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Analysis of Sports Policy in Greece, through
a Strategic Relations Perspective 1980-93

by

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SYNOPSIS

The aim of this study is to identify the changing nature of sports policy in Greece in the period 1980-93. Key themes addressed were the relationship between policy goals and the political values of the principal political actors; the impact of the changing nature of the economic and social structure on policy goals and implementation; and the significance of national, local and transnational influences and contexts for sports policy. This study reflects a concern to develop knowledge in this field, in the sense both that Greek sports policy as an object of study has received little research attention, and that the framework of strategic relations theory, which has informed this analysis, has not been employed to date in investigations of sports policy systems in the literature.

Gathering of data in Greece, incorporated both secondary sources, which provided aspects of the structural picture of sport, and primary data derived from interviews, which principally focused on the relations between actual policy outcomes, the goals of individuals and groups, and the struggles occurring within the social and political structure. Interviews were undertaken at various levels within the hierarchies of sports organisation and of the state.

The principal elements of the concluding analysis in this study were: first, a focus on political change, from the socialist to right wing government, which resulted in changes in economic and social policy, which were themselves reflected in the nature of sports policy; second, a focus on the position of groups and individuals, and the strategic relations within the structures which are subject to policy changes; and third, an analysis of how local, national, and transnational influences have mediated the context of sports policy in Greece from 1980 to 1993.

Having concluded the analysis of empirical data, a number of key themes are developed. These include the significance of the political values of the principal parties on the nature of policy goals at national level; the
evidence of clientelistic relations between central government and national governing bodies of sport; patterns of corporatism in the relations between local government and local sporting bodies; and the impact of political partisanship in the relations between central and local government and its implications for sports policy at local government level. The study concludes by reviewing these phenomena within the context of the conceptual framework implied by strategic relations theory.
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CONTENTS

Synopsis ........................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... iii
List of Figures ................................................................................................. vii
List of Tables ................................................................................................. ix
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................... x

Chapter I  Introduction ..................................................................................... 1

Chapter II  Theories of the State ..................................................................... 5
  Introduction .................................................................................................... 5
  Marxist Theories of the State and the Notion of Sport ................................ 5
  Pluralism and Neopluralism; the State and Sport ........................................ 18
  Feminist Critiques of the State and Sport ................................................... 26
  Implications for the State and Sport of New Right Theories ...................... 35
  Elite Theory of the State and its Implications for Sports Policy .................. 40
  Dual State Thesis and its Questions for Sports Policy ................................. 44
  Fordism and Post-Fordism; Regulation Theory, the State and its Implications for Sport ................................................................. 48
  Strategic Relations Approach ..................................................................... 55

Chapter III  Globalisation ................................................................................. 61
  Globalisation and the Nation-State ............................................................... 61
  Globalisation and Cultural Identities ............................................................ 66
  Transnational Analysis in a Global Environment .......................................... 71
  Sport in a Transnational Context ................................................................ 73

Chapter IV  A Political, Economic, and Social Analysis of the Post-War Greek State ........................................................................................................ 81
  Introduction .................................................................................................... 81
From the Civil War to the Seizing of Democracy; The Period of Economic Boom
Military Rule in Greece (1967-74)
The Restoration of Democracy (1974-81)
PASOK in Power (1981-89) and the Government Change in 1990
Greece in the 1980s: Transnational Influences and Its International Position

**Chapter V**  
Methodology

Strategic Relations Theory and its Methodological Implications
Data Collection
Validity of Method and Reliability of Data
Interviews and Sample Selection
Interview Technique and Interview Schedule Design
Data Analysis

**Chapter VI**  
Sports Policy in Post-War Greece

Introduction
State Involvement in Sport until 1974
Sport Policy in Greece since 1974
Infrastructure for Sport and the 'Sport for All' Campaign
GSS and the National Governing Bodies of Sport
Conclusion

**Chapter VII**  
Central Government Involvement in Sport 1980-93

Introduction
Political Ideologies and Sport in Greece
Sports Policy Goals in the 1980s
The Challenge of the 1996 Olympic Bid
From PASOK to New Democracy; The Impact of the 1990 Government Change on the Nature of Sports Policy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Social and insurance expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1975-81)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Public spending and state expenditure for social welfare, health and insurance as a percentage of GDP (1980-88)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Public funding of sport in real terms 1960-74 (calculated at 1967 prices)</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Public funding of sport as a percentage of total public expenditure (1960-74)</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 GSS grant to NGBs and sports clubs as a percentage of its budget (1960-74)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1960-74)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Public funding of sport as a percentage of total public expenditure (1974-93)</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6 State total expenditure in real terms 1974-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7 GSS funds from the state budget, football pools and public investments in real terms 1974-93 (at 1981 prices)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8 GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1974-93)</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9 'Sport for All': Local government participation</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10 'Sport for All': Participation rates (1983-91)</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11 GSS spending on 'Sport for All' in real terms 1987-92 (calculated at 1981 prices)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12 'Sport for All': Physical education instructors employed in the programmes (1986-91)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.13 GSS grant to NGBs and sports associations as a percentage of its budget (1974-93)</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.14 GSS grant to NGBs in real terms 1974-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.15 GSS grant to the NGBs of athletics and sailing as a percentage of its total grant to the NGBs (1988-93)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.16 GSS grant to the NGBs of volleyball, weight lifting, wrestling as a percentage of its total grant to the NGBs (1988-93)</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.17 GSS grant to the NGBs of basketball, swimming, boxing as a percentage of its total grant to the NGBs (1988-93) 148
6.18 GSS grant to the NGBs of athletics and sailing in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 149
6.19 GSS grant to the NGBs of volleyball, wrestling, weight lifting in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 149
6.20 GSS grant to the NGBs of basketball, swimming, boxing in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 150
6.21 GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1960-92) 153
6.22 GSS funding of NGBs as a percentage of its budget (1960-92) 154
7.1 GSS revenues from football pools in real terms 1980-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 163
7.2 GSS funds from the public investments programme in real terms 1980-93 (at 1981 prices) 164
7.3 State direct funds to GSS in real terms 1980-93 (at 1981 prices) 164
8.1 GSS subsidy to the NGB of wrestling in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 184
8.2 GSS subsidy to the NGB of weight lifting in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 184
8.3 GSS subsidy to the NGB of volleyball in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 185
8.4 GSS subsidy to the NGB of athletics and gymnastics in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 185
8.5 GSS subsidy to the NGB of boxing in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices) 188
9.1 Strategic Relations and the Foci of Analysis in Chapter IX 191
10.1 Strategic Relations in the Greek Sports Policy System 215
10.2 A Simplified Model of Levels of Relations in Local Government Sports Provision 215
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign investments by sector (1953-81)</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports structure in Greece</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of interviewees (individual agents)</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities' Profile</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>United Democratic Left (political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERE</td>
<td>Radical Union (political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>General Secretariat of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>Hellenic Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy (political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Governing Body (of sport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (political party)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The beginning of the 1980s, marked two significant developments in Greece’s history. During this decade the country experienced the first socialist government in its modern history, and saw its position in the global environment altered, mostly due to its entry into the European Community. The socialist party of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) attempted in its first term in office (1981-85) to realise its ‘catch all’ pre-election programme, and the aspirations of its supporters, drawn mainly from the lower and middle classes. The incremental reduction of social inequalities was to be achieved by increasing the role of the state in the economy and introducing a kind of welfare state provision. In a period when the Greek and world economy were in recession, extensive government spending for the finance of PASOK’s policies was sustained through foreign borrowing and the inflow of EC funds. However, this policy could not be sustained for an extended period, and thus, PASOK’s economic policy in its second term in government (1985-89) was characterised by the introduction of ‘stabilisation programme’ in the form of a series of tight economic measures.

However, the austerity programme undermined the government electoral support and in conjunction with the deepening crisis of the economy and the economic scandals of the party’s leadership, the socialist party’s position deteriorated, and support slumped in the 1989 election. After three consecutive elections in ten months, the right wing party of New Democracy regained office in 1990. Its ideology was inspired by a New Right doctrine which called for a minimal role of the state in society and the economy, while the significant role was to be played by market forces. In terms of policy, the reduction of government spending, the shrinkage of the public sector, and the denationalisation of a number of public companies, were among the most significant initiatives.

During the same period, significant developments in the global and particularly in the European scene were said to mark a new era in the role of nation-states. The intensification of international relations and the expansion of multi-national corporations have increased international interdependencies which, while on the one hand challenging the autonomy of national governments to pursue their policies, have, on the other, presented a number of funding and other opportunities for nation-states. In Europe, the role of the member states of the EC has further been affected by the recent developments of both an economic (e.g. the establishment of the single European market)
and a political nature (e.g. the project of political unification implied in the Maastricht Treaty).

In respect to sport, these types of development in the national and global environment are considered to be influential factors, and thus significant elements for the analysis in evaluation of the nature of sports policy developments in a specific context. The aim of this study therefore, is to identify the direction of sports policy in Greece in the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s. This study attempts to provide an answer to a number of research questions, such as;

a) to what extent are political, economic, and social changes reflected in the nature of sports policy?

b) in what ways might the values of political actors in Greece be associated with the direction of sports policy?

c) what is the impact of a number of other factors (e.g. global political and economic changes, transnational influences) on sports policy decision making?

The development of approaches to analysis of the role of the nation-state is discussed in chapter II. This evaluation of approaches to understanding the nature of the state, and its functioning in particular policy contexts, concludes that strategic relations theory offers an important advance in terms of the adequacy of such accounts. However, strategic relations theory, though outlined in principle in the literature, lacks particular empirical referents. Thus, this study is intended to be innovative both in terms of its substantive area of concern (Greek sports policy), and in terms of the way it seeks to operationalise some of the concepts employed by strategic relations theory in an empirical study of one area of state activity.

The research incorporated in this thesis is not intended to support or disconfirm hypotheses concerning the operation of the state. In that sense it may be characterised as exploratory, generating adequate explanations of the nature of state operations in this field (though such explanations may, of course, form hypotheses to be evaluated in future research on the Greek state).
In the course of this study, empirical research focused on gathering of secondary data relevant to the analysis of the Greek state and the development of sports policy, and information derived from in-depth interviews with key policy-relevant individuals in sport in Greece, in the designated period of research attention. This study reflects a concern to employ the main concepts of the strategic relations framework as a means to analyse sports policy developments in a context where this kind of research has been relatively underdeveloped.

The structure of this thesis has incorporated a series of chapters on a number of themes. Chapter II focuses on the review of the fundamental theoretical explanations of the form and the role of the state in liberal democracies. This chapter aims to evaluate the adequacy of competing explanations of the nature of the modern state and provide the theoretical basis for the analysis of the development of the Greek state. Chapter III seeks to extend the analysis beyond the boundaries of nation state and reflects a concern for undertaking transnational research. In that respect, this chapter considers the growing importance of globalisation and transnational interdependencies and their implications for the analysis of the form and activities of the modern state, and sport in particular.

The analysis of the development of the Greek state is the central theme of chapter IV. The nature of political control and its link to economic, social and cultural structures in the period after World War II are central to discussion in this chapter. Particular consideration has been given to the review of social policy changes, since the nature of social policy is rather influential in the direction of national sports policy. The nature of research tools employed in this research is made explicit in chapter V. This chapter aims to provide an account of, and rationale for, the research tools used in the present study, and to establish the methodological procedures followed in the context of the empirical work. The articulation of the main objectives of the study and the research questions that come under examination are also included in this chapter.

Chapter VI, entitled Sports Policy in Post-War Greece, seeks to identify the main themes for investigation in the empirical work. The structure of sport in Greece since 1980 (framed by the changing local, national and transnational context) is the focus of research attention in this chapter. Gathering of
secondary data (e.g. legislative measures, national financial accounts, central government policy documents, civil service documents, records of parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, etc.) provided both a description of the main sports policy developments during the period under investigation, and also an indication of the direction which the empirical investigation should follow.

Chapters VII, VIII and IX, discuss the main findings of interviews with key actors in sport in Greece. Chapter VII focuses on the analysis of information derived from interviews with central government actors (Ministers and General Secretaries of Sport, civil servants), and aims at addressing the relationship between policy goals and the political values of the key political figures in sport. Chapter VIII is centred on the perception of sports governing bodies' administrators of policy changes in sport, and aims to identify the position of the above individuals and organisations in the structure of sport, and their relation with other policy making agencies. The understanding of policy changes and the position and relations of local actors (i.e. local politicians, and sports clubs administrators) with national agencies in sport, constitute the central theme of discussion in chapter IX. Finally, chapter X aims to provide a theoretical explanation of sports policy analysis. In that respect, theoretical considerations discussed in earlier chapters are linked with the main findings of empirical research as a means to provide illustrative examples of the way sports policy systems may be conceptualised.
CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF THE STATE
Introduction

The sports field has long been recognised as an area of state intervention and sports policy as one of the 'responsibilities' of the modern state (though some would argue that it should not be). However, in order for an analysis of sports policy to be adequate, an account of the operation of the state is essential. This chapter therefore, has two primary aims; first, to review and evaluate the theories of the nation state in liberal democracies; and second, to explore the implications of those explanations for an understanding of sports policy. A number of different and in some cases competing ways of theorising the role of the state will be analysed in the light of their adequacy to explain the notion of the modern state. The evaluation of the different approaches to the operation of the nation state which will be discussed in this chapter, is intended to provide a useful theoretical basis for the analysis not only of the development of a specific context (i.e. the Greek state), but also of the origins and development of sports policy in this nation-state. It should be stressed, however, that consideration has also focused on those forces that exist beyond the nation-state and transcend its boundaries (i.e. global activity, transnational influences). For this reason, the review of the different approaches to the form of the state is followed by the analysis of the notion of globalisation and its implications for the present study.

Marxist Theories of the State and the Notion of Sport

Marxist accounts of the state enjoyed resurgence in the 1970s, partly as a reflection of the policy impacts of the deepening economic recession. Marxism has been characterised as the most radical and threatening critique of the capitalist state (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). The common premise of most of the Marxist writings on the role of the state in capitalist societies, is a rejection of the idea that the state is synonymous with government. Rather, Marxists have treated the concept of the state as "a complex of institutions including, for example, the higher echelons of the civil service, the judiciary, the military, the welfare" (Cole, 1988, p. 456). Capitalism is viewed as an economic system based on the exploitation of one class (working class) by another (the capitalist class), who own the means of production, and much of the theoretical effort is exerted in explaining the state's role in sustaining this exploitative relationship.
The orthodox Marxist theory of State Monopoly Capitalism, identifies the state as the instrument of capital, based on the argument that the state has taken on many of the functions of capital, in its attempt to stabilise the dominance of the capitalist class over the working class. Monopoly capital has the ability to ensure that the state does serve its interests by virtue of “its concentration of economic power, its personal connections with the executive, the dominance of the executive over the legislature, and the hold of reformism over the working class” (Clarke, 1991, p. 3). As such, the state is seen not as a neutral institution insulated from the class struggle, but as a direct reflection of class domination, as part of class relations, and its involvement in everyday social and cultural practices aims at securing the domination of the capitalist over the working class.

Urry (1981) has identified a number of Marxist approaches which attempt to theorise the role of the state in capitalist societies. In these attempts the state is perceived;

as a parasite, as the private property of state officials; as mystification, while apparently representing general interests of the society, in fact representing specific interests; as the reflection of the economic base responding to, and hence facilitating, the developing forces of production; as a set of essentially repressive institutions, which function as the instrument of class rule; as a social regulator moderating and channelling the struggles between classes, in cases through suppressing the interests of specific capitalists; and as an ideal collective capitalist standing alongside capital and sustaining its pattern of accumulation (p. 80).

However, according to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987), it is common to identify three models of the state which are consistent with traditional Marxist writings; (i) the instrumental, (ii) the ideological and, (iii) the historical/structural model. The instrumental model of the state is the best known and most ‘orthodox’ Marxist interpretation. It conceptualises the state as a unified organisation which seeks to impose the domination of the capitalist class over the rest of society. The above premise is based on the identification of the state with the interests of capital and is developed in the work of Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969). According to Miliband, the concentration of power to the capitalist class secures capital’s direct and indirect control over the state apparatus and the economy; “the ruling class of capitalist society is that class which owns and
controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of its economic power to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society” (p. 23). Although Miliband himself and King (1986) argue that there is no necessary connection between economic power and state power in capitalist societies, they recognise that there are a number of contingent processes which ensure that the state operates in the collective interests of capital.

Miliband has identified a number of institutions that “make up the state and whose interrelationship shapes the form of the state system” (p. 54). Those institutions include the government, the administration, the military and the police, the judicial branch, sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies. The leading positions in these institutions are occupied by, and hence the state power resides in, the people who constitute what Miliband describes as ‘state elite’. As Miliband argues, although businessmen or leading capitalists may be absent from state positions, the state in capitalist societies is able to act as an instrument of capital through the elites of the major economic, political and cultural institutions, who are overwhelmingly drawn from the same socio-economic classes as the businessmen. On this basis, state power is instrumentally connected to capital whose interests are served by state officials, public bureaucrats, the judiciary etc. who all have shared values and experiences, similar socio-political backgrounds, actual social contact and networks of friendships, and their interests are identified with those of the dominant class. Thus, capital is able to enjoy a dominant position within the state system “by virtue of the composition and ideological inclinations of the state elite” (Miliband, 1969, p. 146).

It was the reductionism of the state to the interests of the dominant economic class, and the immediate identification of the state with capital which raised major criticisms of Miliband’s account. Urry (1981), in identifying a number of criteria for testing the adequacy of a theory of the capitalist state, pointed to the extent the state was not reduced to the interests of the dominant class. He also stressed that the instrumentalist conception of the state failed to take into account the structural interrelations of the state with other elements of capitalist societies which played a role in the formation and pursuing of certain policies. This is described by Clarke (1991) as the instrumentalists’ failure to conceptualise
the limits to the exercise of state power on behalf of capital. For Clarke, Miliband has also replaced economic reductionism of orthodox Marxism - an issue which will be discussed latter - with a class reductionism, "according to which the dominant class stamped its character on the state" (p. 20).

The ideological model of the state was developed by Althusser (1969), who distinguished between the 'repressive' and the 'ideological state apparatus'. The repressive state apparatus includes the police and armed forces and its role is to impose (though only where necessary by force), the domination of capital over labour. The ideological apparatus involves such institutions as education, family, religion and even leisure. Its role is to 'mystify' social reality. The ideological domination of capitalist class is not merely derived from its economic and social predominance, but it is the result of a permanent and pervasive effort of a multitude of agencies to create an ideological hegemony of capitalism (Miliband, 1969). Hegemony can be defined as "the attempt by one fundamental group, and groups allied to it, through ideology, to (re)gain or retain economic, political, intellectual and moral leadership" (Cole, 1988, p. 455). Hegemony thus, generates "an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations" (Miliband, 1969, p. 180).

The establishment of ideological hegemony is therefore the outcome of the 'work' of the cultural institutions controlled by the dominant class. The state is seen as having increased its intervention in ideological competition between the dominant and ruled classes in favour of the former, as it has done in economic life, with the most notable example being the suppression in some capitalist countries of certain parties and organisations (Miliband, 1969). In cases however, where the state appears to respond to pressures from working class groups and to promote the notion of control of economic forces by liberal democratic means, this separation of political and economic power is in practice, illusory. In reality the state's role is to defuse working class opposition by providing an alternative focus for working class action. According to this model, liberal democracy, private life, civil rights and interest groups are all
simply ideological devices designed to pacify and mislead (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

An historical/structural account of the state has been offered by the work of Habermas (1976), Offe (1984), and Castells (1977). The state has been seen as an autonomous but certainly not neutral institution, in which economic and political power are clearly separated. The main argument of the structuralist writers focuses on the contradictory functions of the modern state which stem from the need to meet what are often regarded as opposing or conflicting goals: the support for capital accumulation on the one hand, and its legitimation as a 'neutral state' on the other. Within this framework, the state is seen as a system which aims at integrating and reproducing the society as a whole by subordinating individual and social aspirations.

The state therefore, is described as a political and administrative system, whose role is to filter the increasing demands placed upon it, in accordance to its own political priorities. In this line of argument, Habermas and Offe made the distinction between two different functions of the state, 'legitimation' and 'accumulation'. On one hand, the state must serve the interests of capital, by securing the conditions for sustained capital growth (accumulation function). On the other hand, in order to avoid identifying itself with any particular interest the state must follow those policies that, although within the limits of capital accumulation, are determined by its political priorities (legitimation function). In pursuit of its legitimation function the state must respond to increasing pressures from the working class and satisfy popular aspirations, by taking on the provision of a range of public services. However, these two functions come into contradiction with one another because, as Offe (1984) argues, the 'legitimation' function necessarily conflicts with the interests of capital (which pays for the services through increased taxation), which generates crises and further conflicts. Castells (1977) provided an interesting explanation of the contradictory role of the state at the local level. The role of the local state has been viewed as one of meeting the long term needs of capital while at the same time responding to working class pressures. In periods of economic growth capital has socialised the cost of the reproduction of labour power, through the provision by the state of a range of public services, such as health, housing, education and leisure.
However, when the rate of profit falls, capital presses for lower taxation while the working class demands increasing social expenditure. As a result, the struggles which arise around consumption issues are described by Castells as likely to lead to the crisis of the local state.

An illustration of the contradiction between the role of the state as serving the interests of capital and its need to legitimate its role, is provided by the Marxist critique of the failure of welfare state to meet the needs of the working class. Its main arguments are based on the presumption that while the welfare state seems to satisfy the material needs of the working class, it does so in a way that serves to disorganise, demobilise and 'defuse' the working class since the welfare benefits provided are always conditional on the subordination of wage labour to the capitalist state. More specifically, Müller and Neusüss (1978) describe social policy as "a process of paternalistic supervision, control or 'welfare' of the producer. Hence, ... social policy can never provide a conscious and planned care for the maintenance, renewal and improvement of the social working capacity of the collective worker" (pp. 38-9). With reference to Müller and Neusüss's analysis of the Factory Acts, which placed restrictions on the length of the working day, Holloway and Picciotto (1978), and Urry (1981), point to state intervention as a means for reproducing the labour power, by refreshing the workers physically and mentally and preventing individual capitalists from destroying the bases of their own activity through the exploitation of labourers to their physical and mental limits.

In addition, "the gradual and partial successes of the working class in safeguarding and improving their condition of labour and reproduction with the help of the state apparatus ... have shown themselves to be at the same time an essential moment in social pacification and in keeping class struggle latent" (Hirsch, 1978, p. 84). The same objective is served through the political representation of working class. This is described as an immediate need of capital, which in its effort to avoid any confrontation with the collective power of the working class, has widened the social provision and the political system to include larger sections of the working class. The forms of political representation of the working class have replaced working class resistance with political pressure on the state. This form of pressure is seen as being easier for the state to handle, since the state is now able to advance one section of the working class at the
The cohesion of the society as a whole as the main function of the capitalist state was further developed in Poulantzas' (1976) functional account of state power. Hence, the functions of the state are mainly 'political' and 'ideological' which aim at reproducing the social formation. In so far as this formation is characterised by the dominance of the capitalist class, the role of the state is to ensure the hegemony of the ruling class, and disorganise and fragment the working class. This role is substantiated during the course of class struggles, the outcome of which may decide the reproduction or transformation of the state. In this process, the outcome is not determined by the relative power of the classes in struggle, since the state has an immediate interest in facilitating the dominance of the capitalist class as a means for securing its reproduction. For this reason, the state undertakes the role of organising individual capitalists into capital as a whole and fragmenting the working class through its ideological and political function. However, the state is not neutral in any sense, and the capitalist class is able to secure its own interests irrespective of whether or not the representatives of this class predominate in political or ideological conflicts.

Functionalist accounts are inadequate for constructing a comprehensive analysis of the state since they pay little attention to the internal and external dynamics of the state. Changes in state's policies for instance, are said to be an automatic response to the needs of capital (accumulation function), which, even if they seem to be in favour of working class (legitimation function), they are still within the limits of capitalist growth. As such, the state is conceptualised as an instrument of capital which functions to ensure the outcomes of class struggles in favour of the capitalist class. In these accounts, the structure of the state (i.e. its capitalist formation) is seen as determining the social struggles, and little or no consideration has been given to the fact that the state is operating in the context of such struggles, and its policies may be determined by the nature and effectiveness of those struggles. Habermas' and Offe's, and Poulantzas'
approaches share Miliband’s reductionism of the state to the interests of capitalist class. Furthermore, Poulantzas’ functional account maintains that “anything which functions as the general factor of social cohesion is part of the state, as Althusser argues about the institutions of civil society which he defines as Ideological State Apparatuses” (Urry, 1981, p. 82). In this sense, by defining the state as a factor of social cohesion, certain aspects of society that are to be viewed as outside the state, cannot be excluded by its form.

Finally, Marxist writings have failed to take into account the separation between the ownership of private wealth and resources and their actual control, and the role of ‘professionals’ and managers in private businesses and state bureaucrats in policy decision making. Thus, control of crucial economic areas by managers, who do not themselves own more than a small part of the resources they command, is considered as a sufficient reason for questioning the notion of a ruling class based on its ownership of the means of production. On the other hand, for most of the Marxist writers, policy decision making is articulated and implemented by a unified organisation which seems to serve the needs of capital. However, the ability of the state to meet the needs of capital is limited by its increasing fragmentation. The state apparatus is a complex institution and, even where state agencies can be controlled directly by the central state, decision making is influenced by technical, managerial and financial advisers who, in many cases, seek to serve their own interests rather than the interests of the dominant class (Gruneau, 1982).

In conclusion, Marxist theories of the state have been criticised for their economic reductionism and the failure to describe adequately the state’s policy processes and outcomes. In many cases the state has been conceptualised as an instrument of capital, as a means for securing the economic interests of the capitalist class. But this view has been recently undermined by the inability of the state to deal with the growing economic crisis in the last two decades. Even though we can accept that the capitalist class seeks to impose its class character on the state, such a direct intervention by sections of the dominant class is a normal aspect of the functioning of the modern state. This kind of intervention could hardly reduce the role of the state to a simply economic instrument of capital. Furthermore, state's policy outcomes cannot be easily interpreted as the
result of capital's political power, since there are many capitalist interests involved, the political resolution of which will determine the strategy adopted (Clarke, 1991). More importantly, the identification of the nation state with the interests of national capital fail to take into account the fact that there is no single capitalist state, but a multiplicity of conflicting nation-states (Urry, 1981; Clarke, 1991). Consequently, conceptualising the state as serving the interests of the whole capitalist class has been undermined by the development of world system of conflicting states, an issue which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Marxist approaches to sport have been developed in the same way as the conceptualisation of the role of the state. Marxist theorists have approached the role of sport in capitalist society through different perspectives though most place the notion of class interests at the centre of their analysis. Gruneau (1982) and Hargreaves (1982) have identified the instrumental and structuralist branches of Marxist thoughts on sport as the most common approaches to sport taken by Marxists. On the other hand, the ideological approach to the role of sport in capitalist society has been influenced by the traditional Marxist account provided by the work of Brohm, and by the neo-Marxist writings of Gramsci and his conceptualisation of hegemony. It should be noted however, that the above 'classification' is by no means exclusive, but rather attempts to identify the most influential accounts in Marxist theorists’ writings.

In the instrumental approach “the state, as a political formation, and sport, as a type of cultural practice, are both seen to be direct reflections of class interests and the material forces and relations that define capitalism as a mode of production. ... (Furthermore, work in this mainstream Marxist tradition) tends to assume that all superstructural phenomena (all forms of culture and political expression) are, in some way, instrumentally connected to class interest” (Gruneau, 1982, p. 22). According to this argument, sport is largely controlled by members of the dominant class and its institutional and ideological features have developed in a way that corresponds with, and helps to reproduce, the conditions upon which class power is based. The reproduction of class structure through sport is facilitated by sport's ability to implicate all classes of society and convey with it meanings, values and ideologies that correspond to the capitalist mode of production;
the vertical, hierarchical structure of sport models the social structure of bureaucratic capitalism with its system of competitive selection, promotion, hierarchy and social advancement. ... Sport as a technology of the body structurally reproduces capitalist repressive techniques: the division of labour, ultra-specialisation, repetition, training, ... stereotyped movements, measurement, ... Sport treats the human organism as a machine, in the same way as the worker becomes a mere appendage of the machine in the capitalist system. Sport as an ideology reproduces and strengthens the ideology of alienated labour ... and conditions people for the oppressive work of the factory (Brohm, 1978, p. 50).

In team sport there is a strong reference to the importance of an organised and systematic division of labour, and other meanings and practices drawn from the mode of capitalist economy, such as 'work rate' and 'productivity' (Clarke and Clarke, 1982). As argued, sport, through its meritocratic system and the allocation of rewards based on skills and its hierarchical structure, is legitimating the capitalist system and teaching 'appropriate' values. At the same time, sport, functions as a compensatory mechanism for the under-classes by providing a false sense of escape from the capitalist production, which also explains the reasons for the increasing popularity of sport among these classes.

The class character of sport, and its function as an instrument of the ruling class comes as a consequence of the control of capital over the sports institutions. For Gruneau, there is indeed evidence of under-representation of working class in ownership and control in commercial sport and in key corporate and state positions in sport, that may support the above argument. But at the same time, there is also a good deal of evidence that many of these positions have been held by people whose interests have not always been identical to those of the capitalist class. Subsequently, the fundamental argument of instrumentalists, that members of the dominant class exercise complete control over sport and thus they are able to use it in an instrumental way to serve their interests, cannot be substantiated by empirical evidence. Furthermore, even though it can be argued that sport has been instrumentally used by dominant class interests in some cases, and that its practises, meanings, and values are connected with the logic of the capitalist mode of production, it is too much to assume that its development has been clearly defined according to the interests of the dominant class or that all state programmes in sport
have meant to create and support the intrinsic connection of sport with the capitalist mode of production.

Questions, of ownership and control of sports institutions however, or the degree to which state sports programmes promote the values of capitalism, are irrelevant for structuralist theorists of sport. For structuralists, both state and sport can be considered as autonomous from class interests. Sport in particular, is an autonomous form of activity with its own meanings and features, and as such it cannot be treated as a direct reflection of the interests of any class. However, while relatively autonomous, sport is bound to the process of capitalist reproduction and contributes to the maintenance of class domination by meeting the requirements of capital while on the other hand legitimising itself as an area of social reproduction (Gruneau, 1982). In this line of argument, sport is not part of the cultural practices of society but rather it is part of the ideological state apparatus, identified by Althusser. As part of the ideological state apparatus “sport is adapting to society's requirements and functions in such a way as to integrate individuals into institutions and role expectations” (Parry, 1988, p. 432).

The main strengths of this approach stem from the fact that, first, it avoids identifying all members of sports institutions as members of the dominant class; and second, it recognises that state sports programmes may be able to operate on behalf of the capitalist class without actually being directly controlled by members of this class, a notion that instrumental Marxists have failed to take into account (Gruneau, 1982). However, this argument shares the weaknesses of most Marxist writings, and this is the reduction of meaningful cultural creations to the needs of economic interests, the reproduction of capitalist relations. Seeing individuals as suffering from false consciousness, and as “passive recipients and bearers of structures rather than as active centres of consciousness” (Parry, 1988, p. 433), is argued to be a major shortcoming of this approach. This branch of Marxist accounts on sport has also been criticised for failing to consider the class character of society and the problems that the dominant class may encounter in its attempt to establish its control over sport (Parry, 1988). As Hargreaves argues (1982), both the instrumental and structural approaches fail to conceptualise the conflicts surrounding sport, conflicts which arise from the dominant groups' attempt to control and use sport in their
interests and the responses to these attempts by subordinate groups. Clarke and Clarke (1982) argue that the reproduction of dominant ideological themes through sport, and even in some cases the significance attached to those themes through the natural, non-social realm of sport, is not "uncontested or uncontradictory. ... There are tensions within these images and themes, they do pull in different and sometimes antagonistic directions. At points, subordinate and competing definitions make their presence felt through sport" (p. 68).

The failure to view sport as an arena of class struggle is also argued to be one of the fundamental weaknesses of Brohm's work (Chorbajian, 1984). In his most influential account, Sport-A Prison of Measured Time (1978), Brohm defines sport as a tool of the ruling class, and its institutions as the means through which this class relentlessly manipulates the rest of society. In this work, it is argued that:

the sports system appears as an armed apparatus of coercion, ... which has the ultimate function of protecting the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Sport, like all other institutions, is mediated through the structures of the State apparatus, which means that it takes on a political form. Sport is also an instrument of bourgeois hegemony, ... that it is to say it is one of those secondary arms of the state which enable one social group to exercise its hegemony over national society as a whole (pp. 54-5).

The ideological contribution of sport to the establishment of ruling class hegemony stems from the hidden functions of sport. As argued, "sport trains the work-force to operate according to the norms of capitalist exploitation ... governed by the principle of maximising output. The organism is trained to sustain prolonged effort and maintain the necessary regularity of pace" (Brohm, 1978, p. 55). And below, "the principles of capitalist, commercial society structurally determine sport. Competition implies that the maximum possible productivity be extracted from the labour-power of sportsmen and women, that is to say, from their capacity for high performance" (p. 61). The ideology of sport in capitalist societies is argued to convey values that are in direct relation with the main characteristics of the bureaucratic system; "the system (of sport) forms a pyramid. By going through this (pyramid) ... adolescents are taught a sense of social hierarchy which sport trains them to accept. By creating this illusory hierarchy, sport fulfils a compensatory and diversionary function."
Its make-believe equality serves to avoid doing anything about the hierarchy of everyday life" (pp. 57-8). As noted earlier, defining sport as a tool of the ruling class used to manipulate the population, and rejecting any possibility of resistance or of alternative, constitute fundamental weaknesses of Brohm's approach to the analysis of sport. In addition, the exclusion of the possibility of positive in sports, like enjoyment, creative physical activity, co-operation, success and solidarity, is argued to be contributing to the shortcomings of the above account (Chorbajian, 1984; Gruneau, 1982).

Marxist theorising on sport has been influenced to a certain extent by the work of Gramsci on hegemony (although many would classify it in the neo-Marxist thinking). As noted earlier, hegemony refers to the "ability of a dominant class, or class fraction, to exercise a special kind of leadership not simply based on ownership and control of the means of production, a monopoly of state power and the ability to impose its ideas on the population, but which is also founded on moral leadership, the ability to obtain the consent of the dominated, which ... unites the whole society positively behind it in a historic bloc" (Hargreaves, 1982, p. 114). Hegemony is conveyed by every level of society, from the most formal social institutions and relationships such as political parties, schools, church, voluntary and cultural associations, to the informal practices and meanings such as the family, in other words from what Gramsci describes as the civil society (Parry, 1988). Through this process, a certain version of reality and a specific form of domination is established as 'common sense'. But the most fundamental point is that hegemony is never guaranteed for a class. Its establishment and maintenance is sometimes a highly problematic procedure for a group or class that strives for it, and depends on the specific setting, the national context, so that every time hegemony varies according to the specific circumstances in a society at given points in time.

Analysis therefore of the role of sport in the establishment of hegemony, leaves room for regarding sporting activity as autonomous. The notion of hegemony implies that sport is one of those areas through which the dominant class attempts to establish its leadership while at the same time it does not reject the possibility of other groups being able to resist or even overcome those attempts. This kind of analysis seems to place sport in the
context of struggles between groups by taking into account every possible outcome, such as straightforward domination or negotiation and accommodation of fighting interests. In this line of argument, the domination of the ruling class over sport is not taken for granted. Rather the analysis attempts to explain "how and why the domination of a particular class comes to be expressed through sporting practice in such a way that its values become part of the notion of what is 'natural' or 'common sense’" (Parry, 1988, p. 437).

However, the notion of hegemony seems to avoid the reduction of sport to the interests of the ruling class and the classical Marxist concept of ideology, that the ruling ideas in society are the ideas of the ruling class. It rather attempts to depart from the economic reductionism implicit in classical Marxism and assigns a degree of autonomy between the economic, the political and the cultural field (Rojek, 1993). For this reason the notion of hegemony appears to be in a better position, than the instrumental and structuralist approaches, to provide an adequate analysis of sport. Instead of citing at this point any possible weaknesses of the notion of hegemony and its conceptualisation of sport, it is worth noting that confining the debate on sport to the notions of hegemony, the state, and social reproduction does little to advance understanding of the political, gender, ethnic or any other relationships, beyond those between classes, that may inform an adequate analysis of sport.

Pluralism and Neopluralism; the State and Sport

Pluralist theories of the state enjoyed their strongest support in the post-war period when economic growth favoured the expansion of the welfare state. Pluralism recognises the existence of diversity in social, institutional and ideological practices. Its main difference from Marxist concepts is the rejection of the notion that the state’s role might be to defend the predominance in society of a particular class. Pluralist writers conceptualise the society as a plurality of interest groups rather than as a set of self-interested individuals. Most pluralists ascribe a central role to interest groups in policy making process, and by seeing those groups as holding considerable amount of power, they regard them as an important source of pressure on policy outcomes (Smith, 1990). In this process, interest groups struggle with one another to secure their own objectives,
and exercise pressure upon governmental agencies with a view to influence their decisions.

Nevertheless, competition between interest groups is always unequal since some groups have access to greater resources than others, a fact which is acknowledged by most pluralists, who accept that some interest groups are able to develop close relationships with governmental agencies or departments, and thus prevent outside groups from gaining access to policy making. The power of interest groups is a major factor in state policy making. Pluralists believe that there are a number of indicative factors of the power of an interest group. The size of a group provides an indication of how electorally important it is for governments to meet its needs. In such a case, size is measured by potential voting power; other things being equal, the larger the interest group the greater the influence it can exercise in policy decision making. Politicians also pay attention, according to pluralists, to the rate of mobilisation of a group which can be defined as the proportion of people who join an organisation concerned to advance their interests and support the group's activities. In addition, the intensity with which a group pursues its preferences constitutes a reliable measure of its power (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). As Smith (1990) has summarised, the pressure groups' access is argued to be affected by "the social position of the group, the extent to which it is organised, the skills and qualifications of the leaders, the size of the organisation, the level of finances and the degree of mobilisation" (pp. 302-4). But even in the case where a group is able to control the policy agenda, the multiplicity of interests and competition between blocs of interests ensure that power is diffused, and as such no particular groups are able to dominate the decision making process (Smith, 1990).

The existence of competing interest blocs is said to be only one constraint on the danger of concentration of power on the hands of few groups. Other constraints exist in the form of counter-groups (external constraints), which even if they do not emerge immediately as a countervailing power they can still organise themselves, and hence exercise checks, in the case of a dominant group threatening their interests sufficiently. Internal constraints on the other hand, stem from the fact that "governments need wide support to be re-elected and so must listen to many groups, which might lack one resource, like money, but have an
alternative resource; for example, votes" (Smith, 1990, p. 306), an assumption that features the writings of most of the leading pluralists (Jordan, 1990). Those constraints are said to ensure dispersal of power in modern societies, which is the distinguishing feature of pluralism (Smith, 1990).

Although one would expect most pluralists to argue that the state, subjected as it is to multiple pressures from conflicting interest groups, would be only a reflection of the pressures upon it, Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) have identified three variations of the state form, that can be found in pluralist writings; (i) the weathervane or cipher model, (ii) the neutral state and, (iii) the broker state model. The cipher model, which is the most common pluralist approach, defines the state as a passive vehicle for the expression of struggles between interest groups in civil society. The state is seen as a mirror, a simple reflection of the balance of forces in society. 'State neutrality' in this model means that state organisations respond to, and satisfy the needs of, the strongest pressure group. Like a weather vane the state responds to the 'prevailing wind'. In this sense, "the state is not neutral but certainly favours certain groups, and rules of the games that might advantage some groups over others" (Smith, 1990, p. 304). Cipher pluralists regard both elected politicians and state bureaucrats as passively reflecting the prevailing patterns of pressure.

The above model however, seems to concentrate entirely on the behaviour and organisation of interest groups, and thus to neglect the fact that the state might have its own interests and may act in a way that serves those interests. The above problem also characterises the neutral state model, supported by a number of conventional pluralists who argue that the state can be neutral in a proper polyarchy. According to this model neutrality is expressed by the state acting as a bystander in a contest between interest groups, or as a referee ensuring that the struggle is conducted according to agreed rules, or even as an interventionist trying to make both sides even in an unequal contest. In any of these cases, the state's concern is argued to be the accommodation of all those pressures without any marked bias towards some and against others. Thus, for neutral state theorists, civil servants should conform to the 'public interest' and intervene only in favour of those interest groups which are
in a less advantageous position in expressing and fighting for their interests.

The third pluralist model conceptualises the state as a broker, a 'middleman' who has his/her own interests. Therefore, any public policy is interpreted as the result of pressure group activities which take place not only in the civil society but also within the state organisation itself. The state is neither 'passive' nor 'neutral', but it has its own interests expressed as the interests of the strongest group inside the state apparatus. According to this model state policy is as much the outcome of interest group contests within the state apparatus as it is of contests outside. Broker pluralists expect government departments, public organisations and quasi-governmental agencies to be fertile grounds for group formation. The stronger their group ideologies, the greater their influence on the policy decision making. The state as an institution, and its organisations, like the judiciary, the police, the central and local government and so forth, are always subject to checks by the media, the voters' control and the organisational polyarchy (Henry, 1990).

However, the main premise of this account which concerns voter, media and organisational control as a means to prevent state officials' interests dominating the policy agenda has raised a number of difficulties. For instance, if, according to the broker state model, politicians and bureaucrats were able to filter out the political agenda, and pursue instead their own interests, then voting control would have to 'penalise' them. But in many instances in the local state for example, local politicians have largely been insulated against local opinion and not been penalised for ignoring local pressure groups, since in many cases voters support local politicians as a result of traditional political affiliation with a political party (Henry, 1993). Furthermore, control of the state by the media seems to be a myth, since operational and financial control of the media rests in the hands of specific interest groups which seek to secure their own needs rather than the general 'public interest'. Miliband (1969) argues that the mass media are overwhelmingly controlled by private interests, moreover from those of large-scale capitalist enterprise, since an increasing proportion of the press, magazines and book publishing, cinemas, theatres and also radio and television has come "under the ownership and control of a small and steadily declining number of giant enterprises" (p. 227).
In methodological terms, most pluralists advocate 'individualist' strategy, that is they assume that all hypotheses about collective action and/or interest should ultimately be reduced to the actions and/or interests of the individual human agents. Pluralists, therefore, treat the behaviour of the individual as the mere outcome of his/her interests and since, in many instances, these interests are likely to coincide with the interests of a number of people, pluralists tend to treat all of them as concrete interest groups. However, pluralist approaches to the behaviour and formation of interest groups in the society are based on a doubtful methodological assumption since identical behaviour does not necessarily imply identical interests (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

The attacks on the pluralist theories intensified in the late 1960s, when a number of political and social crises appeared in almost every liberal democracy (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). Marxists reject pluralist theory both as a prescription and as a description of the state. As a prescriptive theory, pluralism is criticised for reinforcing inequalities in society, since certain interests in society are mutually incompatible and hence victory by one group means oppression of another. As a descriptive model, pluralism is rejected by Marxists for its failure to reflect adequately the dominant position of the capitalist class. Other critics focus on the pluralists' tendency to overemphasise the importance of pressure groups in understanding policy making, and thus neglect other factors, such as the role of ideology in the policy process, which for Smith (1990) "is an important factor in determining the nature of policy and in influencing which groups are granted access to the policy process" (p. 308). For Miliband (1969), the main shortcomings of pluralist accounts stem from the claim that the "major organised 'interests' in these societies, and notably capital and labour, compete on more or less equal terms, and that none of them is therefore able to achieve a decisive and permanent advantage in the process of competition" (p. 146). In this line of critique, business was argued to be in an advantageous position both by virtue of its ideological relations with the state elite, as seen in the proceeding section, and by its ability to exercise "pervasive and permanent pressure upon governments and the state, generated by the private control of concentrated industrial, commercial and financial resources ... that no government can ignore in the determination of its policies" (Miliband, 1969, p. 147).
This kind of critique on classic or conventional pluralism gave rise to the neopluralist accounts of the state. Neopluralism shares to a great extent classic pluralists' concern with competition between interest groups, but also recognises what Miliband has supported, that business is in a superior position to, and has certain advantages over, other groups in policy decision making. However, unlike classic pluralists, neopluralists recognise the lack of sufficiently countervailing powers, and thus the danger that business interests may corrupt the democratic process. The superior position enjoyed by business is considered to come as a consequence of state inducements, partly as the result of governments' policy for successful economy, and of the fact that "in a market system many decisions are taken by business which are then removed from the governmental agenda. Consequently, there is no democratic control over important decisions which affect crucial aspects of people's lives" (Smith, 1990, p. 316).

The above premises cumulate in the neopluralist version of a cipher state view, the 'deformed polyarchy' model which has several components. First, the state is subject to voter, mass media and organisational control but it also responds directly or indirectly to the pressures by business interests. Second, business interest focuses mainly on the maintenance of the existing capitalist system of economic development. Lastly, neopluralists insist that, although business exercises extensive control, the 'history making' decisions are still controlled by democratic influences (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

However, although neopluralism provides a major advance on pluralism, by pointing to the advantageous position of business interests and the lack of pluralism in certain areas of decision making, there are certain problems associated with this account. A key theme which still has to be addressed in the deformed polyarchy thesis, as identified by Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987), is how businesses achieve their own goals, and even in some cases exercise their veto, without becoming the focus of counter-mobilisation. In addition, there are some questions emerging from the claims of neopluralism such as why trade associations are formed to represent business interests, if business is so privileged. Whatever the answer is, it has been claimed (Smith, 1990) that the neopluralist approach has failed to pay sufficient attention to two important factors. First, "that
business influence has declined since the 1960s with the rise of public interest groups that push for policies which directly harm the interests of business, and (second, it) underplays the power that western industrial states have by virtue of their resources. To that extent the government can enforce the policies that it wishes, regardless of the demands of business” (p. 318).

To conclude, both accounts (i.e. classic pluralism and neopluralism) share certain shortcomings that render them inadequate for a comprehensive analysis of the development of modern liberal democratic states. Conventional pluralism attempted to interpret political decisions as the mere outcome of conflicting group interests in civil society, and thus failed to analyse the constraints that governments had to face (e.g. business interests), the role of ideology and policy goals of the government in policy making. Neopluralism, on the other hand, sought to explain the operation of the state by adopting a corporatist approach which affirmed the significance of the role played by economic interests in the state's strategies. However, with the exception of the broker state explanation, both pluralist and neopluralist accounts fail to recognise the important role played by individual agents, in other words the fact that "elected and appointed officials have organisational and career interests of their own, and therefore devise policies that advance these interests” (Smith, 1990, p. 320).

From the perspective of pluralist accounts, sport would be seen as a voluntary activity, with actors on the whole conscious of its benefits and disbenefits (Gruneau, 1982; Sage, 1990). The institution of sport is considered to be largely and appropriately managed in voluntary organisations, whose role is to co-ordinate the goals and interests of their memberships, those participating in sport. For many pluralists, sport should be provided for, and controlled, independently of the state, and this view is accompanied by the claim that state intervention is an unjustified intrusion into this field of voluntary action. Although state and sport are regarded as separate institutions, sport is often seen by pluralists as an activity where the state may occasionally regulate some aspects of sporting practice. For this reason, a minimum state involvement in sport is justified by most pluralists, to the extent that
“sporting activities can be accommodated to existing laws which pertain to public order and morality” (Gruneau, 1982, p. 18).

Roberts argued (1978), that the state should avoid involving itself in direct analysis of sporting needs and provision of sporting opportunities. Instead, it should limit its role to generating the conditions under which groups or individuals can identify and satisfy their needs. Nevertheless, state intervention in the sports field is seen as legitimate under certain circumstances, (e.g. for the promotion of national fitness or where specific groups are not able to satisfy their own needs);

if (sporting) opportunities are to be made available to economically disadvantaged groups, public provision is a logical if not the only method. If the state did not subsidise sport and other forms of recreation that involve the use of land, the majority of children would be unable to participate (p. 81).

The state therefore, is justified in acting on behalf, and as a representative, of generalised interests in areas of welfare and health. The state is seen, along these lines, as balancing the various needs and acting to achieve more equitable opportunities (Gruneau, 1982). In such a case, Roberts claims, it would be mistaken to assume, as Marxists do, that the state promotes sport as a means of implanting certain values in the minds of the young, or that this strategy is aimed at stimulating profitable demand for commercial products. Where the state is involved in direct sports provision, its role should be insulated from the competition between interest groups by employing 'neutral' experts in the organisations which have the responsibility for the provision of sporting opportunities.

According to Henry (1990), whether for conventional or neopluralism, one of the key issues to be addressed in the analysis of sport is the identification of those mechanisms that will allow groups to promote their interests and influence policy outcomes. An important point raised from this observation is that pluralists tend to focus on the groups involved in policy making but pay little, or even no attention, to those groups that are not involved and the reasons for their non-involvement (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). For example, some of the feminist critiques, as will be discussed later in this chapter, argue that women are dominated by men in modern society, and point to the fact that women's interests in sport are underrepresented since a great number of committees, as well as
a wide range of formal and voluntary governing bodies in sport are dominated by men. In addition, minority groups in sport whether by nature of the activity or by disadvantage through age, gender, class or race are said to be neglected in policy making or resource allocation, a fact which contradicts most of pluralist claims for the existence of diffused power that prevents control of policy agenda by the powerful few.

Finally, based on the identification of society as a set of interest groups, pluralists would argue that sports policy and planning would be influenced by the outcome of the struggle between interest groups. However, the premise of neutrality of these organisations and the fundamental assumption of equality of influence between interest groups remain a concern for pluralist theorists. Although Marxists might point to the social strata from which those dominating sports administration are drawn, arguing that those from the same strata will manifest similar value systems, and hence promote similar policies, this claim is invalid. Pluralists seek to go beyond the social structures as a source for explaining policy outcomes, and point to the role of individual agents, or groups of agents, as well as structural contexts. As such, pluralist accounts in theory have greater explanatory potential than accounts founded in structuralist analysis. But still, by attempting to analyse sports policy as the pure outcome of group struggles within the society, a research strategy is likely to ignore other factors beyond the behaviour and organisation of interest groups which all might have an influential role in determining policy outcomes.

Feminist Critiques of the State and Sport

Feminist accounts of the state emerged as a counterbalance to both Marxist and pluralist theories which failed to explain the position of women in the social structure and the relations of power between state and women. Marxist definitions of the state, based on the need for the maintenance of social cohesion in a class society, assert that the state mediates only between social classes, omitting gendered and racialised groups (Walby, 1990). On the other hand, pluralist accounts argue that the state is an expression of social conflicts in society between interest groups. Hence, even though the political system is considered as the expression of the most powerful interests, it is certainly not the mirror of all social conflicts.
As a consequence, feminist writers point to the absence of women as a concrete group in political struggles, and also to the fact that while the class war has received theoretical attention, issues relating to gender inequalities, including women's position in this kind of struggles have not received analytical attention (Sassoon, 1987).

Feminists have approached the issue of gender inequalities from a number of different angles. Many authors argue (Walby, 1990; Scraton, 1988; Connell, 1987; Eisenstein, 1979), that four main approaches can be distinguished in feminists' attempt to analyse the relationship between state and gender. These approaches can be best classified into liberalism, Marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism or dual-systems theory. Scraton (1988) makes a further distinction between implementary and fundamental approaches. Implementary approaches are considered those that tend to analyse the way individuals come to adopt a culture that maintains the subordination of women, rather than to investigate the underlying reasons that perpetuate this kind of relationship. Liberal feminism is categorised into this kind of approach. On the other hand, fundamental approaches are different, in the sense that they recognise the subordination of women as the result of structural factors (i.e. capitalism, patriarchy or both) and seek explanations as to why those structures result in the subordination of women. Included in this category are those explanations that regard capitalism and class division as the main source of women's subordination (Marxist feminism), those that place a strong emphasis on gender divisions and the requirements of patriarchal society in their attempt to explain women's oppression (radical feminism), and those that employ an integrated class-gender explanation in their analysis (socialist feminism or dual-systems theory).

The liberal approach to the analysis of state and gender emerged as a criticism of the Marxist assumption that the contemporary oppression of women is the outcome of the capitalist mode of production (Sassoon, 1987). Liberal analyses' fundamental assumption is that in a liberal society the state acts as "neutral arbiter, which in practise can be captured by interest groups, in this case men" (Connell, 1987, p. 127), which further results in the exclusion of less powerful groups, including women. Thus, those analyses too often start by noting the institutional sexism of the state, the relative absence of women from social and political battles and
the domination of powerful positions within the state apparatus by men. Thus, even though it has been argued that the state acts as an impartial arbiter, in reality the only interest groups which consistently dominate the political arena incorporate men. Many liberal writings contain the assumption that if women were more involved in the decision making process, then policy outcomes would have been more advantageous for them. But this assumption seems to come into contradiction with empirical evidence. In the British context for example, Mrs Thatcher's government did not promote women's interests as much as the theory would imply. On the other hand, state policy making is not simply a matter of personal background but rather it is determined by a number of social, political, economic and even structural pressures, that the above analysis seems to neglect (Walby, 1990). However, this is not the only difficulty associated with this kind of analysis. Its fundamental weakness arises from the fact that even though liberal feminism considers the absence of women from the state elites as the result of their disadvantaged position, it tends to leave aside questions about the underlying reasons for the domination/subordination patterns and the powerlessness of women.

Marxist feminism has been prompted by the need to extend the analysis of the development of the capitalist state by focusing not only on relations of power between labour and capital but also on that between the state and women. McIntosh (1978) provides a Marxist analysis which does explicitly take notice of the oppression of women by the state. As argued, the position of women in the social strata is derived by the needs of capital, while capitalist production benefits from a certain form of family. This form is one that ensures the reproduction of labour power and the availability of women as an alternative source of cheap labour. In this line of argument, women are said to be denied access to power by being removed from effective participation in economic life and restricted to domestic or powerless and supportive roles in the work force (Theberge, 1984).

In the Marxist feminist analysis therefore, women's oppression is seen as being derived from their exploitation in a class society, while relations between the two genders seem to be missing from the investigation of Marxist feminist writers. In fact, many Marxist feminists support the view, without bringing the analysis any further, that even though the source of
exploitation is the same for both men and women (i.e. the mode of capitalist production), women's subordinate position is also derived from their concern to "service and support the male breadwinner" (Scraton, 1988, p. 8). The division of labour imposed by the family, a point that seems to be neglected by most of Marxist feminists and has even been accepted by Marx "as natural, whether this means 'necessary' or 'good'" (Eisenstein, 1979, p. 13), is a major shortcoming of the above analysis. What is really considered as a major limitation of this framework is that the perception of the family as the first source of subordination of women, which is acknowledged in some Marxist theorists' writings (i.e. Engels), seems to be neglected in the discussion of the family in the capitalist society, "where people are assigned class positions according to their relations to the means of production, not their sex" (Eisenstein, 1979, pp. 13-5).

Marxist feminism has also been criticised for its economic reductionism. It has been argued that this kind of explanation is functionalist in the sense that it tends to explain gender policy as the functional requirement of the capitalist system (Walby, 1990; Hall, 1985). In this line, any state policy, which in the first instance appears to meet women's needs, has been explained by Marxist feminists as satisfying the long term requirements of capital for the development of the economy. The provision of daycare facilities and maternity leave, for example, is explained by the above theorists as the need of capital for cheap female labour (Sassoon, 1987). Marxist feminism concluded that in the socialist mode of production, the oppression of women would disappear, an assumption that raised major criticism by radical feminists, who argued that "historical studies have illustrated the way in which women's oppression predates capitalism" (Theberge, 1984), and in fact, even in state socialist societies, gender inequality against women is still evident.

Radical feminist studies of the state have been developed in the work of Hanmer and Saunders (1984). In their analysis, they attempt to explain women's oppression by concentrating entirely on the relations between men and women, and the concept of patriarchy. Patriarchy is used to define "a sexual system of power in which the male possesses superior power and economic privilege" (Eisenstein, 1979, p. 17). The sexual division is said to be the most hierarchical division in society which
subsequently is used to differentiate social functions and individual power. Therefore, the perception of struggles is restricted for radical feminists to those between the genders rather than between classes. According to this argument, the state is seen as an instrument of patriarchal domination. The exercise of male violence on women and the lack of state intervention to prevent it are seen as critical points which support the above assumption. According to Walby (1990), this view raises the question as to whether it is appropriate to conceptualise the state as an ‘instrument’ of patriarchy since there is evidence for example, that the state also suppresses some groups of men and constrains much more severely men’s sexuality than that of women (Connell, 1987). For Hall (1985), the most serious difficulty encountered in radical feminism is to explain power relations within a given sex, since division of power is argued to be derived by the biological differentiation between male and female. In addition, there is a real contradiction between the state as an instrument of patriarchy and the patriarchal state as a source of funds for feminism “across a considerable spectrum from rape crisis centres through women’s units in the bureaucracy to grants for feminist academic research” (Connell, 1987, p. 129).

The tendency towards biological determinism of the analysis of patriarchy (Scraton, 1988), which stems from the isolation of women’s oppression from any other relations of power within the capitalist society (i.e. class, race, etc.), in conjunction with the economic reductionism of Marxist feminist accounts gave rise to socialist feminism or dual-systems theory, presented mainly in Eisenstein’s work, Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism (1979). In this work, male domination is explained through an integrated analysis which identifies the importance of both patriarchal structures in society and the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism and patriarchy are related in such a way that they form a mutually interdependent system of capitalist patriarchy. Each side seems to need the other for its survival, with patriarchy contributing order and control, and capitalism providing the means for the accumulation of profit. In this branch of feminist analysis, oppression and exploitation are considered to be two entirely different concepts. Exploitation refers according to Eisenstein to “the economic reality of capitalist class relations for men and women, whereas oppression refers to women within patriarchal and capitalist relations. Exploitation is what happens to men
and women workers in the labour force; woman's oppression occurs from her exploitation as a wage-labourer but also occurs from the relations that define her existence in the patriarchal sexual hierarchy - as mother, domestic labourer and consumer" (1979, p. 22). However, this account tends to underestimate the conflicts between patriarchy and capitalism and ignore social structures other than class and gender (race, age, etc.). In other words, the socialist feminist framework seems to pay no analytical attention to the fact that occupation of official state positions by men does not necessarily imply that capitalist interests can entirely control the state mechanism, and on the other hand, that not all capitalist interests coincide with the patriarchal relations. However, although socialist feminism has attempted to go beyond a mere reproduction of Marxist accounts by integrating issues generated through patriarchal relations, its analysis is limited by a functionalist approach to the state.

Since the emergence of a strong feminist movement in the early 1960's, issues relating to gender inequalities, including women's relationship to sport have received analytical and political attention. More specifically, feminist critiques have approached the issue of women's relations within sport under different perspectives, which in a sense correspond to the different approaches taken for the explanation of women's subordination in society. Accordingly, these approaches can be distinguished into liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist feminist theories of sport (Scraton, 1988).

Liberal feminism is essentially pragmatic, in the sense that is largely concerned with historical inequalities in sport between men and women (Hargreaves, 1994). For liberal feminists, women's absence from sports activities, and sports institutions which hold power in the provision of sports resources (i.e. central government, local authorities, governing bodies etc.), is a major issue of concern. This relation is best indicated, as Theberge suggests (1985), by examining the gender differences in rates of participation;

although there is evidence that the gap is narrowing in rates of participation between men and women, in general sport is still largely organised for men. For example, recent Canadian national survey data show that ... males have considerably higher levels of participation in organised competitive sport. A similar pattern exists in the United States. A second instance of sport as a male preserve is male dominance in the
administration and organisation of sport. Historically, leadership
positions in sport have been held almost exclusively by men (pp.
193-4).

Gender differences in sport are largely treated by liberal feminists as
resulting from the conflict that female participants in sport have to face
between their role as athletes and their role as women. In this perspective,
a clear boundary line of acceptable forms of sports participation is drawn
which is based on the perceived conflict between sport and femininity.
Going beyond those lines, when for example participation in sport might
harm "the normal female sex role/behaviour" (Scraton, 1988, p. 7), is seen
by liberal feminists as a problem which results in a conflict between sport
and femininity. Thus, the emphasis of the theory is on the individual
with no attempt to analyse women's inequalities within the context of
social, political and economic structures, or any kind of resistance and
conflict which might have taken place within the area of women and
sport. Furthermore, the conception of equal opportunities in sport
between men and women, is a limited one, in the sense that it fails "to
relate the concept of equality to wider social, economic, ideological and
political issues" (Hargreaves, 1994, p. 28), and that it treats women as a
homogeneous group. As such, the failure of this approach to examine the
nature of male power and the complexities of power relations in sport, as
an explanatory device of women's subordination has been considered as
its major limitation (Hargreaves, 1994). In addition, through its descriptive
character, liberal feminism continues to perpetuate what most feminists
sought to eradicate, the functionalist notion of the stereotype of femininity
(Yule, 1992).

In contrast, Marxist, and radical feminism's fundamental assumption is
that sport as a cultural practice has a predominately ideological function by
sustaining structured relations of power which convey forms of
domination and subordination. These explanatory frameworks regard
sport as tied to forms of domination, such as between classes or between
sexes. Socialist feminism, on the other hand, seeks to go beyond these
accounts by pointing to the fact that sport may also be used to challenge
hegemony, and as such the link between forms of domination and sport is
regarded as contingent. In this way, these frameworks seek to explain how
sport come to embody capitalist class relations and/or patriarchal gender
relations. Marxist feminist theories of sport identify the sexual division of
labour as the main source of women's subordination, which further constrains their ability to participate in sport. This constraint results from the place of women in the social division of labour (i.e. filling secondary places in the labour market and thus being economically dependent on men) and also from the relations within the family (i.e. their primary role as wives and mothers) (Hargreaves, 1994).

Radical feminist perspectives on women and sport focus on sexuality in their attempt to explain the subordination and oppression of women (Scranton, 1988). Gender is recognised as the primary social division which is transmitted to the sports field and contributes to the maintenance of the subordinate position of women. A useful insight in the way sport conveys relations of male domination has been offered in the work of Willis (1982), where he discusses the role of sport in reinforcing common sense ideologies which assert the superiority of men and reproduce female inferiority. Willis cites the way female sport is presented to emphasise the biological differences between the two sexes, by drawing attention to unarguable physical differences, as though the genders are in a direct physical challenge during sports events. In this way “an ideological view comes to be deposited in our culture as a commonsense assumption - ‘of course women are different and inferior’” (Willis, 1982, p. 130). In his analysis Willis includes media images of sporting women that concentrate on their sexuality; “another powerful way in which the sexual identity is given precedence over the sport’s identity of female athletes is the vein of sexual innuendo running through much sports commentary” (p. 122). The role of sport as an ideological vehicle for guaranteeing male preserve has also been analysed by Green (1990), who argues that, in modern society, sport is a means of maintaining intact the hegemony of men and the ideology of inequality between men and women. Sport has been recognised by Green as a site of hegemonic struggle, by portraying the inferiority of women’s sports performance and records in relation to those of men, and thus ensuring the legitimacy of male domination. In less clearly male-dominated sports, male superiority is facilitated through the persistent reference about women to criteria other than sporting ones; “women athletes are always framed by their status both as athletes and as women (i.e. the assumption is that athletes are male)” (Clarke and Clarke, 1982, p. 67). In this way, radical feminism involves a more adequate conceptualisation of power in sport, than liberal and Marxist feminist
accounts, in the sense that social practices, as well as human agents are central features in the analysis of reproduction of social structures and relations of power.

However, Marxist feminism and radical feminism each theorise either class or gender as the primary source of social division, which leads to certain weaknesses since, by focusing on class or patriarchy as the major structures, other important differences between women are neglected (Yule, 1992). By concentrating entirely on class relations, and assuming that sport functions for the social reproduction of class society, Marxist feminism falls into the shortcomings of economic reductionism facing most of the traditional Marxist accounts reviewed earlier. It also leaves aside major points, such as gender, age or race that might constitute further constraints on (or opportunities for) sports participation experienced by women. Radical feminist theory has been criticised for its inadequacy as an analytical framework, since differences such as class and/or race cannot be ignored by any attempt to provide a coherent theoretical explanation.

The theoretical shortcomings identified above are addressed by socialist feminist theory of sport which seeks to provide a dual analysis by identifying the need to explain sports policy in terms of both gender relations and economic development (Scraton, 1988). But again, although "socialist feminism acknowledges the importance of racism as a structuring feature of our society and of women's (sport), racism is not central to research and analysis" (Yule, 1992, p. 168). In this analysis, the debate on sport has included a consideration both of patriarchy's need to reinforce gender inequalities and also the capitalism's need to sustain inequalities in social, political and economic power. Sport, as an institution, exists within a complex capitalist, patriarchal, economic and social system which inevitably carries the relations between the individual and the existing system. Central to this analysis is the notion that the relation between sport and capitalism/patriarchy is contingent, and therefore, while sport is said to convey relations of the dominant structure, it is also claimed to be a vehicle for challenging the prevailing ideology. Thus, a feminist theory of sport should consider not only gender relations or the women's position in the social structure, but also the links between theoretical explanations and political action.
Theories of the State

Implications for the State and Sport of New Right Theories

The theories reviewed so far, in their attempt to explain the notion of the modern state, have placed emphasis on either the structure of power in capitalist society, or the role of groups of agents in the operation of the state. The New Right approach to the state can be contrasted with both Marxist and pluralist explanations (in its prescriptive form) on the grounds of its advocacy of competitive capitalism, and the rejection of the idea of common interests. The New Right explanatory framework, which draws largely from the classical ideas of liberalism, is characterised by liberal theorists’ commitment to explaining society in terms of individual behaviour and action. Thus, for liberal advocates, civil society is seen as a set of individuals rather than a fertile ground for the formation of interest groups or the cultivation of group ideologies. New Right principles reject the notion of ‘collectivity’, and instead promote the ideal of ‘individualism’, which approaches social phenomena as the consequences of individual human action. Liberal ‘anti-collectivism’ is thus based on the notion that society is made up of individuals with competing interests, who seek to satisfy their own needs in the day to day life (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

New Right ideas about the economy and the role of the state have largely been influenced by the writings of Milton Friedman and his colleagues in the University of Chicago, and by the theorists of the Austrian school. Individualism and a profound hostility to any notion of the welfare state are the fundamental principles of those ideas. Strong emphasis is therefore placed on the freedom of individuals to realise and pursue their interests through the operation of a political and social environment which limits any external coercion. External (state) coercion is justified only where it is exercised as a means to prevent people from restricting the freedom of others. Hence, in terms of state policy, New Right theorists are inclined to the idea of an institution that maximises the freedom of self-interested individuals, by relying on the mechanisms of free market. The state is restricted to an institution largely concerned with the maintenance of the individual freedom and the stability of the market.

What makes the idea of the market favourable among New Right thinkers is its individualistic character; “the market has no ends and
purposes; market phenomena are merely what emerge from the actions of individuals pursuing their ends and purposes” (Barry, 1987, p. 33). For Friedman, the problem of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions of people can ideally be solved through the market, instead of central direction which essentially involves the use of coercion. Voluntary co-ordination of individuals in the free market is achieved through the exchange of their goods;

a working model of a society organised through voluntary exchange is a free private enterprise exchange economy - what we have been calling competitive capitalism. In its simplest form, such a society consists of a number of independent households which produce goods and services that exchange for goods and services produced by other households, on terms mutually acceptable to the two parties to the bargain (Friedman, 1962, p. 13).

The process of exchange between individuals is also considered to be a constantly correcting mechanism for the market. In classical liberal theory, cases such as those of monopoly and ‘neighbourhood effects’ have been identified as market imperfections. Monopoly implies the absence of alternatives to voluntary exchange and as such it undermines individuals’ freedom (Friedman, 1962). Neighbourhood effects occur, for example, when profit-maximising firms cause pollution and damage to the environment by employing the least-cost methods of production. Pollution and damage, in this case, are characterised as a ‘social’ cost which is imposed on others (Barry, 1987). In those two instances, and only in case the process of exchange fails to correct market imperfection, state intervention is justified.

However, most New Right theorists advocate a minimum role of the state rather than its elimination. The state’s role should be limited to the maintenance of social order and certainly not extended to the promotion of establishing equality or a ‘just’ distribution of resources or benefits. The state is conceptualised therefore, as a set of institutions which aim at securing the freedom of its citizens and maintaining the stability of the free market without intervening in its operation, since it is assumed that the market is self-correcting. The state’s essential form is regarded;

as a forum for determining the rules of the game and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on. What the
The minimalist approach is based on the arguments for the efficient operation of the private market and the insufficiency of state services delivery. The New Right argues that in conditions of perfect competition a private market system always produces at a point where the majority of consumers is satisfied from the supply of goods and services. On the other hand, where the state has the responsibility for the provision of services, state agencies tend to over-supply outputs. This results in the dissatisfaction of consumers who have to finance the cost of over-supplied services through increased taxation.

Nevertheless, the state can only provide services that, for technical reasons, cannot be provided by the market. Those services are what liberal accounts of the state call 'public goods', for instance, defence, law and order, clean air and so on. Collective provision of these goods;

is not thought to be antithetical to individualism since the goods in question are held to be desired by individual maximisers; it is simply the case that the market fails in certain areas. The state provides only those services that individuals want but which cannot be provided in any other way: although it acts coercively it is nevertheless a curious kind of voluntary coercion (Barry, 1987, pp. 65-7).

The Austrian school's main contribution to New Right thinking was their devotion to demonstrating the superiority of capitalism as the only rational organisation of economic activity. In economic terms, rationality was taken to mean, for Austrian theorists, the achievement of efficient allocation of resources and maximum level of wealth and productivity. Thus, it was claimed that "modern economic institutions such as the market and money were the spontaneous creation of individual agents and had evolved over a very long period. The only way in which they could work effectively was if their nature was respected" (Gamble, 1986, pp. 40-1). Respect for the market system required government non-intervention and any kind of government involvement was considered as destabilising. The market, as claimed, had the ability to be successful, at least more than government decisions could be, through its approach of
trial-and-error where the best course of action would emerge. However, the market's ability to discover the wants and needs of individuals was regarded by the critics of liberalism, as the result of the persuasive techniques of advertisers. In this sense, individuals' freedom was seen as being under threat, and liberal society was regarded as a set, not of autonomous agents but, of passive individuals vulnerable to market mechanisms. The liberals' answer to the above criticism was a further advocacy of the individuals' right to make even foolish decisions. Furthermore, they reasserted that "what characterises a liberal society is not some idealised, and most probably unrealisable, conception of individual autonomy, but competition between producers for the favours of consumers" (Barry, 1987, p. 51).

Market liberalism therefore, is defended for its substantive contribution as a discovery mechanism. As such, the free market is argued to be the only way through which the preferences and needs of individuals can be discovered and satisfied. In political terms, liberal democracy, where citizens are able to meet their needs without state interference, is the preferred political solution for the New Right. Advocacy of liberal democracy implies a belief in the idea that individuals "should enjoy some protection from arbitrary government (which) should in some way be tied to the will of the people" (Heywood, 1991, p. 57). For liberal theorists therefore, government was necessary for, but simultaneously a potential threat to, individual freedom, a view that stems from the belief that those in position of authority are encouraged to promote their own benefits at the expense of others. State bureaucrats and state agencies' officials have also been seen by New Right theorists as 'budget maximisers' (Gamble, 1986). The notion that their motivations are different from those in the private market is regarded as naive and mistaken. Thus, it is argued that all government officials tend to maximise their agency's budget in order to be able to divert more resources away from public interest objectives and towards satisfying their private interests and preferences.

In conclusion, New Right theorists, having placed a strong emphasis on individual freedom and the mechanisms of free market, argue for an approach which minimises the state's role to that of preserving social order and ensuring the stability of market. A (minimal) intervention on the part of the state is justified only in cases where the market works
imperfectly (i.e. where monopolies, or neighbourhood effects occur) or where the market is unable to satisfy individual aspirations (i.e. in the case of public or merit goods). However, this account, through its descriptive character and individualistic form, might be a useful vehicle for political pragmatism (as it has been proved to be by its application in a number of modern states), but it is certainly inadequate for theorising the role of the state. Its inadequacy stems mainly from the fact that New Right approach fails to identify relations of power, and structures that might restrict individual freedom, and rather treats individual agents as though they are operating in an environment free of structuration.

Stemming from New Right approaches' main principles, a minimal role of the state in sport, in terms of direct provision of sporting opportunities, is advocated. Individuals are seen as the best judges of their wants and preferences and therefore should be set free to satisfy their needs. On the other hand, the market is considered to be an effective mechanism for identifying and subsequently serving the needs of individuals. Consequently, for the New Right, public provision for sport should be restricted to a minimal, residual and non-directive role. The New Right approach of minimal state intervention in the sports field implies reinforcement of the role of the voluntary and commercial sectors. The voluntary sector is encouraged to promote those sports forms which best satisfy the interests of individuals. On the other hand, commercial organisations of sport would have to identify the preferences of consumers and provide appropriate sporting opportunities, in order to survive in a highly competitive market. Subsequently, individual consumers will be able to satisfy their needs by expressing choice in sport through a wide range of commercially or voluntarily provided activities.

The residual role of the state is justified where 'need' is most firmly established and where the market does not provide a sufficient level of provision to meet that need (Coalter, 1990). Based on Friedman's arguments for legitimate state involvement, New Right theorists would advocate state intervention in the sports field in cases where sports provision could result in gains in other spheres of economic and social policy. Provision of sporting opportunities for the unemployed, for example, would be undertaken by the state as one of the ways to provide an alternative focus for the release of anxiety, and thus prevent
vandalism, rather than as a means to achieve equality of opportunities. Furthermore, sports provision for highly deprived areas, or for the inner cities would be seen as necessary by New Right authors, as a means of alleviating some of the social problems in these areas, and thus contributing to social order. In addition, the introduction of young children to sport would be justified on the grounds of providing an acceptable mechanism for transmitting the 'appropriate' values of social behaviour. In conclusion, New Right thinking advocates state intervention in this field not as a means of supporting sport for its own sake, but on the grounds of the externalities gained through sports provision (Henry, 1993).

**Elite Theory of the State and its Implications for Sports Policy**

Classical elite theorists have attempted to articulate a theoretical account which would demonstrate that in every society government by an elite group is inevitable (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). In the same way as Marxists conceptualise the division of society between those who own and control the means of production (ruling class) and those who sell their labour power (working class), elite theorists make the distinction between the few who govern and the many who are governed. In this simplistic distinction, the former group is identified as the power elite which is described as "the leadership group or operating arm of the ruling class. It is made up of active, working members of the ruling class and high level employees in institutions controlled by members of the ruling class" (Domhoff, 1979, p. 13).

As argued, 'elites' are all pervasive, in the sense that, irrespective of the type of society in question or the mode of economic activity (i.e. socialist or capitalist, agricultural or industrial, and so on) there would always be an elite group controlling the state and civil society (Dye and Zeigler, 1981). In this line of argument, even a Marxist revolution, could not produce a classless society but simply would generate a new elite. On the other hand, any belief that a liberal representative democracy would give the opportunity to all groups to fight freely to achieve their interests, has been strongly opposed by elite theorists who argue that liberal democracy cannot alter the stratification of modern society, and that the existence of a ruling class and a mass is enduring and inevitable.
Elite theory of the state was extended by the work of Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (1968). Weber’s notion of ‘democratic elitism’ evolved in this work, is a synthesis of the main principles of elite theory and pluralism. Weber’s arguments are based on the notion of rationality and the logic of industrialisation which have produced organisational elites capable of promoting business interests. In contrast to instrumental Marxist thinking, which supports the view that government elites were established through economic power and aimed at reproducing the logic of capital accumulation, Weberian elitism claimed that organisational elites were established through rational logic in order to control the functions of the state. Those groups are promoted at the top level of the organisational hierarchy, while others, mass-based groups, which promote issues that threaten established elites, are excluded from positions of power.

Formulation and promotion of elites do not necessarily preclude individuals from lower classes and/or mass-based groups, from rising to the top of the social structure. In fact, the elite system is argued to be strengthened by drawing individuals from mass groups and permitting entry to elites. This upward mobility, which takes place as a slow and continuous assimilation, rather than as a rapid or revolutionary change, is considered to be essential for social stability (Dye and Zeigler, 1981). However, the most common criticism of elite accounts, points to the absence of coherence that would allow for a strong class consciousness, capable of developing “class-oriented policies and ideologies to be impressed upon the government and the general public” (Domhoff, 1979, p. 13).

Elite theorists define the state as an institution necessary for the successful maintenance of a monopoly of legitimate force within a given territory. State policy is dictated by the existence of numerous sources of pressure which seek to influence the political agenda in favour of their own interests. The notion of the existence of numerous elites, which seek to exercise pressure on the state apparatus, has been a source of differentiation within elite accounts of the state. As such, radical elite theorists claim that the main source of influence lies on the hands of administrative elites who can either operate in their own interests or respond directly to outside elites. These outside elites could be either
business interests or the interests of people who have similar socio-political backgrounds with those who hold official positions. Thus, state organisations seem to respond in a biased way to the interests of those who have the networks to penetrate the policy decision making process. Control by any external political force is difficult to exercise, and even when exercised successfully, political pressure is interpreted as an expression of the dominant business interests. On the other hand, democratic elitists remain optimistic that strong political control and improved overview procedures can constrain such abuses of power within tolerable limits and enforce a concern to advance the 'public interest'.

The above differentiation gave rise to a number of analytical conceptions of the state. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987), identify three models of the state revealed in elitist accounts. The first conception, namely the externally controlled machine model, seeks to define the state as an institution subjected to control by external elites, who, according to radical elitists remain quite apart from political struggles. These socially dominant elites control effectively both party and state organisations. Subsequently, the state is seen, in the radical elite theory’s machine model, as a passive vehicle used in an exploitive manner by either business or technocratic interests.

The second model (the autonomous model), regards the state as an autonomous institution which responds to the preferences of the administrative and governing elites who can directly control the state organisations. In this model the state is seen as an institution which is controlled by elected politicians and bureaucrats who are both insulated from broader social movements, political parties or any socially dominant elite, and run its organisations according to their interests. Dunall and Freeman (1983) illustrate the way this model of elite state has influenced the explanations of state involvement in the economy. Political influence of the elite bureaucratic and technocratic groups is identified as the source which manages the public sector and guides the process of economic development; "in the extreme, this view holds that the state has been effectively captured by this elite ... (which) forms an independent state, relatively free from the influence of private sector interests, and allocates resources in a way that expands its own power and health" (p. 571).
However, the main limitation of this argument lies in its emphasis on the demands of the state's administrative elite, while such factors as structural constraints and/or economic conditions are not fully appreciated.

The third image seeks to synthesise the other two elitist models. In this account, the state is defined as a corporatist network which responds to pressures from both economic and bureaucratic elites. In practice, economic and political power are so much interrelated that no clear boundary line can be drawn between the two. Any state policy making is seen as the outcome of a bargaining process over strategic issues between elite interests outside and within the state apparatus. In order to be successful, strategic plans should meet the needs of both business and governing elites, since their implementation depends on the elites voluntary co-operation.

In conclusion, elite theory conceptualises social structure as the reflection of domination of an elite group over the rest of society. In the same line of thinking, the state institution is argued to be controlled directly or indirectly by either an administrative or business elite or by the corporatist interests of the two. What should be pointed out is that elite theory of the state suffers from reductionism common in Marxist accounts. Its reductionism stems from the claim that the state is used as an instrument for satisfying the demands of an elite group, whether an administrative or business elite. Domination of those elites over the society and state apparatus is taken as granted, while the possibility of battles within state and society, or even resistance to elite aspirations, is neglected, a fact which further limits the adequacy of the theory as an explanatory framework for state analysis.

Before proceeding to the implications for sport of elite accounts, the lack of any elite writings on sport and the state should be emphasised. Consequently, the argument that follows is derived largely from the main premises of the theory reviewed above. Elite theory's premises, which identify the state with the interests of social or economic elite groups, would imply that any analysis of sports policy must be attempted in the light of the above interests. According to the principles of this theory, any kind of sports policy is said to be undertaken for the benefit of elite and lobby groups' interests around sport. Sports organisations therefore, are
instrumentally controlled by elite groups who seek to satisfy their demands and realise their aspirations.

However, elite thinking implies that state agencies responsible for the formulation of an overall policy for sport, are dominated by the values of the elite group in society. In a similar way to instrumental Marxists, elite theorists argue that appointed members, as well as administrative officials and bureaucrats within the sports organisations, act in a biased way to defend the interests of people with similar backgrounds, incomes and interests to themselves. Consequently, every sports organisation is taken to respond solely to the sporting preferences of administrative and governing elites who directly staff its bodies. However, in cases where these 'internal' elites are considered to be different from elites in society, elite theorists would not deny that sports bodies would respond to pressures exercised by external elites by undertaking a corporatist approach to policy decision making. Elite theorists therefore, would point to the 'origins' of all those in key positions within sports organisations (e.g. the Sports Council and British Olympic Association in Britain or the General Secretariat of Sport and the Hellenic Olympic Committee in Greece). Unfortunately, due to the lack of any empirical work on this area no claim can be made that control of sports organisations rests in the hands of 'elites' or that sports policy outcomes are reflecting the needs and interests of internal or external elites.

Dual State Thesis and its Questions for Sports Policy

The dual state thesis, as its title implies, is not a theory in itself but rather is referred to as a thesis concerning a set of organising tendencies within liberal democratic states. The main suggestion of dual state thesis is that any comprehensive analysis of contemporary political and social developments in advanced capitalist societies has to be able to explain the different, and in some cases contradictory, functions of the state and the allocation of these functions within the state apparatus. This approach to the analysis of the operation of the modern state seeks to identify the allocation of responsibilities, for various functions of the state, to different levels of government. In doing so, the thesis first attempts to draw a clear boundary line between the different kinds of state expenditure and state
action, and then to explain how the two tiers of government, central and local, have undertaken different roles and responsibilities.

More specifically, the fundamental argument of dual state thesis has been developed in four distinctive stages, as identified by Dunleavy (1984). The first stage concerns the classification of state spending to; i) social expenses, ii) social investment, and, iii) social consumption, based on the typology developed by O'Connor (1973). For the first category, O'Connor notes that "there is a tendency of social expenses to rise over time and the state increasingly is compelled to socialise these expenses" (p. 150). Social expenses, even though they are not considered as contributing to economic growth, they are undertaken as a means for the maintenance of social order. Those expenses include welfare and military spending. The former functions to control the population politically, while the latter "inhibits the development of world revolution, thus keeping labour power, raw materials, and markets in the capitalist orbit" (p. 151). On the other hand, social investment - which incorporates the distinction between physical capital (e.g. transportation facilities, industrial development programmes), and human capital (e.g. education, scientific services) - provides the means of production for capital and enhances profit directly. These costs of capital are socialised because "first, most physical capital is used to supply goods or services that private capital requires on a permanent basis, and ... serves a large number of diverse corporations and industries, and second, projects are socialised because costs often exceed the resources of or are regarded as unacceptable financial risks by the companies immediately concerned" (p. 101). Finally, spending for social consumption occurs where the government socialises labour costs, by providing the means for the reproduction of labour power (e.g. medical or recreation facilities, housing, social welfare provision), and hence contributes indirectly to capital accumulation.

The second stage of the thesis, developed by Offe (1984), involves the distinction between 'allocative' and 'productive' actions of the state. State action may be allocative where the government is primarily using its own resources and hence it is acting in a self-guided way. In contrast, state intervention may be productive where the government is undertaking initiatives that require the co-operation of external interests (i.e. business interests) if they are to be successful. A combination of these two stages
would imply that those kinds of allocative intervention which involve social investment can be run in a bureaucratic mode, while productive action involving social investment spending requires a corporatist approach to decision making. On the other hand, for social consumption spending, whether allocative or productive, the government may use pluralist decision procedures.

The third stage integrates the first two, by providing an analysis of the functions of the different tiers of government, based on the above categorisation of state expenditure and modes of intervention. As claimed, central government has undertaken the functions for sustained profit for capital, and thus, its main function is the allocation of social investments through a corporatist way of decision making which is insulated from popular control. In contrast, local government has assumed responsibility for social consumption issues, which are promoted through pluralist decision procedures.

However, the above arrangements are likely to create tensions between central and local government. Saunders (1984) has identified four dimensions of conflict between the two levels of government. The organisational dimension involves a power struggle, where each side attempts to defend and extend the degree of its autonomy and control in relation to the other. The second source of tension (functional dimension) concerns the conflict between production and consumption priorities. This conflict has been interpreted as the result of both central government's attempt to control local government spending on consumption issues, and thus maintain private sector profitability, and the resistance by the majority of local authorities whose first priority has been to provide services for the needs of various local groups. Furthermore, political conflict has been recognised by Saunders as the third key tension in government activity. Political conflict stems from central government's insulation from pressures of competing interests, and its subordination to expressed needs from the private sector. Local government, on the other hand, is said to be more responsive to the needs of a wide range of competing interests around consumption issues. Thus, pluralist pressures from the local level, which always threaten corporatist central arrangements, constitute the main source of political conflicts. Finally, the ideological tension stems from the fact that the two levels of
government have different, and in many cases contradictory, objectives and they are evaluated according to different criteria; economic efficiency and prosperity for central government, and provision of social needs and quality of life for local government.

In the final stage of dual state thesis, Dunleavy attempts to identify the implications, in terms of social structure and political processes, derived from the different functions attributed to central and local government. In this stage, the politics of corporatist central government are said to be dominated by relations of power between capital and labour, while the state is conceived as responding to the interests of the capitalist class for sustained capital accumulation. At local level, on the other hand, political conflicts sustain a typically pluralist process. Local state pluralism stems from the fact that conflicts over consumption issues involve a wider range of social interests rather than just class interests.

However, there are certain problems associated with this explanation of the operation of the state. Taking the case of Britain, for example, where the thesis has been best articulated, the contemporary functions of local authorities seem to spread across all the categories of state spending, social expenses, social investment and social consumption, (e.g. highways, National Health Service), which undermines in the first place the argument concerning the allocation of specific spending to certain tiers of government. Furthermore, O'Connor's distinction between social expenses, investment and consumption is also problematic, since it presents a set of ideal types which has never been applied in detail to any state budget (Dunleavy, 1984). A potentially more serious objection, which further weakens dual state thesis, is that the thesis tends to ignore the importance of professionalism in local government decision making, where professionals have an obvious capacity to generate new initiatives and influence policy outcomes.

The major contribution of the thesis is that it avoids the description of the state as a monolith, and instead attempts to analyse the differential operation of the state at different levels of government. At this point, it should be noted once again that the dual state thesis is not a theory by itself, which implies that it is open to any objection or support deriving from empirical investigation. As far as the analysis of sports policy is
concerned, the main assumption of the thesis is that provision of sport is local government’s responsibility, since local government has undertaken social consumption functions. Thus, as Henry (1993) has pointed out, the dual state thesis does not offer a concrete theory on sports policy but rather highlights strategic questions for consideration in terms of local government sports policy. Each of the four dimensions of conflict between local and central state poses a question for consideration of local sports policy.

In the organisational dimension, which concerns struggles over power and control, a strategic question would be to establish the extent to which central government attempts to influence and/or restrict the direction of local policy on sport. The functional dimension assumes that the central state is responsible for production while local government is allocated responsibility for consumption services. In this respect, sports policy research would be interested in identifying whether sports production and consumption are subject to the above functional division, whether, in other words, the former is central state’s concern while the latter is allocated to local government. Furthermore, the political dimension identified by the dual thesis, i.e. the corporatist mode of central government decision making and the competitive politics of the local state, sets the question of whether local government’s sports policy is in practice the outcome of pluralist decision making or the result of other sources of influence (i.e. professional interests). Finally, the identified tension between central government’s concern for the accumulation of profit and local government’s role in meeting the local needs would help the researcher to question the aims of sports provision at different levels of government. Accordingly, research interests would focus on whether local politics are concerned with the satisfaction of local sports needs, at the same time when central government is concerned with providing sporting opportunities as a means of maintaining the capitalist mode of production.

Fordism and Post-Fordism; Regulation Theory, the State and its Implications for Sport

Regulation theory emerged in part as a response to the criticism against those Marxist approaches that sought to theorise the role of the state as
one of simply reproducing capitalist relations. Functional and ideological Marxist accounts, developed for example by Poulantzas and Althusser, claimed that the reproduction of existing social relations was essential for the maintenance of the state form. Since those relations were considered to be a consequence of the existing form of economic activity (e.g. capitalist production), emphasis was placed on the assumption that capitalist structures maintained themselves in a more or less automatic way. Regulation theorists attempted to explain what they called 'regulation' of the state (as opposed to 'reproduction' used by traditional Marxists) by incorporating in their analysis the significant role of social agencies, and the possibility of incremental or radical transformations in economic and social arrangements in capitalist societies (Jessop, 1990). Regulationists' main assumption is that capital accumulation is stable as long as certain regulatory mechanisms are able to provide the means necessary for the accommodation of tensions and antagonisms, generated within capitalist relations (i.e. either between rival capitals or between capital and labour). These regulatory mechanisms are said to contain all those conflicts until tensions reach a crisis point. When this occurs, capitalism would survive through a new regime of accumulation to be sustained by a new mode of social regulation.

The term 'regime of accumulation' is used to describe a particular form of production and consumption that ensures a compatibility between what is produced and what is consumed in an economy. A mode of regulation comprises a complex of institutional arrangements and social and political norms, which can "secure capitalist reproduction despite the antagonistic character of capitalist social relations" (Jessop, 1990, p. 308). The mode of regulation functions as a support framework for growth regimes. In other words, it enables a particular regime of accumulation to develop in a particular direction in a more or less stable manner and includes a "whole host of cultural styles and political practices, ranging from popular aspirations and social expectations to the more formal interventions of the state" (Allen, 1992, p. 187).

Analytical attention is placed therefore, on both the economic structure of capitalism and the social relations of capitalist society. Regulation theorists' concern is to identify those social mechanisms which ensure the reproduction of capital despite its inherent economic contradictions and
social conflicts. What they seem to agree upon, is that a certain regime of accumulation will be stable as long as modes of regulation can successfully institutionalise class struggles. Confinement of conflicts within certain boundaries, compatible with accumulation, is not guaranteed to last for ever. When conflicts cannot be restrained within the dominant regime of accumulation or mode of regulation, through marginal adjustments or incremental changes, then regulationists speak of "a crisis of (rather than in) an accumulation regime or mode of regulation and stress that the transition to a new phase of accumulation depends on class struggle, trial-and-error experimentation, chance discoveries and so forth" (Jessop, 1990, p. 310). Describing the movement towards a new regime of capital accumulation as the result of class struggles and efforts conducted by political actors, is the way in which the above theory seeks to avoid the reductionist weaknesses of both functionalist and structuralist Marxist accounts of the state (Henry, 1993).

Regulationists' empirical concern lies in what they regard as the key contemporary shift in advanced capitalist economies, the movement from a 'Fordist' to a 'post-Fordist' regime of accumulation accompanied by different forms of social regulation. There are two reference points for the Fordist accumulation regime; the first concerns a "mode of capital accumulation, which generates a rise in labour productivity" and the second refers to "the continual adjustment of mass consumption to the rise in productivity" (Lipietz, 1982, p. 34). The Fordist phase of capitalist development has been characterised by the mass production of durable products, the application of scientific management techniques, the maximisation of productivity by breaking down work tasks to simplified repetitive routines, the emergence of a sharp polarisation between skilled and deskill labour and a relative increase in real wages. This resulted in the generation of a mass market for mass produced commodities, ensuring that final demand would keep pace with supply and lead to a substantial national economic growth (Hirsch, 1991).

Fordist capital accumulation was stabilised by mechanisms of regulation featured by increasing state intervention in the economy (the state's attempt to balance the patterns of production and demand - Keynesian management), and through a form of political, social, and cultural relations. In terms of social policy, the welfare state was proved to be the
institutional form ensuring stability through the provision of a wide range of services (social security, health, education, etc.). In political terms, Fordism is interrelated with the emergence of social democratic regimes (Gamble, 1988). Social democracy has been associated with a progressive enlargement of the public sector. The range of public responsibilities was steadily expanded and included the provision of programmes and services designed to correct extreme inequalities among different sections of the population. Hirsch (1991) argues that increasing intervention by the state was intended first, to ensure the material survival of its social members, and second, to progress the social adjustment and conditioning of the individuals; both considered as essential for maintaining the existing form of accumulation. The successful pursuit of Fordist strategy was based on the productivity of the economy which in turn made the flow of material concessions to subordinate social forces necessary for increasing consumption. Subsequently, workers integration within the modern industrial order was ensured by increasing not only private standards of living but also the ‘social wages’ sustained by public expenditure, as part of the social democratic settlement between labour and capital (Henry, 1993).

Social democratic arrangements could only be sustainable so long as economic growth provided the resources for the provision of services by the state. However, the world-wide economic decline after the mid-1970s, exposed the inadequacies of the Fordist regime of accumulation and the social democratic mode of regulation. Fordism, as a pattern of industrial production had gained credibility by the long post-war boom of the economy. In the 1970s however, a slow-down in productivity, which appeared first in the US in the late 1960s, made its appearance in most of the industrial European countries. The uncertainty caused by the decline in capital’s profits was compounded with the ‘oil shock’ of 1973, which led to a dramatic increase in energy costs in the western nations (Allen, 1992). The stability of Fordist regime of accumulation was further undermined by the challenge to the hegemony of the US in the world economic order. The competitiveness of strong economies such as Japan and Germany was fuelled by the steady erosion of the US dollar as an international regulatory currency, and enhanced the prospect of international recession (Aglietta, 1982).
Other authors have identified inherent contradictions within Fordist capital accumulation which have arguably led to its crisis. Besides the economic recession, the fact that the system of mass integration excluded various interests, and state organisations became rather insensitive and unresponsive to social interests and problems, was argued to have rendered the modes of social regulation rather inadequate to confine social struggles within the existing institutional forms (Hirsch, 1991). Throughout the Western societies, Keynesian stabilisation was attacked, and class conflicts reemerged as evidenced in Britain in the ‘great mobilisation’ of labour (Lash and Urry, 1987). A further contradiction was “rooted in the Fordist labour process and concerned the inability of mass production methods to realise further productivity gains within manufacturing, as well as their limited applicability to areas of the economy such as services” (Allen, 1992, p. 187).

The crisis of Fordist regime of accumulation is argued to have resulted in the transition of economic activity to a new regime of accumulation, necessary for the survival of capital. The Fordist regime of economic development as claimed, has moved to the national economies which constitute the periphery of the global economic system, while in advanced capitalist states it has been replaced by a new regime of economic activity, what many authors have called ‘post-Fordism’ (Hirsch, 1991). Those who argue that Fordism has reached its end, are largely concerned with flexible forms of economic organisation and production, which are seen as having replaced mass production and mass markets. As Lash and Urry (1987) have pointed out, there seems to be a widespread development of firms in many of the advanced capitalist economies shifting to a strategy of non-mass production in smaller workplaces. This development has been caused by changes in technology, changes in consumer tastes, and producers' competition on the grounds of product quality. The new form of capital accumulation is characterised by flexible manufacturing systems, and the introduction of new ways of organising work to improve product quality (e.g. robotics) which might allow savings in costs but also lead to loses in jobs and increase of unemployment or under-employment.

Other authors are cautious about naming a successor to Fordism. In analysing the new economic era they too point to a transformation of the labour process, and draw attention to the global shifts in the organisation
of production. In their analysis, they also identify increased automation in
the workplace and the introduction of new working practices, that lead to
a greater flexibility in production and more cost-effectiveness, as the main
principles of the new economic organisation (Allen, 1992). Stewart and
Stoker (1989), and Harris (1988) for instance, argue that instead of a post-
Fordist regime of economic activity, the world system has been simply
transformed into a neo-Fordist accumulation regime. It is not however
one of the objectives of this analysis to evaluate the economic and other
evidence in the debate concerning the end of Fordism, and whether a
structural shift in economic activity has occurred. Rather, the concern here
is whether such a shift has been perceived as occurring by policy makers
who thus adjust the mode of social regulation. In Britain for example,
even though the shift of economic activity is debatable, there is evidence
to suggest that there has been a major shift in the mode of regulation
which can be associated with the new form of capital accumulation.

In social and political terms, the new regime of accumulation, it is argued,
is associated with a new mode of social relations. The new form of
production has fostered the development of a two tier work force; “core
workers in the new industries (who) are recruited and retained with
packages of inducements ... and (‘peripheral’ labour) to (whom) work is
subcontracted, job security is therefore low and are subject to insecurity
and low wages” (Henry and Bramham, 1991, p. 21). The state is no longer
seen as responsible for the material survival of its citizens nor for their
welfare. State intervention is minimal, with the state creating the
conditions for the efficient operation of a strong market and intervening
only where externalities may accrue. Many theorists point to the
displacement of Keynesianism by a more neo-liberal economic strategy;
that is one based on the economic rationality of the private market (Allen,
1992). As a consequence, the rights of citizen are now to be replaced by
consumer’s rights which is likely to affect more seriously the peripheral
workforce for whom the loss of jobs and the state’s withdrawal from the
provision of welfare services is most keenly felt. Thus, the post-Fordist
mode of accumulation implies a two tier society with those who can take
advantage of the consumer choices offered by the private sector and the
free market, and those who have not the resources to benefit and therefore
are likely to receive a safety net provision.
As part of the regulatory mechanism, sports policy is seen as associated with different modes of economic activity and hence subjected to the conditions of transition to a new era of regulation. It should be noted at this point that sport has not received analytical attention by leading regulation theorists, and any theorising on this issue draws from the analysis of social norms as regulatory mechanisms. Under the Fordist system therefore, provision for sport was undertaken by the state as a form of welfare provision, as part of the social wage. Provision of sporting opportunities was meant to compensate for workers' alienation and improve their private standard of living. The role of the state in sport was largely interventionist, influenced by the social concern for the welfare of the population and characterised by an egalitarian objective stemming from the recognition of the community’s right of access to sports activities for their own sake. In line with this rationale, the state assumed responsibility for the provision of a wide range of sports activities to those communities in particular who were considered as under-privileged (e.g. racial minorities, disadvantaged groups by age, class, gender, etc.). On the other hand, the entrepreneurial spirit and the notion of consumer rights which characterise social regulation in the post-Fordist regime, have been seen as carrying certain implications for sport. The new regime of accumulation and the heavy reliance on the free market, seem to imply that individuals are merely responsible for satisfying their needs for active participation in sport through the operation of the market. The role of the state in this field should be residual, and any form of intervention might be justified on the grounds of economic benefits that are likely to result (an issue that was identified earlier in the review of New Right explanations of the state). Ultimately, the inevitable consequence of such a move towards private provision of sport is the exclusion from sports consumption of those groups that are unable to afford the cost of participation, who are likely to receive a residual, low-level, safety net provision (Henry, 1993).

The regulation approach therefore, seems to advance Marxist analysis of the state by pointing to the possibilities of transformation of economic structures and the associated social relations, and recognising the essential role of class struggles in the process of transition. However, criticism has pointed to the problems involved in adopting a regulation approach for theorising the state (Jessop, 1990). Although the main advance of the
theory appears to be its avoidance of reductionism and functionalism associated with a number of classic Marxist accounts, there are still certain weaknesses encountered in a number of regulationist arguments. By giving priority to the economic functions of the state, regulation theorists seem to reduce its role to managing tensions and contradictions so that capital accumulation can proceed. Regulation approaches to post-war economic growth tend to focus on the state's role as an instrument of economic management, and issues of social consumption are subordinated to the needs of capital. As such, "class struggle enters as ... struggle over distribution and the state is seen to manage the balance of forces so that accumulation can continue by restoring profits and creating demand" (Jessop, 1990, p. 314). In this analysis, there is still the danger of conceiving the state as an institutional form whose functions are determined by the imperatives of economic reproduction. In order for an analysis to adequately address questions on the form and functions of the state, its approach should be free from any notion of reductionism and determinism, where the state would be conceptualised as an ensemble of structural forms, institutions and organisations whose functions are related to battles in society, and not necessarily to the needs of capital.

Strategic Relations Approach

The strategic relations approach to the state has been developed by Bob Jessop in State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place, where he has attempted to advance a Marxist notion of the state going beyond the instrumental and functional/structural accounts most often encountered in Marxist explanations. As he notes, the proposition offered in this work is not yet fully developed, and theoretical and empirical research needs to be undertaken which might further substantiate its main principles. It should be noted that strategic relations theory is in a sense a meta-theory, in that it does not attempt to offer a specific explanation of how the state operates, but rather seeks to inform the way an adequate analysis of the state form and its functions should be developed. It therefore poses a number of critical questions to be addressed in a fruitful approach to the formulation and function of democratic states. Those questions are: How does the form of the state come to be institutionalised? Is there any kind of power that can be ascribed to the state? In what ways do certain forces come to be represented in policy decisions? What is the kind of
Theories of the State

relationship between the state form and society and between the state and its wider environment? How might these relations inform a specific state strategy?

The form of the state should be treated in historical and relational terms. According to strategic relations approach, the state is the institutionalisation of the outcomes of historical battles among diverse forces. The relationship and the balance of forces around the state are not stable but rather subject to change. These forces are not restricted to the identification of class interests, or gender and group interests, or the overwhelming power of economic relations, or even the independent activities of individuals (a notion that most of the theories reviewed have failed to avoid). They are rather taken to include all forces that can be related historically to the state form in a dialectic way. In other words, what the strategic relations approach stresses is that any analysis of the state form should fully consider all kinds of forces that might act within, beyond and around the state which have an impact and at the same time are influenced by the state's institutional form. In this sense, state form is not prescribed for a given situation but it is always linked in relational terms with forces around it and the historical circumstances in which those forces have operated. As such, the state is capitalist for instance, to the extent that it creates, maintains or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation and it is non-capitalist to the extent that these conditions are not realised. As a meta-theory it is beyond the scope of strategic relations approach to provide an explanation of the state, rather it is the task of research to investigate (as opposed to predetermine) the form of the state. Strategic relations theory nevertheless does determine both the nature of questions in this domain, and the scope of answers.

Relevant to this investigation would be the forms of representation where pluralism, clientelism, populism as well as the roles played by political parties, social movements, state officials, corporate bodies, intergovernmental and transnational organisations would be taken into account. In this sense, the state is to be seen as a terrain where battles are conducted among all forces and political projects. Yet, the state as a terrain of social struggles can never be neutral among these forces but rather it is always biased towards some forces. Nevertheless, strategic relational approach points to the fact that "any bias is always tendential and can be
undermined or reinforced by appropriate strategies” (Jessop, 1990, p. 353). What Jessop puts forward as the main characteristic of the state is its ‘strategic selectivity’. The notion of state selectivity is not new in Marxist writings. Poulantzas has also referred to ‘structural selectivity’ of the capitalist state as the possibilities offered by each state form for the successful pursuit of specific class interests. The structural selectivity in this case is able to modify the balance of class forces that act in and through the state. Where Poulantzas’ notion of state selectivity was intended to describe the class-biased capitalist state, Jessop introduced the term slightly modified (i.e. ‘strategic’ rather than ‘structural’ selectivity) to reflect the state as;

the site of strategy ... whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of political strategy than others. Thus a given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power. I believe this notion of strategic selectivity is more fruitful than that of structural selectivity because it brings out more clearly the relational character of this selectivity. For the differential impact of the state system on the capacity of different class (-relevant) forces to pursue their interests in different strategies over a given time horizon is not inscribed in the state system as such but in the relation between state structures and the strategies which different forces adopt towards it (ibid., p. 260).

It is important to emphasise the relational character of selectivity, in the sense that the state system favours specific forces to realise certain interests. These interests can only be established and articulated through the state in relation to specific strategies and over a specific time period. State selectivity should not be confused with the process of the provision of benefits to those groups which make up the social base and the stable core of support for a certain form of regime (which is more closely associated with clientelism). State selectivity may be class, gender, regional and local, or any other type of selectivity, and needs to be established rather than taken for granted. Thus, research needs to examine the level of access of competing forces to state resources (e.g. political, economic) and the consequences of state action over specific forms of interests in a given time horizon, in order to be able to identify the type of state selectivity over this period, and hence explain the function of the state. The dialectic character of the relationship between the state form and all forces around it, stems from the fact that state selectivity offers different possibilities to
social forces for the successful pursuit of their specific interests on the one hand, and on the other, the balance of all forces acting in and around the state determines to a large extent the power of the state.

The state, it is suggested, should be approached as an institutional ensemble with no power of its own. The state has only a set of institutional capacities and therefore its powers should be analysed in relation to the forces which act in and through these institutions; “it is not the state which acts: it is always specific sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state system. It is they who activate specific powers and state capacities inscribed in particular institutions and agencies” (ibid., p. 367). As such, forces may be extended beyond the economic interests of social classes or pluralist interest groups. Rather, they are likely to include state managers as well as class forces, gender groups as well as regional interests and so forth, which are all given unequal chances by different state organisations to act for different political purposes. Yet, focusing entirely on the state system itself, its powers and capacities, is deemed as only one aspect for understanding state power. For Jessop, the powers of the state should be analysed in conditional and relational terms; one should take into account resources and power that the state needs, which are produced elsewhere and their realisation depends on the “structural ties between the state and its encompassing political system, the strategic links among state managers and other political forces, and the complex web of interdependencies and social networks linking the state system to its broader environment” (ibid., p. 367).

What most of the state theories have failed to take into account is what Jessop describes as the unifying force behind state activity; “the role of state managers (both politicians and career officials)” (ibid., p. 261). If the state is the site of competing strategies, it is state managers who act within the state system and therefore their interpretation of the struggles is crucial for the materialisation of state policies. Furthermore, the state itself is a site of rivalries among its different branches where politicians and state officials struggle with one another to secure access to state resources. Their level of success over a specific project depends to a large extent on the strategic selectivity of the state at a given period of time, which may or may not provide state managers with the resources to materialise their aspirations.
The claim made here is that the strategic relational approach carries specific implications for the analysis of sports policy developments in a given context, over a specific time horizon, while not necessarily undermining the premises of other theories of the state. Thus, it is suggested that pluralist interest groups, the economic interests of the capitalist class, elite and gender groups should be taken into account in any fruitful analysis of the state form and policies. Its main strength lies in that the strategic relations approach avoids restricting itself to identifying state power with a particular force or group. State power is analysed as the balance of forces which may include class forces, gender and regional groups as well as influences within the state system (i.e. the outcome of struggles among state managers). In this sense, strategic relations approach offers a theoretical framework which rather than setting the boundaries for empirical research, widens the analysis in a purposeful way. What this approach aims at is not imposing its premises on the research findings but informing the way research on the state's form and function should be conducted.

In relation to sports policy outcomes for instance, the strategic relational approach would require the researcher to identify and select a number of issues as a means to construct a comprehensive picture of a specific context. In a strategic relations analysis, the institution of sport may be capitalist, pluralist, feminist, elitist, individualist etc., to the extent that it is revealed to strategically favour means of labour exploitation for instance, or the prevailing interest groups, or gender relations and so forth. In this line of analysis, the organisational and institutional form of sport and its ties with the state system would be the focus of inquiry rather than taken for granted. Having identified the structural formation of sport, it is seen as essential to sketch out the relations of power both between sport as a whole and the broader environment, and between sports organisations. In other words, sport (through individual agents) should be seen both as a force acting within the state and also as an ensemble of powers which act within sport and between sport and the state. As a force in itself, sport is subjected to the structures of power within the state and accordingly it may be regarded as a force struggling to secure access to state resources for the realisation of specific sports projects. The level of access therefore, is likely to depend on the opportunities offered by the state and its environment at specific time periods. Yet, not
only are the structures and their strategic selectivity considered as essential but also the role of individual actors within and around sport is equally important. As such, the strategic relations approach requires the investigation of strategic links among state sports managers (i.e. politicians and career officials) and other political forces as a means to unfold the kinds of interdependencies that might influence the balance of forces around sport. As it has already been pointed out, the main benefit in employing the strategic relational approach for the analysis of sport lies in the fact that both the structure of sport and interrelations of forces, and the role of individual agents are considered as equally important for a comprehensive inquiry over a specific time horizon and in a specific context.

Among the number of research questions addressed by the strategic relations theory, the position of a specific setting within its broader environment is of particular importance. In this sense, before the investigation proceeds to the analysis of sports policy within a given context it is important to link, in historical and relational terms, the specific field of analysis with both the nation-state and the global environment. Thus, the notion of globalisation and the analysis of political, economic and social developments in post-War Greece, which follow this chapter, aim at linking the context of empirical research with its broader environment.
CHAPTER III

GLOBALISATION
Globalisation and the Nation-State

This chapter intends to shift the attention from the elaboration of theories of the nation-state to a wider concern with the global system. In this system, national societies and nation-states are regarded as constituting only one general reference point for the analysis of globalisation. Globalisation refers to a process where decisions and policy making in one place can have major implications for communities and societies in distant parts of the world. Globalisation can best be described as the global expansion of social interdependencies which also includes the economic, political, and cultural field. Intensification of interaction and interdependence among the states has resulted in the strengthening of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation-states (McGrew, 1992).

There have been many attempts to conceptualise the global system, which will be dealt with briefly in the following paragraphs. The world-system perspective, conceptualises the world as a set of developed and underdeveloped states or zones, with the former being the core of the capitalist world system and the latter in the periphery or semi-periphery. The above distinction is underpinned by an unequal exchange process and the division of labour between the core, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries (Bergesen, 1990). A first criticism on the perspective of world system, developed by Sklair (1991), concerns the increasing difficulty of this approach in explaining adequately the development or at least the industrialisation of a number of countries in the periphery or semi-periphery of the globe. In addition, this approach has been argued to be problematic, since the global totality is regarded as resulting from its sub-units, the component zones or states which are taken to precede the subsequently larger world (Bergesen, 1990). This nation-state centred line of argument however, tends to underemphasise the influence of transnational forces (e.g. transnational capital) in the formation of sub-units (e.g. nation states).

The same line of criticism can be said to render the international relations theory problematic for the analysis of the global circumstance. Nation states, identified as relatively clear and unified national cultures are also considered by this account as the basic elements of the global system. The international system is therefore argued to be the outcome of struggles between sovereign states. However, as Bergesen (1990) points out, for the vast majority of the
states, the international system has preceded their existence and in some cases it has even made this existence possible in the first place. This system is argued to have its own processes and mechanisms of integration (Arnason, 1990), and thus, it cannot be reduced to a scene consisting merely of large scale actors, such as nation-states. According to Robertson (1992), the global system has resulted from the consolidation of cultures, national societies, intra- and cross-national movements and organisations, sub-societies and ethnic groups, and many other kinds of collective or even individual actors. From this process a number of new actors can also emerge, such as transnational movements and international organisations which will be dealt with in more detail in a later stage. The global system therefore, is no longer seen as constituted of separate nation-states that interact with each other, but as a multiple system where territorial boundaries are transcended not only by influences from other states but also from global forces which act beyond the nations (intergovernmental organisations, multi-national corporations, etc.). It is the multiplicity of forces and interaction that has shifted the attention from the nation-state to the global world.

Many theorists have tried to explain the accelerating pace of globalisation by focusing on either an independent causal factor or the interrelation of a number of factors. These accounts which stress the importance of a single factor regard the logic of globalisation as the result of economic, technological, or political developments. In the first account, developed in the work of Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy* (1979), capitalism is viewed as the primary cause of globalisation. The capitalist world-economy is considered to be unique and unequal in its structural arrangements with core, semi-peripheral and peripheral areas ascribed specific functional roles. Capitalism in general and multi-national corporations in particular, are also seen, by classic Marxist accounts, as the driving force behind the global system (Schiller, 1985; Sklair, 1991). For Marxists, the capitalist classes in the most powerful states have replaced the nation states as the most important actor in the global system. This however, is not taken to imply that the global system is synonymous with global capital, but rather that capitalism is the dominant, though not the only driving force, behind the global system. In explaining the above arguments, Sklair (1991) has identified three distinct levels of transnational practices; the economic, the political, and the cultural-ideological primary institutions. Each of these practices is characterised by a primary focus. As such, the primary focus of economic transnational practices
is the transnational corporation which produces commodities, and the services necessary to manufacture and sell them. In the political sphere, the primary focus of activity is located within the transnational capitalist class, which is deemed to produce the political environment for the successful marketing of the above products in different countries. Cultural-ideological transnational practises are focused within the culture-ideology of consumerism, as expressed by the transnational mass media, which produce the values and attitudes that create and sustain the needs for products. The global capitalist system therefore, is taken to dictate the economic transnational practices and dominate to a large extent the political and cultural-ideological transnational practices.

It can therefore be assumed that the needs of global capital in conjunction with the world economic recession in the late 1970s and 1980s have resulted in the rearrangement of economic activity at a global level, the shift in emphasis from manufacturing to service industry, the movement from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of capital accumulation, and the modification of the roles of advanced and peripheral capitalist countries. Such an account, however, would appear to be oversimplistic in the way global economic developments were perceived as serving the needs of global capital. It tends to ignore the fact that capital accumulation is not a unifying factor but rather the interests of capital are in many cases contradictory and hostile (e.g. the interests of competing multi-national corporations). In addition, the reduction of a phenomenon with not only economic but also political, social, and cultural implications, to the logic of purely economic arrangements is problematic in the attempt to explain the globalisation process.

Other authors, such as Rosenau (1990) and Smith (1990), consider technology and its transformative capacities as a globalising imperative. The global human condition is seen as being transformed by the rapid technological innovations which have underlined the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society. In the new order, the nation-state has ceased to be the primary unit of global developments since states have to share the global system with international organisations and transnational corporations which are growing in importance. As such, it is not capitalism and its transnational corporations, but rather the vast telecommunications systems and computerised networks of information that have made possible the construction of much larger institutional units (Smith, 1990).
The political factor as the main cause of globalisation process has been exemplified in Gilpin's argument. According to Gilpin (1987), the global order is determined by the political order which generates the conditions that secure global stability. For Gilpin, global order relies upon the hegemonic power of a liberal state, which imposes over the international system a sense of security necessary to sustain the interconnections between nation-states. The supremacy of a hegemonic state is therefore seen as the condition for the existence of world order. In his account, the process of globalisation seems to be dictated by the political, economic, and/or military power of a single state. The tendency however to reduce the globalisation process to the power of a single state provides a major weakness of the above account. For instance, the argument put forward by some authors that the loosening of US economic and military supremacy in the mid-1970s caused economic recession and world disorder, tends to reduce a process that permeates almost every nation-community to the interests of the hegemonic domination of an individual society, and to ignore the role of intergovernmental organisations (e.g. European Community), as well as the existence of a number of local balances of power.

However, Giddens (1990) has pointed to four discrete factors, those of world capitalist economy, the nation-state system, the world military order, and the international division of labour, as the interrelated causes of globalisation. Globalisation therefore is seen as a phenomenon with a multiplicity of causes that range from the economic interests of capital and the transformation to a service society, to inter-state forces and the need for military preponderance. Giddens' explanatory framework therefore, seems to go beyond the causal logic of a single factor and regards the interrelation of a number of factors as the source of accelerating globalisation;

the main centres of power in the world economy are capitalist states - states in which capitalist economic enterprise is the chief form of production. The influence of any particular state within the global political order is strongly conditioned by the level of its wealth. However, states derive their power from their sovereign capabilities ... as 'actors' jealous of their territorial rights, concerned with the fostering of national cultures, and having strategic geopolitical involvements with other states or alliances of states. ... The globalising of military power is not confined to weaponry and alliances between the armed forces of different states - it also concerns war itself. ... (Finally) the most obvious aspect of industrial development is the expansion of the global division of
labour, which includes the differentiations between more and less industrialised areas in the world (Giddens, 1990, pp. 70-6).

Even though globalisation has certain implications for, and has been associated with the crisis of, nation-state, this should by no means be taken to imply the rejection of the modern nation-state system. As McGrew (1992) has pointed out, the phenomenon of globalisation does not reject fundamental concepts, such as 'society' and the 'nation-state'. It rather poses a set of questions concerning the future of the nation-state and the nature of the modern political community. On the other hand, as Smith (1990) argues, globalisation implies the proliferation of economic superpowers and multinational corporations, vast telecommunications networks, and international division of labour which leave no room for medium and small-scale states or submerged nationalisms. As he concludes, nationalism may have been functional for a world of competing industrial states but it seems to be obsolete in the new 'service society' which is based upon technical knowledge.

In fact, resurgent nationalism (e.g. in the former Yugoslavia, or the former Soviet republics) might be evidence that the state remains of critical significance to political and social organisation. But according to Smith, the recently re-emerged nationalism of submerged ethnic communities reflects a small-scale side effect of globalisation which can be explained on the basis of the new communications networks that have grown along a more intense interaction between members of communities who share common cultural characteristics, namely language. However, even though the above arguments point to the rejection of the notion of nation-state, it is still highly problematic to think of globalisation as eroding the era of nation state. On one hand, the creation of international organisations allows states to pursue their national interests more effectively, and on the other, it should not be neglected that the organisation of different communities into a system of national societies was an aspect of globalisation that fostered its acceleration (Robertson, 1992). In the new context, where transnational and global activity is expanding enormously, it is still the state as an institution that secures the conditions within which such activity can take place.

Though globalisation does not reject the notion of nation-state, it certainly has severe implications for nation-state activity. Globalisation is argued to have challenged four aspects of the state: its competence; its form; its autonomy;
and its legitimacy (McGrew, 1992). Particularly in the economic field, international co-operation is of primary importance for any state wishing to fulfil its policies. The inability, therefore, of the state to pursue its policies independently of international developments and resolve its problems with purely domestic actions and decisions, is regarded as evidence of its declining competence.

Furthermore, the expansion of intergovernmental organisations and the increasing emphasis on international co-operation has changed the form of the state. In most of the areas of national policy there is an intergovernmental agency with overlapping responsibilities and authority. Thus, national centres of decision making find it more difficult to retain direct control over policy formulation, since the range of decisions is often restricted by international regulatory institutions and transnational corporations. This is argued to result in challenging the state’s autonomy. The constraints on national policy formulation, imposed by international organisations, diminishes considerably state autonomy. As a consequence, diminution of state competence and autonomy is said to result in the reduction of government effectiveness, which further undermines the legitimacy and authority of the state. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that state control can still be exercised depending on the nation state itself, as well as on the policy sector and the particular historical circumstances. It is also important to stress that, in some cases, regulatory institutions might have a positive impact on the operation of the nation state, by virtue of funding opportunities and other arrangements derived from such organisations (e.g. the inflow of European Community funds in Greek economy after 1981, which will be discussed in the following chapter).

Globalisation and Cultural Identities

The globalisation process is seen as having affected the nation-state at its organisational and administrative level. Last, but not least, a major debate has been raised concerning the consequences of globalising forces in the cultural field. Cultural homogenisation as opposed to cultural pluralism and differentiation is an issue that bears certain implications for the analysis of sport and sports policy in different countries. For this reason the above issue is of critical significance for the purposes of this study.
Globalisation

As Appadurai suggests (1990), cultural flows brought about by the process of globalisation can be conceived in five dimensions. First, there are ethnoscapes which can be understood as the cultural flows produced by the movement of people from one country to the other (i.e. tourists, immigrants, refugees, and guestworkers). Second, the flow of machinery and plant produced by multinational and national corporations and government agencies is conceived as the flow of technoscapes. Finanscapes represent the third dimension, taken to mean the outcome of rapid flows of money in the currency markets and stock exchanges. Fourth, there are mediascapes which are produced and distributed by newspapers, magazines, television and films, and concern the inflow of images and information. Finally, there are ideoscapes, which are also images, but in most cases they are politically oriented and frequently have to do with state ideologies or with the ideology of counter movements which explicitly aim at capturing state power. The effects of cultural flows on national culture, as described by Appadurai, constitute the central point of debate among theorists. Globalisation seems to affect cultural identities in three possible ways; a) cultural homogenisation is likely to destroy national identities, b) resistance to globalisation might lead to the strengthening of local and/or national differences, and c) national identities might decline in importance and be replaced by new identities (Hall, 1992). This does not, however, imply that those three possible consequences are mutually exclusive. Under certain circumstances those possibilities are likely to coincide in time and place. For instance, the destruction of national identities may lead to the resurgence of local culture and/or the search for entirely new identities.

For reasons of convenience, all the above possibilities will be dealt with in the light of two theoretical camps; those theories that support a largely homogeneous global culture; and those that advocate that globalisation in itself contains the notion of pluralism and as such it is more likely to bring a proliferation of national and/or local cultural identities. For the theorists of the first camp, the general effect of globalisation is taken to be the displacement of national forms of cultural identity. The transnational integration of communities stimulates a search for new cultural identities. The process of identification with the new order is challenging the traditional integrative forms of national culture that further threatens the form of the nation-state (McGrew, 1992). As Hall (1992) has pointed out, national identities are now replaced by cultural ties developed below and/or above
the nation-state. As such, increasing global activity and 'the shrinking of time and space', give rise to new cultural forms shared by people who live in distant places and whose common characteristic is often reduced to labels such as 'clients', 'consumers', 'audience' etc.

As it is supported, global culture has two distinguished characteristics. The first and most important is its homogeneity. Homogenisation of global culture is the consequence of the centre-to-periphery flow of commodities and culture which in turn is said to be the outcome of Western capitalism (Hannerz, 1991). Western capitalism according to this view, creates relations of dependency between strong and weak states and imposes the values and beliefs of powerful societies on weak nations in an exploitative fashion. In this sense, the coming homogeneous global culture is claimed to be a version of contemporary Western culture. The West-centred global culture, however, is the second main characteristic of mass culture. This is taken to imply that capital, advanced technology and techniques, stories and images remain centred in the West (Hall, 1991). For Hall, global mass culture "is a particular form of homogenisation ... (in the sense that) it is wanting to recognise and absorb those (cultural) differences within a larger overarching framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world" (p. 28).

Sklair (1991) has further elaborated this point by stressing the fact that the most important economic, political and cultural commodities are owned, or at least controlled, by a very small group in a relatively small number of countries. His main point of differentiation is that the term 'Western', used to describe the above process, is at least inaccurate, since the emergence of Japan as a highly prestigious and powerful country in the global field should be given serious consideration. Whatever is the case, cultural homogeneity imposed by the advanced societies is said to be facilitated by the capital's control over mass media (Sklair, 1991). Western or US capital control over mass media it is argued, speeds up the circulation of material goods and inculcates the dominant ideology of capitalism in every part of the world.

Among others, Sklair has identified three main types of criticisms of the above argument. First, he acknowledges the fact that many, if not all, countries have the potential to develop internal cultural and media forces to counteract the external influence of Western or US cultural products. Second, the above cultural flows may work for, or against national identities, and
third and most important, different countries may respond in many different ways to the above process of mass culture, and national variations can be more important than global patterns. In his review of the research of the impact of media discourses, Houlihan (1994) points to evidence which support the view that ethnic peculiarities and the social position of the receivers are of particular importance in the ways the message on the screen is interpreted by the viewers.

In this sense, the global field can be highly pluralistic since different responses to globalisation can arise from different national contexts, or definitions of the global condition might express continental, national, regional and even local variations. Robertson (1992), has identified cultural pluralism as one of the constitutive features of globalisation. Cultural pluralism is brought about by the variation of responses to, and interpretations of, globalisation. Not only does national variation lead to cultural pluralism, it also strengthens regional and/or local identities which promotes cultural differentiation. Ethnic and/or religious groups, feeling threatened by cultural homogenisation are said to react in a defensive way by expressing a stronger identification with their ethnicity and religion. The strengthening of local identities might well lead to the resurgence of national cultural forms in those contexts where the process of national integration has reached a point where cultural homogenisation at national level obscures existing local differences. In this case, the fascination with national difference comes as the counteraction to the tendency towards global homogenisation. In some cases also, national cultures themselves come into competition in the global field seeking to increase their prestige and make their mark in the wider political arena (Smith, 1990). In other cases, the search for national identity might encourage conflicts within societies. This is because, according to Robertson (1992), the significance of defining national societies in relation to the new global condition might lead to the emergence of political, ideological, and religious movements as a means to offer a new identity towards the global world.

Variety of responses to the global condition however, is not regarded by Smith as implying the proliferation of cultural pluralism. For Smith (1990), cultural homogenisation might coexist with vital national cultural identities, an argument that may be supported by recent developments in the European community. As Smith argues, in the sphere of culture, the new European
identity is balanced by the still important cultures of Europe's many nations, but this is done in such a way as to subordinate them to the 'cultural imperatives' of the continent. In order to support his arguments, he goes further by drawing upon the case of EC decisions on economic and political issues. In economic policy, there is a balance between common economic regulation from Brussels and the specific social and economic policies of the member states and the Community, while the political sovereignty of the nation states is balanced by the political centres in Brussels and Strasbourg. However, the referendum debate in France, and the Danish 'No' in the referendum to ratify the Maastricht agreement may be considered as strong signs of local resistance to European integration (Maguire, 1993).

As argued, "at various points, in different places, local cultures or identities are strengthened, show resistance or increase in variety. At other points, in the same and/or in different places, the contrasts between cultures diminish" (Maguire, 1993, p. 308). However, there is strong indication that the process of globalisation is most likely to lead to the strengthening of national or local identities. The global field is by no means homogeneous but rather pluralistic, in the sense that it is constituted of the different ways several parts of the globe respond to its process. Robertson (1992) insists that the condition of globalisation favours the proliferation of continental, national, regional and even local definitions of, and responses to globalisation. The variety of responses to the globalisation process suggests that there is little prospect of a unified global culture (Featherstone, 1990).

In fact, those elements, such as shared memories and historic continuity, that can serve to unify the world humanity under one form of culture are essentially rare. The lack of historical memories and the heightening of ethnic, regional and even individual self-consciousness are taken for Robertson to represent the main constraints on social communities to their locating themselves within world history. Even though television might serve as a means for constructing shared historical memory, as all groups receive the same 'picture', the possibility of strong identification with those memories is still very low. Smith (1990), having highlighted the historical specificity, shared memories, and a sense of common destiny that characterises most of the units of population, points to the fact that 'nations' can be understood as historic entities, while on the other hand, a global culture cannot be related with any such historic identity. Thus, the lack of common memories of
historical facts constitutes the central difficulty in any attempt to construct a
global identity.

Globalisation therefore, is not synonymous with homogenisation, but rather it
is understood as a new form of differentiation. Globalisation is not reducible
to large scale societies or actors but includes as its major components both
individuals and societies, the relations between them and the connections
among different communities, the integration of nations, and the
differentiation of national identities, in other words a plurality of cultural
identification. As Mommaas (1994) has stated, increasing global mobility does
not result in homogeneity, but rather in the pluralisation of cultural forms
and an increasing awareness of cultural differences.

Transnational Analysis in a Global Environment

Increasing global activity, the expansion of transnational organisations and
networks of communication, the growth of international relations and
dependencies, and the cross-cutting of national boundaries by global forces
all seem to call for a new approach to the understanding of social world. The
nation-state can no longer be treated as a closed unit of analysis and national
developments as the main point for departure. Rather, the nation-society
must be analysed as part of the global field, where influences of, and
resistance to, global forces shape its form and dictate its position in world
society. As McGrew argues (1992), a logical approach for making sense of the
contemporary world would be the shift of attention away from 'society' and
the 'nation-state' towards the emerging world society. Understanding of the
global condition on the other hand, would give insight to local and national
destinies since without reference to global forces it would be rather difficult to
approach national developments.

The nation-state was at the focus of analysis in post-war studies. The world
was divided according to these administrative units, and if researchers turned
beyond a specific nation, they did so from a cross-national, comparative
perspective, in an attempt to explain the social phenomena in one country
with reference to the interpretation of the same phenomena in other economic
and socio-political contexts. National developments and the creation of
effective states justified the narrow focus on the nation-state as the primary
unit of policy making. But within globalisation the use of countries as
comparative units might not appear to be the most fruitful approach (Qyen, 1990). However, by the end of the 1960s, policy development was no longer considered to be the result of strictly national decisions but rather acquired a more global perspective (Teune, 1990). In fact, the role of international associations, multinational corporations, and transnational organisations has been recognised as a rather influential factor in national policy decision making. Any analysis of a specific national context therefore, must take under consideration the international global system and the vulnerability of countries to penetration from transnational influences.

This is not to imply however the rejection of comparative approaches, but rather to stress that globalisation has required a readjustment of research designs, where both the nation and the global system compose the central point of reference. Such a design which would pay attention to relations existing within and beyond the nation, to the way international developments are interpreted at the national and even local level, and to the significance of national peculiarities or resistance to global integration, could be labelled as 'transnational' research (Mommaas, 1994).

The origins of transnational forces can be found in the global activity of international and transnational organisations. The former is taken to imply those organisations which are created on the basis of a common interest among national groups, and their role is to facilitate the pursuit of interests shared among the nation units that participate in them. International organisations can further be subdivided between intergovernmental organisations (e.g. Council of Europe, United Nations) where member states preserve their sovereignty intact, and supranational organisations such as the European Union where member states are mutually bound by decisions (Bramham et al., 1993). The term 'transnational' mainly applies to non-governmental and/or private organisations, which operate within different nations and are designed to facilitate the achievement of their own interests which may, or may not, coincide with the interests of nation states (Huntington, 1991). The forces of transnationalism are represented by non-governmental actors, working beyond their national boundaries, such as multi-national business firms, the Red Cross, the Olympic movement etc.

The principal sources of the expansion of transnational organisations are to be found in the global growth of American activity soon after World War II.
Globalisation

Technological innovation, that provided the means for global communication and transportation, supported by the political influence of the United States prompted the revolution of transnationalism. Apart from the technological and organisational capability to operate across vast distances, transnational organisations needed political access to the countries in which they wished to operate.

However, the interests of the United States in developing a system of alliances with other governments provided the political means for the realisation of transnationalism (Huntington, 1991). Financial assistance to devastated, after the war, European economies, aid missions and military bases around the world, and investments of American corporations are some examples that provide evidence to support the notion of US-led transnationalism. At this point, however, it is worth stressing once again that this argument does not intend to reduce the whole phenomenon of globalisation to the power (political, military or economic) of a single nation, but rather to emphasise that the evolution of global activity in the post-war period was led by American interests.

Although the immediate origin of transnational corporations is to be found in the American economy, its American 'national' character has been gradually eroded as powerful business, science and technology centres have emerged in Europe and Japan. These centres are said not only to penetrate the underdeveloped countries but also to affect the American society itself (Sunkel and Fuenzalida, 1991). The nation-state is also regarded as an important factor in the process of the growth of transnational corporations, since national governments can play a crucial role so long as access to their territory is granted to transnational interests in such a way as to facilitate the pursuit of the national objectives and strengthen its position in the world order.

Sport in a Transnational Context

Sport, as a cultural form, has also received analytical attention in terms of the impact of globalisation processes on its nature and meaning around the world. Most of the debate on sport and globalisation is centred on the issue of homogenisation as opposed to increasing variety, as expressed in the debate on cultural identities. The homogenisation thesis claims that, in the same way
Globalisation

as Western products and the notion of 'consumerism' have spread around the globe, "the media-sport production complex also ensures that the marketing of the same sport forms, products and images does occur" (Maguire, 1993, p. 310). For Houlihan (1994), homogenisation, defined as western capitalism, is an aspect of modern sport, and increasing evidence for supporting the homogenisation claim is said to be found in Brohm's analysis of sport, and Canadian research on the organisation of sport. The former is taken to place particular emphasis on hierarchical structures in sport that convey capitalist values, while the latter provides evidence for supporting sports homogenisation in terms of hierarchy, bureaucracy and rationalisation.

By contrast, globalisation is said to have brought a greater variety and a strengthening of local identities which have certain implications for sport. Sport, in this line of argument, is viewed as a cultural form with increasing contribution in the variety of cultural identities available. A characteristic example of this process is to be found in the articulation of Australian culture and identity (Maguire, 1993). In the Australian case study, sports (and cricket in particular) have been used to represent a new Australian identity, departing from the economic and cultural dependency on Britain. In the same way, the Gaelic sports movement in Ireland, which aimed at undermining local interest in 'English' sports (Houlihan, 1994), can be said to be an expression of resistance and pluralisation. For Houlihan however, all those movements are said to imitate what they are supposed to oppose. As an illustration, Houlihan cites the case of investment in sport in the former communist countries; "by being more competitive than western teams or athletes, more determined to win medals, and more concerned with record times ... the communist states integrated themselves into the very system of values they were opposing" (p. 184). However, it is beyond the aims of this study to suggest evidence that support either of the above arguments. What is within its scope, is to reflect the ways globalisation processes interact with policies at national level.

It is well documented that the expansion of transnationalism and internationalism has also been felt in the sports field. A number of international and transnational organisations permeate sport, making national sports policy an area that comprises interrelations of interests and forces which exist within and beyond the nation-state. Those influences might extend from the implications of decision making and policies initiated at a
world-wide scale which include the transnational and international organisations of sport (i.e. IOC, International Federations etc.), the interests of multi-national corporations (i.e. television networks, commercial firms etc.), to the policies originated by national governments and bodies of sport.

Maguire (1993) has identified the ways global flows of people, technology, finance, images and ideologies have underpinned sports development;

global migration of both professional and college sports personnel was a pronounced feature of sports development in the 1980s. The flow from country to country of sports goods, equipment and 'landscapes' has grown. The development of a 'media-sport production complex' ... projects images to large global audiences. Global sports festivals ... have come to serve as vehicles for the expression of ideologies that are not only national in character ... but are also transnational in their consequences (p. 309).

The expansion of the Olympic movement and the growing prestige of the Olympic Games and football's World Cup Tournament, particularly after the Second World War, are regarded as clear indications of globalisation processes in sport. The Olympic system comprises four bodies; the International Olympic Committee, the national Olympic committees, the international federations, and the organising committee of the Games (Espy, 1979). The IOC, established in 1894 by the Congress of Paris and entrusted with the control and development of the modern Olympic Games (Art. 10 & 11, Olympic Charter), owns all rights over the organisation, exploitation, transmission and reproduction of the Games, and has the responsibility for the rules of the Olympics, the inclusion of sport in the Olympic programme, and the choice of Games venue (through voting of its ninety two members). The day-to-day operation of the committee falls upon the IOC Executive Board which meets on a regular base, and particularly upon the IOC President, currently Juan Antonio Samaranch of Spain (Taylor, 1986). The role of the IOC is essentially strategic and its immediate partners are the National Olympic Committees. The establishment of a NOC which is recognised by the IOC as being in accord with the Olympic rules is a prerequisite for a country's participation in the Games. The IOC does not have any control over the international federations, which independently rule their individual sports, even at the Olympic Games.
The Olympic system, therefore, and the international sports arena reflect the growing transnational and global character of sport. This system can qualify as a transnational organisation in the sense that it embraces a large number of private organisations operating within different countries which may co-operate with the national governments but "they must never associate themselves with any undertaking which would be in conflict with the principles of the Olympic Movement and with the Rules of the IOC" (Art. 24, Olympic Charter). It would be naive, however, to consider the Olympic movement as governed solely by sports interests. The interests of television companies and business firms have to be borne in mind in Olympic decision making, simply because the IOC and the International Sports Federations are heavily dependent on payments from broadcasting and commercial companies (Taylor, 1986). US television is the dominant contributor having paid $2 million for Tokyo in 1964, $4 million for Mexico in 1968, $25 million for Montreal in 1976, $87 million for Moscow in 1980, and $225 million for Los Angeles in 1984 (79% of the total Olympic TV income) (Taylor, 1986; Houlihan, 1994). Negotiation on television payments was conducted between the organising committee of the Games and the television networks until 1985, when the deal between the Seoul Organising Committee and the Network Broadcasting Company which guaranteed only $300 million, led the IOC to exclude the organising committees from future negotiations.

It is not only television but also commercial companies which show an increasing interest in financing the Games and thus obtaining the rights to advertise their products world-wide. In order to finance the Montreal Games, for example, the Organising Committee sold the rights as 'official supplier' to a number of companies (e.g. companies such as Coca-Cola and Adidas paid $1.3 and $0.5 million respectively), (Espy, 1979). More recently, the Los Angeles Organising Olympic Committee relied entirely on commercial sponsorship to finance the 1984 Games (Taylor, 1986). Television payments and sponsorship are also used extensively to finance international competition of individual sport (i.e. World Cup, European Championship etc.). The fact that such competitions can reach an audience of over half the world's population - the opening ceremony of the 1992 Barcelona Games was watched by an estimated television audience of 3.5 billion, and the closing ceremony by an audience of over 2 billion, while taking all the events together, 2500 hours of television were transmitted over the fifteen days, as opposed to 1800 hours in Seoul (Blain et al., 1993) - has attracted a large
number of interests which in many cases interfere explicitly or implicitly with the decisions of sporting organisations. For example, the need to increase the audience and thus attract advertising sales is the determinant factor for the schedule of Olympic Games. Sometimes those needs may interfere with decisions that regard the selection of Olympic sport, the introduction of new rules in certain sport, and/or the transformation of Olympic rules, with the most notable example being the eligibility granted to professional players to participate in the Games. Although rarely, those interests may be involved in decisions with wider implications such as the nomination of the country to host the Games (i.e. as has been implied in the nomination of Atlanta to host the Golden Games in 1996, a nomination facilitated by the interests of Coca-Cola).

The role of the media, and television in particular, is also ideological, in the sense that the way the Games and other major sports events are covered and transmitted may sometimes serve to project a certain image of the actors. For example, as Trory (1985) notes, the American Broadcasting Company which covered for television the 1984 Los Angeles Games presented the events as though the Games were the American Championships. Such cases may serve as tools to project the sporting excellence of a country and, through the attempted identification of the Games as a national case and/or as a competition among a small number of countries, they try to reduce world sport to the rivalry between certain countries and neglect the performance of others. In other cases, the Olympics itself and television coverage of the Games might serve as a means to project regional differences or national unity. An illustrative example is the 1992 Games in Barcelona, capital of Catalonia, a region which prides itself on being different from the rest of Spain, and which has its own sense of identity, its own language and culture (Blain et al., 1993). The coming therefore, of the Olympic Games was regarded as a tremendous victory for Catalonia and Barcelona above all. Blain et al. argue that the opening ceremony was the cause for a major debate between the authorities of Catalonia and Spain as to which symbols, flags and anthem would prevail, the Spanish or the Catalan. However, television presentation of the Olympic Games represented a major victory for those who supported a unitary conception of Spain, since the Spanish national anthem resounded thirteen times during the Games, and numerous shots of the Spanish king Juan Carlos embracing all Spanish medal winners were broadcast. To support further their argument concerning the role of television broadcast, Blain et al.
cite the example of the medal ceremony of the 20 kilometre walking race, won by the (Catalan) athlete Daniel Plaza. The organisers rescheduled the medal ceremony to take place the following day, and not the day of the race as would normally have been the case, during the interval between the women’s and the men’s 100 metre final, the moment with the highest viewing figures of the entire Games. In that way, not only the whole Spain but in a sense the 'entire world' was shown scenes of a Spanish victor, standing to the Spanish flag and listening to the Spanish national anthem.

However, this is to imply that the nation-state still remains the basis of the Olympic system, even though in some cases the enormous coverage given to the Olympic city during the Games has contributed to the projection of regional differentiation as illustrated by the above example. In every case, there is only one Olympic Committee recognised from each country and also athletes can only participate in the Games and in most of the international competitions as members of a national team. Furthermore, the sports events themselves serve more for the enforcement of nationalism and national differentiation than for the homogenisation of global sport. The cultivation of nationalist feelings, through the playing of national anthems and the raising of flags, is used to build up the sports events' interest and significance. Sometimes also, national governments turn to international sports events and particularly the Olympic Games as a vehicle for gaining recognition as a sovereign state, as for example was the case for East Germany in the late 1960s (Houlihan, 1994).

The use of the example of the Olympic Games in this study is an illustration of the way transnational forces interact with the national environment. It serves to highlight the argument that globalisation of sport does not necessarily imply sports homogenisation. National and sometimes regional differences are strongly demonstrated, e.g. in the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games, where emphasis is placed on the national culture or on the local or regional cultural identities (e.g. the Barcelona Games opening ceremony). Thus, it becomes important in studies of national sports policy systems to identify the global-local tensions which act upon and are reflected in these policy systems.

Cultural differentiation through sports competition in Europe has recently been undermined by developments at the political level. The increasing
emphasis given by the European Community to sport as an industry has certain implications for the future map of European sport. By conforming to the requirements of the single European market, sport is subject to the free flow of goods, people and capital in the European Community. The free movement of sports equipment and knowledge, coaches and managers, sportsmen and women etc. in the EC may alter the picture of sports performance and consequently the development of sport in the nation-members (Seary, 1992; Houlihan, 1994). Furthermore, the role of sport in fostering a European identity was placed on the agenda of the Community in 1985. In the report published by the ad hoc Committee which considered the above issue (the Adonnino Report), sport was recognised as a vehicle for promoting a sense of belonging among citizens of the Community (Commission, 1985). Among others, the Adonnino Report included proposals for the organisation of European Games and the creation of European Community teams for international competition, with a series of implications for the national teams, as well as the Community's interest in serving an integrated programme focused on sports provision for the disabled, the control of drug abuse and the measures to be undertaken against sports violence.

Apart from decisions at the political level, decisions taken by international sports organisations might dictate important parameters of national sports policy for a long period. The nomination of a country to host an international sports event, and most importantly the Olympic Games might be the most influential factor in national decision making. Drawing from the interviews with key actors in the Greek sports scene (to be discussed in more detail in ensuing chapters) it is reasonable to argue that the organisation of international competition may serve a number of national objectives, such as: a) to demonstrate the country's administrative competence, b) to reinforce national identity and its position in the world scene, c) to strengthen the country's position in international sports competition, and d) to improve sports infrastructure nation wide. However, a country's bid for an international event would appear to be a negotiation not only between transnational organisations on the one side and the national government and the national bodies of sport on the other, but also between the government and the organisations of sport within the nation.
Turning our attention to the Greek case, we note that Greece has been involved in a number of such cases in the last years, among these the organisation of the 1982 European Athletics Championship, the 1991 Mediterranean Games, and the Olympic bid for the 1996 Games. Each one of them required specific arrangements which might have determined the direction of national policy for sport, and the allocation of government resources to sport. We can assume then, that the political and economic resources to which sport might have access, are heavily dependent on the nature of negotiation between different actors (national government, national and international bodies of sport, television and business interests etc.). The outcome of the above bargaining is likely to be an influential factor for the position of sport in government's priorities. The impact, however, of transnational forces on the direction of sports policy in Greece since the beginning of the 1980s, along with political, economic, and social changes, will represent an important issue in the attempt to explain sports policy developments in this context.
CHAPTER IV

A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS
OF THE POST-WAR GREEK STATE
Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to review the development of the Greek state since the end of World War II, and to provide the context for the explanation of developments in sports policy. Particular emphasis however, is placed on the period from the beginning of the 1980s, a period which is the focus for the ensuing analysis of sports policy. Changes in economic, social and cultural structures in Greece are reviewed in relation to the nature of political control. Connections between changes in the above structures and shifts in control of government office, and the impact of government changes on the nature of economic and social policy, are traced. Changes in the economic and social policy provide the primary focus of attention by virtue of their impact on sports policy outcomes. In parallel, national developments are reviewed in the light of transnational factors and the changing position of Greece within the international environment.

Analysis of the post-World War II Greek state can perhaps best be undertaken by reference to four distinct periods; i) the period soon after the war up to the late 1960s, ii) the period of military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974, iii) the 1974-81 period which was characterised by the restoration of democratic freedoms, and iv) the 1981-1993 period which was dominated by the rise in power of the socialist party (PASOK), and the regaining of office by the right wing New Democracy party.

From the Civil War to the Seizing of Democracy; The Period of Economic Boom

The most significant developments in the period after World War II included the Greek civil war and the defeat of Communist forces, the political domination of the political right, the restructuring of the devastated national economy and the massive wave of emigration to West European countries, the United States and Australia as well as an internal migration movement towards urban areas. The Greek civil war (1946-49) between the right and left wing forces, had multiple effects on the political and economic life of Greece. The most significant of these can arguably be said to be first, the defeat of the Communists, that resulted in the weakening of all leftist forces in Greece and the outlawing of the
The Post-War Greek State

Communist Party until 1974 (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987), and second, the major delay in the reconstruction of national economy caused by the four year civil war (Freris, 1986).

The main feature of post-war politics was an extreme polarisation between right and left, which took place within a framework that reflected the victory of the right forces. The most striking characteristic of the political framework was the establishment of a “limited parliamentary system in the sense that the Communist party was banned and Communists were systematically persecuted” (Mouzelis and Attalides, 1971, p. 180). The whole period from the end of the civil war to the military coup in 1967 was dominated by an acute right-left antagonism which strengthened the political forces at the two extremes and prevented the development of strong political parties in the middle of the political spectrum. As such, the right wing party of Radical Union (ERE) was able to retain office for eleven years (1952-63), strengthened by the successful use of anti-Communist propaganda (Mouzelis and Attalides, 1971), and the electoral law, which was designed to produce parliamentary majorities; “the object was over-representation of the strongest party in parliament (which) in the political circumstances prevailing at that time, amounted to a buttressing of the power of the right” (Kohler, 1982, p. 103). On the other hand, the followers of the illegal Communist party were able to articulate their demands through the United Democratic Left (EDA), the left wing party. The domination of the right wing Radical Union was further supported by the rapid economic development in the early period after the end of civil war.

The post-civil war governments managed as early as 1950 to get the Greek economy back to its pre-war level of output (Mouzelis, 1978). The early stages of reconstruction had been based on the considerable increase of production in agriculture, the significant development of tourism, and the expansion of shipping by virtue of the country’s attractiveness to ship owners (Mouzelis and Attalides, 1971; Buckley and Artisien, 1987). On the other hand, in the late 1950s manufacturing was still very underdeveloped since Greek capitalists tended to invest in non-manufacturing sectors (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). As such, the commercial sector by virtue of its high profitability attracted banking capital and was developed at the expense of the industrial sector. Furthermore, at that time, commercial banks were reluctant to provide industry with cheap credit, due to its low
profitability (Mouzelis, 1978). In this situation there was no other solution for the industrialisation of the country than to mobilise all means for attracting foreign capital. Despite the passing of Legislative Decree 2687/1953 For the Protection of Foreign Capital, which granted considerable privileges to foreign investors, and the considerably low wage cost (Babanasis, 1986), it was not until the early 1960s that foreign capital increased its investments in Greece. An overwhelming percentage of the total foreign direct investment was in manufacturing (table 4.1). Thus, in the early 1970s, the contribution of industry to GDP (35%) exceeded for the first time the percentage of agricultural production (16%) (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987; Lytras, 1993).

Table 4.1: Foreign investments by sector (1953-81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% share of foreign capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels, tourist enterprises</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, storage</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock, agriculture, fishing</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines, quarries, slatterns</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks, insurance</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The foreign-led industrialisation not only altered the nature of Greek economy but also affected the mode of social reproduction and widened the gap between the top and bottom of social hierarchy. The country's economic policy had to adapt itself to the expectations of foreign investors "which meant that major industries had to be developed at the expense of small- and medium-sized companies" (Kohler, 1982, p. 97). Large scale capital was favoured by the extensive privileges granted by Greek governments, while the beneficial effects of its growth were not diffused over the other sectors of the economy but were transferred abroad. Furthermore, the rapid increase of industrial production did not lead, as one would expect, to the rise of wages and salaries, due to increasing unemployment and the weak position of the new working class. On one hand, the high level of unemployment before the massive emigration (24 per cent of the total labour force in 1961), combined with the government's policy to reduce the costs of production, kept the labour
wages down. On the other, the power of the working class had been diminished due to state control over trade union activity, and the disruption of the labour force caused by the massive wave of migrants from rural to urban areas (Karagiorgas and Pakos, 1986; Ioannou, 1986; Lytras, 1993). Historically, trade unions were never an independent entity in Greek society. The Greek General Confederation of Labour and its politics were successfully controlled by the post-civil war governments which managed to create a “conservative segment of significant size within the labour movement which resulted in the fragmentation of that movement and intense antagonism between organisations loyal to the General Confederation and those opposed to it” (Diamandouros, 1983, p. 58).

The labour movement had also been affected by a considerable internal migration from the countryside to the urban centres in the middle of the 1950s. The number of internal migrants between 1956 and 1961 amounted to 645,000 people, and almost two thirds of them moved to the two major urban centres, Athens and Thessaloniki (Mouzelis and Attalides, 1971). Additional data revealed that between 1961 and 1971 the Greek countryside lost about 800,000 people, which represented more than 20 per cent of its population. The wave of internal migration was prompted by the variations in the availability of work opportunities between urban and rural areas, arising from the dominance of Athens over the socio-economic life of the country (e.g. Athens gathered 29 per cent of the total population and 28 per cent of the economically active males in 1971) (Wagstaff, 1983). Internal migration has led to the economic and cultural decline of the countryside, which still seems to suffer from depopulation, inadequate roads and health services and poor education facilities.

Many authors have argued that the social composition of Greece has been drastically affected by the demographic changes at that period (Katsoulis, 1990; Mouzelis and Attalides, 1971). Social stratification is said to be based on the dichotomy between rural and urban population, and criteria such as property and education. Mouzelis and Attalides have attempted to provide a social stratification of Greece for the period soon after the war up to the late 1960s. Their classification is based on the rural-urban dichotomy and makes the distinction among the upper, middle and lower strata in
both the rural and urban population. In this account, the upper rural stratum consists of:

the most prosperous peasants, large storekeepers or merchants and professionals (the doctor, teacher, governmental official etc.). The middle stratum consists of the bulk of farm owners, small storekeepers and the few skilled workers who exist in the village. Propertyless farm labourers together with the few persons who are not quite acceptable to the village community (i.e. the 'dishonoured', the mentally disturbed) occupy the bottom of the prestige ladder (pp. 182-3).

In a similar way, the upper social stratum of urban Greece is composed of "ship owners, bankers, big merchants and industrialists" (p. 183). The middle stratum composes the majority of the urban population with the upper middle level made up by professionals, senior officials, executives and lesser entrepreneurs and the lower middle level composed of small merchants, shopkeepers, clerks, civil servants and craftsmen. Groups, such as labourers, factory workers, domestic servants and others providing numerous minor services, who possess neither property nor education, are included in the lower stratum.

Marxist analysis of social classes pointed to the existence of four distinctive classes in Greece; the working class; those who sell only a part of their labour strength characterised as 'partly proletariat'; the urban class which includes entrepreneurs (who have the ability to increase their capital through the employment of labourers), top managers and administrators in the private and public sector; and the middle classes which include small scale entrepreneurs and all those who are structurally located between administrators and workers (Papadopoulos, 1987; Pavlidis, 1987). Tsoukalas (1987), however, has questioned the above analysis of social classes in post-war Greece, and has rather supported that hidden economic activities, and multiple occupation and sources of income enjoyed by a large sector of the middle classes, present major difficulties in any attempt to provide an analysis of the social composition in Greece, in the way Marxist theorists have done.

The most obvious change connected with urbanisation was the drastic decline of the agricultural labour force through the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time the percentage of industrial workers increased during the 1960s
and since then it has remained the same. The most dramatic changes concern the percentage of those employed in the service sector which almost doubled between 1951 and 1989 (table 4.2).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>26.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>53.87</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>23.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>40.60</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>30.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>29.30</td>
<td>38.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>27.80</td>
<td>42.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>25.30</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>47.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While agriculture experienced a decline in the size of its labour force, the industrial sector could not absorb the growing number of workers who were concentrated in a few overpopulated large cities. The problem of the inevitable rise in unemployment was overcome through the emigration of Greek workers mainly to West Europe. This massive emigration not only reduced the level of unemployment but also contributed to the rise of living standards in Greece through the emigrants' remittances to their families in Greece. In addition, commercial navigation receipts and tourist foreign currency inflows led to the consumption boom of the 1960s and the maintenance of social stability that might have been threatened by the uneven economic development (Haralambis, 1989).

The intensification of industrial production resulted in inequalities not only between labour and capital but also within the industrial labour force and the lower middle classes. For instance, those employed in the new manufacturing sector as well as certain categories of white-collar employees (executives, employees working on advertising etc.) saw their incomes rise rapidly beyond those of the rest of the middle class (Mouzelis, 1978). In practice, although overall living standards were steadily rising, inequalities in the distribution of wealth continued to grow. This type of unequal distribution was revealed by the huge differences between the top
The percentage of national income received by the top 5 per cent of the social pyramid amounted to 23 in 1957, while at the same period the bottom 20 per cent received 5-6 per cent of national income (Mouzelis, 1986).

Furthermore, these inequalities were reinforced by the lack of development of any kind of welfare state. In reality, despite the rapid growth of national economy - the annual rate of growth of the GNP from 1950 to 1970 was 6 per cent (Negreponti, 1985) - the state did little to provide social services or wage and salary increases (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). In the period of high economic growth, public expenditure on health, education and social welfare services remained at a comparatively low level (3 per cent of GDP). At the same period, wages and salaries in manufacturing kept decreasing due to the need to keep domestic wage costs down, in order to attract foreign capital and increase international competitiveness (Petmesidou, 1991). It is important to note that Greece did not experience the mode of Fordist production and capital accumulation in the form common to other advanced European countries. Industrial production was based on more traditional forms and only a few industries (e.g. electronics) employed the Fordist line of mass production. In the same way, the mode of social regulation had nothing to do with increases in 'the social wage', which would render production costs unprofitable, but rather was supported by the 'safety valve' of emigration.

The huge differences in Greece's rapid but unbalanced post-war growth, whether seen in terms of large scale emigration, urbanisation or growing income inequalities, reached a point of crisis in the early 1960s. In particular, the growth of lower middle class through increasing urbanisation could not be confined within the limits of right-left political polarisation of the post-civil war period. As a response to the above developments, George Papandreou (the father of the PASOK Prime Minister of the 1980s and 1990s, Andreas Papandreou) managed to bring together all the small parties of the centre under the Centre Union Party. Under these circumstances, the right-wing forces were defeated in two successive elections in 1963 and 1964. The new government, which remained in power until 1965, introduced many changes that benefited lower income groups and were intended to narrow the gap of social and
political inequalities. These changes included allocation of greater state funds to social services and education, loosening of wage controls that would result in the wider distribution of income, and also weakening of political clientelism, in other words the governments' policies to develop occupational links with its supporters as a means of securing their votes (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987; Mouzelis, 1986).

However, many authors have seen the 1964 election result (54 per cent of the vote for the Centre Union Party) as presenting a major challenge to the political system established in the post-civil war period. The overwhelming victory of non-right-wing forces expressed, it was argued, public demands for political reforms and modernisation of the old system which, until then, had permitted an essential influence over political life to be exercised by military leaders (Haralambis, 1989; Featherstone and Katsoudas, 1987). The Papandreou government finally resigned in 1965, following a political disagreement with the king. The political instability of the following two years gave the opportunity to the military to abolish parliament and establish the military rule.

Military Rule in Greece (1967-74)

There have been many explanations of the motives of the 'Colonels', as the military junta came to be known. Clogg (1986) argued that the real motive behind the 1967 coup was the fear that a Centre Union victory in the election scheduled for May 1967 would have been followed by reforms within the army and the purging of officers with right-wing beliefs. The major concern of the Colonels, as Karambelias (1989) argued, can directly be linked to the threat that the growing political mobilisation posed for the prevailing relations of domination, in other words for the dominance of army and the ruling class that had been established after the civil war. The old regime was based on the interrelation of the power of government, army leaders and monarchy, while a Centre Union victory would have meant the independence of government to pursue its policies and the right of the middle classes to actively participate in political life. However, as Mouzelis (1978) and Kohler (1982) claimed, the liberalisation policies of the Papandreou government did not present a serious challenge to the existing institutional framework. This argument, alongside the belief that there was no serious chance of a communist takeover and the fact that the
parliamentary right was against a dictatorial solution may provide some support for the claim that the 1967 coup was prompted by the interests of army officers. The strengthening of parliamentary forces, the argument continued, would have weakened the army's dominance within the state and would have adversely affected those playing an influential role in the political life of the country.

In a further analysis of the establishment of military rule in Greece, Mouzelis (1989) pointed to a major contradiction that was directly linked to the imposition of dictatorial rule. This contradiction stemmed from the political mobilisation of large sections of the population on one hand, and the limited parliamentary system described earlier, on the other. As such;

this growing contradiction ... led to an acute struggle between politically excluded or marginalised groups and those forces (i.e., particularly the military) the interests of which were more closely identified with the maintenance or even reinforcement of the prevailing system of parliamentary rule (p. 459).

What is really significant is that the Colonels did not intervene on behalf of any given socio-political group. From the very beginning, the Colonels "abandoned the pretence that there had been a serious communist threat at the time of the coup, and switched their emphasis to depicting a society in total decline" (Clogg, 1972, p. 44). They manifested their hostility to the corruption of politicians which was then to be followed by the arrest and exile of thousands of them with leftist reputation and the imprisonment of a number of centre and right-wing politicians (Clogg, 1987). At the same time, civil liberties were restricted and 'political' strikes were forbidden. In fact the coup of 1967 meant "the dissolution of political parties, the prohibition of all forms of political activity, the silencing of the press and of the communications media" (Yannopoulos, 1972b, p. 164).

However, even though the Colonels established a form of military rule, only minor changes occurred in economic activity, since "they were based on a draft programme elaborated on the institutions of previous governments" (Pesmazoglou, 1972, p. 77). Their economic policy placed a strong emphasis on the principles of free enterprise and private initiatives, and the attraction of greater foreign capital (Clogg, 1972; Pesmazoglou, 1972). After a period of rapid invasion of foreign capital in Greek economy, foreign investments remained stagnant (1967-68) and
then increased steadily from 1969 to 1973 (Vergopoulos, 1986). Furthermore, the new regime was less selective and more disposed to consider and extend guarantees and privileges given to foreign investors.

As Pesmazoglou (1972) argued “the new attitude was influenced by the consideration that the establishment of operations and interests in Greece by major foreign concerns could secure much-needed public relations and political support on an international scale” (p. 97). Thus, the rate of growth soon surpassed the pre-dictatorship levels and the standard of living grew steadily during the period of the dictatorship (Mouzelis, 1978). The new regime managed to maintain the high rate of economic growth of the 1950s and early 1960s through the expansion of tourism, the continued inflow of remittances from seamen and emigrants, and the policy of borrowing (Clogg, 1986). Among the sectors that enjoyed a particularly pronounced average rate of expansion in central government spending, in the first four years (1967-70), were those of defence (21 per cent), sport (estimated at more than 50 per cent), and small local projects (more than 50 per cent). On the other hand, the average rate of expansion for public services such as education, health and social services was much lower (10 per cent or less) (Pesmazoglou, 1972).

In the social field, the new rulers displayed a concern about the lower income groups in an attempt to increase their popularity. As such, some of the regime’s early actions were “the cancellation of agricultural debts, the provision of low cost housing for workers and free text-books for university students” (Pesmazoglou, 1972, p. 77). However, the true nature of the regime’s social policy was shown in a number of repressive mechanisms which were intended to ensure that increasing inequalities would be accepted unconditionally and the social order would be maintained intact. Among those mechanisms, the abolition of all workers right to unionise, protest and strike, the suppression of the political and social rights of the working and rural classes, and the dismissal of the elected boards of trade unions and agricultural co-operatives, which resulted in the elimination of any form of representation of the interests of workers and agricultural producers, had prevalent meaning (Yannopoulos, 1972a; Mouzelis, 1978; Pesmazoglou, 1972).
In his analysis of the regime's policy towards trade union activity, Yannopoulos (1972a) pointed to the transformation of trade unions into branches of the state apparatus. This was achieved at an early stage through the abolition of the existing trade union structure and the arrest of active unionists, especially all those with left beliefs. At a later stage, the Colonels replaced the boards of non-dissolved unions with "people who promised allegiance to the regime" (p. 114). Therefore, it could be argued (Haralambis, 1989), that the military rule and the extended mechanisms of social suppression which were imposed in a period of economic prosperity, did not leave any space for the development of the social arrangements that took place in other countries. In other words, in place of the Fordist compromise which resulted in increases of real and social wages, economic growth in Greece was accompanied by repressive mechanisms to achieve worker compliance.

Even though the junta was lacking the support of the masses and of the 'economic establishment', the political status quo could be sustained as long as the expansion of Greek economy was continued. In fact, "the rapid economic development of the first few years was an additional factor in bringing about a degree of passive acceptance" (Kohler, 1982, p. 98). However, at a time when the rate of expansion started to decline the first oil crisis occurred. Social discontent became visible and social order was threatened in the first year following the economic crisis of 1972-73. A rapidly deteriorating economic situation was accompanied by increasing opposition on the part of university students, including the occupation of the Athens Polytechnic. As the students movement attracted support from large segments of the population, the Colonels decided to end the occupation by sending in troops. The organised opposition to the unpopular regime resulted in extreme brutality, since many students were killed and several hundred were wounded (Clogg, 1987). As social and economic conflicts became more acute and difficult to contain, the discredited regime of the junta lost all legitimacy. In a way, the junta can be said to be the first victim of the world recession that followed the oil crisis in the beginning of 1970s (Mouzelis, 1978).

However, an overview of the reconstruction of Greek state reveals that a major role was played by a range of transnational economic and political factors. The flow of machinery and plant produced by multi-national
corporations, what Appadurai (1990) calls 'technoscapes', and flows of foreign money (finanscapes), had a positive effect on the restructuring of the national economy as long as the process of industrialisation was led by foreign, mainly American, capital (Buckley and Artisien, 1987). Multinational corporations, predominantly of American origin, increased their investments from $11,683,700 in 1960, to $50,026,290 in 1963, up to $157,606,242 in 1966 (Mouzelis, 1978), and the share of foreign capital in the GNP steadily increased from 2 per cent in 1962 to 8 per cent in 1972 (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). The inflow of foreign capital remained stagnant during the years of political instability (1966-68), and then increased steadily from 1969 to 1973, encouraged by extensive privileges provided to foreign commercial, industrial and shipping enterprises, by the dictatorship regime (such as tax exemptions and the right to hire foreign personnel).

Transnational influences in that period were not to be restricted to the interests of multinational firms. An influential role in the reconstruction of Greek economy was played by Greek emigrants. The rapid economic growth in advanced capitalist countries, the expansion of industrial production, and the associated increasing demand for labour, combined with the high level of unemployment in Greece, resulted in the massive wave of emigration in the early 1960s. Not only did emigration contribute to the rise of living standards in Greece, through the inflow of emigrants' remittances but, as claimed, it also served to maintain social order by ensuring the consent of the oppressed working class (Haralambis, 1989).

The Restoration of Democracy (1974-81)

The political system installed in Greece following the return to democratic rule has been characterised as the most open that the country has experienced in its modern history. "The official ending of discriminatory legislation dating back to the civil war; the extension of the right of free political association to all Greeks, including the communists; the deliverance of the Greek right from its hardline and anti-communist elements (and its) resulting ability to act as a moderate, right-of-centre political force" (Diamandouros, 1983, p. 53) were accompanied by two significant developments in political life. First, the participation of the Communist Party in the 1974 election, for the first time since 1936, and
second, the appearance of a new element in the political scene, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), situated to the left of centre, and capable of legitimately bidding for power. The new socialist party's objectives included the pursuit of national independence (mainly from the US), social equality, and the restoration of democratic structures. The right-wing party of New Democracy (ND) was attached to the free market system and accepted a limited role of the state only in key sectors of the economy (Clogg, 1986). The massive victory of the New Democracy party in 1974 (54 per cent of the vote) had been mainly attributed to the personal influence of the party's leader, Konstantinos Karamanlis, who "was identified by the great majority of the population with the painless transition from military rule to democracy, and was further regarded as a guarantor for the stability of continued political development" (Kohler, 1982, p. 106). In the next parliamentary elections in 1977, New Democracy managed to hold on to an absolute majority, even though its strength fell to 42 per cent of the votes, while PASOK emerged as the second largest party and thus the dominant opposition force in parliament.

In its first years in office, the Karamanlis government faced severe economic problems that were rooted in the unfavourable conditions of the internal market and the international economic crisis. As far as the internal market was concerned, the most severe problems included a high rate of inflation (over 30 per cent in 1973) and the low productivity of the economy. The New Democracy government, in the first instance, attempted to increase industrial production and consumption by semi-Keynesian methods of demand management (Haralambis, 1989). As a result, inflation was temporarily reduced and industrial production increased by 4.4 per cent in 1975 and 10.6 per cent in 1976 (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987).

The crisis of the international economy was particularly felt in Greece and had a multiple impact on the country's economic activity. The rising unemployment in Western Europe led to a significant decline in the value of emigrants' remittances. In addition, Greece's development had been adversely affected by the decrease in receipts from tourism as well as the worldwide shipping crisis (Clogg, 1986). However the most severe impact came from the decline of industrial investments. In particular, the proportion of foreign capital to industrial investments fell from 50 per
cent in the period 1960-66 to 23.5 per cent in 1967-72 to 3.7 per cent in the period from 1973 to 1980 (Yiannitsis, 1986).

Industrial investment was discouraged not only by rising energy costs but also by a considerable increase in wage costs. It can be argued that at the time of economic recession, when productivity was declining and national income was growing at a slow pace, significant increases in wages and salaries, that benefited low income groups, had a negative impact on the competitiveness of Greek products in the international market (Petmesidou, 1991; Alexandropoulos, 1990). The unfavourable conditions of the international and national economies led foreign capital to reduce investments in Greece after 1979. In fact, Greece lost its market for certain industrial products after the economic crisis in the early 1970s. All the above factors led to a phase of deindustrialisation of the country, characterised by the decline of shipbuilding and industrial investment (Gonzalez and Henry, 1994). Since the late 1970s, low productivity has been accompanied by a fall in foreign earnings from shipping and foreign workers’ remittances (Buckley and Artisien, 1987).

Notwithstanding the financial difficulties, the Karamanlis government was the first that attempted to develop and provide a framework of state provision of welfare services. The development of the Greek Keynesian welfare state, which until the late 1970s was funded by revenue from tourism, shipping, and Greek workers’ remittances from abroad, was much different from that developed in Northern European countries. In Southern Europe, and particularly in Greece, the state undertook the responsibility for providing a limited range of welfare services (education, pensions schemes etc.) as a means for ensuring a new social consensus after the restoration of liberal democratic system. As Vergopoulos (1986) pointed out, until 1974, Keynesianism was characterised by the consensus between the traditional oligarchy and the middle classes which aimed at maintaining social order on the basis of economic prosperity attained through the inflow of foreign capital. After 1974, the financial crisis which brought about the failure of the existing consensus, associated with the re-establishment of liberal democracy and the legalisation of left-wing forces, fostered the adoption by the Right of a limited range of welfare services (Alexandropoulos, 1990).
In the light of the above changes, public expenditure rose considerably in the 1970s. This rise was mostly due to the expansion of public employment, while spending on social services increased only slightly, from 10.9 per cent of GNP in 1975 to 13.3 per cent in 1979 (figure 4.1). Public employment was a means for maintaining social stability and expanding the clientelistic networks of the leading party. In the period after 1974, the number of employees in the public sector (public utility companies, energy, transport, railways and air travel, insurance companies, companies engaged in communications, banks etc.) grew rapidly. Between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, the proportion of workers employed in the wider public sector increased from 23 per cent to 31 per cent. This was partly due to the fact that under ND the country's economy had been subject to an extensive degree of state control (60 per cent of the economy) (Clegg, 1987).

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1 Clientelistic relationship is "any continuing relationship, often contractual, in which a powerful or influential person provides rewards and services to humbler and weaker persons in return for loyalty and support. ... This relationship may extend ... to a style of national politics in which electoral support is gained through fostering patron-client relationships, with a politician either giving or promising favours. Thus a system of clientelism may be one way of incorporating a wide population into national politics" (Jary and Jary, 1991, p. 458).
In the same period, the proportion of those working in the manufacturing sector decreased from 42 to 34 per cent (Tsoukalas, 1986). Manufacturing employment increased rapidly only during the first years after the restoration of democracy. But this was mostly due to the high rate of establishment of new firms usually of a very small size, rather than to the expansion of already existing firms (Petmesidou, 1991). Through the late 1970s and early 1980s the manufacturing sector had been declining steadily while the public service sector begun to play the leading role in economic activity. From 1976 to 1983 Greece's industrial production had been increasing at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent as opposed to 3.5 per cent in the service sector (Yiannitsis, 1986).

However, in the late 1970s, public sector trade unions started to play a leading role in strike action, following the decline of industrial working class action. The latter, which peaked in 1977 with massive protests and strikes, came as the expression of the industrial classes' demand for the right to negotiate "the price of their labour power" (Ioannou, 1986, p. 38). The post-civil war Greek state had managed to control the content of collective wage agreements, and demand for labour, by abolishing any restrictions to collective dismissal, which in essence gave it the opportunity to successfully control wage costs (Ioannou, 1986). The new service class (mainly white-collar workers in the public sector who enjoyed a secure job) established itself as the only force able to contest the state's economic policies, after the defeat of 80 per cent of the industrial forces' strikes in the period 1978-79 (Ioannou, 1986). This contest, in the form of strikes in the wider public sector, was prompted by the government's intention to pass on to the middle classes the cost of the second oil crisis in 1979 and the subsequent rise in wage costs. As such, workers contributions to insurance and pension schemes were increased and further taxes were imposed (Karambelias, 1989). The leading role in the trade union movement played by public sector employees who enjoyed significant social and economic privileges - in sectors which were expanding rather than declining - constituted a further indication of the increasing social and political significance of the middle class, which seemed to be dissatisfied with the government's policies in the late 1970s. A large sector of this class was engendered by the radical demographic changes of the last thirty years. The massive urbanisation had resulted in the creation of a class "whose chief characteristic was its transitional
nature, a yearning for change, without any concrete notion of what change should bring about, and finally, a vague sense of class antagonism vis-a-vis the 'privileged' strata" (Diamandouros, 1983, p. 59).

The economic crisis that impacted on the world economy in the early 1970s and intensified at the end of the decade, had multiple consequences for the Greek economy. The gradual decrease of inflows from emigrants' remittances, tourism and shipping came as the result of unfavourable international conditions and, combined with the decline of industrial investment, mostly due to rising wage costs, undermined the alliance between the New Democracy governments (1974-1981) and the middle classes. A large section of these classes became the main supporter of a popular alliance which, in 1981, brought to power the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and re-elected it in office in 1985 (Petmesidou, 1991).

**PASOK in Power (1981-89) and the Government Change in 1990**

The rapid increase of PASOK's electoral appeal (from 13 per cent of the vote in 1974 to 48 per cent in 1981) was due to a number of interrelated factors. Since the 1974 election the socialist party had refined its objectives and rhetoric (characterised by a strong anti-American, anti-EEC and anti-NATO stance), and insisted that its programme of radical domestic transformation constituted no threat to the established social order (Clogg, 1986). On the other hand, the serious economic and social problems provided the major opportunity for PASOK and its leader Andrea Papandreou to climb to power. The economic policies of its predecessor right-wing government, in conjunction with the 1979 'oil shock', had led to a decline in real investments, a stagnant GDP, a rising rate of unemployment and a persistently high rate of inflation (Corliras, 1986). Clogg (1983) has attributed the party's appeal to the wider population to its leader's ability;

to articulate, and to cloak with an impressive mantle of socialist rhetoric, the aspirations, and perhaps more especially, the frustrations of those hundreds of thousands of Greeks who in the post-war period have migrated to the towns, ... and life for them has been and remains, a continuing struggle in the face of unrelenting inflation, a deteriorating environment and wholly inadequate educational, welfare and health provision (p. 437).
On the other hand, social integration had never been fully achieved through the social policies of the previous government. The rising social forces, those who saw their economic power to increase as the result of the crisis in manufacturing (small firms, family business), the associated decline of the industrial and upper-middle class and the parallel expansion of self-ownership, self-employment and the service sector, demanded their political integration through increasing access to the state machinery (Vergopoulos, 1986).

However, PASOK projected itself as the one socio-political power capable of improving the economy and implementing the desired social reforms. While in opposition, PASOK strongly opposed Greek membership of EC, arguing that entry of Greece would adversely affect the middle and lower-middle classes (Haralambis, 1989). The three basic principles of PASOK's 'third road' to socialism, that of socialisation of the means of production, decentralisation and worker self-management, formed PASOK's anti-capitalist profile. The socialist party claimed for itself the role of the social force that could effectively represent the interests of the non-privileged as opposed to those of the privileged, while at the same time the abandonment of messages such as national liberation (focused on the independence of Greece from the US and NATO), and social justice distanced itself from communist proposals (Clogg, 1986; Lyrintzis, 1990).

Therefore, PASOK managed to eliminate the differences between the social groups (middle and lower-middle classes, working class and the peasantry) that were likely to support it in the following election, and recognised that it had to appeal to more than a single class or group if it was to be electorally successful. The socialist party successfully managed to mobilise large sections of the Greek society and create a popular movement that, in 1981 elected the first socialist government in the country's history (Lyrintzis, 1990).

The 'catch all' programme and the inevitably high expectations from the new government to satisfy the different and, in many cases, contradictory needs of a number of social groups, represented a real challenge in the first years of PASOK administration and, more importantly, as a total package were unaffordable (Lyrintzis, 1990). In the first instance and until the re-election of PASOK in 1985, the government, in order to sustain the image
of change and establish its credentials as a radical and reforming administration, responded to the challenge by accepting a significant role of the state in economy and implementing the expansion of the welfare state (Karambelias, 1989).

However, for the accomplishment of the goals for 'autonomous economic development' and the simultaneous overcoming of 'recession and inflation' PASOK put forward a set of neo-Keynesian measures (Spourdalakis, 1988). Neo-Keynesian are described those measures employed by governments, that aim at achieving a chosen rate of growth of GDP, and preventing inflation from accelerating (Stewart, 1986). When PASOK took office, inflation was running at 25 per cent. Using price controls, the government managed to bring it down to 18.5 per cent in 1984, which was still well above the average among Greece's European Community partners (McDonald, 1985). In addition to price controls, PASOK government followed a policy of increasing public spending. Thus, until 1985 public expenditure and social spending increased rapidly, as a percentage of GDP (figure 4.2).

Public spending was financed from inflows of capital through EC subsidies and also from borrowing, since the national economy was in a sharp decline (Kazakos, 1990). Thus, PASOK was able to satisfy the explicit needs of different social groups without burdening tax-payers. Historically, fiscal deficits have been offset by high invisible earnings from shipping, immigration remittances, and tourism. However, the latter two were in sharp decline having fallen from $13.2 billion in 1980 to $4.6 billion in 1984 (Spourdalakis, 1988). The end result of pursuing neo-Keynesian economic policies in a period of deep recession had been an inflation rate which ran at 17 per cent, an unemployment rate approaching 10 per cent (in a country which traditionally had, officially, full employment), and also foreign debt which reached at an unprecedented high percentage of Gross National Income (almost 80 per cent in 1985) (Karambelias, 1989).

Financial constraints undermined the government’s freedom to carry out major structural reforms. In the first case, the government implemented wage-indexing, which resulted in a real increase in earnings for the lowest incomes of around 4 per cent, and improved pensions for agricultural workers and women (McDonald, 1985). Although PASOK increased middle and low incomes, its attempt to stimulate the economy by stimulating demand failed because wage increases translated into increasing imports rather than into overall increases in domestic production (Spourdalakis, 1988; Kazakos, 1990). Stagnant domestic industrial production and simultaneously rising wage costs deteriorated further the financial problems of Greek capital. The large and medium firms attempted, in the first case, to overcome the financial crisis by getting loans from the state controlled banks in order to cover part of their loss, since industrial production and profits had been steadily declining (Kazakos, 1990; Karambelias, 1989).

Shortly after the election of PASOK, Greek capital abandoned the problematic industries, which were near bankruptcy to the state. Ownership of these firms as well as the pharmaceutical and arms industries had been socialised under Papandreou government (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). The cost of socialisation of key sectors of the economy ($170 million) was passed to the public, since the government had undertaken the responsibility for the survival of problematic companies that had become indebted to state-owned banks
The government was criticised for its policy of keeping uncompetitive companies alive at the expense of competitive ones. As a response to these criticisms the government spokesmen argued that socialisation had salvaged 138 potentially viable companies and saved 60,000 jobs (McDonald, 1985).

Furthermore, many authors argued that during the period of PASOK administration, the Greek state experienced the most extensive patronage recruitment in its history (Spourdalakis, 1988; Clogg, 1983). Public employment has been facilitating the process of social integration by relieving a considerable number of the working force from the threat of unemployment (Tsoukalas, 1984). More significantly, it has always been a means for providing people, especially the government's supporters, with jobs, which later resulted in their political compromise (Lytras, 1993). During the first period of PASOK in office, appointments to the public sector grew spectacularly, as the large number of agencies which were under state control such as banks, public utility companies, transport, communication, energy etc., were recruiting mainly from within the movement's clientelistic networks (Spourdalakis, 1988). As such, employment to the public sector reached 21.3 per cent of the total employed in 1983, as compared with 14.4 per cent in 1971 (Tsoukalas, 1984). Clientelistic relations between governments and its voters had been intensified by PASOK governments during the 1980s, in an attempt to strengthen its control over the state apparatus. This view was also reinforced by the recruitment regulations in the wider public sector enacted by PASOK, where criteria other than professional qualifications were given significant weight for appointment in the public sector (Petmesidou, 1991).

The rapid expansion of public employment meant that the state had become the major employer. In the mid-1980s, the number of people who had an occupational link with the state was estimated to 600,000, while the same figure was 500,000 in 1981 and 250,000 in 1950, which in relational terms amounted to more than 16 per cent of the economically active population, while at the beginning of the previous decade the figure had been 8 per cent (Karambelias, 1989). As a consequence, expenditure on public administration amounted to 35 per cent of total public consumption expenditure in 1984, while in other west European countries
with well established welfare states it ranged from 6 to 20 per cent (Petmesidou, 1991).

In addition to the growth of the public sector, government's spending was towards the expansion of the welfare state. The expanding influence of middle classes on the state machinery had oriented state policy towards increasing social provision. Thus, the proportion of social spending on total public expenditure increased rapidly between 1980 and 1985, from 14 to 21 per cent (Karambelias, 1989). Social spending took the form of expenditure on health (a National Health System was introduced in Greece), special provisions and benefits for students (access to university education was widened) and disadvantaged groups, through the introduction of youth centres and centres for the elderly, and measures undertaken for the development of social tourism (Tzannatos, 1986; Manesis, 1986). However, although more resources were distributed through the state, direct state provision of social services remained very limited and social policy measures were highly fragmented and uncoordinated (Petmesidou, 1991).

PASOK's public and social policies deprived the state of resources and deepened its financial crisis. This kind of government expenditure greatly exceeded the capacity of Greek economy. The first signs of the inevitable crisis were particularly felt in 1984, but due to the following general election, scheduled for June 1985, no measures to reverse the situation were taken. In October 1985, after the re-election of the socialist party (46 per cent of the vote for PASOK, as opposed to 41 per cent for New Democracy), the government announced a package of financial measures, known as the 'stabilisation programme', which, it was argued, followed the best monetarist traditions in the sense that it imposed heavy price and wage controls (Economist, 19/10/1985). Furthermore, not only were the international conditions hostile to any government attempting to follow Keynesian economic measures and pursue welfare goals, but also the shrinkage of the political and economic power of the socialist world required a re-orientation of the objectives of socialist governments in Western Europe. Thus, as Karambelias (1989) pointed out, the government's announcement of the 'stabilisation' programme, that hit mainly the lower and middle classes, was an indication of PASOK's
reluctance to oppose the forces of the right and its willingness to follow less socialist objectives.

The main objective of the austerity programme was to reduce the payments deficit from the record of $3 billion to $1.8 billion in 1986 and $1.4 billion in 1987 (Economist, 19/10/1985). This would be achieved by fostering the competitiveness of Greek products, decreasing demand for imports, and promoting tourism through the devaluation of drachma. The programme also put restrictions on wage and salary increases, reduced considerably automatic indexation rates, imposed tax increases and higher charges for public services. As a consequence, in 1986 alone, wage earners suffered an 8.6 per cent loss in real wages, which in the second year of the programme amounted to 12 per cent (Spourdalakis, 1988; Kazakos, 1990). Furthermore, the stabilisation programme required the reduction of public expenditure and more specifically that on social spending.

The government's austerity measures undermined PASOK's proclaimed commitment to socialist change, and public protest, which peaked with the national strike in Greece shortly after the announcement of the measures (Economist, 16/11/1985a), was the first sign of dissatisfaction for the government party's policies. The 'stabilisation programme' was enforced until 1987. After two years of the PASOK's austerity programme, the government was faced with the dilemma of whether to reverse the tight economic policies, or risk losing its electoral support (Economist, 31/10/1987). From the beginning of 1988 the government's economic policy was subordinated to the need for a new electoral victory. Thus, public expenditure rose again and resulted in a further increase of the public deficit which amounted to 20 per cent of GNP in 1989, well above the 1984-85 rate. PASOK managed through public spending, state subsidies, appointments to the public sector, tax relief, and also through changes of the electoral law designed to prevent the conservatives from gaining an absolute majority (McDonald, 1989), to sustain itself as a powerful political element in the 1989 general election. This fact acquired even more importance in the light of public disappointment over its ineffective administration and the scandals of abuses of public money, that had severely damaged its leadership's position (Kazakos, 1990).
In addition, among the most effective tools used by PASOK was the network of clientelistic relationship ‘activated’ before the 1989 election. Spanou (1990) has illustrated the ways public appointments aim, by successful ‘timing’, to manipulate the vote of a large section of the population. As such, from January to July 1989, out of 96,801 people appointed to the public sector, 85,716 were employed for a short period with the option of contract renewal. Despite all these measures, towards the end of PASOK's second term in office it became apparent that the party could not sustain its electoral majority. This was mainly due to PASOK's failure to bring about the socialist change proclaimed in 1981 or even the ‘better days’ promised in 1985 (Verney, 1990).

During its eight years in office (1981-89), PASOK had lost part of its support from the middle and working classes. Shortly after 1982, when legislation was passed, enlarging the rights of workers and trade unions, another law made it particularly difficult for trade unions to strike (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). Furthermore, the measures taken by the ‘stabilisation programme’ had been accompanied by anti-strike actions and a strong emphasis on ‘social peace’. In parallel, PASOK proceeded with the arbitrary replacement of the leadership of the National Federation of Labour with party faithful aiming at extending its influence among the working class, and mobilising public support for its labour policies (Spourdalakis, 1988; Mouzelis, 1986). Subsequently, those measures lessened the power of the working class, while, on the other hand, they reinforced the ‘anti-popular’ image of the government.

However, between June 1989 and April 1990 Greece experimented with two coalition governments. The first was between the right-wing New Democracy Party and the Coalition of the Forces of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos). Its purpose was to prosecute all those responsible for the financial and political scandals which shocked Greece during the last years of PASOK administration (Economist, 26/8/1989). The coalition agreed “a limited programme to investigate and prosecute the alleged scandals, to eliminate socialist political control over the civil service, to open broadcasting to all shades of political opinion and to prepare for fresh elections within three months” (McDonald, 1989, p. 196). Following the new election, PASOK joined New Democracy and Synaspismos in the new cabinet (Verney, 1990). All three parties agreed “to co-operate in a policy
designed to trim Greece's vast budget deficit (22% of GNP) by cutting
government spending and raising both taxes and the prices charged by
state-run industries" (Economist, 25/11/1989, p. 75).

Finally, in April 1990 New Democracy achieved an independent majority.
When the new government took power, inflation remained at a very high
level, foreign capital investment in the country was steadily declining,
while tourism also declined in 1990 for the first time ever. (Pettifer, 1991).
Within its first year in power, the new government declared its intention
to pursue strict monetarist policies for the recovery of Greek economy.
Among others, the new measures enforced greater control of public
spending, placed stronger emphasis on the mechanisms of the free market
and required the privatisation of the 'socialised' companies, the reduction
of production costs through wage controls, and the elimination of the
widespread tax evasion. The emphasis placed on these measures had
created the impression of a policy that was similar "to the post-1985
PASOK austerity period rather than anything that showed a radical change
of direction" (Pettifer, 1991, p. 172). The first results of the above measures
seemed to be the reduction of workers' real wages at an annual rate of 3.5
per cent for the years 1991 and 1992, the increase of unemployment (from 7
per cent in 1990 to 8.1 per cent in 1991 and 8.7 per cent during the first
quarter of 1992), and the simultaneous rise of private profits which
increased by 18.4 per cent in 1991 (Pettifer, 1991; Eleftherotypia 7/5/1992

Greece in the 1980s: Transnational Influences and Its International
Position

Greece's international position in the 1980s has significantly altered, due to
the country's entry in the European Community. Greece became a full
member of the EC in 1981, following a long period as an associate member
which was only interrupted during the seven year military dictatorship.
While the EEC is primarily an economic supranational organisation of
twelve European nations, one of its goals (at least for some members) is
the political integration of Europe. The power of the European Parliament,
in which all member states are represented in proportion to their
population, has grown considerably in importance in recent years. One of
the main reasons Greece joined the community was the belief that full
The Post-War Greek State

member would give Greece an international and equal status with the rest of Western Europe and a form of protection in its continued dispute with Turkey (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). Five years before Greece joined the EC, the European Commission seemed to be more hostile than favourable. The reasons for the Commission's hostility to the Greek application stemmed from the fear that the EC could find itself involved in the complicated politics of the eastern Mediterranean. The Commission also pointed to the inadequacy of the Greek tax system which failed to incorporate many Greeks and to the lack of effective government information systems. However, the Greek prime minister signed the Treaty of Accession in 1979, having managed to counter the Commission's opinion through a channel of personal contacts with German and French politicians (Economist, 9/5/1992).

At an earlier stage the opposition to Greek entry by PASOK, had become the party's guiding principle. During the 1981 election campaign, PASOK, through its leader, had promised to hold a referendum to decide the question of membership (McDonald, 1985; Kohler, 1982). This promise, alongside threats to withdraw from NATO and to close American bases were designed for domestic political consumption. When PASOK came to office, and was confronted by the reality of Greece's application for EC membership, it neither "asked the president to hold a referendum, nor notified the Community of its intention to renegotiate or withdraw" (Kohler, 1982, p. 153), nor did it prosecute its plans with regard to withdrawal from NATO; "Greece continues to be a member of the NATO integrated military command structure and ... the socialists signed a further treaty with the United States which, while it foresees closure (of US bases), could conceivably allow for continuation" (McDonald, 1985, p. 135).

Greece's entry into the EC marked a significant development in national policy. PASOK's policy of increasing public expenditure was largely sustained by the inflows of capital through EC subsidies which served as the principal means for the introduction of welfare measures in its early years in office (Kazakos, 1990). In an economy which was in a sharp decline, the finance of social services could only be sustained through increasing taxation. PASOK, in its effort to meet its pre-election promises, introduced its welfare measures which were to be financed not by taxation
but (indirectly) through resources from the EC and extensive borrowing. In March 1985, the EEC granted Greece 2 billion ECU to be invested over the next seven years on development projects, while cash was also attracted from the community's regional and social funds (Economist, 16/11/1985b). Furthermore, the agricultural sector was allocated substantial EC grants in the form of "income support payments to farmers, import restrictions to facilitate the sale of Greek products as well as assistance for restructuring and modernising the industry" (Buckley and Artisien, 1987, p. 15).

In 1989, the Commission approved a support framework for Community structural assistance in the Greek regions, covering the period 1989 to 1993. The main development priorities selected for Greece were; upgrading the country's basic economic infrastructure (i.e. transport, telecommunications, energy, research and technology, environment); development of the primary sector and rural areas; improvement in the competitiveness of firms; balanced development of tourism; and development of human resources. The total cost of the priorities adopted for joint action by the Community and Greece, amounted to 14,342 million ECU, at 1989 prices (Commission, 1990).

When the New Democracy Party took office in 1990, it turned to the EC and international financial institutions for massive loans, as a means to counter the economic crisis. The EC formulated a programme of assistance and made available 2.2 billion ECU to be disbursed between 1991 and 1993, with the release of the latter being conditional on the government's satisfactory performance in reaching certain targets (Pettifer, 1991). Among others, reduction of central government borrowing from 17 per cent of GDP to 1.5 per cent, and shrinkage of public sector employment by 10 per cent over three years were the most important requirements (Economist, 9/5/1992).

Finally, the country's international position has radically changed, following the recent changes in the Balkans. The Yugoslav crisis has affected Greece in two dimensions. In economic terms, the uncompetitiveness of Greece's exports has increased, particularly in the agricultural market, due to the rising transport cost caused by the closing of the Yugoslav motorways. In political terms, the establishment of an
independent state in former Yugoslavia, which opens the "Macedonian Question" (Pettifer, 1991, p. 173) has caused a rift between Greece and its fellow EC states. However, the Balkan changes might have another impact on the country's position in the EC;

no longer does Greece appear as a democratic oasis in a totalitarian desert. The changes in Bulgaria, Albania and ex-Yugoslavia make Greece look more like any other Balkan country. Now that its neighbours are holding free elections, the rest of the EC is becoming less tolerant of Greece's rows with them (Economist, 9/5/1992, p. 41).

In conclusion, the development of a modern welfare state in Greece has never been fully implemented. However, it should be borne in mind that almost all post-war social democratic programmes have been successfully put forward in periods of rapid economic growth. By contrast, the Greek state, partly the New Democracy governments after the mid-1970s and more extensively PASOK governments, attempted to increase government's role in the provision of welfare services in a period of slow or even negative economic growth. The welfare measures finally introduced were undermined by the devastation of Greek economy in the late 1980s and the coming to power of the right wing party of New Democracy which had a manifest commitment to a reduction in the role of the state in most areas of social intervention.

This chapter has sought to develop an explanation of the nature of the Greek state and its environment, as the context for more detailed discussion and analysis of sports policy in ensuing chapters. The strategic relations between, for example, class fragments and political parties or the military, between the Greek state and its European Union partners, and transnational capital, form integral elements of this explanation. These relations (together with others) provide important elements in the account of sports policy constructed from analysis of primary and secondary data in ensuing chapters.
CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGY
Strategic Relations Theory and its Methodological Implications

In the second chapter of the thesis, a number of different approaches to theorising the role of modern liberal democratic states were reviewed and evaluated, in terms of their adequacy to provide a theoretical framework for this study. It was argued that, of the different theories of the state reviewed, strategic relations theory provided the most adequate framework for addressing the role of the state in areas of social action. In this sense, strategic relations theory may be regarded as, in effect, a meta-theory, that is one which articulates what counts as an explanation of the state’s role, rather than an explanation of the state’s role per se. Strategic relations theory highlights the fact that policy outcomes are contingent, and that the analysis of policy outcomes in specific economic, political and social contexts, and specific periods may only be adequately explained by reference to accounts of the structures within which state activities take place, the reproduction and development of such structures by the intended and unintended consequences of human agency, and by reference to the struggles which take place between groups and individuals within those structures.

Given that little work has been undertaken in the analysis of sports policy in the Greek context, the research which forms the focus of this study may be described as exploratory, which implies the addressing of particular research questions, rather than, for example, the more formal process of hypothesis testing. The main research questions which are to be addressed are as follows:

- first, can changing political values be identified, which reflect changes in political control of central government from socialist to New Right, and which inform the goals of social and economic policy, resulting more specifically in significant shifts of sports policy direction?
- second, if the economic and social structure obtaining in Greece form important features of the context of sports policy, in what ways can changes in sports policy be said to reflect changes in social and economic structure?
- and third, what impact have local and transnational actors and organisations on the nature of sports policy?
Key themes to be addressed will, therefore, include the relationship between policy goals and the political values of the principal political actors; the significance of the changing nature of the economic and social structure for sports policy goals and implementation; and the significance of national, local, and transnational influences and contexts for sports policy. The main criterion for using strategic relations theory is that both structure and individual agents are considered as essential for the analysis of policy outcome and therefore, policy developments are regarded as the result of the relations between economic, cultural and/or political contexts and individual or collective actors. The limits of social action result in part from the individuals' position within the structural framework and from the opportunities provided by the structure, at given points in time, for the realisation of individuals' aspirations.

Data Collection

Acceptance of a theoretical framework as the basis of the research may prescribe choice in the method of data collection; qualitative, quantitative or a combination of the two. In this study, the decision to employ a qualitative approach was based on the desire to study intensively a certain situation, in a specific time period, during which certain actors were significant for policy outcomes. The qualitative approach was considered to be appropriate to the aims of this research for a number of reasons, the most significant of which was its tendency to explore interrelations between events and activities in social life and to capture people's interpretations of the factors which produce those connections. The fundamental features or benefits of qualitative methods are described as; a) a focus on the social processes and the meanings given to those processes by participants, b) a commitment to viewing events, action, values etc. from the perspective of the people who are being studied, c) the non-disturbance of the natural setting by the researcher, and d) the fact that the research design can be altered to allow for unexpected yet important findings as they turn up (Shipman, 1988; Bryman, 1988). In the course of this study, the nature and changes of sports policy in Greece, from the beginning of the 1980s, and also the actors' perceptions of those changes were the principal focus of attention.
Qualitative methods permit the researcher to study in depth and detail selected issues. In the course of data collection, the fieldwork is approached without being constrained by predetermined categories of analysis, which in turn enhances the depth, openness and detail of qualitative inquiry. Qualitative methods produce more detailed information about much smaller number of cases, which in effect increases understanding of the particular cases and situations under study but reduces the researcher's ability to draw general conclusions (Patton, 1990). Consequently, conclusions in this study can only be limited to those situations, time periods, persons, context, and purposes for which the data were applicable.

Qualitative methods consist of three principal kinds of data collection as identified by Patton (1990):

(a) in depth open-ended interviews, (b) direct observation, and (c) written documents. The data from interviews consist of direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings, and knowledge. The data from observations consist of detailed descriptions of people's activities, behaviours, actions, and the full range of interpersonal interactions and organisational processes that are part of observable human experience. Document analysis in qualitative inquiry yields experts' quotations, or entire passages from organisational, clinical, or programme records; personal diaries; and open-ended responses to questionnaires and surveys (p. 10).

For the purposes of this study open-ended interviews and written documents (referred to as secondary data) were employed.

Validity of Method and Reliability of Data

The validity of a method may be conceived of in two ways. A method may be said to be valid if it is consistent with an adequate theoretical approach. In this respect, for example, from the perspective of strategic relations theory, the investigation of actors' perceptions of influences on policy through semi-structured interview, may be considered both relevant and valid, given that the individuals' interpretation is crucial for the pursuit of specific policies. Validity of method may also refer to the relationship between the method of measurement and the concept which it is claimed
to measure (Bryman, 1989). These issues of operational validity will be addressed in the section concerning the analysis of interview data.

Gathering of data in Greece, has drawn on secondary, documentary sources, and on information derived from interviews. Secondary data provide aspects of the structural picture of sport in Greece. Legislative measures, records on parliamentary debates, national and GSS accounts, policy documents, newspaper articles etc., mainly concern the policy outcome, in other words they provide one or more descriptions of 'what actually happened'. However, secondary data analysis has certain limitations. In addition to the problem of access to such data, the most serious difficulty, as identified by Frankfort and Nachmias (1992), is that secondary data only approximate to the kind of data that may be used to provide an answer to the research question. Thus, obtaining primary data from interviews with key actors in the formulation and implementation of sports policy in Greece, provides a useful check against which 'official' statements may be evaluated and vice versa.

Interviews principally focused on the relations between actual policy outcomes, the goals of individuals and groups, and the struggles occurring within the social and political structure. Through interviewing key individuals, the 'how' and 'why' of decision making and/or non-decision making, the reasons for government activity and/or inactivity in the sports field, as well as the individual agents' position within, and/or exclusion from the policy process, were the main issues considered. The two-stage research design (i.e. gathering of secondary data and primary interview information) was not used simply as a method of 'triangulation', at least in the sense of using one part of the study simply to check the accuracy of the other part. Secondary data provided the picture of the structure of sports policy in Greece (i.e. patterns of government spending on sport may reveal the hierarchy of government objectives for sport, or the GSS accounts may give an indication of relations of power at central government level), and also provided support (or not) for individual actors' claims. Primary data from interviews provided respondents' explanations or perceptions of the structural configuration of power and resources, and thus, served the need for uncovering relations, struggles, and compromises within the structure.
Reliability of data on the other hand, refers to the consistency of a measure. It is taken to imply the extent to which a measurement procedure produces the same results however and whenever it is conducted (Kirk and Miller, 1986). In other words, a method produces reliable data when the repetition of the same procedures produces the same answers irrespective of the investigator (Briggs, 1986). According to Shipman (1988), reliability in social research can rarely be completely achieved, because the interaction between the researcher and his/her social environment cannot be fully controlled. Furthermore, though reliability of data may be regarded as replicability, as above, there should be also awareness of the fact that all events are unique, that is non-replicable. As is apparent, reliability of interview data is in principle impossible to obtain, since the interviews cannot be repeated. In deciding therefore the level of reliability in this study, what was of critical importance was not so much whether other interviewers would have obtained the same data, but rather whether the method used for obtaining the data was reasonable, in other words whether the questions asked were appropriate to the obtaining of frank and open responses, or whether issues of researcher bias were dealt with. In addition, reliability of data is enhanced by considering that, what was significant in the interviews was the individuals' perceptions of what happened, and not 'what actually happened'. In cases, for instance, where an interviewee claims that 'x' has happened, while all other interviewees and the government reports suggest that 'x' has not happened, the researcher may conclude that 'x' has not happened. This however, does not necessarily mean that the respondent has provided unreliable data since his/her perception is that 'x' has happened. It may be said that the data provided are not reliable when respondents' explanations are inconsistent over time (though even here the differential recall at different points in time may be the sort of data a researcher seeks), or when the respondent seeks to mislead the interviewer.

The problem of reliability in the course of the present study will be dealt with in much detail later in this chapter, where the way interviews have been conducted will be extensively analysed. At this point it is sufficient to point out that reliability of data, in terms of obtaining frank and honest responses was partly secured by the researcher, by stressing the 'scientific' interest of the study and also the fact that anonymity of responses would be strictly preserved. On the other hand, it could be said that one aspect of
reliability of the method of data collection had been secured through gathering of data both from secondary sources and interviews (triangulation). This aspect concerned reliability in relation to factual accuracy, in terms of certain key events, since triangulation in respect of people's perception simply cannot be obtained.

The two-stage research design was also intended, apart from enhancing validity of method, to be used as a method of triangulation. Miles and Huberman (1994) make the distinction between triangulation by data source (the use of a variety of data sources in a study), by method (the use of multiple methods to study a single problem such as observation and interviews, or the comparison of data collected through some kind of qualitative methods with data collected through some kind of quantitative methods), by researcher (investigator A, B, etc.), and triangulation by theory (the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data).

In effect, triangulation is a way to approach inquiry by investigating multiple instances from different sources, by using different methods, and by cross-checking findings with others they need to be cross-checked with. In this study, triangulation by data source as well as by method was employed. This implies, according to Patton (1990), a cross-checking of information derived at different times and by different sources within qualitative research. It means validating information, which was derived from interviews, by checking accounts, documents and other written evidence that can provide the basis for evaluating what interview respondents claim. Thus, informants' claims of policy outcomes can be cross-checked with the picture of what 'has happened' as indicated by the records. This is not to imply however, that interviews are merely an explanation device. In some cases, interviews may complete the structural picture, or provide more accurate sources of information than secondary data and inform the way certain policy outcomes were actually achieved. Furthermore, the selection of interviewees, which included individuals from different political backgrounds and positions, and also from different levels within the sports structure, was another measure for evaluating the reliability of interviewees' responses. For instance, claims from within the General Secretariat of Sport (e.g. from the head of department of competitive sport and/or the General Secretary) that GSS grant to national bodies of sport has increased during a certain period can easily be cross-
checked with data from GSS accounts and responses of the heads of the national governing bodies in question.

Interviews and Sample Selection

Since the focus of the interviews was on the experiences of particular interviewees, the idea of working through a structured, predetermined list of questions similar for each person was rejected in favour of a list of key issues to be explored with each interviewee, employing questions in a sequence meaningful to them. The aim of this kind of interview (semi-structured) is to capture people's perspectives and interpretations of a particular situation. This kind of interview is well-suited when direct comparability of responses is not essential but rather depth of understanding is at the centre of inquiry (Bryman, 1989). Semi-structured interviews, or what Frankfort and Nachmias (1992) call non-schedule-structured or focused interviews have four main characteristics; a) the interviewees are persons who have been involved in a particular experience, b) the interview refers to situations that have been already analysed, c) topics related to the research hypotheses (in our case research questions) have been specified in advance and, d) what is important is the respondents' experience of the situations under investigation. Denzin (1978) attaches one more feature to the characteristics of semi-structured interview (which he calls 'non-schedule standardised interview'), which refers to the sequence of questions. According to Denzin in 'non-schedule standardised' interviews no fixed sequence of questions is appropriate to all respondents. The appropriateness of a sequence will depend on the respondent's readiness and willingness to take up a topic at a given time in the interview.

Selection of interviewees for the present study has been based on a number of criteria. The sampling strategy aimed at contributing to the development of a sound theoretical analysis, rather than producing a representative sample of the population. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), "qualitative samples tend to be purposive, rather than random" (p. 27). As Bryman (1988) argues, "the qualitative researcher should give less attention to the need to meet statistical sampling criteria in assessing the adequacy of a sample; rather, the researcher should be much more concerned with the issue of whether the sample conforms to
the investigator's emerging theoretical framework" (p. 117). The sampling strategy derived from the initial objective of the study, namely to investigate a specific context, and from the fact that social processes, such as those associated with the development of sports policy, have a coherence that cannot be adequately approached by findings from a random sampling. For Patton (1990), the advantage of purposeful sampling lies in selecting cases from which the researcher can derive in-depth information about issues of central importance to the purpose of the study. The interviewees were individuals who had certain access to information and knowledge, derived from their formal position in an organisation or their familiarity with the situation under question. They were also representative of different levels of the sports structure. As such, informants' positions ranged from central government to local government level, from governmental organisations to private and voluntary bodies, and from politicians (from the two major political parties of New Democracy and PASOK) to civil servants (tables 5.1 and 5.2). Selection of individuals from an extensive range of position and political values not only provided a broader picture of sports policy, it also served as a cross-checking of information gathered from different sources and thus, in some respect, as a means for increasing reliability, as discussed earlier. In addition, it has to be noted that sampling decisions were in direct relation to the progress of fieldwork, in the sense that they were informed by the types of experiences and individuals that had already been included in the sample, and also by the gaps needed to be filled in order for the analysis to be progressed. But in identifying the gaps, the research was guided by considerations about what was needed to support or reject the argument, rather than statistical measures about the characteristics of the interviewees in relation to the general population.

Johnson (1990) has outlined five criteria on which to base the selection of the 'ideal' informant. The first and the second criteria relate to the position of informants and the knowledge they possess as a result of their respective roles. The remaining three concern abilities of informants, including such things as willingness to communicate or co-operate, ability to communicate and impartiality. However, respondents' ability to communicate and frankness were features that could not be checked in advance and only willingness to co-operate was considered as essential. On the other hand, interviewees' impartiality was beyond the scope of this
study, since 'partiality' (in the sense of political/professional partisanship) was one of the themes that the study wished to investigate. Therefore, the criterion of impartiality was replaced by the level of truthfulness/frankness of the interviewees.

**Table 5.1: Sports structure in Greece**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Central government</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior Minister of Sport</td>
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**Public sector**

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<tr>
<td>General Secretary of Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of competitive sport</td>
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<td>Department of sports development</td>
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**National level**

<table>
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<th>National governing bodies of sport</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hellenic Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major sports clubs</td>
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**Local level**

<table>
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<th>Voluntary sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>Local sports clubs</td>
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<th>Public sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
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</table>
Table 5.2: List of interviewees (individual agents)

**Central government level**

**A. Politicians and party appointed bureaucrats**

**New Democracy**


**Junior Minister of Sport (1989-1991), was a key party figure and unavailable for the research.**

**General Secretary of Sport (1991-1993), was not accessible.**

**PASOK**

General Secretary of PASOK committee for sport.
Head of GSS Department of Competitive Sport: 1985-1988.
Chairman of ‘Sport for All’ committee: 1983-1989 and 1993 onwards.

**Junior Minister of Sport (1981-1985), was a top party member and thus not available for the research.**

**General Secretary of Sport (1985-1988), was not interested in participating in the research.**

**Junior Minister of Sport (1988-1989), was not accessible.**

**General secretary of Sport (1988-1989), has passed away.**

**B. Politically independent civil servant**

Head of GSS Department of Sports Development: 1991-.

**National level**

**National Governing Bodies of Sport**

Chairmen of:

Hellenic Federation of Athletics and Gymnastics Clubs.
Methodology

Hellenic Volleyball Federation.
Hellenic Federation of Wrestling Fans.
Hellenic Tae Kwon Do Federation.
Hellenic Sailing Federation.
Hellenic Cycling Federation.
Hellenic Federation of Judo Fans.
Hellenic Karate Federation.

General Secretaries of:
Hellenic Weight Lifting Federation (and Technical Director).
Hellenic Fencing Federation.
Hellenic Boxing Federation.

Local government level

Municipality of Marousi (Mayor, and Chairman of the municipality’s Athletic Centre).
Municipality of Iraklio (Deputy Chairman of the municipal Athletic Centre).
Municipality of Nea Ionia (Deputy Chairman of the municipal Athletic Organisation).
Municipality of Drapetsona (Chairman and board member of the municipal Athletic Organisation).
Municipality of Neo Psihiko (Mayor and senior employee responsible for sport).
Municipality of Palio Psihiko (Mayor).

Sports clubs (major and local clubs)

Chairmen of:
Athletic Club Paradisos Marousi
Fans’ Club Nea Ionia
Athletic Club Ionikos Nea Philadelphia
Wrestling Fans’ Club Atlas Kallithea
Athenian Club of Fencing
Nautical Club Palio Faliro
Empirical research involved interviews with sports policy actors at all levels in Greece. At central government level, eight interviews were conducted with Junior Ministers of Sport, General Secretaries of Sport and heads of the two most important departments of the government agency responsible for sports policy in Greece (GSS). At national level, case studies included eleven governing bodies of sport and interviews with chairmen and general secretaries of their board. At local government level, case studies with six municipalities aimed at providing information on the role of local government in sport, the impact of central government developments and several other factors on local sports policy, and the response of local government to those forces. Finally, interviews were conducted with the chairmen of three major multi-sport clubs, and three single sport clubs. Among them, two multi-sport clubs are closely related to two of the local authorities studied, and all of the three single sport clubs are connected with three of the national governing bodies that participated in the research, in an attempt to identify the ways national and local developments influence the smallest units of the institution of sport. At this point it should be noted, that no pretesting interview was employed at central government level due to the unique character of the positions held by each of the interviewees. Preliminary interviews were conducted only with national governing bodies, local authorities and sports clubs, and their evaluation gave the opportunity to the researcher to test the adequacy of the interview schedule as a tool for eliciting credible information.

Interview Technique and Interview Schedule Design

In the course of this study, a preliminary contact with the interviewees, in most cases personal or otherwise through fax or telephone, informed the individuals about the nature and the aims of the study and the reasons for seeking an interview with them. In the following contacts, a list of the topics to be discussed in the interview was provided in advance. Finally, a convenient time and place both for the interviewee and the researcher was arranged. During those contacts the researcher informed the interviewees about his intention to use a tape recorder. Tape recording was selected on the basis of the opportunity it offers to the researcher to follow the responses and be alert to any issues that may arise throughout the interview. Tape recording was preferred for reasons of accuracy and
spontaneity (which note taking would inhibit). In addition, tape recording permits the researcher to be more attentive to the process of the interview and thus to explore further unexpected issues that might emerge. However, recording an interview can have some negative consequences. In particular, it may inhibit frank discussion and thus impinge upon the reliability of information. In an attempt to overcome this problem interviewees were informed that the interview was conducted as part of 'scientific' research (the implication being that it was 'non-political') and reassured that, should they wish it, their anonymity throughout the inquiry and in any subsequent publications would be preserved.

During the interview two major points were given particular attention; a) the researcher tried to avoid creating the impression that what was occurring was a cross-examination of a certain situation and, b) questions that were misunderstood were repeated and clarified. In deciding the order of issues to be addressed, a guide provided by Stone (1984) was followed. As such, the opening questions led the respondent to realise what the nature of the study was, while questions of a personal nature were included in the final part of the interview. Furthermore, although the wording of questions varied, care was taken to ensure that the interviewer's own position on the issue under discussion was not revealed. At this point however, it should be noted that, as Oppenheim (1992) observes, even the most experienced interviewers may occasionally lapse into leading questions under the stress of a difficult in depth interview. In some instances, it is too easy for the interviewer to ask questions that make respondents aware of what may be expected of them. To allow the reader to check whether this has happened, the structure of interviews is provided in appendix I. In addition to avoiding leading questions, a sensible order of questions was kept with each topic beginning with the most general question and gradually narrowing down to more specific questions, though once again the order of the questions was dictated by the early responses and the need to retain spontaneity and interest.

The questions used in the interviews were 'open-ended', which means that the question is asked in such a way that the respondents can reply in their own words (Stone and Harris, 1984), since it was regarded as desirable to give the respondents the opportunity to express their perception of
policy developments. As Patton (1990) stresses, the basic feature of qualitative interviewing is to permit respondents to reply in their own way without imposing predetermined responses. Questions referred to sports policy issues were intended to reveal the respondents' perceptions of developments in the area of their concern.

Questions were formed in a way which was not too technical or complex. This was done for two main reasons; first, complex questions may cause misinterpretations and, second, people are, sometimes, reluctant to admit ignorance of an issue, which subsequently may undermine the reliability of information. In addition, the questions employed contained only one line of enquiry. Multiple questions are likely to create tension and confusion on the part of the person interviewed. This might result in the interviewee feeling uncomfortable, ignorant, confused or hostile, which in turn might have a negative impact on the validity of information. Apart from unconsciously misleading the researcher, respondents are also particularly sensitive to the social and political implications of providing the desired information (Briggs, 1986). Many respondents seek to reply in socially desirable ways and present a positive image of themselves when answering questions (Bryman, 1989). However, ensuring anonymity of responses and cross-checking of information, in terms of internal consistency within the interview, were thought to be the most appropriate measures to overcome the problem of reliability that might arise through misleading information.

Data Analysis

The remaining part of this chapter aims at giving a detailed account of the steps followed in the analysis of information gathered during the fieldwork. Data collection and analysis, which aims at identifying themes and constructing ideas as they are suggested by the data (Tesch, 1990), are parallel and mutually informing processes. As Patton (1990) notes, there is not a precise point at which data collection ends and analysis begins. Ideas of possible analysis are likely to occur during the course of gathering data. At this point the researcher has to be careful, as Patton warns, not to allow those initial interpretations to distort additional data collection.
Analysis of qualitative data however, seems to be a highly problematic issue. Bryman and Burgess (1994), Patton (1990), and Stone and Harris (1984), point that the major problems derive from the nature of qualitative data which are described as voluminous, unstructured, and not conveniently organised around specific categories. Certainly, this is also the case for quantitative data derived from large scale surveys, but those data are systematic and standardised and the availability of standard statistical procedures and computer programmes for handling them, frequently renders, or leads researchers to treat, such data as non-problematic. By contrast, the qualitative findings are in more detail and variable in content, and their analysis becomes difficult because responses are neither systematic nor standardised. The challenge of qualitative inquiry, as identified by Patton then, is “to make sense of massive amounts of data, reduce the volume of information, identify significant patterns, and construct a framework for communicating what the data reveal” (Patton, 1990, pp. 371-2). The problem becomes more acute if one considers that there are few agreed, ground rules for analysing qualitative data, for drawing conclusions and verifying them, or for determining significance (Patton, 1990). There are only guidelines and procedural suggestions for analysing qualitative data, but again guidelines are not rules. However, this does not mean that qualitative data analysis is a haphazard process but rather that there are no ways of perfectly replicating a researcher’s analytical thoughts and as such, each analytical approach used in a qualitative study is unique. Therefore, the last part of this chapter aims at presenting the guidelines followed for the analysis of data gathered in the course of this study.

There are two different operations that play a role in the analysis process. As they have been described by Tesch (1990), those are first, the detailed examination or identification of themes and second, the operation of determination of the essential features or understanding or construction of ideas. Some methodologists also view data analysis as consisting of two separate phases; data organising and data interpretation. In practice, although they are considered as separate stages they happen most of the times simultaneously. One way of thinking of a distinction is to see the stage of organising the data as the preparation for data interpretation since without organising the data in some way, the interpretation becomes almost impossible.
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest a three stage analysis. The first stage is described as data reduction which refers to the process of selecting, focusing and simplifying the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcripts. In the present study, detailed transcripts of interviews, that is "writing the actual words spoken by the informants, however repetitive, slangy or ungrammatical" (Riley, 1990, p. 25), were made by the interviewer himself and completed within the first two or three days after each interview. In that way, an opportunity to get a sense of the data and check out the quality of the information collected was in the researcher's hand. Data reduction is suggested by Miles and Huberman as being a form of analysis that sharpens, focuses and organises data in such a way that final conclusions can be drawn and verified. The second stage of analysis is data display which aims at compressing, organising and displaying information in such a way that permits interpretation and conclusion drawing. Patton (1990) refers to this step as description of data which answers basic questions and should be carefully separated from interpretation. Interpretation "involves explaining the findings, answering 'why' questions, attaching significance to particular results, and putting patterns into an analytic framework" (Patton, 1990, p. 375). The final part of analysis deals with the interpretation of data and involves conclusion drawing and verification. As noted earlier, a form of analysis already begins from the start of data collection. This usually takes the form of deciding what things mean, noting regularities, patterns, possible explanations and propositions. Conclusions are vague at first and then become increasingly explicit and grounded.

Data reduction aimed at identifying and highlighting this part of interviewees' responses that concerned the actual answer to the research questions. Certainly, as Mason argues (1994), deciding when someone is talking about a particular topic is often a matter of interpretation since people rarely use in everyday discourse the precise words that researchers have chosen to deal with the questions. A basic guideline followed (Briggs, 1986), was that every interview was transcribed and analysed as a whole before any of its components were identified as important or not. This technique revealed before anything else, the points at which interviewer and respondent had misunderstood each other which prevented the researcher from misinterpretations. In addition, reading transcripts as a whole gave a better insight in the findings. As Ritchie and Spencer (1994)
argue, familiarisation with the material as a whole is quite important even where the researcher has been involved in all the data collection, since even in this case, recollections of key issues and themes might be selective and partial. By reading therefore the interview transcripts as a whole, the researcher was able to list key ideas and recurrent themes. At this stage of analysis, both an overview of depth and diversity of the data was gained and the process of conceptualisation started. For Patton (1990), it is at this stage that an important decision has to be made. This decision concerns the way interview analysis will start; either with case analysis or cross-case analysis. Beginning with case analysis, which means writing a case study for each interviewee using all the information derived from each individual interview before proceeding with cross-case analysis, is appropriate where variations in individuals are the primary focus of the study. Beginning with cross-case analysis, which means grouping together interviewees’ responses to common questions, is used when a standardised open-ended interview is employed. However, it is not a decision of which strategy will be employed, since those two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive, but rather a decision of how to start the analysis. During the analysis of this study, beginning with a case study was thought to be appropriate since the major concern was variations of interviewees’ responses on research questions. As such, for each interview conducted, a written case report was constructed from the raw case data. This form of analysis focused on gathering of all major information that would be used in the final analysis into a comprehensive case report.

The purpose of case analysis was to organise and classify data that would facilitate searching and uncovering themes across interviews, and it was at this stage that cross-case analysis was employed. Tesch (1990) has identified four sources from which themes can be derived; the research questions and sub-questions, the research instrument(s), concepts or categories used by other authors in previous related studies, and the data themselves. However, due to the lack of any previous related study most of the themes had been provided by the research questions (which consisted the research instrument), generated at the very beginning of the inquiry process, during the phase focused on the conceptualisation of interview questions. In exceptional cases, the data themselves provided themes that were not expected at the beginning of the study.
Having made sure that all information was included in the case analysis, the researcher proceeded to cross-case analysis. Consequently, cross-sectional analysis, looking at topics and themes across all data, was employed. It should be stressed however, that the effort to uncover themes through qualitative analysis requires careful considerations and judgements about what is significant and meaningful in the data. Significance of an observation during a qualitative inquiry is not decided by any statistical test but by the judgement of the qualitative analyst. As a consequence, the analyst may decide that something is not significant when in fact it is; or, conversely, the analyst may attach increasing significance to a finding that is meaningless. Alternative explanations and themes were also considered during the course of data analysis. Closely related to alternative explanations was the search for negative cases, in other words instances that did not fit within the issues that had been identified. For instance, by reference to the present study, the data revealed that a major consideration for explaining state subsidies to different national governing bodies of sport was the bodies' board political affiliation with the political party in office. However, this was not the case for every governing body studied. The fact that those cases contradicted the above argument gave a wider ground to its support, since it would be unrealistic to expect absolute agreement and uniformity in the course of human action and behaviour.

Having constructed a thematic framework, data were lifted from their original context and rearranged according to this framework. This process, referred to as charting, enables the analyst to build up a picture of the data as a whole, by considering the range of experiences for each particular issue or theme (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Charts therefore, were devised with headings and subheadings drawn from the thematic framework and the initial research questions. In the course of this analysis, several responses were entered for each key subject area. Description of the data was then considered to be at a satisfactory stage, and that led to the next step of analysis, namely interpretation of research findings. Interpretation meant going beyond the descriptive data. It meant reviewing the charts, comparing and contrasting the interviewees' perceptions and experiences and searching for connections and explanations offered by the data themselves. According to Patton (1990), "interpretation means attaching significance to what was found, offering explanations, drawing
conclusions, ... building linkages, ... and dealing with rival explanations and disconfirming cases ... as part of testing the validity of an interpretation” (p. 423). Piecing together the overall picture of sports policy in Greece in the last decade, was not simply a question of aggregating patterns or searching for multiplicity of evidence, but rather it was a search for structure and dynamics revealed by salient issues. However, it should be pointed out that reasonableness, in other words the existence of sufficient reasons to draw a certain conclusion from a given set of data, is one of the tests of reliability of analysis. The reader therefore, has to make his/her own mind on the basis of the arguments produced, having in mind sample selective transcripts provided in appendix II.

In conclusion, we may note with Patton (1990) that, "it is important to understand that ... the emphasis of qualitative analysis is on illumination, understanding, and extrapolation rather than causal determination, prediction, and generalisation” (p. 424). In the light of the advantages as well as the problems and limitations of the methods used in the course of the present study, an analysis and discussion of the research findings are presented in the following chapters which seek to explain in depth sports policy developments in Greece after 1980.
CHAPTER VI

SPORTS POLICY IN POST-WAR GREECE
Sports Policy in Greece

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to explore the role of central government in sport, in Greece, to explain the nature of sports policy and also to identify key trends and/or changes in its direction, as evidenced by secondary sources. The main issues identified in this chapter are intended to provide the grounds for the formulation of a strategy for interviews with key agents in sport in Greece, in a subsequent stage of this thesis. The focus of the research is on the nature of state involvement in sport in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, an analysis of the direction of sports policy before that period will provide the historical link necessary for an understanding of policy initiatives since 1980.

It is important to stress that information for the analysis of sports policy in the earlier period (until 1974) is relatively limited for a number of reasons. The most significant of these relate to violation of parliamentary procedures and lack of records on parliamentary debates during the period of rule by the military junta (1967-74), and the lack of any documentation on the General Secretariat of Sport's policy in the earlier years. Therefore, explanations for the nature of state involvement in sport for that period will be based on data from the National and GSS Accounts and on relevant legislation.

In order to contextualise this study, it is necessary to provide the reader with some information on the way sport is organised in Greece. The smallest unit of organised sport in Greece is the sports club, which, for its foundation and administration depends on private initiatives (either voluntary or commercial). Approximately 5,000 sports clubs are officially recognised, while 500,000 athletes are attending their activities (Brademas, 1988). Those clubs are represented by the sports federations, the national governing bodies of sport (NGBs), that have responsibility for specific sports and organisations. Above these bodies in the governmental sector stands the Ministry of Culture, which directs central funds and implements the government's policies for sport through an appointed Junior Minister of Sport and a governmental agency, the General Secretariat of Sport (GSS).
State Involvement in Sport until 1974

State involvement in sport, in modern Greece, developed predominantly after World War II. Until then, the only sign that indicated government concern for sport came in 1899 with the establishment of the Committee for the Olympic Games (Hellenic Olympic Committee). The Committee, as its name implies, was responsible for the promotion of Olympic Ideals at home as well as abroad, and the rejuvenation of the Olympic Games. The foundation of the Committee was prompted by government concern to keep alive what had come to be perceived as the traditional approach of ancient Greece towards culture and sport. Furthermore, the Committee was responsible for the preparation for, and participation of national teams in, Olympic Games. It can be assumed then, that representation in international competition was the impetus for the provision of sporting opportunities. A further legislative measure (the 3148/1955 Act for the Modification and Completion of the Hellenic Olympic Committee Legislation) gave the right to the Committee to act and decide as an independent body about its policy priorities and the way the grant-in-aid allocated by the Ministry of Education would be spent (Act 3148, in The Government Newspaper, 1955).

Following World War II, a series of pieces of legislation indicated government concern for the way sports development might become an area of state policy. In 1944, under the Act for Extracurricular Physical Education, that established the first advisory body on issues concerning government policy for sports development, emphasis was placed on the provision of sporting opportunities for youth (Act 1727, in The Government Newspaper, 1944). Among others, the responsibilities of the new body included the supervision and funding of the national governing bodies of sport and the voluntary sports associations. This body neither had executive power nor was it independent of government control. The chairman of the body and all its members were appointed by, and directly accountable to, the Ministry of Education and Religion, and their decisions had to be approved by the Minister.

The above committee was replaced in 1957, under the Legislative Decree for the Organisation of Extracurricular Sport, by the first government body of sport, the General Secretariat of Sport (Legislative Decree 3769, in The
Government Newspaper, 1957), which had full responsibility for sports policy issues (Royal Decree 12, in The Government Newspaper, 1958). The General Secretary of Sport was appointed by the Ministry to the Presidency. GSS was directly funded mainly through the state budget and granted a share in the profits from football pools, and in certain cases through the programme for public investments. In addition, its responsibilities widened to include supervision and allocation of subsidies for the efficient operation of sports facilities, planning and construction of new facilities, and allocation of funds as grant-in-aid to the Hellenic Olympic Committee and the national governing bodies of sport.

Although sports policy had become a political issue, state intervention in that area was restricted to funding and supervising the national bodies of sport and the voluntary sports clubs. Direct provision of sporting opportunities for the public received little attention. This was due to a variety of reasons such as the relatively little public demand for participation in sport and far less for sports facilities, and also the focus of government on the achievement of economic development and growth and the insignificance of sport as an area of state policy (Papageorgiou, 1993). As such, it can be argued that it was a policy decision to place emphasis on the voluntary sector for meeting any sporting needs of the community. The voluntary sector played a leading role in developing sport but this role was discretionary in the sense that only those who had the talent and physical characteristics for a particular sport were welcome by the sports clubs and associations.

In fact, government spending on sport remained at a very low level until the mid-1960s. As the following figures show (6.1 and 6.2), government grant to GSS increased significantly soon after the establishment of the military regime in 1967, both as a percentage of total government expenditure and in real terms. Simultaneously, GSS budget almost tripled due to the rise of football pools turnover and the proportional increase of GSS share. High spending for sport in that period (1967-74) was towards greater GSS subsidies to the national bodies of sport and sports associations (figure 6.3). For instance, GSS's grant to NGBs increased considerably after 1967, and remained at a very high level as a percentage of GSS's budget, at the expense of GSS spending for the construction and maintenance of sports facilities, which hardly exceeded 30 per cent of its budget (figure 6.4).
Figure 6.1: Public funding of sport in real terms 1960-74 (calculated at 1967 prices)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1960-74
Organisation of football pools, accounts for the years 1960-74

Figure 6.2: Public funding of sport as a percentage of total public expenditure (1960-74)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1960-74
Figure 6.3: GSS grant to NGBs and sports clubs as a percentage of its budget (1960-74)

![Bar chart showing GSS grant as a percentage of budget from 1960 to 1974.]

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1960-74

Figure 6.4: GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1960-74)

![Bar chart showing GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of budget from 1960 to 1974.]

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1960-74
The presumption is that by seizing power, the Colonels were looking for short term response. Elite sport, by virtue of its high visibility, had the potential for a much more attractive and immediate political pay-off than did mass sport. Thus, investment and spending on capital projects was less desirable because it would take time to build and get facilities into use.

However, higher financial support was accompanied by closer supervision and control of the activities of the national bodies and sports clubs. The junta (1967-74) bypassed the GSS by establishing the General Office of Sport in 1967, as a separate department within the Ministry to the Presidency and introducing the role of Government Commissioner (Compulsory Legislation 127, in The Government Newspaper, 1967). The role of the new department was to prepare a national plan for sports development that was to be followed by every sports association and organisation. Its role widened, by a Legislative Decree (no. 76, in The Government Newspaper, 1969), to include exertion of control on the Hellenic Olympic Committee and every organisation or individual member which to date had been supervised by the GSS. Furthermore, the same legislation gave the right to the General Officer to exercise judicial power over every committee or individual member of all bodies of sport and sports associations and took away the right of individuals for appealing to a higher court. On the other hand, a Government Commissioner was appointed to every sports organisation with the responsibility of ensuring that the decisions of the above organisations were in compliance with the policy direction of the General Office of Sport (Compulsory Legislation 127, in The Government Newspaper, 1967). For instance, any decision could only be realised after the Commissioner's approval. Any discrepancy between the sports organisation's board and the Commissioner resulted in the policy decisions having to be approved by the General Officer.

Therefore, the way GSS was passed over, and increasing government control on sports organisations was exercised by the General Office were indicative of the notion and nature of state policy for sport in the period of dictatorship. Sport as a social event was strictly under government control through mechanisms that implied the military regime's intention of using sport for its own means. Although there is not enough evidence to suggest that sport as an institution was used as a mechanism for the promotion of the regime's ideology, it is clear that sport was not funded
for its own sake but rather as a means of gaining public support. Government spending on sport took the form of subsidies to the bodies that could promote a positive image of junta. Consequently, sports clubs' and individuals' international success was regarded as a means for promoting a positive image for the new regime, while enhancing mass public participation in sport seemed to be beyond the immediate interests of junta.

Sport Policy in Greece since 1974

The fall of the junta and the reinstatement of democracy marked a new era not only in the political history of modern Greece, but also in the nature of state involvement in sport. The change from the oppressive system of dictatorship to liberal democracy created a climate of enthusiasm in the community for a better quality of life, associated with more opportunities for sport, recreation and culture (Papageorgiou, 1993). Within this framework it became apparent that sports infrastructure was one of the areas where institutional changes were regarded as imperative.

In the parliamentary debate on the 1975 Act for the Organisation of Extracurricular Sport, sport was recognised by the majority as a fundamental part of government's policy for its benefits on the community's health and the promotion of positive social values among the young. Furthermore, its potential to project a favourable image of Greece abroad was also regarded as essential by the opposition party of PASOK. All parties condemned the way sport had been used in the interests of junta, and in that respect the opposition suggested the detachment of the GSS from the Ministry to the Presidency and the downgrading of the General Secretary's role, as a means to secure the independence of sport from party politics (Official Parliamentary Records, 18th of June 1975). As a first step, all junta initiatives on sport (tight control on sports organisations, General Office of Sport, Government Commissioner) were abolished by legislation, and the role of the national bodies of sport as the main organisations with decision-making responsibilities was reinforcement, while GSS exercised only a supervisory role (Act 75, in The Government Newspaper, 1975).
Although government interest in institutional change in sport was evidenced in the 1975 Act, sport as an area of state investment attracted government attention, even though very limited, only after the late 1970s. As shown in figure 6.5, funding of sport as a percentage of government's overall expenditure reached its highest level in 1980, following a significant reduction in 1976. However, the significance of spending on sport seems to be much greater in the late 1970s if one considers that the proportional increase of grants allocated to GSS took place at a time when government expenditure in real terms remained almost static (figure 6.6). Figure 6.7 shows that government direct grant to GSS in real terms increased rapidly between 1977 and 1981 and remained at a relatively high level up to 1984.

However, it is apparent that the significance of spending for sport, both as a proportion of total government expenditure and in real terms has gradually reduced since 1985. This can be revealed by comparing figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 to each other. In particular, figure 6.6 illustrates that total government spending has been constantly increasing in real terms since 1980. Therefore one would expect an increase in real terms, of government grant to GSS to follow. In contrast, state subsidies for sport have been drastically reduced since the middle of the 1980s, a decline that can be linked with the introduction by PASOK of the economic 'stabilisation programme' in 1985. Figure 6.5 shows that state expenditure for sport as a percentage of the state budget peaked in the beginning of the 1980s. Since then, sport's share of state expenditure has constantly declined.

However, in real terms, state subsidies to GSS have gradually been reduced since 1982, but this has not seriously affected GSS total budget due to the increase of funds from football pools. One point worthy of note is that in the last years of the period under examination (when the right wing party of New Democracy was in office), overall government spending for sport fell to the level of the middle 1970s. This appears to be the case both in real terms and as a percentage of the state budget. State funding of sport has decreased dramatically since 1990, and even though funds from football pools have also fallen, due to the reduction in 1990 of GSS share from 37 to 29 per cent of total revenues, GSS budget in real terms has remained intact, due to the increase of revenues from the public investments programme.
Figure 6.5: Public funding of sport as a percentage of total public expenditure (1974-93)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1974-93
Organisation of football pools, accounts for the years 1974-93

Figure 6.6: State total expenditure in real terms 1974-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1974-93
The most striking feature of the above figures is that the period of the highest government spending for sport coincided with the first term of PASOK administration. More specifically, direct government investment in sport, in real terms, reached an exceptionally high level in 1981 and 1982. High spending for sport continued for most of the period of PASOK first term in office, while after 1985 it fell at the level established in the late 1970s. Since 1989 government spending for sport has diminished, even though overall government expenditure in real terms has continued to grow, and financing of sport has relied increasingly heavily upon revenues from football pools and other games.

Higher spending for sport was only a part of PASOK's approach to the reorganisation of sport. However, the institutional change was not as drastic as expected in the 1980s. PASOK was criticised both by political rivals and by supporters for its failure to pursue by legislation the refinement of issues such as the relationship between state and sport, the role of GSS and its relationship with the governing bodies of sport, the incorporation of local government in the implementation of sports policy (which will be discussed later in this chapter), and its failure to introduce...
legislative measures to safeguard the social goals of 'sport for all' programmes.

On the other hand, the reorganisation of governmental agencies that did take place - GSS was subdivided into a number of specialist departments, the net result of which is to maintain a division between the requirements of elite athletes and 'sport for all' - was not regarded as a radical measure for the institutional change of sport. Although, within the boundaries of the above movement, the Ministry of Culture became the lead department on sports issues at central government level and the Junior Minister of Sport the head of the sports institution (Presidential Decree 77, in The Government Newspaper, 1985), its primary role is still regarded as supervisory without any direct involvement in planning for the development of sport. Its functions are to determine and administer the GSS grant and to establish the general policy framework. The GSS by virtue of its economic control over the governing bodies of sport has a clear capacity to influence their policy. But PASOK institutional change for sport was by no means to be achieved through ministerial decisions which had been common practice during its administration. Those practices, due to their temporary character, were deemed as a mechanism for enhancing political intervention in sport and cultivating clientelistic relationships between the political party in power and sports organisations.

After the government change in 1990, there was no sign that state involvement in sport advocated by New Democracy would be much different in nature from that adopted during PASOK administration. In a recent parliamentary debate, PASOK defending itself against criticism for its reluctance to vote for the new legislation for sport presented by New Democracy (to be discussed in the last part of this chapter), attacked the right wing government for its intention to increase state intervention in those areas of sport with entrepreneurial prospects and abandon those initiatives, such as the 'sport for all' programmes, with predominantly social goals (Parliamentary Records, 1991). The nature of sports policy, and any shifts in its direction that followed the change in office (from the socialist to the right wing government), will be discussed in the analysis of interview findings. However, due to the time when the interviews at central government level were conducted (in 1993), the analysis will be
confined up to the end of ND administration, with the post-1993 period (when PASOK regained power) being untouched.

Infrastructure for Sport and the 'Sport for All' Campaign

The rest of this chapter deals with the interpretation and analysis of data from the GSS budget in an attempt to identify the direction of sports policy in the 1980s and 1990s. As noted in the previous section, expenditure for sport grew in importance from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, both in real terms and as a percentage of the state budget. It is worth noting however, that the period of high spending for sport largely reflected high spending on sports infrastructure. In particular, during the first years of the period of high spending for sport (1977 and 1978), a large proportion of GSS expenditure consisted of capital expenditure (figure 6.8). This was also the case for most of the first period of PASOK administration (1981-84). After that, although the majority of GSS spending was for capital expenditure, in fact this amount in real terms was considerably lower than in the previous years. Construction and/or maintenance of sports facilities ceased to be an area of high investment, and as a matter of fact the amount spent in 1991 was even lower, in percentage terms, than that of 1977, the starting mark of high investment in sport.

Sports infrastructure included finance for the building and maintenance of regional sports facilities, multi-purpose sports centres, indoor sports halls and outdoor swimming pools and also the construction of large scale facilities, concentrated in or near Athens, where big international events were to be held. Expenditure for large scale facilities absorbed the vast majority of GSS budget from 1977 to 1981 and funds were directed towards the construction of the Olympic Stadium of Athens at which the 1982 European Athletics Championship was held. In addition, from 1988 to 1990, expenditure on sports facilities raised its share of GSS spending mostly due to the final preparation of Greece’s bid to host the 1996

1 In some cases during the analysis, there was inconsistency between data retrieved from public records (i.e. State Ordinary Budgets, Football Pools accounts etc.) and internal GSS accounts retrieved from different sources and via persons within the GSS (i.e. accounting director, financial director), indicating a different spending pattern. In these cases, the analysis of government spending was primarily based on official data as they appeared in public accounts, for reasons of consistency.
Olympic Games, and the organisation of the 1991 Mediterranean Games which were held in Greece.

Figure 6.8: GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1974-93)

![Graph showing GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1974-93)]

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1974-93

Spending on the construction of small scale, regional facilities was one of the central points of the strategy of the socialist party to create the means for making sport largely accessible to the public. Investment in small scale sports facilities was only a part of a programme introduced by the socialist government in 1983 to relieve unemployment. The programme which was administered by local authorities provided sources of finance mainly for environmental improvements in deprived areas. Within this framework, although the programme aimed originally at creating more jobs, it also stimulated the creation of valuable recreation facilities, e.g. town squares, parks, playgrounds and sports grounds (Papageorgiou, 1989). At the same period, and under the socialists' commitment for decentralisation, a new era in the relations between local government and GSS was established. The need for GSS funding of local sports events and the improvement and maintenance of sports grounds had been identified as early as 1977 under the Act for the Modification of Extracurricular Sports Legislation (Act 665, in The Government Newspaper, 1977). After 1983, local authorities were encouraged to develop a new type of activity
and involve themselves substantially in the provision of sport for the community.

During PASOK administration local government emerged as a major provider of sports opportunities. Particularly after 1983 local authorities undertook the responsibility for running the 'sport for all' programmes, initiated and funded by the GSS (i.e. 'sport and women', 'sport in childhood', 'sport and the elderly', 'sport and disabled children'). The emphasis of policy was to broaden the basis of participation and the aim of these programmes, as identified in the GSS report (1985) was "to change the relationship between citizens and sport. ... Sport is a right of citizenship that everyone should enjoy independently of gender and age" (p. 1). In the same report local government's role was described as essential if the programmes were to achieve the designated objectives. GSS suggested that every local authority should run the programmes but on the other hand adoption of the 'sport for all' message was optional (GSS, 1987). However, after its initial introduction in the municipality of Athens, the 'sport for all' programmes were adopted by a gradually increasing number of local authorities, as figure 6.9 illustrates.

Figure 6.9: 'Sport for All': Local government participation

![Bar chart showing local government participation in 'Sport for All' programmes from 1984 to 1990]

Note: Data for 1989 could not be retrieved.
Data from 1991 onwards do not exist.
In an extensive analysis of local government's role during the 1980s as a provider of leisure, Papageorgiou (1989) argued that local authorities' provision for leisure varied substantially. Although the analysis is related to leisure as a whole, including arts, culture and sport, it is worth taking into account the most important reasons for the uneven provision of leisure services among councils. According to Papageorgiou, there seems to exist a clear relationship between the priority given to local authority leisure policy and the political affiliation of the council's majority with central government, in this case the socialist government of PASOK. As the argument continued, socialist mayors attached considerable importance to leisure facilities and programmes, accepting the need for informal participation to sport. Furthermore, there were also great differences among councils concerning such issues as the amount of funds granted by central government and the extent to which sports policy was integrated into the social policy programme of local authorities. For instance, as noted in the same study, socialist controlled councils tended to make a quicker and fuller use of the opportunities provided by central government, as compared with councils controlled by an opposition party.

In addition, the quality of 'sport for all' services provided by local councils also varied according to the ability and willingness of local authorities to formulate a comprehensive policy for sport. The shortcomings were many due to a number of reasons; the haphazard way central funds were distributed, the reluctance of local authorities to invest in sports facilities, their reluctance to spend money from their regular budget for the expansion of sports provision, and their dependence on GSS for securing special grants (Papageorgiou, 1993).

Although in many cases, local government policy for sport was formulated in an incidental way, overall the effect of administrating the 'sport for all' programmes has been positive. Firstly, the programmes offered alternatives to sports participation through sports clubs and associations. Secondly, they prompted people to create an interest and explore new opportunities in sport, and finally, they created an awareness about the 'rights' of people for sport as a means for better quality of life (Papageorgiou, 1993). In fact, 'sport for all' programmes were accepted with enthusiasm shortly after their introduction (figure 6.10).
Although socially accepted, the programmes remained a campaign. The socialist government did nothing to safeguard these programmes by legislation (Nikitaras, 1990). The establishment by Presidential Decree (No. 77) of a new department within the GSS for the development of sport, as well as the acceptance of the need for the foundation of regional committees to run more effectively the programmes, articulated in the Preamble of the 1986 Act for the Prevention of Sport Violence (Panagiotopoulos, 1990), have not proved sufficient to ensure government's commitment to 'sport for all'. As such, the change of government in 1990 seemed to have adversely affected the 'sport for all' campaign. In addition to the great reduction in the number of participants after 1989, the reduction of money spent on 'sport for all' (figure 6.11), which seems to come as a consequence of the reduction of physical education instructors (figure 6.12) indicates that the importance of the programmes has faded away.

**Figure 6.10: 'Sport for All': Participation rates (1983-91)**

Source: GSS, Department of Sports Development, 1991

Note: Participation rate in 'sport in childhood' for 1991 is not included
Figure 6.11: GSS spending on 'Sport for All' in real terms 1987-92 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS, Department of Competitive Sport, accounts for the years 1987-92

Figure 6.12: 'Sport for All': Physical education instructors employed in the programmes (1986-91)

Source: GSS, Department of Sports Development, 1986-91
However, what seems to be obvious from the above figures is that, most of the programmes were not among the policy priorities for sport of the right wing government (1990-93), which seemed reluctant to sustain expenditure for 'sport for all' at the level established by its predecessor. The above policy came as no surprise since, in its pre-1989 election programme, New Democracy declared its intention to pursue a policy that would aim at enhancing the effectiveness of the above programmes allowing a reduction in the level of subsidy (New Democracy, 1987).

GSS and the National Governing Bodies of Sport

National governing bodies of sport are voluntary associations primarily responsible for the formulation of policy concerning the development of each particular sport, its competitiveness at home as well as abroad, the means for gaining public and state support, its relationship with the mass media, and decision making for all those contributing factors that can enhance the body's prestige. GSS role is restricted to the supervision and funding of sports bodies. Distribution of funds to NGBs is usually based on criteria such as the number of sports club-members, the international performance of individual clubs and/or the national teams, participation in or organisation of international tournaments, the level of expenditure for running the national and local leagues, the need for the development of a certain sport etc. However, it would be naive not to include to the above factors the pressures exerted, through political mechanisms or combined lobbying efforts, by most of the governing bodies in order to secure a substantial government grant.

Funding for the development of competitive sport has grown gradually up to the middle 1980s, and has been reduced dramatically since 1987, as a percentage of GSS budget (figure 6.13), which caused a severe declined in real terms (figure 6.14). Reduction of total GSS grant to NGBs since 1987 does not necessarily imply that all bodies of sport have faced a proportional reduction of funds granted by GSS. In other words, distribution of funds varied considerably among different bodies of sport. This appears to be the case for the period 1988 to 1993 where not all bodies of sport have suffered a reduction of their grants in real terms. However, the discussion of data concerning the distribution of funds to NGBs is only the first step to be taken for the understanding of mechanisms of GSS
policy towards the development of competitive sport. Unfortunately lack of data for an extended period of time (before 1988) is a restricting factor for drawing safe conclusions.

Despite the difficulties encountered at this stage of investigation, a number of observations can be made. Figures 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 present data on the subsidies granted to nine NGBs over the period 1988 to 1993, as a percentage of GSS total grant to national bodies. Figures 6.18 to 6.20 illustrate the grant received by GSS in real terms over the same period. The criterion for the selection of the above sports bodies was the fact that the above bodies' share of GSS funds allocated to NGBs was relatively considerable.

Figure 6.13: GSS grant to NGBs and sports associations as a percentage of its budget (1974-93)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1974-93
Figure 6.14: GSS grant to NGBs in real terms 1974-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1974-93

Figure 6.15: GSS grant to the NGBs of athletics and sailing as a percentage of its total grant to the NGBs (1988-93)

Source: GSS, Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93
Figure 6.16: GSS grant to the NGBs of volleyball, weight lifting, wrestling as a percentage of its total grant to the NGBs (1988-93)

Source: GSS, Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93

Figure 6.17: GSS grant to the NGBs of basketball, swimming, boxing as a percentage of its total grant to the NGBs (1988-93)

Source: GSS, Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93
Figure 6.18: GSS grant to the NGBs of athletics and sailing in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS, Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93

Figure 6.19: GSS grant to the NGBs of volleyball, wrestling, weight lifting in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS, Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93
The most striking feature of the figures is that the major reduction, both as a proportion of the amount allocated by the GSS to the NGBs and in real terms, has been suffered by the bodies of athletics and gymnastics as well as of sailing (figures 6.15 and 6.18). Even though no safe conclusion can be drawn, a number of issues could be addressed at this point. For instance, if international success (in cases success is measured according to the number of medals won) is meant to be the primary factor for the allocation of subsidies to NGBs, then the reduction imposed on the funds granted to the governing body of athletics and gymnastics in the year following the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, seems to be well justified. What is striking however, is the further reduction of the athletics body’s subsidy, following the most successful performance in modern Olympic Games by the Greek national athletics team in the 1992 Barcelona Games. Thus, a number of questions can be addressed such as: is the poor performance of athletics in the 1988 Seoul Games a sufficient reason for the reduction of its subsidy in the years 1988 to 1992? If so, what is the reason behind the continuous reduction of the body’s funds in the post-1992 period? One of the tasks of the empirical research is to unfold any
kind of relationships between the GSS and the NGBs, that might affect GSS decisions.

In other words, political affiliation or conflict between the GSS and the governing bodies of sport could be the factor that dictated the amount of funds allocated to the national sports bodies. In the case of athletics, the political sympathy, when PASOK was in power, and the conflict between the body's board and the GSS after 1989 seemed to be well documented, at least from the body's side. In a report, published in 1992 by the body of athletics and gymnastics there was a clear reference to the close cooperation between the body and the GSS before 1989. In the same report, it was also argued that the reason for the reduction of grants received after 1989, was the political hostility between the body's board (where the majority of its members belonged to PASOK) and the political leadership of the GSS at that time (New Democracy) (Renovating Movement of Greek Athletics, 1992).

On the other hand, the reduction of funds allocated to the body for sailing might due to administrative changes. The governing body of sailing had also been the organisation through which the funds for the 'sport for all' programmes were distributed. Diminishing government interest in the efficient operation of the above programmes and the introduction of 'sport in childhood' into the national curriculum have resulted in the funds granted to the sailing governing body being substantially reduced since 1988.

The governing bodies of volleyball, weight lifting, swimming, and wrestling have seen their grant reduced considerably since 1990, a year where the total grant distributed to the governing bodies fell both as a percentage of GSS budget and in real terms (figures 6.16, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20). However, only the NGB of swimming managed to retrieve its loss after 1990. On the other hand, although the body of boxing has seen its funds increasing both as a percentage of GSS total grant and in real terms, it still remains at the bottom of the funds scale (figures 6.17 and 6.20). The above issues however, and more importantly the case of the NGBs of athletics and sailing, have been set at the centre of case studies, and as such, research questions are intended to provide the analysis with explanations
given by key actors (i.e. chairmen of the NGBs' boards, and agents in the GSS).

However, the only NGB that managed to minimise the losses, that the rest of NGBs suffered soon after 1989, is the national body of basketball (figures 6.17 and 6.20). Basketball absorbs almost one fifth of total grant and its funds in 1991 were twice as much as in 1988, in real terms. It is also remarkable that the major increase accrued between 1988 and 1989, the years after the 1987 European Championship in Athens where Greece's national team won the gold medal.

Basketball and volleyball attracted ND government's attention not only as an area of increasing GSS funding but also as the only sports whose popularity and growing entrepreneurial prospects imposed the need for a new legislation to redefine the relationship between those two governing bodies and the state. The new act, brought to the Parliament in the summer of 1991 became the subject of political controversy between the two major parties. The new legislation was condemned by PASOK for its failure to take into account the infrastructure of 'sport for all', and for the government's attempt to pass over the governing bodies of basketball and volleyball by appointing a committee of entrepreneurs with responsibility to run the national leagues. This was seen as likely to result in the dictating of policies for the development of the above sports by commercial interests. New Democracy on the other hand, advocated the new legislation on the grounds of its effort to face the new challenge, brought about by the rapid expansion of business interests (mass media, advertising etc.), and the international success of individual clubs and national teams of those sports, by introducing the laws of free market.

Conclusion

The relationship between state and sport in Greece, is not a clear one. The state appears to play a role restricted to the supervision and funding of sport with all the means for the formulation of sports policy taken over by the governing bodies of sport. On the other hand, there is enough evidence to suggest that state funding of sport implies some sort of intervention in this field. Even though the Greek state has not exercised an overt and direct involvement in sport, policy and funding of sport
have become an area of government interest. As figures 6.5 and 6.7 illustrate, state spending for sport, although of little importance, increased gradually until the mid-1980s. In particular, the first term of the socialist party in office (1981-85) was the period when government expenditure on sport peaked in percentage terms, an increase that also resulted in a growing budget for sport in real terms. Since then, government spending for sport has been reduced both in relational and real terms.

Figure 6.21: GSS capital expenditure as a percentage of its budget (1960-92)

![Graph showing the percentage of GSS capital expenditure from 1960 to 1992.](image)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1960-92

However, what is remarkable is that data from GSS accounts seem to follow a certain pattern as far as the way GSS grants have been allocated. Thus, by comparing figures 6.21 and 6.22 to each other we note that where GSS spending for the construction and maintenance of sports facilities is relatively high, subsidies to governing bodies of sport are at a low level. What also seems to be clear is that after a period of sports infrastructure (until the mid-1980s), the majority of GSS allocation of funds was towards the provision of sport through sports clubs and associations. The direction of sports policy into the 1990s seems to be much different from that in the 1980s. The abandonment of the social objectives of 'sport for all' programmes, the reduction of government funds allocated to sport, the
shift of resources to the promotion of elite sport, and the introduction of commercialisation in the most popular sports are areas of change in sports policy, the results of which are still to be evaluated.

**Figure 6.22: GSS funding of NGBs as a percentage of its budget (1960-92)**

![Graph showing GSS funding of NGBs as a percentage of its budget from 1960 to 1992.](Image)

*Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1960-92*
CHAPTER VII

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN SPORT 1980-93
Introduction

The aim of the following three chapters is to present the analysis of the fieldwork conducted in Greece, generating primary data derived from interviews with key actors in the Greek sports field. The main issues to be addressed will be: a) the means through which political values have informed the policy goals in sport both under PASOK (1981-89) and ND administration (1990-93), b) the ways the direction of sports policy has been affected by the political and economic changes in the last two decades, c) the impact of some of the major transnational organisations on Greek sports policy, d) the multiple impact of those changes on key sports organisations (GSS, governing bodies of sport, local government) and individuals (board members of the sports federations, and sports clubs) in this field, e) the position and the response of those actors and agencies to the changing environment, and last but not least, f) the strategic relations within and beyond the institution of sport.

The main objective of this chapter is to proceed with the analysis of interview findings conducted at central government level only, with politicians from the two major parties (i.e. PASOK and New Democracy), and politically appointed bureaucrats in the GSS. The goals of the interviews at this level of sports policy formulation were:

first, to identify the respondents' view of the political values or ideologies represented within New Democracy/PASOK, and their relationship with sport;

second, to evaluate their perception of the impact on sports policy of changes of government;

third, to identify New Democracy/PASOK rationale for supporting Greece's Olympic bid, and to evaluate the impact on sports policy of the bid and of the failure to host the 1996 Olympic Games;

fourth, to investigate the relationship between central government and GSS as well as between the GSS and local government and the governing bodies of sport;
and fifth, to identify the Ministers'/General Secretaries' explanation of the nature of spending patterns for sport, as indicated by the national and GSS accounts, and their perception of specific developments in sport.

**Political Ideologies and Sport in Greece**

Before proceeding with the discussion of the political values of key actors in sport, it will be useful to provide a context in respect of the general ideological positions adopted by the political groups to which the above interviewees belong. This is not to suggest, however, that political ideologies are always the sole or even the principal determinant of sports policy, but rather that there are consequences for sport depending on particular ideological positions. The concept of political ideology employed in this chapter is meant to imply the framework of values and concepts that underlie the way society and state are interpreted. It should also be noted that the absence of a developed body of literature on ideology in Greek political parties, coupled with the 'inconsistency' in the parties' policies, makes the clarification of certain ideological positions in Greece a difficult task.

It has been argued that there are no ideologically rigid groups, in the modern Greek political scene, in the sense that, as Katsoulis (1990) has argued, both of the two major political camps, that of Right and Left, have tended in recent times to approach the traditionally liberal Centre. The Right considers economic liberalism, which is expressed as the right of individuals to pursue their interests in a free market, as the fundamental principle of modern society. The Left, does not reject the ideas of free market and profit, but simultaneously regards the protection of lower income groups and the even distribution of income as the main responsibilities of the state. As such, political parties in Greece, in an attempt to retain their electoral power, have tended to be 'popular' or 'multi-interest' political schemes. In that sense, both the major political parties which have monopolised government office since 1974, have adopted political measures which in many cases have been in conflict with what one might assume to be their ideological position.

New Democracy's ideological declaration in 1974 gave emphasis to the individual activity and the benefits of the free market (Kazakos, 1990).
Although generally in favour of the free market it also supported state intervention and the extension of state-controlled economic areas along with a mixed economy (e.g. the nationalisation of companies such as Olympic Airways, Public Transport Organisation, Trade Bank), seemingly in contradiction to typical liberal ideology (Kohler, 1982). Indeed, Clogg (1987) argued, that the ND government had espoused conservative (rather than liberal or neo-liberal) values and ideas. New Democracy identified the ‘nation’ as a single unified whole, and was committed to serving the ‘national interest’ standing above the ‘misleading’ labels of Right, Centre, and Left. As the decade of the 1970s moved to its close, the expansion of the state in the economy made necessary the re-orientation of the party’s ideological position. The Party declaration for the 1977 election made it clear that no further nationalisation would follow. The ideological re-orientation was completed in 1985, with a shift towards more economic freedom, and less emphasis on state bureaucracy and government intervention (Kazakos, 1990), which has been described as ‘Balkan Thatcherism’, because of its New Right orientation (Clogg, 1985).

Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who assumed the leadership of New Democracy Party in September 1984, declared the shift of the party’s ideology towards liberalism (Clogg, 1987). The pragmatic position of ND stressed the commitment to roll back the state and reduce the size of the public sector which had grown to a considerable level. New Democracy placed the individual at the focus of its concern and declared its intention of enhancing individual freedom. It also accepted a minimum role for the state in the economy, one of encouraging competition and combating monopolies, while the central economic role was to be played by market forces.

PASOK on the other hand, in its Declaration of Aims and Principles in 1974, described itself not as a party but as a movement (as its name implies), where national independence, social liberation and democratic processes were of a major importance. National independence stood above all, as a prerequisite for social liberation and political democracy. PASOK theorists insisted that irrespective of differences that might exist in Greek social stratification, common to all classes was the relationship of subordination to a small upper class which had emerged to act as an intermediary between foreign capital and national resources (Kohler, 1982).
However, in order to maximise its political influence PASOK changed its image from a movement of protest to a party able to govern, by redefining its strategy for a new approach to 'socialism'. Thus, the emphasis shifted from the socialist transformation of society to the need for comprehensive change, which was to be achieved by incremental reduction of inequalities, such as the redistribution of income and the reduction of inequalities in health, education, and welfare, covered by the general and vague term of 'allage' (change). But this was regarded as a radical departure from what socialism in Western Europe had traditionally been associated with, and many would define the party's nature as populist (Clogg, 1985).

Populism, in terms of ideology, is defined as a particular way of presenting social reality, in the sense that it seeks to mobilise not a specific class but the people or the masses in general (Lyrintzis, 1989). According to Lyrintzis, PASOK's populism was achieved through the exploitation of popular elements that had a strong appeal to individuals, i.e. the capitalisation on the division between privileged and non-privileged, the tendency to simplify all social and political divisions, and the identification of all social problems as the result of their opponent's policies. However, it would be mistaken to consider PASOK's populist character as an isolated element of Greek political and social life. The emergence in Greek society, of the self-employed as a considerable part of the working population, the size and significance of the hidden or informal economy in Greece, the leading role of the state as the provider of economic and social goods, and the weak position of the industrial working class are all factors fostering the development of populism (Clogg, 1985; Lyrintzis, 1990).

Although a clear ideological difference between the two major political parties emerged through the interviews, the ideological flexibility of political orientation was evidenced, at least for the Party of New Democracy, in the interviews with two New Democracy Ministers of Sport, in the sense that no distinctive line between liberal ideology and conservative values was identified in the arguments of the above individuals. The argument for limited state intervention in this field was mixed with the belief that government provision of sports opportunities was justified on the grounds of the benefits derived from sport. Those justifications might range from the intrinsic and educational values of sport, to nationalistic purposes.
In the first instance, limited state involvement was strongly advocated; "the sports movement should be kept away from state intervention ... and greater autonomy should be granted to sports governing bodies" (Minister of Sport, 1992-93, to be referred as ND Min. 1992-3), and sport was recognised;

as an autonomous institution ... New Democracy advocates a limited role for the government in this field. There should be drawn a distinctive line between state and sport. The government has to specify the limits of its responsibility which include the funding of the sports movement and provision of sports opportunities, and ensure that the sports legislation is applicable to all (Minister of Sport, 1991-92, and Chairman of the New Democracy Committee for Sport, referred as ND Min. 1991-2).

Even though limited state intervention was advocated, many reasons could justify state support for sport; "one of the reasons for state support for sport is obviously for sport's own sake. Another reason is the positive image of our country that sport can promote abroad. But beyond these, the main reason is the potential for sport to help form disciplined citizens ... to form good characters" (ND Min. 1991-2). Any kind of government involvement in this field should take into account that "sport is a means for expressing the state's concern for the youth and not a tool to be used by political parties".

While limited state involvement in sport is perhaps the major claim for New Democracy politicians interviewed, it is the notion that sport is a right of citizenship which appears in the arguments of the interviewees from PASOK side. The main value shared by all three PASOK MPs (e.g. the Minister and the General Secretary of Sport for the periods 1985-88 and 1981-85 respectively, and the General Secretary of the Party's committee for sport), was their focus on the need for state's social intervention through sports provision. This principle was expressed in a number of statements with phrases such as "physical exercise is a right of citizenship ... and state financial support to sport is granted for its merits for a healthier population" (General Secretary of PASOK committee for sport, to be referred for the rest of this chapter as Gen. Sec. of PASOK), or "community participation was at the centre of PASOK policy" (General Secretary of Sport, 1981-85, to be referred as PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5), and "PASOK placed a strong emphasis on the cultural, human and social elements of sport ... sport is a right of citizenship that reinforces the state's obligation to provide sports
opportunities" (Minister of Sport, 1985-88, to be referred as PASOK Min. 1985-8).

However, it is not only the notion that sport is a public good but also a whole range of extrinsic and intrinsic values attributed to sport that according to PASOK interviewees, require state funding and provision of sport. Among these, the educational value of sport and its contribution for a better quality of life were common to the interviewees' perceptions of the reasons for state support for sport. Furthermore, sport should also be supported for its extrinsic values; "as a means to prevent youngsters from all kind of abuses" (PASOK Gen. Secr. 1981-5); or in order "to observe and collect data that give the opportunity to record the progress, the potential and the problems among youth in specific areas ... Also, in the state's effort to provide a way out, not only for the youngsters' but for everyone's surplus energy, sport can offer the ideal solution" (PASOK Min. 1985-8).

State intervention in this field was perceived by PASOK politicians in a different way from their successors in office; "the state should express the need of the whole society on the one hand, and on the other, it should promote private initiatives that may arise" (PASOK Min. 1985-8). Individual activity was not a central concern of government policy in terms of promotion but rather was the focus of state policies for control;

the state has to serve the cultural potential of sport. In doing so, it should get involved where there appear to be phenomena, arising from private activity, that can destroy the cultural aspect of sport. This kind of intervention should be in such a way that expresses the social opposition to those phenomena (PASOK Min. 1985-8).

However, the arguments concerning the state's role and its intervention in sport, constituted the main points of differentiation between the parties of New Democracy and PASOK. The latter's political values for sport were taken by ND politicians to imply "greater involvement in sport" (ND Min. 1991-2), which eventually "attempts to control the sports organisations for political purposes" (ND Min. 1992-3). On the other hand, the socialist intervention of PASOK was contrasted with ND ideology, perceived by PASOK members as promoting "the economic and professional interests of entrepreneurs in this field" (PASOK Min. 1985-8), and setting the "creation of
a 'star system' and profit at the centre of its policy" (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5).

Sports Policy Goals in the 1980s

PASOK's strong emphasis on the social goals of sports provision were expressed through the introduction of 'sport for all' programmes. Among others, the programmes intended to serve the needs for sports participation of relatively disadvantaged groups, such as women; "since women rarely participated in sport after leaving school" (PASOK Min. 1985-8, PASOK head of GSS Department of Competitive Sport 1985-88, referred as PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8), the elderly, people with special needs. However, the party's social objectives for sport had been refined through time, as the interviews made clear. The policy objectives of the successive PASOK governments, as expressed by interviewees who served in key posts in the Ministry and the General Secretariat of Sport, seemed to depart from the elementary meaning of social provision through sport. While the policy goals of the first PASOK government (1981-85) aimed predominately at widening the basis of sports participation, the objectives of the sports leadership subsequently shifted to the support of competitive and high performance sport. But even in the early years of PASOK administration, there was not a clear conceptualisation of the distinction between sports provision for the community and development of competitive sport. Such statements as "mass sport is entirely different from competitive sport" were mixed with the belief that, "you cannot develop high performance sport without having created a considerably wide basis of participation" (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5). As such, the policy goal of the first PASOK administration was twofold; "to make a new proposal for life, by making thousands of people participating actively in sport ... and to support sports clubs which is the key for the growth of competitive sport" (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5). In other words, while mass sport was supported as an end in itself in its early years, the rationale for sport for all seemed to have shifted, and emphasis was placed on mass sport as a means to serve the needs of success at the competitive level.

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1 The creation of a 'star system' is taken to mean the emphasis placed on high competitive sport for its commercial values as opposed to the social objectives of sports provision.
State involvement in sport was conceived as part of the socialist party's policy of social intervention in Greek society. This view was also shared by the head of the 'sport for all' committee at that time (also a PASOK member); "the corrupted sports model, with doping and hooliganism could only be countered by the right education of all those around sport. We wanted to pass the message that participation and effort in physical exercise could become the basic elements of a new sports model". As such, sport was supported for its own sake; "in order to give children the pleasure derived from participating in sport, and offer the opportunity for physical exercise to women who were restricted to the role of house-wife" (head of 'sport for all'), for its educational value; "a young child learns that success comes not as the result of individualism or selfishness but through co-operation ... sport creates free minds who struggle for their demands and compete in order to succeed", and also as a means to prevent youth from several abuses; "sport cannot co-exist with drugs, or vagrancy, and robbery" (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5), and "it is (provision of sport) quite important for the fight against drugs abuse" (head of 'sport for all' committee).

Widening the basis of sports participation made necessary state investment in sport which increased significantly during this period (up to the mid-1980s), as shown by the data from the State Ordinary Budgets (see figures 6.5 and 6.7). The sports institution managed to strengthen its position at central government level by virtue of its merits as part of the socialists' welfare provision and enjoyed major support by PASOK through the appointment, as Minister of Sport and Youth, of a new political 'rising star', a member of the Party's Central Committee. In addition to increased direct state funding, it was claimed that sport had been further benefited since;

before 1982, sport was entirely financed from football pools and never from the state budget. The Minister of Finance considered it necessary to bring money from football pools into the state budget and then to subsidise sports initiatives (facilities construction etc.) through the GSS. ... There was a great argument between the Junior Minister of Sport and the Minister of Finance ... and our great achievement was that football pools revenues were no longer subject to control from the Ministry of Finance (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5).

Increasing government investment in sport in the first half of the 1980s "was the result of a certain policy supported by the government, that placed increasing emphasis on sport" (PASOK Min. 1985-8). However, 'the new
Central Government Involvement in Sport 1980-93

The proposal for life as described above, required two distinctive capitals; one for the introduction of 'sport for all' programmes, and the other for the construction of sports facilities. The implementation of mass sports participation programmes could immediately be undertaken at minimum cost, since in its initial stage it was introduced in the municipality of Athens and was not expanded until 1985 (see figures 6.9 and 6.10). Therefore, the major GSS investment at that period was directed towards capital expenditure, as illustrated by the curve of capital investment which exhibits high values in that period (figure 6.8). Increasing capital was invested in:

the building of sports facilities, including the completion of Olympic Stadium in Athens and Peace and Friendship Stadium in Piraeus. Those two large scale facilities absorbed the majority of the amount invested by the GSS in sports facilities. Furthermore, many indoor sports halls, football pitches, athletics tracks, were also built during that period (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5).

The construction of facilities was financed from football pools revenues which were steadily increasing, and the funds from the programme of public investments which reached a peak in 1985 (figures 7.1 and 7.2).

Figure 7.1: GSS revenues from football pools in real terms 1980-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: Organisation of football pools, accounts for the years 1980-93
Figure 7.2: GSS funds from the public investments programme in real terms 1980-93 (at 1981 prices)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1980-93

Figure 7.3: State direct funds to GSS in real terms 1980-93 (at 1981 prices)

Source: Ministry of National Economy, State Budget for the years 1980-93
Extensive government spending for sport could not be sustained in a period when the introduction by PASOK of the economic ‘stabilisation programme’ required greater control on public spending, as a means to reverse the decline in the Greek economy. As such, direct government grant to GSS after 1985, fell to levels that could only be compared with those established before the late 1970s (figure 7.3). In addition, the second major GSS source of funds, that of public investments programme, followed the same pattern.

The withdrawal of government investment in sport, during the first years of PASOK’s second term in office (1985-89), was justified by the Minister of Sport in that period, on the grounds that “through a policy of increasing football pools revenues, we managed to have substantial extra revenues that were directed exclusively to the GSS, according to the existing legislation ... Once the Ministry of Finance realised that we had the potential to get extra money, it started to reduce the state’s contribution”. But it is not clear whether increasing football pools revenues resulted in the reduction of the government’s contribution to sport or, if the policy for increasing sports revenues from other sources came as a response to the reduction of government’s direct funding of sport (imposed as part of the ‘stabilisation programme’). The latter scenario was promoted by the head of GSS Department of Competitive Sport in 1985-88 (member of PASOK, appointed directly by the Junior Minister of Sport). As such, since “confrontation with the Minister of Finance could only bring less money through the state budget” (PASOK Min. 1985-8), “we had to find the funds for developing the appropriate sports infrastructure. That is why we started a great effort to increase revenues from football pools” (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8). It can therefore be argued that the institution of sport was no longer enjoying its high position within the government’s priorities, due also to the deterioration of the Greek economy in the middle of the 1980s, which made the reduction of public spending on non-sensitive areas of government investment inevitable.

The second main source of GSS funds, the programme of public investments, was also reduced in a similar way. This amount which “was decided after a series of meetings with the Ministry of Finance”, was reduced, and included only the “funds for small and medium scale facilities”. The responsibility for the construction of large scale facilities was held by the new established Executive Committee of the 1996 Olympic Games;
in 1986, a new legislation prescribed the means for the funding of the programme for the 1996 Olympic Games preparation, directly from football pools revenues. A new board was established, the Executive Committee of the Olympic Games, that conducted the Olympic campaign and simultaneously allocated resources to several programmes - for mass and competitive sport - and to the construction of facilities. ... Members of the HOC and the municipality of Athens were also participating in this committee, ... which was exclusively responsible for the organisation of, and the campaign for, the 1996 (Olympic) bid (PASOK Min. 1985-8).

The Challenge of the 1996 Olympic Bid

Evidence from interviews suggest that Greece’s Olympic bid for hosting the 1996 Games was perceived, by the majority of interviewees, as the driving force of the national sports policy in the second half of the 1980s. Both major political parties (PASOK and ND) supported the nation’s bid for the 1996 Games for historical and emotional reasons “for the celebration of the hundredth anniversaries from the rejuvenation of modern Olympic Games” (ND Ministers 1991-2 and 1992-3, PASOK Min. 1985-8). But this was not the only reason since the interviewees’ emphasis was also placed on the “social, economic and athletic benefits derived from such an event” (ND Min. 1992-3). Through the Olympic bid;

we managed to get together the whole nation. It was not a choice followed only by the party’s supporters but a movement followed by the whole of Greek society. ... A wide social consensus, that had a historical basis, was a reality. This consensus promoted sport to its completion. ... A supreme performance, in terms of organisational success, would promote a positive image of our country abroad. Apart from that, we wanted to have a good performance in the sports side which in a sense would satisfy the political goals in relation to sport (PASOK Min. 1985-8).

The view that the Games were a great opportunity for the country to promote its image abroad was also shared by the ND appointed General Secretary of Sport (1989-91); “ND supported the bid since it would set Greece at the centre of the world”. Apart from the promotion of Greece’s position in the international environment, the organisation of the Games was regarded by both sides as a great opportunity for the country to improve the transport and telecommunication networks, a view that was deemed as one of the reasons
for the political parties' support of the bid (ND Min. 1992-3, PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8).

At central government level, the prospect of hosting the 1996 Games seemed to have inspired the policy priorities for sport. As such, there was "a political and social dynamic, ... a ten-year horizon, and at the end of it the most prestigious sports event, the Olympic Games in Greece" (PASOK Min. 1985-8). The policy followed at that period "was based on a ten-year programme (1986-96) which aimed at the preparation, physical and human, organisational and athletic, of our country for the 1996 Olympic Games" (PASOK Min. 1985-8). The 1996 bid was argued to be the driving force behind physical infrastructure; "after reviewing the IOC file, which specifies the necessary facilities for the Games, we concluded that by the end of the 1980s we had completed 80% of the facilities in need" (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8). However, data from state accounts illustrate that direct capital investment in sport (e.g. funds from the public investments programme) was granted not until 1989 by the coalition government, and reached a high level in 1990, the year of the IOC nomination of the 1996 Olympic city (figure 7.2).

In terms of athletic preparation, substantial steps were taken as a means to increase the country’s athletic competence. The programme of 'sport in childhood' was integrated in a process that took place as "a screening system in schools that identified sports giftedness at an early age ... and would feed in the future the field of competitive sport" (PASOK Min. 1985-8). At the higher level of athletic performance, both the Minister and the head of GSS Department of Competitive Sport in 1985-88, clarified their objective for strengthening competitive sport through scientific support and the creation of closer links between the national governing bodies of sport and the international environment. In the line of this policy the Ministry of Sport "established the National Centre for Sports Research, ... and signed seventeen international agreements with several European and other countries, ... aiming at proceeding to the exchange of advanced scientific knowledge in sport" (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8).

The policy of promoting Greece’s Olympic bid seemed to have created a fertile ground for the cultivation of forms of corporatism 2 between central

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2 Corporatism at central government level is defined as: 1. the "relations between government and key interest groups especially big business and trade unions, involving:
government and the national governing bodies of sport, being evidenced in the;

organisation of 25 World and European Championships ... and the encouragement (by the GSS) of Greek bodies to develop a kind of relationship with European and international federations in order to promote the Olympic effort. As part of this effort we supported Greek candidates in a number of international sports bodies (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8).

Through the preparation for the 1996 Olympic bid, many of the NGBs had the opportunity to establish or enhance their status within the sports structure; "there have been some events that have established the position of our body" (Chairman of Cycling), or "apart from the promotion of our sport within the country, the image of our NGB is positively promoted in the international field" (General Secretary of Fencing), and "public interest is attracted by such an event, and through mass media coverage, success is promoted in such a way as to have a positive influence on the development of this sport" (Chairman of Athletics and Gymnastics). The organisation of prestigious single-sport international events brought also a number of benefits for the respective NGBs, which ranged from greater chances for athletic success, to higher state grants.

Greece's failure to host the Olympic Games in 1996, was argued by all interviewees at central government level, both politicians and party appointed bureaucrats, to have a multiple impact on the Greek sports scene. This impact was seen as being more severe by PASOK members and particularly by the Minister of Sport in 1985-8 who claimed that "a whole preparation, a whole movement, social and athletic, has been abandoned". By contrast, common to most of the interviewees at non-governmental areas of sports policy was the belief that, the 'ten year programme' inspired by the political leadership of sport, was never felt at the lower levels, and as such the failure to host the Games did not seem to have any impact as far as sports development was concerned.

(a) *intermediation* - bodies standing between the state and the individual citizen negotiate agreements with the government on behalf of their members

(b) *incorporation* - the possession of a special status by these organisations, so that, in some respects, they become virtual extensions of government, 2. wide social agreement on the value of social partnership, compulsory membership of trade unions and employers organisations, and effective co-operation between capital and labour (Jary and Jary, 1991, pp. 122-3).
However, it became clear from the interviews at all levels of sports policy in Greece (e.g. governing bodies administrators, local politicians and chairmen of sports clubs), that the nomination of Atlanta for hosting the 1996 Games resulted in the withdrawal of governments' investment in sports facilities. The view that major state support for sport would come as a consequence of Athens' nomination, was a common element in the statements of the above individuals. The ND Minister of Sport in 1991-2 provided a detailed plan for the construction of sports facilities, mainly in the wider area of Athens, in case Greece had won the bid;

there was a long term plan for our preparation for the Games, that was aiming at the transformation of a large area ... into a sports area including many indoor and outdoor facilities. Obviously, at the present time this kind of investment is not an immediate need for our athletes not even for the community. Consequently, the failure to host the Games affected the government's plan for large scale investment in sports facilities ... which are beyond the needs of the community in Athens and also require a vast amount of money for their maintenance3.

It is rather debatable however, taking into account the opposition's view, whether those facilities would be beyond the needs of the community; "all this system of substructure would be needed, even in case we failed to host the Games, as a means to host an activity (mass participation) that was supported by the state's policy and resources" (PASOK Min. 1985-8).

From PASOK to New Democracy; The Impact of the 1990 Government Change on the Nature of Sports Policy

The contradictory arguments, as expressed above, reflect a policy shift in sport that followed the change of government in 1990. At this point however, discussion is limited to information derived from interviews with key actors of sports policy at central government level, since a more detailed discussion of the impact of the political change in 1990 on the nature of sports policy, as it was perceived by interviewees at national and local level, will follow in ensuing chapters. All interviewees serving in central government posts accepted that there was a shift in sports policy direction following the change

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3 Recent research has (Lagiou, 1994) has shown that the facilities used for the 1991 Mediterranean Games, which required a vast amount for their maintenance, have been closed down since then.
in government office in 1990. For PASOK members this change brought about a new philosophy in sport, which was characterised by the great emphasis placed on the commercial values of sport and the abandonment of the social objectives of ‘sport for all’ programmes. ND government’s withdrawal of support to ‘sport for all’ (evidenced in figures 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12) came as a consequence of the party’s position favouring limited state involvement in the sports field. The social objectives of the programmes were replaced by the need “to increase the number of children participating in sport since this is a prerequisite for competing successfully at top level in the future” (ND Min. 1991-2).

Reduction of participants was rather attributed, by the head of GSS Department of Sports Development (1991-), to the need for increasing administrative efficiency of GSS;

since 1989 or 1990 the Ministry of Education has exclusively taken over the responsibility for running the programme of ‘sport in childhood’, and as a result our department has extended its activities into other areas. Sports programmes in schools absorbed a vast amount of money, and left GSS with a small amount to be spent on programmes that were among its first priorities, like physical activities for other groups. Therefore it might appear that the number of participants has been reduced, but essentially participants targeted by our department have increased.

ND members’ statements however, suggested that ‘sport for all’ programmes were not included among the priorities of ND policy. The objectives of ND administration, as stated by the ND General Secretary of Sport in 1989-91, and the head of GSS Department of Competitive Sport (1989-93), showed a clear favouritism towards the promotion of high performance sport; “the main objective was the separation of professional from amateur sport ... and the professionalisation of basketball, ... that ... would attract huge economic interests”. Those objectives mediated the new legislation for sport, introduced by ND government in 1991, which “set the basis for the professionalisation of basketball and volleyball, the modernisation of football management and the minimisation of government control over the sports organisations” (ND Ministers of Sport, 1991-92 and 1992-93). The latter was regarded by ND members to be the major point of differentiation between PASOK’s and ND’s policy on sport.
For ND politicians and party members, the policy of increasing state support for sport followed by PASOK in the period 1981-89, was prompted by the need to 'interfere' and eventually control the sports organisations (mainly the NGBs); "PASOK's aim was to control the sports movement by controlling the sports governing bodies and clubs" (ND Comp. Dep. 1989-93). This issue will be discussed in depth in the following chapter. The need however, for greater autonomy of the NGBs was not taken to imply complete withdrawal of ND government involvement in sport. A kind of government intervention was thought to be essential for the implementation of the new government's goals for sport;

governmental change affects the position of the Minister and General Secretary of Sport. In addition, the head of the GSS Department of Competitive Sport is subject to change because this is a sensitive area where government policy can be identified. This department is the only way through which the GSS has the potential to intervene with the policy of the governing bodies of sport and implement the government's policy (ND Min. 1991-2).

New Democracy's aim however, was to "achieve a positive climate and avoid any confrontation with the governing bodies" (ND Comp. Dep. 1989-93). A confrontation that was eventually caused by "the reduction of GSS grants to NGBs which was inevitable from the time GSS revenues from football pools were also reduced" (ND Comp. Dep. 1989-93). The subsidies to the national governing bodies of sport in real terms, remained at a very low level in the three years of ND administration (see figure 6.14), even though its percentage of GSS expenditure increased considerably in the same period (figure 6.13). As stated by the ND Minister in 1992-3 "a slightly increasing emphasis should be placed on the subsidies to sports governing bodies. The reason is that sport can exist with average sports facilities but certainly cannot exist without sports governing bodies or clubs". But the explanation given by the ND General Secretary of Sport in 1989-91, implied that this shift of GSS expenditure was merely the result of PASOK's policy of heavy capital expenditure; "many facilities were built, including a great number of sports halls and swimming pools, especially in the wider area of Athens, which adequately cover the needs of sport". Investment in large scale sports facilities continued to absorb a large amount of the public investments programme in the first year after the failure of Greece's Olympic bid, due to the large number of facilities that had already been under construction. As noted, "according to the sports facilities in progress, there was a source from the
programme of public investments, which was decided and approved by the Ministry of Finance. ... For the rest of the facilities, the small scale ones, the necessary capital was drawn from football pools revenues" (ND Gen. Sec. 1989-91). Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate however, that funds granted to sport from the public investments programme were substantially reduced in 1992 and 1993, which alongside the decline of football pools revenues, could be seen as indicative of the government’s withdrawal from investment in sports facilities.

This kind of investment would require a vast amount of money, in a period when the Greek economy was in deep recession. The ND government’s intention was to reduce government spending, to place greater control on public expenditure and keep for itself a minimum role in the economy which was to be driven by market forces. As a consequence, the continuous reduction of government direct grant to the GSS intensified after 1989. It was claimed by the ND Minister of Sport (1991-92) however, that reduction of GSS direct state funds was simply meant to continue the policy of the former PASOK government. The explanation offered by both ND Ministers, for the government’s withdrawal of financial support to sport, was the increase of football pools revenues, which was claimed to be the “main source of funds, since the amount granted directly by the state is only a small percentage of the state budget”. However, figure 7.1, showing GSS football pools revenues, cannot be taken as fully supporting the above argument, since football pools revenues decreased in 1990, after the government’s decision to cut the GSS share from 37 to 29 percent of total football pools revenues.

The decline of football pools revenues and the cut off of direct government subsidy to sport, made necessary the introduction of a new lottery game “as a means to increase not only sports funds but most important, state sources of revenues” (ND Gen. Sec. 1989-91). But this amount was also subject to the government’s reduction of public spending and its effort to increase its own sources of funds; “GSS funds from the lottery game decreased from 29% to 15% of the total revenues, after the Ministry of Finance’s proposal. The above decision came as a consequence of the crisis of Greek economy” (ND Min. 1991-2). The above statements could be taken to imply that withdrawal of direct state funding of sport was part of the ND government objectives to cut off public spending, especially in areas where weak opposition (mainly from the respective Ministers) would be met (with sport being one of them).
However, even though sport did not appear to be among the government's priorities for the period 1991 to 1993, after "consistent efforts from the Ministry of Sport, we managed to include sport in the second Delors' programme, which meant that sport would be funded with 50 billion drachmae (£147 million) in the period 1993-4 to 1998-9 from the European Community. The above amount will be used entirely for the construction of sports facilities" (ND Min. 1991-2). European Community funds are likely to "release GSS resources for investment in small scale facilities, while the construction of large facilities will be funded from the second Delors' package" (ND Min. 1991-2).

Shortly after the interviews at central government level were conducted, PASOK returned to government office (October 1993). Consequently, those interviews were focused on the 1990 government change. However, an account of PASOK's pre-election goals for sport was offered by the General Secretary of the Party's committee for sport. Although these accounts may appear to extend beyond the designated period of investigation, they are relevant to the scope of this analysis, in the sense that they provide an insight into the investigation of the issue of the impact of government changes on sport. The main objectives of PASOK policy for sport, as specified by the General Secretary of the Party's committee for sport almost a year before the election, focused on the "the reformation of sports legislation in the light of recent developments ... and the need for a national planning for sport that would be the result of corporatist decisions". Those points seemed to be the main aims of the new political leadership of sport as appeared in the Minister's and General Secretary's press conference statements:

the Hellenic Olympic Committee will be the agency which, in co-operation with the sports leadership will plan the sports policy to be implemented in co-operation with the NGBs. The HOC will also be responsible for the governing bodies' and sports clubs' subsidies. The sports leadership will assume the responsibility for supervising the sports movement and implementing the policy on facilities construction. A committee will be responsible for the national sports planning which will be announced at the beginning of the year following the Olympic Games and will last for four years (TA NEA, 29/12/1993, p. 61).

This position however, was to be the main source of debate in the 1994 National Congress for Sport, organised by PASOK's committee for sport. The key differentiation between the pre-election objectives and the decisions taken
in the congress concerned the issue of the withdrawal of government control over sports institutions and the strengthening of the sports organisations' autonomy. As pointed out by the General Secretary of the committee "it is beyond the role of the state to determine the way administrative problems within the governing bodies of sport are to be solved. We believe that the formulation of a national policy for sport is the responsibility of the governing bodies, the sports associations and the Hellenic Olympic Committee" (Fouras, 1994, p. 8). The controversial issue on the enhancing role of the HOC was eventually overcome by the decision for the establishment of a new agency, the National Sports Planning Board. This agency will consist of the Minister and the General Secretary of Sport, one member of the Scientific Centre for Sports Research and representatives of mass sport and the governing bodies of sport. This organisation, according to the congress declaration, will assume the responsibility for the allocation of subsidies to the governing bodies of sport. Alongside with the decision for the establishment of the above agency, the congress proceedings concerning the new legislation for sport, showed a kind of concern for the transfer of sources and responsibilities to local government, the establishment of an organisation for sport for the community, and the establishment of a new sports governing body for people with special needs.

Last but not least, a major consideration of the members of Congress and the political sports leadership was the issue of abolishing governments' control over the NGBs and sports clubs, and enhancing the sports movement's independence from political control. This kind of consideration was expressed by the Party's Secretary of sport who pointed out that "there is neither plan nor defined goals for sport and therefore the institution of sport is now (under ND administration), governed by partisan policies and government interference". The issue however, of government control over the sports organisations had also been raised in the interviews with New Democracy politicians and party members. More surprisingly, the ND General Secretary of Sport from 1989 to 1991, explicitly admitted the existence of government control over the voluntary sports organisations; "the General Secretariat of Sport is the only governmental agency which has no other role but intervention. To intervene in what starts, takes place and is completed in the field of the governing bodies of sport". This issue however, will constitute a central theme of discussion in the remaining chapters.
CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL CONTROL AND CLIENTELISTIC RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNING BODIES OF
SPORT IN GREECE
Introduction

Interviews with sports governing bodies' administrators essentially aimed at; a) identifying the individuals' perception of policy changes in sport in the period of research attention, b) investigating the position of individuals and organisations within the sports structure and the process of decision making, c) identifying the factors that might have resulted in changing relations between the respective organisations and other sports agencies (i.e. GSS, sports clubs), and d) exploring the individuals' apprehension of significant issues such as the impact on the respective body of the organisation of major events and the achievement of international success, and the body's relationship with other actors, namely the sports clubs. The central theme of this chapter will be the discussion of data serving the first three objectives, which are closely related to interview findings at central government level. Issues relating to the fourth objective will be discussed in the following chapter, which draws on data from sports clubs interviews.

It is important to stress at the outset of analysis of NGBs administrators' views, that many NGBs in Greece are commonly regarded as having a political leaning to one or other of the major parties, with some NGBs regarded as politically neutral. Such a state of affairs is almost inconceivable to those familiar with the Northern European tradition of a 'politically neutral' sports movement. Thus, the NGBs participating in the research, can be divided into those which are affiliated with PASOK party, those with close relationships with the party of New Democracy, and those for which there is no evidence to support any kind of relationship with either political group. This however, should not be taken to imply that by developing explicit links with either of the political groups, those governing bodies are bound with, and controlled by the respective parties. It rather means that key figures of those bodies' boards have identified themselves as members of a certain political group. On the other hand, political neutrality advocated by the rest of the governing bodies' administrators interviewed is taken to imply that key individuals participating in the research, have avoided declaring any kind of personal affiliation with political parties.

NGBs affiliated with political parties included the national federations of athletics and gymnastics, volleyball, weight lifting, wrestling, boxing, and fencing. This claim can be substantiated by the fact that the chairmen of
athletics and gymnastics, volleyball, and wrestling, and the general secretary
of weight lifting are members of PASOK committee for sport. Also, "the
governing body of boxing is considered to belong to ND ... since twelve out of
the fifteen members of its board belong to ND" (Gen. Sec. of Boxing
Federation) and, with reference to fencing NGB; "until 1989 there was an
appointed (by PASOK) board to the body, which was closely affiliated with
the political party in office (PASOK)" (former member of the body's board,
and currently chairman of Athenian Club of Fencing). Those bodies, the
chairmen of which expressed their neutrality in respect of political
developments in sport, included the national federations for cycling, sailing,
judo, karate and Tae Kwon Do. However, it is the task of the following
analysis to identify the position, and investigate the relations of all the above
bodies within the sporting and political structure.

Continuity or Change? The Impact of the Change of Government on Sport
as Perceived by NGBs Administrators

In exploring the individuals' perception of the sports structure, a major issue
of discussion concerned the impact of the 1990 government change on the
direction of sports policy. Most of the interviewees focused on the narrow
field of high performance sport and their perception concentrated on
government policy towards competitive sport, and the impact of
governmental changes on this field. This could be taken to imply that
competitive sport was the central focus of both PASOK and ND governments' 
policy, and that any changes in government policy, resulting from a change in
political control, would be reflected in this field.

Only four of the interviewees perceived government change as an influential
factor on the nature of sports policy per se. It was not a coincidence however,
that three of them were also members of political groups, and as such their
perception of the impact of the government change in 1990 on sport had
common elements with the views expressed by politicians and politically
appointed civil servants at central government posts. The members of PASOK
committee for sport, expressed their concern for "the lack of social objectives
and comprehensive plan for sports development which characterised ND
sports policy" (Chairman Wrestling). Consideration for the social objectives
of sport was also shared by the chairman of one of the politically neutral
bodies; "PASOK has always shown its preference to mass community sport.
Due to its political position it would be (after 1993) more inclined to sport for all, than ND" (Chairman Karate). On the other hand, government change in 1990 was seen as having resulted in less intervention by the government in the NGBs' affairs, which seems to relate with the traditional Conservative notion of independence of sport; "PASOK policy was always favouring its political friends. ... ND declared its intention to follow a less interventionist policy in sport which would be kept intact from partisan interests" (Gen. Sec. Boxing).

The notion however, shared by all governing bodies' administrators interviewed, was that changes in government office result in shifts of subsidies among different governing bodies and consequently, to the development, or not, of certain sports. This seemed to come as a consequence of; a) the heavy dependence of sports governing bodies on the state's financial support;

the governing bodies receive a subsidy allocated by the state. They have no potential to bid for grant-in-aid. Neither can they exercise pressure on, nor threaten the GSS, because they are non-profit administrative federations of the sports clubs, rather than unionist groups. Apart from that, they do not have their own sources. ... They receive an ordinary subsidy which is allocated from the state's ordinary budget and depend on football pools revenues for getting any extra financial assistance (ND Gen. Sec. 1989-91);

b) "the lack of any criteria for the assessment of sports governing bodies, which leave room for political or any other sympathies to mediate this process" (ND Min. 1991-2); and c) the policy of both political parties which aims to control the process of sports development; "the political leadership always intended to control the governing bodies. ... Every government aims at controlling the bodies for several political reasons" (Chairman of Karate Federation) and, "irrespective of the political intention, ... sport is used for the political parties' purposes" (Gen. Sec. of Boxing Federation).

National Governing Bodies of Sport and General Secretariat of Sport: Strategic Relations and Policy-Formulation

All the above factors were perceived as mediating the course of sports policy and affecting the bodies' relationship with the centres of decision making. The Greek sports context seemed to be structured in such a way as to provide the
means for the cultivation and proliferation of clientelistic relations between most of the NGBs and the governmental agency for sport (GSS)\(^1\). In other words, the lack of a comprehensive measure for NGBs' assessment, alongside the heavy dependence of the bodies on state resources, which constitute part of the structure of Greek sport, have bound sports institutions into a process where different individuals and groups, at certain points in time, are provided with opportunities to materialise their aspirations. The actors' level of access to those opportunities seemed to be in line with their position in the political structure and the means they hold to negotiate access to state resources.

The weak position of the governing bodies in bidding for state funds, was one of the factors perceived by interviewees as mediating the structure of sport. Bid for grant-in-aid was identified by NGBs' administrators, as a process of bargaining with the GSS; "we submit the budget and then we bargain with the GSS" (Sailing, Weight Lifting); "the budget we submit is subject to change, in the sense that there is always a bargain with the GSS" (Karate); "the technical service of the GSS has a contact with the body's representatives in order to discuss next year's budget, which takes the form of bargaining" (Volleyball). Only in one case, bid for grant-in-aid was perceived as a process of pressure exercised on the GSS; "we bid by every means, ... sometimes our pressure might reach announcements to the press" (Wrestling). In many occasions, bargaining takes the form of a "series of discussions and meetings between the governing bodies' representatives and GSS civil servants. ... Only in case of a major disagreement, or where the budget concerns a big body, the General Secretary or the Minister of Sport are involved in the meetings" (ND Min. 1991-2). All interviewees agreed that this process usually results in the reduction of NGBs' budget, which comes as a consequence of; "the GSS's financial situation" (Boxing, Sailing); or "because the bodies' budget is always higher than we actually need, since we know that the GSS will approve less than we ask for" (Karate, Sailing); or because "some issues which are

\(^1\) It should be stressed that the phenomenon of clientelism in sport is not encountered in the form common in the wider public sector. In the latter, clientelism is taken to imply provision of jobs to the government's electorate through appointments to the public sector. Recruitment of public employees in this sense, takes place through the political party's clientelistic networks by giving significant weight to criteria other than professional qualifications (Spourdalakis, 1988; Petmesidou, 1991). In the field of sport, characterised by the voluntary activity of NGBs and sports clubs, the cultivation of clientelistic relations might secure direct access to GSS decision making and resources.
mutually agreed are subject to change before they reach the Minister’s office for the final approval” (Volleyball).

The insecurity of the governing bodies is reinforced by the lack of a system of evaluation that would explicitly describe the criteria for the allocation of subsidies, which is the second major structural factor. Those criteria perceived as essential for the allocation of the bodies’ subsidies by most interviewees at central government (i.e. number of athletes and sports clubs, the bodies’ success in the international field, their administration expenses and the cost of running their leagues), were regarded only as one part of the evaluation process by NGBs’ administrators. In addition, decisions taken by the political leadership for the development and support of certain sports were considered to be equally important. This process of decision making seemed to be permeated by a number of inputs which might range from the sport’s potential for success and its appeal to the public, to personal and political factors that can dictate the outcome of decision making for the support, or otherwise, of a certain sport. This view appeared to be adopted by the majority of interviewees at NGB level. Success of the body in international competition was regarded in most cases, as an important factor for the allocation of grant-in-aid. However, personal and political sympathies between key figures of the bodies’ board and central government seemed to be also important. There were also interviewees who adopted more extreme views; “there are no criteria. What is missing is an evaluation by GSS of all governing bodies. ... I have the impression that the political position of the members of the bodies’ board is a very strong factor for the allocation of the bodies’ subsidies” (Volleyball); and “every governing body is subsidised according to its board, (that is) whether it (the board) is affiliated with the government or not. ... The body’s programme and success are of minor importance” (Athletics and Gymnastics). Only in one exceptional case, the allocation of subsidies to NGBs was described as being independent of any factors other than the government’s financial situation (Chairman of Judo).

Political control over the NGBs was argued to be exercised both by PASOK and New Democracy governments. As such, in the line of the argument put forward by the ND head of GSS Competitive Department that “PASOK’s aim was to control the governing sports bodies”, the General Secretary of PASOK committee for sport, by reference to ND administration, argued that the; “distribution of GSS funds was decided according to partisan interests”. This
Clientelistic Relations and Political Control over the Greek NGBs

was echoed by the PASOK head of GSS Competitive Department who supported that “there was a partisan policy at competitive sport expressed through selective distribution of funds to ‘friendly’ (politically) sports clubs, federations and governing bodies”. The above view was also common among NGBs administrators, who in many cases did not deny that the policy followed by the party they belonged to was also interventionist (at least as much as the opposition’s). The following comments illustrate this point;

during the PASOK government, the bodies’ autonomy was also restricted but at least there was a certain programme and planning for sport (Weight Lifting General Secretary and member of PASOK committee for sport);

and;

some governing bodies are subsidised on the basis of political criteria, and I have to note that this is not a recent phenomenon (Volleyball Chairman and member of PASOK committee for sport);

the former governments (PASOK) have followed the same rationale (Athletics and Gymnastics Chairman and member of PASOK committee for sport).

This was the case for both governments;

ND came in office and sometimes there was political intervention in the governing bodies’ affairs (General Secretary of Boxing Federation, affiliated with ND).

Political intervention cannot be claimed to be related with one or the other political party in particular. As it has been argued,

in 1982 there was a major change in sports policy, when the new government attempted to exercise political control on sport. ... It was inevitable that this line of policy would go on after 1990. Since PASOK had implemented a plan for controlling all sports clubs and governing bodies, inevitably the new government of ND followed the same method from the other side (former member of Fencing Federation).

At this point, it is necessary to refer back to the analysis of the Greek state, and point out Spourdalakis’ (1988) and Mouzelis’ (1986) argument, that the policy of increasing control over voluntary organisations was pursued by PASOK party during the 1980s, as a means to promote the party’s objectives in those areas. The above authors put forward the example of the National
Federation of Labour, and the arbitrary replacement of its leadership with PASOK party faithful as a means for mobilising public support for the party's labour policies.

This example matches the case of the NGB of fencing; “in November 1981, the political leadership of sport required the appointment of one of its faithful members as chairman of the body’s board. This kind of interference was a precondition for approving next year’s subsidy and eventually forced the legitimate body’s board to resign” (former member of Fencing Federation). PASOK policy to control a number of sports governing bodies had been explicitly stated by party members in the National Congress for Sport organised by PASOK; “the field of SEGAS (the national federation of athletics and gymnastics) became the main way for expressing PASOK’s policy for sport. Our group was based on the basic elements of PASOK ideology for independence, democracy, decentralisation and meritocracy” (Molyvas, 1994, p. 1). In the same congress, the chairman of wrestling NGB declared that;

as the first step for the democratisation and development of our sports (e.g. heavy sports), we managed to win the election in the governing bodies of wrestling and weight lifting and we had the means to control the governing body of boxing. ... The main negative point was the fact that we worked in isolation from each other, which in conjunction with a kind of partisanship, kept us away from many sports clubs. We had to realise that by confusing the political party with the wider field of sport we made a great mistake (Chamakos, 1994, pp. 4-5).

Parliamentary records also include statements concerning PASOK's effort to control the sports field; “first of all we have to eliminate the governing sports bodies' dependence on the state, which is used by governments as a means to secure their political support. Unfortunately, I have to admit that this relationship existed even during our own administration” (former PASOK Minister of Culture, Parliamentary Records, 1991).

The Position of NGBs in the Sports Structure: Clientelistic Relations and Practices

ND General Secretary of Sport in 1989-91, offered an insight in the way the GSS might influence the result in the governing bodies' election;
in many cases, particularly during a governing body's pre-election period, some sports clubs are granted with extra subsidy by the GSS, in order to vote for those candidates of a governing body's board who are faithful to the government. ... There are also occasions such as the body of basketball, and athletics and gymnastics, which are controlled by PASOK, and where elections have a 'political colour'. ... In case, for example, the GSS grants extra subsidies to 50 sports clubs, while there are 100 clubs with a right to vote, then there is an influence on the election result.

In order for the clientelistic relations between the government and a number of sports bodies to be sustained, key figures of the bodies' boards are granted access to decision making process at central level, which then secures the means for the materialisation of the individuals' and the bodies' objectives;

I was GSS consultant for heavy sports. There was a certain contact with the GSS and its departments. ... We were provided with athletic equipment, a number of indoor halls were constructed, a number of facilities belonging to sports clubs were maintained, all the training centres for the national team were enriched with sports equipment, and in general there was a close contact. This contact was completely cut off after 1990 (Chairman Wrestling).

The importance of those relations cannot be encompassed in the above statement. Wider implications for sports development and capital expenditure seemed to emerge, by considering that; "the need to develop certain sports dictated the decision for the construction of new facilities, which was a point of discussion with those bodies considered as of high priority" (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8). The same kind of relations was evidenced between the governing body of weight lifting (also affiliated with PASOK) and the GSS; "before 1990 there was a very close co-operation with the GSS. There was an exchange of opinions even with the General Secretary and the Minister on the development of weight lifting. ... After 1990 there was no co-operation at all. ... When the new government took over (PASOK in 1993), we asked for an appointment with the Minister and we were accepted the next day" (Gen. Sec. Weight Lifting).

Clientelistic relations might secure direct access to GSS resources which takes the form of; “extra subsidies\(^2\) granted to some governing bodies through

\(^2\) There are four different types of subsidies granted to NGBs; a) ordinary subsidy, allocated directly from GSS funds from the state budget, b) extra subsidy, c) subsidy for several reasons (i.e. athletic equipment, participation in international events, etc.), and d)
vague procedures" (Chairman Wrestling). Those "extra subsidies were granted in several ways, either through the executive committee for the organisation of major events, where the subsidies exceed the needs of the events, or under the label 'provision of sports equipment', granted to the same NGBs every year" (Chairman Wrestling). Although the above statements were made by reference to ND administration, it could be argued that, as a process, it is likely to be applicable to both PASOK and ND governments; "extra subsidies, financed from football pools revenues, are directed to the governing bodies and are not included in the ordinary GSS budget" (ND Gen. Sec. 1989-91); and "increasing football pools revenues gave us the potential to allocate extra money in agreement with governing bodies, sports clubs and local government" (PASOK Min. 1985-8).

Increasing GSS sources from football pools in the late 1980s, seemed to be absorbed by a certain number of governing bodies in the form of ordinary or extra subsidies. Clientelistic relations seem to acquire even more importance by considering a number of statements cited below, in the light of previous claims, made by most of the interviewees, that 'bargaining' with the GSS usually resulted in the reduction of the NGBs subsidies. As far as the NGBs of wrestling, weight lifting, and volleyball (all three affiliated with PASOK) were concerned, 'bargaining' with the GSS (while PASOK in power) resulted in massive benefits for the respective bodies; "we received whatever we claimed from 1985, the year we took over the body, to 1989 (the year of government change). In two occasions the government granted an amount which was higher than we had asked for" (Chairman Wrestling), or; "in 1989 we received 310 million dr. ... which was the amount we had asked for. And suddenly in 1990 the GSS and the political leadership, ... reduced this amount to 120 million prompted by the government's revengeful policy" (Gen. Sec. Weight Lifting), and; "in 1989 we had announced a five year development programme that was approved by the political leadership and as a result the state subsidy to our body reached a very high level. Following that year we suffered a major disaster" (Chairman Volleyball). Those arguments (illustrated also by figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4) can be contrasted with the case of non-PASOK-affiliated NGBs; "if you did not belong to PASOK, then you had a problem even if you did not belong to ND either. You needed the PASOK label in order to have access" (Gen. Sec. Boxing).
Figure 8.1: GSS subsidy to the NGB of wrestling in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93

Figure 8.2: GSS subsidy to the NGB of weight lifting in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93
Figure 8.3: GSS subsidy to the NGB of volleyball in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93

Figure 8.4: GSS subsidy to the NGB of athletics and gymnastics in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

Source: GSS Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93
The change of government in 1990 resulted in changes in the strategic relations between the above actors and groups and the governmental agency for sport. This change has not resulted in the cutting off of clientelistic relationships, but simply to their replacement with different actors at both ends of the chain. A number of other bodies emerged as the main beneficiaries of this change, and GSS financial support shifted to those bodies which, under PASOK, were excluded from access to state resources; “there was political intervention by New Democracy government as well, but those who belonged to ND party complained that they had not the opportunity to recover from the injustice suffered during PASOK” (Gen. Sec. Boxing). Exclusion from the process of decision making at central government level, and shift of resources, hit severely those bodies affiliated with the opposition (i.e. the NGBs of athletics, volleyball, wrestling, and weight lifting); “New Democracy government adopted a revengeful policy which reached its peak with the policy of subsidies to those bodies regarded as belonging to PASOK. ... In that way the GSS started reducing financial resources to the bodies of athletics, weight lifting, and wrestling” (Gen. Sec. Weight Lifting); “the previous government (ND) followed a selective policy in terms of subsidies, by making the distinction between ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. As a consequence, big bodies with major success, such as the bodies of basketball, athletics and gymnastics, volleyball, weight lifting, and wrestling suffered a financial disaster” (Chairman Volleyball); “government change adversely affected our body. ... In 1989 our budget was 580 million dr. and in 1993 it was only 425 million. Certainly this reduction had to do with the governmental change. Our board was not a favourite of the political leadership” (Chairman Wrestling).

Reduction of subsidies was not deemed to be merely the result of the government’s hostility towards those bodies, since a kind of consideration was also given to the availability of GSS resources, which made inevitable the reduction, after 1989, of the total amount granted to governing bodies in real terms (see figure 6.14); “there might be a direct relationship with the revenues of football pools and lottery games. ... In addition, the reduction of our subsidy came as the result of the negative change in our relationship with the GSS in 1990” (Technical Director of Weight Lifting Federation); and, “certainly there was a reduction of GSS resources, due to the reduction of football pools revenues, but our governing body along with four more bodies suffered a major reduction. The body of boxing for instance, where its chairman was
appointed as Deputy General Secretary of Sport had an entirely different treatment" (Chairman Volleyball).

Personal access, which sometimes might be independent from clientelistic relations and political control, was claimed to be another factor mediating the bodies' ability to improve their position in the institution of sport and make a fuller use of the opportunities provided by the sports structure. The examples of the governing bodies of athletics and gymnastics, boxing, and cycling, as emerging from the interviews, are intended to substantiate the above argument. In the case of athletics and gymnastics, political favouritism towards the bodies affiliated with the government of PASOK was not deemed as sufficiently securing the body's access to state resources; "the negative impact for our body started as early as 1989, when the former government (PASOK) was still in office (figure 8.4), caused by the reduction of our subsidy to 40% of that for the previous year. ... We have not identified the reasons of the above reduction. It may be attributed to personal rather than government choice" (Chairman Athletics and Gymnastics). On the other hand, not only political antagonism, but also the outcome of personal battles within the structure were considered as important for deciding access to the agency's resources;

during ND administration there was a close co-operation between the boxing federation and the GSS, since the chairman of our body was Deputy General Secretary of Sport. As such we had an easy access for arranging bureaucratic issues. ... Apart from that, there was not a particular favouritism from the GSS, even though we could secure a higher ordinary subsidy for our body (Gen. Sec. Boxing).

However, although ordinary subsidy to the boxing federation never reached extreme peaks, extra subsidies and subsidies for 'several' reasons exceeded the body's ordinary subsidy for the years 1990 and 1991, as figure 8.5 shows.

The ability of individuals to attract GSS resources for their NGBs, was not only explicitly admitted, but also considered as one of the most important factors for gaining access to state resources; "GSS subsidy is ... based on factors such as the number of participants in certain sports, the sport's development in Greece, and sometimes on personal as well as political influences. ... I served as Finance Director in GSS for 23 years, and I can assure
you that the relationship of a body with the GSS depends to a large extent on the public relations of the governing body’s chairman” (Chairman Cycling).

Figure 8.5: GSS subsidy to the NGB of boxing in real terms 1988-93 (calculated at 1981 prices)

- Ordinary subsidy
- Extra subsidy
- Subsidy for several reasons
- Subsidy for international events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MILLION DRACHMAE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GSS Department of Competitive Sport, 1988-93

However, most of the governing bodies’ relations within the sports structure were subject to change at the time interviews were conducted, which coincided with the period shortly after the 1993 election and the regain of power by PASOK Party. As it was to be expected, the 1993 government change was seen by certain bodies (i.e. athletics and gymnastics, weight lifting, wrestling, and volleyball), as an opportunity to recover from the financial restrictions placed on their budget by the previous government; “the GSS will show respect to our programme without a tendency of intervention” (Gen. Sec. Weight Lifting); “we now have a positive change in the sense that there is state interest towards the body of weight lifting” (Technical Director); “this year we are claiming 981 million dr. in order to recover from what we have suffered in the last four years” (Chairman Wrestling); “the new government has promised to support our programme, through which we will reverse the whole negative climate” (Chairman Athletics and Gymnastics); and; “we expect the new leadership to pay close attention to our sport in
order to recover from what we suffered in the last three years" (Chairman Volleyball). The financial difficulties encountered by the GSS were also a major consideration. For this reason, a selective policy towards the NGBs was advocated to be followed by the GSS, that would be prompted by the need to support those bodies “that have the potential to succeed at higher standard competition” (Chairman Volleyball). In this way, “all sports should be developed but some bodies, which have success at world level, should be given an extra help. For those bodies reduction of subsidies should be less severe” (Gen. Sec. Weight Lifting).

This kind of policy however, would be most likely to lead to the strengthening of the powerful and the weakening of the weak, in this case to the strengthening of the bodies affiliated with PASOK, since those bodies had achieved outstanding success at world competition (the gold Olympic medals in the 1992 Games for athletics and weight lifting, a series of medals in the 1993 Weight Lifting World Championship, the traditional world class performance of wrestling in Olympic Games and World Championships etc.). On the other hand, the low profile of sports governing bodies which are supposedly controlled by the opposition, along with the declared intention of the new government to withdraw from direct interference in the bodies’ affairs and the background of the new General Secretary of Sport, who served as General Secretary of Basketball Federation, were all deemed as important factors to guarantee a less partisan policy by the GSS towards those bodies; “there is political conflict particularly in professional sports such as football and basketball. The change of political leadership has a small effect on amateur sports” (Gen. Secr. Fencing), “judo ... is a small sport and as such it is not affected by governmental changes” (Chairman Judo), and;

in the governing body of boxing there was no political intervention even when PASOK was in office. Probably this was due to the fact that our body is beyond their interests, it does not belong to top priority governing bodies such as wrestling or football. ... Furthermore, the new General Secretary of Sport has been very successful as general secretary of the basketball governing body, and he will stand beyond partisan interests without being hostile to some bodies. I do not think that he will reduce some bodies' subsidies just because they belong to ND (Gen. Sec. Boxing).

Reference to data for the period after 1993, was meant to support the issue of clientelistic relations in the sports field, which was considered as standing between individual actors and agencies. The importance placed by most of
the interviewees on those relations, is indicative of the way the institution of sport is perceived. As such, for the analysis of a specific context (in this case the relations between the GSS and the NGBs), not only the structure but also the individuals' perception of the structure is considered as equally important. It can therefore be argued that, the way competitive sport is organised in Greece provides the means for the proliferation of clientelistic relations. For most of the interviewees, the form of sport is perceived as being shaped by the dependence of NGBs on state resources, the lack of an assessment procedure upon which allocation of subsidies will be based, and the tendency of both PASOK and ND governments to extend their political influence on the sports organisations. As such, the relations between agencies and individuals are subject to political power and control. Considerably important is also the fact that, individual actors and agencies seem to be bound in this process. Their perception that the outcome of battles within the sporting structure depends heavily on personal and political factors, which subsequently decide to a large extent the development or not of a certain sport, is largely reflected in the course of their action.
CHAPTER IX

LOCAL ACTORS' POSITION AND RELATIONS IN SPORT
This chapter aims at providing an account of local actors' understanding of sports policy developments, and of the unfolding relations between local actors and national agencies in sport. Emphasis is also placed on the relations existing between different local actors (i.e. those in local government and in local sports clubs). In this sense, analysis of information from interviews with local politicians will be followed by the discussion of data from interviews with the chairmen of sports clubs. However, information elicited from interviews at central government and national level will be incorporated where appropriate. The strategic relations between central government and local government, between local government and local sports clubs, and between sports clubs and the GSS as well as the NGBs (as shown in the following diagram) will be the central theme of discussion in this chapter.

Figure 9.1: Strategic Relations and the Foci of Analysis in Chapter IX

![Diagram](image)

Policy Changes and Central-Local Government Relations

Local government emerged as a provider of sports opportunities in the early 1980s, prompted by the initiation of the GSS 'sport for all' programmes in 1983. Since then its role has been redefined, its relations with central government and the governmental agency for sport have also altered, and local actors and groups have responded to recent developments in many different ways. The exploitation of local actors' perception of the above changes, and the identification of local responses were the main themes of interview objectives at this level of analysis. In addition, teasing out relations of clientelism and corporatism between local government and national and/or local agents, and identifying formal or informal factors for local
Local Actors' Position and Relations in Sport

Authorities funding on sport, were also among the objectives of interviews conducted with key individuals from six municipalities in the wider area of Athens, the profile of which is provided in table 9.1.

Table 9.1: Local Authorities' Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council of:</th>
<th>Marousi</th>
<th>Iraklio</th>
<th>Nea Ionia</th>
<th>Drapetsona</th>
<th>N. Psihiko</th>
<th>P. Pshiiko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlled by</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person(s) interviewed</td>
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<td>Deputy</td>
<td>Chairman and member</td>
<td>Mayor and civil servant</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>of the Athletic Centre</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Chairman of the Athletic Centre</td>
<td>Chairman of the Athletic Centre</td>
<td>Chairman of the Athletic Centre</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>basketball</td>
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<td>'women and'</td>
<td>'women</td>
<td>tennis and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>volleyball</td>
<td>'women and'</td>
<td>'men and'</td>
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<tr>
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<td>sport</td>
<td>sport</td>
<td>sport</td>
<td>gymnastics</td>
<td>gymnastics</td>
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<tr>
<td>and sport</td>
<td>'women and'</td>
<td>'men and'</td>
<td>'women</td>
<td>'sport for'</td>
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<tr>
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<td>sport</td>
<td>sport</td>
<td>sport</td>
<td>football</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>tae kwon do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>'sport for'</td>
<td>'sport for'</td>
<td>'sport for'</td>
<td>'sport for'</td>
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<td>'sport for'</td>
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<td>special needs</td>
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<td>'sport for'</td>
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<td>basketball</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>table tennis</td>
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<td>special needs</td>
<td>special needs</td>
<td>people with</td>
<td>people with</td>
<td>special needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
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<td>2500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time PE instructors</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before moving on to the discussion of local government relationship with central agencies, it is important to provide an account on the nature of central-local government relations in the 1980s and 1990s, as emerging from secondary sources and primary data. Decentralisation and local government reform acquired primary importance in PASOK's 1981 pre-election programme, as a means to counter the highly centralised nature of the Greek state (Lyrintzis, 1989). Decentralisation was taken to imply the promotion of political autonomy which might lead to the emergence of decision making centres independent from central government's policies. PASOK government proceeded with decentralisation of responsibilities, but these were to be restricted to issues of cultural development and environmental improvement (Presidential Decree 323, in The Government Newspaper, 1989). In contrast to the initial intention, local government remained under central control, so long as the decisions and actions of local councils had to be approved by the prefecture, the agent of central government at regional level (Presidential Decree 323, in The Government Newspaper, 1989).

Local authorities' financial autonomy, which was to be achieved through the reformation of the tax system so that local government could obtain its own sources of funds, was never realised. Consequently, local authorities were still heavily dependent on grants from central government (Papageorgiou, 1989). Central government subsidy included an ordinary grant, based on the population size, and various special grants for certain projects. As Panas (1990) has argued, the decisions for the allocation and distribution of central funds were subject to political pressures, a fact that increased local government's dependency on central agencies. As a consequence, PASOK measures did not lead to effective autonomy of local government. They rather resulted in deconcentration, in the sense that certain responsibilities were transferred to local agents, the activities of which remained under central control (Panas, 1990). Deconcentration was promoted through subsidies to local authorities for the provision of a number of social services (e.g. sport and cultural activities, programmes for relieving unemployment, health centres for the elderly). Overall, local government seemed to widen its activities after 1981, but certainly not at the level that the socialist government had promised in its pre-election programme. The New Democracy government, prompted by the need to reduce public expenditure, encouraged local authorities to curtail costly projects and establish closer links with the
commercial sector as a means to counter financial problems (Eleftherotypia, 10 May 1991).

Increasing decentralisation of resources and responsibilities, attempted by the socialist government in the 1980s, was perceived by PASOK affiliated local politicians as the major change in the nature of relations between central and local government in the last decade. However, all of them recognised PASOK’s failure to promote decentralisation effectively during its eight year administration in the 1980s. The latter was also outlined by the Mayor of one of the ND controlled councils, where lack of resources was seen as the main constraint in the effective promotion of decentralisation; “in the 1980s, many responsibilities were given to local government but they could not be realised due to the lack of resources” (Mayor of N. Psihiko). By contrast, it was availability of resources and extended government spending in the early part of the 1980s, that promoted the role of local authorities during PASOK administration, according to the claims of one of the PASOK affiliated local politicians; “during PASOK governments there was great support for municipalities, mostly due to the fact that the government had the necessary resources” (chairman Athletic Organisation Drapetsona). The contradictory arguments as expressed above reflect the fact that allocation of central funds to local authorities was the outcome of political battles, in the sense that clientelistic relations between local councils and central government was the prevailing factor in deciding the outcome of those battles.

Governmental change in 1990, was regarded, by PASOK politicians only, as marking a shift in central-local government relations. The role of local government it was argued, had been undermined by the New Democracy government, since; “the government did not recognise the right of municipalities to have access to resources which were regarded as being safeguarded by legislation. ... As a result, the municipalities faced serious economic problems” (Mayor of Marousi and deputy chairman of Iraklio Athletic Centre). Changes in the nature of central-local relations were seen as changes in the level of access to central funds. It is also worth noting that the major policy development in the relation between central and local government, as perceived by PASOK affiliated local politicians, focused on the minimum access of those councils to central resources, that followed the government change in 1990. It can consequently be argued that decentralisation of resources was promoted by the government of PASOK
Local Actors' Position and Relations in Sport

Towards politically affiliated local councils. Accordingly, government change in 1990 might not have led to a new era of central-local relations per se, but rather to a new phase of the relationship between central government and PASOK controlled local councils. By reference to sports policy, it was one of the tasks of the empirical research to identify whether political change brought about a new age of central-local government relations, or the replacement of clientelistic networks.

Local Government’s Role in Sport: Changing Position, Changing Relations or Both?

With regard to sport, the role of local government was perceived in different ways by key central government actors. New Democracy Party’s notion of local government’s role in sport, as it was expressed by the ND politicians interviewed, can be best articulated in the statement of the ND General Secretary of Sport (1989-91); “the role of local government is not regarded as particularly essential by the GSS”. However, where its role was recognised as important, it was conceived as supplementary to the government’s effort in pursuit of sports success; “it is a premise for sports development and success that local government is an associate in sports policy implementation” (ND Minister of Sport, 1991-92). It was also the ideological position of the right wing party of New Democracy, advocating a minimum government intervention in areas of economic and social action, which called for less intervention by the GSS in areas of local government initiatives; “GSS subsidy to local government is not enough and local authorities should spend money for sport from their own budget” (ND Minister of Sport, 1991-92), and “the role of local government should be independent from central government” (ND Minister of Sport, 1992-93).

The above statements can be contrasted with PASOK politicians’ position on the same issue; “local government is the main provider of sport at local level and the only agent through which PASOK social intervention in sport can be implemented. ... This kind of intervention (the ‘sport for all’ programmes) had nothing to do with the improvement of performance. It aimed at meeting the public need for participation in sports activities” (General Secretary of PASOK committee for sport). In terms of policy making, the highly evaluated role of local government in sport prompted the GSS to; “organise seminars on sport for the mayors, and all those who were responsible for the programmes
Local Actors' Position and Relations in Sport

within the municipalities, as a means to increase their awareness and interest in sport” (PASOK head of GSS sport for all committee). In addition, “EC money was absorbed by the municipalities as a means for fighting unemployment and was spent for the building of small scale sports facilities” (PASOK head of GSS sport for all committee).

Along with the changing values at central government level, the position of local government in sport it was argued (by PASOK affiliated politicians), had also been affected by central policy changes in relation to 'sport for all', which accompanied the government change in 1990. By contrast, no reference was made on central policy shifts in sport by ND affiliated local actors; “there have not been any radical political changes in sport. Both governments’ strategy focuses on the issue of funds allocated to sport” (Mayor of P. Psihiko). The shift in central government policy, from the social objectives of ‘sport for all’ to the pursuit of excellence, was claimed by PASOK politicians, to have undermined the role of local government in the provision of sports opportunities; “there was a completely different view for sport, an elitist one adopted by ND government. As such, the role of local government was explicitly undermined ... since 'sport for all' and local government was not at the centre of this policy, which focused exclusively on major professional clubs" (Mayor of Marousi). This view was common in the arguments of PASOK affiliated interviewees at local level;

PASOK policy supported mass sport, local councils' provision of sport, amateur sport, etc. ND ... required that children pay their contribution ... and placed all its emphasis on professional sport. As a result, funds were directed to professional clubs and all the rest were left to suffer. ... PASOK is closer to the idea of mass sport, with the municipalities being held responsible for the operation of those programmes (deputy chairman of Athletic Organisation N. Ionia).

Reduction of funds invested in the programmes after 1990 (see figure 6.11), which in any case “do not have a great cost compared to other areas of GSS investment” (ND General Secretary of Sport, 1989-91), was a sign of the minor importance of ‘sport for all’ objectives for the new government. As it was claimed by the head of the GSS Department of Sports Development; “the current government (ND) could abandon the ‘sport for all’ programmes, without violating any institutional rule. On the contrary, the programmes were kept intact, while more cost efficiency is at the centre of government’s
concern”. Cost efficiency of the programmes meant that; “New Democracy government was not against the programmes, but it simply set some constraints to their operation. For instance, while municipal programmes started at the beginning of September, physical education instructors were provided by the GSS to the municipalities no earlier than December” (deputy chairman Athletic Organisation N. Ionia). Those constraints prompted the councils to respond in a meaningful way to central policy developments; “as a council, we had to start the programmes independently of GSS, which subsequently implied that we had to cover a substantial cost (instructors’ payments) for keeping the programmes. ... This cost is covered by the monthly payments, either smaller or bigger, of those participating in the programmes” (Municipality of Iraklio), or; “after the council’s decision the programmes operate independently of the GSS, and are financed by municipal sources” (Municipality of N. Ionia).

Reflecting on change since the end of the period under study, that is after 1993, a critical point can be put forward. Following the government change in 1993, one of the ND affiliated councils seemed to be in a position common to that faced by PASOK controlled councils during the three years of ND administration; “until last year (1993) GSS subsidised all physical education instructors employed for the needs of our programmes. This year (1994) it subsidised none” (Mayor of N. Psihiko), and “we had more financial assistance after 1990 than we did when PASOK was in office” (civil servant responsible for sport).

One may infer therefore that the constraints placed by GSS on the operation of the programmes were, at least to some extent, the outcome of political struggles within the sports policy process, which was bound up with the councils’ political position and affiliation with central government;

political beliefs played a substantial role in the way municipalities responded to the ‘sport for all’ message. ... In 1982-83 there was a conflict between the central government and those councils controlled by the opposition party, ... and certainly this tension still exists. ... There was a positive effect (when PASOK was in office 1981-89) on those municipalities that were politically affiliated with the GSS (PASOK head of GSS sports for all committee).

Political affiliation, as a force mediating the relation between central government and local authorities, was expressed as ‘pressure of politics’ by
the ND General Secretary of Sport (1989-91). In the interviews with the Mayor and the chairman of the athletic centre of the socialist controlled council of Marousi, the vague expression of ‘pressure of politics’ was exemplified; “the relationship of the previous political leadership (New Democracy) and the municipalities was clearly a clientelistic one. Investments in local sports facilities was dictated by the personal influence of MPs representing a certain area” (Mayor) and “in the period of ND government, GSS constructed a number of sports facilities in areas where clientelistic relations were quite strong” (chairman of Athletic Centre). Clientelistic relations also dictated distribution of central funds during PASOK administration, as it was quite explicitly stated by the PASOK head of GSS sports for all committee, and was supported by the deputy chairman of the athletic organisation of one of the socialist controlled municipalities; “in the period 1982-86 a lot of outdoor facilities were constructed in our area, possibly because some people had access to GSS” (municipality of N. Ionia). However, it should be pointed that it was not possible to obtain GSS data for grants to local authorities as a means to check the relation between political control of a local authority and grant levels from GSS.

Clientelistic networks between GSS and local authorities, recognised by the majority of interviewees as a major factor in decision making, were deemed as rendering the relationship between the GSS and local authorities vulnerable to political change. This was evident in the arguments of interviewees from two of the socialist controlled councils; “it is astonishing that our municipality spent hundreds of millions on sport and did not get any financial support from the GSS in the period 1991 to 1993” (Mayor Marousi), and with reference to the same municipality; “in the last four years there was no contact at all between our council and the GSS or any financial assistance from the GSS” (chairman of Athletic Centre). That was also the case for the athletic organisation of another socialist controlled council; “in the period 1989-1993 we did not receive subsidy for new facilities or for the completion and maintenance of some of them ... and we had to subsidise the programmes from municipal sources” (deputy chairman of N. Ionia Athletic Organisation). However, ND affiliated councils appeared to have gained extensive benefits in the same period; “we had the resources (when ND party was in office) for maintaining our facilities, while now (1994) we are spending money for paying instructors’ expenses” (civil servant responsible for sport in the ND controlled council of N. Psihiko).
The interviews with local politicians therefore seem to suggest that "political factors play a major role, particularly when there are limited resources. In this case grants are allocated according to political criteria" (Mayor of ND controlled council). This is not to imply however that sports policy is merely the outcome of political battles, but rather that the individuals' perception of the outcome of struggles within sport focuses on the importance of clientelistic relations. Even in the case where political opposition between local councils and central government was claimed to be of minor importance; "we enjoyed a satisfactory level of financial assistance and contact with the ND General Secretary and the Minister of Sport even though our council had a different policy from the government" (deputy chairman of PASOK controlled Iraklio Athletic Centre), political affiliation was considered by the same individual as essential for the council's access to central resources; "certainly, we expect more from the new government since we are affiliated with the political party in office".

Interviews at both central and local government level, seemed to support the claim that government change in 1990 meant a shift in emphasis from the social objectives to the pursuit of sporting success. The role in sport of many councils (mainly socialist controlled) was subsequently undermined by the above shift. Their affiliation with the socialist party, granted them increasing access to GSS funds in the period 1981-89, and resulted in their exclusion from decision making when the opposition came into office. Regaining of power by the socialist party of PASOK, implied more opportunities for the socialist councils, not only to attract state resources but also to put forward their proposal for safeguarding the 'sport for all' programmes, a point which emerged from interviews with PASOK politicians at central and local government; "the proposal put forward by the Local Union of Municipalities of Attiki, concerns the ways to safeguard the programmes by legislation. In this sense, the duration of the programmes will be known in advance, the number of instructors sent to the municipalities will be based on the population or the activity of the municipalities, and therefore local authorities will be able to plan more effectively their sports activities" (deputy chairman of N. Ionia Athletic Organisation). In addition, "municipalities are now trying to establish a national agency which should be under the jurisdiction of the Central Municipalities Federation and claim direct funding for the programmes from lottery games revenues" (PASOK head of GSS sports for all committee).
New ways of funding the programmes were deemed essential for achieving financial independence from the GSS since; "there is a strong emphasis placed by the Ministry of Sport on the promotion of competitive sport. Furthermore, there is an expressed opposition to the movement of mass sport by those members of the political party who support high standard sport. This is a negative point particularly for a party like PASOK, which has to express a social consideration and treat sport as a social right" (PASOK head of GSS sports for all committee). Consideration for altering the system of sport for all funding might also lead to the personal contribution of those participating in the programmes; "all participants in the programmes should have a small contribution by paying a symbolic fee. ... Everyone but those with special needs and the elderly would have to pay a small amount. We also have to find ways to attract sponsors" (PASOK head of GSS sports for all committee). The argument however, which was put forward in the earlier chapter of the analysis, that PASOK social objectives for sport have been refined through time, can partly be substantiated by the statements of the above individual but not by empirical examples, since recent policy developments could not be investigated, due to the fact that the empirical research was completed shortly after the 1993 election which brought PASOK back in government office.

Political Values and Sport in Local Government: From Community to Competitive Sport?

For the majority of local actors, identified as key figures in developing sports policy in these authorities, sports provision was intended to serve as a means of social intervention in the local community. As evidenced in the arguments of politicians from both New Democracy and PASOK controlled municipalities, sport was at the focus of local social provision. However, although personal values, as a means for promoting sports issues in the local community, appeared in the cases of two local councils to be more important than the ideological position of the local political groups, a connection between local political values and centrally adopted political ideologies can be noted. Politicians in the ND controlled municipalities seemed to be more inclined to traditional conservative values. In that respect, provision of sporting opportunities for youth was supported for sport's educational values; "by sport we mean everything that has to do with youngsters. Our main emphasis is not only on sport itself but rather on sporting education. ...
Our philosophy is to offer any service, and simultaneously education to the youth“ (Mayor of N. Psihiko).

On the other hand, a significant resemblance with the socialist party’s ideology can be noted in the arguments of PASOK affiliated politicians. The majority of them seemed to share centrally adopted values, which regarded sport as a right of citizenship. Interviewees from the athletic organisations of the municipalities of Iraklío and N. Ionia recognised sport as a right that everyone should enjoy; “the philosophy of our local party for sport is that sport is a right shared by the whole of the local community irrespective of age or gender” (deputy chairman of Iraklío Athletic Centre), and; “our local political group is explicitly in favour of mass sport, which stems from our belief that apart from the opportunities offered by the local sports clubs, all local citizens have equal rights to sport. By that, we mean all ages and especially the elderly, both genders, and specially the people with special needs where we have placed our emphasis” (deputy chairman of N. Ionia Athletic Organisation).

Even though a kind of consideration was given to all age and gender groups, the aims of sports provision, as expressed by the individuals interviewed, placed a stronger emphasis on the provision of sporting opportunities for youth. Gender relations in local sport therefore, can be said to be relatively unimportant, a premise supported by the complete lack of reference by the interviewees to relations between men and women, a reference that, on the other hand was strongly presented on age relations. In this sense, sports opportunities offered to certain age groups were regarded as part of the councils’ philosophy for social provision; “the top priority is to provide, mainly for children, an accepted social service, in this case sport, which is approached through a comprehensive programme of social provision” (Mayor of Marousi), and; “the municipality’s policy for sport with some sort of sports provision started by the initiation of a policy that mainly targeted young children. It was an intervention from our municipality to the local community and especially the youngsters” (chairman of Marousi Athletic Centre).

This kind of intervention was prompted by different needs; “our main aim is to prevent the youngsters from getting involved with drugs, and to protect them from other dangerous situations” (Athletic Centre Iraklio), and; “our
aim is to offer the best opportunities for sport to the mass of children, and pick up the talented athletes for the local clubs” (Athletic Organisation N. Ionia). The latter consideration was also common in ND controlled councils; “we aim to identify the talented athletes among the mass, and give them the opportunity to progress further through the sports clubs” (Mayor of N. Psihiko), and; “our aim is to meet the needs of local community for sports participation within our city, and keep the talented athletes in the local sports clubs” (Mayor of P. Psihiko).

Local initiatives exhibited a wide variety of involvement in sport. Most of the local politicians interviewed, expressed their concern for the support of competitive sport in their area. Consideration for ‘sport for all’ issues was balanced by a strong emphasis placed on the support of local sports clubs. This was even the case for those municipalities which strongly advocated sports provision for the whole community on the grounds of their ideological position;

our approach to sport is a part of a comprehensive programme for social provision. ... An essential part (of our strategy for sport) is the support to the major local sports clubs. ... We believe that high performance sport should be developed in parallel with mass sport in a way that they will support each other. For this reason we have paid a lot of attention in finding the resources through sponsorship from local entrepreneurs, in order to face successfully the professionalisation of high performance sport. ... Another part is to support the small local sports clubs, ... which stand mid-way between the major professional clubs and mass sport, and could link our own athletic centre with the big clubs (Mayor of Marousi).

However, the picture of local sports provision appeared to be clear in two municipalities. In the municipality of N. Ionia, competitive sport seemed to have a privileged position among the Athletic Organisation’s activities; “we believe that the gifted athletes, participating in the mass programmes, can further progress through the clubs. ... There is contact with all clubs which gain some benefits from the fact that the municipality has a strong sports organisation. The municipality employs 40 physical education instructors approximately, and most of them offer their services to the clubs” (deputy chairman). The interests of competitive sport were strongly represented in the municipal athletic organisation since the interviewee (member of the local council and deputy chairman of the Athletic Organisation), was also chairman of the major local sports club.
In the second case, all local opportunities provided by the Athletic Organisation of Drapetsona were in support of ‘sporting excellence’; “in our planning, which also reveals our philosophy, we wish to link the municipal and curricular sport with competitive sport promoted by the local clubs” (chairman), and also; “the main objective of this plan is to link with each other school, municipal, and club sport, with municipal sport bridging the other two. We aim at implementing aspects of both social and sports policy. We certainly pay a lot of attention to the achievement of excellence which can only be developed through the sports clubs” (member of the organisation’s board).

The case of the municipality of Drapetsona provides a characteristic example of the way local government involvement in sport has focused on the support of competitive sport. This seemed to come as a result of the fact that local policy for sport was led by the local sports lobby (the chairman of the organisation had been chairman of the major local sports club until 1992), common in the case of the municipality of N. Ionia. However, the case of the municipality of Drapetsona was exceptional in the sense that the Athletic Organisation was the only one of the six municipal sports centres studied, which was administered by individuals who were not members of the local council. In both cases, the need for developing local competitive sport, as expressed by key individuals in the athletic organisations' boards, seemed to dictate the nature of local sports provision, and municipal resources were directed to the strengthening of the local sports clubs. As argued by the chairman of the Athletic Organisation of Drapetsona; “the position of the council is the one we have suggested and the proposal we submitted on sport, which described our position and philosophy, was approved by the majority of the local council’s board”.

Local Government and Local Sports Clubs

Interviews with sports clubs administrators focused on the interviewees' perception of sports policy changes over the last decade, the impact of those changes on the sports clubs, and the clubs' relations with individuals and organisations in sport. Interviews at this level were conducted with the chairmen of six sports clubs. Three of them could be described as major multi-sport clubs, characterised by a large number of participants, medium budget (which ranged from 30 million to slightly more than 100 million dr.), and
were included among the 50 top clubs in the country, in terms of subsidy granted by the state. The rest were small single-sport clubs with a relatively low budget and small number of athletes.

By incorporating the findings from interviews with local politicians and sports clubs administrators, the relations between local government and local sports clubs appeared to vary to a large extent. While local sports clubs seemed to enjoy a certain level of access to local resources, as illustrated by the above two cases, the relation between those two local actors seemed to be highly problematic in other cases. This was argued by some respondents to be a consequence of local involvement in the field of competitive sport, an argument which was also put forward by the chairman of GSS committee for 'sport for all'; “there is a confusion by the municipalities between the notion of ‘sport for all’ on one hand, and mass participation in certain sports on the other”.

Overlapping activity at local level, was deemed as the main source of rivalry between local councils and sports clubs. This kind of relationship was most typically presented in the study of a specific context, where interviews were conducted with the Mayor of the local council and the chairman of the municipality’s athletic centre, on one hand, and the chairman of the multi-sport club II on the other, which is one of the two major clubs in the local area. Both local politicians supported the view which was put forward by most of the interviewees at local level and regarded local sports clubs as the major beneficiaries of municipal sports activities; “(through local government provision of sport) we are able to make our intervention in sport and at the same time provide economic benefits for the clubs. ... We also subsidise the clubs according to their activities. ... In addition, we have improved the sports facilities, and we have offered the opportunity to the clubs to use more and better facilities” (chairman of Marousi Athletic Centre). By contrast, municipal involvement in sport was seen by the chairman of one of the local sports clubs as having shifted its focus from social provision to development of competitive sport, which presented a direct involvement in the area of local

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1 The multi-sport clubs were: the Fans’ Club Nea Ionia (multi-sport I), the Athletic Club Paradisos (multi-sport II), and the Athletic Club Ionikos Nea Philadelphia (multi-sport III).

2 The single sport clubs were: the Athenian Club of Fencing (fencing club), the Wrestling Fans’ Club Atlas Kallithea (wrestling club), and the Nautical Club of Palio Faliro (sailing club).
Local Actors’ Position and Relations in Sport

The municipality has made an effort to develop mass/social sport which is a valuable effort, as long as it does not compete with the sports clubs. ... The municipality offers the same sports programmes to children free of charge, and subsequently the sports clubs’ programmes have not the potential to attract a large number of participants” (multi-sport II). The latter was also acknowledged as a source of tension in the relation between local authorities and sports clubs by one of the local politicians interviewed; “some clubs are not happy with the operation of the centre. The reason is that we attract young children to our programmes while the clubs also try to recruit children for their sports academies, as an attempt to increase their resources” (deputy chairman Athletic Centre of Iraklio).

Contrary to the above arguments, the co-operation between local government and local sports clubs was described in many cases as excellent, with most notable example the case of Wrestling Fan Club Atlas Kallithea, where; “it would be impossible for our club to exist without the assistance of the local council. There is an excellent co-operation, which could be illustrative of the way local council relationship with sports clubs should be. ... More important, this co-operation takes place irrespective of the local political party in office” (Chairman). This kind of co-operation seemed to be based on the grounds of corporatist relations for pursuing sports excellence; “due to the activity and the image of the club\(^3\), we are granted with an amount which represents an overwhelming percentage of the council’s total subsidy to the local sports clubs” (wrestling club).

On the other hand, the ‘excellent’ relationship of local agents in sport, was argued by some to be the exception to the rule;

the political factor plays a major role in this relationship. If the board of the club has the same political identity as the local board then it can get access to municipal resources. If not, there is a symbolic amount granted, as it is the case with our club (multi-sport III). ... We do not have any assistance by the local board, even though our club is the only big club in the municipality which successfully represents it in Greece and Europe (Chairman).

\(^3\) Among its athletes’ outstanding successes, the bronze Olympic medals in the 1980, 1984 and 1988 Olympic Games are the most notable examples.
In at least one case then political affiliation was seen as an important factor, but for most of the respondents this was not significant. In some cases it was even formally denied; “I do not think that political affiliation plays a substantial role, since I am aware that even though the other local sports club is opposed to the political beliefs of the municipality, it still has a good cooperation with the council” (multi-sport II). However, it should be kept in mind that perceptions of individual actors do not imply representativeness of local agents in general. Nevertheless, in the cases investigated, for most interviewees it can be argued that clientelistic relations did not appear to play a major role in the relations between agents in the specific local contexts.

By contrast, the existence of political or in some cases personal affiliation of the clubs with agents within the GSS, was perceived as increasingly important. All sports clubs' chairmen interviewed described the relationship between the central agency for sport and the sports clubs as purely economic, while the clubs seemed to depend to a large extent on sources other than state funds; “the state subsidy is very small for every club ... and all the weight of financial support falls on the individual members of the clubs' boards” (multi-sport III), and “the relationship between the clubs and the state is restricted to the subsidy and nothing more. This subsidy is so small that it is not even enough for meeting the clubs' administration expenses” (wrestling club). Common to their arguments was also the belief that government change might result to fluctuation of subsidies, rather than to a comprehensive change of the above relationship;

the GSS, due to its structure, operates only as a source of money and its relationship with the sports clubs is purely economic. ... If your club is affiliated with the existing political situation, you can gain a lot of benefits. ... If you are against the political leadership of the GSS, then you have the option of negotiating access to resources through other people who are ‘friends’ with the GSS (multi-sport I).

Political Affiliation and the Sports Clubs' Position

Political affiliation between the sports clubs and the GSS was seen as the most influential factor for making use of central funds, other than those provided as 'ordinary' subsidy; “only when a sports club has the political means will be subsidised with 'extra' subsidies from the GSS, once or even twice every year. ... Those clubs that have political tools certainly get higher subsidies” (multi-
Local Actors' Position and Relations in Sport

sport III), and; “the GSS can give extra subsidy to those clubs with which it is politically affiliated. If the club is not affiliated then it is difficult to get anything from the GSS” (multi-sport II). It was however argued that the above process was prompted by the structure of the governmental agency of sport since; “the GSS is more keen to keep its clientelistic relations with the sports clubs rather than to develop an extensive co-operation with them” (wrestling club).

By contrast to the allocation of extra subsidies, the clubs' ordinary subsidy was seen as based on the assessment of sports clubs' activity, according to a number of objective criteria. This view was common in both NGBs and sports clubs administrators' statements. According to the claims of interviewees at governing bodies level, those criteria were; a) participation in, and performance at the national leagues, b) number of athletes from a club involved in the national squads, and c) number of teams participating in different levels of competition (e.g. men, women, junior etc.). The same view was also shared by all sports clubs interviewees who explained the fluctuations of their ordinary subsidy in recent years, as reflecting the performance of the club in the national leagues.

However, contradictory evidence was also provided in one case. As it was supported, the process of sports clubs' assessment, was also vulnerable to inputs other than the club's performance. Assessment of the performance of each sport operated in a sports club, is the responsibility of the respective governing body. Based on this assessment, the GSS decides the amount of ordinary subsidy allocated to every club, separately for each one of its sports;

at the end of each year we (NGBs) produce and send to the GSS a table which shows the participation of the clubs' athletes, and their performance, in the domestic championships. The GSS allocates the subsidies to the clubs according to the above list. ... I have reasons to believe that this policy has not been explicitly followed by the weight lifting federation. Last year, (name of sports club), which is opposed to the body's board, has not been included in the tables of activity sent by the body to the GSS, and as such it appears as though it has minimal or no activity at all (Gen. Sec. Boxing).

However, this is not meant to imply that political developments are the decisive factor in the clubs' position within sport, and their relations with the agents in this field. It rather aims at illustrating the ways lower scale decision
making is also perceived of as being vulnerable to political affiliation between different actors (i.e. sports clubs, national governing bodies, central government agency etc.). The exercise of ‘political’ pressure from the sports federations to the clubs was also thoroughly acknowledged by one of the sports clubs’ interviewees; “the governing bodies exercise political influence to the clubs. Particularly those bodies affiliated with political parties require from the clubs to support, in the NGB election, those candidates who belong to the same political group” (multi-sport II). The latter statements are indicative of the ways political confrontation, between a voluntary sports club and a voluntary sports federation may decide the club’s access to legitimate resources. For the Athenian Club of Fencing, political confrontation seemed even to result in its exclusion from the respective sports federation; “between 1983 and 1989 our club was excluded from the body due to political opposition to the body’s board” (Chairman of fencing club).

Forms of Corporatism in Competitive Sport

Small single sport clubs in particular, appeared to have developed strong corporatist relations with the respective sports federation. Corporatist relations in this context are taken to imply increasing access to NGB resources, granted to those sports clubs which have the potential to promote the image and serve the objectives of the national federation. NGBs’ administrators (i.e. weight lifting, wrestling, fencing, cycling, boxing, judo, Tae Kwon Do) expressed their concern for maintaining and supporting corporatist relations with those clubs that seemed to promote their sport successfully. For all the bodies mentioned above, the policy towards the clubs can be said to be corporatist, in the sense that; “we have a closer co-operation with the clubs that have the potential to develop our sport, as compared to some others that do not” (Gen. Sec. Weight Lifting). Co-operation takes the form of “selection of 10 sports clubs approximately, that have been appointed as training centres. With those clubs we have a closer contact, we try to develop fully their potential” (Technical Director Weight Lifting).

Corporatist relations seemed to result in greater access to the governing bodies’ resources; “there is a closer contact with the trainers and the board members of those clubs as a means to improve the training skills, their sports equipment, and training halls” (Chairman Wrestling). Only in one case did
Local Actors' Position and Relations in Sport

corporatist relations include the bulk of the sports clubs and aimed at widening the basis of participation;

all clubs are now integrated into a development programme which is at its fourth year of implementation. According to this project, the better athletes of the clubs are assuming the responsibility for recruiting a number of young children and teaching them the basic skills of fencing. Co-operation therefore with the clubs lies in the fact that the clubs provide the NGB with their athletes and facilities for the promotion of the above objective (Gen. Sec. Fencing).

Quality of performance had been perceived by most of the sports clubs' chairmen, as a means for attracting attention and funds from the governing bodies. In addition, representation of the club in the bodies' boards was deemed as essential for promoting the clubs' interests; "the members of the bodies' board come originally from a certain club and as such they can influence the bodies' decisions in a way that serves the interests of their clubs" (multi-sport II). Therefore, "as a sports club we are represented in a number of NGBs' board. This kind of contact certainly influences the relationship of a club with the governing bodies. ... As a consequence, the members of the bodies' board have also the potential to favour their own clubs" (multi-sport I).

By contrast, the federations of athletics and volleyball appeared to have adopted a less corporatist policy, which can be explained by the massive development of their sport and the high profile they enjoy as sports organisations. This policy was expressed by tight measures set for the clubs assessment;

the governing body's subsidy is allocated to the clubs with a system of evaluation which is completely explicit. Every athlete, trainer, club, regional committee and NGB committee is able to know from the beginning of the year, the way it can get a certain amount of subsidy. An X club which has a substantial activity knows that according to its success in the national championships it will get grades that will be important for its final evaluation (Chairman Athletics).

In conclusion, relations of political power were not perceived as significant in the local contexts studied. In this sense, the nature of provision of sports opportunities in the local context depended to a large extent both on the
councils' commitment to social provision, and the outcome of battles of local interests in sport. In two cases, the needs of competitive sport proved to be in an advantageous position to use municipal resources and facilities. The outcome of political battles on the other hand, was considered as important in the actors' efforts to attract central sources. This was proved to be the case for the relations between central and local government, and between sports clubs and the central agency for sport (GSS), and the national governing sports bodies. In this respect, particularly the position and ability of socialist controlled councils to use state funds was adversely affected by the government change in 1990. Political opposition was also the reason for the exclusion of agents even from legitimate resources, as it was claimed in one case by the chairman of one of the sports clubs interviewed. Forms of clientelism and corporatism, as evidenced in the interviewees' responses, along with the main findings of the empirical research, will be summarised in the last chapter of the thesis, where a number of theoretical considerations implied by this study will consist the main theme of discussion.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION: ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC RELATIONS
IN THE GREEK SPORTS POLICY SYSTEM 1980-93
This study sought to investigate the Greek sports policy system in the period 1980-93, by addressing questions on the nature of political control during this period, the political values (ideologies) of key figures in sport, relations between the social, political and economic structures, relations between transnational factors and the national/local context, and relations between organisations as well as between agents in sport. The role of this chapter is to link the principal findings of the empirical research conducted in this study with theoretical considerations posed by the principles of strategic relations theory. In doing so, this chapter returns to questions identified in chapter 2 as being posed by strategic relations' principles, concerning the nature of strategic relations and the ways they interact in the sports policy system, as well as the forms of representation of interests in sports policy decision making.

Strategic Relations as Identified by Jessop

The investigation of the form of sport in Greece through a strategic relations perspective, calls for the identification of forms of representation, in terms of political parties, social movements, state officials, clientelistic networks, transnational organisations, and local forces, all of which are deemed to be factors interacting in a dialectical way in sports policy processes. The above agents (not necessarily all of them), whether political parties, local interests, or transnational organisations for example, attempt to put forward specific projects by adopting certain strategies for the realisation of their aspirations. The success or failure of those strategies depends to a large extent, on the nature of the project and the strategy adopted, and the strategic selectivity, in other words whether the dynamics of the state and sports system provide the sufficient conditions for the achievement of their aims/goals, or otherwise. The relation between the strategies of those agents and the sports policy system is said to be dialectic in the sense that the outcome of their strategies depends on, and simultaneously may result in the reproduction or transformation of, the structure of sport. Explanations of state sports policy therefore, have to address the nature of relations between the state and sport in a specific context and over a specific period, and the outcome of interactions among human agencies that act within and around state and sport.
By strategic relations Jessop (1990) means the relations between structures (i.e. political, economic, social structure) as well as the relations between forces acting in and through the state. Those forces should not be restricted to political ones; "'relational' theorists also note the importance of extra-political constraints on the exercise of state power. But there is no reason why these should be restricted to 'business interests as functional constraints' and they examine the role of structural interdependencies and power relations in other fields too" (p. 149). As such, tensions and struggles in the social and economic structures are also important actions (along with the political structure) to be taken into account in the investigation of state policies. Consequently, the forces which act within and around a particular state form might include the intended as well as the unintended activities of "state managers as well as class forces, gender groups as well as regional interests, and so forth" (1990, p. 270).

However, types of strategic relations have not been operationalised in the work of Jessop, in the sense that reference to strategic relations existing within and beyond the state lacks any detailed articulation in empirical terms. Nor have the types of forces acting in and through the state been identified in operational terms;

the relational character of the state's selectivity ... depends on the relation between state structures and the strategies which various forces adopt towards it (p. 10),

and elsewhere;

(a strategic relations approach) directs attention to the differential constitution of the various forces engaged in struggle within, as well as outside, the state and to the diverse structural and conjunctural factors that determine their relative weight (p. 149).

Jessop attempts to provide a kind of explanation of the relations he employs in his writings, such as;

if political forces committed to, let us say, working-class advance fail to influence the exercise of state power as they had hoped, this might not be due to any absolute and unconditional recalcitrance of the bourgeois state to such influence. Instead it might be due to their having failed to calculate the horizon of interests in the current conjuncture and/or to pursue the sort of political strategies to which this particular state form is vulnerable (p. 260),
the state is the site of class (-relevant) struggles and contradictions as well as the site of struggles and rivalries among its different branches (p. 261).

He accepts elsewhere that strategic relations involved in the state cannot be reduced solely to class forces and interests. Rather;

the state system itself engenders sui generis political interests. These concern not only the interests of state managers as opposed to forces outside the state but also the interests which are constituted around forms of state and around the policies pursued by the state. All such interests must be assessed strategically (p. 269).

The lack of empirical research to provide a contextual framework for the conceptualisation of strategic relations' principles is clearly acknowledged by Jessop;

this approach is still in its infancy. ... it is implicit in some recent developments in political economy and state theory and ... it has major implications for more orthodox analyses of the capitalist economy and the state. But these have not yet been worked out and there are many issues still unresolved (p. 267),

and;

in advocating a strategic-theoretical approach I have only been able to provide some abstract and formal indications about new directions for research and enquiry (p. 270).

Identifying and conceptualising the strategic relations in empirical terms, in a specific setting and for a specific period of time, has been one of the main tasks of the empirical research conducted in this study.

Levels of Strategic Relations as Conceptualised in this Study

In particular, this study attempted to provide an account of state sports policy in Greece in the period 1980-93, based on the exploration of the form of the Greek state and sport, as derived from secondary sources, and the identification of battles, strategies and relations between human agencies as evidenced in interviews with key agents in the sports field. What this study
suggests however, is that developments in Greek sports policy since 1980 are reflections of the strategic relations within and around the specific context, and present the materialisation of specific strategies put forward by certain agents and favoured by the form of the Greek state and sport over that period.

More specifically, the levels of strategic relations conceptualised in this study, were:

- between elements of the social structure and the state, such as class interests, gender relations, age etc.
- between political organisations and the state, such as relations within and between political parties and state administrative machinery
- between levels within government, such as central-local relations
- between non-governmental organisations within society: sports clubs, national sports federations
- between government (in its political and administrative guises) and non-governmental organisations e.g. relations between GSS and NGBs, or local government and sports clubs, or GSS and sports clubs
- between individual agents, such as between politicians or between politicians and state officials, or members of NGBs/sports clubs/local politicians
- between interest groups at various levels e.g. competitive sport interests versus mass participation at central and local government level
- and last but not least, by incorporating Appadurai's (1990) dimensions of cultural flows, between transnational factors and national/local organisations, such as influences from the EC, or the Olympic movement etc.

Schematically, the strategic relations interacting in the Greek sports policy system can be illustrated in figure 10.1, where the overlapping circles intend
to demonstrate that certain policy outcomes depend on the interaction of those forces. Figure 10.2 aims to provide an example to clarify this point.

**Figure 10.1: Strategic Relations in the Greek Sports Policy System**

**Figure 10.2: A Simplified Model of Levels of Relations in Local Government Sports Provision**
The above model seeks to highlight the need to explain, for instance, local authority provision of sport by reference to a number of levels of relations. Such an analysis, it is suggested by this study, should take into account:

- the relations between the national and local environment, and the global field, as for example evident in more than one respondent's argument that; "a large amount of EC money was absorbed by the municipalities as a means for fighting unemployment, and was invested in small scale sports facilities" (PASOK head of 'Sport for All' committee),

- the economic structure of Greece in the 1980s, in respect to growing government spending in the first half of the 1980s,

- the class interests and political organisations prevailing in the form of the state, in the sense that government projects aiming to increase welfare provision and decentralise resources and responsibilities were put forward, at least in the first term of PASOK in office,

- relations of political affiliation between the GSS and local authorities, and the role of individuals, all of which are deemed to be significant factors in deciding the level of access to central resources,

- the means by which local interests (competitive versus community sport for example) are able to influence the local agenda.

The rest of this chapter aims to provide an account of the different levels of relations as they were identified in the Greek context.

*Relations between social structure, political organisations and the state*

Relations between elements of the social structure and the state, as well as between political organisations and the state machinery underwent significant changes with the coming to power of the socialist party PASOK in the early 1980s. Incremental changes in health, education, welfare and social provision, promised in the pre-election period were meant to serve as a means for increasing the Party's appeal to wide sections of the population and projecting the Party as the political formation capable of materialising the aspirations of the under-privileged (see chapter 4). The strategy of expanding
social provision, and establishing a form of welfare state, was promoted for those class fragments (mainly consisting of the middle and lower classes) which constituted the basis of PASOK's party organisation and electoral support.

As evidenced in the empirical research, state intervention in welfare provision also included sport. Common to most of the PASOK interviewees at central government level was the belief that "sport is a right of citizenship", and the state had to fulfil an essential role in this field. State intervention in this field, during this period, aimed to serve the PASOK programme for reducing social inequalities. As such, the governmental agency for sport (GSS) managed to increase its access to state resources in the early years of the 1980s, since the political values of the party in power, along with the positive impact of global factors at that time provided the conditions for the successful pursuit of the strategy aiming at increasing government investment in sport.

Public programmes for sport, introduced as early as 1983, aimed to provide for those social groups that could not provide for themselves. Although at an earlier stage 'sport for all' programmes provided for all age and gender groups (with programmes such as 'women and sport', 'sport and the elderly', 'sport and people with special needs'), emphasis seemed to have shifted to the provision of sporting opportunities for youth. However, gender relations within sport was one of the issues this study failed to address. The absence of women from positions of responsibility in the sports structure, coupled with the research strategy's objective to interview key actors in sport, was the main reason for this shortcoming. Key positions at all levels of sport (i.e. government, national, local) were almost invariably occupied by men. There was one exception to this general rule, which was that of the only female (ever to have held office as the) Minister of Sport. Unfortunately this individual declined to be interviewed. As a result of this omission the commentary tends to reflect the dominance of the male sports agenda. This is not to imply however that representation of gender groups in positions of the institution of sport would certainly have an effect on sports policy outcomes. It rather tends to emphasise the lack of evidence (either primary or secondary) of battles between gender groups, or those representing gender groups, within sports structures. It has to be noted however, that the issue of women's exclusion from centres of decision making in sport could possibly be investigated by conducting interviews with individuals other than those
involved in the institutions of sport. Due to time limits however, this type of research appeared not to be feasible. Irrespective of the limitations of this research, some support for the notion that patriarchal relations operate in sport can be said to be evidenced in interviewees' values and perceptions, in the sense that, with the exception of the implementation of the programme ‘women and sport', no further reference was noted on issues concerning the interests and needs of women in sport. By contrast, emphasis was placed by most of the interviewees on the need for state provision of sport for youth. However, actors in the state machinery tended to view both groups (women and youth) as clients, passive receivers of the state's services rather than active participants in decision making.

The government change in 1990 marked a considerable change in many levels of relations. As evidenced in empirical research the state's partial withdrawal from sport reflected the political values of the party in office (the economically right wing party of New Democracy), the perceptions and actions of key politicians in sport, the weakening of the Greek economy, and the changing relations of national sports bodies with the global field. New Democracy’s political ideology implied a minimal state intervention in the economy and in the social life of the community. The economic policy of the new government meant among other things a reduction in central government borrowing, a shrinking of public sector employment, and a decrease in state expenditure. The first two targets were the most important requirements for the release of EC funds to the Greek state. Indeed, the conditions placed on Greece by the EC for receipt of funding, illustrate again the impact of global factors on the local context.

Political representation in the state form, and the associated policies in the economic and social field were reflected in the nature of sports policy at the beginning of the 1990s. Limited state involvement was strongly advocated by key ND politicians, which in terms of policy was expressed as a reduction of direct state grant to sport - “after the Ministry of Finance’s proposal ... (which) came as a consequence of the crisis of Greek economy” (ND Minister of Sport, 1991-92) - and the abandonment of social provision of sport. As such, the form of the state in the period 1990-93 appeared not to favour projects the realisation of which would require extensive state involvement and increasing public spending.
Relations between individual agents

The strategic relations approach accepts the importance of the role of individual actors and groups of actors (e.g. politicians and state officials), in the sense that it is they who act within the state machinery, and their relations and battles are seen as influential factors of the policy outcome. The role of individual agents was arguably important for example, in sport’s attempt to gain access to state resources in the first years of PASOK in office, where the Minister was able to affect significant policy change;

There was a great argument between the Junior Minister of Sport (a rapidly climbing member of PASOK party Central Committee) and the Minister of Finance ... and our great achievement was that football pools revenues were no longer subject to control from the Ministry of Finance (PASOK Gen. Sec. 1981-5).

Individual agents however, seemed unable to negotiate sport’s access to central resources in the second term of PASOK in office, as evident in the interviews; “confrontation (between the Minister of Sport and) the Minister of Finance could only bring less money (to sport) through the state budget” (PASOK Minister of Sport 1985-88). Their weakening position in the state machinery, is associated with economic changes, in particular the initiation of PASOK’s economic stabilisation programme. The economic policy of PASOK in the second half of the 1980s which sought to reduce public spending on non-sensitive areas of state action, was reflected in the direction of sports policy and seemed to undermine the level of access to central resources enjoyed by sport’s agents in the first of PASOK’s terms in office.

Relations between transnational factors and national/local organisations

Increasing public expenditure to finance the strategy of public provision of social services in the first PASOK government, was made possible by changes in the economic structure, and in particular by the relation between Greece and the European Community. European funds and extensive foreign borrowing sought to support PASOK’s strategy for the expansion of the welfare state. The inflow of EU money into the Greek economy gave the opportunity to PASOK to release state resources that were directed to areas of social provision (Kazakos, 1990). In addition, European funds were directly absorbed by municipalities and invested in small scale sports facilities.
Relations between transnational factors and national organisations, and the impact of finanscapes and ideoscapes on the Greek context were profound at the end of the 1980s. Those relations were associated with Greece's bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. The prospect of improving the physical infrastructure, alongside the optimistic evaluation of Greece's bid, arguably brought sport to the forefront of governments' objectives. The political instability at the end of the decade, characterised by the successive general elections and the coming to power of two coalition governments would, in other circumstances, seem likely to keep sport in a stagnant position. However, sport managed to strengthen its position in a year of political insecurity and claim for itself a major investment in sports facilities (as shown in figure 7.2). The opportunity, provided by the bid "to proceed and speed up the construction of sports facilities" was claimed as being fully exploited; "up to the end of the 1980s we had completed the construction of 80% of the facilities necessary for the Games" (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8), and "billions of drachmae were spent for sports facilities particularly in Athens area" (ND Min. 1991-2). The failure of the 1996 bid had adversely affected sport and seemed to have further weakened individual agents' position (e.g. politicians) in negotiating access for sport to state resources; "there was a long term plan for our preparation for the (1996) Games. ... Obviously, at the present time this kind of investment is not an immediate need. ... As a result, the failure to host the Games affected the government's plan for investment in sports facilities" (ND Minister 1991-92).

Greece's bid can be said to have played a major role in altering the relation between national sports bodies and the global environment, through the; "organisation (in Greece) of many World and European Championships and ... the election of Greek candidates to a number of international sports bodies" (PASOK Comp. Dep. 1985-8). Changing relations brought about a greater two way flow of what Appadurai (1990) described as ethnoscapes, understood as the cultural flows produced by the movement of athletes; technoscapes, conceived as the flow of sports equipment and machinery; finanscapes; and mediascapes, produced by the great inflow of images and information. It is not clear however, whether cultural flows in this form have resulted in the strengthening of national identity through sport or in the subordination of Greek sports culture to global identities. What was clear was a sense of national unity, perceived by central government figures at the time as being promoted by the country's effort to win the Olympic bid.
Relations between government and non-governmental organisations and between individual agents

Changes in the form of the state and sport were reflected in changing relations between government and non-governmental organisations. Changing relations provided different interests within sport and sports organisations with certain opportunities to materialise their projects, as evidenced by interviews with key sports agents for the period 1980-93. The structure of sport was perceived by those agents, as creating fertile ground for clientelistic relations between the political party in office and non-governmental organisations in sport (NGBs, and sports clubs). It is important to stress that clientelism as a form of representation in the state form has traditionally been deeply rooted in the Greek state, in the sense that a significant part of the state machinery was allocated to the 'clients' of the party in power in the form of jobs or other related benefits.

The structure of sports provision, characterised by the heavy dependence of non-governmental sports organisations on state funding, the lack of sports organisations' assessment by the government agency for sport (GSS), and the tendency of governments to exercise political control over this field, is important in any attempt to analyse the relations of agencies and individuals in sport. The importance of the elements of the sports structure lies in the fact that the outcome of battles between human agencies was deemed to have depended, to a considerable extent, on relations of political power. The development of clientelistic relations with the political party in office was claimed, by the majority of interviewees at central, national, and local level of the sports structure, to be the most successful form of strategy for the pursuit of specific projects. Clientelistic relations provided individuals and agencies with the opportunity to increase their access to decision making, and thus influence the course of action in such a way as to promote their interests. Thus, shifts of political control were seen only as incremental changes, unable by themselves to result in the transformation of the structure of sport. As such, government change in 1990 resulted in the redefining of clientelistic relations, in the sense that for a specific period of time, different agents and interests were given the opportunity to increase their access to the state and promote their objectives.
Conclusion

Relations between levels within government

The nature of relations between central and local government was also considered to be influenced by clientelism. As argued, changes in the relations between the state and political parties and class interests in the early 1980s, as well as the impact of transnational factors on the national and local context (mainly in the form of funding from the EC), seemed to provide local authorities with the opportunity to emerge as an essential part of the PASOK government’s strategy to increase public provision of social services. Decentralisation of resources and responsibilities (however limited to environmental and cultural issues) meant to incorporate local authorities in central government’s plan for better quality of life. However, it can hardly be argued that the state form favoured sports projects put forward by local government as a unified organisation. Rather, there is evidence to suggest that only those councils which were politically affiliated with central government managed to make an extensive use of opportunities provided by the centre (see chapter 9). In this respect, relations of clientelism between local councils and the General Secretariat of Sport favoured the interests of local councils affiliated with the political party in government.

It is essential to stress also that the shift in sports policy, claimed by most of PASOK local politicians to have occurred in 1990, can be interpreted in the light of political battles between local councils to gain access to central decision making. Consequently, changes of central-local relations, which as argued by PASOK politicians had a negative impact on the role of local actors in sport, appeared to be the result of changing relations of power between a number of local authorities (affiliated with the opposition party of PASOK) and the government of New Democracy. In parallel with the process of changing relations of power at national level, different local actors emerged as the beneficiaries of the new form of representation in the state and the sports structure.

Relations between non-governmental organisations

However, political affiliation did not seem to be significant in the strategic relations between non-governmental organisations, that is between sports clubs and national sports federations, or between local government and sports clubs. Rather, representation of sports clubs in national and local
decision making appeared to a great extent to be the result of corporatist arrangements. In this sense, access to NGBs' and local authorities' resources was granted to those groups (i.e. sports clubs) which could successfully promote corporatist goals. Power relations at this level of policy were dependent on individual actors' ability to make use of opportunities offered by agencies in such a way as to serve the needs of those agencies. Thus, corporatist relations appeared to be stronger than political affiliation. However, contradictory evidence was provided on at least one occasion, where political confrontation was claimed to have resulted in the exclusion of specific interests from decision making (the case of the fencing club, see chapter 9).

**Relations between various interest groups**

Relations between various interest groups at local level were rather influential in the form of local authorities sports provision. In some cases, corporatist arrangements between local councils and sports clubs were promoted by competitive sport lobbying groups, who wished to promote sporting excellence at local level. In other cases, the changing form of local government involvement in sport (from the provision of sport for the community to the promotion of excellence) seemed to be a source of tension between local actors. Local government provision of sport seemed to have shifted its attention to the promotion of competitive sport. Although programmes targeted all age and gender groups were still operated, the focus of provision was on younger age groups. Provision of specific forms of sports activity seemed to depend, to a large extent, on the perceptions and values of key actors in local authorities' sports provision and the strategy pursued by the interests of competitive sport.

**Conclusion**

This study has sought to advance knowledge in the field of sports policy analysis by addressing a series of research questions in the Greek system of sports policy for the period 1980-93. The way this study has sought to achieve its objective can be summarised as follows. First, research was conducted in a context which had received minimal analytical attention. In the course of this analysis, the ways specific developments were reflected in the direction of
sports policy were identified. The political ideologies of the leading political parties in Greece, the political, economic, and social changes in the period 1980-93, the impact of transnational factors, and a number of unique features of the Greek context, such as relations of clientelism between the political party in office and non-governmental organisations in sport, were set at the focus of research attention in this study.

Second, in explaining the nature of sports policy in the Greek context, this study was based on the principles of strategic relational approach, which, as an analytical framework, had not been employed in investigations of sports policy systems. Strategic relations approach articulated the way research of a specific context should proceed. In other words, it pointed to the need to investigate a specific context, in this case the Greek sports policy system, by taking into account the strategic relations between structures and agents within and around sport.

However, the nature of 'relations' had not been operationalised by Jessop. In that respect, this study sought to advance knowledge by articulating the strategic relations, as they were identified in the context of Greek sport. Although the analysis focused on the nature of strategic relations in different levels of activity within a specific context, the way strategic relations have been contextualised here, represents an attempt to develop the application of this body of theory. Going beyond the specific context, for example, the identification of relations between the government and non-governmental organisations in sport, or between Greek sport and transnational factors, this study has also attempted to articulate the different spheres of relations between structures and agency (actors or groups of actors), that might be significant for the analysis of sports policy systems.

Last but not least, this study highlighted the nature and location of specific types of relations. Particular reference should be made to relations of clientelism and corporatism as they appeared in different levels of activity in sport. Clientelism at central government level, in other words central government's 'favouritism' towards certain voluntary sports organisations and agents, was a uniquely overt feature of the Greek context. Relations of clientelism appeared to be more significant at national level (between the government and the NGBs) and were also strongly reflected in the relations between levels of government (central-local government). Relations between
Conclusion

non-governmental sports organisations, on the other hand, as well as between agencies at local level were mediated by corporatist practices. The heterogeneous nature of state activity in sport, as was revealed by the significance given to different types of relations at different levels of decision making in sport, was thus a central point of the analysis of the Greek sports policy system in the period under study.
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APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW STRUCTURE
A. What are the reasons for state support for sport? What should be the limits of this support?

What are the main political values of New Democracy/PASOK and how are these expressed in terms of sports policy?

To what extent is N.D./PASOK political philosophy for sport different from that espoused by the opposition?

What are/were the main objectives and goals of sports policy pursued by New Democracy/PASOK government(s)?

B. What was the rationale of your political party for supporting the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games?

What was the impact on sport of Greece’s bid for the above Games?

What is the impact of the failure to host the 1996 Games?

C. What is/was the process of budget construction in relation to sport, both at central government and GSS level?

In what ways do changes of government affect appointments to top positions within the GSS?

In what ways do governing bodies of sport bid for grant-in-aid?

What are/were the factors taken into consideration for the allocation of subsidies to the NGBs? (Do you think that during PASOK/N.D. administration political affiliation between NGBs and central government was/is a determinant factor for the allocation of subsidies?)
How is/was the role of local government in the implementation of sports policy regarded by your government/your party/the GSS?

What are/were the main factors taken into account for the distribution of funds to local authorities? (Do you think that during PASOK/N.D. administration political affiliation between local councils and central government was/is a determinant factor for the distribution of funds?)

What kind of priority does/did N.D./PASOK give to the development of elite sport and to the provision of sport for the community?

D. Questions on specific sports policy developments

What were the reasons for the increase of state grant to GSS from 1980 to 1985? (PASOK Ministers and General Secretaries 1981-88)

What were the reasons for the reduction of government grant since then? (PASOK Ministers and General Secretaries 1985-90, N.D. side)

What are the reasons for the reduction of GSS's grant in recent years, both in real terms and as a percentage of government expenditure? (N.D. side, PASOK 1988-90)

What was the rationale for the introduction of ‘sport for all’ programmes? (PASOK side 1981-85)

My data show a shift of GSS spending from capital expenditure to increasing subsidies of the governing bodies of sport. What were the reasons for the above shift? (PASOK side)

My data show a considerable change of the relation between GSS's capital and revenue expenditure in the last years. What is this relation likely to be in the future? (N.D. side)

What were the reasons and what are the main objectives of the new legislation for the organisation of professional sport?
Would you like to add anything else?

Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this post?
Central Government
Civil Servants and Party Appointed Bureaucrats

A. To what extent has government change affected the direction and nature of sports policy?

To what extent might the change of the Minister of Sport affect GSS policy?

In what ways has any of the above changes affected the role of your department?

What was the impact of Greece's bid for the 1996 Games on the direction of GSS policy?

What is the impact of Greece's failure to host the Games?

B. What is the process of GSS budget construction and what is the role of your department in the above process?

In what ways have international sports events, held in Greece, affected sports policy and your department in particular? (Department of competitive sport)

In what ways do/did governing bodies of sport bid for grant-in-aid? (Department of competitive sport)

What are/were the factors taken into consideration for the allocation of subsidies to the NGBs? (Department of competitive sport) [Does political affiliation of governing bodies affect the amount of subsidy they receive?]

C. What kind of priority does/did N.D./PASOK give to the development of elite sport and to the provision of sport for the community? (Department of competitive sport, Department of sports development)
What was the rationale for the introduction of 'sport for all' programmes? (Department of sports development)

What are/were the main factors taken into account for the distribution of funds to local authorities? (Department of sports development)
[Does political affiliation of local councils affect the amount of subsidy they receive?]

Would you like to add anything else?

Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this post?
Appendix I

National Level
Sports Governing Bodies' Administrators

A. To what extent did government change in 1990 affect the direction and nature of sports policy?

In what ways did the above change affect the governing body of............?

B. What is the process of budget construction within the governing body?

In what ways do sports clubs bid for grant-in-aid?

What are the factors taken into account for the allocation of subsidies to the above clubs?

Is there any kind of co-operation with some clubs for the pursuit of certain objectives?

C. In what ways does your governing body bid for grant-in-aid?

What are the factors taken into account for the allocation of subsidies to the governing bodies?

Do you think that political affiliation between some bodies and the government of N.D./PASOK has resulted in greater grant-in-aid?

Were there any major changes in the relationship between your body and the GSS in the past? (Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?)

D. In what ways might major international success of individual clubs or the national team affect the respective governing body?
To what extent might the organisation of major international events influence the policy of the body? (including the bid and failure to host the 1996 Games)

Would you like to add anything else?

Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this position, and if there has been any other position in sport that you have served?
Appendix I
Local Level
Local Politicians

A. What are the main features of your local party policy on sport?

In what ways do these differ from the opposition party’s policy?

B. What were the major changes in the relationship between central and local government in the 1980s and 1990s?

In what ways have those changes affected the council of .........................?

C. What were the main changes in sports policy in the last years, and how has your council’s policy on sport been affected by these changes?

What was the response of your council on these changes?

What are the main objectives of the council’s sports centre?

What is the kind of relationship between your council and the GSS?

Was there any major change of this relationship in the past?

On what basis (factors) is/was the council subsidised by the GSS?

D. To what extent does the local council influence the decision making process of the sports centre?

In what ways are the wants and needs of the local community expressed in decision making for sports provision?

E. What is the kind of relationship between the council and the local sports clubs?
Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

What are the criteria for subsidising the above clubs?

How is the role of local sports clubs likely to be affected by the operation of the sports centre?

Would you like to add anything else?

Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this position, and if there has been any other position in sport that you have served?
Appendix I

Major and Local Sports Clubs

A. What were the main changes in sports policy in the last few years?

In what ways have these changes affected your club?

B. What are the main values in relation to sport adopted by your club?

What is the process of decision making and budget construction within your club? What are the internal and/or external factors that might have an influence in decision making?

C. What is the relationship between your club and the GSS?

Was there any change in this relationship over the past few years?

Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

In what ways can the GSS influence decision making in your club?

How often is the contact with the governing bodies and what form does it take (formal, informal)?

Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

In what ways might governing bodies influence decision making in your club?

What are the factors taken into account for the subsidisation of sports clubs?

How often is the contact with the local council? What form does it take?

Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

On what factors is the local council's subsidy based?
D. What was the impact on your club of Greece's bid, and its failure to host the 1996 Games?

Would you like to add anything else?

Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this position, and if there has been any other position in sport that you have served?
APPENDIX II

SAMPLE SELECTIVE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS
Central Government Level
New Democracy Junior Minister of Sport (1991-92)

Question
What are the reasons for state support for sport? What should be the limits of this support?

Answer
The benefits from participating in sport are well known. Therefore, the benefits that the state can expect from the youth participating in sport are also known. One of the reasons for state support is obviously for sport's own sake. Another reason is to promote a positive image of our country abroad through successes in the sports fields. But beyond these, the main reason is, and has to be, to formulate disciplined citizens. It is well known that sport has the potential to formulate good characters. We live in a society where particularly the youngsters face many problems such as drugs abuse etc. However, a child who is involved with sport at an early age, might have only a small chance to become a champion, but definitely has a great chance to become a disciplined citizen. Therefore, every society has to provide sport, among others, in order to secure the well being of the youth.

Sport is a means for expressing state concern for the youth and not a tool to be used by political parties. The government in office should restrict itself to a supervising role and not use sport as a means for gaining party benefits. In practise this can be achieved when the government does not intervene, or has a limited role to play, in the administration of the governing bodies of sport and the sports event itself.

Question
What are the main political values of New Democracy and how these are expressed in terms of sports policy?

Answer
If we talk about democracy and peace, which are the main political values of ND, then sport has a great role to play as a means to install democratic freedoms, peace and meritocracy. In my last answer I said that sport should not be used for the parties' policy. At this point I will make a further comment. The political programme of ND clearly states that the government
has to specify the limits of its responsibilities. The government is responsible for funding the sports movement, providing the opportunities for sports participation, in close co-operation with school and local authorities, supporting sport in a number of cases (by providing scientific support, educating sports instructors etc.), and initiating legislative measures for sport. On the other hand, there is a distinctive line between the state and sport. ND advocates a limited role for the government in the sports 'being'. Our philosophy is that the sports field should be managed from those who have the experience and the expertise to do so. The state should secure that the sports legislation is applicable to all. Furthermore, as far as the amount granted to sport is concerned the role of the state is to prevent abuses of money and not get actively involved in the distribution of money among the governing bodies.

Question
To what extent is ND political philosophy for sport different from that espoused by the opposition (PASOK)?

Answer
My last point illustrates the main difference between ND and PASOK political philosophy for sport. The difference between ND and the former PASOK governments is that our party advocates limited state intervention in sport while PASOK argues for greater government involvement in this field. PASOK not only wishes to set the general objective of sports policy, which certainly is a responsibility of the state, but also seeks to specify the way the above objective is to be achieved. To give you an example: the sports policy of government might be; i) to increase mass participation, and ii) to promote elite sport for winning Olympic medals. These are the general objectives to be followed by the governing bodies of sport. The way the above objectives are to be achieved is a matter of governing bodies' policy which also have the responsibility for the detailed plan.

Question
What are the main objectives and goals of sports policy pursued by New Democracy government?
Answer
The main goals of ND policy for sport are to increase the number of children participating in sport, and on the other hand to achieve great results at the top level. Therefore we can say that sport for all and elite sport are of equal importance for the government.

B. Question
What was the rationale of your political party for supporting the bid for the 1996 Olympic Games?

Answer
The idea of Olympic Games was born in ancient Greece. Furthermore, the first Olympic Games in the modern age were held in Athens. Bearing in mind the problems the Olympic movement has faced the last decades, we believe that it is absolutely essential for the Games to be held in Greece on a permanent basis. This is our long term objective. In the short term, the objective was to host the 1996 Games in order to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary from the rejuvenation of the Games in 1896. That would be a great opportunity for our country to build sports facilities not only in Athens but in other areas as well.

The gigantism and the economic interests around the Games is a further constraint for small countries to host the Olympic Games. The cost of the Games is not the only major constraint, it is also the fact that the Olympic movement is used for purposes not associated with the Olympic ideals. Therefore, in case our country had won the bid it would have been a proof that the Olympic movement is independent from non-sports interests. But unfortunately the decision of Tokyo is a further indication that interests other than sport have a great impact on the Games.

Question
What was the impact on sport of Greece's bid for the above Games?

Answer
Greece's bid had a great impact not only on sport but also on the Greek society as a whole. The nation's dream was to win the bid and host the Games. In particular, due to the bid for the Games a number of sports
facilities were constructed in Athens. Billions of drachmae were spent for sports facilities, and the Mediterranean Games were held in Athens in 1991 as a general preparation for the Olympic Games. For instance, a large scale swimming pool was constructed particularly for the Games, which is beyond the needs of the community in Athens and also requires a vast amount of money for its maintenance. Furthermore, in the area of the Olympic Stadium, facilities for cycling and tennis were constructed that included two tennis courts for 5000 attendants. Recently we started the construction of a huge sports hall for 18000 attendants and its cost would be approximately 20 billion drachmae (£ 59 m). Hence, particularly in Athens area we have invested a great amount of money in our effort to be ready for the 1996 Games bid. This kind of investment had a positive impact on sport and also passed the message to the elite athletes that the 1996 Games were of a great importance for our country and therefore their own preparation for the Games should also be intensive.

**Question**

What is the impact of the failure to host the 1996 Games?

**Answer**

The effort to host the 1996 Games was rather a national objective. There is no doubt that the failure to host the Games has adversely affected the nation's morale. It was also obvious that the result had disappointed the sports leadership. As a consequence, the government ceased the investments in large scale facilities. At this point I have to tell you that there was a long term plan for our preparation for the Games that was aiming at the transformation of a large area around the Peace and Friendship Stadium into a sports area including a number of indoor and outdoor facilities. Obviously, at the present time this kind of investment is not an immediate need for our athletes, not even for the community. Consequently, the failure to host the Games affected the government's plan for large scale investments in sports facilities. This kind of investment is beyond the needs of the community in Athens and requires a vast amount of money for maintenance.

**C. Question**

What is the process of budget construction in relation to sport, both at central government and GSS level?
Answer

Before I answer, let me tell you what the main sources of funds for sport are. Sport is funded mainly from football pools, LOTTO, the programme for public investments, the national budget, and a small amount comes from horse racing revenues. For instance, last year sport received 30 billion drachmae from football pools, and 6 billion from the national budget. The funds received from the programme for public investments depend on a number of factors. For example, during the period of our preparation for the Olympic bid the amount of money from the above programme reached 11.5 billion drachmae, while last year this amount fell to 1.5 billion, due to our failure to host the Games. For 1993 the funds from the national budget will reach 8 billion drachmae, from public investments 4.5 billion and we expect 30 to 33 billion from the football pools. Therefore, the main financial support is based on the revenues from football pools since the amount funded directly from the state is only a small percentage of the national budget. However, a great amount of money is being returned to the public either via the GSS's grant to the governing bodies of sport and the sports associations or through the construction of sports facilities.

The process of budget construction at central government level is the same for every Ministry. The Minister of Finance has a meeting with the Junior Minister of Sport and the argument is based on both the financial data of the previous year and the GSS programme for the following year. But more or less the rationale for the decision on the sports budget is based on last year's funds plus the inflation, bearing always in mind that the main source of funds is the football pools. The only area for negotiation concerns the funds from the programme for public investments and as I said earlier the government invested a huge amount so far as Greece had a good chance to host the Games.

Furthermore, through consistent efforts from our Ministry we managed to include sport into the second Delors programme which meant that sport would be funded with 50 billion drachmae (£147 million) in the period 1993-4 to 1998-9 from the European Community. The above amount will be used entirely for the construction of sports facilities.
**Question**
Could you please tell me whether the money will fund the construction of large or small facilities in Athens or the periphery?

**Answer**
There is one condition included in the above agreement, that is that the cost of any facility to be included in the above programme has to be more than 500 million drachmae (£1.5 m). That means that the EC will fund large scale facilities and therefore the GSS funds will be directed to smaller facilities. For the time being the GSS funds both large and small scale facilities. From now on and for the next five years there is a clear policy for the GSS funding of small facilities while the EC will support the construction of large facilities. But to be honest with you, 500 million drachmae is nothing else but the cost of a swimming pool, and one of our first priorities is to build one swimming pool in every big city. The size and the concentration of the population are the main criteria for the area of facilities construction. Therefore, the first objective is to build the basic sports facilities (swimming pools, sports halls etc.) in every big city and then to extend the programme to even smaller communities. Our aim is to use the EC funds for the completion of the first stage.

**Question**
As I can realise the lack of facilities and the size of the population are the determining factors for an area to be included in the above programme.

**Answer**
There seems to be no doubt about that. At the moment we have a list that proves the lack of sports facilities. To give you an example, there are 20 out of the 52 county capitals which lack a swimming pool, and therefore you can realise that there is no swimming pool in the whole province. Consequently, the immediate plan calls for the construction of twenty swimming pools in the above areas. In addition, almost twenty five county capitals lack facilities for track events and athletics. This is another criterion for the construction of facilities. In cases where the cost of facilities was less than 500 million drachmae, we included two or three facilities as a single contract project.

The process of budget construction at GSS level is quite the same as at central government level.
**Question**
What I mean with my initial question on budget construction is what is the process of decision making for the allocation of GSS funds (grants to governing bodies, funding of facilities etc.).

**Answer**
The GSS has three main areas of spending; i) the finance of facilities that have not yet been completed, ii) the programme of the new year's activities (money for entirely new facilities). Therefore, under the label facilities we make the distinction between facilities in construction and new facilities. At the moment the amount needed for the completion of the existing facilities is 15 billion drachmae. Every year the GSS finances almost half of that amount, approximately 7.5 billion, and an equal amount is included in the budget for the construction of new facilities. Therefore, 15 billion drachmae is absorbed every year for new and uncompleted facilities. If you consider that the total GSS budget is about 45 billion, there are 30 billion left to be used for the running cost of sport (third area of spending), that includes; i) grants to the governing bodies of sport, ii) direct grants to sports clubs and associations based on each club's appraisal by the governing body, without the state intervening in this process, iii) funds given to local government, iv) the cost of 'sport for all' programmes and curriculum sport that are conducted in co-operation with the Ministry of Education, v) maintenance of sports facilities, the most expensive of which are the swimming pools, and vi) several other minor categories of spending.

**Question**
As I can realise the main source of GSS funds is the football pools. What is the process of decision making on the percentage of revenues allocated to the GSS?

**Answer**
The percentage of GSS from football pools has remained the same since its introduction, that is 29%. What has changed is the percentage of LOTTO revenues. Following the Minister of Finance's proposal and the argument between the above Minister and the Junior Minister of Sport, GSS funds from LOTTO have decreased from 29% to 15% of total revenues. The above decision came as a consequence of the crisis of Greek economy. An easy way to counter the financial difficulties was to reduce sports proportion on
LOTTO revenues. Therefore, the decision for the above issues is taken after a meeting between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Sport. The Minister of Sport follows the budget proposals as these have been decided by the different departments within the GSS.

Question
In what ways is government change likely to affect appointments at top positions within the GSS?

Answer
Changes in government affect the position of the Minister and the General Secretary of Sport. Furthermore, by law there is a position within the department of competitive sport (the head of the department) which is held by an employee with degree on physical education. This person is also subject to change. The rest of the positions (head of departments, junior officers etc.) are occupied by GSS employees on a permanent basis. Therefore, only those three top positions depend on the party in office.

Question
Could you please tell me why the only position affected by governmental changes is that of the head of the competitive sport department?

Answer
Mainly because it is a sensitive area where the government policy can be identified. For example, ND may argue for a minimal state intervention. In this case, once we agree with an X governing body on its annual budget, the GSS has no further interest in the budget allocation and the detailed policy of the above sports body. On the other hand, the department of competitive sport is the only way through which the GSS might intervene with the policy (detailed plan, instructor appointments etc.) of the governing bodies of sport. Therefore, the head of the department has to change in order for the government to be able to implement its policy.

Question
Does this fact mean that the above department is more important for the government and/or the government places more emphasis on competitive sport?
Answer
It is simply a compliance to a piece of legislation voted many years ago. I do not believe that this is the reason behind it. In practise, our effort is to achieve continuity in the policy of that department and we only appoint a new person after changes in office and not after changes within the government.

Question
In what ways do governing bodies of sport bid for grant-in-aid?

Answer
Before the new economic year the governing bodies submit their budget to the GSS. The final budget is usually the result of a series of discussions and meetings between the governing bodies and GSS employees. In the case of a major disagreement, or where the budget concerns a large body, the discussion takes place between the governing body and the General Secretary or the Minister of Sport.

Question
What are the factors taken into consideration for the allocation of subsidies to the NGBs?

Answer
Due to the lack of any specific measures for the appraisal of the governing bodies and their achievements, political or any kind of sympathies can work very well. In practise it is very difficult to use such measures as the number of medals won or the bodies' position in the world rankings. The main criteria are the number of sports clubs represented by a particular governing body, its administration cost and its successes in the sports field. For example, the body of football represents 5000 clubs all over the country, basketball 1100-1200 clubs, swimming nearly 1000, athletics 400 clubs. All those numbers offer a picture of the needs of every single body. But on the other hand there is no doubt that in case you wish to make a personal favour you can do so.

Question
How is the role of local government in the implementation of sports policy regarded by your government?
Appendix II

Answer
There is no doubt that local government can play a great role in sport. It is also a premise for sports development and success that local government is an associate in sports policy implementation. It is obvious that the amount of funds allocated to local government by the GSS does not match the need for sports development at local level and therefore local authorities should spend money for sport from their own budget. For example, during 1992 the budget for 'sport for all' programmes reached at 2 billion drachmae. In addition, sport in school has a great role to play in the whole effort. But in Greece, sport in school is still at a very low level despite the efforts towards that objective. GSS funds are available to the Ministry of Education, and also specific programmes searching for talented young athletes are now in progress. But in general since most schools lack basic sports facilities we cannot talk about the existence of sport in school.

D. Question
What are the reasons for the reduction of GSS's grant in the last years, both in real terms and as a percentage of government expenditure?

Answer
If we examine the proportion of the National Budget spent on sport we will see that this has been constantly decreased in the last years. To give you an example, in 1981 GSS budget was about 0.9 percent of the national budget, while in 1992 this was 0.1 percent. The main reason for the above reduction is the proportional increase of revenues from the football pools and LOTTO. Therefore, the Minister of Finance, taking into account the increase of GSS funds from football pools, reaches to a decision for a proportional reduction of GSS funds from the government. As a conclusion we can argue that the amount of money spent on sport has remained the same in real terms. What has happened is a reduction of state contribution to this amount.

Question
What kind of priority does ND give to the development of elite sport and the provision of sport for the community?
There should be a balance between those two objectives. One is a prerequisite for the other. You cannot achieve high performance in sport without providing mass sport. If a large number of children take part in sport, you can expect positive results in the future. Therefore, promotion of mass sport is an objective which aims at attracting as many children as possible in sport, and at providing the opportunity to talented children to become champions. There is not a boundary line between elite and mass sport. You can only say that I have no interest in elite sport and my aim is to develop mass sport. On the other hand, if you wish to achieve high performance sport, you have to develop mass sport as well.

My data show a considerable change of the relation between GSS’s capital and revenue expenditure in the last years. What is this relation likely to be in the future?

When I was in office our policy was to increase capital expenditure without decreasing revenue expenditure. In other words, we tried to sustain GSS grant to the governing bodies at the same level in real terms by allocating next year's funds according to last year's grants plus the inflation. Our belief was that the number of facilities available was a determining factor for the successful work of governing bodies of sport and sports associations. My personal view is that if we follow a comprehensive programme for two years we may resolve the problem of facilities for the next twenty years. This policy is likely to be pursued in the future, given that European funds will provide the resources for the above objective.

What were the reasons and what are the main objectives of the new legislation for the organisation of professional sport?

The 1958 Act mainly deals with football and basketball. Football became a professional sport with the 1979 Act (no. 879). Until recently, basketball was regarded as an amateur sport, even though at the same time there were huge economic interests around it. The government therefore introduced the last
act aiming at the following objectives; i) to transform basketball to a professional sport and put 'legal' limits to the financial deals within this field, ii) to re-examine and bring up to date football management and, according to our philosophy, to minimise government action and control within football, and iii) to modernise the area of football refereeing by taking off responsibilities from the Minister of Sport which were not in line with his role.

In more detail, bringing up to date football management was a major step forward. There are at least ten articles in the above act that deal with the financial management of football clubs. From 1979 to 1991 there was no financial control on the activities of football clubs. State subsidies were subject to abuse, and football clubs were in debt to the Social Insurance Foundation and tax authorities. The above act specified the revenue from football pools a club receives, according to the national division it takes part in (i.e. clubs from division one share an amount equal to three percent of football revenue, clubs in division two receive two percent etc.), while at the past the Minister was free to allocate money according to his wishes. Subsequently, the clubs are required to open five bank accounts corresponding to several categories of financial transactions (i.e. an account for the running cost, another one for players signing up etc.). Furthermore, a number of tight measures are taken to secure that all clubs repay their debts. In addition, we introduced the act no. 2021 in order to give the clubs the chance to repay their debts in sixty or ninety monthly payments. For instance, Olympiakos F.C. pays 30 to 35 million drachmae every month as a repayment of the old debt, plus the requirements that have to be paid for a professional football club.

When I was in charge, we aimed to introduce a further legislation especially for football officials. At this point I would like to say a few words. Until 1991 the Junior Minister of Sport was responsible for the appointment of the Supreme Committee of football officials. However, appointments based on personal criteria was the usual practise that caused a lot of problems in football. The 1958 Act transferred the above responsibilities from the Minister to the local officials associations who now vote for the above committee. Certainly this step was not taken without any problems. The main opposition came from the existing governing body of officials, who now see their authority and responsibilities passed by the Supreme Committee. Therefore,
it is the government's role to draw the boundary line of responsibility between those two bodies.

Question
Would you like to add anything else?

Answer
I would like to say a few words about the conference of the Ministers of Sport from the nation-members of the Council of Europe, that was held in Rhodes. One of the objectives of the European Community and the Council of Europe is the implementation of a common policy for sport. This objective is really very important, and all of us have to contribute for its success. The merits of a common sports policy among the thirty members of the Council of Europe and the twelve nations of the EC will be; i) higher athletic performance, ii) the exchange of knowledge among the above countries, and iii) the reduction of research expenses that are very high at the moment since a number of costly projects are producing the same results. Therefore, a common sports policy would be a major progress in that field.

Question
Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this post?

Answer
In 1985 I was appointed head of the New Democracy committee for sport, to draw up the Party's political programme for sport that was published in 1986-87, and subsequently I served the Office of the Junior Minister of Sport from the eighth of August in 1991 until the second of December in 1992. I was an athlete from 1963 to 1978 with a personal interest in 100 meter. My personal best in 100 meters was 10 seconds. That was the European record in 1972 and still stands as the national record in Greece. My degree is on dentistry. In 1978 I was elected in the local council of Thessaloniki, and in 1981, being a candidate with ND, I was elected MP representing the same area. I was re-elected in 1985, 1989 and twice in the 1990 elections.
Question
To what extent did government change in 1990 affect the direction and nature of sports policy?

Answer
I would like to extend my answer to previous governments that played a substantial role in sport and the way sport was developed. In my opinion, certain developments marked sport from 1981 onwards. Before 1981 sport was part of a restricted orientation of the conservative party within the limits of star system. This system was restricted to a number of individuals who achieved high performance and success in a haphazard way. From this story both sides gained some benefits, the athletes who achieved success and the state that took advantage and exploited this success for reasons of propaganda. Certain examples include A. Verouli and S. Sakorafa who succeeded without the state's assistance, and C. Papanikolaou well before that. To conclude, the government's responsibility is huge and its accountability is greater when there are no collective procedures and collective planning and programme for sport. Those procedures were set to a new basis during PASOK governments after 1981. At least we reached the mass development of sport, the scientific support through a number of norms, a programme, a plan which achieved 70% of our original aim. The results of this collective effort were obvious in the 1992 Olympic Games and the Mediterranean Games. But now we can see different results. The lack of a comprehensive sports policy since 1990 has adversely affected sport. There still is an obsolete legislature for sport that restricts the autonomy of governing sports bodies to plan their activities. During PASOK this autonomy was also restricted but at least there was programme and planning for sport. The GSS made the plan along with the bodies, they decided a certain line of policy and then they considered the financial cost of this policy. The central plan was decided after GSS intervention, but at least it had a philosophy.

The New Democracy government adopted a revengeful policy which reached its peak with the policy of subsidies to those governing bodies that ND
regarded as belonging to PASOK. Let me tell you that no governing body belongs to a political party. Members of the bodies' board might belong to a political party (whether this is PASOK or ND) and therefore express a certain view, but at least PASOK never said that this body is mine. New Democracy labelled the NGBs as PASOK or ND bodies, according to the majority within the bodies' board, and that was a great mistake. In that way it started reducing financial resources to those bodies. In the list of revenge, intervention and disaster were included the bodies of athletics, with great success in the Olympic Games, weight lifting, wrestling. As a result we have reduced our programmes to 30%. It is sport that eventually loses. As a result, we may conclude that there was a lack of strategic planning and philosophy for sport. Even the bodies controlled by the government had no results and faced a bad situation due to the lack of policy. Therefore, each political leadership has its own philosophy and plays a significant role in sport.

Question
In what ways did the above change affect the governing body of weight lifting?

Answer
As a governing body we had made our plans and programmes. First, based on world accepted data on sports development, we concluded that in order to become a successful athlete you have to start training from the age of 15-16 years. Therefore, if you aim at high performance you have to start with boys of 10-11 years of age. Based on that we had set up four training centres for talented young athletes, in Athens, Thessaloniki, Ioannina and Kavala. We recruited young boys based on those norms in order to train them, keep them close to the sport, support them financially and solve for them any institutional problems. In close co-operation with the GSS we had solved most of them. The reduction of funds from GSS forced our body to close those centres down, since we could not subsidise them any longer. We could not materialise our plans for the organisation of big events for those children, and special seminars in co-operation with the world federation. We have reduced our competitive plan to 30%. This 30% included the national championship for women, for men and juniors, and we had decided to abolish even these events in case we were not able to get some money at this period. We are now in November and we have not received yet 120 million dr. from 1993 subsidy. It was a disaster for us. We reached a point where our Olympic gold medal
winner had not the equipment necessary for his training sessions, due to the fact that in the last three years they did not grant us the amount to buy training equipment. I will give you a very important and illustrative example; every year since 1990 we asked for an appointment with the political leadership and the Minister, and they never accepted us. When the new government took over, we asked for an appointment on Thursday and he accepted us of Friday. We expressed our problems and he asked for evidence of our three year disaster and our proposal for the development of weight lifting.

I believe that today's government should look at the resources available until the end of this year. Our previous example illustrates the way the new government seeks to withdraw itself and let the governing bodies plan and programme their activities. We are now in a new phase of development, we have new ideas and programmes, we will make our proposals to the GSS for evaluation and intervention, and based on the financial availability we will set our priorities. The GSS will show respect to our programme without a tendency of intervention. I believe that the GSS will play a role of subsidiser. Through this policy every body will have the opportunity to show its competence for developing its sport. This will be either positive or negative. Positive for those bodies that have programmes, ideas and philosophy for sport and negative for those that lack all these elements. The philosophy of the new government is not to set the programme because it does not wish to intervene in the free activities of the sports movement.

B. Question
What is the process of budget construction within the governing body?

Answer
First, we have the administrative expenses. These are inflexible, in the sense that we know them from the beginning of the year. The next part is based on what we call the philosophy of sport. Do we need training centres? How many? Every centre needs two coaches. That concerns the development of sport. The next concerns the national squads. We have the national men, juniors and women teams. What is our objective? For example, participation in the European and World games. What are my objectives in relation to the performance and the medals? Therefore we need certain preparation as far as
training centres, transport, athletic materials, accommodation, food and so forth are concerned. You also have to take into account the financial incentives for the athletes and for every medal. In that way we construct every year's budget. Myself, as the chairman of the technical committee and the technical advisor of the body, with degree in economics, Mr. George Iliou, who knows very well the sport as an old athlete, make the proposals to the body's board for approval. And I can say that our proposals have never been rejected from the board.

**Question**
In what ways do sports clubs bid for grant-in-aid?

**Answer**
Unfortunately, sports clubs have not a close co-operation with the governing body due to their structure. The clubs are subsidised from the GSS according to their success in every sport. Unfortunately, the clubs that receive an amount for a certain sport, tend to pass this amount to other sports they develop, which is partially justified because the clubs have a number of needs. For example if there is a need for the basketball or volleyball team this amount of money will go to the above sports. Unfortunately, due to the existing legislation the governing body has not the right to intervene in the autonomy of the clubs. Our relationship with the clubs is not the one that we would like it to be. One reason is the lack of competent coaches for weight lifting. I believe that if we had scientists-coaches we could pay directly their salaries so that the clubs could produce better results. This situation would create a different relationship between clubs and the state and clubs and the governing body. But under the current situation we have no right to intervene in the affairs of the sports clubs.

**Question**
What are the factors taken into account for the allocation of subsidies to the above clubs?

**Answer**
The level of activity is the main factor. How many athletes of a certain club are actively participating in weight lifting? How many of them take part in the national championship? What is their performance in the championships? That is what we call the quality of the club. Before 1989 those factors were
taken into consideration and we had the resources to subsidise this effort. Now we do not have the money to sustain the subsidies. But certainly there are certain criteria. Based on those criteria we allocated subsidies to the sports clubs.

Question
My data from the GSS show that in 1986 there was a drastic reduction of the body's subsidy to the sports clubs. In the period 1986-89 this amount quadrupled. In 1990 it reduced 50%, and then constantly increased and in 1992 reached at the 1989 level. Could you explain me the reasons for the above fluctuations? (Graphs were shown to the interviewee)

Answer
I remember very well that there was a drop in 1986 and that was due to the new criteria we initiated. We took over in October 1984. In 1985 we set the new criteria. The clubs accepted those criteria but their planning had not yet been adjusted in order to be productive. As a result, in 1986 they had not yet created the conditions to perform under the new criteria. From 1986 to 1989 they adjusted their activities to the new criteria set by our body, they cooperated with the body, we also did what we could do in order for the programme to be realised, and gradually we had this increase (quantitative and qualitative increase) until 1989. Every government gives its political stigma. There was a disappointment from the clubs since we did not have the money to subsidise their programme in order for them to be within the lines of the criteria, and as a result there was a relaxation. In response, we tried to help the clubs by cutting some other programmes. So, the slight increase after 1990 was due to the fact that we paid more attention to the clubs.

Question
Is there any kind of co-operation with some clubs for the pursuit of certain objectives?

Answer
At the end of every year you can say that those clubs for example had this activity, a certain level of participation and quality in our sport, and therefore you pay more attention to those clubs. As a result, you have a closer cooperation with those clubs as compared to some others that do not have the potential to develop the sport. The pilot club of our effort was Olympiada
from Aspropyrgos and now Spartakos Ioannina is at this privileged position. These clubs work in depth, both in juniors and at the centre for talented athletes, which is under the clubs supervision after our own decision. We also have Milon, Panellinios and two more clubs in Northern Greece. This cooperation is based on the contact between members of the clubs board and our body, and contact between the instructors. The members of Spartakos for instance have a great interest in weight lifting and they have invested time, ideas and their own money in this effort. They truly invest money from the GSS in the sport of weight lifting.

C. Question
In what ways does your governing body bid for grant-in-aid?

Answer
It submits its budget and then bargains with the state. For instance we might have an ambitious programme that is likely to cost 800 million dr. On the other hand you have to take into account the potential of the GSS to give you this amount. In our budget we analyse our plan and argue why we need this amount. For example we might include the cost for attending 10 seminars abroad and the GSS might reduce it to 7 or 8. You might also have a training centre which requires 4 coaches for its operation. "Reduce it to 2", the GSS might say. There is a co-operation and within an atmosphere of mutual respect we can adjust and re-adjust our budget. In addition, you might have some unforeseen expenditure not included in the budget. In this case in agreement with the GSS you cover this extra cost by getting extra subsidies.

Question
What are the factors taken into account for the allocation of subsidies to the governing bodies?

Answer
In my opinion, as a member of the PASOK Committee for sport, which draws the political planning for sport with respect to the government's actions, there should be a different treatment to some bodies. In the Committee, we concluded that all bodies should be in the same position to develop their sport. Beyond that, the bodies subsidies, which are subject to reduction from the GSS should be set in such a way as to reward those sports that are now
productive and successful. All sports should be developed, but some bodies that have successes at world level should be given an extra help, the reduction should be less severe. Reduction of subsidies should be more severe for those bodies that lack success, rather than for those which are successful. I do not intend to make a comparison between different sports, but this is the reality. There are sports that are not productive in international events. And we all know the sports which are productive. Success is not merely the result of planning and programme, it depends also on the suitability of some sports to Greek culture. All around the world this kind of selection is the norm. The policy of developing all sports belongs to the past. The gigantic effort from some countries (ex Soviet Union, US) to be the leaders in every sport is over. Now there is a selection of sport, between those that can be developed as opposed to those that they cannot. The same happens in Greece. Basketball, weight lifting, volleyball, wrestling, and swimming a few years ago, because now swimming is also a victim of New Democracy's policy even though it 'belongs' to it, stand at a high level. Since we have these sports which are successful, we have to subsidise them with a higher amount.

**Question**
Do you think that political affiliation between some bodies and the government of ND has resulted in greater grant-in-aid for those bodies?

**Answer**
Yes. It has resulted in greater grant-in-aid but not in good results. This policy was also unproductive. That was due to the lack of strategic planning, philosophy for sport. It is not only a matter of money, it is the knowledge to approach sport which is also important.

**Question**
Were there any major changes in the relationship between your body and the GSS in the past? (Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?)

**Answer**
Prior to 1990 there was a very close co-operation with the GSS. There was an exchange of opinions even with the General Secretary and the Minister on the development of weight lifting. Our view was accepted, and based on that we
have today's success. After 1990 there was no co-operation at all and this was not our fault. We had asked for co-operation but it never happened.

**Question**

Data from the GSS show that GSS subsidy to your body increased substantially, both in real terms and as a percentage of total GSS subsidy to governing bodies, in 1989. In the same way the subsidy reduced in 1990 and then remained at the level of 1988 subsidy. Could you explain me the reasons for the above fluctuations? (Graphs were shown to the interviewee)

**Answer**

In 1989 we received 310 million drachmae, and it was the most ambitious programme. Having gained the respect of the GSS through all those years of co-operation, we were granted the amount that we had asked for. There was only a slight reduction. Our programme proved to be successful with the gold medal in 1992 Olympic Games, and many other good results. Therefore the programme was productive. And suddenly in 1990 the GSS and the political leadership, without even looking at our success (how many medals we have) reduced this amount to 120 million prompted by its revengeful policy. This was also the case of the athletics governing body. In the Olympic Games we had 1st, 5th and 6th position and then from 120 million we reached 220 million. After the Games we submitted another ambitious budget, far less than the one in 1989 irrespective of the major success, and at the end we got only 270 million.

**D. Question**

In what ways might major international success of the national team affect the respective governing body?

**Answer**

In our sport we cannot talk about mass participation. Pyrros (the gold medal winner) can hardly become an idol like Komanetsi for instance. Following our own analysis we have no evidence to support that our success resulted in increasing participation in weight lifting. But such a great success has a positive impact within our sport. The athletes now have an objective. They realise that with hard work they can reach such a high standard of performance. But success had no effect on the budget. Simply we escaped
from the major fall of 120 million. But the budget should have exceeded that of 1989. Taking into account both success and inflation, and based on a very important plan we had prepared, the budget should have been over 450-500 million.

**Question**
To what extent might the organisation of major international events influence the policy of the body? (including the bid and failure to host the 1996 Games)

**Answer**
Before the decision in Tokyo, we had organised the junior and men world championship in weight lifting. Our relationship with the world federation is excellent. The chairman of our body, Mr. I. Sgouros is also deputy chairman of the World and European federation of weight lifting. We discuss with the chairman and the general secretary our thoughts about the development of our sport, not only in Greece but also world-wide. It has been noted that the best world championships have been organised in France, and in Greece. Our success in organising such an event was achieved without any prior experience, but we proved that we had both knowledge and ideas. But all these factors are not taken into account in an Olympic bid. Other factors are more important, such as economic factors, advertising and marketing interests etc. The IOC members saw that a 10 million people country would not have the same perspectives with a country of 200 million, especially when this country is called US of America. At this stage sponsoring played a major part. Therefore, the excellent organisation of our championship played no role at all.

Certainly, in case we had won the bid and the sports infrastructure had fully taken place, the sport of weight lifting would have had its own facilities. Those facilities today simply do not exist. I can say that the sport of Olympic winners begs for a place to host the national championships. From 1990 onwards we pay fees to national sports centres in order to organise those events. Fortunately, the chairman of the body is also chairman of a sports club (Milon) and some major events have taken place in the club's sports centre, in a private-voluntary club and not in a public centre under the financial supervision and assistance of the GSS. If we had won the 1996 Games it would have been a positive development for us, mainly as a means to acquire our own sports facilities.
Question
Would you like to add anything else?

Answer
We insist for the building of facilities for 3000-4000 people to be used exclusively for weight lifting, both for training and events. We would need such facilities, one in Athens and one in the wider area of Macedonia-Thrace. Also, the south part of Greece will need such a centre. Our ambitious programme includes the development of centres for talented young athletes, in order to have mass participation and simultaneously to produce our own world champions. We did not manage to realise our programme at its full extent because after 1990 there was a disaster.

Question
Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this position, and if there has been any other position in sport that you have served?

Answer
I have been in this position, as the body's general secretary since 1984. I have been elected twice member of the HOC (1988-92 and 1992-). For a four year period I was member of the scientific committee of the world federation, and of the Athens Olympic Stadium committee.
Local Level
Municipality of Iraklio (Attiki)
Deputy Chairman of the Municipal Athletic Centre
and Member of the Local Council

A. Question
What are the main features of your local party policy on sport?

Answer
The policy on sport of our municipality is expressed through the Athletic Centre. In its board there are persons who have dealt with sport either as ex-athletes or as members of the clubs' boards. The philosophy of our local party for sport is that sport is a right shared by the whole of the local community irrespective of age or gender. The participation of the European champion Mrs A. Verouli, who is the chairman of the Athletic Centre, and the fact that the Mayor was a former athlete of volleyball, played a great role in the realisation of sports policy from our centre.

Question
In what ways do these features differ from the opposition party policy?

Answer
As far as the opposition party is concerned, I would like to say that when they were in office, from 1986 to 1990, they did not pay attention to sport, since the former Mayor had no relation with sport at all. As a result only a few programmes were maintained. It seems to be important that the Mayor is a former athlete and as such he considers sports issues under a different angle. Irrespective of whether the Mayor has a relationship with sport, which if it happens is a further advantage, any kind of philosophy for sport should be accompanied with the persons who want to offer to sport.

B. Question
What were the major changes in the relationship between central and local government in the 1980s and 1990s?
Answer

Although I was not in the council in that period, I have an opinion on this issue. The changes planned by the central government in most cases remained a plan. An important change was the establishment of neighbourhood councils, introduced shortly after 1980, which worked very well at the beginning but then their importance fed away. Also the thought for setting up the second level of local administration remained in the papers, and we believe that the new government will make this a reality.

Question

In what ways have those changes affected the council of Iraklio?

Answer

The neighbourhood councils had a positive impact. The fact that the second level of local administration was never materialised was the main negative impact. By its materialisation the municipalities would have acquired their own sources of money, and a greater autonomy from central government. In a local community the Mayor and the council are able to know better the problems and the needs of this community, and as such they can take a better course of action in order to solve those problems. Through decentralisation, enhanced by the second level of local government, the municipalities would work much better. On the other hand, some sources of money are regarded as being safeguarded by legislation. Those sources were subject to the will of each government. For instance, the former government did not recognise the right of the municipalities to receive those funds. As a result the municipalities had serious economic problems, and it was difficult for the councils to plan their policy.

Question

What were the main changes in sports policy in the last years? How has your council's policy on sport been affected by these changes?

Answer

In sport there were major changes. The most important was the implementation of 'sport for all' programmes, which we still keep as a municipality. Certainly our policy has been affected by the serious economic difficulties. When we came in the council in 1990 we managed to implement the programmes for sport, through the subsidy from the council - which is
institutionally set at 1% of the municipality's budget - and the contribution of
the participants. We also had some assistance from the GSS, which provided
and paid the physical education instructors which in a sense is the major cost.
If there was not the GSS assistance it would be difficult to keep the
programmes since the cost for 40 instructors is unbearable. Sometimes there is
a delay in GSS sending instructors. Last year the instructors from the GSS
came at the end of November, this year they have not come yet. As a council
therefore, we had to start the programmes independently of GSS, which
subsequently implied that we had to cover a substantial cost (for 12
instructors we have to pay 2 million dr. a month), for keeping the
programmes. This cost is covered by the monthly payments, either small or
bigger, of those participating in the programmes. The GSS followed and kept
a policy on 'sport for all' programmes which was initiated by the previous
government. Having said that, it was up to the municipalities and the persons
in their boards to work and implement the programmes. Since we had the
people to work for the programmes, GSS contributed to our effort and there
was no impact from any change in GSS policy for the programmes.

Question
What are the main objectives of the sports centre?

Answer
The sports clubs are oriented towards high performance sport, while on the
other hand we try to promote mass sport for all citizens irrespective of age or
talent in sport. We only aim at providing sports activities for children,
women, the elderly etc. This is always achieved through the GSS which
provides the instructors. We have started our programmes with 3 or 4
instructors and now we have 40. Our main aim is to prevent the youngsters
from getting involved with drugs, and to protect them from other dangerous
situations.

Question
What is the kind of relationship between your council and the GSS? Was there
any major change of this relationship in the past?

Answer
Even though our council had a different policy from the government we had
the GSS's assistance, because we are a municipality with many programmes
for sport and major events. GSS subsidised us in order to cover the cost of the programmes. For instance, the cost of the high jump meeting was 4-5 million dr., and the GSS granted us 1-2 million dr. The same was the case for the rest of the events we organised. Apart from instructors we also received financial assistance from the GSS. There was a positive response from the GSS to all our events. We also had contact with the General Secretary and the Minister of Sport, who were present in all our events. During the year we also have contact with governing bodies since we give the municipal sports hall for their leagues. Certainly, we expect more from the new government since we are affiliated with the political party in office. We expect to be subsidised for the completion of one swimming pool. We had contact with the former Minister of Sport, who promised to give us 50 million dr. but the election came before that. We believe that now we will get this money.

D. Question
What is the process of decision making for the allocation of the council's subsidy to the athletic centre?

Answer
The subsidy for sport is 1% of the municipality's budget, and this is the case for every council. With this subsidy and the participants' small contribution we manage to cover the expenses for the operation of the programmes and the facilities.

Question
To what extent does the local council influence the decision making process of the sports centre's committee?

Answer
The local council has no influence on decision making, since the athletic centre has its own board, and this board has assumed the responsibility for decision making on sports policy issues.

Question
In what ways are the wants and needs of the electorate expressed in decision making for sports provision?
Answer
Decisions taken by the local community have no impact on the centre's policy. Certainly we take them into account. We are open to any proposal or problem and we always discuss them. We also want to have contact with the people. We keep and implement most of the positive proposals.

E. Question
What is the kind of relationship between the council and the local sports clubs? Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives? What are the criteria for subsidising the above clubs?

Answer
The relationship of the council and the athletic centre with the local clubs is very good. We let them use all our facilities without a rent, and we subsidise them according to the leagues they take part in, their activities etc. Certainly the centre’s sports policy is quite different from the clubs' policy. The athletic centre and the municipality follow the policy of 'sport for all' while the clubs want to play a protagonist role in their leagues. We offer exercise for all while the clubs specialise in some sport and recruit athletes who are suitable to their squads.

Question
How has the role of local sports clubs been affected by the operation of the sports centre?

Answer
There is an effect. Some clubs are not happy with the operation of the centre, which, I believe, is not justified. The reason is that we attract young children to our programmes, while the clubs also try to recruit children for their sports academies, as an attempt to increase their sources of funds. But a club will never accept short or fat boys for instance, because it makes a selection based on the sport that it develops. We offer exercise for all children. In parallel, the local clubs have the potential to recruit children from our programmes at a latter stage. If you like, we prepare children for the clubs. One other thing is that we have gathered almost 2000 children which would not be feasible for the clubs. We understand the problem of the clubs, since the subsidy from the state is small and the cost is huge, but the athletic centre has its own policy; to
offer sport for all irrespective of age and talent, and I think that the clubs have a lot to gain from the centre.

*Question*
In what ways has the Greek bid for the 1996 Games affected the athletic centre?

*Answer*
Certainly the final decision affected the whole world of sport, because it was influenced by other factors such as economic interests, and sponsorship. In case we had won the bid, then a large area in our municipality would have been transformed into sports facilities for the Games. All this construction stopped after the decision to give the Games to Atlanta. As a municipality we missed the opportunity to use those facilities for our needs after the Games.

*Question*
Would you like to add anything else?

*Answer*
I would like to say that nowadays sport as an exercise and not as competition is a need more than anything else, because it can improve both health and spirit, and certainly our duty is to lead youngsters to sport as a means to prevent them from drugs. In my opinion, you can only fight drugs through leading our children to other activities which consume time and as such children can be kept away from bad things. Sport is a tool for protecting youngsters from any kind of danger.

*Question*
Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this position, and if there has been any other position in sport that you have served?

*Answer*
I have been responsible, as a deputy chairman, for the municipality's sports programmes since 1990. I have been member of the centre's board since 1983. I was a football player and also I have got a degree from GSS seminars on football coaching. Also I have been an elected member of the municipal board since 1990.
Sports Clubs
Athletic Club Paradisos Amarousiou (Chairman)

A. Question
What were the main changes in sport in the last few years that affected your club?

Answer
Until 1960 Greek sport was not subsidised by the state, but it was based on private initiatives. It was amateur sport in its ideal form. When PROPO was introduced, Greek sport was organised in the form of governing bodies, and the state started to fund sport. Greece also started to take part in international events of the international federations. This meant that apart from the clubs, the governing bodies started to make work, since they developed the national teams and undertook the responsibility for making Greece known through sport. Government changes had not a major impact on sport. This is because the subsidy given is still much less than we need. As I said, at the beginning we were based on amateur sport. Now we have to pass state's money to the athletes in order to maintain the club. Now the number of athletes has also been increased. Governing bodies subsidies also might appear to be reduced, but actually there was an increase. I am talking from my own experience as chairman of special committees in four bodies (wrestling, volleyball, weight lifting, judo and tennis). Since 1980 the bodies have received more money compared to that in earlier years. I was deputy chairman in wrestling. Before 1980 we could manage our affairs with 50-60 million dr. We even reached a point where we had 500 million dr. budget. In the last three years, there was a reduction indeed. In some bodies, such as wrestling and weight lifting there is also the political game, since those bodies were opposed to the ND government. But in general there was a reduction of subsidies. In particular, last year the Minister of Culture used a large amount of money from PROPO revenues and disposed it to the museums. Those money was not disposed to sport. The Ministry of Culture gave less money to the Deputy Ministry of Sport.

Certainly this reduction affected our club, since the bodies help the clubs in case for instance a club wishes to make a construction work in a sports hall. In addition, the bodies could not pay their trainers. There was an impact but it was not severe. I was in the bodies' board and I can honestly say that the
bodies have learned to waste money. For instance, they contacted journalist and they printed pamphlets that were not in need, as a means to show to the public that they do sport. They used money that could go to the clubs. That is why I am saying that the impact was not severe. Because essentially money was not allocated to the clubs. They could raise instead the payments to the trainers. As a result of the reduction, the bodies forced to reduce the number of participation in international events. The little trips of the administrators in expensive hotels and so forth. It happened for me to be in a meeting where they decided to give money to journalists. And other incidents such as high payments to trainers who happened to be former Olympic winner. So they wasted 100 million dr. to advertise their activities.

The 1958 Act completed the 75/75 Act. First of all it modernised the legislation for football. Second, it introduced semi-professionalism in basketball and volleyball. With this act the athletes safeguarded their rights that sometimes were in question from their clubs or the GSS. In that way the clubs came under the supervision of the law. The act considers transfer of players, etc. The impact of the new legislation on our club was direct through the volleyball team which became semi-professional.

B. Question
What are the main values in relation to sport adopted by your club?

Answer
Personally I am dealing with sport because I believe that every Greek has to offer something in Greek society. I think that my contribution to the Greek society is to lead the young Greeks into a right road, and this road is "healthy spirit in healthy body". Those two can do nothing else but a good citizen. Now I feel proud because youngsters have shown me love and respect. Many youngsters who have not forgotten us, who know that we never lied to them, to whom we gave whatever we could afford. We gave them a motive to start sport. I believe that none of those children who are in sport takes drugs for example. They all have become good fathers who bring their children to the club. And it is not only me who worked hard. By my side there were many people who worked as much as they could.
Question
What is the process of decision making and budget construction within your club? What are the internal and/or external factors that might have an influence in decision making?

Answer
In the past we were trying to imagine what the possible sources of revenues could be and constructed a small budget, since our expenses were also small. Now things are different. A large part of our budget comes from the state's subsidy. Unfortunately, we do not receive this subsidy from the beginning of the year so that we are unable to know exactly what we are given in order to construct our budget. For instance, the 1993 subsidy was announced in the 26th of September 1993. In that case you cannot construct a budget. As a result we only take account the last year's budget which was approximately 15 million dr. Bearing in mind that the men volleyball squad would be subsidised with an extra 10 million dr., since it had become a professional team, we calculated the subsidy for the rest of our sports. That was approximately 10 million dr. We estimated that we would receive 3 million from the municipality, which we have not received yet. One million dr. could come from other events and along with a help from some governing bodies we could reach 15 million dr. Fortunately, some governing bodies help us by covering the expenses for the trainers' payment. This is the result of a personal initiatives. I did that for the bodies I was a board member. Unfortunately, not all bodies do that. I initially took this kind of initiative in the governing body of wrestling, where for many years I was deputy chairman and chairman of the financial committee. According to the quality of the club and the number of athletes the governing body gives a bonus to the trainers. I did the same when I was general secretary of weight lifting. I was also successful with the governing body of fencing and the body of cycling. From last year, after a personal effort and proposal to the general meeting, as chairman of the technical committee, I was successful with the body of judo. I will also make my proposal to the body of tennis. In that way the governing body can supervise the work of the trainers since it covers their payments and the clubs can give an extra amount to them so that they will be able to make their living.

I ask from every sport in the club to submit its budget. Certainly this budget is far from reality. After a series of meetings we decide to reduce the budget
of one sport and increase those most in need. Sometimes this creates conflict between the different sports. There are no external factors that can influence the budget. The person who is responsible for every sport knows the budget and the needs for this sport, and also knows very well the possible sources of funds. Our complaint is that we do not get the money when we need it. And this creates problems with the athletes who ask for their money and we do not have it, as it happens with volleyball.

C. Question
What is the relationship between your club and the GSS? Was there any change in this relationship over the past few years?

Answer
According to the existing legislation the GSS cannot offer a direct help to a sports club, in order for instance for the club to acquire its own facilities. The local council has to make the proposal for available space so that the GSS can help us to build the facilities we need. As a club we need many halls, for judo, wrestling, fencing, weight lifting, table tennis, gymnastics, etc. As a result we pay a rent for using these halls. The GSS subsidises a capital for the administrative expenses to all clubs, which can start from 10-20% and reach 60% of the clubs' budget. But this is not enough. Certainly, our relationship is excellent. We have asked for help from some Ministers in order to build a sports hall.

Question
Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

Answer
I have a personal contact with many people in the GSS. I do not have any available space so that I can capitalise on my friendship and build a sports hall.

Question
In what ways can the GSS influence decision making in your club?
Answer
If we decide to meet some expenses and we do not get the money certainly there is an influence. Every club is autonomous, and as long as we comply with the athletic legislation then there is no influence. The only influence concerns the subsidy. If we do not get the money we cannot realise our programme.

Question
My data from GSS show that the subsidy to your club reduced in 1989 and increased again in 1990. Would you like to explain the reasons for this fluctuation?

Answer
The reduction in 1989 is due to the fact that the volleyball team relegated from division A2 to second national division. As such we had a reduction of subsidy from 15 to 10 million dr. The increase is again due to the volleyball team and its promotion. The reduction from 1991 to 1992 is due to the fact that we stopped having some sports, gymnastics in particular. And we did so because the gymnastics body's system was not fair. And this is because in order to have a trainer paid by the body of athletics you need to get 100 points, if you get 99 points you cannot get this kind of assistance. That happened with athletics and gymnastics in our club. Years ago, we managed to get 176 points and we needed 180 in order to get a second trainer. So, we paid from our pocket for the second instructor since we needed him. This is SEGAS' fault because when a club does an effort the body should help it. But in our case we managed to get to a certain level of performance and there was no help.

Question
How often is the contact with the governing bodies and what form does it take (formal, informal)?

Answer
There is always a formal contact through the members of the club's board who are also members of the bodies' boards. The contact is direct. We also help the bodies by suggesting a number of measures, because as a club we have a long experience.
Question
Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

Answer
When they ask for this kind of co-operation, yes there is. We have so many objectives to reach as a club that we do not have the time to deal with theirs. A common objective comes through our athletes who are members of the national teams. And we have many. And also there is co-operation through the trainers, as I have said.

Question
In what ways might governing bodies influence decision making in your club?

Answer
There is an influence exercised for example when they do not allow you to organise an event at the time you want. So far it has never happened to me. Another way is by not granting you subsidy, or by giving you less money than that it gives to the other clubs. Again, I do not think that they do it deliberately. A governing body can also influence the result of a league game (by not sending competent referees to a vital game for you), which then has an impact on the amount of subsidy. The members of the body's board come originally from a certain club and as such they can influence the bodies' decisions in a way that serves the interests of their clubs, which might benefit their club and harm yours.

Question
How often is the contact with the local council? What form does it take? Is there any kind of co-operation for the pursuit of certain objectives?

Answer
We have a contact with the council. We have a representative in the athletic organisation of the municipality. In the municipality they do not have enough knowledge on sports issues. The municipality has made an effort to develop mass/social sport which is a valuable effort, as long as it does not compete with the sports club. When the municipality for instance, introduces tennis lessons, children tend to go there instead of coming to the club. In the club we have to pay the tennis instructors while in the municipality the GSS
subsidises his payment. The children attend free of charge the municipal programmes and on the other hand the GSS does not give us money to pay the instructor. As a result we have to pay for both the facilities used, and the instructor. The same is true for football, basketball for example, where the children go there instead of coming to the club. I am not saying that the municipality does a bad thing. All I am saying is that there should be some people in the board to implement a programme in sport to a point where it offers help to the local clubs and does not make any harm to them. I offered my services to the municipality, without aiming at getting back any benefits for myself or the club. The municipality should not compete with the clubs because if the clubs cease to exist then there will be no sport at all. In some municipalities I have seen the councils doing everything in sport, but I am not sure if they can replace the clubs successfully. Because the people in the municipalities lack the passion with sport. I will give you an example. In 1988 we asked from the council to hire for us four halls that we needed and they approved two of them in 1993. And they did that because of personal problems of the employee in the municipality charged with those matters. I have no problem with the council. Especially the last administration has worked on sport, they have created an athletic centre even though they do not have enough knowledge. We stopped organising some events because the local council does the same. We could organise the events together but the council offers no substantial assistance. On the other hand, the municipality has an even co-operation with all local clubs. This is right. But when we work harder and the other clubs get the benefits it is not fair. As a result we do not have many joint activities with the municipality. The council gave 2 million dr. to us and 3 million dr. to the other major local club. When the other club promoted to a higher league in basketball they were given an extra 2 million dr. after the board's decision. Due to the personal interference of Mr. Mostrus, who is charged with the athletic centre, we were also given 2 million dr., since our team promoted to a higher league as well. There is an uneven treatment in relation to Marousi club, and we have twice as many sports as Marousi. The municipality also promised to pay the rents for a number of halls and also gave us 1 million dr. for sports equipment. But still there is an unequal treatment. And when I asked for a reason, a member of the board told me that the Mayor was dissatisfied with the club because we failed, as a club, to support in the local elections a local candidate who is member of our club. But that was not the club's fault but rather the candidate's. And certainly I cannot explicitly support this candidate since he belongs to a party and by
supporting him I will become an enemy of the other party. As a club we follow an independent line and we do not deal with politics. We do not politicise the club. We have our personal beliefs. Anyone can be a member of the board irrespective of his political beliefs. We all work for sport and not for a political party. Certainly, the municipality has a political colour. The Mayor has offered me the chair of the municipal board but I refused.

Question
On what factors is the local council's subsidy based?

Answer
On the fact that we had 48 national, two Balkan, two European and two World victories. That was the factor and still we got less than the Gymnastic Club of Marousi. Still we get less subsidy even though we do twice as much as Marousi club. I do not think that political affiliation plays a substantial role since I am aware that even though the other local sports club is opposed to the political beliefs of the municipality, it still has a good co-operation with the council. It was the suspicion by someone that the Mayor was dissatisfied with us because we did not elect the individual mentioned earlier. But on the other hand, neither did Marousi club. On the other hand, the Mayor asked me from the phone to appoint one of his faithful, who is also member of our club, as the club's representative in the governing body of weight lifting, while ND was in office. I refused this appointment and I said that the club's board would have to decide on this issue, since the club's regulations state that only the chairman and the general secretary can represent the club to the governing bodies' boards. Mr. Mostrus wanted to be the club's representative, since this body is controlled by PASOK. I refused because Mr. Mostrus was also a member of PASOK party and that would mean that the club of Paradisos was involved with politics. I wanted to be the representative so that none would know what my vote would be. What I want to say is that the clubs should not be influenced by the bodies, they should keep themselves away from politics. The whole sport should stay away from politics. I believe that the governing bodies exercise political influence to the clubs. Particularly those bodies affiliated with political parties require from the clubs to support, in the NGB election, those candidates who belong to the same political group. In that way they exercise a kind of pressure to the clubs and that makes things difficult for the clubs that want to make sport. As a club, if we adopt a political line we will come in conflict with the opposition. We want from the
bodies to let us vote those people who have made a contribution to the sport. Many people who have offered a lot will be wasted in that way. We will not allow that. And the GSS can exercise the same influence. The GSS can give extra subsidy to those clubs with which it is politically affiliated. If the club is not affiliated then it is difficult to get anything from the GSS. And if the club is neutral, such as our club, it is always a looser. And certainly the local council can exercise influence to the local clubs.

**D. Question**
What was the impact on your club of Greece's bid, and its failure to host the 1996 Games?

**Answer**
There was no impact on the club. The impact did not reach the club. There was an impact on the state and the nation due to emotional reasons. We had the ambition to organise the Games after 100 years from their rejuvenation but we failed. I do not believe that we can bid again. The technology goes further and unfortunately the old Olympic idea is absent. Everything is about money, and the last vote for Atlanta is the proof and I am very disappointed. Since we do not have the potential to have Olympic winners in our club, there was no impact at all. We only lost a good opportunity to improve the picture of our city because we are close to the Olympic stadium. We also lost the opportunity to see the transport infrastructure taking place.

**Question**
Would you like to add anything else?

**Answer**
I hope that the Mayor will catch the opportunity of open space in our town and will plan the building of a football ground, two more indoor sports halls and one or two swimming pools. We should also have the first priority to use the facilities of the Olympic stadium.

**Question**
Would you mind telling me how long have you served in this position, and if there has been any other position in sport that you have served?
Answer

I have been chairman for 38 years. I was deputy chairman in wrestling governing body, the first general secretary of weight lifting body, chairman in the body of cycling, chairman for a short period in fencing, member of judo governing body, member of the international body of wrestling, member of the world cycling federation. I am chairman of the executive committee of volleyball, tennis, and weight lifting federations. I have produced the legal documents of 13 governing bodies.