a project view of the world shared by police and reformers. It is possible to shed more light on the political and moral context of the wish for community policing by comparing it with current police organisation and practice.

Senior officers now generally recognise the counter-productive nature of paramilitarism (Reiner 1991). New legal powers give them more authority to avoid such confrontations. The new technology of information-gathering is also counter-productive, involving a decline in local contact and trust. The inevitable division between police and public, where real world experiences of policing compete with expectations generated by the formal legal system and constitutional dogma, can have in severe consequences for officers. Community policing needs to be realistic and not based on false assumptions that the police can be a friend of all. The social service police role rests ultimately on the crime control function, a situation which makes some conflict inevitable.

Critics suggest that implementations of community policing are, in operation, a far cry from successful police-community relations. The use of such a strategy to 'gain the confidence' of other agencies, key workers in the community and the people themselves, provides the chance for a level of targeting and surveillance which no previous strategy could offer. Combined with the proven lack of political accountability, it has not only consolidated police autonomy but has also laid the foundation for a form of total policing without effective consultation and with no check on the use of police discretion (Gordon 1987).

The advocates of community policing stress that the officers responsible for an area should be totally familiar with their surroundings and should know something of their character. This might possibly involve living in that area and such a situation would certainly encourage communication and co-operation between the home beat officer and his neighbours. Unfortunately however, it seems that this is not really happening to any great degree. The Merseyside Council Crime Survey (Jones *et al.* 1986) showed that, 81 per cent of police officers in the Merseyside area were living outside their divisions and well over half were spending none of their leisure time there. If officers are not seen to be a part of the community they are responsible for, in terms of living in that area or spending some of their leisure time there, they will almost inevitably be seen as 'outsiders', especially in close-knit communities, and there will be a barrier between them and the public.

Kinsey *et al.* (1986) also have reservations about the nature of police/community institution relationships in a multi-agency approach to tackling crime, suggesting that in some cases police may dictate activity, compromising the effectiveness of other community bodies. It is also of particular concern that the achievement of the concept of community policing appears to be fundamentally dependent on the 'goodwill' of police chief and particular officers. The police in this model are presented as the 'good guys', who only have other interests of the community at heart (Wilson and Kelling 1989). The reality, however, is that this goodwill is a limited commodity within urban police forces and the police have other interests. One of the most difficult jobs for senior managers is to keep these different interests in check (McConville and Shepherd 1992). Secondly as will be mentioned in Chapter IV, patrol work and dealing with low level disorder is low priority and low status work for the police (McConville and Shepherd 1992, Holdaway 1983). Thirdly, unless the emphasis on preventive policing is given, bureaucratic and organisational structures resist the implementation of community policing (Weatheritt 1986).

Proposals and significance of the research

The purpose of community policing, it has been suggested, is to ensure or to improve the relationship between the police and the community. Good relationships between the police and the community, it is argued, provide the grounding for the most appropriate policing strategies to achieve peace and stability .

Despite all the criticisms, community policing can be put forward as a strategy which offers an alternative to authoritarian, military, or non-consensual policing while still responding to the social problem of crime and victimisation. In this sense it is a subject worthy of further research for anyone concerned with improving police/public relations. Eliminating the problems which are often encountered, or merely feared, in implementing community policing can only have a desirable effect upon relations between the public and the police, and promote a positive impetus towards maximising the acceptance by communities of an institution which, due to its role as a public agent ultimately exercising force and coercion, inevitably occupies contentious social position.

The theoretical models of this study are based on the argument that riots in the 1980s in England and Wales directed attention at the failings of the police as institution and there was a growing crisis in the relationship between the police and certain sections of the community. In his report on the disorders, Lord Scarman highlighted particular problems with ethnic minorities, youth and the unemployed (PSI 1983, Scarman


1982). As a result of his analysis of the causes of the riots Scarman set out two guiding principles that he said were necessary for policing a free society :1- Consent and balance. 2- Independence and accountability (Scarman 1982: Para. 4.55).

Scarman recommended the development of improved relationships between the police and the community as a necessary pre-requisite for containing and eventually reducing crime. The historical tradition of British policing has stressed the necessity of 'policing by consent', meaning policing with the support of the community. One of the important questions this thesis examines is how this support can be achieved.

Although Alderson's research attempted to set up community policing before 1980, it has only been part of the national police agenda since the publication of the Scarman report in 1982. In 1984, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act required every police force in England and Wales to set up Police Consultative Committees (PCCs). The innovatory nature of this enterprise is recognised and this study will consider the problems which have been encountered in establishing this concept as a meaningful part of everyday police routine. In Chapter V, I shall raise the problem of defining 'community' in relation to these schemes. In addition, there are major hurdles such as the problems encountered by the police in implementing schemes in inner city areas and accommodating this style of policing within established routines. Some critics also undermine the PCCs as a viable scheme of policing and point out the potential for community police to 'colonise' existing community agencies, eroding civil liberties and compromising the long-term legitimacy of these agencies in the eyes of the communities they serve (Kinsey *et al.* 1986).

As shown in figure 1, the theoretical background of this thesis arises from the proposition that for more than three decades, authoritarianism, racism, professionalisation, politicisation and bureaucratic changes in the British police have resulted in a growing gap between the police and many communities. There are two main issues identified in this thesis. The first is the decline in police legitimacy and accountability in England and Wales, particularly in inner cities and large towns, which has led to major problems between the police and the public.³ In these extreme circumstances the means of re-establishing police legitimacy was thought to be to 're-involve' the community (Alderson 1979, Scarman 1982, Alderson 1984).

³ Brixton, Stoke Newington, Hackney, Notting Hill, Islington in London; Toxteth in Liverpool; Handsworth, Small Heath, Bordesley Green in Birmingham, Highfields in Leicester, Hillfield in Coventry, Moss Side in Manchester have been places where relationships between the police and the public have been based upon conflict.



Question: Overall, to what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way your / this area is policed?

Source: MORI, in Benyon (1994: 50)

The notion of community is obviously central to community policing. In community policing schemes, it is a common illusion that the nature of community in modern societies is misunderstood. Considering the nature of community, what are the important implications for the proposed policing schemes? What should be the strategies of community policing?

In England and Wales, therefore, we can see how social and economic change in one part of the political environment is leading to changes in others including the field of policing; such a tendency is noted by Solesbury (1976). In Turkey however, this does not appear to be the case and this intransigence will be the focus of the second aspect of this study — an effort to account for the particular intransigence towards police organisational and operational development.

Secondly, this study will consider the problems of policing in Turkey, particularly problems in police-public relations. During the late 1970s and early 1980s Turkish police officers have developed a reputation for using excessive force, and even torturing suspects. The Turkish police culture, like police cultures everywhere, has often been blamed for police violence. Especially it is in the policing of public

demonstrations that the consequences of the conjunction between state imperatives and police cultural exigencies have been most manifest.

Policing has often been regarded as a source of oppression. There is a widely accepted belief that the violence that begins on the street continues inside the police station. In Turkey, with particular respect to police violence, the term has even less meaning than elsewhere. Police violence in Turkey, firstly, is linked directly with the normative expectations and practices of the rank-and-file (the police culture). Secondly, especially in the events of mass protest, it is linked with the rules formally governing police work.

The Turkish police culture contains all the elements universally found among rank-and-file police — a sense of 'mission', a combination of suspicion and paranoia, the isolation of the police as a community within a community, conservatism, a gender-based chauvinism, stereotypical assumptions about race and qualities of realism and pragmatism. Torture is as much a mainstay of Turkish policing as mass carnage. It has been, and continues to be, a normal part of the custodial and interrogative practices of the Turkish police. Not surprisingly, especially during the 1980s, deaths in custody were a regular occurrence (Amnesty International 1991).

Turkish police are being called upon to establish harmonious relationships with the public that are process — rather than rule-based and that have broad rather than narrowly defined objectives. Instead of carrying on as the unique representatives of internal sovereignty, they now will be expected to work within a framework of dual power. Whatever criticisms we might have of power-sharing as a constitutional principle, it seems that, as well as is the case in other countries, Turkish police require a form of integrated power-sharing between organs of the state and organs of the community. The community accordingly does not surrender its sovereignty to the organs of the state but rather shares in the exercise of sovereignty with them (Brogden & Shearing 1993: x).

The emerging approach to the improvement of the Turkish police is founded on the claim that their practices are out of line with accepted 'international standards'.⁴ What is required to solve the problems of Turkish policing, it is argued, is a development programme that will make the Turkish police more like the police in

⁴ One of the reasons why the European Union turned down Turkey was her 'violation of human rights', especially shown by bad policing practices. Aslan (1991) argues that the European Union appears to insist that aspiring members should be unequivocally 'liberal' and 'democratic'. In these circumstances, there has been pressure from the European Union and from non-governmental organisations, particularly Amnesty International on Turkey.

Western liberal democracies, the problem of improvement is straightforward. Find a model of sound 'liberal-democratic policing' and then re-shape the Turkish police so that it approximates it. The central feature of policing models that can be offered to Turks is that they all adhere to two central principles of liberal-democratic policing. First, the models accept the liberal principle that policing should be constrained by a right-based 'rule of law'. Second, they accept the democratic principle that they should answer to the people as a whole — 'policing by consent'. What can be done to implement this in Turkey? Can community policing provide one of the answers to these problems?

The thesis argues that most of the police/community relations initiatives, and the demands for police accountability, are in response to continually recurring crises in police/public encounters. These crises occur mainly where the unemployed and ethnic minorities form a substantial proportion of the community. All of these divisions may be seen as evidence of significant and increasingly fragmented demands within society — a product of increasing social diversity and complexity which some writers have seen as heralding the demise of the 'modern age' (Reiner 1994) This form of analysis provides major challenges to all social institutions, but perhaps especially for those concerned with social control.

Of the various outcomes of police/community relations initiatives, a central question is what effect they have had on day-to-day encounters between the police and the public and what changes have been wrought in the way the police are perceived in the community? The main hypothesis of this thesis is that community-based models of policing constitute the ideal for modern liberal democratic societies. The theory and practice of community policing is transferable to countries striving to develop modern liberal democratic systems such as Turkey.

The thesis points out that community-based policing strategies lack understanding of the sociological meaning of communities. It suggests that communities differ in their experiences and responses to the problem of crime. Therefore, the thesis analyses how important is an understanding of the community in terms of setting the best crime prevention strategy in such a community? What are the arguments about how good relations between the police and their local communities could be best fostered? Are there new approaches that might be adopted? What can be done to gain public support? In particular what should be done to improve policing strategies for the police amongst the young and ethnic minorities? Is Neighbourhood Watch one of the answers to the problem of crime? Regarding Turkish policing practices, I propose that in order to legitimate their position and activity in the eyes of the Turkish people and

international human rights concerns, the Turkish police need to improve policing practices. In order to examine these issues, this study shall proceed as follows:

Chapter II: Every police force is, of course, in a perpetual state of 'crisis'. Policing large numbers of people and maintaining the status quo is necessarily a contingent exercise. However, since 'law and order' debates were raised to unparalleled prominence around the 1979 general election, the policy crisis has been perceived as a general concern about the political motivations of police practices. This crisis is reflected in relations between the police and the young, especially ethnic minorities, and increasingly authoritarian police methods, particularly in the inner cities in the 1980s. One of the aim of this chapter is to look at how extensive is racial disadvantage and discrimination and what part did these factors play in the urban disorders of the 1980s?

As well as examining at the formal political aspect of the rationale behind community policing, I will also consider the financial reasons behind its rise, such as the introduction of the Home Office circular 114/83, Operational Policing Review and the debates on quality of service and value for money.

Chapter III: In this chapter, the main debate is raised on the question of 'what is the significance of the concepts of 'accountability' and 'consultation' in terms of policing practices?'. In order to consider debates on police accountability and police response, it is necessary to look at the main elements of community policing. This involves an examination of the function of the Police Consultative Committees (PCCs) — arrangements for a degree of local community representation made under the section of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 (Section 106). This examination involves addressing the following issues: What is the impact of the PCCs in terms of the role of the police/public co-operation in policing policy making process? How do the PCCs function? Are the PCCs successful in terms of meeting their objectives? What is the future of community/police representative forums given current legislative developments?

Chapter IV: This chapter critically examines the principles, programmes, and procedures pertaining to community policing that are being put into operation throughout England and Wales. What is meant by the term community policing? What are the philosophies? In this respect several types of community policing efforts will be identified which aim to integrate police and community aims. These can be generally identified as public relations campaigns; Neighbourhood Watch schemes; self-help associations; consultative efforts; multi-agency co-operation and sector

policing. What are the advantages of community policing and in what ways is it performed? What are the problems of implementing multi-agency policing? The main questions which arise are whether such schemes have resulted in success in terms of meeting their objectives and does the notion of community policing serve the same function as the rhetoric of legislation, militarisation and professionalisation in earlier periods? As Gordon (1987) asks, is community policing another form of political control merely an adjunct to more directly coercive forms of politically inspired social control?

Chapter V: In order to develop a theory of community crime prevention strategies, the issue of understanding community myths is raised in this chapter. It is widely seen in the literature that the notion of crime being tackled at the community level does not suggest that a simple solution or definitive approach is likely to emerge. The literature also suggests that there is no complete agreement as to the nature of the 'community'. So, there are a number of questions which need to be scrutinised: What models of community exist and are they adequate? What is the meaning of a neighbourhood? What are the theories underpinning community approaches to reducing crime? Is there any link between crime, crime prevention and the environment? What are the phases of successful community crime prevention strategies? How can links be made between the concept of community and its relevance to the concept of community policing?

Chapter VI: This chapter examines policing in Turkey, assessing the relationship between the police and the public, and the reasons behind the alienation of the public from the police. What is the role of political, historical, socio-economic and cultural factors in determining the relationships between the police and the public? What are the barriers to attempting a review of Turkish policing strategy along the lines of those currently being experimented with in England and Wales?

In this way the following research questions will be addressed and hypotheses tested.

Research questions, hypotheses and problems

In Turkey, there is currently no academic sociological research on policing so far. No-one (including academics and the police themselves) inside the country questions policing practices. Regarding historical analysis, the literature review has revealed that there are also very few Turkish studies in this area. There are short articles on the Turkish police and policing published in the Turkish Police Journal but this publication cannot be regarded as objective or academic. In addition, if we consider

parliamentary debates, newspaper editorials, correspondence columns, radio and television programmes and other media where political issues are aired, it is difficult to find discussions of the police and policing matters except where the police are involved in problems of terrorism. The question here is how and why policing matters are marginalised in the Turkish political agenda?

Solesbury (1976: 380) argues that in democratic countries, change in one part of any particular environmental system can lead to consequent change elsewhere. But this is not always the case in Turkey. In order to understand this failure to address policing matters an incorporation of Solesbury's model and the historical, socio-politic and cultural factors needs to be considered.⁵

One of the aims of this study is to examine the nature of police / community relations in Turkey. Regarding police/public relations, a survey was carried out by PIAR in Istanbul amongst a sample of 1500 citizens in 1992. Also a victimisation survey was conducted by Tugrul Ozsengul between February and May 1993 in Istanbul.⁶ Therefore, in order to get some ideas about police / public relations and the public perceptions of the police in Turkey, I will consider the findings of these surveys. Regarding the position of the Turkish police I will use the findings of Muammer Yildiz (1995) who conducted participant observation amongst the Turkish police in Ankara and Fethiye.

In England and Wales, there are only limited published evaluations of community policing programmes. However, there is a larger body of research evidence available on the kinds of policing programmes identified above as the most practical applications of a community policing strategy. The aim of this section is to examine possible problems at the stage of evaluation of community policing schemes. Concerning the success of a scheme, I shall point out that the nature and evaluation of community policing cannot give us a concrete answer.

I shall not conduct a formal evaluative study although I shall be considering previous research carried out by British academics. However, the problem of evaluating

⁵ This will be examined later in the assessment Chapter.

⁶ The survey was conducted among a sample of 2000 in Gungoren, one of the suburbs of Istanbul. The aim was to find out the extent of crime, to get information on the public perception of the police and fear of crime. He used 'face to face' and 'drop-pick' techniques. The response rates were 67% in 'face to face' and 46% in 'drop and pick' surveys.

community policing strategies will be of concern. Perhaps the most fundamental problem is the low internal validity of the typical research design used. Rosenbaum (1988) notes that he has little confidence that the behaviour which distinguishes participants from non-participants is attributable to the act of participation or the influence of the groups, rather than pre-existing differences between two groups. Self selection is one of the biggest threats to the validity of non-experimental evaluation research in many fields (Rosenbaum 1988: 128).

All of the empirical observations leave unanswered the fundamental question of whether the introduction of community crime prevention programmes such as Neighbourhood Watch can make a difference in the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour of local residents. The important question here is whether informal social control (and other processes supposedly activated by watch type programmes) can be implanted in neighbourhoods where they have not developed 'naturally' (Rosenbaum 1988: 128).

In evaluating NW — a significant plank of recent community policing initiatives in England and Wales — a fundamental problem arises from the fact that crime patterns vary continuously in space and time in response to a wide range of variables. It is difficult to predict much of the variation and there can be no experimental control. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute any perceived change to the introduction of one particular initiative (Bennett 1990).

Another point which must be addressed here is that the results of any evaluation are also likely to be influenced by the scope and scale of the investigation, and by the extent to which displacement of crime is examined. As a result of a local initiative, if participants experienced a reduction in a particular targeted crime, it can be concluded that the initiative had been successful. On the other hand this conclusion requires qualification, because it is possible that criminal activity was wholly or partially deflected to alternative locations, and / or offences (horizontal or vertical displacement) (Rosenbaum 1988). Also although the distribution was significantly altered, it may be that the total level of crime remained constant. In addition to such arguments, the problem of definition appears time and again in the research literature, notably in the framing of questions and the interpretation of answers in survey work. It is often difficult to discover exactly what is being measured and described; consequently, serious problems are encountered in attempting to compare one study with another.

Summary

'Community policing' offers a useful alternative to authoritarian, military or non-consensual policing which responds to the social problems of crime and victimisation while allowing full representation of democracy and human rights. The thesis suggests that police violence and resultant problems with police / public relations are a result of police culture and disorders are caused partly by racial disadvantage and discrimination (Benyon 1986).

Another important suggestion is that the police can obtain the support of the community they serve by consultation. In this context, Police Consultative Committees set up by PACE 1984 are a valuable means of improving police / public relations in England and Wales.

This chapter has presented the conceptual framework of the study. The meaning of community policing, the proposals of the present research and several features indicating the significance of research and policy have been addressed. The theoretical framework and research hypotheses for the present study have been outlined. I have also raised the problems involved in carrying out this research, provided an understanding of the significance of the work and given an overview of the current situation on police research in Turkey.

Chapter 2

The crisis in policing and the search for solutions: the rise of
community policing

This chapter will describe and attempt to explain the process of demystification of the police activity in England and Wales. It will be suggested that a number of factors have plunged the police into acute controversy and conflict: corruption and miscarriage of justice scandals; accusation of racial discrimination; increasing public disorder and the militarization of police tactics (Waddington 1992); increase in the use of technology; politicisation of the police; and post-modernity (Reiner 1994). For more than three decades recorded crime rate has continued to rise, clear up rate has continued to decrease. Resulted in the questioning the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, these problems have changed the characteristics of the relationships between the police and the public.

Since 1950s, public attitudes towards the police in England and Wales have changed dramatically (Home Office 1982, 1984, 1988; the PSI 1983). One of the main reasons could be the fact that during the early 1980s, especially after the Brixton riots, there was a growing concern among the public, critics and police leaders that the relationship between the police and the public was deteriorating (Scarman 1982).⁷ At one level this appeared to be a symptom of an increasing distance between the police and the public brought about by the technological developments in policing in the 1960's and 1970's. In particular, the use of cars and personal radios were identified as reasons of the growing isolation of the police from the public and the opinion that policing was becoming more 'reactive', distanced from regular, informal communication with the public and in some cases distinctly more hostile to certain stereotypical categories of the public (Alderson 1979, Ekblom 1986, Weatheritt 1983). Predictably, there appeared to be growing indication that particular subgroups of the community were becoming hostile and antagonistic towards the police and vice versa.⁸ Research, such as that carried out by the Policy Studies Institute in 1982-3, showed that a significant proportion of the black population lacked any sense of reliance and trust in the police. This negative relationship was made especially visible firstly in responses to outbreaks of disorder at the Notting Hill Carnival in 1976 and 1977 and, more spectacularly in the St. Pauls area of Bristol in 1980 and the Brixton

⁷ Systematic surveys of opinions about policing from members of the public frequently yield positive views at a general view, but these are often tempered when specific questions are asked, or when details of any individual's encounters with the police are considered. More importantly, there are systematic class and age differences revealed in public views about the police.

⁸ See, for example the PSI 1983.

disorders of 1981 and subsequent riots in both London and in other parts of the country (Scarman 1982, Kettle and Hodges 1982, Benyon 1984).⁹

The issue of the growing isolation of the police from the public was addressed to some extent by the development in the early 1980s of the concept of community policing, notably as espoused by ex-Chief Constable John Alderson (Alderson 1979). The fundamental principle of community policing propounded by Alderson was that the police should enter into an agreement with the public and jointly they should work towards 'the common good' (Alderson 1979). The proposal received a mixed reception. The experience of community policing in Alderson's Devon and Cornwall provided some evidence that there might be an alternative path along which proactive policing might positively develop. However, there was also some fear among critics that community policing might either be unworkable in practice or politically and socially hazardous in terms of violating civil liberties and abusing fundamental democratic rights (Short 1983, Scraton 1985).

The concept and implementation of community policing in Britain is particularly associated with the ideas of Alderson and the particular practice of community policing as developed by the Crime Prevention Support Unit in Exeter (Moore and Brown 1981). Alderson's view of community policing failed to achieve popular support and as a total policing hypothesis has failed to develop, yet interest in community policing has increased significantly over the last ten years in other ways.¹⁰

One of the main aim of this chapter is to examine the rationale behind the rise of community policing in England and Wales. What were the reasons for the birth, or 're-birth' of community policing? In doing this I shall firstly outline the historical tradition of policing in England and Wales and explain its development from the formation of formal, public police forces following the inception of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. Secondly, I shall provide an analytical account of the significant developments in 20th Century policing in England and Wales in order to explain the reasons for the widening gap between the police and the community. I will

⁹ Regarding public opinion of the police at the beginning of the 1990s, Duncan Campbell, the Crime Correspondent of *the Guardian*, argues that the police are suffering their most serious crisis in public confidence for 30 years. In the same article, John Newing, Chief Constable of Derbyshire, argues that the fall in confidence is not an illusion, it is a fact (for more discussion, see *the Guardian*, 28 November 1990).

¹⁰ e.g. Neighbourhood Watch, Multi-Agency Policing, Sector Policing, PCCs.

particularly examine the argument that there has been trend towards a 'law and order state'; and the effects of long term unemployment and racism in British Society, the politicisation of the police, racial discrimination by the police and the role of the increase in the use of technology enhancing reactive capacity in amplifying a decline in the relationship between police and public. Finally I shall look at the rise in recorded crime and the government response embodied in Home Office Circular 114/83 emphasising value for money and quality of service.

A historical account of policing in England and Wales

There are two broad interpretations of British police history: conservative and revisionist accounts (Reiner 1992a). In the conservative account the police are seen as an inevitable and unequivocally beneficial institution, a cornerstone of national pride and civilised existence. However, the revisionist view is located in a comprehensive examination of the 18th and 19th centuries, seeing police as a means of maintaining the dominance of a ruling class over the various sections of the working class who constitute the majority of the population (Bunyan 1983).

The orthodox account had recognised the widespread hostility to the establishment of the police which permeated British Society in the 18th and early 19th Centuries, but dismissed it as fraudulent (Reiner 1992b). The revisionists analysed these conflicting political currents in terms of their class position and interests, and established the rationality of anti-police opposition from a variety of perspectives.

The orthodox explanations of the founding of the 'new' police in England in the 1820s and 1830s¹¹ have been couched in terms of problem-response models. The introduction of the new police is defined as the response of the governing classes to perceived problems of riot, crime, social disorganisation, working class indiscipline, or some combination of these and other problems. At their worst, such accounts have crudely juxtaposed some very generally specified problems: increased levels of 'antisocial' behaviour, or accentuated class conflict resulting from industrialisation and urbanisation, and a response: the 'new' police, which is presented as the inevitable and wholly appropriate outcome. The source of the need for a new police in 1829 could be attributed to the assumption that industrialisation and urbanisation caused the old control arrangements to be no longer capable of coping with the

¹¹ 'Modern police history begins not in Britain itself but in Ireland, with the passing of the Irish Peace Preservation Force act in 1814, when Peel was Irish Secretary' (Jeffries 1952: 53; in Brogden 1987: 4).

problems of order. Such a crisis in maintaining order resulted in the establishment of a formal, public, police institution (Critchley 1978).

The early histories emphasised the significance of the 'mob' (Critchley 1978). Alternatively, crime fears were perceived as the element which constituted the problem to which the new police was a response. Thirdly, accounts of the growth of policing in the United States have centred upon the more complicated features of urbanisation and migration movement. Fourthly, a law of uncompromising executive proliferation has been elaborated. Finally, there have been more far-reaching critical comments, with debts variously to Foucault and to more materialist histories, and relating the rise of professional policing to the conjunctural crisis of early capitalism (in Brogden 1987).

Critchley (1978) presumed that riots were the precipitating element in the formation of the new police. Tolerance of public disorder declined, as its aims were transformed from symbolic protest to material destruction. As the social disapproval of the ghetto dwellers spilt over the boundaries, the traditional form of lower class political articulation collided with the new bourgeois standards of the industrialising city. This clash brought forth a direct response in the model of the professional police, as one component in the new disciplinary order.

The criticisms of the 'riot' explanation are well established. Various writers (Monkkonen 1981, Field 1981, Emsley 1983) have argued that there were few such precipitating riots, and often a long interval between those conflicts and police formation. It is a misunderstanding to over-emphasise the cause and effect connection between mob violence and the creation of the new police.

Mounting crime levels featured in many of the earlier explanations. A concern with crime dominated the original Parliamentary debate (Stead 1977). Johnson (1979) has explained police modernisation in the 19th century in terms of rising crime. He assumed that the ordinary watch/constable system could not handle the rising wave of crime, which was produced by urban population growth. Such an explanation raises some questions. For example, it is uncertain whether crime was 'climbing' in London prior to the development of the Metropolitan Police. For Harring (1983), social deviance was a product of the changes imposed upon the working class of the period, rather than a cause of police reform. Crime control was one way in which the new institutions of industrial capitalism could be legitimised. There was no necessity for the response to a rising crime rate to be the institution of a uniformed and preventative police when, traditionally, other methods had been the conventional

response: temperance campaigns for those who blamed 'the demon drink'; educational reform where crime was blamed on inability to read and write (Johnson 1979); or changes in penal measures (Monkkonen 1981).

...the modern police were formed at a time when the old system of policing which had worked quite effectively for more than five hundred years, broke down with the onset of industrial capitalism. The rank and file of the police were recruited exclusively from the working class and came to provide protection primarily for bourgeoisie persons and property in the name of an 'independent' agency and through an 'independent' system of law with the beginnings of the liberal democracy in the latter part of the nineteenth century, this protection under law was extended to working-class communities and respect for the rule of law was exacted from this class (Bunyan 1983: 73-74).

More radical writers have located the emergence of the professional police within the conjunctural crisis of the beginning of industrial capitalism. As Bunyan argues:

... with the beginning of capitalism, the duties of the Justices of Peace extended to dealing with vagrants and paupers, and with the regulation of wages and working hours. During the next two hundred years with the movement from the land to towns, the growth in population and advent of large numbers of people living in poverty, crime increased. The ruling class responded first by seeking to extend the old system of policing and then later by the formation of regular police forces (1983: 69).

In the eyes of the ruling classes therefore, the nascent working-class had to be disciplined by new forms of pressure and legitimation. A New Police, combining both those elements, was to be a major weapon in that victory (Haring 1979), ensuring the substantiality of the social relations of production. As private policing increased in cost to the new manufacturers, property owners and merchants, the police institution was socialised and its cost transferred from the private to the public sector (Spitzer and Scull 1977). Professional policing was one of several forms of social organisation that emerged to maintain and strengthen the position of the new city ruling classes, and hence to regulate the nascent class struggle. Modern police forces were set up to deal with dangerous, criminal classes emerging as a product of the material changes generated by the rise of industrialisation and capitalism and, inevitably, the new system worked at the expense of the working class. 'The maintenance of public order was essential to frustrate the nation-wide struggles by the new working class and the dispossessed. Public order was preserved by the comprehensive use of force' (Bunyan 1983: 61).

The modern police force emerged out of the crisis of urban administration in the Victorian city. It was the first branch of the British state to develop an ideological as well as a purely repressive function. As such, the official task of policing was both to protect the institutions of private property, and to enforce statutory norms of public order primarily designed to ensure the free

circulation of commodities, including the commodity of labour power (Cohen 1979: 120).

Crime and the mob have latterly been merged in the accounts of writers in the social disorganisation tradition; linking together the process of immigration and of urbanisation (Lane 1967, Richardson 1979). Police departments were not established to reduce crime or control riots. They were organised on behalf of urban elites to supervise the migrant poor, who were increasingly seen as a potentially 'dangerous class'. People control, rather than crime or riot control, was the primary concern.

The revisionists also argue that the new police were developed in response to corruption and inefficiency. They stress not so much the basic ineffectiveness of the old private policing as its growing unsuitability for the new class relations of a capitalist society (Reiner 1992a: 27-29). The essential grounds behind the birth of the new police is seen as neither crime control, for moral discipline nor riot control *per se*.

It was the need for a force which could stabilise relations between conflicting social classes as far as this was possible. Therefore, the police were charged with an 'omnibus mandate' of regulating all facets of working class life (Storch 1975: 88; Brogden 1982: 53-71, in Reiner 1992a: 30).

The authority for the establishment of the new police force was the maintenance of order required by the capitalist classes, with control of crime, riot, political dissidence and public morality being separate subsidiary facets of this overall task (Reiner 1992a: 30-31). 'Police' as a word had always conjured up an image of an authoritarian government maintaining social control through repressive methods and more particularly deterrence. It was seen as an intrusive force posing a significant intimidation to the independence of people. Thus, anything approaching a standing army of executive was strongly resisted and founders of the modern police created a unique force. As MacDonald explains:

...once the class begins to organise, to agitate, to demonstrate, you need a force which has all the appearance of independence, which cannot be seen to be visibly taking sides in the class struggle but which is merely there to enforce the law. The genius of the British ruling class is that they realised the need to have such a force and set about creating it (quoted in Bunyan 1983: 62).

The labouring classes did suppose that they were the subjects of pressure. From the outset, the new police began to spend most of their time on sustaining public order rather than crime-related problems. The working class saw the police as the representatives of societal control enforcing the dictates of a prevailing power structure. The police were considered as an obstacle to social and political change and

as guardians of the status quo. For this reason, the introduction of the police was met with stiff opposition and took a agonising course. As Bowden argues:

In his detailed study of riots and public order in the Black Country in 1835-60 Philips records that the police operated to the disadvantage of the working class since power lay with the Lord Lieutenant and the justices of peace who had influence over the country police through the Quarter Sessions and through the chief constable, whom they appointed. They could command bodies of police, troops and special constables in times of emergency; and in the Black country, a large number of JPs were themselves large coal and iron masters, they could exercise their power to protect their own interests and property through the normal forces of authority and law and order (1978: 225)

From the quotation above, it can be said that the new police were not directly an arm of the central government, but that they were controlled by the propertied classes through Justices of Peace. The new police were, especially in times of crisis, in the last resort subject to State supervision and control. Nevertheless, if we are to accept that the police were independent of the government, it does not mean that they operated as neutral arbiters of the Law. As Bunyan argues, the government is readily used as a substitute for the term 'state', whereas in fact it constitutes only one institution of the state. The government's power is limited only and with the other institutions making up the state can it act to command state power (Bunyan 1983: 2).

All these accounts are open to many questions. In the first place, it is assumed that because the professional police in Anglo-American societies developed in the form that they did, such development was inevitable. This deterministic history denies any contingent social contribution to that change (Emsley 1983). Secondly, many accounts of the sources of the professional police are based on the duties assumed after their arrangement. There is a confusion between what the police actually did and the causes that brought them about. The fact that they 'may' have been effective against social disorder, crime, migrant workers and working-class people does not, of itself, prove that was why they were created. There are also considerable problems with any typology which traces the emergence of the police to the establishment of the 'new' police alone. The development of paid policing and police forces in England was occurring long before the setting up of the Metropolitan force in 1829; while professionalisation, central direction and national standardisation remained weak long after that date (Styles 1987: 18).

The major reason for the weakness of the orthodox rationalisation is their ethnocentricity. They commence from the domain supposition of the early Metropolitan model of professional police work. It is presumed that the London Metropolitan model, as conventionally portrayed, was the only possible prototype.

None of the above explanations disputes the authenticity and inevitability of that particular form of organisation. Anglo-American police history fails to identify alternative producing of police work (Brogden 1987: 7-8).

Brogden (1987) offers wider possibilities. The first is a preventative police. From this perspective, policing in relation to the 'low crime' of the streets may be perceived as an aberration from the primary police commitment to the defence of the realm. A second model regarded policing as the administration of the affairs of state. Thirdly, the influence of commercial police work explains police development. And finally Brogden argues that explanations of the character and emergence of the English police must take into account the wider context of British colonial policing in the 19th and 20th centuries Colonial police work explains the development of the modern police force. Colonial policing functioned to legitimate central rule from Westminster. Colonial police work, and perhaps in turn British police work, was pre-eminently missionary work to legitimate external governance (Brogden 1987: 809).

...there is evidence of an immediate link between British policing and colonial practices. British institutions, from medicine to law enforcement, were transplanted to the Empire: to de-legitimise indigenous customs; to impose centralised social control; and to incorporate local society as a branch of imperial society (Brogden 1987: 10).

Liberal writers argue that the police were able to legitimate themselves to a notable extent by the 1950s. It is suggested that such a success could be attributed to the fact that the English police tradition was able to de-politicise policing, sustain the image of impartial and non-partisan legal authority, the reliance on minimal force, and the cultivation of a service role, including the wider historical processes of the incorporation of the working class into the body politic and the pacification of social relations (Reiner 1992a: xvi).¹² In addition to these, the achievement of consensus policing in Britain was partly the product of specific aspects of police organisational policy: bureaucratic organisation, the rule of law, the strategy of minimal force, non-partisanship, accountability, the service role, preventive policing, effectiveness (see Reiner 1992a: 58 - 73). In the history of policing in England, such a period has been called a 'golden age' although critics on the left argue that it has never existed (see Scraton 1987).¹³ One of the reasons could be attributed to the claim that:

¹² Benyon (1986: 11) points out six related factors which may help to explain how policing reached its 'Golden Era': effectiveness, identity, participation, legitimacy and consent. The six policing factors are to a considerable extent dependent upon the image of the police, and on the perceived distance between policing and the public. They are also interrelated and so, for example, a high level of effectiveness is likely to increase consent, legitimacy, identity and so on.

¹³ The success of the development of British policing has been attributed to a number of factors. It was, of course, partly the result of social and economic policies which decreased the amount of overt

...The antagonism was not resolved, but it was pursued by means other than street beatings and set-tos. The reasons for the change are complex: they are partly to do with changes in the conditions and composition of the local working class, partly with the position of youth within the generational division of labour, and partly the result of the changing function of the police force in the developing structure of the capitalist state (Cohen 1979: 123).

Although no-one is certain how much corruption and misuse of power existed underneath the facade of British policing in the 'Golden Age' of public acceptance (Reiner 1992b), the complacent image of policing in the period began to break down with changes in the political and media presentations of policing in the 1960s, which was manifested in a growing debate about police malpractice, and an apparent change of overall tactics towards a more coercive style. This crisis increased dramatically in the early 1980s, and reached its peak in the miners' strike of 1984 (Fine, Bob and Millar 1985). In this period of crisis in policing, the role of the police, and their legitimacy and accountability were brought into the debate by critics. Because of the increased politicisation within the Metropolitan authorities and the manner in which the activities of some have spread beyond the ambit of the area and authority they serve, it has become more common for chief officers to move into the public political arena. This has led to calls for redefined constitutional boundaries of responsibility with a tripartite structure of policing services — chief constables / police authorities / Home Office. Certainly there has been an increasing demand for better definition of the boundaries.

In England and Wales, if we look at contemporary policing over the last two decades, the consequences of crime and disorder and how to handle the problem of lawlessness have been at the top of the political agenda (Scarman 1982, Benyon 1984, Reiner 1992a). In the 1970s, the phenomenon of 'mugging' became the focus for public concern and violent street crime has continued to be an indicator of a perceived degeneration of moral values and of rising crime rates ever since. Hall *et al.* (1978) have argued that their focus on 'mugging' identified mechanisms whereby an authoritarian view of law and order might be re-introduced especially at times of social disillusionment in the light of economic crisis. I shall therefore look at the political background to the enduring media interest in crime statistics and emphasise the disparity between media myths and reality.

conflict, and partly the consequence of political action which enabled the working class to articulate grievances through formal channels such as elections, trade unions and the Labour Party (Reiner 1992a).

Directed by the political right, the Conservative government's law and order programme¹⁴ has been persistently undermined by crime rates and spectacular outbreaks of disorder, which have reached record levels year after year. It is important to remember that one of the main manifesto issues for every Conservative campaign, especially over the last 20 years, has been a pledge to fight crime and to re-impose law and order. For Conservatives, in the 1979 general election campaign, this was an important issue in a society where the recorded crime rates in 1979 had reached an apparently unacceptable level of 2.5 million recorded offences (Loveday 1992: 297). In 1979, an Independent Television News research survey, reported on election night after the closure of the polls, indicated that 23% of voters who had switched allegiance to the Tories did so on law and order issues (Downes 1983: 2). Significant numbers of voters were persuaded to vote Conservative by the belief that they could be relied upon to maintain law and order, while Labour could not.

One of the most interesting social features of contemporary Britain has been the remarkable increase in recorded crime, and the growth of public disorder which has characterised both the Thatcher and Major governments. This has occurred despite increases, in the number of police, police salaries, police powers under the Public Order Act 1986, an increase in weaponry and training in 'public order' policing to combat crime. These increases constitute what Brake and Hale (1992) describe as the 'control culture of the law and order society'. During this period the number of noticeable offences recorded by the police was 2 377 000 in 1979 (excluding criminal damage under £20), but by 1988 this had gone up to 3 550 000.

¹⁴ After the 1979 election victory, as Rawlings (1991) puts it: 'the election of a law and order government', the Conservatives began to implement their proposals on crime and criminal justice by beginning to construct a strong police force in terms of better pay, and equipment, with enhanced technology and powers. Punishment was also to be 'beefed-up'; tougher sentencing was promised (see Prevention of terrorism Act, 1984, 1986). (Although it is not directly relevant here, it should also be mentioned the restriction on the use of parole for drugs and firearms offences in the late 1980s and increase in prison building programmes in the 1980s.)

Rawlings also points out that law and order services were the only areas to attract increased public expenditure, in real terms apart from the usual areas of defence and social security. Between 1979 and 1990, there was a 62% increase in public spending on the police service. This increase funded a 16% increase in police manpower, a 22% increase in civilian staff and pay settlements in 1979 which were higher than the annual inflation rate and increases offered to other public sector employees. As a result of this investment, the Conservative election manifesto in 1992 was able to boast a real increase in law & order expenditure of 67% for the thirteen year period of their leadership. This trend continues to manifest itself and the plans published for 1992-1993 (HMSO) allow for further increases in per annual. Although it is not directly relevant here, it should also be mentioned the restriction on the use of parole for drugs and firearms offences in the late 1980s and increase in prison building programs in the 1980s.

At this time of continuing crisis in policing, in the 1980s, there was an important series of crime surveys carried out by the Home Office Research Unit (Hough and Mayhew 1983 and 1985; Mayhew, Elliot and Dowds 1989). There were also a number of influential local crime surveys (Kinsey 1985, Farrington and Downs 1985, Jones, Maclean and Young 1986, Bottoms, Mawby and Walker 1987, Bottoms, Mawby and Xanthos 1989; in: Reiner & Cross 1991: 1). There are many disparities between official data and these surveys in terms of recorded levels and patterns of crime. These surveys also show that there has been popular perception of increasing crime in the recent past, and an attendant fear of crime. This has resulted in a new 'left realist' position, which regards crime as a significant social problem blighting the lives of the weakest groups in the population (Taylor 1981, Lea and Young 1984, Kinsey, Lea and Young 1986, Young 1986, Philips 1986; in: Reiner & Cross 1991: 2), countering traditional views of the left that most of the increase in crime can be accounted for by 'moral panics'.

Although it is not an issue to be discussed in detail here, it should be stressed that criminal statistics are open to question: one problem with statistics of recorded crime is that they are functions both of police administrative practices and of the public's propensity to report offences. There are substantial variations between geographical areas. There are significant differences within police force areas, with urban areas and centres of population showing a significantly higher crime rate than more rural, lower population areas. Although the national figures are a useful bench mark for broad comparisons, as well as being useful for identifying trends over time, they are often of limited use when the particular focus is not just a single police force area, but also a specific part within an area. Police sensitisation and mobilisation against particular crimes increases figures. Also, when considering 'fear of crime', public anxiety over 'highlighted' crimes leads to over-reporting. It would also be suggested that statistics are based on legal categories and are thus arbitrary in terms of their meaning to eventual and potential victims. In addition to these, changes in the law make comparisons over time difficult (see Hough & Mayhew 1983, 1985).

Another problem of criminal statistics is that many crimes go unnoticed. People may not realise that they have had property stolen putting down a loss to personal carelessness; firms may not be aware that stores are being removed, and so on. Where there is no direct victim, as in the case of many motoring offences, the chances of the offence going undetected are greater still. Of those offences which are noticed, by no means all are reported to the police. People may not bother to report offences if they think there is little chance of effective action being taken as a result. In addition even when offences are brought to the attention of the police, many are not ultimately

recorded as crimes. No record may be made or, even when it is, the incident may be 'no crimed' and thus not appear in the Home Office figures.

The figures in Criminal Statistics are only part of the story. Evidence collected by the Home Office itself and from other official sources, derived from surveys of the victims of crime, suggests that recorded crime underestimates the true level of crime.

Examining the crime statistics of the 1980s in detail, it can be argued that they show that the Conservative package of 'law and order' seems to have failed in terms of its objectives of reducing crime. The cost of policing in England and Wales increased by 60 per cent between 1974-1990 from £2.58 billion to £4.12 billion (Graef 1990, in: Brake & Hale 1992: 1). Between 1979 and 1988, the total number of indictable offences known to the police increased by just under 50% (Home Office Criminal Statistics 1988, in Brake & Hale 1992). This figure includes a reduction in recorded offences of 5 per cent in 1988, a result greeted with much self-congratulation by Home Office ministers. Figures for 1989 (*The Guardian*, 30.3.1990, in: Brake & Hale 1992) showed an annual increase of 4.2 per cent, and the highest ever rise in recorded crime of 17 per cent in the second quarter of 1990 compared with the same period of 1989 (*The Independent*, 27.9.90 (in Brake & Hale 1992), which suggests that this fall was simply a transitory blip in the otherwise steady increase in recorded crime. The average annual change in serious crime known to the police was 4.3 per cent between 1979 and 1988 compared to 4.2 per cent between 1974 and 1979. Furthermore, the national clear-up rate was 41 per cent in 1979 but had fallen to 35 per cent by 1988 and 34 per cent in 1989, a drop of 17 per cent (Brake & Hale 1992: 2). Because it is open to use of bureaucratic manipulation, the problem with 'clear-up rate' as a useful statistic should be recognised. While there was an overall reduction of one per cent in the rate of increase in recorded crime in 1991 (from 17% to 16%) which allowed the Home Minister to claim that the 'rate of increase in crime was slowing down', total recorded crime rose to 5.3m that year. In the twelve months to March 1992, some 5.4 million noticeable offences were recorded by the police — a rise of 15 per cent over the previous 12 months (Home Office, 1992). Through the late 1980s and into the 1990s the crime rate has grown at a rate faster than that recorded under the Labour Government of 1974-1979. The 1980 clear-up rate of 49% had fallen to 32% by 1992. This has raised fundamental questions concerning the utility of Government strategies on law and order. In 1987 the Conservatives stated they would:

...continue to put a high priority on the fight against crime, so that the citizen can feel safe on the street or in his home (Conservative Central Office 1987).

Recorded crime increased in nearly all police areas. Clearly the idea that the Conservative Party possesses the answers to rising crime rates has become difficult to sustain.

Apart from political debates on the law and order issue, in the history of post-war British policing, notably from the 1960s to the present, there have been significant changes in terms of technical, organisational and operational matters. In the 1960s, changes in policing style were introduced. These changes involved motorisation on a universal scale which, together with the advent of the personal radio, gradually but inexorably established a gulf between police and public (Alderson 1984). Modern police officers can now call upon vast resources of technology to assist them in their work: these include patrol cars, radios, helicopters, sophisticated surveillance devices and so on. Manwaring and White (1983) argue that because of this vastly increased reliance upon technology the police presence in some areas began to fall with serious consequences for relations with the public. Before long, the presence of the police in some neighbourhoods became limited to a quick drive through by a patrol car giving no real contact with the local population.

It can be said that, until very recently, police were increasingly confined to being a reactive service. This, in part, was due to the number of police officers being insufficient to serve as a social service, as envisaged in Alderson's ideal models. Police are dependent on public reporting of crime and aim to handle situations with a quick drive from the police stations. This results in a little 'non-crime' contact with the public and this may create distant and strained relations. It can be suggested that:

...greater police professionalism may have resulted in greater isolation and internalisation of police from the community (Sparrow *et al.* 1990; in Friedman 1992: 35).

Combined with the process of technologism, professionalisation has also been an unfortunate trend for British policing. The process of professionalisation has entailed developments which have adversely affected the image of policing and increased its remoteness, and undermined effectiveness, identity, participation, legitimacy, justice and consent. Professionalism as an ideology has resulted in police officers seeing themselves as 'crime fighters' on behalf of society (Benyon 1986: 2-3)¹⁵.

¹⁵ As a result of the attempt at professionalisation, police officers tend to see themselves as specialist and expert crime fighters, set apart from ordinary citizens. The image of policing has changed, so that the public sees the police as remote. Many of the charges of unfairness concern police treatment of black people (For a review and assessment see Benyon 1986).

The question here is why have these undesirable developments occurred? One of the main theses of this study is that part of the reason for the decline in public support for the police, and for the politicisation of policing, is the process of professionalisation which the service has attempted since the early 1960s.

In 1966 the then Home Secretary, Mr Roy Jenkins, pressed upon all police forces (including the Metropolitan Police) a style of policing known as the 'unit beat system'. The idea was sound, but the findings did not match expectations or the full potential of the system (Reiner 1992a). Reiner (1992a) argues that, this new system proposed greater motorisation for improved response to incidents and was ideally intended to be superimposed upon a system of traditional foot patrols. One of the reasons for the new system was the crisis in the number of police. Due to full employment in both public and private sectors, experienced officers could obtain better paid jobs elsewhere. Eventually, the foot patrols were absorbed into the motorised section, and within a few years police officers patrolling on foot had all but disappeared from the streets. Police officers gradually lost their ability to talk to people and involve themselves in the community. Despite the new professionalism of the technological cop and the advent of police computers, the preservation of public tranquillity became harder to maintain and the control of crime remained an illusion. Police became like fire brigades, they were an unknown force and co-operation between the police and public appeared to be decreasing.

'By the end of the 1980s the crisis of legitimacy and confidence in the British police had become a cliché, with 1989 being a vintage year for scandals' (Reiner 1990a, in Reiner 1992b: 3). From the 1960s and onwards, the important and benevolent image of the police force was destroyed by the series of Scotland Yard corruption scandals. Such scandals involved the covering up of serious crimes, fabricating of evidence, the systematic, institutionalised and widespread network of corruption (Reiner 1992a: 79).¹⁶ The scandals dented the image of the police as impersonal and disciplined law

¹⁶ The PSI 1983 revealed that 55 per cent of the Londoners surveyed thought police officers accepted goods or favours sometimes and 51 per cent believed they took bribes 'occasionally' or 'often', while 14 per cent said 'hardly ever' and 26 per cent 'never'. the survey of police officers revealed that 81 per cent of the Metropolitan Police who were sampled thought that some officers often behaved rudely to members of the public and two-thirds believed that some officers often used more force than necessary.

A recent police scandal appeared in the press as:

A call for a full judicial inquiry into policing in a n area of east London was made on 7 February 1992 by a community group, which named 30 officers as being allegedly involved in police malpractice. The call - which echoes one made by Brain Sedgemore, Labour MP for Hackney South and Shoreditch, in the Commons on Monday - comes during a police

enforcers, which the tradition built up by Rowan and Mayne had stressed. While in the 1960 Royal Commission survey 46.9 per cent of the public did not believe bribetaking occurred, the 1981 Policy Studies Institute study of Londoners found that only 14 per cent believed the police 'hardly ever' took bribes (PSI 1983, vol. I: 249).

Aiming at restoring their legitimacy,¹⁷ following the Scarman Report there has been a strong current of reform in policing policies; notably the introduction of the PACE Act 1984. PACE 1984 replaced the Police Complaints Board with the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). The PCA took on the same *post hoc* critique and adjudication functions as the old Board had; but it also acquired the power to supervise the police investigation of any complaints which it wanted to follow and it was required to supervise certain types of serious complaint investigations, notably alleged assaults by police. The Act also attempted to provide a framework for much tighter regulation of police powers, through the police disciplinary process.

The issue of why the image and substance of policing in Britain has changed is of fundamental importance to understanding the current policies of the police. From the 1960s, there have been moves towards specialised, quasi-military police units. The Metropolitan Special Patrol Group (SPG), established in 1965, was formed as a mobile reserve targeting areas of high crime. In 1974, all England and Wales police forces established Police Support Units, (PSUs) capable of rapid mobilisation in public order situations, such as fights outside public houses, soccer hooliganism, demonstrations, strikes and prevention of trespass. Most provincial forces now have groups similar to the SPG with different names such as the Tactical Patrol Group, Task Force or Tactical Aid Group, but the SPG itself was disbanded in 1987 after an internal inquiry by the Metropolitan Police. It was replaced by the Territorial Support Groups based on the area commands (Uglow 1988a: 46, in: Brake & Hale 1992: 44). Another interesting style of policing were the dog patrols, which were introduced on Sandringham Road in Brixton in both 1982 and 1983. Most people, black and white, disliked the patrols and several complaints arose from people who had been bitten

investigation into what senior Scotland Yard sources have described as the most serious corruption allegations for 20 years (*The Guardian*, 8 February 1992).

¹⁷ The issue of police violations of legal procedures in the course of dealing with offences became acutely politicised in the 1970s. On the one hand, groups like the National Council for Civil Liberties publicised evidence of widespread police malpractice, while on the other the police began to lobby for greater powers to aid the 'war against crime' (Reiner 1992a: 82). Also, the PSI study found that while outright fabrication of evidence is probably rare... departure from rules and procedure affecting evidence are far more common... There will be no fundamental change as long as many police officers believe that the job cannot be done effectively within the rules (PSI 1983, vol.IV: 228-30). Between 1989 and 1991 public confidence in the police was shaken by a series of scandals revealing serious malpractice (e.g. the case of the Guilford Four, the Birmingham Six, Stefan Kiszko).

(Keith 1993: 192). One of the problems arising out of the creation of such groups was that the sort of police work in which they were involved is quite obviously closer to a military or at least 'colonial' model than to the traditional independent function of the constable (Keith 1993: 191).

The most important change, however, has been the disastrous deterioration of relations with the black community. Evidenced by the PSI (1983), there is a long history of police prejudice against blacks and complaints of racial harassment. By the mid-1970s, clear evidence had mounted of blacks (especially black youths) being disproportionately involved in arrests for certain offences, largely but not only because of police discrimination (Lea and Young 1984). The consequences of this crisis have been described as:

The sustained economic depression of the post-1973 years, coupled with a sense, and possibly a reality, of the growth in civil strife and popular dissent, threatened to discredit the consensus politics of the post-war era and to question the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the British electorate. Yet if the 1970s were the years of CRISIS, the 1980s were to see the SOLUTIONS to the crisis (Keith 1993: 234-5).

Keith goes on to suggest that:

The crisis of legitimacy and economic restructuring lent themselves to a form of new authoritarianism in 1970s Britain, and it was New Commonwealth migrants and their children who provided an important medium through which this logic was extended into an invidious process of systematic criminalisation. The historical ground of racist (criminal) stereotyping, dating back many decades, coincided with a shift away from liberal consensus nationally and a need to explain, or at least rationalise, the early 1970s crisis in police/Black relations (Keith 1993: 237).

For more than three decades black communities have been suffering from 'over-heavy policing', (overt discrimination, saturation policing of Black communities, over-policing Black social and political institutions, and police abuse) and the failure to police racial attacks effectively (Keith 1993: 11). The 1980s witnessed a transformation in police practice. Such transformational police practice was seen in the 1980-1 inner city riots. The policing experiences of inner cities highlights the nature of changes in police practice in the 1980s. At each stage in the escalation of conflict, dating back to the 1960s, police policy can be seen reacting to events rather than analysing them (Keith 1993: 196). Hall *et al.* (1978) provide evidence that in retrospect may be seen to suggest that the grounds for these riots had been well prepared by the moral panic over mugging which developed during the 1970s. Consequently, it can be seen that the deteriorating relationship between blacks and

the police brought to a head the already poor relations between the police and the black community. There had been serious confrontations leading to an erosion of confidence in the police by the black community since the 1950s. It was also felt that racially motivated arson, physical attacks and even murders had not been pursued seriously. It was felt that black British youth were stereotyped as drug dealers, criminals or illegal immigrants.

During the years prior to the 1979 election, the image of muggers as 'young, black and male' was developed. To examine this issue Hall *et al.* (1978) systematically attempted to unpick the moral panic over mugging. Examining the pattern of offences, and the official and social reactions to them, in the context of the crisis of hegemony affecting the British state during that period, they show how mugging become symbolic of lawlessness and a breakdown of social order. The white population conflated its fears of young people and immigrants into a new folk devil — the mugger. Anxieties about the general economic and political decline of Britain became projected onto black youth, the image of the un-British black 'immigrant' became combined with that of threatening black male youth. As Scraton (1987: ix) argues:

The 1980s, then, have been a period of division and polarisation in which the poor, the unemployed, the young, the old, women and black people have become increasingly economically and politically marginalised. Pushed to the edges of mainstream class locations their subjugated positions have been justified by appeals to ideologies of classism, racism and sexism. It has been this framework that the state has operated to regulate the conflict inherent within the social relations of production and reproduction through the rule of law and the process of criminal justice.

Although the categories 'robbery and violent theft' are quite flexible, and amounts to only 3% of crimes; the *Sun*, by omitting more serious crimes committed by whites, presenting the image of the black criminal reported:

'BLACK CRIME SHOCK' [Headline] 'Blacks carried out twice as many muggings as whites in London last year' (23 March, 1983; in: Lea & Young 1984: 104).

As a consequence of this image among the police, promoted by the press and some politicians, many confrontations were seen between the police and black youth in the inner cities. Policing has been, and remains, a principal focus for black community mobilisation (Keith 1993:5). The essential problem is one of policing a multi-racial society (Keith 1993: 6). The black community has been seen by the police as

intruders from another culture and has felt itself policed rather than protected from racist attacks. It was argued by James Callaghan in 1982:

There had always to be some approach towards the centre because, whatever their politics, Home Secretaries sprang from the same culture, a culture it was their duty to preserve if the country was remain a good place to live in (Home Office Bi-Centenary Lecture, quoted in Gilroy 1987: 76).

There was a history of police raids on cafes, youth clubs and social centres in black areas. There was a tendency for local police to regard them as places where drugs and stolen property were sold. However, these places were meeting points of young black people, and also functioned as legal advice centres. As such, they are seen by the police as sites of 'grass roots'. The community regards attacks on them as attacks on organised black resistance. As Keith (1993: 28) points out:

Several long-serving Brixton police officers confirmed this pattern; in the nebulous divide between the illegal and the criminal, the raids on drinking clubs provided a forum for the rationalisation and justification of racist police behaviour, taking on the respectability of official police actions. Some of these raids, professionally conducted and well organised, passed peacefully; others most certainly did not (e.g. the raids on clubs in Kellet Road and Talma Road in 1975).

The Scarman Report (1982) shifted the focus away from questions about the police as an institution to the safer area of the personal attitudes and prejudices of individual police officers and their relationships with the black community (Scruton 1985: 91). A method much used to rationalise specific demonstrable cases of racist behaviour by police was the practice, commonly reflected in official accounts, of attributing the failings of particular incidents to the police proclivities of a small minority of 'rotten apples' within the police force. It is also suggested that the antagonism between police and black communities is the product of a small minority of police officers (Scarman 1982). However as the PSI (1983) revealed, there was ample evidence that racism was institutional, pervasive and not confined to young, inexperienced officers. Black people were more likely to be stopped; the pervasive imagery in the force unquestioningly links blacks to crime; there was poor response to requests from Asians for action against racist attacks and demonstrations involving black people were more aggressively policed (Scruton 1985: 104).

The main reason for the introduction of such techniques was to replace the sort of disastrous operations such as Swamp 81 with its arbitrary stop and search tactics that brought such massive numbers into hostile contact with the police and reaped such little long-term reward in fighting crime. However, for the communities who live in such areas, who often spot the observation vehicle used by the police, who know the houses which are used for observation and who occasionally see the cameras and binoculars that are

used (Gifford 1986, in Keith 1993: 195), there is often a bitter resentment that their lives are monitored, scrutinised and spied on in this way. Several representatives of Black organisations in both Brixton and Notting Hill have regularly expressed great bitterness about such 'Big Brother' tactics (Keith 1993: 195).

Considering the problem of crime, Lea and Young (1982) argued that differences in the crime rates between different ethnic groups could be explained by the greater extent of social and political marginalisation experienced by young blacks. Crime, they argued was a negative manifestation of this marginalisation. This marginalisation was not a consequence of the 'alienness' of young blacks but, on the contrary, was a result of the high degree of assimilation that made their relative deprivation all the harder to bear (Lea and Young 1984, 1993). Many on the left, especially Gilroy (1987) dismissed this argument as racist. They refused to admit any recognition that the crime rate was disproportionately high for young blacks. The idea that blacks are a high crime group in relation to their white counterparts has become a central notion in the debate over black culture.

The 'thin red line' of troops in the colonial front-line, standing between us and them, between black and white, has been translated into the 'thin blue line' of the police, personifying the law (Gilroy 1987: 110).

As Lea and Young argue:

The classification of people into 'races' based on a combination of skin colour and other physical features simply does not correspond to the actual lived realities within which different subcultures exist. 'Black', for example, in Britain groups together Afro-Caribbeans and various peoples of African origin with totally different lifestyles and behaviour patterns. In the United States such a classification takes on an even more bizarre form where Hispanics are frequently classified as 'whites' and their crime and imprisonment rates compared to those of 'blacks' which includes Afro-Americans and Afro-Caribbeans (Lynch 1990). Similarly 'Asian' involves even more of a cultural heterogeneity, with Bengalis (who in Britain have a generally worse economic predicament than Afro-Caribbeans) classified along with Pakistanis and Indians who have a class structure ranging from the very poor to the very wealthy. Such unreal groupings create crime figures which cancel out differences and conceal variations (Lea and Young 1993: xv-xvi).

Regarding the explanation of crime Lea and Young argue as:

...our views on the explanation of crime have developed and taken on a more integrated perspective, of which relative deprivation and the exclusion from legitimate channels of achievement form only one component. We understand the level of crime as resulting from the interaction of potential offenders, potential victims, actions of the state and criminal justice system, and levels of informal community and family social control (Lea 1992, Young 1992; quoted in Lea and Young 1993: x).

As mentioned earlier, the 1980s witnessed great disturbances, especially evidenced by many riots in the inner cities. After the disorders of 1981, it is more likely that, that year will be remembered in the minds of the police and those who interest themselves in police affairs than the year of the mining dispute. The miners' strike has led to the situation where potential conflict between chief constables and their police authorities is forever present and the temptation for police authorities and committees to attempt to influence the operational authority of the chief constable has been put to the test. Most of these attempts have occurred in those areas where the Labour Party activists are in some strength (Barley 1985: 103).

The preparedness of the police to cope with public order problems began to be expanded and refined during the 1970s, as political and industrial conflict increased. This militarisation of policing proceeded apace in the 1980s in the wake of yet more serious disorder, beginning with the 1981 urban riots in Brixton and elsewhere (Reiner 1992c: 766). The police appear to have become more willing to accept an increasingly coercive and political role in the industrial relations of a divided society in crisis. Gilroy and Sim (1987) argue that such strategies of the police confirmed the centrality of law and policing to contemporary British politics. They also (1985) suggest that this involvement in policing industrial disputes is not in itself new, but the openness with which the police appear willing to take on this task is a radical change in policy and practice. As Reiner argues:

Without much public debate *de facto* 'third forces' have developed, specifically trained and readily mobilisable to cope with riots. They are co-ordinated in a crisis by the national Reporting Centre, established in 1972 and located at Scotland Yard. When in operation it is controlled by the current President of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Its most controversial and prominent use was during the 1984-85 miners' strike, when a massive, centrally co-ordinated policy operation was directed by the Centre, amid much criticism of 'police-state tactics' (McCabe 1988, in Reiner 1992c: 766).

Neither the harder methods available since the 1981 riots, nor the extensive reforms influenced by Lord Scarman Report, were able to prevent the more serious urban riots of 1985, on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham and elsewhere. In 1990, anti-poll tax demonstrations were the cause of serious public order clashes, especially following a rally in Trafalgar Square on 31 March.

From the end of the 1980s, the greatest public anxieties have not been industrial or political conflicts; rather a 'moral panic' developed about disorder occurring in a variety of leisure contexts. In 1989-90, there was great police attention to the spread

of the 'rave' scene and the occurrence of 'acid-house' parties. Between 1990 and 1992, serious violence and disorder broke out most frequently in peripheral public housing estates rather than inner city areas, ranging from Bristol to Tyneside, after police attempts to control 'joy-riding' (in Reiner 1992c: 766). The police were subject to disapproval, both for under-reacting to the joy-riding and from other quarters, for chasing teenagers suspected of joy-riding. The disturbances involved predominantly young white males and, unlike the 1981 and 1985 riots, could not be ascribed to either police racism or racial tension. The violence spread from Newcastle, Coventry, Oxford, Bristol and Salford and appears to have been unleashed following an initial spark involving a specific police response to acts of criminality. Although the police response to riots remains lower in profile than most foreign forces, there has undoubtedly been a stiffening of strategy and more resort to technology, equipment and weaponry (Reiner 1992c: 766).

In contrast to decrease in confidence other factors were combining to place greater confidence in authority. In particular the growing emergence of the 'law and order' debate and the perceived 'war on crime' would concentrate public attention on police effectiveness and the apparent inability of the authorities to turn the tide of the rising crime rate. Consequently, a hardening of both public and police attitudes led to an acceptance of toughened policing styles whether through the increased availability of public order hardware, through a preparedness to push legal powers to the limits of illegality, or through a toleration of out-spoken senior police officers who did not see their independence as requiring silent and anonymous service outside the political arena (Butler 1985: 310-311).

Reiner (1992 b: 51) argues:

There is now copious evidence that certain social characteristics are associated with a greater likelihood of being at the receiving end of police powers. Being young, male, Afro-Caribbean and / or unemployed or in low paid irregular work are all associated with a greater probability of being stopped and searched, arrested, and charged by the police.

Starting from the 1970s, a number of critics have noted the '*politicisation*' of the police (see Reiner 1980, 1985, 1991)). Especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a marked tendency for chief constables to become more prominent and apparently partisan, in their public interventions in the media and political debate (Reiner 1985: 73-6). Tony Bunyan's *The Political Police in Britain*, published in 1976, thoroughly explained the political dimensions of policing. *Policing the Crisis* (Hall *et al.* 1978), offers an account of the police contribution to the creation of a

'moral panic' about mugging in the early 1970s. In the context of major economic and social changes and resultant anxieties, this research is different from others, because it is not based on research within the police but on the media reports.

In terms of the politicisation of the police, Reiner makes it clear:

Order maintenance is clearly a political enterprise, raising questions of definition, equity and accountability. The recognition that the distinctive police resource is the authority derived from the potential for the legitimate use of forces places policing at the heart of the function of the state. However, it is a function which is both necessary and capable of fulfilment by the police. To regard the primary task of the police as crime control is dangerous for the police themselves, for there is now an impressive body of evidence which suggests not only that it is not being accomplished effectively, but that it could not be (Reiner 1985: 116).

Referring to the last decade concerning the issue of the politics of the police, Reiner (1992b: 54) points out:

The police have also been the most special of Mrs. Thatcher's special relationships. Apart from general ideological affinity, she has relied upon them in controlling the disorderly fall-out from other aspects of Government policy, notably the urban disorders of 1981 and 1985, and the mid-1980s militancy of a trade union movement under siege, especially during the 1984-5 miners' strike (Fine and Millar 1985, Scraton and Thomas 1985, Geary 1985, McCabe and Wallington *et al.* 1988). Public order policing has become an increasingly significant commitment on the mainland as in Northern Ireland, and is a source of growing police expenditure on hardware and overtime (Bunyan and Kettle 1980; Manwaring and White 1983; Gregory 1985; Waddington 1987, 1988).

Regarding politicisation of the police, chief constables are an effective elite group of increasing significance. For more than two decades, some have become prominent public figures, and their professional body, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) features regularly in discussions about policing issues (Reiner 1991: 3). Some radical critics also accused the ACPO of being the *watchdog* of the Home Office (Campbell 1987: 121, in Reiner 1991). However difficult it is for them to say publicly, in an interview with the forty chief constables Reiner (1991) found that most chief constables accept that the duty of the police to obey the will of an elected government, even if they disagree with it (Reiner 1991: 212). Chief Constables regularly declaim on the political neutrality of the police service and on the dangers embodied in the current campaigns for enchanted accountability to democratically-elected local authorities, denouncing this as an insidious bid for 'political' control. They argue that the police are not servants of government at any level; they do not act at the behest of a minister or any political party, not even the party in government. They indicate that they only act on behalf of the people as a whole (Reiner 1985: 5).

On the other hand, what we have been witnessing is that policing is not a separate issue from politics (see Scraton 1987, Hall *et al.* 1978).

It would be suggested from past experience that the concept of 'political neutrality or independence' of the police cannot remain without crucial examination. The 1980s witnessed the political motivation of chief constables and points to their actions during the miners' strike as proof of hostility to trade unions. The police were seen as enemies of the left and the causes espoused by the left; ethnic minorities and anti-racism. In a broader sense all relationships which have a power scope are political. The Police are essentially and inescapably political: 'The civil police is a social organisation created and sustained by political processes to enforce dominant conceptions of public order' (Skolnick 1972: 41; in Reiner 1985: 2).

As mentioned earlier, the consequence of such a 'law and order approach has therefore been to politicise the police, so that it is now commonplace to see senior officers explaining their views on criminal justice or public order before the television cameras or hear to them on the radio. The police have become lobby politicians in their own right whether through the Association of Chief Police Officers or through the Police Federation, and it is difficult to disassociate these developments with the divergence of opinion which has come about between the two major political parties. The police have become associated, whether by intention or circumstances, with a political approach to the war on crime which emphasises power rather than liberty, and policing of the miners' strike has only served to confirm this conclusion (Baxter 1985: 310-311).

Existing political bodies influence the definition of the police mandate, central government represented by the Home Secretary, the police authority, and consultative committees. There are also a number of individuals and bodies within the police who can influence the mandate; namely, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Superintendents' Association, the Police Federation and individual officers who have as part of their responsibilities a consultative role with these political and community bodies (Butler 1985: 177-178).

Underlying all the various issues which have sparked controversy — corruption, abuse of powers, racial discrimination, miscarriage of justice, public order methods, effectiveness in crime control and many other vexed matters—there has been a fundamental concern with accountability (Reiner 1989; in Smith 1989: 195). As Gilroy and Sim argue:

Policing is a profoundly political process. Police work entails the use, often in a very arbitrary way, of violence and coercion (Gilroy and Sim 1987: 79).

Out of the history of English policing has become apparent a situation in which Chief Constables have extensive operational independence. Changes in accountability procedures — through the complaints system, through Codes of Practices (which may be regarded as counterproductive as 'managed' by the police), and through consultative committees (which are unrepresentative and depend too much on the police for information) cannot affect police practice without the goodwill of the rank-and file and of the chiefs. 'Where police venture into interaction with the community, it is usually on their own terms'. Rule-tightening approaches are of little value unless combined with public support.

The 1980s have also witnessed extensive changes in the legal and constitutional position and powers of the police. The riots of 1981 and the Scarman Report (1982) were one crucial source of these developments, marking a turning-point in the increasingly politicised debate about police organisation and strategy, and the accountability and constitutional status of the police. The Report made a number of recommendations aimed at improving accountability within the existing constitutional framework (Morgan 1987a). The most influential of these was the idea of police-community consultative committees (PCCs), which were further encouraged by (s. 106) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. PACE attempted a codification of the powers of the police to investigate crime, and the safeguards over their exercise, while the Public Order Act 1986 attempted clarification of their powers in this significant area.

PACE came at a time when policing had become a critical attraction of the political debate, not only because of the immediate issues surrounding the coal industry dispute, but because of the commutative effects of a series of issues which had been emerging since the early sixties. A series of disclosures of police malpractice served to undermine, for some, the traditional confidence that Britain has in those who enforce the law.

Before PACE, the Government provided a significant input into policing matters through the workings of the *Financial Management Initiative* and the various circulars which flowed from it. The *Financial Management Initiative* (HMSO 1982) aimed to produce more precise and quantifiable measures of outputs from the public services. This means increases in police resources would depend upon a demonstration that existing resources were being used as efficiently, effectively and

economically as possible. The Home Office Circular 114/83 (Home Office 1983) outlined the way in which the philosophy of the Financial Management Initiative applied to the police service. It stressed the need for all policing activities to have clear objectives and for the police to monitor the effectiveness of their actions in achieving these objectives. Tougher rules were introduced in the Home Office Circular 106 of (1988) which required that a case had to be made for each extra constable, showing what his or her specific contribution would be. These circulars have brought about a reorientation in the management style of police forces, including 'privatisation' of policing, and the encouragement of citizen volunteers in the Special Constabulary and other guises (Reiner 1992b: 55, 73).

Another attempt to increase public accountability of police forces was a system of 'lay visitors' to police stations. Following a 1986 Home Office Circular most police forces began to introduce such schemes. It can be suggested that the use of Home Office circulars as form of greater central control of locally accountable services led increasingly to politicisation of the police.

Racism and racial discrimination are other issues that have led to decrease in legitimacy as a product of social change.¹⁸ The 1960s witnessed the emergence of the multi-racial society in Britain (Gilroy 1983, Kettle and Hodges 1982, Benyon and Solomos (1987). Racial discrimination and prejudice were also common in housing and employment and also policing (Rex 1984). Children grew up to regard the police as an enemy to their families and neighbours. The growth of movements such as the National Front, and events such as Enoch Powell's 'river of blood' speech increased the hostility between the police and ethnic minorities. The issue of 'race and crime' was on the political agenda during the period of the 1970s. It was reported as:

...the extent of total recorded indictable crime in any conurbation or police division is not related to the presence of ethnic minorities; that blacks were in the Metropolitan police District (1975) arrested more frequently than whites; but that a large part of this excess can be statistically accounted for by the deprivations specific to the black, white and Asian population... Finally, it has been found that while victims' reports and arrest rates point to the conclusion that blacks are excessively involved in recorded street crime, the data also suggests that blacks are more liable to be picked up by the police (particularly 'suspected person' and other violent theft arrests) (Stevens & Willis 1979: 112).

Kinsey (1986) argues that the decade of the seventies began with the police restive and crime rates rising. Relations with ethnic minorities, especially with black people

¹⁸ (see Reiner 1992, 'Policing a Post Modern Society', *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 55, No. 6: 761-781)

were deteriorating increasingly. To give a broad picture on this issue, Thomas (1984; in Benyon (1984: 185) argues:

... late 1970s were characterised by increasingly frantic attempts to prevent Black People coming to this country using legislation and any other means available. In this context, black people came together to form organisations to defend themselves and to campaign against racism in their communities who were trying to brutalise them. They formed groups that provided support in dealing with the complex institutions of the British society such as social services departments, educational institutions, unions and work places. Anywhere that black people were put under pressure, they responded.

Thomas (1984) argues that, in this regard the police were one of the first institutions that blacks had to organise and campaign about, due to their partial and unfair modes of operation. As Reiner (1992b: 52) argues:

What has been hotly debated during the 1980s is the extent to which police differentiation is explicable and justifiable by legally relevant differences between racial groups (Waddington 1983, 1984), or due to police racism.¹⁹

Lord Scarman (1982) suggested that 'the history of relations between the police and the people of Brixton has been a tale of failure' (para. 4.43), and he suggested that 'both the police and the local leaders 'must accept a share of the blame' (para. 4.46). Scarman also identified harassment, lack of flexibility in policing methods and handling of disorders as causes of the deterioration of police public relations (para. 4.65-4.96).

Law and order crises, politicisation of the police, racial discrimination, professionalisation of the police, and the use of tough policing methods have all been specific, concrete issues of controversy and concern in recent years, symptoms of the erosion of the public standing of the police. Underlying them, however, are a combination of deeper social changes which form the social context of the declining legitimacy of the police (Reiner 1992c). Since the 1960s, police functions have concentrated on the economically marginal elements in society; the unemployed, the young (men), and the blacks. 'Such powerless groups have been aptly named *police property*' (Cray 1972; Lee 1981; in Reiner 1992a: 102). The development of more self-conscious youth cultures, the return of long-term unemployment, and the increasing militancy of industrial conflict since the early 1970s has resulted in the

¹⁹ PSI (1983) demonstrated clearly that racism was institutionalised within the canteen culture and professional policies and practices of the Force.

development of social strata with a consciousness of antagonism towards (and from) the police (Reiner 1992a: 102).

The destructive deterioration of relations with the black community has been a more crucial change in the history of policing. There is a long history of police prejudice against blacks and complaints of racial harassment. By the mid-1970s clear evidence mounts of blacks (especially black youths) being disproportionately involved in arrests for certain offences, partly because of police discrimination (Reiner 1992a: 102). As mentioned earlier, amongst the blacks, such disastrous relations have resulted in 'lack of confidence in the police' (PSI 1983, vol. iv: 326).

The early eighties have seen the breakdown of the British economy, the collapse of the welfare state and the disappearance of social consensus. Nowhere have these movements cut more deeply than in the inner city, where industrial deterioration, low incomes, high unemployment and housing decay and racial tension are common characteristics of the life (Harrison 1983). Due to economic crisis, and heightening of police's self-consciousness as targets of policing, long-term structural unemployment also resulted in politicised policing since the 1970s against vulnerable groups such as the unemployed, blacks and the young. Brogden (1983) argues that the young 'street' population has always been the prime focus of police order maintenance and law enforcement work. Racial discrimination in housing, employment and education led young blacks to be disproportionately involved in street culture. In times of economic catastrophe and contention for jobs and other resources, the majority group (especially the working class) might indeed benefit from the effects of over pricing of blacks, because black stigmatisation as criminal, the acquisition of criminal records, reduces their competitiveness (Johnson 1976: 108; in Reiner 1992a: 170). That is why the economically marginal ethnic minorities, and especially their youth, are prone to become 'police property' (Lee 1981, in Reiner 1992a: 170).

In terms of the changing of police powers and policing styles from the soft approach to the tough approach in which aggression and confrontation are routine components, the inner cities, constitute the critical sites of policing. Because the poor working-class youths spent their time in the inner city streets these areas were considered as the 'symbolic locations' of the sources of crime. As Sir Kenneth Newman claims:

Throughout London there are locations where unemployed youth—often black youths congregate; where the sale and purchase of drugs, the exchange of stolen property and illegal drinking and gaming is not uncommon. The youths regard these locations as their territory. Police are viewed as intruders, the symbol of responsible authority — largely white authority — in a society that is for all their grievances about unemployment, prejudice and discrimination. They

closely equate with the criminal 'rookeries' of Dickensian London (cited in Gilroy and Sim 1987: 100).

Symbolic locations reinforces authoritarian policing styles and constitutes a demand for extra police powers. So long as these areas are said to be immune from 'standard' policing expectations, there is an apparent dispute as to the operational implications that flow from this police analysis. As Sir Kenneth Newman put it:

If allowed to continue, locations with these characteristics assume symbolic importance — a negative symbolism of the inability of the police to maintain order. Their existence encourages law breaking elsewhere, affects public perceptions of police effectiveness, heightens fear of crime and reinforces the phenomenon of urban decay (Newman 1987, quoted in Gilroy and Sim 1987: 100).

Thus, police concern was primarily with the symbolic level at which these localities attract police wrath, because of 'their capacity to convey the limitations of police power and to signify the fragility of the order which the police were able to impose' (Gilroy and Sim 1987: 100). The police construction of these symbolic locations was used both to legitimate police methods for dealing with the communities themselves and to justify claims for additional para-military powers for more general use. They were another indication of the rise of the strong state (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982).²⁰

Response from the Government, Home Office Circular 114/83, value for money, quality of service

The Conservatives realised that despite the promised drop in crime as a result of their 'law and order' policies, crime had actually risen. An editorial in the *Guardian* noted that the government was aware that shouting too raucously for a great war against crime, will make people ask about what had been achieved for eight years? (*The Guardian* 7 March 1986, Taylor 1987; in: Rawlings 1991: 42). As I have mentioned earlier; the Government had encountered difficulties in trying to fulfil their promises to cut public expenditure. Against the huge increase in the crime rate, the Home Office has recognised that crime prevention programmes are more likely to impact on crime levels than reliance on the police service. In pursuing such initiatives as Neighbourhood Watch and Community Policing, the Home Office has sought to encourage the community to involve itself in the prevention of crime. As (Reiner & Cross 1991: 4) describe it, the government's stance began, slowly but perceptibly, to change, although the tough elements of the programme remained in place, especially

²⁰ For more information, see Keith, M (1993) *Race, Riots and Policing*, VLL Press.

the capacity of the police to deal with public disorder for example policing the poll tax demonstration in 1990. Alongside these we can see examples of rhetoric and realities in policing strategies in terms of conflict between reducing crime.

The origins of crime lie deep in society: in families where parents do not support or control children; in schools where discipline is poor; and in the wider world where violence is glamorised and traditional values are under attack. Government alone cannot tackle such deep-rooted problems easily or quickly (Conservative Party Election Manifesto 1987, in: Brake & Hale 1992: 1).

The reason for such a U-turn by the Conservatives was the recognition that the criminal justice system itself, and more broadly any aspect of government policy, can have only a limited part to play in controlling crime. The sources of crime, and therefore the sources of crime control, lie in the broader social process, as critics of the government's original 'law and order' package had always argued (see Scraton 1985; Gordon 1987). The strategy of the Government has more recently attempted to reduce crime directing attention beyond the formal structures of the criminal justice system. The Government argued that crime was due to factors which were beyond the control of the government and the police (*The Police*, June 1986). Therefore, the solutions lay in the hands of offenders, parents, teachers, those who controlled television, video makers and even potential victims and their neighbours. Crime prevention and detection was not the exclusive preserve of the police: Combating crime, according to Thatcher, is everybody's business, everybody's responsibility. It cannot be left solely to the police (*The Times*, 26 May 1988; also Hurd in: *Police*, September 1986; *The Guardian*, 22 October 1987, in: Rawlings 1991: 43). The role of the wider community, business and voluntary organisations and everyone as citizens in preventing crime before it happens, took the government's agenda on crime prevention. 'Community' approaches are found everywhere in its pages: community policing, community crime prevention, punishment in the community; a rhetoric not dissimilar from that put forward by the Labour Party from the mid 1980s (see Birley & Bright 1985).

Another reason for moving towards community based crime prevention is the scope for 'expenditure cuts'. Policing is by far the largest element of public spending on law and order. An obvious starting point in looking at this area is the 'law and order' programme as defined in the public expenditure White Papers. This includes those activities for which central government is directly responsible — Crown courts, probation and prisons and some police services — and those which come under local government; principally magistrates' courts and police expenditure. As early as 1983 the Home Office indicated its commitment to applying the Financial Management

Initiative to the criminal justice system, with the issuing of Circular 114 to police forces, and a package of changes aimed at improving management information and control of resources within the prison system (Reiner & Cross 1991).

Home Office Circular 114 explained a new, key role for Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary in enhancing police effectiveness. HMICs were to be responsible for assessing how effectively chief officers, working with the police authority and the local community, identified policing problems, set objectives, deployed resources and reviewed performance. HMICs were to become arbiters of the effectiveness of not just the managerial but also the political processes involved in performance review (Weatheritt 1993: 26).

The circular marked the beginning of what has become a persistent and high-profile pursuit of better value for money in police forces. On the other hand the introduction by Circular 114/1983 of new management techniques has also led to problems. Although civilians have always been employed in police forces, the government have made the transfer of work from police officers to civilians a key feature of their drive for a more effective use of resources (Home Office Circulars 114/1983 and 105/1988; Loveday 1989, in Rawlings 1991). The rationale behind this exercise was cost-cutting rather than an attempt to improve policing practices, because civilians are cheaper than police officers (Police, June 1984; in: Rawlings 1991).

At the end of 1990, the Association of Chief Police Officers launched a statement of corporate values, to which every force has subsequently signed up, which committed the police force to improving the quality of police services in partnership with the public (ACPO 1990, in Weatheritt 1993: 36). Evidenced by the British Crime Survey published earlier in the year, the main reason behind this statement was a 'steady erosion' in support for the police since the early 1980s. The survey revealed a gap between people's expectations about the capacity of the police and their ability to deliver services.

The working group (ACPO, PF, Superintendents' Associations, the Home Office) identified 'key service areas' of policing which have provided the framework within which, with the addition of a category relating to the costs of policing, ACPO, the Audit Commission, the Inspectorate and the Home Office have subsequently sought to develop the key indicators of police performance most relevant to their respective constitutional and organisational priorities. (Those key areas are the way in which forces handle calls from the public; crime management; traffic management; public

reassurance and order maintenance; and community policing (Quality of Service Sub-Committee 1991; in Weatheritt 1993: 37).

Summary

This chapter has demonstrated that the collapse of traditional consensual British policing led to a widening gap between the police and some sections of the community. Especially in inner city areas, such gap produced hostility between the police and the public. Many sections of the public lacked confidence in the police (PSI 1983). As Reiner (1994) points out, over more than two and half decades the process of increasing acceptance of the police in England and Wales has been reversed. Reiner adds some other major problems in policing such as corruption and miscarriage of justice scandals, accusations of race and sex discrimination, increasing public disorder and the militarisation of police tactics (Jefferson 1990), rising crime and an apparently declining police ability to deal with it, decreasing public accountability as forces have grown larger, more centralised, and more reliant on technology (Reiner 1992a: ch. 2).

Underlying the many specific causes of controversy over policing, such as malpractice, militarisation, or apparently declining effectiveness, Reiner (1992c) suggests that there is a deeper and more fundamental change in contemporary society, often labelled as 'post modernity'. As Reiner points out:

...the rise of a specific organisation specialising in policing functions coincides with the development of modern nation-states, and is an aspect of the process by which they sought to gain centralised control over a particular territory. This was particularly true of the British case, where bureaucratic police organisations came into being comparatively late by European standards and coincided with the historical trajectory towards greater social integration after the initial impact of the industrial revolution. The British police have always been unique on a comparative scale for concentrating in the same organisation a variety of policing functions-crime prevention, detection, peace-keeping, public order maintenance, and the preservation of state security- which in other countries are divided among separate bodies. In all societies the symbolic functions of the police are at least as important as their direct instrumental effectiveness in dealing with crime and disorder (Manning 1977). This is particularly true in Britain, where the police came to stand-together with the monarchy, whose peace they are sworn to protect-as symbols of consensual and legitimate order (Reiner 1994: 756).

In the view of Reiner (1994), the state of the police as an organisation symbolising national unity and order is endangered fundamentally by the advent of those social changes labelled as 'post modernity' (Reiner 1994: 756). The term has been used by social theorists from a variety of perspectives to refer to a complex set of cultural,

social, and economic developments which are seen as fundamentally transforming the modern world into a new kind of social order (Reiner 1994).

Post-modern culture lacks any central reference-point or conception of the 'good society' (Harvey 1989, Jameson 1992; in Reiner 1994: 756). The role of intellectuals is no longer that of 'legislators' mapping brave new worlds of progress but that of 'interpreters' of a pluralistic mosaic of lifestyle, none of which can trump the others in legitimacy. Consumerism becomes the driving force of action, the 'pleasure principle' displacing the Puritan asceticism and discipline which formed the cultural foundation of modern industrialism (Bauman 1987: Reiner 1994: 756).

Regarding the British police Reiner (1994: 757) puts it as:

In this context, the British conception of the police as a body with an omnibus mandate, symbolising order and harmony, becomes increasingly anachronistic. The British police are likely to move towards the international pattern of specialist national units for serious crime, terrorism, public order, large-scale fraud, and other national or international problems. Local police providing services to particular communities will remain, but with sharp differences between 'service'-style organisations in stable suburban areas, and 'watchman' bodies with the rump duties of the present police, keeping the lid on underclass symbolic locations.

There have been many critics (i.e. Hall *et al.* 1978, Reiner 1992a, Scraton 1985, 1987) who have in common the fact that all of them have demonstrated critical concern about the establishment, organisation and methods of police activity. Concern about the abuse of police powers is not a theme confined to the current period. It has always been on the political agenda since the establishment of Modern British policing in 1829 (see Critchley 1978, Bowden 1978). Recent evidence has highlighted the fact that changes in the organisation and method of policing to cope with recent developments of policing of crime, public order and terrorism, in the context of a persistent manpower shortage, have served to place the most youthful and least experienced officers in the forefront of routine street policing. At this level concern has usually manifested itself in response to a perceived lack of sensitivity by police in handling situations. The concern with particular aspects of police activity is still very noticeable (e.g. policing in poll tax demonstrations, policing in the miners' strike of the 1984-5, policing in the inner city disturbances of the 1980s-85s, Swamp 81, the use of SPGs, though linked with disquiet about public order policing, the advent of computerised information gathering, complaints procedure). At the bottom of every specific conflict, critics pinpointed the problem of the police being out of control by any outside bodies and hence unresponsive to the popular will.

Since then concerns about the direction and control of police powers vested in the police have surfaced regularly at times of political tension. During the late 1970s and early 1980s political and social polarisation increased greatly in England and Wales, and the police became embroiled in acute controversies (Reiner 1992a). Whether the police were adequately accountable became a prominent issue (Morgan and Smith 1989). Great concerns about policing raise questions of how the police are to be controlled and managed.

The apparent failure of the police to maintain a harmonious relations with the public has led to a search for a solution by police leaders and policy makers. Such a trend has been a realisation of the fact that community support based on respect for civil right and accountability is necessary for effective policing (Kinsey *et al.* 1986). As a solution to the crisis in policing, the concept of 'community policing' had a great deal of prominence and it was widely recognised that fostering the relationship between the police and the public was crucial in improving the service which the police provided. Especially the responses to the riots of 1981 have some clear implications for English policing in general — most notably for the prospects of community policing. Scarman found that 'racial disadvantage is a fact of current British life', the impoverished condition of urban blacks (especially youths) threatens to become an 'endemic, ineradicable disease threatening the very survival of our society' (Scarman 1982). Policing in Britain has to be considered against this background of racial disadvantage, and Scarman comes out strongly in favour of community policing in inner-city areas by recommending that senior police officials consider the followings:

1. The pattern of patrolling, especially the mix of foot and mobile patrols;
2. The role of Home Beat Officers, with particular emphasis on ways in which they can be integrated more effectively into the mainstream of operational policing;
3. The provision of opportunities for operational officers to get to know the community they are policing;
4. Ways of ensuring greater continuity and balanced spread of officers of different ages in more sensitive inner city areas, and of ensuring that officers transferred to work in such areas are given an effective introduction (Scarman 1982: 130)

Following the Scarman Report (1982) there has been an increase in the development of police/community relations initiatives; it is the viability of community policing which is the subject of examination in this thesis. Therefore, the next two chapters will identify principles, patterns and practices in improving police accountability and consensus. As suggested by Scarman (1982), I shall first look at statutory local Police Consultative Committees, and then, in the fourth chapter, I shall examine communitarian, top-down corporate police/community schemes.

Chapter 3

Community involvement: police accountability and police response

As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate about policing matters has to a large extent focused on the concepts of 'police accountability', 'direction and control', 'police methods', and the whole ethos of policing which were called into discussion. This chapter firstly looks at the emergence of the accountability issue, then goes on to examine the development of the police-community consultation arrangement made under PACE 1984 (s.106.) analysing the various responses of the main agencies in the process: the police, the police authority and the local committees themselves; and consider the extent to which the practice of consultation relates to wider claims for the enhancement of police accountability. In doing this the following questions will be addressed: 'how has the purpose of the exercise been defined within a specific police area?', 'what form has the consultation process taken?', 'what has been impact, if any, on policing policy and operations?', 'what has consultation meant in practice?'. I shall also look at police decision-making at the community level and examine the tension between national and local decision-making.

In modern societies, to sustain order and to administer the law, the police are expected to serve as an institution to defend and promote the harmonious reality or potential of the existing social order (Morgan & Smith 1989: 1). Although, over the last three decades, surveys have consistently shown a high level of public contentment with the police (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 16), it is accepted that there is a significant falling in confidence. Consensus about the police role and activity has begun to look increasingly weak (Morgan & Smith 1989). Studies have uncovered marked distinctions between groups, with convincing evidence of significant levels of dissatisfaction in urban areas, and a decline in the general level of satisfaction with the police (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 17).

For instance, the PSI (1983) found a 'dangerous lack of confidence' in the police among substantial numbers of young white people and a 'disastrous lack of confidence' among young people of West Indian origin. The Islington Crime Surveys (Jones *et al.* 1986, Crawford *et al.* 1990) found considerable dissatisfaction with regard to local policing, that it is concentrated most heavily in young people, and that it is growing (Crawford *et al.* 1990: 103). Such growing dissatisfaction is explained by Skogan (1990: 2):

The surveys indicate that confidence has fallen in almost every type of community and in many important social categories. The percentage of persons who think police do a 'very good job' has declined the most in small towns and rural areas, among women and the elderly, and among whites — all groups which traditionally have been the most supportive of the police.

Regarding the police and black people, prejudice and hostility are the two elements which have been most in existence amongst the police (Holdaway 1983, PSI 1983, McConville and Shepherd 1992). In the first place, black people in general but particularly black youths are seen as anti-authority or, and this is much the same for most officers, anti-police (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 166). The bad police treatment of young, economically-marginalised lower-class males, especially black males has been the subject many British studies. Studies show that young males, especially if unemployed or black, or both, are disproportionately subject to stops and stop-searches in the street by the police (see The PSI 1983, Benyon 1984). The Policy Studies Institute (1983) found that the result of this police attention has led to many being more hostile to the police than other groups. McConville and Shepherd (1992: 173) show serious criticism of the police by white residents, male and female and of all ages. The crisis in policing over the last two decades has been developing concerning some aspects of policing practices. This is nothing to do with equipment or training; it is as Alderson suggests that:

The arrangements for policing somehow no longer seem to match the complexity of society (Alderson 1982: 135).

As Chapter II illustrated, in recent years policing practices, such as operational tactics, the increased use of technology, developments in military style training, management practices, the developments of community policing have been on the agenda for critical examination. It has been argued that police policy had seldom been an issue for debate. It was demonstrated that chief constables decided on policy and had to justify it to no one (Cox 1975: 194; in Stephens 1988: 167, Reiner 1991). On the other hand the issue of the democratic control of the police (police accountability) has emerged as a controversial political subject and while, according to many critics, chief constables still effectively lay down policy, there are increasing demands that they explain and justify their decisions.

The position of chief constables has always been central to the accountability debate. The series of scandals which led to the 1960 Royal commission on the police mainly turned on this, and its 1962 Report put its view plainly: 'The problem of controlling the police can... be re-stated as the problem of controlling chief constables' (para. 102; in: Reiner 1989: 195).

In the rising conflict chief constables continued to implement their policies without considering the views of police authorities who were demanding a say on how their areas were being policed (McLaughlin 1992: 2). This period witnessed the refusal of

the chief constables to allow any discussion of what they defined as operational matters, e.g., the manner in which the 1981 riots and the 1984-85 coal dispute were policed. In addition to these, national developments in policy matters, such as the National Reporting Centre, mutual aid arrangements and the acquisition of riot equipment were decided upon by the Home Office and ACPO without reference to Police Authorities (McLaughlin 1992: 2).

On the one hand chief constables and the Home Office claim that the police are made accountable to the public for their practices by following the internal disciplinary procedures. For example, it was reported that 45 per cent of the chief constables claim their own police authority performs its functions well, and another 35 per cent say quite well (Reiner 1991: 250). Most chief constables also claim that their relationships with their police authorities are good in that they have been in the right direction in maintaining a strong relationship in which the authority is not 'political' and accept their professional perspective (Reiner 1991: 258). Conversely, critics, by looking at the specialised and increasingly technological police, becoming remote from the communities they serve, argue that the institutions by which accountability is said to be achieved are incapable of providing it (Morgan 1986, 1987a, 1989; Morgan & Maggs 1984, 1985; Jefferson *et al.* 1988; Jefferson & Grimshaw 1984; Reiner 1991; Scraton 1987). It has been suggested that democratic control of the police has been brought into sharp focus in recent years by increased specialisation and use of technology; by the increased arming of the police and by the growth in force size (Jefferson *et al.* 1988: 15).

Such debates on police accountability have led to the argument that existing British representative democratic arrangements have failed to provide for adequate community participation in decision making process. For example, Jefferson *et al.* (1988) argue that the crisis in policing is one of the most striking manifestations of the broader crisis of democracy in Britain (Jefferson *et al.*: 102). The issue of democracy also brings the argument about effective policing responsive to the needs of the community. It is argued that an organised and rigorous system of local democratic accountability of the police is vital for restoring mutual trust between police and the community.

Another anti-democratic development in British policing, as McLaughlin (1992: 2) argues, was the introduction of the Local Government Bill in July 1985 (whilst became an act in 1986), abolishing of the Labour controlled Metropolitan County Councils and the Greater London Council. Joint Boards were established to take over the responsibilities of the formerly rebellious Police Authorities whose view was

contrary to the Conservative Party policing policies. To control the new Joint Boards, this Act gave authority to the central government (McLaughlin 1992: 2). The passing of the Local Government Act effectively quashed demands for democratic accountability.

It is argued that the position of the police within a liberal democratic structure poses key questions for those who believe that officials who are appointed or elected to positions where they routinely exercise power over others should be accountable for their actions. The police, in this respect, are open to questions because of the nature of the powers that have been delegated to them and the implications of the use of those powers. The main question is for whom do the police exercise their power?

It is not unfair to say that the police have been in an insupportable state. Transformation in policing practices for more than last two decades has resulted in a virtually sovereign and dangerously isolated police force, practising in inner cities without support or even, it would seem, the consent of the community at large. The police are no longer, (if indeed they ever really were) the answer to the question of social unrest, they are part of the dispute. An even larger police force, with greatly increased power could make matters much worse.

Democratic policing methods require the development of some form of consensus, which means dealing with the problem of crime with community support, or at least gaining the acceptance of the community for policing activities. The police officer is in and within the community. Officers' knowledge of local criminal activity should be high and public information should be readily forthcoming from the community. This is an ideal state of policing which has probably been approximated to in rural communities. In working class areas of the modern city, there has always been a degree of distance between the police and the community (Lea & Young 1982: 10).

Over twenty years and more, consensus about the police has begun to look increasingly fragile. Twenty years ago, or more, most people, including most academics and politicians, were content to leave policing to the police. More recently, a number of events have led widely divergent groups to ask questions about the effectiveness of the police in achieving their purposes, whatever they might be (Morgan & Smith 1989: 1).

Brogden *et al.* (1988: 154) argue

... the scale and comprehensiveness of the present public concern parallels that of the early nineteenth century, with the difference that the earlier debate focused on the very idea of a police force, while the present one (now that the idea of police has become taken for granted) is largely confined to questions on the kind of policing. Examples of the kind of issue that have caused concern in the last decade or so include: the use (and abuse) of police powers; corruption; 'styles' of policing; riot-control technology and paramilitarism; computers and surveillance; special 'proactive' squads; police entry into the political arena; firearms; deployment; resources and finance.

Critics such as Scarman (1982), Scraton (1987), Kinsey *et al.* (1986), claim that anti-democratic policing methods in the inner city were one of the reasons that developed the hostility between the police and the public. In the inner city, with the rising long-term unemployment and an increase in crime rates the police begin to deploy high profile strategies aimed less at particular identifiable offenders located with the aid of information obtained from the community, than against the community itself or at least the young. In this context the differentiation between offender and non-offender is confused and the situation approaches one in which any young person is as likely as any other to be caught in the net of stop-and-search or other forms of aggressive policing, quite irrespective of their actions. Once this happens then two further developments begin to crystallise: first, the community begins to become alienated from the police and the processes of information gathering and co-operation become worse. The outcome of this is that it becomes difficult to implement 'older' strategies of consensus policing and tracking down individuals. The police carry out oppressive operations to get information. These further alienate innocent members of the community and often have low productivity as police operations. The 'Swamp 81' operation conducted by the Metropolitan Police in the Brixton area of London, which preceded the rioting in that area, is an example of such a problem. It shows how it is possible to antagonise the greatest possible number of people while at the same time achieving the minimum efficiency in the direct control of a particular type of crime, in this case robbery. The police stopped 'suspicious' youths randomly. Apart from being black, male and young, there was no clear idea of who constituted a 'suspicious' character. Such an operation, apart from a show of force to remind the community that the police can control the streets, was not only alienating as far as the community was concerned but doomed to failure as a crime prevention exercise (Lea & Young 1982: 12).


The implementation of 'military' policing strategies, together with the confusion of offenders and non-offenders, has meant that the type of trust between police and community that characterised consensus policing has broken down. After this point, the community comes to see any attempt at an arrest by officers as a symbolic attack

on the community *per se* and, as a consequence, the phenomenon of collective resistance to the arrest of an individual begins to emerge (Lea & Young 1982: 12). Then disorder is inevitable. Lea & Young (1982: 12) formulate the vicious circle of cumulative causation as:

The deterioration in police-community relations leads to a drying up of information which in turn forms the background to the development of aggressive 'military' policing. This reinforces the tendency of the community to dry up as an information source and the general alienation further undermines the basis of consensus policing, leaving military style action as the only viable strategy available to the police.

This is well illustrated in the following diagram (from: Lea & Young (1982: 13):

The Collapse of Consensus policing



From the diagram it is clear that race becomes an element of this vicious circle. Lea & Young argue:

The economic alienation of young black people gives rise to a culture with a propensity to crime. The police make the initial connection between race and crime; the niceties of the links between deprivation, racial discrimination and delinquent behaviour do not concern them. In this environment, whatever racist

sentiments exist within the police force are reinforced. The activity of policing the inner city with high crime rates and a high proportion of black youth, in the context of a more 'military' style of policing, reinforces racist sentiments among police officers (Lea & Young 1982: 12-13).

It is suggested that there are serious deficiencies in police community relations which exist in certain areas of cities and, above all, in relation to particular sectors of the community, most notably the ethnic minorities. Scraton (1982: 21) argues:

The serious and prolonged civil disturbances during the Summer of 1981 served notice on our national and local governments that inner-city communities, particularly black communities are no longer going to tolerate the appalling economic conditions, the meagre social and health facilities and the intimidation, harassment and brutality to which they have been subject.

Such explanations cannot be attributed to all disorders in England and Wales. Many critics stressed that the Brixton disorders were not race disorders. A great number of the participants were reported to have been whites (see Scarman 1982, Benyon & Solomos 1987). Therefore, Lea & Young's explanation would be partial and misleading. Perhaps other quite fundamental questions are involved, such as the advance of urban capitalism. Such development resulted in the growth of a population of young people in the decaying inner cities, a great proportion of them with little or no experience of work and employment. This is thus not simply a set of social problems and deprivations, this is also a crisis for the political process (Lea & Young 1982: 14).

The conservative response to the disorders made the situation worse. The conservative argues that the lack of social discipline and work ethic stems from a lack of cultural commitment to British values, and it is this that has given rise to the growth of criminal ghettos. It is the responsibility of the police to maintain the peace in those areas. Therefore, the entry of the police into these ghettos is legitimised. The rioters are seen as criminally inclined, resisting the imposition of law and order upon them. Tough policing practices are seen to be necessary in the areas where there is no stable discipline of working life, no family discipline. The state, as the conservatives argue, must provide the necessary element of coercion (Lea & Young 1982: 6).

The responses to the disorders of the 1980s were no more than a tough, military style of policing. Consequently, such responses as mentioned above made matters worse by reinforcing the vicious circle of police militarisation and the marginalisation of the community. The question of police accountability to the community became a major matter.

After the Brixton disorders of the 1980s, in an attempt to gain consensus, some initiatives began to appear: the birth of democratically elected police authorities along the lines currently urged in 'GLC' policy would be one example of such a development. A forum would be created for community involvement in a political solution to the problem of urban policing and would thereby remove the basis for the response to that problem by violence. The concept of police accountability involved here should not be seen simply in terms of the community putting a check of police activity but becoming involved in a real debate on policing policy. The rationale behind such response was as Bradley *et al.* argue:

Without community involvement in police policy generation, the question of policy legitimation becomes fraught with difficulty, and a democratically acceptable content cannot be guaranteed. By the same token, unless policy legitimation is taken seriously, it may be that community involvement in policy generation cannot be adequately sponsored, again with negative implications for policy content; furthermore, and more directly, the implication of the content of any policy will be particularly frustrated without adequate support Bradley *et al.* (1986: 84).

Police accountability

Police accountability concerns how police work is to be controlled, whether through the very limited means of retrospective explanation or through the much more direct system of prospective control. It becomes an issue when the public feel controls are not working, which has been a recurring feature of police history. At present, police of all ranks are formally controlled by law in their law enforcement decisions, a system designed to guarantee their impartiality. If they offered they can be called to account in the case of the constable through the courts, the discipline code and the complaints procedure; and, in the case of a chief constable, by his police authority and the Home Secretary.

The debate on police accountability can be described as an attempt to understand the relationship between various institutions affecting police work; to examine how the law, the organisation and the occupational culture interact to produce 'police work', In the examination of 'police accountability', specifically, there are three questions which need to be addressed: 1- What is police accountability? 2- Why is accountability an issue? 3- To whom should the police be accountable? (Brogden 1988: 151)

It is argued that law enforcement, in a democracy, is expected to be undertaken impartially, which means according all citizens equal treatment under the law (Jefferson and Grimshaw 1984: 137; in Brogden 1988: 152). Accountability also requires efficiency, which means using resources to good effect. As Brogden (1988) argues:

Being a service within a democracy, it is, finally expected to strive for effectiveness in the eyes of those it serves; in other words, to satisfy the criterion of public acceptability or *consent*. Being a police officer in a democracy, then entails enforcing the law impartially, in an efficient manner, and with the consent of the public. In so far as there is agreement that this is happening, it can be argued that the obligations of office are being carried out. And, if this is the case, it can be said that the police are accountable (Brogden 1988: 153).

The issue of 'police accountability' has a complex dimension and the theory of it can generate a good deal of heat and rhetoric in discussion (Newing 1990: 45). It has been apparent that the police themselves do not always welcome demands for greater accountability for they argue that they are already sufficiently accountable to the law, the courts, the police authorities, and the Police Complaints Authority.

...there is a fundamental ambivalence in the attitude of the police towards the whole notion of accountability to the community. Senior officers are fond of stressing that the police are indeed accountable, that they can only police 'with the consent' of the community. But when this Platonic 'community' takes on a real shape through its elected representatives, accountability is condemned as 'political interference' (Hewitt 1982: 58; in Stephens 1988: 170).

Many statements concerning police accountability stressed that greater accountability can only lead to greater political control over the police themselves. On the other hand, critics argue that there is no effective control of the police forces exercised either by the electorate or those who are elected (Stephens 1988: 170). Drawing on her experience as chairwoman of the Merseyside Police Authority, Simey (1984) has argued that the growing professional power of the police in recent years has left the police authorities at a disadvantage.

..the police have taken over an increasing share of the decision-making responsibility which should properly fall to the politicians. Almost unobserved, they have acquired an astonishingly comprehensive control over every aspect of the service. Recruitment and training, deployment of manpower and resources, even the extent to which they shall be accountable for what they do: all this falls within their purview *under the general heading of matters 'operational'* (Simey 1984: 136; in Stephens 1988: 171).

In this sense the Home Office is also seen as an influential, sometimes resented, force controlling the plan of police policy and performance (Reiner 1991: 276). In terms of the position of chief constables, Reiner argues:

...it seems clear that the line of accountability for chief constables is tilted increasingly towards the centre (in: Stephens 1988: 285).

The issues of 'accountability' or control of police forces is one of the fundamental policing issues in policing practices. One of the most important questions here is: who has the power to determine the policies which will actually be put into practice? Until the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill 1994, the 1964 Police Act made it clear that the chief constable, the local Police Authority and the Central Government in the form of the Home Secretary, are elements of the accountability process. The operational independence of the Chief Constable was guaranteed with the 1964 Police Act. The Police Authorities (made up two thirds local political representatives and one third magistrates (local judiciary) were to provide and equip so as to ensure an efficient police force, advise the Chief Constable on local conditions and, where necessary, ask for reports on the policing of the locality from the chief constable (although the latter was under no obligation to comply with this request). The third part of the tripartite structure, the Home Secretary, the central government representative, was given legal responsibility to promote the efficiency of policing, a range of powers not possessed by local police authorities, and the role of arbiter in the case of disputes between chief constables and their police authorities. However, the Home Secretary was not given the power to direct the operations of chief constables. The only part of the England and Wales to which this arrangement did not apply was London.

In spite of being the largest conurbation, London had a police force that was not locally accountable to the people who paid the taxes necessary for its maintenance, but only to the Home Secretary. Policing in London, through the late 1970s and 1980s became an increasingly important part of political debate in Britain.

Since the Police Act 1964, it is currently the police themselves who make policy choices, with little control or influence from democratic institutions (Morgan 1989: 245). It was argued that the control of the police should be given to local elected representatives (Lustgarten 1986; in Morgan & Smith 1989: 245). On the other hand ninety-five per cent of chief constables rejected the notion that police authorities should control decision-making in the police. The rationale behind such rejection was

that it would result in policing being determined by political rather than professional considerations.

As I will examine in this chapter, the resistance of the Government to Lustgarten's argument can be seen in the provision within the PACE 1984 for local consultation. Such provision, according to Morgan (1989) serves to legitimise police decision-making, because, as will be explained later in this chapter, the police are likely to dominate the consultative committees.

Before the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill 1994, the primary method of selecting representatives of Police Authorities was the electoral process. The Home Secretary was a member of the elected government of the day. Two-thirds of local police authority members were elected councillors. This has attracted two contrasting viewpoints. The Police opinion have often criticised police authority members for being either unrepresentative or lacking adequate expertise or both (cf. Reiner 1991: chap. 11; in Reiner 1993: 13). Police officers have often argued for a form of appointment rather than election of local representative to counter this (Anderton 1981, Oliver 1987; in Reiner 1993: 14). Local police authorities should, it is argued, be selected so as to be representatives of those interests with a legitimate stake in policing decisions, for example, professional, residents' and business associations.

On the other hand there has been strong support for the opposite view that local representatives should be chosen entirely by the electoral process and that the one-third JP element is anomalous. This has been the view of Labour and the Liberal Democrats and was supported by the Widdicombe Committee in 1986. The same body of opinion supports the idea of an elected local police authority in London, ending the anomalous position whereby the Metropolitan Police uniquely lack a political authority (Reiner 1993: 15).

On 23 March 1993, the Home Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, pronounced proposals for 'the most significant changes of the police service for 30 years. These included changes to the number (reducing the members of police authorities to 16) and composition of police authorities, making them smaller and 'more businesslike', with some of the members and the Chair appointed by the Home Secretary. According to Kenneth Clarke's proposal, the number of police authorities would be reduced to 16 members, made up of eight councillors, three magistrates and five people appointed by the Home Secretary. These proposals were included in the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill 1994. The Bill can be called 'calculative and contractual', and it parallels Conservative government policy in health, education and other public services. Local

police authorities and chief constables are to be given complete freedom for the allocation of their budgets, the bulk of which will come from central government. However, they will be responsible in very strict ways for their stewardship of the budget. Police authorities will largely be accountable to central government through the mechanism of appointment. Chief police officers will be accountable primarily through a market mechanism. They will be appointed on short-term contracts and receive performance related pay (PRP). Their performance will be judged according to the achievement of a limited range of performance indicators. Mr Clarke announced that these will include crime clear-up rates and response times to calls from the public (Reiner 1993: 19).

According to the Police and Magistrates' Courts Bill 1994, local authorities will lose their residual influence over policing while continuing to pay part of the bill. Police authorities will become free standing committees with half of their members non-elected magistrates and central government nominees. Central control will be reinforced by the Home Secretary's powers to appoint each authority's chairman and to set national performance targets which police authorities will be required to attain. Police authorities will, within those limits, be expected to set local objectives and performance targets. While chief constables retain 'direction and control' of their forces, however, it is not clear what power they will have to ensure that those targets are attained.

Central control over police authorities will be further enhanced by the replacement of some elected councillors with members nominated by the Home Secretary on the basis of the 'skills and abilities' which are needed to make the authority more 'businesslike'. While those nominated to the boards would be able to influence the service, it is also clear that the parameters within which they work would be closely set by the central department. Independence from local government would mean that the meetings of the authority would not be subjected to local government rules on public access and access to information (Loveday 1993). The main question is why is police accountability an issue?

In broad terms, police accountability becomes an issue when there is public concern that the arrangements for ensuring the police perform satisfactorily are not working. Inappropriate police action, from the biased use of powers and the wasteful deployment of resources to practices unacceptable to any section of the public; anything, in short, which threatens to undermine any of their central obligations or impartiality, efficiency and consent are basic problems that may cause such concern.

In the last three decades of policing, the issue of accountability, in more radical arguments, deals with the questions of when, where and in relation to what groups in particular the police are concerned? 'Crisis in the city among the deprived and powerless' is a simple answer to these questions. Taking the term 'crisis', it can be argued that the 1980s can be characterised as a period of crisis. This period experienced profound economic restructuring as technological changes made existing skills redundant and made many people unemployed; both were accompanied by heated political argument and disagreement (Jefferson *et al.* 1988: 155).

Reiner (1984 in Jefferson *et al.* 1988: 155) argues that 'the nub of the police state' argument is accountability. Centralisation, increased powers, militarisation and police pervasiveness do not amount to a police state if the police are legally and democratically accountable.

Accountability is being increasingly interpreted as a matter of *political control* over policing and the decisions upon which policing are based (Savage 1984: 48).

As Lea & Young (1984: 226) argue:

... one consequence of economic marginality and relative deprivation is a rise in crime rates. This has become bound up with the vicious circle of the drift to military policing in the inner city which has become one of the main ingredients of the riots of summer 1981.

As mentioned earlier, if we look at the history of policing in the 1980s, major incidents in the miners' strike of 1984-5 in the pit villages increased the concern about accountability. In the cities, the problem of crime and disorder, such as the riots in 1981 and 1985, were predominantly city affairs. Swamp 81, a policing tactic aimed at dealing with a perceived inner-city crime problem, produced the massive public order problem of the 1981 riots. The Brixton riots of the 1980s also brought to the fore the issue of police accountability:

Accountability is...the key to successful consultation and socially responsive policing. Exclusive reliance on 'voluntary' consultative machinery will not do, as the Brixton story illustrates. It must be backed by law (Scarman 1982: para. 5.57).

There is little evidence to support the view that the police are either more or less accountable than in 1982 when Lord Scarman recommended the introduction of local consultative committees (Butler 1985: 174). There is the problem of the definition of the term 'accountability'. A police force can declare itself in favour of being

'accountable to a community', but if the community does not have a clear understanding of the objectives of the force and furthermore, no means of measuring whether these objectives were achieved, then the police will never be accountable in the full sense of the definition (Butler 1985: 174).

Accountability is a concept meaning different things to different people (Kegan 1986, Day & Khlein 1987, in: Morgan & Smith 1989: 7). A number of the difficulties that arise in applying the concept of accountability to policing are paralleled in other fields of policing. In particular, accountability is compromised unless there is an unbroken chain of responsibility for the delivery of a service and a consensus about the nature and standard of service required (Smith 1989: 7). People can be held to account where there is agreement about what their subordinates ought to be doing, where they can control what they do. None of these conditions is adequately met in the case of the police.

There is a long chain of command, with diffuse responsibility; those at the bottom of the chain have a large degree of independence and are encouraged to exercise discretion; professional expertise reinforces discretion and therefore immunity from rule-governed direction; and there are many competing and incommensurable objections. So it would be difficult, even were there consensus on this matter which there is not, to make a clear statement about what police officers ought to be doing (Morgan & Smith 1989: 7).

After the Scarman Report (1982), police forces are being asked to account for the way they use their resources. It is argued that police do not have a right to spend anything more than is necessary to achieve the level of service demanded by the community. Starting from the 1980s, such consideration raised the questions of socio-political and economic accountability (Butler 1985: 174). As Guy (1992) states:

Because the effectiveness of the police service is difficult to measure in terms of final outputs, there is often a tendency among police managers to see its value-for-money as incalculable. Attention has focused instead upon how budgets are spent on input resources. But the police service is making progress on a number of fronts towards better management which would put a premium on quality of services. The success of these initiatives will depend upon delegating more responsibility for resource management to professional local police commanders, as a corollary to holding them more accountable for the value-for-money of the services they produce (Guy 1992: 41).

Answering the question of 'to whom should the police be accountable?', generally speaking, police are accountable to the law. It means that to fulfil their legal duty to uphold the law, they are responsible only to the law. For every police officer,

including all ranks, the duties of the police require them to decide in particular instances whether there has been a legal infraction and to take steps accordingly. In Practice, if the police fail in part of their duty, the instruments available to call them to account are: 1) the discipline code, 2) the courts, 3) the complaints procedure

It could be argued that the real problem of accountability arises in those situations where neither law nor contending citizens can offer any guidance to police action. Here, the discretion of the police is a key element in terms of accountability concern. The main argument, then, concerns how police discretion can be controlled: is PACE enough to achieve this objective? How can we maintain accountability? Is policing by consent the answer to the problem of declining police accountability?

Although there is emphasise on 'policing by consent' in the policing agenda, there is no clarity about its meaning. As mentioned in Chapter I, Lord Scarman, (1982: para.4.55) in his inquiry to Brixton disorders, set out two guiding principles that he said were necessary for policing a free society: 1- Consent and balance. 2- Independence and accountability.

From the bad experience of policing practice in England and Wales, it has become increasingly necessary to consider the degree to which policing can be by consent and, to the extent that it can, indicate how consent is signified and made manifest in police operations. For this reason it is necessary to look at s.106 of PACE providing for community consultation about policing, designed to give substance to the doctrine of consent. Before examining the initiative we need first to separate the component parts of meaning in the idea of 'policing by consent'.

'Policing by consent', in terms of definition is a vague term. It should be understood that it does not mean that suspects or offenders must assent to be acted against by the police. If this were the case, there would be no need of police. Also it does not mean that the police should not act against offenders unless victims first assent. It would be argued that there are good reasons for removing from individuals the capacity to determine prosecution and the allocation of punishment. Consent refers to policing policy rather than particular police decisions.

Policing, like most public services, looks to Parliament to find the core of consent for policy. This may be called 'contractual consent' and has two dimensions: the *legal* and the *political* (Morgan 1989: 218). This means the police are established, governed, regulated, and empowered by statute. This body of law, approved by a democratically elected Parliament, ideally represents the will of the people.

The law does not specify a pattern of policing or give guidance on what police ought to do, and it probably cannot do so. Instead, it provides a somewhat flexible framework of constraints and opportunities (Morgan & Smith 1989: 8). In practice, police decision making, strategic and tactical, is strongly influenced by moral and political considerations that do not spring from the law (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982; in Morgan & Smith 1989: 7). Moreover, the everyday politics of policing, typically glossed over with phrases like 'policing by consent' (Oxford 1984) and 'community policing', are widely dependent on the local context; it is hard to generalise about decisions made in response to micro-politics, or to plan for them.

Because of the dependency on the local context, policing by consent is regarded as a very difficult concept to maintain. One of the reasons could be attributed to the fact that the public is not a homogeneous consensual whole (Morgan 1989: 219). Thus, the law and policing, and consent to them, are not unitary entities. In spite of people's objections to particular laws, police priorities, powers and methods, the authority of the police may be regarded as legitimate. The objections of the people to particular laws, police priorities, powers and methods differ. In addition to these, the police and their methods are not a straightforward reflection of the society in which they operate. They may, for example, reflect the threat posed to order by a very small minority. Further, different sections of the community are more or less able to voice their views on policing and the degree to which they get a hearing is to some extent shaped by the structures of information exchange over which the police themselves exert a substantial degree of control.

Here, my aim is not to review these issues. Rather, I would argue the fact that during the last decade, especially since the introduction of PACE, and the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 1986, 1989, there has been great increase in the training and deployment of public order equipment, disproportional stop and search against particular groups and increased hostility to the police (Keith 1993, The PSI 1983, Willis 1983). The claim that there is an acceptable level of consent, in all four senses of the term-legal, political, operational and attitudinal- has seriously been challenged.

Calls for democratic accountability to local authorities

In this part of the thesis, I will place the emergence and subsequent growth of consultative committees within the broader political and policy context of the post-Scarman agenda on community relations, police accountability and public service efficiency. It can be seen from most of the existing literature that the local operation

of consultative committees cannot be examined unless this broader context is understood.

The Conservative government, while remaining basically at ease with the *status quo* in terms of basic constitutional arrangements, see some problems in the effective work of the existing body (Reiner 1991: 249). Following the Scarman report (1982), so as to enhance local consultation PACE introduced a rule that all Police Authorities should make arrangements for community consultation policing.

Consultation may be seen as one step on the road to towards greater accountability. It may be an effective way of developing relationships between the police and the public. Scarman (1982) argued that one of the reasons for the breakdown in relations between the police and the public in Brixton was the failure of the police to consult with the local community concerning operations such as 'Swamp 81'. Lack of consultation led not only to the public putting the worst interpretation on police operations, but also it allowed the myth of police brutality and racism to flourish (Scarman 1982: 46-7, paras. 4.2-4.3). Critics of police policy in Brixton highlighted what they saw as a distinct lack of police accountability. Despite the effect that this policy had on innocent individuals, Brixton was often subject to stop and search operations, the deployment of the SPG, etc., since these were the operational priorities decided upon by the police for the area. The senior police officers in Brixton were not prepared to enter into consultation about police priorities or about an operation such as 'Swamp 81' because they saw 'consultation as a danger to the success of the operation, as well as an intrusion upon their independence of judgement as police officers' (Scarman 1982: para. 4.73).

Critical of the general failure of the police to consult the public, Scarman went on to argue that consultation and accountability were important mechanisms through which the police could 'keep in touch with, and are responsible to, the community they police' (Scarman 1982: para. 5.57). Moreover, he appeared to fire a broadside at the police's sacred cow; namely, that all operational policing would be jeopardised if it had to be subject to public consultation. Scarman stated:

Community involvement in the policy and operations of policing is perfectly feasible without undermining the independence of the police or destroying the secrecy of those operations against crime which have to be kept secret... If a rift is not to develop between the police and the public as a whole (not just the members of the ethnic minority communities), it is in my view essential that a means be devised of enabling the community to be heard not only in the development of policing policy but in the planning of many, though not all, operations against crime (Scarman 1982: para. 5.56).

Therefore, Scarman (1982) recommended the creation of statutory police/public liaison committees or some other form of consultative arrangements in order to forge a more effective link between accountability and consultation. It can be said that the origins of s.106 of PACE can be traced back to Scarman's recommendation that 'liaison committees, or other appropriate consultative machinery, be established, preferably at police division or sub-division level, in every force'. Scarman concluded that the 1981 Brixton disorders represented an 'outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police' (para. 3.110). Criticising the adoption of policing methods which did not command the support of the community, he suggested that the failure to keep formal liaison between the black community and the police in Brixton was both symptom and contributory cause of that lack of consent which he saw as vital to effective and efficient policing.

There are two aspects of policing policy behind s.106: 1- The party political divide about political accountability. 2- The Government's financial management initiative applied to policing expenditure (Morgan 1986: 86; see Collins 1985). As mentioned in the previous chapter the introduction of 'Home Office Circular 114/83 of 1983' was the signal for a dramatic change in the language, style and process of resources management in the police service. It was argued:

Circular 114 took shape because chief constables and police authorities, to whom it was addressed, were increasingly coming to believe that a new outlook on resource management was required to tackle the policing problems and the financial pressure faced (Collins 1985: 75).

Coming back to PCCs again, Morgan and Maggs (1985) claim that PCC strategy has as its cornerstone, the utilisation of the community as a central resource in crime prevention, and as community resources are generally free or, at least, far cheaper than a police officer's salary, has the potential for considerable savings on the law and order budget. Morgan (1986:87) argues:

The Home Office response to the Prime Minister's Financial Management Initiative(1984, Cmnd 9297) has focused on the police. Police expenditure makes up the greater part of the 'law and order' budget: it also has a knock-on impact for the criminal justice and penal system as a whole; more police spell more arrest, more prosecutions and so on... There is, therefore, a clear financial and administrative need to ensure: that the police concentrate on those activities where they are most effective (hence the vogue for 'policing by objectives'); that those objectives are congruent with community priorities; and that the public is mobilised to assist or engage in self-help policing.

Section 106 of PACE stipulates that 'arrangements shall be made in each area for obtaining the views of the people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in the area'. The Act does not say what form consultation should take, but guidelines issued by the Home Office (Circular 2/85) recommended the setting up of formal police consultative committees (PCCs). This advice has been followed by virtually all police authorities, the agents statutorily responsible for arrangements.

Some critics argue that the introduction of PCCs must in part be understood as a means of overcoming the problem of public dissatisfaction with existing police-community relations without destroying the independence of routine operational policing (see Morgan 1986; Savage 1984). To these problems Scarman's 'solution' was to 'lie in a form of accountability dependent not on powers of directions or on the regulatory powers and sanctions, but on agreement and co-operation!' (Savage 1984: 56).

Although Scarman's suggested reforms can be criticised as limited in nature, it is also possible to define them as a genuine attempt to get to grips with policing on the ground rather than what are often the formalities of democratic and legal accountability (Savage 1984: 57). As Morgan (1986:84) argues:

...s.106 is couched in the vaguest of terms. There is no specification as to: what the consultation 'arrangements' shall comprise; how the 'the views of the people' shall be obtained; what 'matters concerning the policing of the area' should or can be discussed; or how the discretion of the Police Authorities (who are statutorily responsible for arrangements) and their chief constables (on whose co-operation the arrangements substantially depend).

The legal requirement of PCCs in each police force has been in force since PACE took effect on 1.1.1985. It is couched in terms of establishing arrangements for obtaining the views of the community about the policing of their area and for obtaining the community's co-operation in preventing crime. The stated purposes of the consultative scheme were: 1- To enable the police to adapt their policies to the needs of the community. 2- To improve relations between the police and the community. 3- To promote agreed solutions to local problems and to provide opportunities for the community to gain better understanding of the police (Hughes 1992: 5).

The aim of PCCs, as Morgan and Swift (1988) argue is gathering consumers' opinions, educating the public about the limitations of public services, resolving police-community conflict and providing launching pads for community self-help

crime prevention schemes. As a result of PACE, the issue of police accountability to the community is addressed and conceived of in terms of a partnership model.

PCCs are an exercise in public participation. Apart from what Hughes (1992) stated above it is explained in the analysis of Home Office circulars, ministerial speeches, and interviews with civil servants that PCCs had four explicit substantive objectives: i) Improved articulation of the consumer's viewpoint. ii) Improved education of consumers about policing. iii) The resolution or amelioration of conflicts between the police and particular community groups. iv) Encouraging practical 'self-help' community crime prevention initiatives (Morgan 1989: 221).

To examine community consultation it would be helpful to elaborate the key terms of community consultation, representation, participation and community. As policing has become more controversial in Britain in the last two decades, so the perception of the mechanisms of accountability has changed. The police were seen increasingly as unrepresentative in terms of race, gender and culture, and alienated from the groups they typically dealt with as offenders and victims (Cashmore and McLaughlin 1991).

In a modern democracy, especially in increasingly fragmented British social structure, it has always been problematic how to establish a correspondence between the representatives and the represented. The problem here is that the representation process must be flexible enough to allow for the representation of the needs and interests of those presently not represented. It would be accepted that this is not easy to do. Such an issue, on the other hand is in the part of serious agenda of democratic socialism (Jefferson *et al.* 1988: 97).

Participation, like representation is an essential part of a democracy on grounds which stress the rights of citizens to be involved in the decision-making processes which affect their lives, and to facilitate accountability (Jefferson *et al.* 1988: 97). Participation can be direct or indirect. It has always been witnessed that people who are powerful take part in the participation process, but how about the young, unemployed, women, black?

Community, as it will be examined in chapter V does not have a common definition. Although 'community' refers homogeneity and unity, the policies on community do not answer to what exactly unhomogeneous British inner cities need. Cowley *et al.* (1977: 5; in Jefferson *et al.* 1988: 98) argue:

To speak of a community when working politically on issues such as housing, health, play or welfare can cause great confusion, since, however one looks at it no community exist: on the contrary one is confronted with a cluster of class positions, conflicts and interests, some of which are irreconcilable.

Background to PCCs: community policing initiatives prior to PACE

The concept of 'community policing' is an influential factor behind PCCs. Community policing, it can be argued, was brought to the policing agenda by Alderson (1979, 1982) who was the most famous and significant supporter of community policing from the ranks of the police force. It can also be argued that much of his theory (and practice) relating to his time as Chief Constable in Devon and Cornwall was a major influence behind Lord Scarman's recommendations for improving police-community relations in London (Hughes 1992: 8).

After the Brixton disorders, most community policing initiatives were a consequence of the recommendations associated with the Scarman Report (1982). In the aftermath of urban violence of 1981, and the findings of Lord Scarman's inquiry into the Brixton riots, the debate on law and order has acquired a national dimension. The central issue is: how should Britain be policed? Amid the doubts and dilemmas, there was one certainty: policing by consent must be the main plank of policy. The idea behind Scarman recommendations was that he was fearful of the police becoming more alienated from sections of the most deprived urban population, particularly the black community. He also noted that the lack of any formal liaison was a major flaw in the existing systems of inner-city policing.

As mentioned earlier, in his report, Scarman (1982) stressed the problem of policing methods which did not command the support of the local community. Particularly, he interpreted the failure to maintain formal liaison between the black community and the police in Brixton as both symptom and contributory cause of that lack of consent which he claimed is vital to effective policing in a democratic society. This led him to the conclusion that 'a police force which does not consult locally will fail to be efficient' (Scarman 1982: para. 5.62). Accordingly, Scarman put forward the idea that statutory arrangements in the shape of local liaison committees should be put in place to stem the tide of mutual hostility in the deprived metropolitan areas.

Morgan (1986) notices that the encouragement of the establishment of such committees was made by the Home Secretary, Home office and Police Inspectorate through England and Wales in the year of between 1982 and 1984. The problem here is that such developments were not to compromise the existing system of police

powers and accountability. Noticing the system established by the Police Act of 1964 was to remain, Whitelaw, in Savage and Wilson (1987: 253) argues that the purpose of PCCs was to enhance police effectiveness rather than increase accountability. The chief constable was to remain responsible for the direction and control of his force. The police authority made up of elected and non-elected (magistrates') representatives (outside London) would be responsible for the maintenance of an adequate local police force and the Home Office would be responsible for ensuring the efficiency of the forces nationally. As an independent officer of the Crown, the chief constable was not answering to any police authority for the operational side of policing (Savage 1984: 49-50).

Although most forces did not experience riots in the 1980s, urban disorder was a source of embarrassment for the Government that resulted in the establishment of the PCCs. There has been an increase in public demand for greater police accountability, or at least accessibility, thus the emphasis on independent 'community representatives'. It was also recognised that the police cannot take sole responsibility for crime control combined with the desire to professionalise the force with greater local autonomy through accountability to the consumer (Stratta 1990). It would be suggested that PCCs are part of what Reiner (1990) terms the three 'E's of Government litany, economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

The Government's position, according to Morgan and Swift (1988: 427) was seen as being an attempt to make policing 'more transparent, sensitising the police to local opinion and reinvigorating the idea of policing as community partnership'. They advocated a 'model of police accountability as stewardship, with the police consulting more widely before taking decisions and providing fuller *ex post facto* explanations of events'. We see a new definition of consumer satisfaction rather than locally elected control.

Morgan (1986) argues that PCCs are seen as a means of resolving the problem for Government that it wishes to both continue the operational independence of the chief constable but is also aware that the legitimacy of policing has been seriously questioned in some quarters. Consequently, PCCs enter as a possible solution to the problem (Morgan 1986: 86-87). Morgan argues that the legitimacy of such committees is problematic where community groups are not represented, and that where community views on appropriate police policies are so diverse and pluralistic both community accountability and local political accountability tend not to represent the perspectives of those most critical of the police.

There is also limited consultation about major police operations in some subdivisions (Morgan 1987a: 40) but it is intermittent and partial (Morgan 1987a:39). In the absence of a democratic framework for political accountability locally the process typically generates a sequence of recrimination and counter-recrimination as to whether those who are consulted (usually appointed or self selected persons) are representative of the community and whether they are watch dogs or lap-dogs (Morgan 1987a: 39).

If we look at the organisations and practice of PCCs, it can be said that PCCs are generally based on police sub-divisions rather than local authority boundaries; chaired by elected members of police authorities. They comprise 15-25 members made up of councillors (county, district, and parish councils) and representatives of statutory agencies, national associations for the aged, voluntary work, and commerce, plus leaders of local community groups. PCCs also include sub-divisional commanders (superintendents) representing the police. They usually meet in community premises but sometimes in police stations (Morgan 1989: 228).

Most of the members of the committees are appointed by the respective police authorities, and they tend to be representatives of various local agencies and groups (Stephens 1988: 174). It was also noted that at consultative committee meetings, members tend to accept the priorities for action as explained by the officers present. The committees do not normally discuss the formulation of police priorities and policies (Stephens 1988: 175). Morgan argues:

More importantly, routine operational policy is not discussed in any meaningful sense because...the sort of people who attend consultative committees generally have little or no experience of policing and, possessing only that information which the police choose to give them, are persuaded that the police do the best they can with limited resources. Committees do not *discuss* operational policy because they perceive there to be little to discuss (Morgan 1987a: 38).

Morgan (1989: 223) calls the introduction of the PCCs a *legitimation hypothesis* which means formal consultative machinery will reinvigorate, and thereby legitimate, the 1964 Police Act tripartite arrangements for the governance of the police. Morgan's legitimation hypothesis about PCCs is as follows:

- i) PCCs will involve the police, police authority members, and a variety of community representatives;
- ii) police officers will learn better about the manner in which police actions are viewed locally by politically powerful groups and will adjust policy if necessary to meet local needs and viewpoints;

- iii) the police will furnish PCCs with fuller accounts of their resources and operations;
- iv) through their PCC involvement, police authority members will develop closer relationships with officers in management ranks, will learn more about policing, and will tend increasingly to share police viewpoints and definitions of what the problems of policing are;
- v) being better informed, police authority members will take their duties more seriously, and as they become more sympathetic to police problems and viewpoints, the police will more fully consult them as part of their police planning cycle;
- vi) given the development of more mutually trusting relationships between police and police authority members, fewer councillors will be convinced of the need for constitutional change to the arrangements for the governance of the police: this will diminish the likelihood of political parties nationally pressing for constitutional change (Morgan 1989: 224).

The Marginalisation hypothesis states that the existence of PCCs will serve to marginalise those persons and groups critical of the police (Scruton 1985; Scruton 1987; in: Morgan 1989: 224). Such an argument is based on the assumptions that most participants are from socially and economically advantaged classes and are largely dependent on the police for their information as to the policing problems of their area, and they hold pro-police attitudes when they join committees. As a result of this most participants will become sympathetic to police viewpoints and give less credit to criticisms of the police which come from non-participants (Morgan 1989: 224).

The Penetration hypothesis regards PCCs as one of the intrusive policing agencies in the community. Built on the propositions that crime prevention initiatives are on police-approved lines (NW and similar schemes) aiming to encourage the participants to be the 'eyes and ears' of the police, the penetration of the police into the community, Cohen (1985) and Gordon (1987) (in Morgan 1989: 225) argue that the operation of PCCs is likely to blur the boundary between formal and informal policing and extend the degree to which there is policing of the community rather than for community.

Morgan (1989: 229) notes that PCC members are dominantly male, middle-class, middle-aged, 'involved' members of the community. Members are generally pro-police in their attitudes when they join PCCs. There is no success in getting young people and ethnic minority representatives to join and attend meetings.

Hughes (1992: 17) after analysing two existing national surveys (Morgan & Maggs 1985/Morgan 1987c, Home Office 1989) and engaging himself in the studies by (Savage & Wilson 1987, Stratta 1990) concludes that there is still a relative

deficiency of research on PCCs but the results of the existing observational and interview-based work are quite unequivocal and negative. There are three major criticisms of PCCs which emerge from the existing research (Hughes 1992: 20):

(i) PCCs are often passive, ineffective 'talking shops', with non-police members ill-prepared and lacking in sufficient information about policing. there is an absence of conflict and meaningful dialogue. (ii) PCCs are generally police-dominated in terms of the setting of the agenda and presentation of viewpoints. (iii) PCCs are insufficiently representative of the wider community and particularly of the groups most often in conflict with the police (youth, unemployed, some ethnic minorities).

It has been reported that PCCs are mostly preoccupied with small-scale 'nuisance' problems combined with one-way police presentations which were educational but rarely gave rise to any kind of 'development discussion' (The Home Office Report 1989: para.42). In the same report, it was noted that there was a low expectation of what the Committees could achieve (para. 122). Confirming this passive and consensus picture, other research, notably Morgan (1987a) notes that most meetings revolve around a report of a police commander or a specially invited police guest! 'Consultative Committee meetings often look like WEA classes in policing in which there is a marked absence of well informed dialogue (Hughes 1992: para. 35). Stratta (1990) argues that the local PCCs lack teeth, rarely do anything in the way of constructive policy initiatives and have no rights or powers. The major function, it is suggested, is that of supporting and legitimating existing police practices.

In terms of the setting of the agenda and information, Morgan argues that the police tend to keep their operational practice by dominating committees in most areas. Based on his national surveys, Morgan claims that the police do not reveal the basis on which they determine resource allocation to neighbourhoods. The manner and degree to which localities determine policing is therefore largely unknown outside policing. Developing this point, Morgan suggested that the question of community involvement in the planning of police operational planning scarcely arises in most parts of the country (Morgan 1978c: 37-39).

Stratta (1990: 537) argues that the concept of 'partnership' does not extend to the discussion of resources, arguing that the PCCs in the past may have therefore have often failed to provide a collaboration examination of competing community demands for police resources and their resolution through particular policies (Stratta 1990: 544). As Savage and Wilson (1987: 260) note:

Their (police) effect on committee meetings, however, was very much to set the scene in terms of 'here are the problems we face, with limited resources etc.', to

which the typical response was 'how can we help?'. In all meetings so far observed, these presentations seemed to stimulate an attitude of support for police endeavours and sympathy with the sorts of problems they face.

Another problem in PCCs is that they do not adequately reflect a genuine cross-section of the population. There is a preponderance of professional, middle class, white and 40+ age group according to the Home office Report (1989: 8). It can be seen that the young seem to be especially under-represented. The members, it is argued, appear to have no ideas for alternative policing methods and no disagreement with the current policing practices (Morgan 1987c, Stratta 1990). The research also revealed that PCCs operate in the areas where there is least need. The 'consumers' of the initiatives are rarely what can be termed the 'conflict groups' which Scarman wished to reach (Bell 1989).

For many critics on the left, PCCs are a fake avoiding real democratic accountability of the police. Savage (1984) argues that accountability is not likely to work simply by the existence of either legal rules or formal systems of political accountability. In the explanations of Morgan (1987c), it is noted that it would be naive to think that PCCs can act as a medicine for the problems from which the idea arose but the consultative process may act as one positive link in the chain of acceptable policing (Morgan 1987c).

Regarding the effectiveness of PCCs, it would be necessary for PCCs to be 'opened up' to a wider constituency. The Home Office (1989) report noted that there must be fuller representation of youth or representatives from youth workers and teachers, and ethnic minority groups. It was supported in the same report that the use of a Community Representative as chair of the PCC could be used in order to underline the independence of the committee. It was also suggested that Magistrates may be unsuitable as chairpersons due to their compromised position regarding any criticism of the criminal justice system (Morgan & Swift 1988: 475). Because the community representatives; dominated by local elected representatives, had less experience of policing matters, it was warned in the Home Office (1989) report that this caused problems in terms of establishing an accountable PCC. The Home Office Report (1989) recommended that PCCs would be greatly improved if they developed a more 'structured framework'. To solve problems and contribute to the discussion of police strategy and priorities, it was recommended that PCCs should have a more dynamic and active role. This development is however predicated upon greater openness from the police (Home office 1989: para.111).

Summary

The challenge that the public should become involved in shaping the general policing policies of an area is an important development. This involvement would not mean expressing criticism of and dissatisfaction with aspects of police conduct. The public involvement in policing would mean that the police themselves would be able to benefit from the knowledge and experience of non-police personnel. It would be suggested that while the police may know something about the nature of policing, they know far less about the experience of being policed; and it is this valuable information, among other benefits, that the public would bring to a system of proper police accountability.

There are some relevant examples which suggest that the police are still exceptionally wary of adopting a more open and responsive attitude to the wishes of the public. The police have introduced many new devices (particularly the use of some aspects of computer technology and the kind of information such machines would store) with little public consultation, despite anxiety about the uses to which they might be put.

From the research findings on the local operation of Police Consultative Committees, it would be argued that it is very difficult to evaluate whether most PCCs are meeting their objectives as set out in the vague language of the legislation of the PACE 1984. The existing research suggest that PCCs are not efficiently meeting the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Morgan (1989: 231) argues that some PCCs are moderately successful at gathering the consumer's viewpoint from persons who want more attention from the police and who are generally not hostile to them. Committees are relatively successful at educating consumers already well disposed to the police about the limitations of the police service.

PCCs are far away from having meaningful dialogue and it is hardly difficult to give good evidence of conflict in PCCs process. There is insufficient participation from the wider community and particularly of the groups which are mostly in conflict with the police. It was also demonstrated that there is no sufficient report about policing. In terms of setting of the agenda and presentation of view points, the police are dominated by such committees. Consequently, it can be said that the current situation of the PCCs are not maintaining effective, accountable policing.

One of the main reasons for the failure of the PCCs could be attributed to the fact that the committees are usually officer-led and do not begin to provide the degree of

representation of local interests which have been claimed for them. They might, indeed, be better viewed as a diversion from, rather than a substitute for, local accountability of police. These rather weak arrangements would hardly appear to be the structures upon which to place the burden of local police accountability. Additionally, the wider use of nominated members of the police boards, may only serve to centralise the police service as a smaller number of chief officers prove ultimately unable to protect the service from growing central direction and departmental interference (Loveday 1993).

It can also be argued that the presence of magistrates in the consultative process is open to question. In order to be more accountable to the community, radical changes (in particular the improvement of elected police authorities to determine policing policies, the establishment of a local police authority for London, and the institution of completely independent investigation and adjudication of complaints against the police) need to be carried out.

If consultation and accountability are carried on within an atmosphere of growing trust and understanding between the police and the public, it might be expected to yield for the police that most precious of commodities-information (Kinsey *et al.* 1986). Without information, police are not able to solve many crimes and they deploy questionable 'intelligence' gathering tactics.

To solve the problem of controlling the political and discretionary aspects of policies, it is necessary to create police authorities comprising elected members. Additionally the authorities would be given responsibility for setting the general policing strategy in their areas; for making NW schemes; and for undertaking research on matters relating to the policing policy and crime prevention. Also, as Kinsey *et al.* (1986: 174-7) suggest, the responsibilities for handling police complaints must be given to the Police Authorities.

There is a need for consultation with the public to take place on a more localised and more meaningful basis. Kinsey *et al.* (1986) suggest a new form for police/community consultation committees so that they might be better able to lessen the existing isolation of the police occupational subculture. They would try to achieve this end by ensuring that members of the committees could meet with various groups of police officers. These officers would then begin to develop some identification with community problems and see the point of view of community members. At the same time rank and file officers could — since such dialogues would not be part of some bureaucratic police-public relations exercise—speak freely about the strains and

problems that faced them in their particular work areas. The public would in this way be drawn closer to an understanding of the police point of view. There would, we hope, be a mutual understanding and a breaking down of entrenched positions. The police would become less isolated, and the public would be more trusting and sympathetic. This would have a pay-off in terms of increased information flow (Kinsey *et al.* 1986: 181).

The following chapter will provide examples of programs of community policing. The examples were chosen to illustrate how police / public relations, community service, and advocacy policing are performed functionally.

Chapter 4

The practice of community policing

This chapter examines the questions of what is happening in terms of policing on the ground? Do community policing initiatives meet their stated objectives? Do such schemes result in an adequate, democratic policing. What are the problems in implementing community policing schemes? Or, as Keith (1993) argues do the police always have a vested interest in selling consensus?

In answering these questions, I shall focus in particular on recent attempts to implement community policing in practice and to identify some of the issues and some of the problems involved in this process. Investigating the assumptions on which it is based, I shall also introduce and assess a variety of objections that have been raised to the adoption of these new organisational strategies for policing. Considering the problems of limited financial resources, the inherent uncertainties and potential lack of support which discourages innovation and the police culture's resistance to change (McConville & Shepherd 1992), the main question arises: is community policing compatible with the dominant ethos of the police service? Describing some of the pressures on forces to implement what amounts to community policing programs and the political context in which they have done so; I shall also look at claims that the police will become too powerful and interfering and the possibility that community policing might involve the police in political activities (Moore 1992).

This chapter covers issues on the assessment of and the problems involved in implementing community policing; what is known about what the problems are and what is known about community policing practice and effectiveness. I shall raise some questions about the failure of community policing ideas to tackle fundamental issues about the police role, providing a framework for considering those issues. I shall explore why the majority of officers hold views which are opposed to community policing precepts, how they understand their social world, their own role in it, and the consequences for the communities they police. One of the aim of this paper is also to focus on the theory, objectives and operation of Neighbourhood Watch (NW) and assess its impact, examining the problems associated with reality of NW, such as what do members of NW actually do? Is NW a success? What are the fundamental problems in evaluating NW? How do participants and non participants see NW?

Over the last decade and especially since the riots of the summer of 1981, the role of the police in Britain has become the subject of intense discussion. As suggested in Chapters I and II, many commentators suggested that policing in a free society could be fulfilled by implementing 'community policing strategies (Alderson 1979,

Scarman 1982, Moore 1992). Community policing has reached the status of an orthodoxy in many English-speaking countries. As a result it has tended to be seen as providing a coherent and self-evidently sensible and beneficial set of answers to policing problems (Weatheritt 1988). However, more sophisticated writers believe that as a result of some changes that have been made under the banner of 'community policing', damaging forms of policy have emerged (Bunyan 1981/1982, Short 1983, Gordon 1987, Scraton 1985).

Although community policing has made significant contribution to debates about policing in Britain and stimulated a substantial number of policing innovations, it has ducked or fudged some fundamental questions about the role of the police and has failed to provide an adequate framework or set of concepts for considering those questions. Community policing ideas have sometimes been pursued and implemented with surprisingly little concern over how they might be given practical content (Weatheritt 1988). As mentioned in Chapter I, the major problem could be attributed to the problem of a lack of clarity about what the concept of community policing and how it can be implemented without eroding civil liberties. Short (1983: 67) argues that if community policing is to be more than a slogan we must define and clarify its objectives and methods so that we know what community policing is, how it can be implemented and what it might fulfil. As Jones (1983) argues, the major problem of policing is the gap between what the public expect and what the police provide.

As examined in the previous chapter, apart from community consultation schemes, community policing is based on a number of levels. It is concerned with developing a set of programmes or activities for police: foot patrol, community-based crime prevention, ways of consulting communities about the kinds of problems they have and the kind of policing they want, such as sector policing and multi-agency policing. Activities such as foot patrol, or Neighbourhood Watch, are undertaken because they are expected to make the police more effective in preventing and detecting crime or maintaining certain kinds of order. Such activities are also undertaken because they enable the police to present themselves in a way that will alter, for the better, public perceptions of them. On this second level, community policing is about promoting better police-public relations and a better police image. This 'advertising work' is important not merely because it is supposed to enhance police effectiveness. It is undertaken because community policing activities are seen as good in themselves in giving legitimacy to policing as an activity and to the police as an institution. Community policing is also about altering the ethos of policing to stress the concepts of service, flexibility, consumer responsiveness, conciliation, consultation, and negotiation (Weatheritt 1988).

There are few assessments of programmes called community policing. However, there is a larger body of research evidence available on the kinds of policing programmes identified above as the most common practical exercises of a community policing philosophy (Bennett 1994a). The main aim of this section is to examine evaluations of the main operational forms of community policing and to determine the benefits and drawbacks of these forms of policing in practice. The review of the literature will be confined to a small number of selected evaluations, chosen on the grounds of relevance to the current debate, and comments about them will be limited to the main issues of interest to the discussion.

Community policing has attracted a good deal of attention in terms of providing a direction for the development of policing in modern democratic societies. In practice, however, there are many problems in implementing such a strategy (Gill and Thrasher 1985). As mentioned in Chapter I, commentators have pointed out that community policing rests on a number of assumptions (Manning 1984). Here, the most relevant assumptions will be examined.

It is assumed that people wish to see more police on the beat. The evidence however, is mixed. Some people want contact with the police outside essential encounters (Trajanowicz 1982). However there are many groups who either do not want to see the police, who find them a threat, a representative of an alien force (see Kettle and Hodges 1982). They see the police as adversaries and, not surprisingly, opinions differ according to the socio-economic composition of an area (Mastrofski 1983). Skogan (1990), Bennett (1990) claims that people want more patrols. The research on vehicle and foot patrols has also generally produced negative results concerning their potential effectiveness in reducing crime (Bennett 1994a).

A more recent evaluation of contact patrols in England and Wales showed that some gains might be gained from increasing police public contact. The study was conducted in the Metropolitan Police and West Midlands police. Police officers were encouraged to knock on the doors and to make proactive attempts to speak to residents. The evaluation showed that the programme had little effect on crime or reporting rates (Bennett 1991). However, the results showed that during the period of experiment, public satisfaction with police performance improved substantially.

A second assumption is that the presence of police reduces fear of crime. There are indications that increased foot patrols have such an effect (e.g. Police Foundation

1981, Bennett 1990), even though there may be no actual reduction in crime (Kansas City Patrol Experiment, reported in Moore 1992).

Community policing emphasises the work of foot-beat officers, particularly community constables. This may be justified on the grounds that this is what the public want. The arguments in favour of having more foot patrol officers are in essence the converse of those deployed against reactive policing. Officers on foot are seen to be more approachable than officers in cars and the more there are, the more will opportunities increase for friendly non-adversarial contact between police and public (Alderson 1979). Increased contact will make for better relationships with the public, who will then be more ready to give the police information about crime and criminals (Kinsey *et al.* 1986).

Evidence from surveys show that people want more patrols (PSI 1983). For example in the Merseyside Crime Survey, eight out of ten people said they wanted more officers to patrol on foot (Kinsey 1984). Smith *et al.* (1983: chapter 7) found that seven out of ten people wanted foot patrols. A national survey conducted by the Harris Research Centre in July 1989 found that there was a strong consensus of opinion that more police should be patrolling the area on foot (Operational Policing Reviewing 1990: Section 4: 1). The idea of foot a patrol seems to be popular because of the friendly image it conjures up and because it seems to provide a concrete and visible remedy to the negative consequences and pejorative associates of 'reactive' or 'fire-brigade' policing (Weatheritt 1988: 161). However, there is very little evidence to show that a shift in the balance towards foot patrols is a successful policy. In America, the Network foot patrol experiment (Police Foundation, Washington 1981) indicated a decline in the fear of crime associated with an increase in the level of foot patrols, but it could not show any more concrete benefit (in Smith 1987: 60). A study completed in New Jersey (1980) has shown that there appears to be little or no relationship between the level of crime occurring in a particular area and the number of officers patrolling there. As well as having no clear objectives in mind, the lack of practical on-the-job training, the absence of training skills and the poor integration of the beat officers amongst the other mainstream policing were cited as some of the major reasons for such a failure (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 118-123). However, it was found that foot patrols do reduce residents' fear of crime (in Heal & Morris 1985: 110; in Operational Policing Review, 1990, Section 2: 46). Such findings were supported by Newark, New Jersey and Flint experiments (Moore 1992: 137).

Although great emphasis is placed on the importance of beat work, due to priority given to the legalistic crime control and law enforcement aspects of policing, Jones (1980; in Weatheritt 1983: 138) argues that the system of organisational rewards within the service serves to undermine its actual value. Occupational police work undermines the value of community policing. Beat work is considered by officers to be boring, unglamorous and disconnected from 'real' policing (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 125). Community beat work was constantly characterised as 'drinking cups of tea with old ladies', 'visiting schools and talking to children', 'attending meetings': activities which were not real police work. Community beat work was widely considered as something for 'older officers'. Walking the beat can be very lonely, is often felt to be aimless, and is not likely to produce an exciting encounter (McConville & Shepherd 1992: 151-153).

The research findings from different studies have collectively contributed to the widely held belief that conventional patrol methods are largely ineffective. For example Weatheritt found that recorded crime increased in all the test areas over the course of the experiment (Weatheritt 1986, in McConville and Shepherd 1992: 34). Such a belief could be attributed to the fact that the effectiveness of patrols has in the past been judged in terms of the ability of patrol as a function to contribute to the reduction of crime and apprehension of criminals (Operational Policing Review 1990: 46). Chatterton & Rogers (1988: 8) found that as well as the absence of regular meetings between beat officers and members of other departments and the CID, there was a lack of communication between the beat constables and their senior police officers. They claim that in the absence of information and lack of engagement in meaningful discussions of strategy, identifying a specific problem is difficult. They also found that constables did not record information which might be of value to their colleagues (Chatterton & Rogers 1988: 8).

Although the ideology of the beat is to improve pro-active policing, it would appear that beat police officers are not regarded as separate from reactive policing, but a part of it. The apparent conflict between the two approaches is sometimes noted by the police themselves (Gordon 1987: 135). In respect of a beat policing scheme in Stoke, *the Sunday Times* pointed out:

Unlike the old bobby on the beat, these men are part of a pervasive system of intensive policing that is supported by a sophisticated command and control computer system. The beat policemen are supplemented by panda cars (or 'incident response vehicles'), the CID crime squad, a local equivalent of the SPG, and the specialist units such as squads (Gordon 1987: 135).

An example of such a strategy is provided by the police raid on the Black and White cafe in St Paul's, Bristol in 1980 which led to street fighting between the police and black people, and the removal of the police from the area. The local beat officer was reported to have been visiting the cafe to obtain intelligence among the black community (Gordon 1987: 135).

As will be examined in next chapter, a further overstated assumption, the validity of which has already been challenged, is that consensus does exist within communities in terms both of what they expect from the police and of the kinds of behaviour that they support or are at least prepared to tolerate. Communities vary in terms of experiencing and responding crime. Therefore, it is difficult to find a united consensus among the members of a community. Sharp division among members of the general public about the roles policemen are expected to perform is now common in communities.

The conflict over police role expectations is complicated by another variance in community expectations: he means that the police should employ either in law enforcement or in order maintenance. Some people believe that the police should stamp out crime even at some cost in civil liberties; others feel that civil liberties must be maintained even at some cost in terms of crime.

Another assumption, which has already been touched upon, is that police organisations and personnel are equipped to develop and maintain community policing. The bureaucratic and militaristic composition of the police is at odds with the more flexible and democratic structure which is needed both to recognise the previously unfamiliar self-directing role of the community constable and to work in a meaningful partnership with the community (McConville & Shepherd 1992). Community policing is not popular with many constables with an interest in career advancement (Weatheritt 1986, Bennett 1994a). Policing is seen as a collective effort directed towards the restoration of law and order rather than an individual task concerned with servicing the expressed needs of the community (Holdaway 1983). Canteen culture emphasises measurement good policing by the number of arrests (McConville and Shepherd 1992). This means that, if officers make more arrests they are on the way to promotion. While the assignment and expectations of community policing are almost limitless, they are not considered popular by police officers and chief constables (Gill and Thrasher 1985, Reiner 1991). Community policing is considered to be low-status and aimed at crime prevention but in practice is applied towards law enforcement. Lord Scarman (1982: para. 5.51) refers to this point in his report on the Brixton Disorders:

The constable, must, in my view, be seen not as occupying the bottom of the pecking order, but as its apex, in the forefront of the police team.

Here, the argument is to what extent does reality endorse the particular wish of those advocating community policing. The status of community officers as 'forgotten men' seemed hardly to have improved (Weatheritt 1988: 162). In order to commit themselves to community policing, individual officers will need to examine their own stance vis-a vis the 'proper' role of officers as perceived by police culture. For many, it will be difficult to abandon the self image of a reactive crime fighter.

Research has demonstrated that the rank and file of the police tend to be critical of community-based crime prevention approaches, considering such initiatives as distractions from the core police tasks of crime-fighting and detection (Reiner 1985: 76-7, 133). They dismiss the broader service conception of policing as 'bullshit' (Reiss 1971: 42, or 'codswollop' (Reiner 1978: 213-17; in Reiner 1991: 106). Lord Scarman (1982) found that Home Beat Officers (HBOs) were regarded as 'hobby bobbies' by other police officers. HBOs were accepted by other policeman as being outside the mainstream of operational policing. Giving one example of this claim, in Exeter due to scepticism by most police officers, the community policing scheme set up by Alderson encountered difficulties in convincing police officers of its worth (in Stephens 1988: 99). Many high-ranking officers have expressed doubts that community policing could work in the inner cities (Baldwin and Kinsey 1982). As Waddington, P. A. J. (1984) argues:

The problems which most acutely confront the police are those of policing the inner-cities. Here, most of all, what is required is impartial, impersonal authority and restrained use of force. In these areas the police may indeed be seen as a visible irritant. It is even more essential, therefore, that they be seen as representatives of the law, above considerations of class and race.

A recent survey of a national representative sample of 1,226 police officers (which was coupled with a census of the ACPO ranks) confirmed that the rank and file remain wedded to a 'strong' approach to policing, and refuse comprehensive community-oriented philosophies as 'soft' (Operational Policing review 1990, sect. 6). In his extensive interview amongst chief constables, Reiner (1991) found that 55 per cent of them declare some sort of belief in community policing. Complaining about having not enough manpower to make community policing meaningful, 45 per cent argued it was a meaningless expression (Reiner 1991: 110). As one of the chief constables claimed:

Community policing — I personally believe it's become an unfortunate expression used by politicians and political rhetoric, and frankly it means nothing to me (Reiner 1991: 112).

As well as seeing policing in narrower law enforcement terms, those who objected also saw community policing as merely a new label for old-style policing, or as prioritising a 'soft' approach which can only be realised in a few idyllic places but which implied an ideal that made most policing seem lacking (Reiner 1991: 111). Manning (1984) claims that calls for community policing are part of a broader public hope for a return to things as they were (or were thought to have been) and for a personalisation of public services. The first hope may be based on flawed memories, and the second is impossible to fulfil without visible changes being made to the police service.

Manning (1984) points out that the police service is a bureaucratic organisation, with operating methods and personnel structures which are not co-ordinated to the philosophy of community policing. Police promotion systems tend to favour officers who seek a specialist position or who succeed in the conservative crime-fighting role, not those who apply themselves to foot patrol duties over long periods in order to develop intimate contact with the community. In their study of five police forces, Brown and Iles (1985) found that for community policing to develop and succeed, there had to be a change of ethos.

A further set of assumptions are tied together. These are that it is proper for the police to take part in (and sometimes lead) activities designed to promote community cohesiveness and co-ordinated action, and that doing so will neither challenge the apolitical standing of the police nor weaken police accountability. These interlinking assumptions can be challenged. It is difficult to say which tasks are and are not proper ones for the police. Michael Hirst, the former Chief Constable of Leicestershire, has said that the police are uncertain of their role — are they expected to detect crime or to prevent it, or are they social workers in uniform (*Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting Community Expectations*: ACPO: 1990). Nevertheless, police participation in community panels (other than those restricted to crime prevention and traditional police activities) and police commitment to raising and distributing funds for projects, are at odds with their orthodox position as apolitical agents of the law. Certainly, it is easy to appreciate Short's (1983) concern that such involvement will lead to policemen acting like politicians.

Doubts must also be cast on claims that community policing enhances police accountability because it supplements formal checks and balances on police actions with informal ones (Alderson 1979). In fact, the opposite may apply. By reducing the law enforcement side of police work and increasing police involvement in negotiations on behalf of the community, community policing expands the areas of police work which are not subject to legal controls. Community policing also means that greater discretion be given to individual, low ranking officers. As the efficiency of formal controls is questioned by many critics, it is hard to believe that informal checks would be any more effective (see Jefferson *et al.* 1988).

Considering the assumption that community policing could improve the relationship between the police and the public, Gordon (1987: 123) argues that police-community relations work did nothing to show Britain's black citizens that they had no reason to distrust the police. To some extent, it coexisted with practices which have approved that distrust and, at the same time, has placed the black community as a group apart from the rest of society, a group demanding its own specific liaison standards.

In order to win the trust of the community, the police attempt to help members of the community. In these circumstances, it is likely to develop powers of patronage by advising on how grant money should be distributed and by inviting some individual to sit on committees to represent their community. As mentioned earlier, one possible problem in community policing is that it could lead police officers to behave more and more like politicians. This leads to the general perception that only groups who keep in with the police will get access to grants for premises and facilities and to power and recognition (Short 1983: 72). Given this, the question arises whether the police are the most appropriate agency to take and lead this sort of approach (Short 1983:73). It would appear that co-operation and implementation does not come from the bureaucrats from different agencies, but rather from the senior officials in the police force alone. It can be suggested that many crime prevention support units, leading to inter-agency co-operation structures, are artificially established (Gill and Thrasher 1985).

Multi-agency policing

Most conceptions of community policing, as demonstrated above, promise to help people come together in meeting their needs and tackling common problems. In the context of policing, this is called the multi-agency approach to the prevention of crime and public disorder, with the police acting as the main catalysts.

Following his appointment as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in 1982, Sir Kenneth Newman developed the terms and structure of multi-agency policing. This is the suggestion that the police should work in partnership with other agencies, voluntary and official. It is implicit in the co-ordinated approach to crime prevention, but it may also be used to pursue other objectives, for example helping the victims of crime or dealing with mentally ill. This strategy would suggest that the police be more responsive to the types of policing required by the public. Apart from the police, social workers and teachers play a crucial role in this strategy. The rationale behind such a strategy is:

The appeal of co-ordinated or multi-agency prevention lies in its recognition of the complexities of situations in which crimes occur and in its promise that they can be dealt with in a program of action where the partial knowledge of interested parties can be pooled and their fragmented responsibilities reconciled. This approach has come to epitomise par excellence the idea that policing problems can be solved if a consensus can be reached by appropriate parties about how to proceed (Weatheritt 1988: 169).

Apart from the influence of the Scarman Report (1982), Reiner (1985) argues that the multi-agency approach stemmed from three basic problems facing the police: (i) a crisis in legitimacy and public confidence, (ii) the failure to clear up or prevent crime and (iii) the message enshrined in Home Office Circular 114/83 that further resources would not be available for forces who did not demonstrate efficiency.

To define multi-agency policing in very general terms, it is the close co-operation between police and local education, housing and social work agencies, together with the general public, in the implementation of strategies aimed at crime prevention. Kinsey *et al.* (1986) classified multi-agency policing in three parts:

a — Separate and equal: For some agencies, crime prevention may be seen as an aspect of their normal function. Housing agencies can be given as an example of such an agency and to explain the role of the police here, Kinsey *et al.* (1986: 111) note:

Different agencies, working quite independently of one another, may include crime prevention as an aspect of their normal functioning. This, the weakest form of what is now called multi-agency co-operation, has been around for a long time, and it generally enables other agencies to make their contribution with only a minimal contact with the police.

Much social work and youth work, which is another important aspect of multi-agency policing, can be considered as forms of crime prevention pursued quite independently of the police. Whatever the kind and frequency of contact between youth workers and the police, for all sorts of reasons concerning the activities of young people, the very

act of attempting to establish youth clubs and centres to get youngsters off the streets and away from situations which may lead them into crime is of itself a crime-prevention activity. Youth workers may work in conjunction with other non-police agencies, such as local authority housing departments, tenants associations and voluntary sector bodies like the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO) or The National Association of Youth Clubs (NAYC), in an attempt to organise activities to keep young people 'out of trouble' on particular housing estates.

In general sense, it is accepted that there is a minimal police contribution in multi-agency policing. However, by virtue of the fact that the police have traditionally made it their business to know what goes on in a locality and to develop an informal liaison with a wide variety of people who know the area and are therefore to be seen as potential sources of criminal intelligence.

b — Joint action: This is a much stronger form of multi-agency policing which involves the police and other agencies in a new working relationship. In this strategy, police and social service agencies may combine to produce a joint strategy against crime of a particular type (for example, vandalism by young people) or in a particular area such as a housing estate. This may result in the setting up of new levels of information-sharing, including mutual access to records and other data.

By far the most aspiring initiatives in multi-agency policing in the area of joint action concern the relationship between the police and the public itself (Kinsey *et al* 1986: 116). As mentioned in the previous chapter, PACE makes a statutory requirement of what is at present a blossoming initiative in some areas: police community liaison panels.

As seen so far, from the Scarman Report (1982) onwards, a variety of measures have been advocated for the improvement of police-community relations, covering areas such as recruitment, training, complaints procedures, community consultations, lay visitor schemes, and neighbourhood watch schemes. Despite the many initiatives and achievements, relationships between police and communities in many of Britain's multi-racial cities remain cool at best, with conflict persisting or erupting in numerous locations.

Oakley (1992: 219) introduced a scheme for 'sector policing' in Tottenham in 1987. All the objectives might seem closer to the idea of 'consultation' than to the idea of 'training'. Sector policing is a term used here to cover a number of schemes with

slightly different names including: zone policing, neighbourhood policing, geographic policing, and grid-square policing (Bennett 1994b). A recent national survey of community-oriented policing found that about one third of all forces had adopted at least one example of sector policing within its police force area (Bennett and Lupton 1994; in Bennett 1994b: 233). Sector policing makes its input to the public accountability of the police within existing legal and political structures (Dixon & Stanko 1993: 16). The strategy ultimately adopted for meeting requirements at the local level involved a three-stage programme of meetings between police and invited members of the local community. The general aim was:

To promote awareness and understanding of each others' perceptions of problem areas in police-community relations, with a view to enhancing police service to the public within the local area (Oakley 1992: 220).

Subsidiary aims were:

...to promote knowledge and awareness specific to the sector, and to enhance the commitment of the management team as a group to a service and community oriented approach (Oakley 1992: 220).

Such a strategy provided an opening for community participants to express satisfaction with the opportunity to learn more about policing, and to discover that police officers beneath the uniform were also fellow human beings (Oakley 1992: 225). On the other hand in a recent study Dixon and Stanko (1993: 35) found that members of 'sector crime panel' were unsure about the panel's purpose and relevance of local 'non-crime' problems to its work as a forum for discussion about local policing. This uncertainty has, in part, been attributed to the failure of the police either to clarify what they believed the purpose of the panel to be, or to provide it with the information members required to consider public needs and priorities and assess police performance in meeting them .

Dixon and Stanko (1993: 35) argue that Sector Policing Panel in Highbury has made a limited contribution to developing the accountability of sector police officers to the people of Highbury. The main reason was that the panel itself was not in a position accurately to communicate public needs to the police. However, it was suggested that the panel succeeded at least in achieving a working agreement with the police about the kind of policing the panel itself would like to see.

c — Colonisation: This final type of multi-agency policing involves other institutions in the crime prevention and detection process, essentially as appendages of the police. To the extent that they do become involved, they remain passive

providers of information to the police. Colonisation may imply quite simple activities: for example, the Criminal Investigation Department, with the agreement of local authority housing departments, uses flats for surveillance purposes. But by far the most important initiatives of this type are the neighbourhood watch schemes which shall be discussed now. One aspect of their work — the transmission of information to the police concerning 'suspicious circumstances' — is an example of the colonisation of the public as an auxiliary information-gathering organ of the police.

The involvement of the police in other institutions raises some serious concern regarding the activities of the police. For instance, the consideration of the relationship between the police and schools brings a fundamental question on how the line is drawn between questioning and information gathering. In involvement with schools, some teachers expressed their concern because of police access to schools and the possibility of confidentiality being broken. The main concern expressed by teachers was that there were no effective checks on police activity in schools. (Scruton 1985: 129). The school is but one example of an agency that may be recruited to assist in multi-agency policing and has, when properly employed, considerable crime prevention potential.

Gordon (1987: 126) points out that the involvement of police in schools has been challenged. In 1979, following the death of an east London teacher, Blair Peach, at the hands of the police, Hackney Teachers Association (the local branch of the National Union of Teachers) adopted a policy of non-co-operation with the police. Another reason was that there was growing awareness among teachers of the suspicion and distrust with which the police were regarded by many black students and their families. Similarly, the All London Teachers Against Racism and Fascism took the same action, arguing that police work in schools was cosmetic and did not affect policing outside schools.

The accusations and fears raised by critical groups suggested that schools were used to gather information and intelligence. Children were asked to pass on any information they might have about theft and vandalism (Gordon 1987). This clearly compromises the role of the teachers and has been resisted by some local branches of the National Union of Teachers, who have opposed police presence in schools. In 1982 branches of the National Union of Teachers in Hackney and Lambeth decided to oppose police presence in schools, because they were worried about their children's civil liberties as well as the propriety of police liaison (Policing London, in Christian 1983: 128). In 1987 teachers in the Inner London Teachers Association banned any

further co-operation with the police (Brake & Hale 1992: 76-77). It can be said that the multi-agency approach placed teachers in the difficult position of being seen as extensions of the police surveillance system (Brake & Hale 1992: 77). Gordon (1987) discloses that one officer in the Lothian and Borders Police said they used schools not only to obtain information from the children themselves but from the staff about the students and their relatives outside the school:

We go down to the schools a lot. You get a hell of a lot of information from the kids. They get wise to us once they're about seven or eight, but they still like to boast about what their big brothers or their dads have been up to so we get a lot off the teachers (Baldwin & Kinsey 1982: 101; in Gordon 1987: 127).

Gordon (1987: 127) claims:

The ethics of such behaviour — by police and teachers — have gone largely unquestioned.

Police presence in schools is justified by arguing that it provides education about the law or citizenship or road safety. The use of such liaison for intelligence gathering purposes is inconsistent with the policing requirements of a harmonious democracy. The children may meet the police formally for the first time in their lives. The idea of involvement with schools should be to introduce the police as a friend, guide and public servant in order to promote the ideal image of policing in a democratic society.

In terms of effectiveness, multi-agency crime prevention has some other problems. It would be suggested that co-ordinating the work of several organisations in order to prevent more crime is not only too difficult to achieve but can also compromise effective action. This could be attributed to the fact that agencies do not always agree what the problems are, let alone how they should be tackled. If a number of agencies were involved, it is likely that none of them have sole or prime responsibility, and none have to give the matter the highest priority. As Weatheritt (1988: 170) explains:

Co-ordinated crime prevention is not a panacea. Rather, it entails a highly problematic set of prescriptions whose outcomes are by no means predictable.

Another problem is that agencies are suspicious of working with the police and they do not want to give information due to feeling that the police will use that information for aims they do not approve of (Weatheritt 1988: 174). The reason could be attributed to the claim that, in the multi-agency crime prevention strategy, police see themselves as one of many agencies working in the direction of the same objective. Because of the absence of the explanation of Home Office circular of July

1983 about who will lead the new crime prevention strategies, what multi-agency policing means is co-operation directed and controlled by the police (Christian 1983: 126). Manning (1984: 218) supports this claim as:

It seems rather obvious that the interests of the police become the basis for operational notions of the 'order' and individual officers the locus of prescriptive definitions.

There have been many criticisms of the social control aspects of multi-agency policing. The main argument is that the major goal of such a strategy is to widen the surveillance capacity of the police in certain targeted areas, and to use the scheme to gather all manner of information and 'intelligence', which the police will then use as they see fit (Stephans 1988: 94). This is a major criticism of the theory of community policing; that it is a threat to civil liberties. As mentioned earlier, normally the police take the leadership role formally or informally. The kind of information the police might obtain and how to use such information would appear to be a general concern. As Weatheritt 1988: 174 argues:

Agencies are often suspicious of working with the police and do not want to share information with them because they feel that the police will use that information for purposes they do not approve of. They are concerned that the police view of problems will prevail.

Christian (1983: 132) argues that due to the use of multi-agency policing as an expanding system of internal immigration controls, black people in particular were victimised. Because they had to produce passports, they were unable to have access to hospitals, housing, school and welfare services. Gordon (1981; in Christian 1983: 132) argues that immigration control has increasingly become a function of the police. To carry out immigration control, police and immigration service carried out raids on workplaces where black people work. This raids were based on general intelligence about workplaces where people without national insurance cards obtain low paid and casual employment (Christian 1983: 133).

As seen above, the quality of inter-agency co-ordination is another main problems in the multi-agency approach to community policing (Stephans 1988: 99). This can be explained in terms of the criticism that the police take on the role of leadership in the co-ordination business. As Moore and Brown (1981: 119-20) explain:

...in carrying out the pro-active role the police come to believe they are fulfilling what they see as a leadership void in present-day society. This assumption could blow back in their faces and create distress and conflict rather than harmony between agencies within communities. The policeman's leadership qualities, recognised by many in the community, must be subdued so that they are seen in

terms of 'service' rather than as a new velvet glove on the old iron hand; a more insidious form of social control.

This creates the serious risk of an extreme worry with authority, not only for the individual police officer, but also for the police organisation. A quite rational and appropriate institutional response to this is to emphasise the importance of procedure and control, as a means of constraining and focusing this considerable power. It is likely that reactive strategies of policing will emerge through these processes of control and procedure (Taylor 1992: 157). However this does not mean that community policing should not be encouraged and developed. As Taylor (1992: 157) suggests, through recognising this essentially conceptual limitation to practical police work, we might make a more realistic decision about and assessment of community policing initiatives. Weatheritt points out:

The idea that there is a consensual community waiting to be discovered and, moreover, that the police are best placed to discover it and to give practical expression to it is not only a recipe for failure, it is to misunderstand the nature of social process and the place of the police in the political order. Social harmony is not waiting to be discovered and it cannot be engineered by the police. Community policing provides no magic formula for escaping the inherent tension between freedom and security. To pretend that it does so is to abrogate responsibility for division a constitutional framework in which the resolution of genuine and difficult tensions can be explored (Weatheritt 1988: 167).

In any partnership enterprise in the field of crime prevention, there seems to be a problem of colonisation of other agencies by the police. This might result in the use of other agencies as surrogates for the police, and a weakening of their capacity to operate independently and hence threaten their authority and ability to fulfil their proper function.

Wilson and Kelling (1982: 34) have suggested that 'the police know the informal control mechanisms found in a community, can accommodate them, and can in some fashion act to enhance'. This argument poses a serious concern. The desired police role with respect to community intervention, the shaping of community structures and participation in community life can be open to debate. Here, the important point which must be raised is that the police should not assume the wider responsibility of social order, because one could argue that the police are not essentially placed as a social agency to perform the maintenance of social order. They cannot provide a substitute for informal social control (Manning 1984). As Manning (1984: 217-218) suggests, many local cultures are in fact in conflict with the police. They have only a limited role to play in the maintenance of social order. In this task, one could suggest

that education could be much more effective if it is given this responsibility. That is why, as mentioned earlier, in terms of civil liberties, the police should not take initiatives, because they may employ some strategies which result in the erosion of civil liberties.

Cited as a model of contemporary community policing, in Handsworth, in Birmingham, the police developed a strategy in association with the Partnership programme. Using Partnership money, the West Midlands Police set up the Lozells Community Policing Project in conjunction with the education, probation and social services departments (Gordon 1987: 130). The architect of the scheme explains:

Handsworth in the last three years demonstrates a growing pattern of police community contact and interaction — with education and Youth Services through police contributions to school programmes and to leisure and sports activities for young people; with the Social Services through joint consultation on young offenders, and through training exchanges; with the Probation Service through a victim support scheme; with ethnic minorities through collaboration in dealing with community problems and through encouragement of self-help schemes; with housing authorities through discussions on the control of 'squats'; and with a wide range of other statutory and voluntary bodies.... As a result of this community involvement, police in Handsworth are now able to act with greater confidence and with greater public backing, and to harness more effectively both community co-operation and community resources in containing crime and disorder (Police Studies, Spring 1981; in Gordon 1987: 131).

The other side of the coin was described by Bunyan (1981: 183) as:

Since the initial year of the Lozells project the bulk of the funding has gone towards the cost of a police-operated community centre and related activities and less has been available for wider distribution, although, significantly, recipient groups are now being required to involve police officers in their organisations as the price for receiving financial support. By these means, the local police have succeeded in penetrating local statutory and voluntary organisations and compromising their workers. Moreover, those politically conscious organisations who refuse to co-operate in such activities have been singled out for adverse comment and attention by the police. In some cases, it has been alleged, this has involved special forms of harassment in terms of searches and raids as specific 'punishment' for their non-co-operation.

One of the most extensive studies of multi-agency partnerships is a retrospective evaluation of the '5 Towns Crime Prevention Initiative' (Liddle and Botoms 1991). The research found that tensions often raised between representatives of the professional agencies at the project committee level, the bodies responsible for implementing particular crime prevention projects, which hindered their effective operation. The main sources of tensions reported were differences in the seniority levels of committee members within their respective agencies, dissatisfaction arising

from unequal workloads and levels of commitment of individual committee members, the alienation of some members as a result of backstage work by key members of the committee, and clashes between the work of the committee and other agency work. The potential seriousness of these problems was reflected in the conclusion drawn by the authors who recommended that multi-agency co-operation would be more effective if it were limited to the managerial level and if crime prevention at the operational level were restricted to individual agencies.

A study of multi-agency partnership in three areas in London and in a northern town also reported tension between agencies and noted that the agencies did not always work together on an equal basis. The main reason was that the police often became the lead agency in defining goals and designing initiatives which undermined the authority and the spirit of the other agencies (Sampson *et al.* 1988).

Neighbourhood watch

Despite the problems outlined above, the search for a sustainable bedrock for policing a complex society has led to one of the main issues in police management today being the implementation of community or neighbourhood policing. Numerous agencies have departed from traditional police methods and embarked on a journey involving the radical restructuring of the police organisation and society's perception of 'what police do' (Findley & Taylor 1990). One of the major initiatives that has resulted from this substantial review is Neighbourhood Watch (NW) — an effort to encourage much greater police/public partnership.

Citizen involvement in crime prevention programmes has been prevalent in the United States since the 1970s, and is also well-developed in Australia and Canada. Its introduction to Britain, as mentioned before, can be traced to the establishment in 1982 of a single scheme at Mollington, a small Cheshire village, which at the time was experiencing a spate of serious burglaries (Husain 1990). Although the precise location is unremarkable, the circumstances surrounding scheme formation here are of considerable interest because subsequently they have been replicated many times across the country. Residents were concerned about crime in their community and wanted preventive measures to be taken; the police had insufficient resources to provide what they considered to be adequate protection. The result was an innovative venture that depended on the participation of both parties.

Diffusion of the NW concept from Cheshire was initially slow and localised. Schemes soon appeared in the Metropolitan Police District, South Wales, Merseyside

and Essex, but in January 1986 half of the police forces in England and Wales reported fewer than ten schemes in existence. Many, including Hampshire, Lincolnshire and Gwent, had none at all. It is clear that in several of these areas senior officers were extremely apprehensive about becoming involved in what was then a radical initiative and preferred to wait and learn from the experiences being gained elsewhere. It has therefore been in the period since mid-1986 that NW has taken off (Husain 1990).

It can be demonstrated that the emergence of NW was a response to problems concerning crime. Schemes are strongly concentrated in urban areas, but NW can now be found in all forms of residential environments from remote rural villages to densely populated inner cities. Additionally, numerous variations have developed to cover other geographical and interest areas, such as 'Pub Watch', 'Farm Watch', 'Hospital Watch' — all operating on the same basis — encouraging the public to be the 'eyes and ears' of the police.

Since its inception in 1982, the growth of Neighbourhood Watch in England and Wales has been an outstanding phenomenon (Husain 1988, 1990; Bennett 1990, McConville & Shepherd 1992). Not only has it captured public interest in the apparently mundane topic of crime prevention, something which has proved exceedingly difficult to achieve in the past, but supporters claim that it has actually stimulated active involvement in a community-based initiative in a way unparalleled by any other post-war voluntary movement. Such has been its rate of growth that by late 1989, according to Home Office records, there were 75,000 schemes in operation, and more than three million households were living within scheme confines (Husain 1990). Despite its widespread promotion and adoption, many fundamental questions about NW remain unanswered. For example, little is known about the operation and effects of schemes that have been established, or the demands they make on police resources. It is not difficult to see why this occurred. NW has received substantial support from politicians and the police, and clearly successful schemes have been given extensive publicity:

There are, however, schemes where a reduction in recorded crime has followed the introduction of neighbourhood watch...In the London Borough of Wandsworth an increase in the number of neighbourhood watch schemes from 375 in 1985 to 558 in 1986 coincided with a reduction in residential burglaries from 4,119 to 3,514 (Mr Douglas Hogg, 13 May 1987; in Husain 1990).

A number of points can be recognised behind neighbourhood watch. As Weatheritt (1988: 168) puts it:

There is *localism* and *consumer responsiveness*, the ideas that problems have to be tackled at the level where they are most likely to be felt and that, as the circular puts it, 'the public can only be expected to help... where initiatives against [crime] reflect their own perceptions and concerns, otherwise their involvement will be minimal'. There is an emphasis on *voluntarism* and *self-help*, expressed through the development of neighbourhood watch and crime prevention panels. There is the government's wish to see that the police together with other public services become more rigorously managed financially. 'Value for money' is the watchword; greater efficiency and effectiveness its corollaries.

It is not possible to give accurate dates about the developing number of schemes. The sole source for national figure is the Home Office, which has collected returns from individual police forces at irregular intervals. Statistics for the number of participants have not been collated centrally on a regular basis. However, in September 1989 the Home Office estimated that 3.7m households were covered by NW, or approximately one in five of the population.

Table 2 The growth of neighbourhood watch schemes according to official figures

Date	Number of schemes
1985(July)	1,300
1987(March)	18,000
1989(July)	66,000
1990(March)	81,302
1991(March)	91,000
1993(December)	115,000

Source: [*New Society*, 20.9.1985; *The Times*, 6.3.1987, *The Guardian*, 12.7.1989; *The Guardian*, 2.3.1990; *The Daily Mail*, 10.4.1991 (in: McConville & Shepherd 1992: 9); *The Independent*, 5.12.1993]

The expansion of NW in Britain can be explained as a consequence of increased concern about crime, increased emphasis on community-based preventative initiatives, vociferous support from politicians and a willingness amongst the public to adopt the idea. Yet throughout its short history there has been uncertainty about its effectiveness and impact.

Although there is no simple answer to the astonishing explosion of NW schemes, it can be suggested that two fundamental underlying causes can be identified. Firstly, rising levels of crime and fear of crime generated pressure for effective counter

measures to be taken by the police (Kinsey *et al.* 1986, McConville & Shepherd 1992). Secondly, conventional approaches to crime prevention, the framework for which was provided by the Cornish Committee in 1965 (Home Office 1965), appeared unable to interrupt the upward trend, despite long-term expansion in police manpower and steady investment in technological support. To understand why this particular response to the problem emerged, it is necessary to examine further the reactions for this lack of success in the past.

It would be suggested that part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in operational aspects of preventive policing. Within police forces, crime prevention has traditionally not been accorded the status of certain other specialist activities, and has arguably been provided with inadequate resources. Weatheritt (1986) argues that opportunities for career progression are limited, so it has been difficult to retain good officers committed to crime prevention. For similar reasons, local beat constables, who have considerable discretion over the use of their time, have given preventative work a low priority. At the same time, undue emphasis may have been placed on physical measures and technology which do nothing to change the attitudes or value judgements that fail to control offending behaviour in the first place. Investment in equipment and new centralised managerial structures, intended to make the police more effective, may have had the reverse effect. The introduction of motorised patrols and modern communications systems have reduced the need and opportunities for the personal contacts with the public which are now recognised as being potentially highly beneficial.

But while such arguments may well-founded, it would be quite wrong to attribute responsibility for the continued upward trend solely to the inadequacy of police action. The variable success of crime prevention publicity campaigns has demonstrated that the police are resistant to behavioural change that might lessen the risk of an offence being committed (Riley and Mayhew 1980).

There are three issues which are particularly relevant to the growth of NW: the concept of rational choice in the explanation of criminal behaviour; the involvement of the public in preventive action; and the promotion of area-based policies (Heal and Laycock 1986, Hope and Shaw 1988 and Tuck 1988).

Situational crime prevention together with 'law enforcement and the criminal justice agencies' and 'social crime prevention' are on the agenda of the current crime prevention debate. The aim of 'situational crime prevention' which is regarded by Home Office policy makers as having the greatest potential to make an impact on

crime, is to reduce opportunities for committing crime by modifying the design or management of the situation in which crime is known to occur.

The reason that the Home Office gives a heavy emphasis to 'situational crime prevention' is that Home Office is fairly suspicious of social crime prevention, believing that it is not rigorously conceived and difficult and expensive to implement and evaluate (Bright 1991: 64). In addition to this many of the structural explanations of criminal behaviour which located the causes of crime in the deprivation and social disorganisation of inner urban communities and on the unequal distribution of opportunities did not offer governments politically achievable objectives. On the other hand the failure of penal policy, social intervention and social reform to prevent crime led to the 'nothing works' pessimism of the late 1970s and, a shift in focus away from the offender to the victim and the development of 'situational' or 'opportunity reduction' theories of crime prevention (Mayhew *et al.* 1976, in Bright 1991: 65).

The introduction of the concept of rational choice was an alternative to the medico-psychological explanation for criminal behaviour (Heal and Laycock 1986). There has been a revival of interest in theories which suggested that crime is a result of individual choice, strongly influenced by biological make-up and family relationships which are considered to be largely unaffected by outside forces. This has led to a debate on whether there is a permanent underclass whose criminality is unlikely to be affected by social and economic reforms (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985, in Bright 1991: 65). This concept is based on the premises that whether or not an offence is actually committed depends on a logical assessment by the potential offender of the opportunities, risks and rewards of a particular course of action. It is recognised that individuals will view situations through their own unique perception filter and the assessment will be based on imperfect information. Consequently, it can be suggested that, on a particular occasion different individuals will reach different conclusions. Nevertheless, within these limits an offence is the outcome of a rational decision making process and, if the circumstances are unfavourable, the individual will desist from carrying out of the offence. The important implication of this model, subsequently formally expressed as rational choice theory, is that by reducing the opportunities, increasing the risks and minimising rewards, specific crimes can be prevented. However, as crime figures continued to rise, it was clear that the control of crime can not be managed by increased detection, investigation and deterrence. By the early 1980s, research showed some promise to reduce the phenomenon (Heal 1989, in Bright 1991: 66). This policy directed awareness gave rise to an emphasis on

the need for individuals and agencies to work together at a local level to prevent crime by target hardening and other situational measures.

It is clear that this argument cannot be generalised. The 'protection' of a particular target is unlikely to persuade professional criminals, such as bank robbers, to change their occupation. Given the vast number of potential targets and the impossibility of protecting them all, such action may simply lead to displacement in time, space, type of offence or method of operation. Also, in the case of murder, rape; rational choice does not seem adequate in the context of crimes of passion or expressive crimes.

After developing such ideas, a significant re-orientation in crime prevention policy has been introduced; activities such as aiming at the offender, supplementing by 'situational' measures directed at the immediate environment in which offences can occur. It means that priority is given to concentrating on reducing the physical opportunities for crime and/or increasing the risk of the offender being caught.

The effective of this strategy is that it leads to practical action which can reduce the incidence of some crimes. Improving household security, redesigning the layout of shops, housing estates and car parks to enable easier surveillance and to reduce opportunities can bring obvious results. The car and house building industries are considering security at the design stage of production. On the other hand it is an obvious reality that most people do not steal cars or burgle houses. As Bright (1991: 66) notes:

Environmental determinism is not an adequate explanation of criminal behaviour, although it does help to explain why people with a propensity to offend commit particular crimes in particular places at particular times. While situational crime prevention, theoretically can reduce the estimate 70 per cent of recorded crime that is thought to be opportunistic, it is unable to prevent many violent crimes such as some categories of assault, domestic violence, child abuse and racially motivated crime.

The involvement of the public in crime prevention is a response to the crime prevention theories which support public consent and co-operation in crime prevention. This is not a new idea, but the need for good personal contacts between the police and the public seems to have been underestimated or neglected until recently at the same time as opportunities to develop such contacts have been declining. Alderson's (1979) theory of community policing has been widely supported by the police, assuming that this approach can build improved relationships with the public to achieve effective crime prevention and detection. As introduced in Chapter I, in order to establish such strategy, Scarman suggests the necessity of

'consent and balance' which he describes one of the 'principles of policing' (Scarman 1982: para. 4.55). He states that the police officer's first duty is to co-operate with others in maintaining 'the normal state of society'. Scarman (1982) also recognises the importance of community involvement, stating that:

Community involvement in the policy and operations of policing is perfectly feasible without undermining the independence of the police or destroying the secrecy of those operations against crime which have to be kept secret (para. 5.56).

Area based policing strategies are recognition that there are considerable spatial variations between areas in the level and nature of crime problems, but there is now greater use of that variation in strategy formulation. That is why increased emphasis on policing tailored to specific neighbourhoods has been put forward on the agenda. Although it is difficult to see such programs on official policy, the use of targeting as a form of tactical policing; the use of community policing, improvement of the physical environment on 'problem' estates can be given as examples of this strategy (See Hope & Shaw 1988).

One of the most comprehensive examinations of area-based policing in England and Wales was carried out by Irving *et al.* (1989) for the Police Foundation in relation to the pilot schemes of the neighbourhood policing programme in Notting Hill in London. The report revealed no change in public attitudes towards the police or the area in which they live; and no change in victimisation rates, apart from an increase in multiple victimisation. Irving *et al.* (1989) argue that the absence of positive outcome findings was a result of programme implementation failure. Geographic responsibility was resisted by the relief officers on the grounds that it undermined reactive cover and manning levels, while home beat officers resisted it on the grounds that allocating proactive tasks to relief officers undermined and confused their position. There was also resistance among the relief officers to changing the roster system to match availability of officers to area workload which was seen as undermining the traditional shift system. The implementation of graded response was widely criticised by the officers and was eventually abandoned and the computerised management information system failed to be operated in a way that could provide useful results. The report concluded that the programme failed to overcome the issue of police conservatism and self-interest of the various policing groups and the strong inertia to change and desire to maintain the status quo among front line officers and junior managers.

Another study of area-based policing in England & Wales found that key elements of the programme were not implemented because of resistance by lower ranking officers (Chatterton 1991). Chatterton showed that changes in the collection and use of information from a largely manual system to a computerised system threatened the ability of lower ranking officers to control information about their own behaviour. As a result various resistance tactics were adopted including the use of generalised rather than specific descriptions of their activities in written reports, the frequent challenge that 'local knowledge' was a more effective source of information, general opposition to increased paperwork, the submission of reports that were too brief to have any practical use, and frequent complaints of the inaccuracy of the computerised system.

There is also the argument that crime prevention has an important legitimating function for the police, partly because of the consumer consultative mechanisms it implies, partly because of the conflict-free and non adversarial picture of policing that it promotes (Weatheritt 1988: 168). To the public, support from these agencies for what seemed intuitively to be a good idea has proved irresistible. At a time of widespread concern about rising levels of crime, numerous constituencies have been receptive to new initiatives and have readily responded to this innovative concept. Although there were theoretical and practical reasons to justify the introduction of NW, and although it has been shown to reduce the fear of crime (Bennett 1990, Husain 1990) there remains much uncertainty about its impact, especially in the context of crime prevention. Indeed, it is no overstatement to say that NW has been widely implemented because many people have an instinctive belief that it should prevent crime, rather than because there is comprehensive indication that it does.

NW is being presented to, and adopted by, the public as a crime prevention measure. It would therefore be misleading, and possibly irresponsible, to continue to encourage the public to place confidence in an initiative which cannot be shown to work in the terms that it has been supported. Furthermore, NW is consuming substantial resources, particularly in the form of support from the police.

Recent innovations in policing, have sought to establish a closer relationship between the police and the local communities they serve, and aim to prevent crime by drawing on community resources, provide the conceptual and theoretical background of NW. To some extent, the appeal of collective citizen action stems from the hope that strategies such as NW will serve to correct or replace spontaneous responses to crime, which can be seen to include such negative developments such as heightened levels of fear and behavioural withdrawal from social environments that are perceived as dangerous (Rosenbaum 1988). The philosophy underlying NW is a composite

formulation built upon the foundations of both the 'victimisation' and the 'social control' perspective (Bennett 1990: 30, Rosenbaum 1988: 127; see also Iadicola 1986).

Watching out for and reporting suspicious incidents to the police is the primary aim of nearly all NW schemes. To reduce the opportunities for offending by altering the cost-rewards balance as perceived by potential offenders can be given as the main purpose of watching and reporting. To this extent NW programmes fall within the framework of the 'victimisation perspective', and neatly complement such official policy theories of crime such as 'crime as opportunity' and its 'situational crime prevention' implementation.

That the strengthening of informal social control can be generated by introducing NW is another argument deployed by those who advocate such schemes. Rosenbaum (1988: 127) argues that interaction among local residents resulting from scheme membership increases social integration and cohesion, which indirectly promotes a degree of informal social control. In this context, NW programmes fall within the framework of the 'social control perspective' which has developed complementary to crime as opportunity and situational crime prevention concepts in much policy oriented checking.

Bennett (1990) puts emphasis on the possibility that NW schemes might reduce crime as a result of a growth in the flow of useful information from the public to the police. Such information might concern crimes in progress, and suspicious persons and events which might lead to a great number of arrests and convictions and result in a reduction in crime through the prosecution and possible incapacitation of local offenders.

The idea of NW is based upon the creation of a structure of public-spirited members of the community who will assist the police in the fight against crime (McConville & Shepherd 1992, Kinsey *et al.* 1986). It is a community-based activity that is primarily directed at crime prevention in residential areas. It depends on individual residents accepting greater responsibility for crime prevention in their community and co-operating with police to take effective action. The underlying rationale is that NW schemes will deter prospective criminals because it will be known that residents in such areas will be vigilant, property crime will therefore be lower, and the risk of detection higher, than elsewhere. NW strategy has been conceptualised as a collective, 'public-minded' strategy as opposed to the individual-focused, 'private-minded' responses to crime that are typical of most citizens (Rosenbaum 1988).

However, the benefits to be anticipated from NW extend far beyond crime prevention alone. Because NW requires residents to work together to protect each other's property, successful schemes will increase contact and interaction within neighbourhoods, thereby improving 'community spirit'. In turn, this enhanced social cohesion — combined with the anticipated reduction in crime — will provide reassurance to residents and reduce their fear of victimisation. Finally, since the police play a key role in NW, it provides them with an opportunity to establish constructive links with residents and improve relationships with the local community.

Relating to NW, the official Metropolitan Police guide-lines, issued in June 1983 describe the scheme as having four basic elements:

- 1- Neighbours watching out for each other's homes and reporting suspicious activity,
- 2- Encouraging the marking of valuable property,
- 3- The availability of a free home security survey carried out on request by a local crime prevention officer,
- 4- The promotion of crime prevention and community campaigns to address particular local environment issues (McConville & Shepherd 1992: 5).

In most localities the police, often with the co-operation of local media, have publicised the benefits that NW might bring, but have adopted a reactive approach to scheme formation (Husain 1988). This means that, although the police have been willing to co-operate and provide advice, the onus has been on residents to make the initial approach, to canvass support and to organise initial meeting. Their rationale has been that, since NW can only work where residents are genuinely enthusiastic, this type of approach ensures schemes are only formed where this is the case. Thus, most schemes have resulted from individuals, residents' associations, parish groups or other community organisations. On occasions a more pro-active stance has been adopted, with schemes being deliberately established by the police in targeted areas where it was thought their introduction could contribute to the solution of a particular local problem. It should be noted that some forces now appoint full time civilian and / or police NW co-ordinators with a service response and pro-active role.

For the individual resident, participation requires two basic types of activity to prevent crime. The first is intended to have a beneficial effect throughout the local area and is arguably more dependent on a change of attitude than behavioural change. Residents are required to become more vigilant, to notice unusual activities of people, and to report anything suspicious. This, of course, can only be accomplished if

residents know what is normal in their area, emphasising the need for participants to take an interest in their neighbourhood and to get to know their neighbours. The second type of activity is designed to lessen the risk of personal victimisation. Individuals are encouraged to ensure that their home is secure, to 'mark' their property with their postcode and to keep neighbours informed when their home is unoccupied. Such measures do require action to be taken, demonstrating that NW can only work where residents recognise that they have a personal responsibility to protect their property and can not rely on the police or others to do it for them. In terms of deterrence, however, the existence of a scheme — and the involvement of individual households — must be made known, for which purpose street signs and window stickers are widely displayed.

Once a scheme has been launched, the residents are expected to take responsibility for its administration and management. This often involves the organisation of a programme of activities to inform participants of relevant developments in their area, to maintain interest, strengthen contacts with in the community and bring new members into the scheme. Meetings about crime prevention, social functions such as street parties, and charity fund raising illustrate the diverse nature of events included in such programmes.

A committee may be appointed to undertake these tasks but the main burden normally falls on the local co-ordinator (It should not be confused with the larger scale police appointed co-ordinator in some areas). In some areas an administrative hierarchy is established with each road having its own street co-ordinator, while area co-ordinators maintain links between schemes. The co-ordinator is also the point of contact between the scheme and outside agencies, and in particular with the local beat police officer. In successful schemes the officer will provide on a regular basis information about local crime developments, feedback about report from residents, news from other schemes and information about crime prevention for onward dissemination. In return, the co-ordinator will pass on questions and information from residents, which — for various reasons — they may have been reluctant or unable to communicate direct to the police.

The exchange of information between police and residents appears to be crucial ingredient in maintaining the momentum of a scheme. Residents, it appears, need frequent reassurance that the police value their contribution and, when necessary, will respond appropriately. Whilst they are willing to supply information, they also expect communication to be a two way process from which they too will be benefit. Recognising the importance of this relationship, some forces organise conferences for

participants, while elsewhere communication is achieved through the distribution of newsletters prepared by the police or the co-ordinator.

Assessing the impact of neighbourhood watch on crime

It would be suggested that the argument on the effects of NW on crime prevention is a question far from being solved. What is more relevant here, though, is whether residents consider it has a beneficial effect, not just on the problem of crime, but also on related issues. Husain (1988) found that among co-ordinators there is a widespread belief that it does.

To evaluate the impact of NW is clearly of fundamental importance. To decide whether NW is successful is extremely problematic. The evidence from a variety of sources suggests that the success of NW is almost beyond doubt. More than 70 per cent of respondents in one of survey co-ordinators claimed that they perceived their scheme had been successful in crime prevention, especially in preventing burglary (Husain 1988, see also Forrester *et al.* 1990). For three reasons, such confidence appears to exist. Firstly, increased surveillance and security to reduce the opportunities for crime and increase the probability of criminals being apprehended are expected to make sense by initiating NW. Secondly, participants have been told by the police and other agencies that NW can prevent crime. And finally, considerable publicity has been given to apparently successful schemes and anecdotal evidence of 'success stories' in areas that have experienced dramatic reductions in crime following the introduction of NW.

The methodology below was developed by Berry and Carter (1992: 27-30) as:

- 1- Define problem- Where are we know?
- 2- Set clear objectives — 'Where do we want to be?
- 3- Define strategy/Tactics — 'How shall we get there?
- 4- Identify Resources — Who does it and who pays?
- 5- Set up assessment procedures — How shall we measure how we are doing?
- 6- Pre-project assessment — will it be worth it?
- 7- Decision making — Shall we do it?
- 8- Implement the initiative — Let's do it.
- 9- On-going monitoring — How are we doing?
- 10- Final post project assessment — How have we done?

In evaluating NW, a fundamental problem arises from the fact that crime patterns vary continuously in space and time in response to a wide range of variables. It is difficult to predict much of the variation and it cannot be controlled in an experimental sense. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute any change to the introduction of one particular initiative.

Another point which must be addressed here is that the results of any evaluation are also likely to be influenced by the scope and scale of the investigation, and by the extent to which displacement of crime is examined. As a result of a local initiative, if participants experienced a reduction in a particular targeted crime, it can be concluded that the initiative had been successful. On the other hand that conclusion requires qualification, because it is possible that criminal activity was wholly or partially deflected to alternative locations, and or offences ('horizontal' or 'vertical' displacement). Although the distribution was significantly altered, it may be that the total level of crime remained constant. In addition to such arguments the problems of definition appear time and again in the research literature, notably in the framing of questions and the interpretation of answers in survey work. It is often difficult to discover exactly what is being measured and described; consequently, serious problems are encountered in attempting to compare one study with another.

Ekblom (1988: 6) suggests four principles to evaluate a crime prevention scheme:

- a- Was there a real change in the relevant crime rate?
- b- What proportion of this change can be attributed to the preventive initiative as opposed to coincidental events, such as increased police operations?
- c- Were there side effects of the initiative, such as displacement?
- d- What was the cost-effectiveness of the initiative, in financial and social terms?

To give a completely correct answer to these questions is almost impossible. The reason is that it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between the occurrence of a real change, and mere random fluctuation in crime levels; even having succeeded in this, it is extremely hard to move from demonstrating an association between a security initiative and drop in crime, to a firm conclusion that the initiative caused the drop. However, in order to give an overall picture, I shall look at some previous studies.

In England and Wales, it is possible to discover references in various places suggesting that the impact of NW on crime has been widely measured and that

impressive reductions in crime have been frequently identified. Similar comments can be found in chief constables' annual reports. The majority are the result of small-scale localised projects completed by police officers, either as part of their training or as short-term ad hoc tasks allocated by a superior officer, one suggests also possibly with an agenda that is the product of some pressure to demonstrate success.

Anderton (1985) published a report relating to Cheshire, which can be said one of the earliest studies of NW. He studied the effectiveness of Home Watch, as it was termed in that county, and covered much more than impact on crime, acknowledging the contribution schemes have made in apprehending criminals and reducing the fear of crime. However, he emphasises that the main objective is to reduce crime in general and house burglary in particular, and he concluded that this objective has been achieved. This study is based on an analysis of recorded crime statistics which encompasses consideration of both small-area data for individual or small clusters of scheme as well as aggregated data covering the whole force.

Anderton (1985) reports a dramatic improvement in Mollington village, where the first scheme was located. 19 high value house burglaries were reported in the 18 months prior to scheme formation but not one in the 30 months that followed. He also cites several other locations where there have been no or very few burglaries after schemes have been formed. One may wonder whether increased police attention leading to pressure on, or arrest of, one or two offenders may have achieved these results.

The most extensive research of NW has undoubtedly been Bennett's (1990) work in the Metropolitan Police District. The results of the detailed study of two neighbourhood watch schemes in London raised a number of points associated with programme implementation and effectiveness. He studied two schemes, one in Acton and the other in Wimbledon, and compared crime levels in the year before NW started with the year after. The selection of these individual schemes was the culmination of a search for what was thought to be the ideal type of NW. Consequently, if NW could have a definite impact on crime, it was expected to be detectable here. In addition, during the same periods crime was also monitored in a control area and an area close to one of the schemes to which crime might have been displaced. In each area, the study was based on victimisation surveys, not recorded crime, having the advantage of surveying victims who may not have reported offences for numerous reasons (see Hough & Mayhew 1983).

Bennett found no significant decrease in the prevalence of victimisation in either NW area compared to the control area. He also failed to find any significant increase in reporting rates. Given the rigorous quasi-experimental approach adopted in his analysis, these results are important. However, Bennett was careful not to dismiss the concept of NW as ineffective. Although theory failure was possible, he inclined to the view that, despite careful selection, his study areas were not ideal examples of NW in operation, largely because of their design and administration of schemes. He concluded that the lack of programme impact was a result, at least in part, of programme failure and a weak programme design which limited the level of public involvement in it. More specifically, Bennett highlights a number of problems in the implementation of NW in the Metropolitan Police District which might have prevented their potential from being fully realised. Apart from attending the launch meeting and displaying a neighbourhood watch sticker in their windows, local residents took little further active part in the scheme. The police found it difficult to service the increasing number of neighbourhood watch schemes in their area and few additional personnel or other resources were made available to conduct this task. Little encouragement was given to the public, beyond the initial launch meeting, to participate in policing their area and few residents said that they looked out for anything suspicious or reported it to the police. Given these circumstances and the fact that only two schemes were examined, generalisations based on this study must be cautious.

Ramsay (1987) after studying six schemes set up in Humberside between June and August 1986, came to similar inconclusive results as Bennett did. The schemes, which varied in size from 300 to 1,500 dwellings, were established in contrasting residential environments and initiated by the police. In this study, Ramsay used reported crime statistics for two years before NW and one year after the establishment of the scheme. These were supplemented by victimisation surveys carried out immediately before implementation and one year after. The remainder of the beat in which each scheme was located provided a control against which scheme performance was evaluated.

In absolute terms there was an overall increase in crime of 24 per cent over the preceding 12 months in scheme areas, with both burglary (dwelling and other) and auto crime exceeding this figure. When compared to the total crime reported for the remainder of each beat, it is clear that even in relative terms there was no identifiable improvement with NW. This increase, partly could be attributable to an increase in reporting rates for particular types of offence, such as criminal damage and non-dwelling burglary. However, there was no significant rise in the proportion of

burglaries in a dwelling reported. Also, the victimisation surveys failed to reveal significant differences either in the pre-scheme/post-scheme situation or between scheme and control areas. Here, once again, Ramsay emphasises that small samples, data collection problems and other considerations limited the opportunities for analysis.

Husain (1990) in his study examining NW schemes in Handsworth Wood (Birmingham), Saltdean (Brighton), Hargher Clough (Burnley), Trafford/Stretford (Manchester), Grange Estate/Moor Nook (Preston) and Boldmere/Maney/Wylde Green (Sutton Coldfield), reports that Manchester, where 500 NW schemes cover 11,000 houses, witnessed the most significant change with dramatic and absolute reductions occurring during the year following scheme formation in all three offence categories (burglary in a dwelling with loss, unauthorised taking and driving away of a motor vehicle and theft from a motor vehicle) (Husain 1990: 53). In Saltdean and Grange Estate and Moor Nook (Preston), less marked improvements were recorded. The absolute burglary figures for the months immediately following scheme formation are not encouraging in Saltdean but, compared with the control area, a relative reduction is evident (Husain 1990: 54). In Husain's work similar situation can be seen in Preston where burglary totals match exactly the expected figure, but in succeeding 15 months there were 28 per cent fewer than predicted. Husain also notes that on the basis of available evidence, it can be concluded that NW has been instrumental in bringing about the recorded improvements. Given that the Manchester schemes operated in an inner-city area with a high crime rate and a population characterised by its economic, social and cultural diversity, the idea that successful schemes even in low-crime middle-class suburbia, as has sometimes been assumed, was not supported by this substantial case.

On the other hand the evidence of these areas was not totally supportive. Husain (1990: 54) argues that the observed improvements were relative; the study areas performed better than corresponding control areas. He noted that this was not always associated with an absolute reduction in the level of offences studied and any assessment of NW must be tempered by this. He also went on to suggest that the relative reduction appears difficult to sustain. Consequently these trends could be interpreted as indicating that any benefit of NW is short-lived. However this is not the only possible explanation. Husain argues that NW may have effect beyond the schemes boundaries. It may have had influence on those people tempted to commit such crimes. In this way it may have an effect even in areas where there is not a NW scheme. If this were to occur, any advantage that NW areas might have initially

would gradually disappear. In such circumstances, however, it would be quite wrong to dismiss NW as ineffective.

McConville and Shepherd's (1992) analysis is based upon an intensive study of Neighbourhood Watch and non-Neighbourhood Watch sites in three police (forces The Metropolitan, Avon and Somerset and Gwent) in England and Wales over the period of 1988-90. They found that NW is not emergent and does not represent a genuine community demand. The launch of a scheme may bring benefits for some individuals, by teaching basic security principles and broadening their friendships within the neighbourhood, but the effects overall are insubstantial for claiming NW as a social movement. Most schemes quickly become dormant, and those which may still be said to function at some level have a life only in the meeting of police and co-ordinators, and in the occasional newsletter. In broad terms, NW areas are indistinguishable from those which lack a scheme. Consequently, McConville and Shepherd argued that NW cannot be described as 'success'. They went on to claim that members make no such claim and, apart from a few exceptions, are unable to beneficial structural changes relating to the reduction of crime and fear of crime, the improvement in home security systems, the creation of better social relations, or improved relations with the police.

Support for NW comes from Hope (1988). In his analysis of a British Crime Survey, conducted in 1984, He notes that from 5600 representative sample, 89% thought that NW might be effective in preventing burglary. The number who could be defined as potential supporters, though still a majority, was rather less 62% (p.148). This support for NW is related to being worried about becoming the victim of burglary. People seem to be changing their support for the idea in principle and have a stated willingness to participate in practice.

Evaluations of NW typically consider the effectiveness of programmes in achieving their objectives (i.e. whether they are effective in preventing crime) (Bennett 1990). Some evaluations have more limited aims, and seek to determine whether the program is reaching its intended target or whether the programme elements are effectively implemented. The reports have been divided into police and independent research.

One of the most detailed of published reviews of the literature on NW has been conducted by Titus (1984 in: Bennett 1990). Titus summarised the results of nearly 40 community crime prevention programmes, most of which included NW elements. Titus divided the studies into two groups: 'simple before/ after studies' and 'studies

with treated / untreated area comparison' (Bennett 1990: 44). Under the heading of simple before/ after studies, Titus shows the effectiveness of 14 NW-type schemes. 20 NW-type schemes were found effective under the heading of treated/ untreated area comparisons. The review showed that all of these studies reported favourable comparisons between NW and non-NW area in terms of burglary rates in (Bennett 1990).

The overwhelming finding from the US research conducted by police departments or from data supplied by police departments is that NW programmes are effective in reducing burglary. Bennett (1990) argues that the majority of studies, however are based on research methods are seriously flawed. For instance the major problem with before / after studies is that it is unknown whether the burglary rates were reducing in similar areas at the same time. If so, it would be expected that burglary rates would have reduced in the experimental areas in the absence of the NW programme. The major problem with treated / untreated post test only comparison is that it is unknown whether post-test differences between the areas could be explained by pre-test differences; and if so, it would again be expected that post-test burglary rates would be lower in the treatment then non-treatment areas in the absence of the programme.

The review of evaluations of NW effectiveness indicates that the vast majority of studies conclude that NW is effective in preventing crime in general, or burglary in particular (Bennett 1990: 45). The results of research conducted by the police tends to conclude that NW is successful in achieving its objectives. The results of research conducted by independent researchers tends to conclude that NW is partly or wholly unsuccessful (Bennett 1990). Bennett (1990) also argues that with few exceptions, nearly all of this research suffers from serious methodological weakness. As a result, it is almost impossible to arrive at an overall conclusion about the effectiveness of NW in preventing crime.

Police studies are generally based on police-recorded crimes as their primary data source. It is now widely accepted that police recorded crimes exclude a large number of offences and are strongly affected by the changes in public reporting and police recording practices (Hough & Mayhew 1983). This is a particularly important problem in relation to NW evaluations as increased public reporting of crime is one of the stated functions of NW.

Bennett (1990) also reports that there is the problem of small numbers, indicating police evaluations are often based on programmes operating in small areas which have lower than average crime rates. Furthermore many of the evaluations are based

on 'before/after' comparisons, with no adequate control area comparison. Therefore it is not obvious from 'before' and 'after' comparisons whether a measured reduction in crime is a result of the programme.

'Construct validity' which concerns the nature of the NW programme implemented and the extent to which it matches the theoretical formulation of NW (see Cook and Campbell 1979; in Bennett 1990). The problem is not so much that these studies fail to employ a detailed theoretical discussion, but that they fail to provide an adequate description of the kind of programme being evaluated. The problem is exacerbated when the evaluation relates to a comprehensive programme comprising NW and other crime prevention measures. It is often uncertain to what extent the studies are evaluations of one programme, or many types of programme. The problem can only be resolved by fuller explication of the nature of the treatment being investigated. Again there is lack of dealing with the problem of 'internal validity' which refers to the extent to which the measured outcome — e.g. crime reduction—can be justifiably attributed to the NW programme.

Rosenbaum *et al.* (1986) argue that there might be a danger that NW meetings might serve to heighten fear of crime and reduce feelings of efficacy and social cohesion. Lavrakas *et al.* (in Skogan 1988) point out the same issue claiming that fear of crime does not stimulate participation in collective efforts to act against crime; rather, it often has the effect of undermining commitment to an area and interest in participation.

From non-evaluative research literature; mainly conversation with police officers and residents and opinions expressed in newspaper or magazine articles, NW is expressed as being socially divisive. This argument is further developed, claiming that NW could reinforce race differences and exacerbate racial tensions (Gordon 1987, Scraton 1987). In other words, in an area where there is racial tension, it would be unlikely that there would be unification of the people to participate in a NW scheme. Related to this argument, another criticism is that the organisers of NW schemes are unrepresentative of the community and attract a disproportionate share of police resources. For example, it is argued that police resources are drawn into low-crime, middle-class areas which results in police time being spent in areas which need them least (Donnison, Scola and Thomas 1986). In addition to this, crime prevented in these areas are likely to be displaced into areas less suitable for NW which, in turn, reinforces social economic inequalities.

Concerning the perceptions of the nature of the problems in an area, the police and the public might hold different views. For example residents might be concerned about people loitering in the streets, graffiti and noise from neighbours, whereas the police might wish to focus community attention on the problem of residential burglary (Rosenbaum 1986). Although the majority of police forces in Britain discourage 'citizen patrols', there is a concern that NW might promote 'vigilantism'. Related to 'vigilantism', some commentators argue that NW encourages neighbours to spy on each other. This may result in the break down of the communities, rather than their restoration.

From studies, it can be concluded that, there is no clarity on what it means to have a NW scheme or to be a member of a scheme. We can see a general assumption that a definition of a scheme or of membership is unnecessary either because these matters are obvious or because every scheme must be allowed to vary according to local conditions. Therefore, the result is that there is no official understanding of what constitutes a scheme; what constitutes membership; what responsibilities or obligations, if any, are imposed on citizens by membership; and what responsibilities or obligations, if any, are imposed on the police by creation of an official scheme (McConville & Shepherd 1992). Findley & Taylor (1990) note that much of the blame is heaped upon the conversion to neighbourhood policing as officers complain that there are no clear objectives or consistent direction built into the concept.

Considering the impact of NW the difficulties which NW may face in involving the poor, or renters, or the elderly, are those which it shares with a broad range of other participatory activities (Hope 1988). In terms of measuring the impact of NW there is no agreement about or understanding of what is being counted (Husain and Bright 1990). Rosenbaum (1988) found that there is little evidence that NW meetings cause local residents to engage in neighbourhood surveillance, social interaction, bystander intervention, and specific crime prevention activities-behaviours that are posited as the central mechanisms for strengthening informal social controls and reducing the opportunities for crime.

Another question is as raised by Rosenbaum (1988) is whether to try harder to implement NW in the areas where obtaining citizen participation is the most difficult or take a more sceptical view that this type of programme may be inappropriate for such neighbourhoods. In any event, organisers should recognise that a single strategy such as 'watching' is unlikely, by itself, to curtail a deeply rooted crime problem and that a variety of approaches will be necessary. To support such view, as stated in the account of *The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention project*:

One of the most valuable lessons to be learned from this earlier work is that the adoption of a series of measures is likely to have much greater impact than simply taking one or two steps. Methodologically this is less attractive because it is scarcely ever practicable to tease out the relative contributions to crime prevention of the various measures, and the interactions between them (Forrester *et al.* 1988: 11).

The key elements in the Kirkholt Project were: the use of crime pattern analysis to understand the problem and plan preventive measures; the coming together of the various agencies to deal with the problems; and the use of interviews to obtain information from different groups of people associated with the situation, these being the offenders and their victims. It can also be said that community support was one of the key elements of the scheme. Project workers visited the homes of burglary victims on the estate, offering support and putting victims in touch with the appropriate agencies. Consequently, the rate of burglary on Kirkholt fell to 40% of its pre-initiative level within five months of the start of the programme. Repeat victimisation fell to zero over the same period, and did not exceed two in any month thereafter (Forrester *et al.* 1990: 4).

Forrester *et al.* (1990: 43) do not give one element the credit for the success in preventing burglary, rather they identify the effects of more than one specific measure:

We are unable to draw out which of the specific measures implemented in the project has been instrumental in reducing the incidence of burglary on Kirkholt. We cannot contend that, for instance, the project would have been less successful without the establishment of Home Watch. (Forrester *et al.* (1990: 43) .

As mentioned earlier, it is being recognised that schemes may be beneficial in other respects, notably by providing reassurance to the public and improving community relationships with the police (Husain 1988). It would be unrealistic to hope for every NW scheme to be successful in preventing crime since schemes will vary in quality and local conditions will influence the potential benefits that can be gained,

Discussion and evaluation

If community policing were to be fully developed, it may represent a means for circumventing democratic control of the police by local authorities and of co-opting or isolating social and political activists operating at grassroots level. However, the concept is a flexible one and can comprise a number of different methods and

purposes. For example, community policing can involve political control, embracing an extension of police intelligence-gathering by placement of police officers in schools and other community institutions. Community policing can become an instrument of political control, through which the community is made accountable to the police rather than the police accountable to the community (Bunyan 1981: 182). Bunyan (1981: 182) argues that considering police-community liaisons, the experience of such committees has been that they tend to be consulted only following and rarely preceding police incursions into the community, and as a result, this method has been largely discredited.

Community policing can be used as a double edged tool to penetrate the community, through other professional agencies and by spying on the community under the guise of offering a protective, friendly approach. 'Consent' is thus to be 'engineered', and in case this fails, intelligence is gathered in an attempt to pre-empt dissent (Bunyan 1981: 169). Gordon (1987: 140) reports that community policing can apply to some people and not to others. Some critics argue that community policing is an unfortunate development. It is not an alternative to 'hard' policing, rather community policing is a form of 'soft control' that completes the various methods whereby the police extend their control over society (Stephens 1988: 93). It was suggested that community policing and reactive response policing go hand in hand Gordon (1987: 140). As Gordon (1987: 141) goes on to argue:

Community policing is not an alternative to reactive policing, More important, community policing is an attempt at the surveillance and control of communities by the police, an attempt which operates under the guise of police offering advice and assistance, and which is all the more dangerous because it is not only merges the activities of different agencies of the state, but does so under the control and direction of the police.

Supporting Gordon's argument, Lee Bridges points out (*Race and Class*, vol. XXIII, nos. 2/3, Autumn 1981/Winter 1982, in Gordon 1987: 141).

...community policing merges at the local level the coercive and consensual functions of government, enabling the police to wield a frightening mixture of repressive powers, on the one hand, and programmes of social intervention, on the other, as mutually reinforcing tools in their efforts to control and contain the political struggles of the black and working class communities.

Gordon (1987: 141) argues:

Community policing offers no prospect of greater democratic control of the police and policing. Indeed, community policing has come to the fore precisely at the same time as there have been widespread demands for greater public

accountability and control of the police. Control of community policing remains firmly in the hands of the police.

In the problems of implementing community policing, Morgan and Smith (1989) refer to three crucial dilemmas. They both suggest that most of the functions of the police are, as Smith defines it, 'adversarial' and this is likely to result in difficulties in the creation of consensus. Secondly, the establishment of goodwill is difficult because in any locality the police have to deal not with one community but with several and will almost inevitably impinge on those communities in different ways. Thirdly, there can be basic conflicts between the rule of law and two key features of community policing — decentralisation and 'flexibility' of treatment.

The evidence shows that in practice, the application of the idea of community policing has either made little difference or has not produced the intended results. Considering the renewed emphasis on permanent beat officers, as mentioned earlier, there is little indication that this has had a significant effect on the pattern or nature of policing. Perhaps the most important point is that, despite the impression that is sometimes created in public discussion, permanent beat officers are only a small proportion of the manpower in all forces, typically about 5 percent (Morgan & Smith 1989: 59).

The failure of the implementation of community policing in practice has implications for the debate at a number of levels.

At beat level—where there has also been a tendency to treat patrol activity as a given that does need to be explicated — it has resulted in a failure to define a prepared therefore workable role for community beat officers, except at the most general and idealistic level. For many advocates of community policing, the combative and adversarial aspects of the police role have simply been wished away and have ceased to exist. Important law enforcement aspects of community constables' roles, particularly those deriving from their local knowledge or intelligence-gathering activities, have been ignored. In the fashionable rhetoric, such activities have become associated with 'hard' policing to which community policing is counterpoised as a softer and less-intrusive alternative.

At the level of police policy making, community policing has failed to deal adequately, if at all, with the fact that policing affects different publics in different ways and that law enforcement is bound to impinge on some groups more than others. There are interests to be reconciled and the appeal to an ideal of consensual community made by advocates of community policing does not provide a method or a means for doing this. Community policing is often seen as being most necessary in areas where sections of the community are hostile to the police or where informal social controls have broken down so that some sections of the community feel preyed upon or threatened by others (Weatheritt 1988: 173).

Weatheritt (1986) argues that community policing initiatives have not made any measurable change, pointing out that 'whilst community policing ideas have been useful in stimulating debate and action, answers to policing problems cannot be found in community policing philosophy nor in the practice to which it has given to rise'.

Involving the police in a broader range of activities and widening their role increases the problems which attach to that role. The more thoroughgoing versions of community policing raise fundamental questions about the proper limits of policing. Nor do theories of community policing carry within themselves the means to solve them. Whilst community policing ideas have been useful in stimulating debate and action, answers to policing problems cannot be found embedded in community policing philosophy nor in the practice to which it has given to rise.

Community policing initiatives have not been conducted in line with the theory that gave rise to them. Their effects have not been evaluated well. There is a tendency to expect too much of policing, particularly on large housing estates or in areas where there is a high proportion of public sector housing characterised by poor design, minimal facilities, poor services, disrepair and serious crime problems (NACRO 1988: 24).

In evaluating the effects of community policing, the fundamental question is that of what criteria should be used in assessing the success of a scheme. Furthermore, as Gill and Thrasher (1985: 36) suggest, the ambiguity of the concept appears to have affected research on community policing. It should also be considered not only whether these effects have been achieved, but also by what means and at what costs. What is also lacking in most research conceptualisation is a methodological issue relating to the measurement of achievement. It is almost accepted that if an intervention results in success, then the crime rate will go down. It is also said that success will bring about a more secure feeling or reduce fear of crime. It needs to be noted that a successful programme may result in increasing reporting and the genuine impact on unreported crime may not be known for some time (Friedmann 1992: 44). Community should be analysed and viewed as a multidimensional concept, or variable, of social and symbolic organisation of the human environment that provides meaningful channels for individual and collective social action.

It can be argued that the acceptance of community policing has not yet fully tested its potential in the areas of training, inter-agency co-operation, police managerial and administrative changes and better or closer ties with citizens. The approved

consultative councils and planning committees add a structural, more stable dimension to issues of police accountability, power alliance and increased police-community co-operation but they need to be better organised, informed and supported in order for citizens to be helpful to any degree.

Short (1983: 80) suggests that police advice on the needs of local communities should be taken and respected, but decisions on resource allocation should be made through local government mechanisms. The police should not have, or be seen to have access to resources which they distribute to groups they favour.

As mentioned earlier one of the biggest obstacles in implementing community policing is that of police culture. To overcome this problem, first the organisation should be opened to many more external pressures than at present. Secondly, the dominant values of the organisation must be articulated (Wasserman and Moore 1988; in Moore 1992: 151). In addition those inside the police department should be quite clear about what is expected and the important values they must serve. Thirdly, aspects of the existing administrative system that are inconsistent with new values must be changed. This requires attracting personnel moved by the spirit of service rather than the spirit of adventure and rewarding them for maintaining peace on their beats rather than making numbers of arrests.

Community policing requires a department to create structures and processes that offer real access to the public, that are genuinely open to the public's primary concerns and its views on what should and should not be done to address them, and that require the police to account to the public for its policies, strategies, programmes, and effects. There is also little evidence available on changes in the use of community constables over the last decade (Bennett 1994a: 110). The only published data that can shed light on this are the results of the survey conducted by the PSI (1983) and a more recent national survey which included a study of the Metropolitan Police District in 1990 (Bennett & Lupton 1990, 1992a; in Bennett 1994a: 110). Research carried out by the Home Office in the early 1980s found that community officers were removed from their beats to fulfil different requirements, such as public order duties and meetings shortfalls of relief officers (Brown and Iles 1985, in McConville and Shepherd 1992: 119). This was justified on the grounds that personnel were 'put where they are most needed' or, quite bluntly, that 'the relief comes first' (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 122). Relief officers might describe CBO work as 'a bit of a luxury' (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 127). Furthermore:

...many relief and beat officers are agreed: that being a CBO does involve 'rubbish' work (Grimshaw and Jefferson 1987: 77-83; in McConville and Shepherd 1992: 128).

McConville and Shepherd also found that the image of community beat work was so low that inadequate numbers of officers volunteered for postings, but forcing officers to accept assignments risked loss of morale and disgruntlement (1992: 131).

Summary

Community policing suggested a promise to improve police/public relations. The concept has many inherent problems in terms of defining what community policing is about; as Gill and Thrasher (1985: 38) found, there are major differences between theory and practice in community policing. This has resulted in problems in implementation of such a concept: namely administrative and political problems. All forces have had difficulty in translating the aspirations of community policing into practical policies (McConville & Shepherd 1992: 46). The gap between the official rhetoric of the forces and ground level realities is, however, most clearly displayed in the areas of staff deployment and training (McConville & Shepherd 1992: 119).

Because the programmes are so varied, it is difficult to arrive at any strong conclusion on the state and prospects of community policing. It will be a long time before we can say something definitive about the whole set of programmes, the individual elements of the set, and the particular features of particular programmes (Moore 1994: 294). However, it can be said that community policing schemes have had little impact because they were overthrown by the authoritarian occupational culture of those in the lower ranks (Holdaway 1983, Dixon and Stanko 1993), and discredited by 45 % of chief constables (Reiner 1991). As Bennett (1994b: 232) argues:

Overall, there is insufficient research evidence to arrive at a strong conclusion on the extent to which British police believe in a community policing philosophy of policing. The evidence that is available, however, suggests that while the philosophy of community policing is widely and publicly proclaimed as a central principle of policing in Britain, the philosophy has not yet become fully integrated into police thinking and beliefs.

The difficulties associated with the implementation of community policing are a product of the ambitious nature of its mission. Community policing seeks to create a new role for the patrol officer (problem solver) and forge new working relationship with the public (partnership). The research found that patrol officers are particularly resistant to the transition to community policing because community policing seeks to

redefine their role and the way they perform their duties (Grinc 1994: 35). As well as being essentially aggressive and action-centred, current police culture is antipathetic towards the service model of policing, has little time for community policing ideals, and does not value community beat work (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 159-184). The significance attached within police culture to action, excitement and variety as essential ingredients of 'real police work' is problematic for community policing (Dixon & Stanko 1993).²¹ Some chief constables hold considerable questions about the political accountability of the police, with some arguing that they involve the police in politics in a way that is potentially dangerous in a democratic society (Gordon 1987, Short 1983). And still another criticism is that community policing schemes have been evaluated using methods that make the claims for their success of questionable validity (Weatheritt 1983).

Gordon (1984) suggests that community policing has a dubious side, namely the gathering of information about members of a local neighbourhood. The police community-beat officers have access to local populations which would normally would be closed to them. Multi-agency policing allows the police entry into new areas of civilian life. Community policing is seen in the context of increased surveillance and discipline by the strong state, which takes the form of trade-union legislation, immigration control and the criminalisation of sections of the community.

Although the concept of community policing was suggested as a means of solving the conflict between the police and the public, in consideration of the problems of inner cities Waddington argues:

The solution to the problems of policing the inner-cities will not be found in policing alone and least of all in 'community policing'. To focus upon policing is to distract attention from the deprivations and disadvantages suffered by residents of the inner-cities, the response to which brings so many young people, both black and white, into conflict with the police (Lambert, *op.cit.*, ch.1-4; in Waddington 1984: 95).

Community policing helps to meet criticisms of the lack of 'participation' and community involvement in programmes such as the Inner City Partnerships, while at the same time deflecting what are seen as politically motivated demands for greater democratic control of the police through local authority police committees. It also provides central government, and the Home Office in particular, with a social outlet

²¹ 'Real police work' is identified with responding to and investigating 'real crime' like car thefts, burglaries and street robberies. It is about stopping and searching people in the street, fights, car chases and making 'crime' arrests.

in the community which is neither subject to the vagaries of local elections nor in danger of 'going native' and siding with the community in wider political struggles against the state. Community policing merges at the local level the coercive and consensual functions of government, enabling the police to wield a frightening mixture of repressive powers on the one hand and programmes of social intervention on the other, as mutually reinforcing tools in their efforts to control and contain the political struggle of the black and working-class communities (Bunyan 1981: 183-184).

This chapter has offered a less optimistic view of community policing than is justified. In order to let in a little light, it should be recognised that there is no hard evidence to suggest that the motives behind this attempt to introduce changes into policing have been anything other than distinguished. Although it is a feature of community policing that the police may act in ways which threaten political neutrality, this may be an incidental consequence rather than an intended one. Rather than state categorically that community policing is based on a facade of public consensus, it might be fairer to say that it is based on a number of untested or as Manning (1984) claims, imaginary exercises, based upon questionable assumptions unsupported by research. As a protean concept (per Weatheritt 1983) it can mean all things to all men, but ultimately it will satisfy very few. As well as requiring structural and changes in definition, organisation, reward structure and performance evaluation, for a style of policing to suit community needs, it has to be based on careful research and not on guesswork and wishful thinking.

To implement community policing on a general ground would demand both the re-thinking of the police and community role in crime prevention, the restructuring of command and control systems in police agencies. Reward and punishment systems would of necessity be altered to reflect such rewards as effective problem-solving violence de-escalation, and numerous heretofore unmeasured police outputs (Weatheritt 1986).

It must be emphasised that the solution to the problems extend beyond the police function. Whilst the police are an important element in managing the problems that face society, the police function alone is ultimately limited in what it can achieve. Successful contemporary initiatives in crime control, like the Kirkholt Project for example, simply serve to emphasise this. I suspect a recognition and acceptance of this, a recognition of the constraints on police behaviour, and a more complete working through of the implications of these factors precedes the development of effective and successful community oriented initiatives.

The rhetoric of community policing ascribes to 'the community' a great power to regulate itself, shake off its fear of crime by forming 'partnerships' with the police, and re-establish community norms that regulate behaviour and successfully resist the encroachments of the criminal element. Unfortunately, early returns from the field suggest that its success in this regard is modest and that community policing initiatives have so far failed to tap the great wellspring of 'community' believed to lie waiting for the proper catalyst.

Little attention has been given to a definition of the community commensurate with the vast promise embedded in the community policing rhetoric. As Pawson & Tilley (1993: 23) point out, experiment tells half the story — we learn about community policing without the community.²² Hope and Foster (1991) have showed that a community spirit varies from street to street and it can influence differences in the propensity to prevent crime from (literally) one side of the road to the other. Even less has been spared for defining the role that can be reasonably expected of 'the community', howsoever it should be defined. Though some departments and localities are engaged in honest efforts to make the promises a reality, community policing by and large remains a unilateral action on the part of the police. As Pawson & Tilley (1993: 22) argue:

Without knowledge of the context into which a programme is located we can only have haphazard expectations of how it will be received.

In the next chapter, I shall therefore examine the meaning and the role of the communities in police/public relations.

²² For instance Bennett (1990) provides virtually no information on the communities inspected in this experiment. He only mentions two communities in London geographically (These geographical identities are chosen for the sake of anonymity rather than explanation (Pawson & Tilley 1993: 21).

Chapter 5

The problem of defining community and the misunderstanding
of community potential

This chapter examines the assumption that there is substantial interaction between the characteristics of each community and the way it is policed. Community policing schemes failed to understand the fact that there is variation in the 'natural' characteristics of the community, ranging from physical geography and demographics to political power. Variation in policing across neighbourhoods is enormous. There is also variation in the decisions made by police executives and others constrained by community characteristics about policing in each community. Those decisions largely determine the structures, resources, and strategies of policing each community.

As examined in Chapters III and IV, questions of which community-based policing strategies work best to control crime and to improve the quality of life by improving police-community relations have received increased attention over the past two decades, especially at the community level of analysis. But the question has never been formulated in terms of the difference that community context makes in police effectiveness. Do different types of policing produce different gains and costs in different types of communities? What interaction effects, if any, exist between community characteristics and policing in shaping police effectiveness? Regarding ineffective community-based policing initiatives, the main question is which approaches to policing communities work best in maintaining harmonious relations between the police and the public? The main aim in this chapter is to examine what constitutes one of the unarticulated benefits of the community approach to crime and policing?

Community crime prevention strategies appear to lack understanding of what social, psychological, economic, cultural and biological factors cause individuals to commit crimes. The main reason could be attributed to the fact that policy makers and implementations tend to ignore the theory that the specific strategies employed in any particular community should be based on the community's unique characteristics. It is a fact that police perceptions of community commonly affect pro-active police work (and, indeed, how they chose to respond to citizen-initiated complaints). It is significant to understand that encounters are not simply a function of offending behaviour by the citizen but are created by the operationalisation of police stereotypes. It is also apparent that the views about the community held by some officers have a major control on how officers interact with the public (McConville & Shepherd 1992: 181). In order to implement a successful community policing strategy, are must understand what is community, what are the dynamics of a community?

The function of community in controlling crime has not been subjected to detailed examination. Instead much research has paid attention to community strategies to control crime (see McConville & Shepherd 1992, Irving *et al.* 1989, Bennett 1990, Hope & Shaw 1988, Reiss *et al.* 1986). Recent studies in policing have been giving attention to the link between the social control exercised in local neighbourhoods and the crime committed there either by external predators or by community members themselves. That is why the sociological examination of 'community' cannot be ignored. For this reason, I shall explore the problems that the concept of 'community' poses for developments in policing practice. I shall also look at the background to current interest in community crime prevention and then will go on to examine some of the themes raised by the various contributors, and attempt to identify what they have often tacitly assumed to be the characteristics of 'community' and hence be in a position to judge their likely success in terms of the policy that they advocate.

By the late the 1960s while the concepts of rights, power, authority, freedom, democracy and justice have all been subjects of penetrating and sustained analyses, the concept of community seems to be the one most neglected by social and political philosophers. The notion of community is central to discussions of social policy and is widely used to characterise and legitimate almost any valued social achievement. 'Community action', 'community care', 'community development', 'community organisation', 'community politics', 'community power', 'community school', 'community policing' are all part of the available stock of descriptions for defining and evaluating the social world.

It can be suggested that in social sciences, the theoretical aspects of community studies are less advanced than the empirical work. In explaining this hypothesis, it is argued that the problem has been one of too many definitions rather than too few. Indeed, the analysis of various definitions of community has from time to time provided a thriving sociological sideline. It can be suggested that the best known example is Hillery's paper (1955) 'Definitions of community: areas of agreement', which considered no fewer than ninety-four such definitions to be found in the literature. Almost inevitably, the quality that was most lacking was agreement: apart from finding that all of the definitions deal with people (Hillery 1955: 117). There was no overall consensus, and indeed, approaching 40 more years of contribution.²³

²³ Hillery (1955) reported that, considering the concept of community, the 69 of the 94 definitions; most people are in basic agreement that community consists of persons in social interaction with a geographic area and having one or more additional common ties. Hillery also notes that all except three of the definitions clearly mention the presence of a group of people, i.e., persons in social interaction. Hillery also sees that definitions which specify social interaction as a necessary element of the community and those which emphasise the community as ecological relationships (p.115). Helpful as

A perusal of Hillery's paper, together with the many publications dealing with community enable some conclusions to be drawn. However, essentially the many and varied definitions of community are reducible to three:

1- Community as a fixed and bounded locality — that is, denoting a human settlement located within a particular local territory. This is not really a sociological usage of community because, apart from the observation that they are all living together in a particular place, there is no consideration of the inhabitants at all, nor of how or, indeed, whether they interact with one another.

2- Community as a local system- that is, as a set of social relationships which take place wholly, or mostly, within a locality. This is a more sociological usage of community since some indication is given of the social life of the areas. Thus a community in this sense may be said to exist when a network of interrelationships is established between those people living in the same locality. For example, where 'everyone knows everyone else'. But it should be noted that nothing is being stated about the content of these relationships, merely the fact that individuals do relate to one another (Newby & Lee 1983: 57). It may be, for example, that 'everyone knows everyone else' in the locality, but that they all hate one another! Even if they were in constant conflict, however, they would still constitute a 'community' in this second sense of the world.

3- Community as a type of relationship. More particularly, community is defined as a sense of identity between individuals (even though, in some cases, their mutual identification may never have resulted from any personal contact). This definition corresponds most closely with the colloquial usage of community, the idea of a spirit of community, a sense of commonalty among a group of people. In this meaning community may have no geographical (local) referent at all; a 'community spirit' may exist between individuals who are very widely scattered geographically. This notion of 'community', with its overtones of common identity, is perhaps best called *communion* since this word more clearly conveys what is involved (Newby & Lee 1983: 58).²⁴

territory and social; relations are in defining community, most researchers consider these elements so vague that they do not provide sufficient direction for specifying the variables or attributes that characterise a community.

²⁴ Considering the definition of community, Hillery's type 3, in the words of Senate(1970), 'Community' is a deceptive social term. People speak of a 'community' of interest-for instance, men who do the same kind of labour or depend on each other to make money. There are also 'communities' of affection, like religious or ethnic groups whose members feel emotional ties to another. Yet, even in

A definition indicating what all communities have in common can have little cognitive value unless it is connected with an overall model indicating how and why the characteristics of communities change when societies become more differentiated and more complex. Tonnies introduced the concepts of '*Gemeinschaft*' [community], and '*Gesellschaft*' [association](Bell & Newby 1974: xi).²⁵ Tonnies believed that both industrialism and urbanism had been associated with an increase in the complexity of society resulting in it being characterised by impersonal social relationships. The lack of close affective relationships enabled social interaction to become more easily regulated by contract, so that *gemeinschaftlich* relationships were more calculative and more specific-that is, more rational in the sense that they were 'restricted to a definite end and a definite means of obtaining it' (Tonnies 1957, in: Newby 1980: 15). Life in communities, for Tonnies, by contrast, is warmer, more homely and affectionate. Solidarity and harmony, unity of purpose and co-operation, ensured by a firm tradition are greater. Tonnies' use of the term 'community' shows a similar type of sentiment. Community was for him the symbol of a past and a better age (Bell & Newby 1974: xi).²⁶

Reflecting the three fold typology suggested by Hillery, the term 'community' as conventionally used today still reflects the sentiment of the term as suggested by Tonnies, although perhaps in a wider sense, referring to: villages in the less developed regions of more advanced industrial and urban societies; it can refer to suburban groups and estates of large cities in highly industrialised urban societies. It can also be applied to neighbourhood groups of hippies, to religious or ethnic minorities, to student communities and many other types of grouping even within the metropolitan cities.

everyday language, the idea of a community is not interchangeable with the idea of a social group; a community is a particular kind of social group in which people believe they share something together. The feeling of community is fraternal, it involves something more than the recognition that men need each other materially. The bonds of community is one of sensing community identity, a pleasure in recognising 'us' and 'who' we are (p.30-1).

²⁵ *Gesellschaft* is more difficult to render exactly in English and is variously translated as 'society', 'organisation' or 'association' (Newby 1980: 14-5). It means, this term consist of everything that the conventional use of the term community is not. *Gesellschaft* refers to the large-scale, impersonal, calculative and contractual relationships which, according to Tonnies, were on the increase in the industrial world at the expense of *Gemeinschaft*.

²⁶ As we have seen, Tonnies was referring to the dehumanising consequences of contemporary social change in any geographical location. For him *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* referred to forms of human association which could occur anywhere in society. Tonnies's concern was not urbanisation *per se* but the 'loss of community' in a much broader sense - the loss of a sense of identity, meaning and authenticity in the modern world (Newby & Lee 1983: 51).

A common use of the term community, and one perhaps implicit in some of the work on policing (e.g. Alderson 1979), Hillery's type 2, a community is a group of households situated in the same locality and linked to each other by functional interdependencies which are closer than interdependencies of the same kind with other groups of people within the wider social field to which a community belongs. Specific reciprocal dependencies of people having their home in relatively close propinquity within certain visible or invisible boundaries from, as it were, the primary common ground which relates communities of all kinds to each other.

There has been a largely unexamined assumption that life in particular localities promotes a certain structure of relationships which results in the presence or absence of 'communion' (Newby & Lee 1983: 58). This, for example, was the assumption upon which the rural-urban continuum rested. The notion that ways of life could be linked to settlement patterns was first examined by the American anthropologist, Oscar Lewis, who in 1949 published his account of *Life in a Mexican Village* (Newby & Lee 1983: 58). The village subjected to the study was Tepoztlan, which Redfield had originally studied in the 1930s and which had formed the basis for his conception of the 'folk society'. Whereas Redfield had discovered a homogeneous, smoothly functioning, well-integrated, contented, stable and harmonious community, Lewis, somewhat unerringly, emphasised:

The underlying individualism of Tepoztlan institutions and character, the lack of co-operation, the tension between villages within the *municipio*, the schisms within the village, the pervading quality of fear, envy and distrust, in interpersonal relations (Lewis 1953: 123; in Newby & Lee 1983: 58).

Such a statement disproves Alderson's (1979: 186) argument of social life of the village:

The social control of crime and misbehaviour in a village community is facilitated by the very nature of that community. It is usually homogeneous, has shared values, and achieves stability through the general will.²⁷

Referring to the second type of community defined by Hillery, the early Chicago ecologists focused on the close relationship of people to the land. In fact, the effect of the land on social relations and social boundaries was considered most significant

²⁷ Lewis argues that the discrepancies between the two accounts are very marked and cannot all be accounted for by changes in Tepoztlan itself during the intervening period, nor by Lewis's advantage of working with more personnel and resources and possessing the benefit of hindsight. Rather the differences are due to the fact that Redfield and Lewis were operating with different theoretical orientations with influenced the selection and coverage of the data and the way in which the data were organised (in Newby & Lee 1983).

(Meenaghan 1972: 95). For instance the community was seen as a group of people living in a specific geographic area and conditioned by the subcultural or life processes of competition, co-operation, assimilation, and conflict. It can be suggested that from this perspective the community is the natural area and has a high degree of visibility. The Chicago model seems to be inadequate for the community researcher of today. Firstly, it is severely time and place bound to early twentieth-century Chicago. Secondly, it minimises the role of social and cultural forces. or at least sees such forces as largely dependent on geographic, material and physical forces. It can be suggested that the Chicago theory fails to investigate sufficiently the relationship between the culture and society of one sub-community and those of another.

Analysis of the various models for outlining a community suggest that the territorial models contain serious methodological difficulties. Factors that are perhaps more relevant than geographical area include population, issues, and type of community (Meenaghan 1972: 94). The major social changes, such as the ability to travel greater distances in a shorter period of time, greater distances between places of work, home and consumer services; the increasing variety of interests that are typical of city living and are often fulfilled outside one's area of residence leading to Hillery type 3 increasing in importance, notably in the urban context? It might argued that the nature of community has followed Tonnie's *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* continuum through history, but the impact may not be as sentimentally problematic as he suggests.

If we look at the complete territorial community, the main assumption of the research of this type is that small towns, villages, etc., constitute communities that can be considered 'mini' social systems. In these places, everyone knows everyone else at least by sight, and social relations are informal although as we have noted, not necessarily unproblematic. From the early studies on 'community', it can be seen that such early models of community did not adequately deal with certain societal and population characteristics. Social character of local areas is an important predictor of individual attitudes, behaviour, sub-cultural patterns and social organisation (Meenaghan 1972: 96).

The Weberian perspective on community suggests that community formation and communal relationships result from competition for economic, political, or social interests. Communities exist among persons sharing similar social status, ethnicity, or other characteristics (Effrat 1973: 20). Effrat (1973: 2) categorises the concept of community as :1- community as solidarity institutions; 2-community as 'primary' interaction; 3- community as institutionally distinct group. The first category refers to those spheres or institutions of society whose function is to produce solidarity.

Communal institutions would be those in which the legitimate forms of behaviour tend to engender warm feelings of closeness and belonging. The family, ethnic groupings, voluntary organisations of various kinds, and residential groups are all examples of such institutions. The second category explains 'community' by considering the nature of the interaction among people, and the existence of close relationship among them. Consequently, community refers to interpersonal interaction characterised by informal, primary relationships. The final category refers to a group of people who share a range of institutions (economic, political and social) on the basis of their belonging to some familiar social category (e.g. as defined by ethnicity, occupation, life style, or residential location). Thus the focus here is partly on institutions, but not simply communal institutions. Rather community refers to a segment of the population who tend to interact with one another in overlapping friendship networks, to share similar interests and outlook, and to participate in common institutions (Chinese, Turkish, Asian community in Britain). In this context the history of migration from the Common Wealth countries to the UK needs to be discussed: it would be seen that such migration has resulted in many sub-cultures because of the policy of the British government to manage and contain the conflicts of interest of those migrants; leading to segregation of such migrants from the British people (Rex and Moore 1967). The Newcomers were forced to live in areas which the British people left due to poor housing, lack of decent facilities, such as education, health and any other social and economic means. In the words of Rex and Moore (1967: 6) such trends are seen as:

The various politico-economic classes and more specifically what we have called 'housing classes.

People belonging to the 'housing class' differ from British people in their racial background, primary community ties that they have, housing situation, economic position and status aspiration. Such areas play the role of a transitional area for those who can move to a better area. That is why, giving reference to the *Sparkbrook* area of Birmingham, Rex and Moore (1967) define it as a 'non-statal' area, which is explained as the continual movement of families in and out by means of a continual diversification of group structures.

It should be acknowledged that the hypothesis is that in modern urban industrial societies the structure of social relations is bent on by a pattern of conflicting interests set up by different groups of men of material facilities. Such explanation makes us to agree with Max Weber when, in his analysis of the formation of classes, he gives equal consideration to ownership of domestic property and ownership of the means of

industrial production (Rex and Morre 1967: 36). There are mainly two issues to be discussed: 1- whether community involves many different functions, or only a few; 2- whether community must be grounded in a particular, delimited place, or whether it can exist among people who are territorially dispersed.

Community participation

Chicago School writers, Reisman and Znaniecki describe the feeling of a common identity as a counterfeit experience (in: Sennett 1970: 36). People talk about their understanding of each other and of the common ties that bind them, but images are not true to their actual relations. Its use is that it makes a coherent image of the community as a whole: people draw a picture of who they are that binds them all together as one being, with a definite set of desires, dislikes and goals. The image of community is purified of all that might convey a feeling of difference, let alone conflict, in who 'we' are. In this way the myth of community solidarity is a purification ritual (Sennett 1970: 36).

What is distinctive about this mythic 'sharing' in communities is that people feel they belong to each other, and share together, because they are the same. In the purification of a coherent community image, fear rather than love of men's 'others' prevails (Sennett 1970: 39). Out of this fear is bred the counterfeit of experience. The 'we' feeling, which expresses a desire to be similar, is a way for men to avoid the necessity of looking deeper into each other; instead, men imagine that they know all about each other, and their knowledge becomes a vision of how they must be the same.

In the community participation process, community development focuses on small communities, seeking to establish democratic decision making institutions at the local level. Community development also mobilises people to improve their social and economic circumstances through undertaking a variety of development projects (Brokensha and Hodge 1969: in Midgley 1986: 17). It should be noted that the participation process in respect of setting goals, formulating policies and planning and implementing economic and social development programmes have a very important role to play.

In promoting community participation, it could be argued that many proponents are concerned with how new mechanisms for community participation, that conform to the principles described earlier, can be established. As well as being an ideal

therefore, community participation is a specific process involving the use of prescribed techniques and procedures.

To improve the quality and the effectiveness of participation, mass meetings are an essential element in the promotion of community participation. These meetings permit the discussion of local issues, such as policing and crime prevention, and help to foster group solidarity. In addition to that, in crime prevention, referring to the concept of 'solidarity', there has to be an intention among the members of a group to act in certain ways, and to value each person as a member of a group. Often, role play methods are used to sensitise the people to both local and external problems. Referring to crime control, however, the police should not directly tell the community what to do. Their task is to foster grass-roots participation and to build local institutions that can take decisions democratically and autonomously. A community police officer must know where to draw line between being a catalyst and a manipulator. Also, instead of seeking to impose their own ideological preferences on community, the police should allow local people to form their own views and make their own decisions on these wider issues.

Community-based approaches to reducing crime and improving police/public relations

Community crime prevention is often regarded as the heart of community policing as it comprised a working alliance between the police and the public in the prevention of crime. The rationale behind community approaches to reducing crime comes from the assumption that while the police cannot directly affect the incidence of crime, they can influence the community environment in which crime occurs, and citizen involvement in reporting and preventing crime. Such influence, it is argued that, will ultimately improve the community's ability to resist crime, while reducing fear of crime at the neighbourhood level of social organisation.

The aim of the tradition of *ecological crime prevention* is mainly to maintain '*natural communities*', to get rid of 'community 'decline' and to prevent communities from the illness of deterioration. The crime prevention emphasis of these community programmes has generally been in the integration of potential offenders within communities (Hope & Hough 1988, in: Hope & Shaw 1988).

Jacobs (1961), an architectural journalist gave the first sign of a break with introducing '*The Death and Life of great American Cities*'. In her study, we see a sceptical attitude by towards the urban pastoral which underpinned many community

projects, arguing that the attempt to generate or re-generate close-knit urban communities was fundamentally misconceived and that the anonymity of city life was part of its richness. Her emphasis was on the informal social control which a city could yield, in contrast to the potential for integration of deviants which an active community promised; and she identified diversity of land-use as the level for maximising informal social control. Jacobs argues that if we understand the principles behind the behaviour of communities, we can build on potential assets and strengths, instead of acting at cross-purposes to them. First, we have to know what we want; how does life in communities work?

After the publication of *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, a sizeable body of research has accumulated on links between crime, crime prevention, and the built environment. Crime prevention hypotheses have been developed at neighbourhood, community, street, and site levels. Newman (1972) developed Jacobs' argument, introducing the work, '*Defensible Space*'. Newman's study was the concept of territoriality from ethnology; the essence of *Defensible Space* was that housing design could and should engender both a sense of territoriality amongst residents and the opportunity for surveillance. Newman, in contrast to Jacobs, achieved an immediate and highly visible impact, and architectural design now routinely incorporates at least a token piece of territory for urban residents.

With the introduction of 'community approaches' to reducing crime, the role of informal social control became increasingly prominent as a purpose of prevention. Informal surveillance-by householders, shopkeepers, bus-drivers, etc.- was an important strategy in the 'situational approach' to crime prevention developed by the Home Office (see Clark & Mayhew 1980).

Jacob's (1961) emphasis on '*informal social control*' is elaborated in the work of J. Q. Wilson & George Kelling, called the theory of '*Broken Windows*' (1982). In this study, Wilson & Kelling, like Jacobs and Newman, gave attention to the centrality of informal social control, but the distinctive feature about the Wilson and Kelling hypothesis is the idea that the level of '*incivilities*' — something they believe to be within police control- is one of the factors which shape the nature and strength of informal control. One of their considerable suggestions is that certain levels of disorderly behaviour such as on the part of drunks, tramps, rowdy youths, prostitutes and other disreputables can trigger a spiral of neighbourhood decline, with increased fear of crime, migration of the law-abiding from the area, weakening of informal social control and ultimately, increases in serious crime. According to Wilson &

Kelling (1982), beat policeman should be assigned long term to areas at risk to break the spiral, clamping down on the '*incivilities*' which lead to decline.²⁸

Wilson and Kelling's theory specifies a process involving the following elements (in: Hope and Hough 1986: 35). i. Incivilities are perceived as signs of crime and disorder. ii. This reduces the sense of community and communal control exercised by residents in a neighbourhood. iii. The diminution of informal community control leads to increased criminal activity. iv. This in turn leads to increasing fear of crime. v. Which reduces the commitment of residents to neighbourhood; and so on.

The 'Broken Windows' hypothesis does not simply put forward a relationship between incivility and crime but also assumes it has a certain form, corresponding to a 'development sequence' of events. This could be stated as some of form of exponential relationship: at first crime rates rise gently with increasing incivility but after a certain level is reached, a vicious spiral of decline sets in, and crime rates increase at a much greater rate with increasing increments of incivility (Hope and Hough 1986: 37). It would be true to be cautiously confident that neighbourhood incivilities play an important part in the dynamics of crime and community.

It is necessary to take into account the relationship between crime and disorder and the social and economic forces which underlie stability or change in communities. Disorder, I would argue sparks concern and fear of crime among neighbourhood residents, and may actually increase the level of serious crime. It apparently undermines the processes by which stable neighbourhoods exercise informal control over local events and conditions, and drives out residents for whom stable community life is important. In this view, disorder is a source of neighbourhood destabilisation and decline (Skogan 1988).

Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that disorder undermines the processes by which communities ordinarily maintain order. In stable neighbourhoods, families care for their homes, and residents supervise the activities of youths, watch over one another's property, and challenge those who seem to be up to no good. Where public drinking, street gambling, begging, teenage loitering, and the like, go on, those arrangements do not work effectively. Respectable people then use the streets less often; when they

²⁸ Generally, there is a high level of support for the idea of beat policing. However, surveys of residents in inner city and outer urban areas reveal a high level of dissatisfaction with what actually happens. Too few officers are allocated to beats which are too large; they are called away to other duties too frequently; home beat policing does not appear to be seen an integral part of area policing strategies; and all too often, it lacks effectiveness and purpose (NACRO 1988: 19).

do, they avoid contact with strangers and potentially threatening situations, and believe it is safer to 'not get involved'. They think of neighbourhoods as a place to live, but they have little commitment to it. In such areas, no one takes responsibility for rowdy behaviour in public places, the residents' sense of 'territoriality' shrinks to include only their own households, and untended property is fair game for plunder or destruction.

Wilson and Kelling (1982) also argue that a neighbourhood's reputation for being tolerant of social disorder serves as an invitation to outside trouble makers. The consequences of crime and disorder for communities is that the decline of community take control of neighbourhood conditions. Crime, physical deterioration and social disorder are the problems that emerge. These in turn undermine the capacity of the community to deal with its problems, with weakening of informal social control, a decline in the organisational and political capacity of the neighbourhood, and deterioration of local business conditions. Another problem of the decline of the communities that such problematic conditions of the community, discourages residents in that problems cannot be solved locally; consequently, such belief increases the sense of personal isolation, and spreads the perception that no one will come to their rescue when they find themselves in trouble (Lewis & Salem 1986; in: Skogan 1988). Surveys and experiments indicate that fear reduces people's willingness to take positive actions when they see crimes-including simply calling the police (Skogan 1988).

Another problem in disorderly communities that crime and disorder erode organisational capacity. Such an argument was reinforced by Lavrakas *et al.* (1981; in Skogan 1988), arguing fear of crime undermines commitment to an area and interest in participation. This argument contradicts the arguments of the advocates of the NW. Lavrakas *et al.* further argue that where fear promotes suspicion in place of neighbourliness it can be difficult to forge formal linkages between residents to attack neighbourhood problems. As a result of this, the political capacity of the area is diminished (Skogan 1988: 54).

The 'Broken Windows' article argues that policing should be neighbourhood-oriented. More officers should be deployed on foot patrol, and those officers should concentrate less on catching criminals and more on enforcing informal neighbourhood norms of behaviour. Wilson and Kelling introduce two traditions of communal involvement, one of which proposes a return to what they see as an older 'watchman' style of policing, arguing such tradition existed before the advent of

crime control oriented policing in the 1930s. The other tradition is that of 'vigilante' [see Wilson and Kelling (1989: 379)].

We can examine community approaches to reducing crime by looking at five subtitles. These are: 1- The disorganised community. 2- The disadvantaged community. 3- Neighbourhood crime in modern cities. 4- 'Social' and 'situational' prevention: explanations of community. 5- Citizen Involvement and Multi-Agency Co-ordination. It should also be indicated that the physical environment does not have 'stand alone' crime prevention effectiveness but rather can play a role in preventing or displacing crime (Taylor & Gottfredson 1986: 399).

The theory of disorganised community concerns the idea that crime results from a failure of community life in particular, a failure of those positive mechanisms of socialisation and informal social control which work against the development of offending. This idea goes back to Chicago sociologists whose theories were based upon a relatively free market during a period of rapid economic and population growth (Hope & Shaw 1988). Consequently, the poorest most recently arrived immigrant groups located within the lowest property value areas. People who improved their economic condition moved away from such communities and new comers to the city replaced them in such areas. It can be said that such communities played the role of a 'transitional area'. Because there was no improvement in social, economic and political aspects of life, such areas remained unstable, disorganised and criminogenic. In crime-free neighbourhoods residents established themselves socially and politically, consequently they had a stable culture and set of institutions.

The Chicago school's implications for crime prevention had three aspects (Hope & Shaw 1988): Firstly, it suggests that the distribution of both crime and social disorganisation between communities can be affected by the broader policies and trends which shape the urban scene. Secondly, that measures against offending should somehow seek to socialise and integrate residents, especially youth, into a shared set of norms and standards of behaviour. And thirdly, the most effective resource for this is to be found amongst ordinary members of the community, though they may need considerable assistance in the trying and difficult circumstances which exist in their neighbourhoods.

According to the theory of 'the disadvantaged community', crime would develop as a way of life amongst youth in neighbourhoods where opportunities for personal economic improvement were blocked. Crime, in this view, was seen as reaction by slum youth to a failure to attain qualifications, a good job, a decent income, which are

seem to be available to people who live elsewhere (Cloward and Ohlin 1960, in: Hope and Shaw 1988). Such a statement was supported by the British Crime Survey (Mayhew *et al.* 1988) showing that crime is concentrated in inner urban run-down areas and on council estates. 37 per cent of burglaries and 33 per cent of thefts from the person and robberies are concentrated in such areas, although they contain only 12 per cent of households (Hough and Mayhew 1985). In low crime areas, as Box *et al.* (1988) argue, informal social controls develop naturally and inhibit anti-social and criminal behaviour. In high crime areas, such controls are weak and need to be strengthened. In addition, Parliamentary All-party Penal Affairs Group, 1983 reports that habitual offenders may come from a subculture where criminal behaviour enhances personal status. Many young male offenders have grown up on housing projects with a constantly shifting population, inadequate support from families and limited access to educational and employment opportunities.

In addition to these, crime surveys, carried out by criminologists of the Left realist approach, have shown that Home Office — sponsored national surveys have persistently underestimated the amount of inner-city crime and its effect on city dwellers (Jones *et al.* 1986). If we look at the inner cities, the independent surveys showed that the impact of crime is relatively greater on the poor, its effect is compounded by the other problems they face, such as low income and poor housing, and it falls heavily on women, particularly domestic violence and sexual assault. Also, such surveys indicate that racially motivated crime and harassment continue to damage the lives of Britain's ethnic minorities. So it can be said that the three British Crime Surveys of 1982, 1984 and 1988 failed to assess the impact of crime on inner inner-city residents, especially women and members of ethnic minority groups (Jones *et al.* 1986).

In examining neighbourhood crime in modern cities, we can see that since the Second World War, the development of both American and British cities has diverged from the Chicago model, most notably, due to greatly increased government intervention in urban market. American commentators such as Jacobs (1961) noted that, the culture and organisation of residential communities over this period has also become increasingly affected by urban planning and redevelopment (In: Hope & Shaw 1988). We can see a life of their own, their identity, institutions and political representation tending to emerge from within the community itself in the communities which established themselves during the expansion of cities in America and Europe. Large-scale urban redevelopment began to replace established communities with new neighbourhoods with the development of the modern city.

Taylor & Gottfredson (1986: 387) note that offenders take into account social and physical incivilities when deciding which neighbourhood to choose as crime targets. Such a hypothesis fails to cover the explanation of a criminal offence where the offenders are from the neighbourhood in which criminal offence takes place. They suggest five categories of causes that influence the content and clarity of the neighbourhood image held by a particular offender, namely, physical environment features, resident socio-demographic characteristics and behaviour patterns, policing patterns, offenders' collective social knowledge of locale, and the knowledge and disposition of the individual offender (Taylor & Gottfredson 1986: 390). Felson offers a solution:

...crime prevention can be introduced incrementally into many parts of our society. The basic strategy is to imitate activity patterns of everyday life as already observed in nature. Included are chunking and channelling human activity to reduce temptations and increase informal control. Such efforts can reduce crime, up to a point, given the context of our current society (Felson 1994: 133).

Social prevention theories examine how the residents of particular communities come to engage in criminal activity. They are thus oriented towards offenders or potential offenders and suggest 'social' measures or prevention directing attention towards the deployment of social policies in housing, employment, job creation, recreation, etc. in the interest of crime prevention (Iadicola 1986). In the 1970s the views shifted emphasis from the vulnerable, young offender to particular situational measures designed to reduce the opportunities which are available for offending, and thus to reduce the risk of victimisation to individual citizens and corporate bodies (. To make the distinction between 'social' and 'situational' measures of crime prevention, Heal and Laycock (1986) argue that 'social' attempt to measures deal with the 'fundamental causes' of crime. Designating social policies, promoting respect for moral values, increasing community solidarity, improving facilities, strengthening relationships with the police are included in 'social' measures. 'Situational' measures deal with physical aspects of reducing crime, such as reducing opportunities for offending.

Less attention has been given to social crime prevention by the Home Office policy makers, which aims to strengthen socialisation agencies and community institutions in order to influence those groups that are most at risk offending (Bright 1991: 64). This can be achieved by incorporating social crime prevention considerations into a wide range of social policies, most importantly planning, housing, employment, education, family, youth and health. To invoke communities gives chance to reach ordinary people and encourage people to adopt protective initiatives (Heal &

Laycock, 1986). In this context 'neighbourhood watch', which was examined in Chapter IV, has come to be examined as a popular strategy implementing opportunity reduction in local communities.

Jane Jacobs (1961: 31-2) expressed the basic principal behind the informal social control as it pertains to crime control:

The first thing to understand is that public peace... is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.

Citizen involvement and multi-agency co-ordination

The theory of 'citizen involvement and multi-agency co-ordination', as examined in Chapter IV, widens the sense of responsibility for crime prevention beyond the criminal justice system (see Newman 1972). One of the encouragements for this strategy is that there has been an increasing sensitisation to the social problem of the 'fear of crime' and, in particular, to the harmful effects which such fear was thought to be having on community life. Another encouragement is that there has also been a growing awareness of the limitations of what the criminal justice system can do. It means the task of crime prevention cannot be carried solely by the police, the courts and the penal system. Such strategy has two approaches to organising preventive effort in the community: citizen involvement; and multi-agency co-ordination (Kinsey *et al.* 1986). A community hypothesis, emerging particularly in North America has these rationale for citizen involvement. (DuBow and Emmons 1981: 171, in: Hope & Shaw 1988: 12):

- i. Neighbourhood residents can be mobilised by community organisations to participate in collective crime prevention projects.
- ii. Involvement in these activities creates a stronger community because people will take greater responsibility for their own protection and local problems, and interactions among neighbours will be increased, both formally, through the activities of crime prevention projects, and informally as a by product of these activities,
- iii. A stronger sense of community and increased social interactions leads to more effective informal social control.
- iv. Aside from the direct effects of community crime prevention activity in reducing crime and fear of crime by rebuilding local social control in the neighbourhood.

In this approach attention is focused on reducing the impact of crime on the individual and on community institutions. In the short — term, measures predicated

on this perspective are aimed particularly at providing mutual self — protection; in the longer term, it is hoped that these will enhance the greater integration of community members, itself seen as a defence against invasion from crime.

The move towards a co-ordinated, multi-agency approach in tackling crime within local communities has emerged, in Britain at least, primarily as a response by those agencies charged with dealing crime (Kinsey *et al.* 1986). The basic premise underlying the approach has been that, inasmuch as crime within local communities is likely to be sustained by a broad range of factors in housing, education, recreation, etc.- the agencies and organisations who are in some way responsible for, or capable of, affecting those factors, ought to join in common cause so that they are not working at cross-purposes or sustaining crime inadvertently.

Community crime prevention, according to Currie (1988) can be identified as having two phases which rest on sharply differing understanding of what a community is and what should be done to it to reduce crime. As a result of different conceptions the views of what it means to strengthen a community in order to combat crime differ sharply. The conceptions of what a community is also affect the balance to be struck between public and private responsibility for crime prevention.

Phase 1 is typified by a victim-centred, defensive approach to crime prevention, mostly generalised by Neighbourhood Watch; emphasising citizen action, opportunity reduction and the need to protect the community from offenders who are seen as outsiders. In this context, considering the broad conception of community, it leans towards what can be called a symbolic, or perhaps a socio-psychological, view of community-rather than a more 'structural' or institutional one. To think of 'community' is primarily a matter of collective attitudes and styles of interpersonal behaviour, with the behaviour usually seen as flowing from the attitudes. If you want to improve community conditions you are in essence in the business of changing attitudes, or altering the symbols of community, in the hope that improved interpersonal relations will follow.

This explanation fails to cover what a community is. It can also be argued that, by itself, it is not the most important for crime control. In this explanation, what is missing here is the sense of those more tangible structures and institutions that underlie and shape community attitudes, and also necessarily shape those 'signs' of symbols of crime and disorder so prominent in Phase 1 discussions of crime prevention.

One of the problems is that 'Phase 1' thinking typically misunderstand the relationship between the offender and the community. In this view, as mentioned above, crime is committed by outsiders, in the environmental design model, where the aim is to reduce crime by environmental design, attention is given to people who are outsiders. There is no sense that these offenders are members of a community. Such strategy closes the eyes to the roots of crime, for example there is no sense that the people who are dealt with might be a neighbour's child who has his own problems, such as learning or truancy. There is also no consideration of mental disorder, unemployment or any other reason that can cause crime. There is no attempt at recognising that men who cause domestic violence might have alcohol or financial problems. There is no understanding that people who cause trouble or uncivilised behaviour may be part of the community. Furthermore, there is little sense that where such troublesome people come from within the social structure, and what this tells us about tactics for effective crime prevention.

'Phase 2' sees 'community' in much more structural, or institutional terms not just as a set of attitudes we can 'implant' or mobilise, but as an interlocked set of long standing institutions which in turn are deeply affected by larger social and economic forces. Employment opportunities and external family structures are included in 'Phase 2'.

Considering community crime prevention, it must be recognised that real communities thrive or fail to thrive, become healthy or ill, mainly as a result of the strength or weakness of these basic institutions: work, family and kin, a vibrant local economy capable of generating stable livelihoods. When these elements are weak, it is impossible for a 'neighbourhood watch' scheme to work. 'Phase 2' deals with the deeper structural problems of tough communities, with the aim of building or rebuilding the institutions that most directly influence the causes of crime. It accepts that offenders are likely to be part of the community and aims to tackle the processes which lead to criminal behaviour. It should also increase the range of opportunities available to potential offenders. As Currie (1988: 281) argues:

The biggest problem with the (phase 1) approach is that programmes based wholly on it do not seem to work well, and sometimes not all, as the more serious evaluations of NW have shown. Moreover, to the extent they work all, they tend to work for communities with the least serious crime problems, the lowest risk. They work badly in resource-poor communities where victimisation is more severe.

In community crime prevention, we must find out much more about how Phase 2 programmes work, and how they can be changed to specific communities. It must

also be taken into consideration that each area has its own characteristic set of crime problems, cultural and population mix, housing, policing and administrative structures.

The link between crime, community and the environment

There is an assumption that the industrial revolution threatened or destroyed 'community'. In this context it can be seen that rapid urbanisation and industrialisation were seen as causes of the destruction of the notion of community. Personal isolation is becoming a major social fact of our time. A great many people are disturbed by the feeling that they are rootless or increasingly anonymous, that they are living in a continually changing environment where there is little sense of community. The old bases of social solidarity were seen as being eroded and altered with increasing industrialisation. Consequently, the industrial revolution was believed to have changed not only the structure of society by concentrating large numbers of people in cities and in factories, but also the quality of relationships upon which a sense of community rested.

Industrialisation is believed to have created inner cities where the services and the environmental health of inner cities, have many problems that need to be sorted out: the high rate of crime and unemployment, transportation is problematic, the streets are dirty, sanitation staffs are problematic, the schools are out of date and poorly equipped with inadequate provisions for teachers and staff, policing holds a major problem in those areas. In addition to such problems; in the inner cities, there is a clear and continuing connection between unemployment and crime (Joseph 1982, Box 1987). Studies even indicate that there is a relationship between the decline in productive work opportunities, such as in manufacturing, and the rates of serious crime (Wallace & Humphries 1981, in: Joseph 1982). This resulted in the movement of capital from older industrial regions to new industrial regions. During such transition processes the older markets are generally changed to lower wage jobs in clerical and service industries.

Much evidence indicated that neighbourhoods function like micro economies; reliable information can be produced to demonstrate the economic health of a particular neighbourhood (Hallett 1978, in: Joseph 1982: 35). This health can be influenced by changing the flow of resources and multiply their value to the residents of the community. It can be suggested that economically unhealthy neighbourhoods do, as Shaw and McKay (1942, in Joseph 1982: 35) observed about 50 years ago, produce higher levels of serious crime. The local economy will change, when capital

shifts away from one region toward another in order to sustain a higher level of profitability. To prevent crime within the environment, there are two main objectives: 1- to prevent offences. 2-to prevent neighbourhood decline.

For this reason, on crime prevention strategy, it would be suggested that, issues such as housing estates, ethnic minorities and the young who live on such estates need to be examined to improve our understanding of the underlying causes of crime. The reason is that, without knowing what is going on, it is impossible to produce and implement an effective policy to tackle crime.

Policing is only one element of a crime prevention or community safety strategy. In most cases, the safety and security of residents on council estates depends to a large extent on the local authority's ability to deliver services responsively and to invest sensibly in security hardware and remedial design measures. Unfortunately, there are many estates where this necessary investment has not been made in the past and cannot be made now because of cutbacks in housing budgets.

Recent developments in the fields of urban planning and in particular slum clearance and housing re-development, have led criminal policy makers towards identifying the effects of public housing allocation and management practices on crime and victimisation rates (Hope and Shaw 1988). The idea that decentralising housing allocation and management practice and improving housing allocation procures might lead to reductions in crime is based on the premise that such practices will improve the physical appearance and structure of the estate, restore a sense of control to residents and reduce the neighbourhood's vulnerability. The actual or perceived vulnerability of an area is not determined merely by design factors, but by housing policies and markets which influence the social mix of residential areas and the willingness and ability of residents to develop community bonds and exert informal control over their environment. But research on the relationship between crime and housing has shown that this area is both highly complex and equivocal.

Firstly, the problems which generally characterise public housing are often quite different from those which characterise private and rented or owner-occupied housing areas. The former tend to be high offender as well as offence rate areas and usually have quite different social compositions and histories. Secondly, there are also variations between different areas of public housing. Tenants in the poorest public housing estates are, according to Hope (1986), five times more likely to be burgled at least once a year than tenants living in better-off public housing areas. Other research

has found that areas of similar design with similar tenure and resident income levels can experience very different crime rates (Bottoms *et al.* 1987). Thirdly, although local authorities accept that they have an important role to play in this field very few have drawn up a crime prevention or community safety policy. Where council services impact directly on security matters, there are often problems with their effectiveness and quality, unconnected with restraints on capital spending. In particular, the failure of many housing authorities to manage and maintain their estates has led to levels of neglect and vandalism which are not only costly to the authority but also reflect a lack of care and supervision. This generates more abuse and criminal activity which, even if petty in itself, has a devastating effect on an estate and undermines the security of the tenants. On estates where there are serious crime problems, it is likely that there are many other issues that concern residents such as poor housing, high levels of unemployment, an absence of youth facilities and so on. These matters also need to be addressed as well as those which are more directly related to safety and security. Therefore crime prevention/community safety initiatives are likely to be most successful when they are developed within the context of council-led, multi-agency steering groups which have the authority to co-ordinate the input of various agencies and are able to respond to a variety of problems. So research into the relations between crime and housing, which is still in its infancy, does not yet provide clear guidelines for policy makers.²⁹

People who live in estates frequently suffer from bad housing, inadequate facilities, neglected and poorly-maintained dwellings and public spaces; and a turnover of disparate populations with concentrations of social and economic disadvantage. As a consequence of these features, life in such estates is unpopular, and the residential community becomes demoralised, fragmented and determined to leave. As a result of such bad conditions, life on an estate becomes very difficult to cope with, characterised by worsening concentrations of social problems, vandalism, crime and drug use which the local authority housing department is unable to cope with. As stated by Taub, Taylor and Dunham, and Bottoms and Xanthos (in: Hope 1986: 27).

Constantly inadequate services cause tenant dissatisfaction and high levels of applications to transfer elsewhere. An atmosphere of insecurity is created as a result of this neglect, leading to a lack of any real community organisation and the general observation that no one really seems to care. The combined absence of formal management control and informal community controls provides

²⁹ The police contribution to crime prevention initiatives on housing estates has often been to promote neighbourhood watch schemes. However, there have been serious difficulties in successfully introducing schemes in areas where crime problems are most severe. In such circumstances, alternative policing strategies need to be considered by the police, in co-operation with the local authority and residents' organisations.

opportunities for disruptive behaviour and those crimes commonly associated with housing estates.

To overcome such problems the British government of the 1980s has tried to achieve these objectives: Bright (1991: 71) explains:

Among the other departments which have included crime prevention in their programmes are the Department of the Environment in its Estate Action Schemes, the Department of Trade and Industry through its Inner City Task forces and City Action Teams and, more recently, the Department of Education and Science in its guidance to schools. Most of this effort has been concentrated in the areas where crime problems are known to be most serious, namely inner city and outer urban housing estates. Target investment in these areas might reasonably be expected to reduce crime rates.

The result was:

Unfortunately, the level of input has not approached the scale of the problem. The Department of the Environment's Housing Investment Programme and Estate Action Scheme allocations amounted to £2.2 bn. 1990/91, a limited contribution to the £19 bn. needed simply to repair housing stock and only a proportion of which was designated for crime prevention purposes (Department of the Environment 1985, 1990; in Bright 1991: 71-2).

To attempt to explain change in crime on the problem estate, it would be possible to show two ideal typical cultural tendencies which shape behaviour and attitudes towards offending on the estate (Hope & Foster 1992: 489). As Hope & Foster explain:

First, there is the tendency towards *informal social control* (Greenbergs *et al.* 1985). Contemporary understanding of this idea takes two broad forms (Rosenbaum 1988). In the first place, it can be exerted in the form of *surveillance* over the residential environment. In this definition, control relies upon the possibility of residents intervening to forestall crimes from taking place, either personally or, more usually, by calling the police. A second meaning of informal control is the idea of a community upholding its own *norms of conduct* and regulating its members to abide by such standards — for instance, not to victimise people on the estate (despite, perhaps, involvement in crime elsewhere). In this sense, social control consists of subtle and not-so-subtle rewards and sanctions to ensure a conformity to the values and behaviour of those invoking them (Greenberg *et al.* 1985, quoted in Hope & Foster 1992: 489).

Housing based crime prevention programmes take one of the aspects of multi-dimensional crime prevention strategies. Newman's (1972) work, it can be suggested, influenced such trends directly or indirectly. The proponents of housing based crime prevention programmes (Poyner 1983, Poyner *et al.* 1985, Coleman 1985; in Bottoms & Wiles 1988: 85) argue that the design of housing can influence crime rates by

denying or offering opportunities for offending. Coleman argues that the design of apartment blocks may encourage various forms of uncivilised behaviour among those who live in them, and by extension, may also influence crime. The argument here is 'is that all?' To answer to this question, Bright (1991) states:

It was clear that crime prevention projects on housing estates could not just be about crime prevention. The best were multi-focused projects tackling the multiple problems found in such areas. Estate design and management, play and youth provision, community facilities, policing, employment opportunities, all had to be addressed and many projects concentrated as much on estate management as they did on crime prevention (Bright 1991: 76).

After improving the environment on a problematic estate, the study of Hope & Foster (1992) showed how estate-based initiatives may influence the criminogenic impact of this kind of population change. The environmental improvements managed to divert population change to be a particular part of the estate and, together with the optimism inspired by the PEP model, generated sufficient informal social control to afford some security to a significant number of tenants. As they argue:

In general, the PEP model offered a positive way in which both established tenants and some of the new arrivals could assert a certain degree of control over their residential environments. Those who worked closely with PEP were genuinely committed to improving the estate and curbing the 'criminal element' (Hope & Foster 1992: 498).

Summary

The concept of community is certainly central to community policing. It has been a matter of concern that in community-based crime prevention strategies, the questions of the nature of community and the traditional definition of such a concept stays in rhetorical form. The definition of the concept of community ranges from mere geographical location to a mental concept which cannot be objectively defined (Irving *et al.* 1989: 4). There is a widely belief that communities are found in particular places. Community is the positive attachment of people to the places where they live. Communities are 'locally defined cohesive units'. Such a view of community is confused. Communities should not be defined in such spatial terms but as Neuwirth (1969: 149) puts it, they 'should be defined in terms of the solidarity shared by their members which forms the basis of their mutual orientation to social action' and 'in the mutual feelings of belonging' that exist among groups of people.

If solidarity and feeling of belonging are the main components of a community, there is no account why its boundaries should be territorial. This explanation undermines

the idea that 'feelings of mutual belonging' should exist in neighbourhoods in urban areas. Community boundaries may in certain circumstances coincide with territorial boundaries but this coincidence is not essential to the existence of a community. Similarly the missing of a sense of solidarity within territorial units is not evidence of the absence of community. Neighbourhood ties may decline in importance in urban areas but people in these areas compensate by their participation in networks of social relationships that extend beyond the geographical boundaries of their neighbourhoods (McCullagh 1985: 172-173).

This particular notion of community has a number of connections with the community policing schemes. In some areas a sense of solidarity exists because of economic constraints, because the existence of substantial deprivation may force working-class people to confine their social networks to the local area. In such circumstances neighbours become important not as a matter of choice but as a matter of necessity. By contrast, middle and upper class people can maintain a sense of solidarity with people dispersed over wide distances through the use of the telephone and private transport. In other words they can maintain a workable set of social relations even where they are separated in space and across large distances.

It can be said that the sense of solidarity that exists in many deprived areas remains a fragile and delicately balanced one. No one can give guarantee that attempts to deepen this sense of solidarity will necessarily be welcomed by the people involved. Given a rational option they would not favour to live where they do. In these conditions experiments in community development can characterise a form of coercion of the poor. They are attempts to get them to like people with whom they have little in common expect the fact of being placed beside each other by the vagaries of housing policies. For this reason, community in its traditional sense cannot necessarily provide the basis from which community organisation can proceed.

Another argument on community is that community groups cannot claim to represent fully the interests of people living in particular areas as these people's interests are not bounded by the boundaries of these areas. This to a large extent explains the low levels of response to, and participation in, the activities of many community groups. There is a tendency to participate only in those activities which produce directly individual benefits, for example, sports days and outings, rather than activities which produce communal ones. Equally there is a tendency to act collectively when individual interests are threatened.

A third implication is that social and geographical mobility have both created the need for, and the possibility of, maintaining communities across territorial areas. They have created a network of social relations in society that transcends local boundaries. Such extended communities cannot be governed or limited by the informal social control that is presumed to have been typical of older villages. Informal control was possible in the past because all aspects of a person's life were lived out in, and under the scrutiny of, local people and neighbours. Behaviour in one dimension of one's life had ramifications in and became a source of comment for those with whom one interacted in other dimensions of one's life. However, industrialisation has made it possible to separate out different dimension of one's life and in the process these have acquired a degree of autonomy. Now it is possible to separate one's family and work lives so that one's behaviour in one area has no necessary implications for how one behaves or how one is judged in the other. To the extent that the success of the community policing option requires the restoration of local social control, it is unlikely given the nature of contemporary society to be able to achieve it.

A fourth implication is that, there is another point that needs to be made about community. The desire to 'restore' community life (Alderson 1979) which is central to community policing rests on a particular view of the past in England and Wales which is open to many questions. Alderson (1979) suggests that the British rural village or small town can be used as the model for social cohesion, community life and freedom from crime. This view represents to a large extent a nostalgia for an imaginary past because it is not clear when such villages and towns were stable and crime-free communities.

A fifth factor indicates the fact that other factors which will also influence the capacity of a community to reduce crime are the strength of existing networks and organisations, the extent to which residents are involved in community issues upon which to build, the existence of 'natural' leaders and the nature and extent of economic opportunities. In some cases, particularly where little or no sense of 'community' exists, crime prevention initiatives may need to be attached to existing community organisations if they are to have much chance of success (Skogan 1986). Where such organisations are totally lacking or poorly supported, then some kind of community development must precede any concerted effort to tackle crime. Crime prevention programs alone are not be able to generate a sense of 'community' where none exists.

It is recognised that the capacity of communities to organise a collective response to crime and socialise residents, especially immigrants and the young, into a community consensus of norms and values, is severely limited (Garofalo and McLeo 1988, in Graham 1990). McConville and Shepherd (1992: 182) discovered following:

...many police officers consider that certain areas of the city are not suitable for community policing precepts. This is evidenced by the attitude of community beat officers who often view council estates and areas populated by ethnic minority groups as inappropriate for neighbourhood watch schemes.

Preventing crime in better-off communities is intellectually, practically and politically less problematic than in poorer communities. Mobilising community support and co-operation in the poorer kinds of communities is often difficult. A very high proportion of local crime prevention schemes suffer from a falling off in enthusiasm and participation. Experience has shown that community-based prevention initiative often drift into tackling other problems and Skogan (1988), suggests that it is therefore more productive to attach crime prevention initiatives to other community issues around which the community has already organised.

Where concern about crime reflects, if only in part, an expression of conflict between groups within the community, initiatives to prevent crime have to be handled sensitively. Where, for example, high crime areas contain high concentrations of ethnic minorities, measures to reinforce community cohesion may in practice turn out to be divisive where such areas also suffer from latent or actual racism. Neighbourhood watch, for example, can lead to vigilantism and a worsening of race relations if those involved associate particular ethnic minority groups and especially youths, with crime (Kinsey *et al.* 1986). Similarly, where high crime areas are characterised by strained or antagonistic relations with the police, mobilising community support and generating a greater sense of 'community', which depends on building a basis of trust and co-operation between residents and the police, may be very difficult. In areas like this, where the consent of those being policed is absent, policing can even be counter-productive.

Thus unfortunately, the conditions for reducing or preventing crime tend to be least favourable in communities which suffer the most from crime and fear of crime. Given this dilemma, decisions concerning the targeting of crime prevention resources — whether, for example, to concentrate on those areas which need the resources most or those areas where efforts are most likely to succeed — must be taken with care. The question of how to optimise the targeting of crime prevention resources is the subject of considerable debate (Skogan 1986).

The theory of community policing is inadequate in understanding the meaning and problematic to transfer the theory of community policing into practice. The specific strategies employed in any particular community should be based on the community's unique characteristics. But the problem still remains that substantial differences in police practices can be found also at the neighbourhood level within cities. Such variation is a joint product of what police expect will be the consequences of their differing behaviours in different neighbourhood or what the political power of the different neighbourhood will let them get away with. The police have to work in many different types of community. It may be that Britain is so culturally diverse that there is no unified account which could be given to the police. It could be argued that different cultural groups within society give the police of that community a different form and level of consent, and it is for this reason that it is necessary to police differently in different communities. This is not just a question of race and culture — differences between communities are as marked between communities of the same race and culture as between these of different race and culture, or mixed races or cultures (Lee 1992: 175). The community must have a voice in the forums that define community policing itself, must be a ready and knowledgeable ally to the forces of the reform, and, in the neighbourhood, where the benefits are supposed to be delivered, must have a serious part in implementing solutions as well as nominating problems.

Chapter 6

Policing and public perceptions of the police in Turkey

This chapter examines policing and public perceptions of the police in Turkey and explores the potential to introduce Scarman's ideal model of policing. It examines how the Turkish police are perceived by members of the society, and suggests what can be done to build a positive rapport between the public and police. In doing this, policing will be analysed in the context of historical, political and cultural aspects. I shall also identify and discuss the primary orientations and preoccupation of police work in Turkey since the foundation of the Turkish police and analyse the perceptions of, and attitudes toward, the Turkish police by members of the society. Examining and interpreting the police within the context of political and socio-economic frameworks enables us to understand the character of policing in Turkey. Wilson (1968) has provided profound illuminations on policing styles and the tensions of police work respectively. Wilson demonstrated that the social organisation and structure of jurisdictions influence the policing style adopted by the police. A legalistic policing style, which is concerned with strict enforcement of violation or, in Parker's (1968) typology, the 'crime — control model' as distinct from the 'due the process model' is found in areas with a high level of social and economic differentiation and heterogeneity. From this, it will seem that Turkish national police forces are overall more likely to adopt a legalistic policing style with variations determined by local conditions.

This chapter will also attempt to illustrate not only the public perception of the police but also the perception of the police themselves about their own activities. Only by placing policing in its proper context within the broad spread of a criminal justice system and at the same time, within the broader spread of the culture, the historical development of ideas about the control of crime and criminal activity, the philosophies and the psychology of the people and the associated mores and norms of the society, can one have a more complete understanding of the relationship of police to their macro-society. Moreover, this chapter asks what is the constitutional position of the police and how is their role seen by the courts and the legislators? How do controls which seek to 'police the police' operate? What are the, often controversial, laws such as stop and search provisions, which allow the police to exercise a proactive crime prevention role but which if used, may bring the police into a spiral of conflict with some sections of the community? What is the relationship of the police to the armed forces in such circumstances, and what are the general conditions and controls which are present to deal with the use of deadly force in these and other circumstances? What are the mechanisms, organisational responses and practical considerations which shape the response to public disorder, both in the form of limited criminal law street level public order enforcement and in the larger context of riot, rout or unlawful assembly?

An historical analysis of the relative weakness of countervailing institutions in Turkey can help to explain why and how the police can remain isolated from efforts to develop consensual democratic reform elsewhere in Turkish society. The Ottoman Empire had well-organised police forces, usually under military control; for example, the elite *Janissaries* were both palace protectors and professional soldiers of the highest rank. By 1917 there were administrative, executive and judicial police officers. During the Ottoman period (Between the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 till 1923, the foundation of the new Turkish republic) in the capital, Istanbul, the *Grand Vezier* served as chief of police for most of the capital, and was therefore in a position of supremacy. He was generally in charge of all security and police matters along with his many other obligations. His responsibilities included the protection of property and the maintenance of order in most of Istanbul. The supreme admiral (*Kaputan Pasha*), the chief of the armouries (*Jebeji Bashi*), the chief of the gunners (*Topcu Bashi*), the leader of the elite fighting unit, known as the *Aga of the Janissaries*, and the head gardener (*Bostanji Bashi*) also served under the *grand vezir* to supervise policing (Swanson 1975: 42). At that time the responsibility of policing was divided into two parts: the night patrol was carried out by under the control of *Asas Bashi*; the daytime duty was shared by a chief of the local *Janissaries*, known as the *Subashi*, and by the market superintendent, the *Muhtesip*.

Outside Istanbul, the Ottoman police system retained at least two characteristics already seen in the capital: the importance of the *Janissaries*, and the *Sultan's* attempt to govern through agents dependent on him. *Subashi*, for example, carried out police duties in urban and rural areas. One type of *Subashi* was charged with financial, administrative, and police functions in the provinces. Another, the *Subashi* of the treasury, was stationed in the towns, where he worked in liaison with the *Muhtesip*, made day and night rounds, and performed general police work (Swanson 1975: 47).³⁰

The *Janissaries*, the major source supplying police officers, were abolished in 1826. In 1845 the first modern police were established under the directory known as the *Zabtiye Mushiriyeti*. In 1870 *Zabtiye Mushiriyeti* became a separate ministry of police. In 1880 police stations (*Karakols*) were set up. The first police code was introduced on 6 December 1896 (*Phoenix* 1993: 34). From 1909, the police came

³⁰ It is clear to see that the police and military were inseparable from each other. The same partnership has been modernised, but is apparent in modern Turkey.

under the public security department of the Ministry of the Interior (Swanson 1975: 49-55).

After the World War I and the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, a reorganisation took place under M. Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. A Directorate of Public Security was set up in Ankara in 1923 to control the local police directorates. A further reorganisation in 1932 divided the police into two main departments: uniformed force and detectives. New regulations were introduced in 1937 which are still in force. On 11 May 1953 traffic police were introduced (*Phoenix* 1993: 35).

Certain important constants are observable in surveying the history of the Turkish political context since the foundation of the modern Turkish state in 1923. Especially since the 1960 coup, the military/police/intelligence bureaucracies remain 'the most powerful single grouping' within the state. In the mid 1960s, in order to counter public order disturbances, the public order police were established (*Phoenix* 1993: 35). Therefore, no one can suggest that the police operate in the healthiest political context for the development of consensual relationship with many sections of the public. Indeed, it will be argued that their own history and current attitudes contribute heavily to that context.

Historically, the Turkish police have been responsive primarily to the needs of political organisations and the concentrations of power they represented. Political influence in police organisations has been very great, especially with respect to appointments, promotions, and transfers.³¹ Moreover the police have functioned as an arm of the state, and the state as the embodiment of the laws.

It is not miraculous that a powerful centralised state bureaucracy, including the nationalised and centralised police force from the late 19th century, can remain today aloof and removed from pressure by relatively weak and scattered countervailing institutions, be they opposition political parties, labour unions, student groups, or human rights lobbies. Now, Turkey is divided 79 provinces. Since the inception of the modern police in 1845, the task of policing has been a centralised one. The increased politicisation of the police can be explained by centralisation of the police. The Ministry of the Interior is the main body in charge of policing (*ETK* 1). Obviously, when the government is changed, the Minister of the Interior changes.

³¹ Tayyar Safak reports that there is nobody who works in the CID for ten years continuously. The chief constables are subjected to replacement nearly every six month (*Tercuman* 21 July 1993).

When the Minister of the Interior is changed, all chief constables and higher rank officers are also replaced by sympathetic or, convenient, individuals.

Hierarchically, the police are controlled by the Directorate General of Public Security, which reports to the Ministry of the Interior and controls the 79 provincial Directorates of Public Security, each one under a Commissioner of police. The provincial directorates are divided into district police commands. The police are responsible for upholding the law, preventing criminal activities, apprehending offenders, protecting property, regulating the traffic in urban areas and performing certain political and judicial duties. The force has three main components: General Duties, Traffic; and Criminal Investigation. The police force is divided into four sections: executive (general duties), judicial (the detective force), political (internal security), and administrative.

As I shall explain, the force at the centre of the state's monopoly of violence is older and stronger than they, and is, furthermore, supported and sustained by the custom and tradition of hierarchy and obedience, by modern kindred institutions of the state itself, including the government and the military. Overall, the consensus of critical opinion is that the history of the force, as summarised, reflects certain basic unchanging constants: centralisation, politicisation, hierarchy, reaction/repression.

Examining policing and public perceptions of the police in Turkey, it is often suggested by the mass media and commentators various social groups in the country have negative perceptions of the police (PIAR 1992a, *Ozgur Gundem*, 25 April 1993, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 June 1993). However, rigorous and systematic investigations on the nature and structure of perceptions of the Turkish police by the public or different social groups within it are virtually non-existent. There are no studies relating to disorderly and repressive events which permit social and historical examination over time. The perceptual and attitudinal scaling method is one satisfactory measurement and analytical procedure for deriving data which, with adequate sensitivity to the interplay of political, economic and historical forces structuring police-citizen relationships, can be used to evaluate the structure of, and variations in perceptions of police over time and across cultural, socio-political and economic settings.

However, the nature of the relationship appears, especially, in the event of mass protests and riots, strikes and disparate forms of social and economic upheavals in which the police have often responded to social dislocations with highly organised violent strategies (See *Sabah*, 3 October 1993; *Panel*, No. 46, 15 Jan.- 15 Feb. 1993, *Zaman*, 11 February 1994). The use of the police to break up strikes and

demonstrations appears to have become the norm, recent examples include the miners' strike in 1990 in Zonguldak, student demonstrations in Istanbul and the demonstrations of the workers of Zonguldak City Council in 1992-93. (*Zaman*, 25 Augusts 1993). Legitimising these strategies through the *PVSK* and *ETK*, the sundry coercive and surveillance functionaries (police, military officers) tribunals, intelligence agents and informers are also employed by the state for the suppression of opposition and popular struggles against unpopular measures.

From the point of view of the police, as an agency, in order to broaden its mandate successfully beyond criminal-related activities into a wider role of providing social and other services, law-violators become but one domain of activity for the police, whereby police will interact with a wide range of individuals but more so with other organisations, agencies or voluntary associations. However, in Turkey, there has been no systematically organised attempt to improve need-assessment, the identification of problems such as potential youth at risk delinquents or the unemployed. That is why there has been no consideration of the possibility of working closely with social service agencies. Linking with the private sector provides material and organisational support that is often essential for police function and welfare in a wide range of activities that emphasise social support. The media has evidenced some encouraging hopes: '*Hero Police*' (*Turkiye*, 14, 7 1992). '*Full support from the public for the police*' (*Zaman*, 14 April 1992).

Leaving aside such encouraging hopes, generally speaking, the police of Turkey are very serious, impolite, aggressive, armed, discourteous, unhelpful, unaccountable and subjected to political influence (PIAR 1992a: 62). For example, according to a survey carried out by PIAR (1992a) in Istanbul, in order to control their children, 61 % of parents threaten their children by saying 'the police are coming'. Such trends increase to 68 % in the lower socio-economic class (PIAR 1992a: 55). In the same study, it is suggested that 47 % of the sample were unwilling to approach the police with a complaint or to act as a witness. People think that police treat the people rudely (PIAR 1992a: 42). Unsurprisingly, 59 % of the sample were unhappy with police attitudes and behaviour. Such dissatisfaction increases amongst the young and the educationally and economically higher class (PIAR 1992a: 51). Two out of three people complained about the language used by the police in public encounters. Similarly, most complaints come from the young and people belonging to the economically and educationally higher class (PIAR 1992a: 52). For this reason 71 % of the sample say that the police should keep a low profile (PIAR 1992a: 60), but they cannot reveal such a wish publicly.

One explanation can be given to the fact that the perception of the right to resist authority that may be identified as illegitimate or unreasoning is very firmly rooted. Islam also requires obedience, but implies the state playing fair too.³² Indeed the founding of the nation depended on that principle. That is why any movement against the state or the constitution is perceived as illegitimate or illegal and a challenge against the state is forbidden by the Law (see the 1982 Constitution, part II, section I). Anything necessary can be done to suppress such movements (see PVSK section 2).³³ This results in an assumption that a challenge to the police is a challenge to authority, and a challenge to authority is itself a form of criminal behaviour.

The statutes encourage legalistic policing styles, as can be gleaned from such provisions that charge the police with 'due enforcement of all laws and regulations' (see PVSK). Nonetheless, a casual observation of the policing scene in Turkey indicates that police officers are unaccountable, poorly educated (see PIAR 1992b) and inadequately motivated to evolve an operational style that fits Wilson's typology. In reality the police in Turkey seem to have settled for a chaotic, reactive, arbitrary and repressive policing style.

Although no sociological research has been carried out on police attitudes, the negative attitude of officers towards the community and towards the service delivery aspects of policing as opposed to law enforcement can be found in the media:

Hurriyet, on 12 February, 1993, carried the headline: *one of chief superintendent attacked a journalist* and *Zaman*, on 25 May 1993 reported another physical police attack on a member of the press, this time by a deputy chief constable.

Attitudes of police officers are important not only when they are directed with respect to the community they serve but also when directed at themselves. Two types of attitude are important in this regard and they have to do with assessment of job performance and with job satisfaction. It is unfortunate to say that the majority of today's Turkish police officers are still very much production-oriented as their performance is clearly evaluated by a system which values their ability to make arrests, write tickets, and successfully confront and overcome incidents of public disorder. In this regard Turkish police officers perceive themselves often as being the

³² O you believe, obey God, obey the prophet, and obey those among you who hold authority (*Qur'an*, iv. 62).

³³ Indeed every military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were justified on the ground that the main aim of the three military coups was to protect and maintain the regime and the state.

only component of the criminal justice system that is actively attempting to do anything about stopping crimes.

Perceptions derive from, and are continuously influenced or moulded by, direct and indirect contacts and experiences of percipients with the object of perception (for instance the police). Socio-economic and political structures determine the latitude, contents, context and ramifications of the encounters between police and the citizens and the latter's perceptions of the processes and consequences involved. The public do not seem to regard the police sympathetically as public servants to their interests, and this is partly due to the absence of a social service dimension in police work in Turkey. The routine police work in Turkey is around stop and question/search, arrest, crime investigation, detention, prosecution, riot and crowd control, and armed combat against violent criminals. Consequently, there are rather too few positive consensual attributes of policing that can be projected.³⁴

Generally speaking, police stations in Turkey represent more than police territory; they represent the militaristic nature of tough, authoritarian policing, the dogmatic mentality of officers who are banded together around a common occupational culture, and the social and political distance that is maintained between the police and the public. As mentioned earlier, the majority of people do not want to go to or call the police for any reason (PIAR 1992a, Ozsengul 1995).

In Turkey, the police see no need to alter the status quo; rather, they see themselves as the defenders of the status quo. Any political or moral challenge to authority seems to them at best antisocial and at worst downright criminal (a case of criminal anarchy). This results in the fact that in many communities, people do not bother to make complaints against the police because they feel that no action will be taken and, beyond that, because they fear that the police will attempt harassment and retaliation against the complainants (see PIAR 1992 a).³⁵

Another bar to proper police-community relations is the occasional excessive reliance on force by some police officers. While society must protect itself against its violent members, the use of force can quickly become an improper crutch for a policeman

³⁴ This can be defined as absence of non-crime service function.

³⁵ Suleyman Avcioglu, a resident in Istanbul, after having his cassette player in his car stolen, parked in front of his home, went to a nearest police station in order to report the incident and ask the police to do something about it. The answer he received was very interesting: Why did you leave your cassette player in your car? (*Zaman*, 11 April 1993).

who must face a wide variety of complex situations. It only takes one or two incidents of the misuse of violence to create an atmosphere of fear and suspicion where there should be trust and co-operation (Civil servant demonstrations in Ankara in January 1994, see daily newspapers published between 10-15 January 1994).

Underlying the co-operative efforts between the police and the community is the assumption that such co-operation rests on, and in turn shapes, the attitudes that citizens hold towards the police. These attitudes will influence the character of the relationship between citizens and the police and will function to further or hinder progress in improving the relationship.

Attitudes expressing those images are considered critical, particularly when negative. In other words, the images and perceptions that citizens have about 'police' will augment or restrict their inclination to co-operate with police officers and will affect the number of offences receiving police attention. Herein lies one hope for the motivation to assist the police in their work. Attitudes towards the police include such matters as the perceptions of police efficiency, police toughness and assistance to citizens, and may be indicative of potential co-operation — or lack of it — with the police. They also help classify images of officers in the eyes of the public as 'good' or 'bad' and as such influence the extent to which citizens will co-operate with police. The question here is that why are the Turkish police isolated from the public? Examining political, economic, cultural factors and putting these factors into police training and Turkish community can make some contribution to such a question.

Turkey is a speedily industrialising country, but its incorporation into the world capitalist system, and its disadvantaged place in the international division of labour, has created economic, political and social problems which are common in other parts of the world. Turkey, undoubtedly, shares important features with many other newly industrialising countries of the world. They are experiencing similar economic, political and social upheavals, and their people are suffering military rule, political and social upheavals, and the dismantling of democracy

Since the Second World War, the police have opposed intellectuals, critics and writers. The main criticism of the police came from this point. Moreover, the police were used against labours, strikes and trade unions (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 April 1993).³⁶

³⁶ The Turkish state, strong and centralised as it is, has been effective in maintaining public order. When it was faced with widespread terrorism and violence as in the late 1970s, however, it had to turn to the army by declaring martial law. This may be related to the fact that police forces, being with the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, are more susceptible to political influences and, sometimes, even to infiltration by extremist groups, as was the case in the late 1970s. Especially in a

Leading to a crisis of the state in Turkey, the economic transformation of the sixties did not take place without creating major problems, social, economic, and political (Ahmad 1977: 281).³⁷ Ahmad (1985) argues that the industrial bourgeoisie of the 1960s created its own nemesis in the form of the working class. By the end of the sixties the industrial work force about three million strong out of a total work force of 12 million. Of the three million about a million were unionised. Since 1963 the working class had been given the right to bargain collectively and to strike in support of its economic demands.

In 1970, there were 4,324,533 wage workers in Turkey, accounting for 27.3 per cent of the whole labour force. Of these, 1,918,601 (or 44.4 per cent) were industrial workers (State Institute of Statistics 1975; in Berberoglu 1981: 284) By 1975, the number of working class had risen by 29.7 percent over 1970, reaching 5,609,000 (36 per cent of the total labour force (Berberoglu 1981: 284). With the growth of the working class during this period, there was also a significant increase in the number of unionised workers — 1,200,000 in 1971 to 2,000,000 in 1978, with DISK accounting for nearly one-half of the total.

The unionisation drive of the late 1960s and early 1970s made possible the signing of 'favourable' wage contracts, as a result, money wages showed a relative increase during this period. But the annual increase in the cost of living over the same period was higher than the increase in wages. This means that the nominal gains in money wages secured by workers in industry during the 1970s were practically wiped out by higher inflation which was running at 100 per cent in 1979. Such conditions resulted in circumstances in which millions of workers have for decades been unable to move out of insanitary and uninhabitable shanties and to obtain decent housing.³⁸

politically changed atmosphere, therefore, police action is not considered as impartial and as legitimate by the public as military action.

³⁷ This period witnessed widespread strikes around the country. For instance in 1968, 1,800 workers of the Derby rubber factory carried out the first factory occupation in Turkey. Strike activity intensified — the number of industrial strikes increased from fifty-four in 1968, to eighty-one in 1969 and 112 in 1970. The number of workers involved in these strikes increased from just over 5,000 in 1968, to 15,000 in 1969 and over 21,000 in 1970 (Berberoglu 1981: 280). On 15-16 June 1970, more than 100,000 workers in 135 factories throughout Istanbul and Kocaeli stopped work in protest against an attempt to weaken the movement by amending the law governing trade unions. In the demonstrations that followed, bloody clashes took place between the workers and the army and police throughout Istanbul. The right-wing government of Suleyman Demirel only managed to control the situation by declaring martial law (Berberoglu 1981: 280).

³⁸ Housing problems have not been brought to the agenda by any government in Turkey. It has been known that the policies of governments on housing have always been not to have any policy.

On 12 March 1971, the army moved in to take full control of the state apparatus. In late April martial law was declared in eleven important provinces — including the eight most industrialised, where *DISK* (Turkish Acronym for the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Union) was strongest, and three rural provinces with a large population.³⁹ As a result, strikes and demonstrations were banned. Liberal and progressive newspapers were closed down and journalists associated with them were prosecuted. Thousands of trade unionists, students and teachers were detained, while all students' and teachers' unions were banned and their leaders were imprisoned. In an attempt to silence opposition and to consolidate military rule, a large number of constitutional amendments were passed to restrict or abolish basic rights, such as freedom of speech and of assembly and the right to form trade unions. In 1972, an operation code-named *Tornado 1* was organised by the military and the police, in which over 80,000 troops and police terrorised Istanbul, searching more than half a million houses, offices and workshops. Again, thousands of progressive students, teachers, lawyers, journalists and trade unionists were arrested, imprisoned and tortured (Cousins 1973). It can be said that the 1971 military intervention took place in response to the faltering economy and the mass strikes and demonstrations which followed.

Between 1973 and 1979 Turkey went through a series of changeable and unstable coalition governments, led alternatively by the reactionary Justice Party (JP) and the 'social-democratic' Republican People's Party (RPP), based on an alliance with an assortment of right-wing parties. In early 1974 the RPP, led by Bulent Ecevit, formed a coalition government with the Islamic-reactionary National Salvation Party (NSP). This unstable coalition lasted only until September of that year. The coalition government which then emerged was a Nationalist Front Coalition, formed by an alliance of four right-wing parties — the JP, NSP, RPP (Republican Reliance Party) and NAP (Nationalist Action Party) — under the leadership of Demirel. This coalition remained in power until the elections in June 1977, during which time the state was engineered to serve the interests of the ultra-right. The JP had a free hand in utilising the state sector to expand the interests of the oppressors, while the NAP, through the vice-premiership of Turkes, obtained key positions within the state apparatus, especially in the secret service, police and armed forces.

³⁹ Martial law under the Turkish constitutional system entails the transfer of police functions to military authorities, the restriction or complete suspension of civil liberties.

By 1977, the effects of the government's policies began to be felt and battles developed within and between the 'Nationalist Front' parties over these policies. Thus, the second 'Nationalist Front' government, which came to power following the June 1977 elections, survived only until the end of the year. In January 1978, with support from independents, Ecevit, the leader of the Republican Reliance Party, formed a new, RPP-led government. Resulting in losing its majority and the resignation of Ecevit and his cabinet, in 1979, the RPP failed to secure the necessary seats in parliamentary by — elections. Once again, Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party, was asked to form a new government. By the end of 1979 a JP-led right wing government had been formed. During the period 1973-80, there were thirteen coalition governments formed. None of them was able to solve the climbing economic problems which had brought Turkey to brink of a major breakdown, and which had at the same time led to expanded public order disturbances and riots among the masses.⁴⁰

The economic and political condition of the working class worsened throughout the 1970s. Unemployment reached at catastrophic levels. While there were 2 million unemployed in 1971, by the end of 1978 this figure had reached 3.5 million. The worsening economic situation in the latter half of the decade also drove many firms out of business, leaving hundred of thousands of workers jobless. The workers' reply to the worsening economic circumstances was to take part in mass strikes and demonstrations, occupy factories and openly resist the police. Between 1970 and 1976, there were 658 industrial strikes, involving well over a hundred thousand workers (Berberoglu 1981: 286). By the mid-1970s, the size and power of DISK and its associated unions had greatly increased and the workers' movement had become more militant. In September 1976, a general strike was called with the demand that the State Security Courts be abolished. On 20 March 1978, more than two million people took part in a two-hour general strike called by DISK, which brought together thousands of workers, students and progressives and quickly spread throughout the country, beyond Ankara and Istanbul to Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Mersin, Hatay and Gaziantep. In all the major rallies and demonstrations throughout Turkey, the demands that the working class made were not simply economic, but were part and parcel of its long-term political interest. They included the immediate abolition of

⁴⁰ The 1970s experienced a disastrous period in the economy. There was a huge deficit in its external trade; while exports remained the same, imports continued to increase dramatically. Although foreign borrowing allowed the government to cover the deficit in the short term, the added debt and debt-servicing further aggravated Turkey's balance of payments crisis. The Turkish lira had been devaluated several times. There were widespread shortages of basic commodities, electricity cuts on a daily basis, scarcity of heating fuel, medicines and other necessities creating an atmosphere of panic among the population.

articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution, withdrawal from NATO and the legislation of the CPT (The Communist Party of Turkey).

This decade also witnessed widespread terrorist campaigns, costing many lives. For instance from January to mid-December 1978 alone, well over 1,000 persons were killed in terrorist activities. In Kahramanmaraş over 100 people were killed in an atrocity. Following the massacre, martial law was declared in thirteen provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara, and eleven eastern provinces with a high proportion of Kurds. In 1979, another six eastern provinces (populated mainly by Kurds) were brought under martial law.⁴¹ As a result, many progressive organisations and publications were closed down, students and workers were arrested for wall-postering or being in possession of banned publications. Searches were carried out daily in universities, factories and people's homes by soldiers and policemen. Students at Istanbul University, for example, had to pass through five military check-points before entering classes (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 April 1979).

In 1979, as May Day came closer, the martial law commanders imposed a uniform ban on May Day meetings, demonstrations and marches in nineteen provinces under martial law. On April 30, trade unionists and progressives, including the president of DISK and five members of its executive committee, were arrested. Following this, the martial law authorities issued a statement announcing that 24-hour curfews had been imposed, to take effect from midnight Monday, 30 April to 5 am, Wednesday, 2 May, 'warning the people of Istanbul...[that] all security forces under martial law command have the authority to shoot' (Nalsun 1981: 85).

Despite the massive display of force by the police and armed forces, May Day meetings were held in all the nineteen provinces in a total of forty-three cities and towns. In Istanbul, which was under curfew, at least seventeen May Day meetings took place throughout the city. Many of these — at building sites, factories and workplaces — were surrounded by troops and police armed with machine-guns. In Istanbul, at least 1,200 arrests were made, *Inonu* Stadium had been turned into a detention centre for the occasion.⁴² In Ankara, clashes between security forces and demonstrators resulted in nearly 700 arrests, and several people were wounded when

⁴¹ Martial law in these eastern provinces continued till the military coup in September 1980.

⁴² Of all the factors that alleviate class tensions in Turkey probably the most important one is the extent of horizontal (geographic) and vertical (social) mobility. Most studies on rural-to-urban migration observed that urban migrants are generally younger, better educated, more skilled, and presumably also more energetic and ambitious than the average rural population (Ozbudun 1988).

police opened fire on one group. In Mersin, nearly 200 people were arrested for carrying banners and shouting slogans in Kurdish (Turkey Today 1979). In Izmir over 100,000 people gathered. The police, 10,000 strong, were backed up not only by army units but by gunboats, a number of which were standing ready in the harbour, and by aerial surveillance and security from helicopters.

The crisis amongst the working class continues to intensify in 1979. In Bursa, thousands of workers at *Maysan*, *Renault* and other nearby factories clashed with military police. In October, 400 workers occupied the Kula Textile Factory in Izmir and maintained their occupation for eight hours until police broke down the doors and dispersed them with pressurised water hoses. They all were arrested. In October, in Adana, the Ceyhan Textile Factory was occupied by 850 workers of whom 600 were women. At the end of December, strikes and demonstrations were held in more than fifteen cities to protest against military repression and in memory of the victims of the massacre at Kahramanmaraş. The police opened fire on the demonstrators, killing a dozen students and teachers and wounding many more.

The early 1980s continued to witness strikes, factory occupations and student protests. The state-owned *Taris* thread factory was occupied in Izmir. The occupation continued for a month. Workers blocked the road to the airport and cut off electricity and water supplies, stopped transport in several districts and closed shops.

The economic and social crises of the late 1970s and the acceleration of the working-class and people's struggle during the past year led the army and the police to intensify coercion on the people. This could be attributed to the fact that the coercive agencies of the Turkish state were thus overwhelmingly directed against these movements and the potential threat they posed. In September 1980 a military coup overthrew the right wing civilian government of Suleyman Demirel and installed in its place an open military dictatorship.⁴³ In a statement made on 12 September 1980, Chief of Staff General Kenen Evren announced that 'anxious to safeguard the nation's unity', the Turkish armed forces had decided to take over the administration of the country in order to restore "the authority of the state." For the third time since 1946, when pluralism replaced monopoly rule, the free workings of political parties had been interrupted by a military intervention.

⁴³ The immediate reason behind the military intervention was the growing political violence and terrorism that, between 1975 and 1980, left more than 5,000 people killed and three times as many wounded. Acts of violence, which became particularly acute between 1978 and 1980, also included armed assaults, sabotages, kidnappings, bank robberies, occupation and destruction of workplaces, and bombings.

Another aspect of the causes of the military coup was described as:

Lawyers, politicians and trade unionists I met largely agreed that the military authorities in the Istanbul area must have consciously allowed terrorists to operate in the period before the military coup and that this must have been done to prepare the ground for the coup itself on 12 September 1980 (Nalsun: 1981: 87).

After the September 1980 coup, Jon Nalsun, Deputy Secretary General of ETUC (European Trade Union Congress) described the situation of Istanbul as;

Istanbul has the appearance of an occupied city. There are soldiers everywhere with automatic rifles, fingers poised on triggers; according to people I met, the soldiers are authorised to shoot if any trouble erupts. They carry out constant controls on ordinary public buses which are frequently stopped, passengers asked to get out and searched; people are constantly being asked to produce identification papers, etc. (Nalsun 1981: 87).

As seen in demonstrations and industrial strikes, for the police, the best way to deal with public disturbances has been the use of force. Using force is synonymous with controlling the people. In some segments of the police establishment, it is still considered to be an object of faith that performance of police work is synonymous with the use of force. This is a more or less automatic assumption of the police, based partly on the prevalent conception of the police officer as the law enforcer and partly on their own subjective inclinations. By training, by orientation, and often by background, police are structured to be aggressive. When you ask them not to be aggressive in performing their duties, you are asking them to deny everything they have learned, everything they have come to trust. This can be summarised as: 'It's our obligation to enforce the law and we'll use the force necessary to deal with any given situation.'

To the extent that this view continues to predominate among the police administration in Turkey in which diverse voices are being raised in even louder protest, incidents of excessive or ill-applied force by police will continue to occur. The traditional way to deal with public disorder has been to wade in with clubs. A police officer feels that he is capable of carrying out this tactic, and he is perfectly willing to do so. There may be some give and take, but he feels that in the end he will come out on top.

To analyse the underlying culture and social environment in Turkey, it can be suggested that the country is a homogeneous society. Traditionally, the entire socio-economic fabric of Turkey is woven in terms of seniority and the prestige which

comes from being the older, senior person. Hierarchy, for the Turks is inseparable from orderliness; a group is not organised unless its members are ranked. This has been true in Turkey until recent days. Another strong national characteristic is the individual's sense of group. At every level of society the Turks have a very strong sense of who is 'on the inside' and who is not. Even in big cities, this results in areas in which the same citizens (migrants) live.

The common philosophical roots of the Turkish culture, reinforced by centuries of tradition, have moulded societies of a patriarchal, hierarchical, authoritarian nature, bound by notions of reciprocal duty, informal resolution of conflict, and great reliance on group pressures in the service of conformity and compromise. It can be suggested that the notion of a loyal and legitimate opposition has not been fully institutionalised at the cultural level (Ozbudun 1988: 33). Therefore, Turkish culture has accepted an 'authoritarian way' in order to achieve and maintain that quotient of political continuity, predictability, and stability necessary in its own right and as a firm foundation for economic modernisation.⁴⁴ However, especially since the foundation of the new Republic of Turkey in 1923, the reception of Western values of democracy and equality has, to some extent, equalised and individualised social structure in modern Turkey, greatly influencing the social context within which the police function, or the structures of the police forces themselves.

The Turkish police forces perpetuate their traditional profiles, but the cultures of which they are a part — which they influence and which influence them — now reflect a mix of old and new, East and West, vertical and horizontal, authoritarian and democratic tendencies. They display stricter authoritarian attitudes and structure, are more overtly political, and are less accepted by and integrated into the populace as a whole. The Turkish police force is national, hierarchical, authoritarian — feared and based on such fear, respected (see PIAR 1992 a) by the vast majority; opposed, even hated by politically progressive minorities.

Another reason for the alienation of the people from the police is the lack of education in police service (see PIAR 1992b). The Turkish police training de-personalises recruits (PIAR 1992b). It certainly does not produce the kind of police officer everyone says they want. The sort of police officer the populations of the nation want is problematic but it does appear that, particularly within the police,

⁴⁴ One of the principal legacies of the Ottoman Empire is the strong and centralised state authority. The political centre composed of the *Sultan* and his military and civilian bureaucrats sought to eliminate all rival centres of power. The resulting situation has been referred to as the 'absence of civil society', which means the absence of corporate, autonomous, intermediary social structures.

there is a strongly-held belief that policing is largely a matter of common sense. The training program is authoritarian and militaristic and there is no emphasis on the social skills of policing. The art of policing, the deft handling of people and situations, remains largely untouched in initial training, except in a nominal sense. The young police officer learns what it means to carry out his / her duties through a process that is a combination of experiential learning and informal socialisation. The process has some positive aspects, but unfortunately the negative components far outweigh them.

The process of informal socialisation consists mainly of repudiation of the formal training that the police have only recently received, immortalised in the time-honoured police slogan, 'You can't believe what they tell you at the police school or academy. That's not the way it's done'. This process encourages a profile of characteristics (secrecy, defensiveness, cynicism) which, once assumed by the young police officers, alienates them totally from the larger society. Unfortunately, nothing in the young officers' formal training program prepares them for their experience, that being a police officer is a source of pride to them-or, at any rate, they once hoped and expected that it would be.

At present the police officer is not properly trained for a workload which necessitates a high degree of autonomy and discretion, as well as repeated contact with the public. Nor is he encouraged to function in that manner when he receives his first assignment. Through most of his career, in fact, the police officer lives in a world of power, yet one in which he himself has no power. As one police officer claims:

The period of police training is one year.⁴⁵ We encounter university graduated suspects. We graduated from high school. We do not know the law. For this reason we try to solve the problem with shouting and talking rudely. This is not fair. For this reason we must be trained how to talk to the public and how to treat to them (PIAR 1992 b: 4).

Another officer claims:

Police public relations course is only 40 minutes in one week. There must be more... (PIAR 1992 b: 4).

Evidence suggests that police training in Turkey is not at a satisfactory level and in particular that the police do not know to behave to the public. Higher ranking police officers agree that this is a problem (PIAR 1992b: 5).

⁴⁵ It is now for six months.

Police officers operate with a hierarchical structure that by definition limits their action, or, perhaps, directs and guides it in the direction desired by the organisation. As with any organisation, compliance with its values, goals and objectives, can be achieved through proper recruitment, training and peer socialisation. It can be suggested that the point where police and citizens meet produces potential cultural shock, possible friction and potential conflict. The manner in which they handle an incident may serve as the foundation for new conflict to emerge. Therefore, it is not surprising that early recognition of this potential — though not necessarily inevitable — collision course may be attenuated by resorting to proper training which will emphasise appropriate intervention strategies, improve interaction patterns and better address police-community issues.

Regarding community relations, the context of training is ignored or avoided. In the areas of perceived excessive violence, police officers are trained to handle these situations understanding full well that there may be an inherent bias against the police in some incidents. It cannot be said that community and legislative pressures as well as internal police pressures led to administrative attempts to limit the use of force.

Training is essential to facilitate the perception of vulnerability on the part of the police force's potential clientele. Officers are trained according to well-established standards in anything from the handling of firearms to being better communicators and more effective speakers. If the training element in the officer's background is recognised as an important socialisation factor, it can — or should — become the major vehicle through which information, values and principles of better community relations and community policing may be achieved.

Consultation and accountability

It can be said that the police are totally autonomous in a formal organisational sense; they control themselves and are ultimately responsible only to the Minister of Interior. The Turkish people have become increasingly aware of their democratic freedoms and protections. Politicians cannot use the military to promote their own ends at the expense of the people. The police force, however, is a civil institution and has legitimate authority to perform social control functions. Because the line between legitimate and illegitimate police functions can be a fine one, unscrupulous politicians can sometimes take advantage of this blurring of functions and manipulate the police to accomplish anti-democratic goals.

In Turkey, the more specific question is how we might explain the ways in which authoritarian regime comes to use police forces as instruments supporting and maintaining their own power. What constitutes such non-democratic uses; when, how, where and most importantly, why do these practices occur; who perpetrates them; what are the consequences; and how they possibly be reduced, if not prevented?

In Turkey, the cultural influence of the Ottoman empire can still be clearly seen and there remains a very strong and widespread sense of obedience to state authority. In general terms, it can be said that this extends to respect for state representatives, such as the police and the military but how much of this respect is genuine and how much derives from fear is a matter for debate. What is certain is that the majority of people do not, and indeed cannot, criticise authority in public. The police and military are perceived as guardians of the state and by inference, as guardians of its citizens. In practice, of course, the police and military are guardians of the ruling government. It is the confusion of the terms 'state' and 'government' which leads to the confusion about the role and purpose of the police. In Turkey, acts against the state are forbidden by the constitution, an edict which is open to a very broad interpretation.

Another important factor is that there has been a crisis in democracy in Turkey since the foundation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. From then until 1950, Turkey was ruled by a single party and the country witnessed many antidemocratic changes and repressive means of enforcing the new order. Critics of Ataturk were punished and the new so-called democracy was merely the instrument by which the status quo was maintained.

Since 1923, Turkey has witnessed three military coups; in 1960, 1971 and 1980. After each coup, the constitution was subjected to change. Restriction of fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or the establishment of trade unions and other kinds of associations, controlling the media, and thereby the minds and speech of the people. These changes were initiated by soldiers and academics who had taken part in or who had supported the coups. Students, civil servants, teachers, lecturers, academics, police officers, and clerical workers were banned from organising their unions. Only manual workers, villagers and businessmen were allowed to continue to be unionised. These antidemocratic articles in the constitutions led to the absence of intellectual, articulate pressure groups. There remained only one single powerful pressure group, *TUSIAD*, a union established by businessmen. Therefore, the sources of new ideas and issues is now very limited.

In economic terms these changes have meant that the rich have become richer and the poor have become poorer. Students, teachers, civil servants, manual workers, and villagers are all living below the poverty line and the middle classes have been destroyed by the continuing economic crisis and rocketing inflation rate, which is now around at 80-90 per cent per annum. For the vast majority of people, social survival attempts to maintain whatever economic advantages they see themselves as having or having had, is the main issue and consideration of policing matters is a luxury. For these reasons unlike more identifiably democratic countries, the public cannot force policing issues into the political agenda. The political agenda is directed by interest groups, such as by *TUSIAD*, whose concerns do not reflect those of the majority of Turkish citizens.

In Turkey, the character of government and police action are virtually indistinguishable. The government is recognised as being authoritarian if its police are repressive; democratic if its police are restrained. A repressive police role in politics is caused by the existence of a non democratic government, when one knows that the regime is non democratic because the police are playing a repressive role in politics.

Understanding precisely how and why the government wields political influence over the Turkish police, and understanding the police officers' attitudes and approaches to the law, seems crucial to determining democracy's chances of succeeding in Turkey. As long as the government holds the police force in its tight grip, any democratising steps will ultimately depend on the whim of the central government. As long as the shadow of police interference hangs over the state, it will not be possible to secure democratic changes. Furthermore, as long as government officials see the police as their private army, and as their insurance policy against too much local and individual autonomy, they will resist democratization. The police remain an entity over which the government maintains its strong, central control.

The Turkish police structure is characterised by a highly vertical and centralised concentration of power and a high degree of politicisation. This structure makes it easy for centralised hierarchies to substitute their own goals and commands for the rules of law. Another important line of analysis of politicisation issues examines the relationships between authoritarian personalities and authoritarian law-on-the-books and state structure. Police tend to have politically conservative, authoritarian personalities by nature, which attract them to their roles and which are in turn reinforced by their roles. By embodying and enforcing 'the Law' the police may tend to internalise and rationalise the existing order — the laws themselves, and the

structures which promulgate (and enforce) them. This "circular rationale" strengthens itself, producing police forces which in mentality and behaviour stand antithetical to the liberal democratic state.

If it is true that police work attracts authoritarian personality types in Turkey, it is certainly the case that their recruitment, training and service take place within a vertical, hierarchical, authoritarian structure suffused with a conservative, pro-state ideology (Yildiz 1995). Again, the nature and structure of the force reflects and strengthens the nature and structure of tradition-bound oriental social organisation. Forces both within and outside the job itself thus reinforce authoritarianism within the police structure. The ideological undercurrents at work are much subtler, stronger, and more durable than mere 'on-the-job' attitudes. Authoritarian personality, social tradition and organisation all work hand-in-hand to produce a not-easily overcome ideology, despite the progress of democratisation.

In Turkey, there is no law which specifies a pattern of policing or which gives guidance on what the police ought to do, and it probably cannot do so. Instead, it provides a somewhat flexible framework of constraints and opportunities (see *PVSK* (the Police Code of Practice) and *ETK* (the Code of Police Organisation)). Consultation and accountability are the key elements of police/public relations to perform an ideal democratic policing (Scarman 1982). These are, Scarman argues, 'the mechanisms upon which we rely to ensure that the police in their policies and operations keep in touch with, and are responsible to, the communities they police'. Of the two, accountability is the more important as it is 'the key to successful and socially responsive policing' (1982: 147). When we bring this perspective to bear on the Turkish policing we see that the question of consultation is not addressed and the question of accountability is totally neglected.

Because policing is a centralised one, the public do not take part in policy making concerning policing in their area. This results in a lack of sympathy in any consultation process, or any movement to increase in the development of democratic rights. However, in order to get the views of the public about policing matters, a circular dated 17.6. 1985 from the Director General asked all police stations to meet, once a month to meet the members of the community. These meetings are called 'Huzur (peace) meetings' (Aydin 1991: 51). The members of these meetings are: Head masters, teachers, parish headmen, Local governors, shopkeepers, local citizens and policemen. At the present, this circular is forgotten and such meetings are held only in Istanbul in some districts (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 February 1993).

This is not really consultation with the local people, because there are no regular meetings. The effects of such groups are merely nominal. The wider issue of police accountability is neither mentioned nor discussed. The police are responsible to central government and through that, the theory goes, to the general public. However, accountability in the more specific sense of being responsible and accountable to people in local areas for policing policies and practices in those areas does not exist under the present system nor is it advocated in the proposed new one. Except '*Huzur* meetings' there is even no cosmetic proposal offering local areas to control their own policing.

The Turkish police are only required to be accountable to the law and the internal disciplinary procedure. The average number of complaints against the police is about 1500-2000 a year (Kockal 1986: 123; in Aydin 1991: 69). Blows or strokes, unequal treatment, corruption, insult, physical and verbal threat and attack are the most common complaints against the police (Aydin 1991: 69). Although about 50-100 officers are dismissed for such offences every year, more than half of them are returned to the job after appeal to the High Administrative Court (Aydin 1991: 69).

Regarding police accountability, there are no formal arrangements, such as democratically elected bodies, called police authorities (Aydin 1991: 65). Not surprisingly, Aydin also found that 11 out of 19 police chiefs said that the police are not accountable to the community (Aydin 1991: 66). The main reason could be attributed to the fact that there is no consideration of adding a dimension of community involvement to the present policing system. The police do not involve any more fundamental re-adjustments to the terms of the relationship between people and the police.

The issues of consultation and accountability are central to a genuine system of community policing. The main question is, why is Turkish policing so limited in scope? One possible reason is that the Turkish police probably resent the degree of client control that is implied by the requirements of consultation and accountability. In England and Wales this has certainly been a problem. Police resistance to client participation can be seen in their antipathy to Lord Scarman's proposals for statutory liaison between the police and local representatives (see Benton and Wintour 1982).

A further reason for the lack of consultation is the alienation of people from the police. Here, primary importance is accorded to the shortage of police manpower. This has forced the police to adopt more impersonal policing strategies such as the greater use of motorised patrols. Technology in this way has created a barrier

between police and people. However, such explanation does not constitute a total explanation. There needs to be another explanation of alienation of the public from the police; the most important one could be attributed to the fact that the Turkish policing has an authoritarian strategy in nature.

Another reason for the alienation of the police from the public is that police suspicion falls in particular on young people, especially university students. The students have been finding themselves stopped and searched at regular intervals and generally experience what they would describe as police harassment. This results in considerable alienation of young people from the police which in turn has a negative effect on the attitudes of parents and adults to the police. Let alone giving information, they all become less willing to be in contact with the police at all (PIAR 1992a). To overcome this, the police are forced to adopt more aggressive forms of policing. Questioning of suspects has to replace information from the public as the major source in crime detection but, as the police now lack a local data base, 'suspicious individuals' are identified for questioning on the basis of police prejudice or of social stereotypes.

The use of such powers, which generally involve wider and looser powers of arrest and questioning, further increases the degree of alienation of the people from the police. This results in reducing the flow of information to the police. This in turn then requires more powers for the police and more aggressive and reactive policing. In this way there is a definite link between the alienation of people from the police and the policy of reactive policing. One feeds and depends upon the existence of the other. The major object of any police reform must be to break out of the vicious circle. In these terms community policing can represent a solution to this problem, if it provides an alternative to reactive policing or if it at least places the question of the style of policing in a local area as an item for discussion between local people and the police. The problem is that such a strategy can cause suspicion amongst the people the reactive policing is still going merrily on in the background. In other words, the notion of 'community policing' which does not include consultation and accountability on the full range of policing issues, is an inadequate response to the problem that they are designed to solve. Without them there is little reason why people in areas where disaffection with the police is high, should accept community policing nor is there any reason why community policing should necessarily have the beneficial consequences claimed for it.

It is necessary to note that arguing for a system of local accountability does not require or imply the existence of community in the local area. As demonstrated in

Chapter III, the obvious model of accountability is the English system of police committees. These are based on local areas and while remaining independent of local government, do report to local councils. Though by no means perfect, they do provide at least a rudimentary form of local accountability and their functioning does not require or depend on notions of community.

As mentioned earlier, except '*Huzur*' meetings, in Turkey, there is no consideration of regular meetings between police and business and professional people, or between police and students. This could be attributed to the fact that many policemen fear that the establishment of such meetings will somehow result in a diminution of their authority. Police responsiveness to voiced community needs, in my opinion, does not lessen police authority. Moreover, such meetings can provide the police with an opportunity to present their point of view to the community.

The police think and act as though they were responsible only to the internal police system, through its hierarchical structure to the chief administrator, and through him to the elected officials who hold political power. One effect of this attitude is that the typical patrolman never realises that he ought to seek approval for his activities from within the community in which he works. On the contrary, it is impressed upon him from the beginning by his peers that his primary responsibility is to the police subculture. This fosters an alienation from the community which is underscored by the most dominant characteristics of the police subculture: secrecy, cynicism, isolation, and a willingness to exercise authority — to the point of unauthorised violence — purely on behalf of police goals.

The police exhibit traditional behaviour in dealing with certain citizens, particularly those in the lower classes. The most common of these practices are: The use of profane and abusive language; commands to move on or get home; stopping and questioning people on the street or searching them and their cars; threats to use force if not obeyed; the actual use of physical force or violence itself.

Summary

It is worrying that terrorism, riots and crime panics have become an umbrella by which the use of weapons and violence directed to the people is legitimated. For this reason, the public satisfaction of the police is not at a satisfactory level. The Turkish people see the police as very tough, aggressive, impolite and unhelpful (PIAR 1992a: 20). Only a minority of the people are optimistic about the behaviour of the police. The traffic police are known as especially corrupt. Two out of three of parents do not

want their children to join the police force and the same ratio do not want their children to get married to someone from the police organisation (PIAR 1992a: 62).

The crucial and fragile key foundation of police effectiveness is public confidence and consent which, once eroded may be beyond restoration. This is that if the new form of policing is intended to win hearts and minds it must be a kind of policing which people can trust. In a system of democratic politics, confidence is placed in those institutions which can be made accountable to the public will. Where the police are concerned this means that 'if the people are to consent to be policed, the police must consent to submit to democratic control' (Simey 1983: 57). In this way a genuine system of community policing requires a much greater degree of local control than is allowed for in Turkish policing. Therefore, there is little reason to anticipate that the Turkish police would be prepared to consider or to agree to the extent of local control that is necessary if we wish to turn the notion of 'community policing' with limited public participation into a system of policing which is responsive to local needs and which is subject to considerable local influence. The main reasons are: political interference, public apathy, lack of proper selection criteria, inadequate training for recruits.

The Turkish police are not 'philosophers, guides, and friends' as Cumming *et al.* (1965) defined the police; in fact, they are alien to some groups such as trade and student unions and other democratic organisations. Furthermore, the increase in the misuse of force or authority by the police makes the majority of the population resentful. I remember how one of my close friends got angry with me when I told him that I was going to be a police sergeant after finishing university. Even my father, who is an ordinary citizen, got angry when I told him that I wanted to be a police sergeant. In this context, it is vital for the Turkish Police to gain a good reputation in the eyes of the public. This would be a starting point in order to sustain good relationships with the public.

Policy-makers and police authorities also need to appreciate the structure and nature of public perceptions of the police in order to institute measures that maximise public support for police work and minimise police-public discordance. Police cynicism and unprofessional conduct usually result from and are promoted by police alienation from the public. Power should be exercised showing commitment to justice and social democracy, and in accordance with the rule of law, equal respect for, and due enforcement of, the citizens' fundamental liberties. If police work is rooted on these premises and concerns, it will be easier for the positive attributes of policing to

become visible, and the police would not find it difficult to draw favourable perceptions, support and legitimacy from the members of the Turkish society.

As well as inside the police organisations, the sources of antagonistic relationships and discordance between the police and public lie outside police organisations. Thus, it can be suggested that the political and economic organisations and relations have resulted in the widespread oppressive and violent police behaviour. Consequently, administrative and personnel changes within the police organisations alone will accomplish little, although they are welcomed. The police in Turkey are what they are primarily because of underdeveloped social democratic and humane structures — legal, political and socio-economic — in the country since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Pervasive use of force and violence is a logical extension and a mechanism for enforcing political and economic repression in Turkey. After all, as Blumberg (1979) has observed, the police are the ‘social lightning rod’ and ‘a controlling radar’ calculated to keep people within the political and economic confines constructed for the society by its rulers, who stand to gain most from preserving the status quo.

While administrative reforms within the police oriented toward more just and democratic and less repressive policing are definitely desirable, at the present, the Turkish police cannot guarantee equality, fairness, justice, and individual liberties when political, economic and legal inequalities and incapacitates are continuously being strengthened through state policies and government programmes. Thus such changes cannot achieve much. Only concerted struggle and political will for social democracy and the development of authentic political and economic institutions that can sustain fundamental rights and liberties, social justice, fair and legitimate succession to power, can provide a lasting solution to the quagmire in which the Turkish society and police find themselves.

The Turkish police system does not provide any mechanism which allows individuals or groups to assess and comment on decisions, practices and policies. The system also does not allow individuals or groups directly to influence the making of decisions, the defining of practices or the initiation and development of policies. In the absence of local control of police, it is all too easy for the police function to be dictated (and controlled) by central government, rather than by a definition of the needs of a given society to control crime, maintain order or provide support.

The investigation of the police complaints system is also open to question. The system does not provide independent legislation regarding disciplinary offences. It is

too difficult to claim the impartiality of policing in the investigation of complaints by members of the public.

In the context of rapid economic and social change, another reason for police-community hostility is that the police role has remained the same while the needs of the community have been changing. The police must be made an integral part of the community if they are to be aware of the constantly changing needs and expectations of their clientele.

It must be admitted that defining the problem is easy. It is the task of finding and implementing the solutions to problems that makes life difficult but interesting. A very realistic, common-sense approach should be taken in constructing better police-community relations. The proposals which I would offer are simple: the basic idea is to make the police hierarchy more responsive to what is happening in the street. A decentralised power structure can make more intelligent personnel assignments and receive more community feedback. Giving well-trained patrolmen greater decision-making responsibility makes for better relations at the crucial point of contact between the police and the community. A patrolman can achieve an emotional identification with a neighbourhood if he realises that his daily decision can significantly affect the welfare of individuals whom he has come to know well.

Traditional policing has created a style of management that is terribly negative. The success of sergeants or upper ranks is not measured by what they accomplish positively, but by the degree to which they control their subordinates and keep them out of trouble. The mere suggestion that police officers operate with greater flexibility and greater independence is viewed as an anathema by many of those in middle management. Indeed, they are at a loss how to supervise employees with such freedom. To be sure, one cannot dismiss the need for controls in a system in which armed employees exercise enormous authority without being observed. Correcting the situation will require 3 major reorientation of police middle management. It will require the adoption of new values and new management techniques, as well as an acknowledgement that errors in judgement will occasionally be made.

In Turkey, it is too difficult to suggest that there is potential to bring about organisational changes which may turn the police into a less hierarchical organisation. The Turkish police have to respond to public and community needs and also to re-examine and change internal force culture, its organisational structure, social relationships within the force and formal communications, all of which make up what amounts to police service but which is not obvious to the public. Whereas

incident-driven policing is hierarchical, standardised and command-centralised, community policing is command decentralised and more flexible. This implies the need to change the role and function of police officers, redefine report emphasis and content and the role of line managers.

Unless the changing strategies and tactics of policing are accompanied by internal police organisational changes to be consistent with and supportive of community policing, any effort will be doomed to be very limited in its scope and likelihood for success. Such a wide-ranging adoption of community policing will and should have implications for recruitment, selection, training, performance evaluation, reward systems, and decentralisation. The police will thus become a better co-ordinator of activities and communications with criminal justice, and social agencies and, ultimately with the citizens themselves.

Chapter 7

Assessment and conclusion

This study has demonstrated that the implementation of community policing schemes do not necessarily produce the results proposed by the theoreticians. In theory, community policing schemes are both encouraging and optimistic in terms of improving police/public relations, police accountability and improving the legitimacy of the police. In practice, however, major limitations have been demonstrated in terms of any real effect on targeted problem areas. Critics argue that community policing schemes have either had little effect, or the results have not been those intended (Smith 1987, Bennett 1994a). Given this lack of result, or the results being 'off target', it would seem valid to question the degree to which community policing has been implemented. Critics of the schemes, particularly those from the hard left, suggest that the new initiatives are more an exercise in the rhetoric of public relations, than a foundation for building a new partnership between the police and the community (Gordon 1984, Scraton 1985, 1987). Some critics also claim that the police are only interested in selling consensus (Keith 1993).

The evidence suggests that at the level of official discourse and policing policy, the philosophy of policing in England and Wales is strongly connected with the principles of community policing despite the fact that the phrase is hardly ever used in official publications. There is less evidence, however, that community policing is part of the working philosophy or occupational culture (Bennett 1994b: 243). The empirical research evidence shows that there is often resistance among lower ranking officers to efforts to implement policing programmes which are in some way different to traditional enforcement policing methods. There is also some evidence that the further away from the enforcement model of policing the greater resistance (Bennett 1994a). The main reason for resistance to change among the lower ranks can be explained by police subculture (Holdaway 1983, 1989).⁴⁶ Thus, the main objective should be to change police subculture.

⁴⁶ There have traditionally been two approaches to changing police culture - to making the rank-and-file more socially responsive. One of these perspectives has emphasised legalistic or rule-making devices. The second has been to meet the police culture head-on and to attempt to change it directly by culturalistic devices. Legalistic approaches to the perceived autonomous practices of police culture have suggested that the primary way of dealing with it is one of rule-making. Police failure to act according to desirable requirements is portrayed as resulting from the absence of appropriate directives. The solution therefore is either to impose rules where they do not exist — for example — or alternatively, to specify in more detail, where the general rules of police work do not cover adequately the specifics of particular situations. Legalists acknowledge that rule-making on its own may have little effect on rank-and file practice. Rules, when not congruent with police practice, are there to be ingeniously broken, rather than to be obeyed. The heterogeneity of police practice, the varied situations of police work as it has developed historically, has meant that ways round the rules are constantly found. New rules can never catch up with police practice. Attempts to transform police practice that have envisaged the problem as critically one of rule-making have failed to recognise that 'where there is a will there is a way'. The culture is resilient. Rule-making practices on their own are insufficient. Principally, rule-making devices have failed to recognise that you cannot 'crush' the culture. They must be complemented by more sociological culturalistic approaches — seeking to change the culture

There is also evidence of a lack of knowledge among senior officers about the practical realities of the more innovative programmes and the problems that they are likely to face. It is likely that the more innovative the programme, and the further the programme from traditional enforcement policing, the less information that there will be for senior managers to draw upon (Bennett 1994a).

There is almost an implementation problem associated with management and planning (Gill and Thrasher 1985, Bennett 1994a). Due to less experience in implementing community oriented policing, police managers are likely to fail to provide the appropriate machinery for effective implementation. This is a general problem in England and Wales and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is currently involved with the Home Office in developing qualitative performance indicators. The development of community policing programmes will require further changes to management process including the development of appropriate police training, methods of performance review, effective, relevant, and useful management information, and management styles including, perhaps, greater involvement of the junior ranks in management decisions.

As explained in Chapter IV, there appear to be fundamental problems associated with developing partnerships between the police and other agencies. It would be expected that further expansion of the police role and further developments in community-oriented approaches to policing would almost inevitably lead to greater involvement of the police with other agencies. The research suggests that multi-agency partnership

from inside (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 96-7). The ways of thinking and of acting by police officers are to be changed by exposing them to more community-sensitive values and norms. However, the latter are also insufficient on their own. Attempting to change the culture — for example, by changes in the patterns of recruitment or training — to alter the racism or sexism of the police culture, ignores the overall rule-bound nature of police-work. Legalistic and culturalistic devices are complementary (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 97).

These two devices draw on a biological analogy in suggesting how that culture might be changed. Changing the character of the culture, the culturalistic approach, and the limiting the intake of particular life-giving gases to that seedbed, rule-making approaches, are interrelated devices in tackling the police culture.

Cultural reproduction requires two critical elements - defences against the infiltration of impurities, and life-giving oxygen. Impervious barriers prevent the importation and implanting of foreign strains. The more aseptic the atmosphere, the more likely that a pure culture can be reproduced. Controlling police culture, making rank-and-file police officers more receptive to social demands, means breaching those protective barriers and substituting more community-benevolent cells. Second, the culture requires oxygen for the cells to propagate. It requires space, territory, in which to survive and multiply. Constraining those survival and reproduction processes requires closure techniques to diminish the supply of oxygen, and to decrease the autonomous space of the culture, constraining police discretion, requires restrictions upon the space within which the culture survives (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 97).

is limited in its effectiveness. One solution proposed in the literature is to limit multi-agency collaboration to the planning stage and managerial level of contact. Most practical work could then be conducted by independent agencies working within an agreed planning framework. Another solution is to recognise the problems associated with multi-agency partnerships and take steps to tackle these problems directly.

Apart from the problem of the hiatus which exists between the theories and the realities of implementation, it may be unrealistic to expect community policing schemes to provide a nostrum for a police image tainted by the public exposure of corruption. Police forces are caught in a cleft stick; decline in accountability and the renewed drive to be seen to be taking strenuous action against corruption has exposed serious scandals in recent years, especially within the large Metropolitan forces. Instead of perceiving this as a positive effect of community policing initiatives, the exposure of corruption is often viewed by the public with cynicism. Large communities believe that police corruption is inherent and widespread and that the scandals brought into public view represent only a fraction of the undesirable activity which occurs within police forces from day to day.

Apart from the effects of corruption scandals, the possible reasons for such a pessimistic view of the theory of community policing can be summarised as lack of incorporation between the analysis of the social causes of crime and the ways in which the police deal with social problems. Communities possess unique characteristics in terms of experiencing and responding to the problems of crime. This, frequently results in misunderstandings and ineffective communication between the police and the communities they are trying to serve. Community potential is often overlooked or undervalued and the domination of the police in setting up community policing schemes and directing the use of resources can result in resentment and suspicion between the police and existing community agencies (Stephens 1988). In some communities, especially those in which minority groups form a majority and where economic and social problems are severe, community policing schemes have proved to be counter-productive. In some places the tension between the police and the community (especially the black community) increased because of the use of such schemes as agencies of intelligence gathering (Scruton 1985). This caused lack of partnership between agencies such as the department of education, health, environment, employment and the social services. As Scruton (1985: 139) argues:

Community-policing initiatives are in practice a far cry from progressive police-community relations. The use of such a strategy to 'gain the confidence' of other agencies, key workers in the community and the people themselves, provides the opportunity for a level of targeting and surveillance which no previous strategy could offer. Coupled with the proven lack of political

accountability, it has only consolidated police autonomy but has also laid the foundation for a form of total policing without effective consultation and with no check on the use of police discretion.

The experiment of community policing also suggests that police-initiated activity is mostly adversarial and that consensus-building activity is hard to plan (Smith 1987). Most consensus-building activities failed to recognise that the answer to the problems stretch out beyond police potential. Whereas the police are an important component in handling the problems that face society, the police function alone is ultimately limited in what it can achieve. The fictional status of liberal visions of society creates a situation in which the nature of real policing depends upon common acceptance of normative images of the function of the police institution. Policing practices too have a dual status, tied to the images of policing they connote and the real effects they may produce. To take just one high-profile example: the 'value' of neighbourhood-watch schemes is, quite understandably, measured for the police not solely by their success in reducing arithmetically measured crime rates (Keith 1993: 226).

The perception the police have of themselves as the main agents of maintaining social order in modern industrial societies is a real threat to attempts to improve the legitimacy of the police. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that the responsibility of the police must be to maintain and control the environment within which conflict can be safely expressed, analysed and managed. It should not be the responsibility of the police to express and manage it; the police cannot solve other people's conflicts. They can, however, provide the conditions within which it may be easier for them to do so. Community policing schemes are unlikely to succeed while many of those governed by the existing systems continue to be socially, economically and politically marginalised.

In order to increase the legitimacy of police practices in an area, consultation is suggested as one of the principles of policing (Scarman 1982). The one concrete change in this area has been the creation of the police consultative groups, which were required by PACE, section 106. However, Chapter III demonstrated that the use of various forms of consultative committees in England and Wales has not resulted in greater control of the police or in an increased sharing of power with it. Because they lack information and professional advice, the consultative groups are not able to engage in an intelligent discussion on equal terms with local police managers about policing policy and practice. As a result the discussion tends to be ritualistic. Once a group has covered the early stages (in which there will be a fair amount of anti-police posturing in left-wing areas) it will generally become a means whereby the police

confer legitimacy on the policies and practices they have decided to adopt. To say that the groups are used to confer legitimacy is, of course, different from saying (as the hard left do) that they are used to imply direct control on the community and are successfully co-opted to participate actively in pursuing police-defined objectives (For the perspective from the left, see for example Gordon 1984).

Consideration should be given to the gap between the rhetoric of the ideology of consultation and the realities of full implementation. Regarding the composition and characteristic development of consultative committees, it has been suggested that although they can be of value in ventilating local problems and promoting practical co-operative solutions, they have not had much success in building, in any serious way, the hoped-for partnership between the police and the community (Morgan 1987a).

Various explanations for this failure can be summarised as 'confusion and ignorance' on the part of committee members, the lack of education to help them in their role, the negative response to the police and the committees — for understandable reasons — from certain elements in the community, and the reluctance of police forces — for equally understandable reasons — to provide adequate information to the committees or to treat them as much more than a public relations forum. PCCs are usually officer-led and do not begin to provide the degree of representation of local interests which has been claimed for them. PCC members were disproportionately male, middle class, middle aged, and were active members of the community. Few PCC members had adversarial experience of the police nor did they have much contact with people who did have. Members were generally pro-police in their attitudes when they joined (Morgan 1986). PCC members were fairly ignorant of day-to-day policing methods and procedures and their meetings tended to be dominated by the police and police accounts which tended to stress the rising incidents of serious crime and the paucity of police resources. Overall police priorities or use of resources were rarely questioned and PCC members tended to become sympathetic towards rather than critical of the police (Morgan 1986). They might, indeed, be better viewed as a diversion from, rather than a substitute for, local accountability of police. Involving citizens means many things to many people, but if it does address the activation of individual, organisational and associational efforts at attempting to control crime and the forces that generate it, then simply 'feeling good', and 'improving' attitudes towards the police is all that can be expected, and positive as this is, it may be short-lived if that is all policing efforts are capable of delivering.

Although a commitment to developing a more robust and vigorous system of local consultation would help police authorities to gain a better purchase on grass roots policing priorities and would help create more effective local force for holding the police to account, it is becoming increasingly evident that local accountability to police authorities has undermined. It is being replaced by a degree of central control amounting to a *de facto* national force (Reiner 1991). It is obvious that the perceived lack of adequate local accountability has been a major factor undermining police legitimacy in recent years.

The success of community policing to a large extent depends on decentralisation and improving the accountability of policing locally. However, the immediate future for locally elected police authorities and local responsibility which has traditionally characterised policing in England and Wales would appear to look bleak. The Conservative government's recent legislative package includes the increase of the size of local police authorities from 16 to 17 with eight elected councillors appointed. The remaining 17 members will include three magistrates and five people nominated by the Home Office (The *Guardian*, 2 March 1994). Such an increase in the involvement of the Home Office must be a matter of concern as direct involvement in locally run services encourages responsive management and greater police commitment. If the service role of the police is to be sustained, then local mechanisms of accountability need to be strengthened, rather than weakened; a policy is needed which seeks to complement, rather than replace. Accountability must be fully realised through elected representatives, performance review, customer choice and the Citizen's Charter.

According to recent Home Office proposals nominated members of police boards or other authorities are unlikely to enjoy either the authority or legitimacy to enable them to challenge central directives or informal pressures. The system which is to replace it, however, contains profound threats to both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the police. This is because the bodies to which the police will be accountable at local level lack the representation and legitimacy which stem from election. Instead they will be dominated by appointees of the Home Office and magistrates (appointed by the Lord Chancellor). Unlike elected local authorities these cannot be ejected at the ballot box if they do not represent local opinion.

In this kind of structure, the notion that the chief officer and his board members could genuinely determine policing priorities must be viewed as unlikely. The over-riding, centrally-determined performance indicators coupled with the veto power held by the central department over member nominations would inevitably mean that local

discretion would be limited and subjected to government intervention. The replacement of some elected councillors with members nominated by the Home Secretary will enhance central control over police authorities.

Most policing matters concern only local areas, relating to small-scale crime and peace-keeping problems. Determining the objectives and priorities of this police work and the allocation of resources should be the responsibility of the locally elected police authority in conjunction with their chief officer of police. The local authority would have the primary responsibility for policing in its area with a general and perhaps statutory responsibility for law enforcement, crime prevention and community safety.

Loveday (1993) argues that since most policing decisions primarily concern local matters, there must be an important role for local government. The involvement of local government is also necessary to balance the power of central government and of the professional police themselves. Because the police are the agency entrusted with the state's monopoly of legitimated force, it is vital that the control of policing is divided between different independent bodies to prevent a monolithic concentration of coercive power. Although the power of local police authorities has been drastically weakened in recent years under the tripartite system, local government, at least, has provided part of the countervailing power, balancing that of central government and the police.

The authority should be a wholly elected body and also a purchaser of services. The social market approach provides a useful mechanism to enable an elected authority to overcome the problems traditionally associated with a service dominated by its chief officers. Clearly, the national performance measures and close overseeing which the Home Secretary plans to exercise on the basis of the comparative data provided by police authorities, will effectively circumscribe the degree of police independence which chief officers have in the past traditionally exercised.

Locally, accountable policing is not just a matter of democratic legitimacy, however, but of effectiveness. Studies of how police clear up crimes show that successful detection is primarily the consequence of public co-operation (Reiner 1992a, Kinsey *et al.* 1986). The primary determinant of police effectiveness in dealing with crime is not managerial efficiency or technical prowess but the flow of information. The lifeblood of policing is support. If sections of society are alienated from the police this is not only regrettable in itself but a serious barrier to investigation of crime. Government plans to decrease the possibility of local communities influencing

policing through the ballot box will undermine effective policing, no matter how rationally they reorganise management structures and expose police officers to dismissal for failing to meet targets.

The structure of police decision-making and accountability should above all ensure that the power over police decision-making is not monolithic but divided between central government, local government and police officers themselves as the appointed officials. The responsibility of local government for ensuring that local services meet the needs and priorities of local people must be accepted if the essence of liberal democracy is not to be undermined.

An important consequence of the application of the idea of community policing has been a renewed emphasis on foot patrols. Police in vehicles answering calls over a wide area have been equated with large scale and centralisation, while officers on foot (or perhaps on a wobbly bicycle) have been equated with the capacity to engage with the community and respond to its needs. But there is very little evidence to show that a shift in the balance towards foot patrol is a successful policy. The Network Foot Patrol experiment (Police Foundation 1981) appeared to demonstrate a decline in the fear of crime associated with an increase in the level of foot patrols, but it could not show any more tangible benefit. Similarly, Weatheritt (1985) argues that the British innovations in policing are less encouraging.

In this regard, it should also be mentioned that most research lacks a methodology which gives relative measurements of success. It is commonly assumed that if an intervention is successful then the crime rate will go down. It is also assumed that success will bring about a more secure feeling or reduce fear of crime. It needs to be noted that a successful programme may result in increasing reporting and the true impact on unreported crime may not be known for some time (Friedmann 1992: 44). As Pawson and Tiley (1993: 1) argue

...there is a need for the incorporation of *scientific realist* strategy into evaluation. Evaluation research, at the present suffers from inconsistent results, non-replicability, partisan disagreement and above all lack of cumulation.

The effectiveness of community policing can be analysed from two opposed perspectives. On the one hand, it is a system that is sensitive to the needs of local communities, attempting to fabricate a proper partnership between police and public to combat crime. On the other hand, is it a form of police work that not only extends surveillance capabilities but also enhances police control over society by dovetailing this form of policing with the reactive style (Stephens 1988: 111).

There is a potential conflict between the two styles of policing and this will remain until such time as the police decide whether community policing in general is to become both a proper alternative to reactive policing and an opportunity to create an honest partnership with the public (Stephens 1988: 112). This concern was not addressed by Lord Scarman (1982). He argues that there would remain circumstances in which it would prove necessary for the police to employ 'hard' activities such as stop and search and the use of specialist squads (Scarman 1982: para. 4.56). To Scarman, the significant question was not the actual deployment of police saturation tactics or of units like the SPG, but the consultation with the public that ought to conduct their deployment. As explained in Chapter III, the consultation processes set out by Scarman seem unable to deliver such a development. Scarman also failed to address the extent to which the style of policing in the inner city areas had become confrontational. While Scarman outlines the problems caused by 'hard' policing, and while he also describes the advantages of a more consensual style of policing, he does not fully scrutinise the inherent conflicts between them. The Scarman report also fails to declare clear support for the replacement of hard-line policing. Finally, although Scarman gave much credit to consultation, it is similarly unclear why the public would desire to co-operate with the police if the police not only fail to introduce a more consensual method of policing, but also remain with the reactive kind (Baldwin and Kinsey 1982: 243).

Scarman argues that the future use of 'hard-line' tactics would have to be a matter of professional judgement for the police (Scarman 1982: para. 4.75). With the continuing belief in the emphasis on the detection and arrest of criminals within the police force, it is not surprising that the police have continued to pursue reactive policing strategies in such large measure. Scarman failed to realise that community policing was not the kind of activity that could be simply added on to a predominantly non-consensual and reactive style of policing (Baldwin and Kinsey 1982: 245). Consequently, while Scarman gave a political objective to police forces to be seen to be doing something in the community policing field, it would be a mistake to think that community policing has been a great success or that it has provided a genuine alternative to reactive policing.

Regarding the nature of communities, it can be suggested that the idea of community does not seem to provide us with a model for dealing with the conflicts between the police and the communities they serve: Chapter V shows that communities differ in their demands for policing. The question is how can the idea of community be used in thinking about policing and the links between its application in that field? One

answer to this question could be given that policing affects different groups in entirely different ways. In implementing community policing schemes, communities should be analysed and viewed as a multidimensional concept, or variable, of social and symbolic organisation of the human environment that provides meaningful channels for individual and collective action.

Although police/public relations were worsened by some forms of police action such as corruption scandals, and apparent racial discrimination, the attempt to improve their image through various kinds of community policing initiatives is, in principle, an objective which deserves support. Fostering more harmonious police/public relations is valuable in itself as well as being a means by which the police can count on individuals to provide the kind of information that will help them in their fight against crime (Kinsey *et al.* 1986).

To a large extent, the success of community-based crime prevention programmes based upon local policies which attempt to alter the social and economic fabric of neighbourhoods, will ultimately depend on the development of, or at least support for, the same policies at both national and regional levels. However, there is room for local communities to manoeuvre within the overall constraints of national and regional socio-economic policies. Resources for combating crime can be specifically targeted on those areas which need them the most; residents in high crime areas can learn how to use existing resources more effectively; administrative arrangements can be re-organised in order to focus resources more closely on the needs and problems identified by local inhabitants; the democratisation of political power can empower local citizens to achieve their objectives more readily and effectively. Thus, there is scope for developing local strategies for combating crime which go beyond tinkering with the physical environment and influence the social, economic and cultural conditions associated with crime in particular areas. There are several means by which a closer relationship between police and community could be encouraged.

The first one is defined as cultural colonialism — taking the police to the community (Brogden & Shearing 1993). Cultural colonialism, as a method for police reform has some components, varying from selection and training devices to tactics of community element. It presumes a public regulation to change existing police values and norms and to substitute alternatives deemed more congruent with those of wider public. In Western forces, colonising cop culture through 'positive' selection and training has been given authoritative imprimaturs through police academies. These initiatives assumes that police culture is an limitation to the professional accomplishment of policework. They are premised on the assumption that directives

of law and of police management are being subverted by the cop culture which is conceived of as alien to the host body. These techniques attempt to colonise the space occupied by the 'alien' culture. The central idea is to promote a culture which is more supportive of legal and organisational directives (Brogden & Shearing 1993).

The thesis developed from the orthodox position is that more representative and better trained police will be in accord with both communal requirements and democratic norms. This argument assumes that the principle source of the problems with policing is the predisposition of rank-and-file police, which are often incongruent with democratic values and norms. According to this analysis, transforming cop culture requires the introduction of new selection devices. A related and complementary strategy involves rewarding people within the police who possess the appropriate characteristics but whose inclinations have been subverted by a hostile cop culture, to act in accord with their 'natural' predispositions (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 98-9).

Selection devices typically have two targets — personality factors and attitudinal characteristics — on the grounds that the police culture reflects the origin of police officers. Orthodox critics assume that traditionally certain kinds of authoritarian individuals choose the police occupation to fit their personality or that police officers are actually selected from a more conservative and authoritarian section of the population.⁴⁷

Secondly, there is the idea of devising alternative performance measures. The nature and focus of crime prevention work within the police profession needs to be clarified and enhanced, particularly amongst the lower ranks. The idea that the main function of the police is to detect mainly serious crime, irrespective of its frequency in, or impact on, local communities, needs to be qualified. To enhance the status of community policing in general and beat policing in particular, the advantages of proactive work and the disadvantages of reactive work need to be identified.

⁴⁷ Strategies of cultural colonisation have been criticised on the grounds that they do less in practice to incorporate community sensibilities into the police culture their advocates think Cop culture, the evidence suggests, is remarkably resilient. It is accordingly the new sensibilities acquired through training that are most likely to be subverted by the old, not the old by the new. Recruitment and training makes a difference, but not as much of a difference as one would hope. The general lesson from cultural colonialist device is that they have little impact in themselves. Recruitment of officers from a different background, a more heterogeneous intake, and specific forms of attitude and behaviour training can only make marginal inroads on the negative features of the police culture. There are only minor gains to be made through such orthodox selection and training solutions to the perceived cultural problem (Brogden & Shearing: 103).

There is an urgent great need to produce a sensible balance between reactive and proactive policing and it is necessary to enhance proactive work. The introduction of other performance indicators in addition to arrest and process reports could assist this. These could include the development of productive contacts with local groups and agencies and changes in reporting levels and clear up rates for those crimes of most concern to the public.

The third promising area which would affect the community's role is crime prevention. The greatest promise, given the problem of community definition, resistance by the occupational culture of the ranks and the management philosophy, lies in situational crime prevention (Poyner 1982, in Fielding 1986). Co-operation in prevention programmes is important and desirable but it suits the present policy to side-step the culturally and structurally embedded problems and to attempt to control opportunities for crime ecologically by reducing the situations in which crimes can be committed. Measures include supervision of children's play on housing estates, vandal resistant design, property marking schemes and improved lighting. The members of the community should be encouraged to provide feedback to the police department on its individual officers and general department performance. This feedback loop will assure that top-level policy makers know what is expected or demanded in different communities.

Regarding the community's role in crime prevention, as examined in Chapter IV, in the 1980s a quite different type of community-based strategy blossomed in the form of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes. The schemes are conceived of as providing the police with assistance through the promotion of community crime control. However, the schemes are exist on the paper than in practice. Significantly, they appear to have signally failed to influence police practices. The main reasons could be attributed to the fact that in England and Wales the communities are more heterogeneous. They are imposed from the top — from the police — not growing from the grass roots of the community.

It is also important that an agency other than the police be set up to assist people in neighbourhoods to form community groups which can co-operate with the police or act independently in advising and associating community members. Often the community-organising initiatives of the community policing schemes die out because the people do not know how to organise themselves, or how to go about understanding the problems that concern them, or how to participate co-operatively in such a process with the police, or other public agencies. It should also be considered that the police department is not the appropriate agency to take on the general

function of supporting local groups to organise themselves for problem solving. Other agencies, public and private, have the appropriate skills and more initial credibility.

The fourth proposal concerns training. Police training should focus more on increasing professional skills relevant to community policing, especially the development of communicating and organising skills, on work with other agencies and on community relations work, especially with minority groups and work with the young and elderly. The police officers should be educated and trained in the expectations of the communities they serve. They must be made aware of which differences may exist between gender or ethnic groups or between social classes so they can bring their own style of policing into line with the expectations of the community and the department.

The final proposal deals with police/public consultation. Insofar as police effectiveness depends upon public co-operation, the police should construct strategies to prevent those crimes and public nuisances which are of greatest concern to the community. The police should not and cannot "own" the crime problem, so strategies should be developed together with residents and local agencies and the police should keep the public informed about developments. Local surveys can be used to establish the priorities of a community, what the community expects and demands of the police and which areas or groups are most at risk from crime or victimisation.

Police/public consultation can ideally influence the occupational culture by requiring police officers to directly local public perceptions of their function and of their degree of efficiency in meeting publicly determined goals. They can provide an alternative reference group, away from the immediate work-group influence of police peers. However, as mentioned earlier and in Chapter III, police/public consultation schemes (PCCs) have been criticised in England and Wales for several reasons (Morgan 1987a). Lacking an appropriate representational structure and continuing membership (on both and community side) and sanctioning powers, they have generally been atypical of local communities. Debate over critical policing issues has largely been absent, more trivial issues have dominated. Police officers have increasingly set the forum agenda for meetings, so that their priorities have police concerns rather than communal ones. Police Consultative Committees might be conceived of as ideal way in which the culture could be influenced and made responsive by direct interaction between the relevant local police officers and representative members of the community. However, it appears that cultural attributes remain almost totally unaffected by such experiences (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 104).

Considering the picture of police/public relations in Turkey, it can be suggested that the crisis in democracy, the politicisation of the police, tremendous powers given to the police by the law and the police code, insufficient laws which fails to explain the power of the police in their everyday encounters with the public, and the arbitrary use of police power has resulted in disharmonious relations between the police and the public. The character of policing is shaped by politicisation, lack of democratic participation in the policing policy making process, lack of consultation between the police and the public, the use of arbitrary force, and lack of respect for basic individual democratic rights.

In Turkey, it is unfortunate that there is no definite law which defines the power of arrest and detention. This lack of clarity in the law and leaving the power to arrest and detain at police discretion results in arbitrary arrests. For example, between 1978 and 1987, over 635 000 people were arrested and taken under preliminary detention. Of these who were arrested, 202.507 were transferred to the Public Prosecutors. Amongst these, only 150 348 were charged. Of those who were charged, only 76.136 were imprisoned (Human Rights Association, Ankara Branch 1991: 13, *Anti Teror mu? Anti Demokrasi mi?*) (Is it anti terror or anti democracy?).

The reason for such a great percentage of arbitrary arrests may be due to the fact that the powers of arrest and detention are not found in one single act. Not only the powers of the police, but also the right of citizens are difficult to trace in the various acts. The powers and rights themselves are often expressed ambiguously or in unclear language, exceptions to the general rule are not mentioned or in some cases not explained in detail. For example, in the context of the use of force in effecting an arrest, the law simply stipulates that 'the police can use reasonable force to effect on arrest, as much as the circumstances necessitate', without specifying its circumstances (Article 17/1(b) PVSK (Eryilmaz 1995).

Given the fact that this is the only guidance provided by the law to be applied by the police officers, the legislature in doing so, gives unfettered discretion to the police and does not provide an adequate for the application of restrictions and limitations. It is obvious that for a police officer, the concepts of 'public morals', 'security of the public', 'authority of the State and government' (Article 127, *CMUK*), 'public peace' (Article 12, *PVSK*) are vague and inadequate in terms of putting their understanding of such concepts onto practice. Not surprisingly, this lack of definitions has not resulted in the police developing a uniform and fair application of the rules. As mentioned earlier, arbitrary arrests are commonplace and many innocent people continue to be disturbed by police conduct (Eryilmaz 1995).

Although the desire to limit the power of the police is patently an important objective in a liberal society in the context of Turkish law, the rules and safeguards are drawn up too loosely. Despite the relatively broad interpretation of the main rules, general rules are not articulated by the Acts themselves. Accordingly, the application of the law has been left largely at the discretion of the police. This results in different interpretations of the same powers by different police officers. On the other hand despite the existence of the wide discretionary arrest and detention powers granted to the police, the nature of any compensating obligations remain vague. There is nothing to stop the police from arresting someone and having them questioned for a while and then to release him or her. The procedures also do not provide satisfactory means of supervision and review in order to diminish the suspicion of what goes on behind the closed doors of the police stations. The police have been given tremendous unquestionable power over the arrested and detained person (Eryilmaz 1995).

In Turkey, where the police are polarised politically, and in the absence of any clear guide-line, police officers will make their own rules in accordance with their political judgements. It is reasonable to suggest that this imbalance has proved to be counter-productive and has led to citizen alienation and loss of confidence in the police. Such loss of confidence in return has resulted in a big gap between the state and its representatives and the public and the police have been left without the active support of the community. Therefore, it is necessary that a balance be struck between rigidly defined laws and discretion of law enforcement officers.

In the light of this study, what conclusions can be drawn about improving police community relations in Turkey? What are the implications for discussion about building a partnership between the police and the public which will result in increased confidence in the police and improve the public perception of the police? In order to improve policing policies in Turkey, what are the lessons that can be learned from the practice of community policing in England and Wales?

The adoption of community policing in Turkey depends on a wide range of conditions. Pawson and Tilley (1993) argue that actual outcome patterns of policing interventions will follow from the outworking of the range of potential mechanisms whose functioning is rendered possible by contexts conducive to their operation (Pawson & Tilley 1994: 302). As far as the context is considered, there are substantial differences between Turkey and England and Wales. In Turkey an appropriate context is needed for the operation of community policing mechanisms. There are major contextual problems which needed to be overcome if community policing is to have

any likelihood of success in Turkey. These are mainly the absence of democratic control of policing, the resistance to change in the police organisation (police culture) — especially the opposition to greater public participation and control and the preference of reactive policing strategies, the top-down, centralised police structure.

In England and Wales, we see some form of the active participation of the public in policing, such as the Police Consultative Committees, Police Liaison Programs and Police Surgeries. As shown in Chapter V, the active participation of the community in policing matters in Turkey is non-existent. The reason for this lack of participation is the absence of a democratic structure for policing and a lack of channels through which the police can be made accountable to the community. In Turkey, the existing constitutional principles of police governance are inadequate for a democratisation of policing. In the absence of an effective and meaningful form of local democratic representation and participation in policing matters, the introduction of community policing remains suspicious. In order to implement community policing successfully, there must be real changes in the balance of power between the police and the community. However, as demonstrated in Chapter V, the authoritarian police culture in Turkey is likely to refuse the idea of power shearing between the police and the community (p. 189).

Another fundamental problem is the lack of understanding of the community by the police. In a centralised policing structure, as Gill and Thrasher (1985) pointed out, top-down models of community policing are inadequate. A nationally top-down set agenda could lead to an information gathering exercise which may lead to increasing surveillance. Without democratic participation and control community policing represents the policy needs of the 'authoritarian state'. In the context of a centralised, top-down policing structure, implementing community policing could lead agencies such as education, social service departments, being colonised to carry out territorially based crime control functions under the direction of the police. If these issues are not addressed openly, a community policing program will be flawed, and there is every possibility that marginalised and dissenting voices will not participate or be adequately represented. Therefore, policing in Turkey needs fundamental constitutional reform, which provides a form of participatory democratic arrangements and process that are flexible, recognise plurality, fragmentation, difference, heterogeneity, antagonism and conflict of interests.

In any social structure, individuals and groups will have different interests so that some conflict of interests is inevitable. In so far as the police are delivering services, these should be distributed fairly between groups and individuals. In so far as the

police are enforcing the law in their adversarial role, the pattern of enforcement should be fair. (Kinsey *et al.* 1986: 145-6) argue that, the problem of lack of participation and representation could be resolved by legislatively ensuring that political and organisational structure of the police force is open, democratic and accountable.

The idea that policing policy should be responsive to some expression of the views of the public derives from the democratic principle that government should reflect the wishes of the people. What is the most appropriate method of testing the views of the public is open to debate. One method is through elected representatives. However, as shown in this study, in England and Wales, elected representatives lack the formal powers they would need in order to exert an influence on policing policy. In Turkey, I would suggest that there is scope for aspects of policing policy to be determined by local representative bodies if they are adequately serviced by professional advisers and are adequately represented groups that come into conflict with the police. They should also be given statutory power to determine broad policy priorities. Another method is to use surveys of the general public, of people who have been in contact with the police.

In determining the order of priorities, the allocation of resources between different activities and objectives, and the choice of policing methods, the police should be responsive to the views of a representative body. Power to determine policing policy should not be concentrated but distributed between a number of different bodies. As far as possible, citizen should participate in discussion of policing policy with police managers. A representative body should be able to engage in a continuing dialogue with the professional managers of the police force so as to become better informed. Policy makers should also concentrate on openness, information, and the opportunity for people to see, as directly as possible, what the police do and how they do it.

One of the main objectives in discussing the British experiment of community policing in improving police community relations in Turkey is the devolution of power or the development of police/public consultation. If the emphasis on 'public service' is to become not just an ideal but a reality, then police organisations will have to develop their institutional capacity to listen more effectively to what the public feel they need, and be able to respond in a manner which is more accountable to the public while safeguarding professionalism and the requirements of the law.

In Turkey a new understanding of policing is essential. This requires the elimination of the implementation of an existing one. This can be achieved by community

policing or schemes that seek to enhance community police liaison. These schemes focus attention on the police and involve endeavours to provide greater citizen support for the police, greater input into what the police do, as well as more ongoing supervision of the police by the community.

Considering the application of community policing in Turkey, sociologically, there are some encouraging hopes of implementing community policing successfully. However, the organisation of the police imposes some structural limitations on community policing by virtue of being a closed system; that is, being of a hierarchical quasi-military nature. It can also be suggested that police organisations in Turkey are not flexible and adaptive, and these are necessary conditions for community policing. As in the case in England and Wales, organisational rigidity among police agencies will resist such efforts. Because enormous discretion is left in the hands of the police, politically and legally, the application of community policing is severely limited. The challenge that the public should become involved in shaping the general policing policies of an area is an important issue. However, in Turkey, crime prevention has not become part of the traditional political agenda in the same way that education, health, the economy and other public policy issues are discussed. In order to involve the public in policing matters and produce policies and put them into practice, the police force in Turkey needs to undergo radical organisational change, possibly towards decentralisation. In Turkey, police culture has been commonly depicted as the major impediment to Turkish police transformation, a key obstacle to policing in response to community demands.

Considering the improvement of the public perception of the police, Turkey needs to raise the educational and training standards of the police. The inevitability of granting some degree of discretion to police officers brings into play the importance of training. As well as emphasising the importance of understanding criminal law, police officers should be given training in sociology, physiology and all the social skills necessary for police work. Policies must be introduced to attract graduates to the service and to encourage higher education for serving police. Significant changes must be introduced in recruit training. If these policies are put into practice, this may prevent a further erosion of public confidence in police professional standards.

In order to control the practice of the police with consideration of the democratic right of the public, *PVSK*, and *ETK*, introduced in the late 1930s, need to be altered and some new democratic articles must be included. The existing codes do not adequately meet the requirements of democratic, consensual, fair and just policing in this period of rapid economic and social change.

Another set of policies promoting the growth of civil society would be the strengthening of local governments. Because of the potential for the abuse of the police service, local government should, like central government, play a significant part in police decision making, informed by the expertise and experience of police officers. Policing in Turkey should both seek to empower people at a very local level to determine the order in which they will live their lives and to police it themselves. In making these proposals community differences should be recognised and community participation and control over ordering should be encouraged. However this may not result in what we want to achieve. As Bennett argues:

There are grounds to believe that decentralisation in the absence of more fundamental change is unlikely to be effective in achieving either implementation or outcome objectives. This conclusion suggests that attempts to date to implement community policing have been conducted within organisational structures that have undergone either no reform or only partial reform. Although there is view that community policing operational strategies can be effectively "bolted onto" quite different organisational structures community policing is unlikely to be implemented effectively (Bennett 1994b: 234).

A direct road to improving policing practices in Turkey would be to rise the socio-economic status of the Turkish police as an occupation, thus drawing on recruits from a less conservative and traditional background, and to increase the recruitment and career opportunities of working class and of women generally. However, there is insignificant indication that changes in recruitment patterns at last yield a notable different type of policing. Police culture seems to be primarily rebounding to changes in recruitment patterns in relation to stratification. The evidence from Western police forces suggests that unless significant numbers of personnel are recruited from other than the dominant groups, their inclusion is likely to have minimal effect on prevailing culture. For example, research literature suggests that women police officers in a largely male force, tend to adopt either overtly 'POLICEwomen definitions (embracing the male culture as their own), or policeWOMEN (those who see themselves as fulfilling the more traditional expectations associated with the role of policewomen) the service role' (Ehrlich-Martin 1980; in Brogden & Shearing 1993: 100). The culture does not change significantly just because more women are recruited.

The culture has a outstanding competence to reproduce itself, to resocialize recruits (Brogden & Shearing 1993: 101). In Turkey, simple chain recruitment practices with regard to class and gender are unlikely to have alike effect the day-to-day practice of policework unless accompanied by important structural changes in the character of

police organisation related to the normative handling of police-public encounters. Similarly, unless new patterns of local policing are followed, combined with less exclusive opportunities for promotion, any changes in recruitment patterns will have little benefit.

To summarise, it would be wrong to suggest that the objectives of community policing are either unworthy or completely impossible to achieve. In my opinion, although the implementation of community policing is much more difficult, in reality than in theory, the spirit is right. So far, critics have not suggested an alternative strategy to a community-based policing approach. It would be advisable to continue experimenting with the concept of community policing, as long as we remain alert to the hazards. Still, there are some trends that seem to be relatively robust — at least for the time being. It seems clear, for example, that citizens like community policing programmes. As Skogan (1992; in Pawson and Tilley 1993: 15) reports:

There is evidence in many evaluations that public hungry for attention has a great deal to tell the police. When they see more police walking on foot or working out of a local substation, they feel less fearful.

This means, Turkey can and should learn from the lessons of others, especially experience of the English and Welsh. However, this is very different from simply 'buying' their 'models'. As Friedman points out:

There are temptations in a comparative effort to examine the possibilities of importing some aspects of successful policing from one country to another...a policing tactic should not be imposed when it does not fit (Friedman 1992: 201).

Consideration of the specificities of the context are crucial to decisions over such transplants (Friedman: 1992: 203-4). Learning from others requires the adoption of a critical stance towards their institutions. Community-based policing strategies only work if they fire the appropriate mechanisms in the appropriate context (Pawson & Tilley 1993: 7).

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