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LOAN COPY
Communicating Capitalism:
A Study of the Contemporary Turkish Press

by

Mine Gencel Bek

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of
Ph.D. of Loughborough University

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February 1999
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Abstract

The main aim of this thesis is to explore the operation of the ideological discourse in Turkey that 'liberalisation in economy brings liberalisation in politics'. This early claim of the modernization theorists has been renewed in the age of globalization with the assumption that the state is in decline; statism in the economy is coming to end and as a result of this, democracy, civil society and citizenship are flourishing. This ideological discourse, which appeared in the 'liberal' environment of Turkey in the 1980s following the military coup, has been more visible in the 1990s with the added and emphasised elements of privatization and European integration. The critical period in recent Turkish history, in which the transfer of state economic enterprises to the private sector was legalised, is given particular attention as a case study in this management of political ideology.

In exploring how this link between liberal economy, declining state and democracy has arisen, this thesis traces the existence of discourses other than liberalism. Since the media are the major arena in which these discourses are represented, the thesis investigates them in the contemporary Turkish press through an examination of the ideological management of economic change.

The thesis traces the political and economic roots of these discourses on a national and global scale before analysing the operation of the ideology in the news, editorials and columns of the Turkish press. It investigates the structure of the media industries in which the meanings are produced, and explores the news production process by examining the daily practices of the media professionals.

By investigating how capitalism as an ideology is communicated and by showing how the media limits the availability of information by privileging some choices in the public debate about political economy, this thesis attempts to make a contribution to the ideas which aim to develop democracy and citizenship in Turkey.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>State Central Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Justice Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBK</td>
<td>National Unity Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGK</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OYAK</td>
<td>Army Mutual Assistance Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Populist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEs</td>
<td>State Economic Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGS</td>
<td>Turkish Journalists Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>Turkish Radio Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TISK</td>
<td>Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Welfare Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary of Key Political Figures and Parties

**Tansu ÇİLLER**: Economy professor. After Demirel became President, she was selected for the leadership of the True Path Party, 13 June, 1993, by defeating two other candidates in a party congress. Then she headed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Populist Party in June 1993 and remained as Prime Minister until March 1996.

**Süleyman DEMİREL**: He was trained as a hydraulics engineer and worked in the dam-building programme under Adnan Menderes, who was the leader of the Democrat Party. He became the leader of the Justice Party in 1964, now subsumed in the True Path Party. He was Prime Minister between 1965-1971, 1974-1978, 1979-1980 and 1991-1993. With the military coup in 1980, he was banned from political activity for three years. When President Özal died in 1993, he was Prime Minister, and was then elected in May, 1993, by the Grand National Assembly, as the ninth President.

**Büleent ECEVİT**: He was a member of the parliament of the RPP in 1957, and Minister of Labour in İsmet İnönü's coalition government. In 1966, he became Secretary General, of the RPP and in 1973, its leader. He was Prime Minister from 1973 to 1974 and from 1978 to 79. Banned from politics in 1980, he was imprisoned twice. Now, he is the leader of the Democratic Left Party.

**Kenan EVREN** graduated from the military academy. Head of the military which made the coup on the 12 September, 1980. He ruled the country until 1982 through the National Security Council, which prohibited all political activities. He was president between 1982 and 1989.

**Erdal İNÖNÜ** Scientist. Worked as academic and rector. The founder of the Social Democratic Populist Party in 1983. He was the deputy prime minister in 1991 in Demirel's coalition government.

Democrat Party-DP (Demokrat Parti-DP) The party formed by the dissidents of the RPP one-party regime, came to power in 1950 by winning the first election. Its rule was ended and its activity was outlawed by the military intervention on 27 May, 1960. The leaders were arrested and charged with corruption. The leader and prime minister, Adnan Menderes, was executed.

Motherland Party-MP (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) It is a right -of -centre grouping committed to the growth of private, rather than state controlled business enterprise, while being politically conservative. It won a majority of 212 Assembly seats in the November, 1983 elections, increasing its representation to 237 in the elections of September, 1986. It remained as the ruling party until it was replaced by the TPP in November, 1991. Currently, it continues to be active in Turkish political life under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz.

Republican People’s Party-RPP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) The RPP is a left of centre party founded in 1923 by Kemal Atatürk. After his death in 1938, İsmet İnönü, and in 1972, Bülent Ecevit served the party as leaders. It was dissolved in 1981 and reactivated in 1992 by 21 MP’s who resigned from the SDP to reclaim the groups’ historic legacy. Now, it is continuing under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. The Kemalist principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, reformism and statism, which were the original ‘six arrows’ of the party, are maintained today.
Social Democratic Populist Party-SDP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti- SHP) It was formed in November, 1985, by a merger of the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti-HP), a centre left formation that secured 117 seats in the 1983 Grand National Assembly election, and the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokrat Parti SODEP), which was not permitted to offer candidates for the 1983 election. The SDP was runner-up to the MP in November, 1987. It formed the coalition government with the TPP in June 1993.

True Path Party -TPP (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP): Although it has existed in Turkish politics since the November, 1987 elections, it can be considered as the continuation of the Democrat and Justice Parties. It won 178 seats in October, 1991. In November, it formed a coalition government under Demirel with Erdal İnönü, the leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party. A second TPP/SDP government was formed by the new TPP leader, Tansu Çiller. Between July, 1996 and June, 1997, it formed a coalition government with the Welfare Party.

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

This thesis arose from a discontent with some ideological assumptions about ‘globalization’ and its application to the peculiar conditions of post-1980 Turkey. The modernization paradigm, which conceived underdeveloped countries as on an inevitable path to capitalism by promising democracy as a result of capitalist development, has been renewed and strengthened by the globalization paradigm and the other perspectives on transition, which aim to develop the old socialist countries and bring democracy. The modernist assumption that a liberal economy brings democracy is sustained in the globalization paradigm. As a different, but related assumption, we see the discrediting of the state which earlier had a role in the development of capitalism.

Even though it is possible to trace these ideological assumptions in Turkey’s history, they became overwhelming with the economic stabilisation and liberalisation programmes in the 1980s, following a military coup. The political liberalism and democracy which were seen as natural outcomes of liberal economic policies, are echoed in the 1990s mainly with the privatization of the state economic enterprises, the Customs Union Agreement and membership of the European Union. The pluralism and democracy claims of the ‘liberal’ era have been strengthened further with the emergence of the private television channels.

In Turkey, the lack of democracy has been explained as a result of the state’s excessive role in national development, which prevented the bourgeoisie from developing democracy. This argument has always been prevalent. It has become more prominent and assertive with the appearance of the word ‘globalization’. It is argued that the role of the state in the economy should be minimized after the ‘bankruptcy’ of the idea of national development, since capitalism now is not national but global. The state is declared to be less powerful in the current era, while integration with the global market is related to democracy (Keyder, 1993: 137-139). Similarly, the end of statism in the economy after the military coup in the 1980s, is associated with democracy and citizenship (Heper, 1985:151-152).
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Some academics claim that as an extension of the liberal economy, strengthening of civil society, greater political opening, democratization (Sayar, 1992: 29-34), and the rise of differences and 'autonomization' of civil society (Göle, 1994: 217-218) have occurred.

In this thesis, I challenge these ideas and argue that liberalism is not free from statism. On the contrary, it maintains statism with its understanding of a strong state in politics. It is proposed in the thesis that, even in the global era in which it is claimed that states are in decline and are becoming less powerful, the end of economic statism does not mean the end of political statism and the emergence of democracy.

The media are the major arena in which ideologies are represented. The main purpose of this thesis is to find out how these ideologies are constructed, with which discourses, and what other views are represented in the Turkish press, by investigating in particular how economic change has been ideologically managed in the 1990s. The analysis of ideological formulations in public communication is of great importance, because these can themselves determine or affect some policy changes rather than simply being outcomes. For example, stating and convincing others that there is no alternative reduces the attempts and aspirations to search for those alternatives. Compared with earlier periods, capitalism is asserting itself even more strongly with the declaration that 'there is no alternative', even though the inequality of the capitalist system and its negative effects on humanity and nature continue. Thus, capitalism works not only at the level of the political economy, but also at the level of discourse, and presents itself as the only system in which plurality and freedom can be sustained.

In looking at ideology, this thesis does not consider it as something false, and does not aim to expose the illusion or concealed ideology as opposed to the objective or correct one, but rather it aims to understand and explain how these discourses are structured in the current context. It also indicates the origins of these discourses and how they have been influenced through history. The main concerns of this thesis are examining 'communicating capitalism' (Golding, 1992); exploring the ways capitalism is being prioritised by privileging some meanings over others, and
by which mechanisms; analysing the representation and the construction of the
discourses on the state, market and democracy during the enactment of the law on
privatization in the Turkish newspapers; and searching for the existence of
discourses other than the liberal one, and if they exist, examining how. However,
this thesis is not simply a textual analysis, but an investigation of the mediation
between meanings and structure, of 'the interplay between the symbolic and
economic dimensions' in the media (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 15). Therefore,
the thesis aims to trace both the mechanisms, which generate and spread these
discourses, and the political economic developments and choices in the current
global and national political economic situation. It also investigates the media
industry, the practices of media professionals, and finally, the media texts.

Initially there will be some discussion of globalization, state and capitalism,
followed by an examination of the political history of Turkey, including some
important turning points which will be used as a context for the later analysis. It
was also considered essential to look at the structure of the media industry and its
rapid development in Turkey, in order to provide an analysis of the framework
within which the media texts are produced. An investigation into the work
practices of the producers of media texts was also seen as important in order to
understand the news production dynamics which are themselves complementary to
these structural characteristics. The analysis of the interviews carried out with the
media professionals aims to grasp those dynamics. Through the analysis of the
news and the editorials and columns on privatization in the Turkish press, the
ideological representation of capitalism, state and democracy will be explored
further.

The thesis has two parts and consists of eight chapters.

Chapter Two introduces the discussions of capitalism, state and democracy. It
begins with the modernization paradigm, and by pointing out the similarities and
the differences between early modernization and current globalization theories, it
turns to the approaches which advocate and criticise globalisation. One of the main
assumptions of globalization theorists, which is the crisis of the nation-state, is then
dealt with by attempting to provide the responses against this claim from two main approaches.

In Chapter Three, an attempt is made to explain the story of Turkey’s modernization. This chapter does not provide a full account of modern Turkey; instead it prioritises the issues in relation to the problematic of the thesis. It starts with the official ideology of Turkey, Kemalism. It summarises the principles of Kemalism with a special focus on statism. This is followed by the so-called liberal period, with the DP government. The military coups following the DP government, and the military, are evaluated in a general sense as the guardians of Kemalism and as responses to crises of capital accumulation and hegemony. After providing this background information, the chapter deals with the post-1980 claims of liberalism. The general theoretical discussions, which are introduced in the second chapter, are applied to Turkey in this chapter and the general arguments of the thesis are established from the author’s personal position.

Chapter Four introduces the media in Turkey and looks in detail at the developments that have taken place over the last decade. It maps the media scene considering the concentration and conglomeration of the media, with a developing advertising industry, and increasing competition mainly through promotion campaigns. It also examines the coalition of the big media groups for financial profit, and their alliance for national interests is considered by giving examples from the news. The pluralism and democracy claims of the 1980s are reiterated, but here focusing on the issue of the media, with the emergence of the private channels in the technologically developed world without frontiers. The state and market dichotomy which is introduced in the second chapter and continued in the third chapter, is considered here in terms of the commercial media environment and the positioning of the media themselves as multiple and diverse alternatives. The close relationship between the state elite and the private sector is emphasised, and the common patterns and continuities of the Kemalists and the liberals, a theme introduced in an earlier chapter, are exemplified.

Chapter Five is based on the analysis of the interviews conducted with the journalists and editors of the Turkish press. After an exploration of their
description of the newspaper on which they work and their job in general, the chapter summarises their daily working routines under the titles of editorial control, self-censorship and professional values, using their own words. In this chapter, the criticism and resistance of the media professionals are also presented, however limited they may be.

Chapter Six presents the results of the empirical research into the news published in six Turkish newspapers six months before and after the enactment of the law on privatization. The data is organised by focusing on the actors and the themes of the news.

Chapter Seven explores the ideological formulations in the columns and the editorials. It analyses the sample data by tracing the common and different themes and the ways in which they are constructed, and by giving quotations to illustrate the themes which appeared. The role of the media elites in politics and their relationship with the parliament before, during and after a legislative process is taken into account.

Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by bringing together the general arguments and the findings of the empirical research. It reflects on democracy in Turkey in general and on the democratic media environment. In conclusion, it offers suggestions for the development of democracy in Turkey and in the Turkish media environment, and for further research which needs to be carried out in the area.
CHAPTER TWO
Capitalism, State and Democracy in the Global Era

The relationship between capitalism and democracy is of great importance to the issues in this thesis. The arguments which consider capitalism as a condition for democracy, will be traced, starting from the early modernization theories and following the ideas which celebrate the victory of capitalism and the end of the alternatives, leading to recent globalization theories. The relationship between market and state will also be focused upon in the current chapter.

1. Capitalism and Democracy

One of the classical studies in the vast amount of literature on capitalism and democracy is Friedman's book 'Capitalism and Freedom', which has become a source of influence not only for modernization theorists, but also, lately, for the transition theorists, who study the adaptation to 'democracy' in the former socialist countries.

The 'freedom' referred to by Friedman is mainly economic and is regarded as an end in itself. In addition, it is an 'indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom' (Friedman, 1967: 8). Political freedom, for Friedman, is the lack of 'concentration or dispersion of power'. The cause of this concentration of power is the central political authority, namely the state:

"The importance of government as a buyer of so much of our output, and the sole buyer of the output of many firms and industries, already concentrates a dangerous amount of economic power in the hands of the political authorities"(Friedman, 1967: 202).

Although political freedom is seen as the final objective, no details are given as to its nature. It is merely repeated that it will come with 'the free market' and the 'development of capitalist institutions' (Friedman, 1967: 9).
Friedman emphasises that history shows that capitalism is a necessity for economic and, thus political freedom. Only capitalism can guarantee these (Friedman, 1967: 9-10).

When it is explained how the market brings freedom, an idealised picture of capitalist societies is drawn. He calls it 'competitive capitalism', which is claimed to be free of coercion. By coercion, Friedman mainly means interference in the economic sphere:

"By removing the organisation of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power...so in the complex enterprises and money exchange economy, co-operation is strictly individual and voluntary provided: (a) that enterprises are private, so that the ultimate contracting parties are individuals and (b) that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary.... the consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers with whom he can deal The seller is protected from coercion by the consumer because of other consumers to whom he can sell. The employee is protected from coercion by the employer because of other employers with whom he can work, ad so on, and the market does this impersonally and without centralised authority" (Friedman, 1967: 14-5).

Many different issues surrounding this idealised picture of capitalist societies have been questioned or criticised. One of these is the separation of the economic from the political1. Another aspect open to criticism is the concept of freedom in its restricted meaning, and the lack of the concept of equality2. Further, it can be

1 The separation of the economic and the political, or insulating the economic sphere from immediate control by the 'demos' is a characteristic of liberalism. It is done in order to "protect either 'the primacy of the political' or else 'the sanctity of private property rights' "(Pierson, 1993: 179). For a detailed discussion, see E.M. Wood, "The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism", New Left Review, no.127, May-June, 1981, p.66-96.

2 This kind of understanding of freedom is a negative one in terms of its definition as the lack of force or interventions. There are two things that can be said in this context. First, freedom does not exist only with the lack of something, but also depends on the realisation or achievement of something. People cannot be free when they are left alone; some material, social and intellectual necessities are required (Norman, 1982: 86). Although it has been advocated by some other groups as well (Birch, 1993: 103-104), positive understanding of freedom is mainly common in Marxism. According to that, freedom means emancipation; 'removal of obstacles to human emancipation' (Lukes, 1993:431). Equality in that sense cannot be
CHAPTER 2  CAPITLALISM STATE AND DEMOCRACY

questioned whether a conceptualisation which does not contain equality can be democratic. There are also objections to Friedman regarding the merit of market.\(^3\) In addition, there is a lack of interest in the state as a political pressure mechanism, while the role of the state in the economy is criticised. In fact, states can be strong and can use violence against their citizens, even in the advanced capitalist countries.

In the next two sections the relationship between capitalism and democracy will be discussed; firstly with its emergence in Western societies and secondly in the context of modernization in peripheral countries.

1.1. The rise of capitalism in the West:

It is possible to find a parallel between the development of capitalism and the extension of some of the civil rights in the western societies. This extension was appropriate, to a certain extent, for the aims of the bourgeoisie, according to which, the equality of people was important in order to guarantee selling their labour. However, these rights were very restricted. The state was liberal, but not democratic. Democratisation, namely expansion of civil, political, and social rights,\(^4\) came to the agenda after this development. The democratisation of the

\(^3\) Barber gives a critical account of market and democracy relationship: "... markets are simply not designed to do the things democratic polities do. Markets give us private rather than public modes of discourse, allowing us as consumers to speak via our currencies of consumption to producers of material goods, but preventing us from speaking as citizens to one another about the social consequences of our private market choices. ... Markets preclude 'we' thinking and 'we' action of any kind at all, trusting in the power of aggregated individual choices (the invisible hand) to somehow secure the common good..." (Barber, 1996: 154). See also C.B. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, 1973, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.143-157.

\(^4\) As Held mentions, 'civil rights' are the ones which are necessary for the establishment of individual autonomy, including liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to be treated equally with others before the law ...etc.
liberal state was 'not a benevolent concession from above'. The driving force for democracy was not the bourgeoisie, it was mainly the product of the political mobilisation of the ‘working class-sometimes in conjunction with the peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie, or section of the middle classes’ (Boron, 1995: 9-11, Therborn, 1997).

The sanction of ‘the bourgeoisie and its allied classes and fractions’ of democratic reforms was subsequent to the mobilisation of these subordinate classes (Boron, 1995: 9-11).

Therborn further emphasises the allies of the working class by mentioning that the working class was not sufficient alone. These allies appeared as a result of the ‘imperialist rivalry, national conflicts, the contradiction of competition and monopolisation, and clashes between different fractions of capital’, namely the ‘contradictions of capitalism’. (Therborn, 1997: 34): “Democracy developed neither out of the positive tendencies of capitalism, nor as a historical accident, but out of the contradictions of capitalism...” (Therborn, 1997:35).

1.2. The penetration of capitalism in the peripheral countries: Modernization

The story of democracy in the peripheral countries is different from that described above. Capitalism has penetrated from the West as a form of modernization in

By quoting from Marshall, Held mentions that although the civil rights ‘threatened many traditional forms of power and inequality, they did not strain the new forms of inequalities created by the emergence of the competitive capitalist market; on the contrary, they were essential to it’ (Marshall cited by Held, 1995: 65-68). Having said that, according to Held, civil rights are considered very important in the development of political rights which ‘create the possibility of participation in the exercise of political power as a member of a political association, or as an elector of the members of such an association...’. The struggle for political citizenship, Held states, was maintained by the trade-union movement and the labour movement in alliance with sectors of the middle classes, women’s suffrage also contained ‘social rights’ which targeted a struggle against ‘social inequalities’(Held, 1995: 65-68).

Therborn explains national mobilisation against external threat as a factor in the history of democratisation. According to his study, in eight out of twenty-one countries, ‘the outcome of the world wars was causally decisive in the instalment of bourgeois democracy’ (Therborn, 1997: 21-23). Also, national unification and liberation have been seen by the bourgeoisie as ‘a strategic necessity for the development and protection of trade and industry and the breaking of feudal dynastic power’ (Therborn, 1997: 29).
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these countries. This 'external inducement' of capitalism has three effects, Therborn argues: firstly, the internal differentiation of the capitalist class is very restricted, and depends on one external centre; secondly, the externally dependent economic structure is so fragile and vulnerable to international crises that it can decrease the interventions of the national bourgeoisie against the exploited classes; thirdly, the existence of pre-capitalist modes has negative effects on the development of the impersonal rule of capital, by limiting the growth of the labour movement and of petite bourgeoisie (Therborn, 1997: 32-33).

Although the peripheral countries have their peculiar conditions as Therborn shows, modernization theories focus on the establishment of capitalism and democracy in these countries by reducing the issues to development and ignoring their differences. According to modernization theories, democratisation is the culmination of a process which inherits the 'sequences of industrialisation, urbanisation, education, communication, mobilisation and political incorporation' (Przeworski et al., 1997: 157-158). As Cammack critically recognises, democracy in the 'less developed countries', according to modernization theory, is postponed until capitalism is 'firmly established' (Cammack, 1996: 47).

Lipset's 'Political Man', which is a classical study of modernization theory, relates democracy to the level of economic development: 'The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy', he argues.

He states that 'the average wealth, degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries' (Lipset, 1971: 48-50). He argues that education is more significant than income or occupation at the individual level. The same is true at the national level. If the level of education of a nation's population is higher, according to Lipset, it is more likely to support democracy. (Lipset, 1971: 54-56).

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6 The indicators of wealth in his analysis are, for example, 'per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle and thousands of persons per physician and the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousands persons...'. He measures industrialisation by 'the percentage of employed males in agriculture and the per capita commercial produced 'energy' being used in the country' (Lipset, 1971: 54-56).
Scholars like Pye and Lerner similarly focus on transition from traditional to modern societies, and argue that the conditions for democracy occur a generation later with mobilisation, education and socialisation which can be facilitated by communication (Lerner, 1963: 350). According to that, with communication, the gap between 'westernised, more urbanised leaders' and 'the more tradition-bound, village based masses' can be reduced by changing the attitudes of those 'masses' (Pye, 1963: 8, 13).

Modernization theory, with its linear understanding of development, capitalism and democracy, has been challenged for several reasons. Although it was originally the extension of the study of comparative politics, it has been criticised by those involved in comparative studies. For example, Przeworski and Limongi, in their comparative study, argue that dictatorship may die for many different reasons and development plays no privileged role (Przeworski et al., 1997: 157-8). They test the main assumption of modernization theory which makes a connection between development and democracy, suggesting that a transition to democracy should take place when authoritarian regimes have a higher economic development level. However, they found that above the income level of $6,000 per capita per annum, dictatorships became more stable (Przeworski et al., 1997: 159). Thus, they disproved the link between democracy and wealth by showing empirically that dictatorships survived for years in countries that were wealthy. They state that only 19 dictatorships out of 123 developed and 'reached modernity' (Przeworski et al., 1997: 160). So, in fact, the opposite is the case: '...dictatorships are needed to generate development...the probability of transitions to democracy declines as new countries develop under authoritarian rule' (Przeworski et al., 1997: 176).

Although all these are broadly considered as modernization theorists Cammack considers these political development theorists separately from modernization theorists. According to him, political development theory drew upon modernization theory, but they reviewed it. For Cammack, they did not argue for modernization and westernisation in all aspects. Political development theorists rejected the polarisation of tradition and modernity. Instead they realised that modernization can be successful by retaining traditional elements. (Cammack, 1997:45-49).

Similarly, Boron argues that the development of capitalism did not create the conditions which lead to democratic achievements as happened in the West. On the contrary, it 'reduced the few possibilities that might have existed for bourgeois democratic developments' (Boron, 1995:14-15).

It is true that the examples found in history lead researchers to question the relationship between capitalism and democracy. Not all capitalist countries are democratic. Capitalism is very flexible and adaptable, and can be mixed with alternative forms of political domination, including bourgeois democracy, fascism, dictatorship, and the Latin American military state of the 1970s (Boron, 1995:11).

Munck states that the case of South Africa showed that the relationship between democracy and development is not necessary or permanent. Instead 'that relationship is necessarily contingent and historically bound' (Munck, 1994: 29).

Barber gives the example of Russia and its former republics which show that 'wild' capitalism can exist perfectly well not only without democracy, but as democracy's nemesis' (Barber, 1996: 153).

The converse is also true. Not all democratic countries are capitalist: Jessop, quoting Rosa Luxemburg, argues that 'democracy has been found in the most dissimilar social formations: in primitive communist groups, in the slave states of antiquity, and in mediaeval communes' and 'no absolute and general relation can be constructed between capitalist development and democracy' (Jessop, 1978:20).

2. The end of history and the triumph of capitalism?

The idealisations of capitalism in the West and recipes for 'underdeveloped' countries did not end, despite the crisis of capitalism in the West and the challenges in the peripheral countries. On the contrary, capitalism has been celebrated more assertively in the last decade. The dissolution of the socialist systems and the rising neo-liberal governments strengthened this tendency. Capitalism this time asserted itself not only as something desirable and something which would bring democracy, but as the only alternative. Democracy did not disappear as a concept though, and it has been described almost as a synonym for capitalism. The old socialist countries' transition to capitalism has been used interchangeably as the transition to democracy.

Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history is a good example of this current environment. Fukuyama, like Friedman, praises capitalism. However, in contrast to Friedman, Fukuyama does not take the issue of democracy as the outcome of capitalist development, but instead argues that the desirability of democracy - which everyone agrees about - itself brings capitalism:

'It is not economics, then, but ideology that constitutes the second, and more important explanation for the recent wave of democratizations ... politics has its own specific dignity that is never simply reducible to subpolitical factors like economics or social structure. That is, democracy is impossible without people who believe in the legitimacy of democracy, and conversely in the illegitimacy of dictatorship .... Thus economic development is neither a sufficient or necessary cause of democracy; while democracy can best arise under certain economic conditions, it must be desired for essentially non-economic reasons' (Fukuyama, 1991: 661).

Modernization, capitalism and freedom have a causal interrelationship in Fukuyama’s book, similar to Friedman’s theory: ‘Societies have a degree of freedom in the extent to which they regulate and plan capitalist economies’. However, for Fukuyama, it is more a natural process. The only viable way is capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992: 96-7). For most of the world, he claims, there is now no ideology which can challenge liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992: 45). In a way, he develops Bell’s argument of ‘the end of ideology’ which declares the exhaustion of ideologies and the end of utopias in the West (Bell, 1960: 373). In
contrast, Fukuyama puts the argument more assertively and globally. While the focus of modernization theorists before was 'underdeveloped' countries, Fukuyama's inspiration has been the 'collapse of communism worldwide' (Fukuyama, 1992: 292-3). In relation to democracy, the difference between them is that in the former there is a 'development' from authoritarian dictatorships mainly in Latin America, whereas in the latter the 'transition' is from socialism to capitalism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern block.

Fukuyama perceives liberal democracy as the upper stage in the evolution of the 'Universal History of Mankind' (Fukuyama, 1992: 48). As an extension of this comment, he suggests 'the end of history':

"...if we are now at the point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end" (Fukuyama, 1992: 51).

The emphasis on freedom, similar to the work of Friedman, is very dominant in Fukuyama's book. Even when he considers equality, it is non-material and is considered to have negative effects on freedom: 'Every effort to give the disadvantaged "equal dignity" will mean the abridgement of the freedom or rights of other people' (Fukuyama, 1992: 292-293).

Fukuyama's ideas have been criticised mainly because of his idealisation of the liberal democracies. One of his critics, Youngs, argues that Fukuyama's ideas are West centric and do not discuss the issues of power dynamics in general. Young criticises the way liberal economics and politics are presented as mutually supportive in a positive, unproblematic and cohesive way (Youngs, 1996: 65).

Fukuyama's 'end of history' has been followed by the other 'end' declarations. O'Brien declared the end of geography by claiming 'the end or diminution of sovereignty' of the nation-state and governments as the embodiments of geography. There are similar arguments around this theme which will be discussed in detail later in relation to globalization and the nation-state. If there is an end to
these, there is a start, more properly restart, of something which is for O’Brien ‘the freedom-of-money force’ (O’Brien, 1992: 100). ‘The emergence of a seamless global financial market’, O’Brien argues, is

“bringing back memories (for those with long memories) of the free-capital era of the late nineteenth century. Barriers will be gone, service will be global, the world economy will benefit and so too, presumably, will the customer, being offered “global choice”’ (O’Brien, 1992: 99-100).

In some sense, O’Brien celebrates the return of laissez-faire liberalism with his declaration of the end of geography.

In ‘The End of Politics’, Naisbitt claims the end of ‘representative democracy’ and the emergence of ‘direct democracy’. He uses the terms ‘free market democracy’ and ‘consumer-driven democracy’ instead of direct democracy. According to him, there is no longer need to have representatives because ‘people are given an opportunity to vote on the things that directly impact on their lives’ (Naisbitt, 1995: 42-3).

In a similar way to the authors previously mentioned, Naisbitt claims that as a result of the ‘global shift’ ‘the idea that the central government... is the most important part of governance is obsolete’ Instead, ‘politics will re-emerge as the engine of individualism’ (Naisbitt, 1995: 50-51). Despite critics who warn against concentration in the contemporary economic structure, he argues that the bigger the world economy is, the smaller the players are (Naisbitt, 1995: 50). He explains the ‘global paradox’:

‘This zeroing in on the individual as the locus of this new telecommunications revolution is a metaphor for the global paradox: the larger system in service to the smallest player’ (Naisbitt, 1995: 271).

All of these have been made possible ‘by the revolution in telecommunications’ according to Naisbitt (1995: 42-3). ‘As we move toward linking up millions of host

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9 see Timothy Burns (ed.), After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics, 1994, London:Littlefield

10 For example Scholte states that in the world of globalizing capitalism, large strategic alliances and mergers intensified the concentration of ownership and power in many areas of production (Scholte, 1997: 438).
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computer networks, countries will become irrelevant and begin to fade away' (Naisbitt, 1995: 51).

Morse also emphasizes the importance of technology by stating that modern communications and technological innovations have changed the geographic conceptualisation of international politics and have revolutionised the concept of distance (Morse, 1976: 18). Thus, he argues, modernization, with technology, has contributed to the development of a global international system (Morse, 1976: 14).

Technological determinism, idealisation of capitalism and the declaration of the end of the nation-state, are common characteristics among the supporters of modernization, as seen above. Currently, they are also very important elements for globalization theorists.

As these theorists themselves state, globalization today has its roots in early modernization. Modernization is the central catalyst and driving force in globalization with technology (Smith, 1993: 258).

In the next section, the assumptions of globalization theorists will be examined and then the state will be discussed in relation to globalization.

3. Globalization and its critiques:

There are a wide range of publications which consider many dimensions of globalization in different disciplines such as sociology, politics, media studies, women's studies, international relations, economics, business and banking. Waters states that globalization is an economic phenomenon with the issues of world trade, multinational enterprises, and floating finance; a political phenomenon with the crisis of the state, planetary problems, and international organisations; and a cultural phenomenon which raises issues like consumer sovereignty, cosmopolitanism, and global culture (Waters, 1995).

Scholte groups the manifestations of globalization in terms of the rise of supraterritoriality under six headings: The first is, not surprisingly, the sphere of communications, such as air travel, telephone, computer networks, and the media; the second is the area of organisations, business enterprises, civic associations and
regulatory agencies that work as transborder operations; the third is trade of goods and services; the fourth is finance that circulates across the world; the fifth, according to Scholte, is ecology, which can no longer be constrained by national borders; the sixth relates to the level of consciousness, that is people’s conception of the world as a single place, their affiliation with communities beyond national orders (Scholte, 1997: 432)

Globalization here will be taken with the economic, political and ideological dimensions 11, with a special focus on the relationship between capitalism, state and democracy.

It is possible to list the characteristics of the ‘global’ world:

- The globalization of money and finance: Their detachment from territorial spaces.
- The integration of economies through cross-border integration: For example, the regional economic integration in Europe.
- Global markets: The merging of national capitals into a global market, the growth of transborder marketing of firms.
- Global production: Growing international ownership and production of companies.
- The diffusion of technology: Its use, especially in finance, beyond national borders.

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More can be added to the list by including the indicators of globalization from the different disciplines mentioned. Although, especially in business textbooks, these are taken for granted, they are not objective evaluations which are exempted from value. In fact, there are very critical views about globalization.

In the next three sections, these views will be outlined.

3.1. Globalization is not so global:
The global character of globalization is questioned in two aspects:

Firstly, it is argued that globalization has not expanded to include the whole world. It is more ‘triad’ (Hirst, 1995: 424-425) or ‘trilateral’ (Mann, 1997: 480) than global. Capitalism is dominated by the economies of the advanced nation-states. The three most developed regions of the world, North America, Western Europe and Japan, together with the new industrialised countries of South-East Asia, account for more than 85 per cent of world trade (Mann, 1997:480). They have a stronger relationship with each other than with the rest of the world (Petrella, 1996:77, Tooze, 1997: 223). They can co-ordinate policy, and exert pressures over financial markets (Hirst, 1996: 2-3).

Therefore, despite the advocates of globalization, capital is not evenly expanded throughout the world, capital mobility has not brought a shift of investment and employment from advanced to developing countries (Hirst et al., 1996: 424-425). The north is still rich, the south is still poor (Mann, 1997:480). It can even be asserted that the ‘subordination of the South’ has been ‘reinforced’ (Scholte, 1997:450-451).

Secondly, it is argued that the number of transnational companies is very small, and they still have strong ties with the nation-state (Axford, 1995:97). Hirst and Thompson argue that an economy with a high and growing degree of international trade and investment is not necessarily a global economy. It is more a highly internationalised economy than a truly globalized one (Hirst et al., 1995: 424-425). Many of the transnationals operate from their national bases and wish to maintain their national identity (Hirst et al., 1995: 424-425). They are ‘embedded, economically, politically and socially, within nation-states’ (Sally, 1996:71). The
transnational companies are particularly sensitive to nation state politics and shifts in policy (Axford, 1995:97) because it is the nation-state which decides to make the international regulations and pursue them (Hirst, 1995: 424) as will be seen later.

3.2. Globalization is not new:

Marshall claims that the term 'globalization' may be an 'aesthetically elegant' 'appropriate buzzword' for 'this high-tech age', but it is not explanatory. Furthermore it is misleading (Marshall, 1996: 214). Some scholars prefer using the word capitalism by arguing that it is arbitrary to describe late-twentieth-century capitalist transnational as globalized since capital accumulation was always globalist.

Although recent technological changes increase the movement of transnationals globally, foreign ownership, exports and investments are not new (Laxer, 1995: 290, Boyer et al.1996: 13, Krasner, 1994:13).

Pieterse argues that globalization 'is no more than a fashionable code word for advance capitalism' (Pieterse, 1996:555). Instead of globalization, Wood uses the phrase the 'universalization of capitalism' which means an 'increasing imposition of capitalist imperatives, a capitalist 'logic of process', on all aspects of social life' (Wood, 1997:553-554).

3.3. Globalization is the ideology of neo-liberalism:

Criticising globalization because it is a neo-liberal ideology is actually closely related with questioning it as a completely new development, as explained above.

According to Piven, the difference between globalization and nineteenth-century laissez-faire is that 'market law now operated on an international scale...in search

12 In fact, Marx and Engels mentioned in the Communist Manifesto 'The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexion everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character of production and consumption in every country'. (Marx et.al., 1967: 83)
Neo-liberalism first started in the United States during the Reagan period and spread beyond the U.S. with the emphasis on 'tax-cuts, the deregulation of industry, the liberalisation of foreign exchange and capital markets, an attack on union power' (Gill, 1993:253-254). It is possible to explain this by the dominance of the U.S. in the world, although it is often said that this prominence has now decreased, as proved by the regionalization tendencies mainly in Europe, and the rising Asian Tigers. However, one should be very careful in claiming that the power of the U.S. is decreasing. Even though the relative strength of the U.S. productive capacity has declined (Cox, 1994: 55), the dollar is still the medium of trade at the global level (Hirst et al., 1995: 419). The U.S. has a great deal of power in world politics not only through its economic influence, but also through its military power, since it can intervene in political disorders which might affect world trade (Cox, 1994: 55, Hirst et al., 1996: 14).

Besides Reaganism in the U.S., Thatcherism in Britain 'provided both a political rationale and power base' for neo-liberalism (Cerny, 1997:265). Its main target, for Gamble, was social democracy, in another words, the welfare settlements of the 1940s. Its main policy was privatization in parallel with the neo-liberal strand of 'new right'. New right as a synthesis has neo-liberal and neo-conservative strands which promote free economy and a strong state in national security and law (Gamble, 1989:4-5, 15-16, Levitas, 1986: 5-6). In addition to privatization, neo-

13 The polemics of Hall and Jessop on the analysis of Thatcherism should be mentioned briefly here. Hall develops a concept called 'authoritarian populism' with inspiration from Poulantzas. For Hall, the 'unstable equilibrium' between coercion and consent is the starting point. He analyses Thatcherism by looking at the combinations of these two poles. He shows the contradictory nature of Thatcherism which includes 'organic Toryism, family, duty, authority, standards, traditionalism, patriarchalism with the aggressive themes of a revived neo-liberalism -self-interest, competitive individualism, anti-statism' (Hall, 1985:116,122). However, Jessop accuses Hall of ignoring 'some political sources of contradiction and tension within Thatcherism'. His main criticism is the 'ideologism' of Hall's approach (Jessop, 1984: 33). He argues that Hall analysed the discursive strategies, but ignored the 'material conditions of transmission and reception of ideologies' (Jessop, 1985: 95). Hall replies to this criticism by accepting that he works on the political and ideological dimension, but he argues that this is because it is neglected by the left (Hall,
liberalism gives priority to reducing inflation over unemployment, cutting public expenditure, reducing welfare provision, obstructing the power of trade unions anti-collectivism, competitive individualism (Hall, 1984: 13, Cox, 1997: 59).

Neo-liberal policies have also been exercised in the Third World countries, especially with privatization. The state running of the industrialization process and national development have been discredited (Harris, 1986: 160-167).

Although the heavy industrialization programmes of nation states have been abandoned in this discredited environment of national development, the debt owed to international finance institutions is not decreasing, it is, in fact, increasing. Cox argues that the more the debt increases, the more governments become accountable to external markets rather than to their own publics. The options of states in areas such as exchange rate policy, fiscal policy, and trade policy are restricted by global finance, which works 24 hours a day as an unregulated network and makes decisions in several cities like New York, Tokyo, London, Paris and Frankfurt that can effect the whole world (Cox, 1994: 47-48, Cox, 1997: 59). Similarly Axtmann states that the global economy is beyond the control of the states by stressing that the decisions of ‘multi- and transnational corporations, stock brokers and international money and securities dealers...affect the economic well being of states and people without being accountable to them’. He argues that these global forces threaten democracy since they can impose constraints and limits on ‘democratically constituted political agency’, namely the state, and the citizens of the states can not control these forces (Axtmann, 1996: 131). The lack of mechanisms between the states and ‘supraterritorial constituents’ for ‘transparency, open debate and accountability’ (Scholte, 1997:450-451) inspire the theorists of democracy to develop global democracy models. 14

14 Some of the criticisms of globalization lead to alternative conceptions of globalization. For example, Pieterse criticises globalization being identified with neo-liberalism. For him, it is a coincidence (Pieterse et.al., 1996: 555). As a result of the critical look to the current neo-liberal globalization, he develops ‘critical globalization’ (Pieterse et.al., 1996: 536). Critical globalization includes not only ‘market forces but also
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As an effect of neo liberalism via global finance, the economic sovereignty of states is questioned, (Gill, 1994: 80). The governments are believed to be limited to applying welfare policies in order to reduce the social disparities (Cox, 1997: 58). States are seen as no longer being able to follow an autonomous path driven by domestic economic goals (Cerny, 1994: 226). The range of state strategies, it is argued, has been narrowed (Marshall, 1996: 208), and thus the state has to compromise (Kobrin, 1997: 157) or develop alternative strategies, as will be seen below.

Although it is true that the role of the state is changing in the global era, the question arises as to whether this will lead to the eclipse of the nation-state and if so, in what ways the power of the state is declining as a result.

4. The crisis of the nation-state

The crisis of the nation-state was first brought to the agenda by the international relations theorists, and has subsequently been taken up by the economists and the business scholars. Morse, from the sphere of international relations, mentions that national actors and their autonomy have been undermined as a result of the spread of industrialization and international interdependence (Morse, 1976: 3).

The developments in world politics since 1945 are seen as a challenge to understanding of the nation-state as the sole actor, and to some scholars, to the sovereignty of nation states (Mansbach et al., 1976: 25). The end of the Cold War is considered as another important factor which has contributed to an increase in the interdependency of nations and a weakening of the nation-state (Brown, 1995: 22)

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interstate relations, international agencies and civil society in its domestic as well as transnational manifestations'. Non-governmental organisations are seen as having a great potential in this kind of globalization understanding (Pieterse et.al., 1996: 560).

Held's cosmopolitan democracy can be thought of as another attempt to coincide democracy and globalization. Held argues that democracy has to become a transnational affair which contains both a restricted geographic domain and the wider international community. According to him, democracy, democratic institutions and agencies should be expanded into what he called 'the cosmopolitan model of democracy' (Held, 1993:39).
In parallel with these ideas, the ‘world politics paradigm’ that includes ‘transnational’, ‘transgovernmental’, and ‘interstate’ interactions is proposed by researchers in international politics (Keohane et al., 1973: 386-398). Because of the growing diversification of the international arena, that is, because of the proliferation of international actors, it is argued that the state can no longer assert exclusive status and monopoly of force (Badie et al., 1994: 164).

Beyond the recognition of the other actors in the international arena, the nation-state in the ‘present-day world’ is declared ‘inadequate’ by arguing that it is not even possible to protect the lives of citizens (Deutsch, 1981: 331). The changes in world ecology, and problems which derive from an increasing world population, such as shortage of raw materials, energy or food, and large-scale violence, are shown as evidence of the weakening of the nation-state (Deutsch, 1981: 331, Mansbach et al., 1976: 298).

Here, it can be questioned whether the economic and political power of the state is declining because of globalization or not. The responses to this can be divided roughly into two groups. The first group emphasises the adaptable or competitive character of the state in globalization, mainly with an emphasis on economics, whereas the second group emphasises the capitalist character of the state from a broader perspective.

### 4.1. Competitive state/ state strategies:

Some theorists mention that the states can adapt to the conditions. For Krasner, the constraints of economic interdependence as opposed to sovereignty is an issue for ‘smaller’ and ‘less developed’ states. In general, the states can overcome the problems created by interdependence by responding to new circumstances (Krasner, 1995: 319).

Similarly Weiss argues that ‘strong’ states adapt and facilitate internationalisation rather than becoming a victim of it. These states can be ‘catalytic’ in consolidating national and regional networks of trade and investment (Weiss, 1997: 17).

In contrast, Porter argues that although companies seem to have transcended countries, few nations have the leadership in particular industries. National
differences, he argues, constitute the key element in the competitive advantage of some nations over many decades. Porter claims that, 'differences in national economic structures, values, cultures, institutions, and histories contribute profoundly to competitive success'. These characteristics, according to him, also make the role of the home nation strong in international companies (Porter, 1990: 18-9).

Evans challenges the idea of the eclipse of the state and claims that in fact the opposite is true: He gives 'East Asian success' as an example by stressing that competitive advantage in global markets may be best achieved through more intense state development (Evans, 1997: 67-70). Thus, rather than adaptation, Evans considers the state as an important constitutive element in globalization.

Cerny is one of the leading scholars who argue that the process of globalization does not cause the withering away of the states. Instead, states are the critical agents in the process of globalization (Cerny, 1997: 257-258, Cerny, 1996: 133). What Cerny means here is that in order for states to continue to exist they need to do more than just adapt. He develops the concept of 'competitive state' by relying on the observations that the state makes firms which are located within its territory competitive in international markets. Furthermore, the state as an institution and set of practices reorganises itself like a private industry, becoming more 'marketized' in order to compete in the global financial marketplace (Cerny, 1994: 231, Cerny, 1997: 264, 269-270, Cerny, 1996: 124).

Palan et al. develop the idea of competitive state as competitive strategies. They argue that there is no such thing as a competitive state as a single universal model on the global scale. Instead, there are many different competitive strategies which are pursued by states. They suggest that, states have seven policy options or competitive strategies available to them in order to 'cope with' the changing environment in the global economy (Palan et al., 1996: 5, 12-13).

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15 Four of these are mainly valid for 'the group of states represented in the OECD' and three others are open to the 'less developed countries': 'States may wish to join together in large regional blocks, they may adopt the "developmental state" model, they may embrace the "social democratic" mode of selective integration into the world economy, or a selected number of states may seek to dominate their regional economy or...
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The aim of these strategies is to increase the competition of countries in the global economy (Palan et al., 1996: 6, 12-13). Thus, the basis of their ideas is the existence of states and national businesses. They imply that everything has to be adapted according to global conditions, while they do not discuss globalization to any great extent.

The weakness of these ideas is their acceptance of globalization and the necessity of the state to respond to its reality. However, some scholars make broader analyses and put globalization discourse in context by evaluating it critically. They do not seek ways to guarantee the existence of the state against the global market because they do not see the market and the state as binary oppositions. For them, the capitalist character of the state, and the economic and political outcomes of it are all important.

4.2. Capitalist state

As seen above in the critiques of globalization, some emphasise the ideological character of globalization and argue that the 'withering' or the 'hollowing out of the state' thesis is based on the neo liberal rejection of the Keynesian state. The 'erosion of the state', they argue, is 'the ideological armoury of an emergent transnational coalition of classes dominated by financial interests' (Overbeek et al., 1993).

The issue of greatest concern for the Marxist scholars is dealing with the capitalist nature of the state and showing the links between nation-states and globalization. For example, Wood favours the term universalised capitalism or the global reach of capitalism instead of globalization because the former does not necessarily imply the dissolution or the decline of the nation-state:

even the world economy or even the world economy to achieve hegemony. On the other hand, poorer and weaker states are likely to opt for one of the following strategies: they may try to exploit their cheap and abundant labour to attract foreign capital; they may seek to exploit a parasitical niche in the world market such as tax havens, or they may be structurally impeded from joining the competitive game at all' (Palan et al., 1996: 5).
'If anything, the new global order is more than ever a world of nation-states; and if these states are permeable to movements of capital, that permeability has as its corollary, indeed as its condition, the existence of national boundaries and state jurisdictions... today, transnational capital is even more effective than was the old-style military imperialism in penetrating every corner of the world; but it tends to accomplish this through the medium of local capital and national states, and it depends on local political jurisdictions to maintain the conditions of economic stability and labour discipline... ’ (Wood, 1997: 553-554).

Indeed, the private sector asks the state for privileged access to the internal market, and support and assistance in order to compete in international markets. It requires state ‘covering the cost of basic “infrastructures”, ‘providing the tax incentives needed for investment in industrial R&D and technological innovations’ (Petrella, 1996:75).

Another important point which is not addressed by the statist critics of ‘the end of the state’ thesis, is that of states remaining strong in the political sense. Although economic liberalism makes the minimal state its motto, states remain strong and at the same time ‘serve to enforce the rules of market society’ as mentioned above in the discussions on Thatcherism (Gill, 1994: 79).

Hirst and Thompson label it as ‘the new globalist rhetoric’ which is

‘based on an anti-political liberalism. Set free from politics, the new globalized economy allows companies and markets to allocate the factors of production to greatest advantage, without the distortions of state intervention’ (Hirst et al., 1995: 414).

As Petrella argues, even though the economy is globalised, there is no parallel decline in the power of the nation-state in ‘military and security matters’ (Petrella, 1996:67).

The nation-state is the primary source of law within a territory, it polices the borders of a territory. ‘Populations remain territorial and subject to the citizenship of a national state’ (Hirst et al., 1995: 431-434). This is mainly because of the state’s ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.
This right is only recognised for the state (Weber, 1983: 111-112). This force can be extended to the international level as well. The state's right of going to war even determines people's life-chances (Hinsley as cited by Held, 1995: 95).

Similarly, Scholte discusses that in the era of globalization, democracy is very restricted. Firstly, popular participation is not sufficient to control the state. The existence of multiparty competition is not a guarantee of democracy. Governments still violate human rights. Secondly, marketization of governance brings concerns over democracy (Scholte, 1997: 27).

The marketization of states is presented by the statist critiques of 'the end of the state' thesis as the success of states in competing with globalization. However, as Scholte states, this should be considered in association with the negative effects on democracy. The issue of state power in politics is completely ignored. In fact, all these stem from the approaches to state and market. These two are seen as binary oppositions by both the liberal globalization advocates and statists. Marxism, on the other hand, does not consider state and market separately, which does not mean that the state is only the instrument of the bourgeoisie. In fact, the early Marxist idea of the state as the apparatus of the bourgeois class has been developed through the recognition of the contradictory nature of the state and through the inclusion of the concept of hegemony.

Hall, with the influence of Gramsci, argues that force is not the only means of ensuring state power. He accepts that 'the state is physically capable of doing many things, including torturing prisoners, making troublesome citizens disappear, or even the wiping-out of whole ethnic groups'. In addition to that, he stresses the use of consent by the state in order to legitimise the use of violence (Hall, 1984:16).

Jessop, a state theorist, again with the influence of Gramsci, emphasises hegemony to elaborate the idea of the state. In contrast to accumulation strategies, which mainly concern 'the relations of production' and 'balance of class forces', hegemonic projects are not only concerned with economic relations, Jessop argues, but also with non-economic issues (Jessop, 1991: 172). In fact, 'hegemonic projects' can work against the 'contradiction between accumulation and legitimation' by claiming a 'general interest in accumulation' (Jessop, 1991: 181).
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Offe develops the debate between Poulantzas and Miliband\(^{16}\) by rejecting the state as an instrument of the ruling class or the state apparatus, which is not allied with certain classes, but has an autonomy from class interests in capitalist society. He conceives of the state as having contradictory tasks. As Jessop also implies, state in Offe’s theory must regulate the process of accumulation since the state itself ‘depends on’ ‘guaranteeing and safeguarding a ‘healthy’ accumulation process’ ‘for the sake of its own power’. On the other hand, the state must present itself as the impartial arbiter of class interests in order to legitimate its power (Offe et al., 1982: 249-250, also Offe 1972, 1974 quoted in Held et al., 1983: 487).

To sum up, in contrast to the competitive state or state strategies approaches which consider competition and commercialisation of the state uncritically, the alternative approaches view the state in capitalist countries as having a violent and forceful character and they do not put state and market as binary oppositions.

5. Conclusion

The aim of spreading capitalism to peripheral countries around the world was constructed through the paradigm of national development in modernization. Now, it is being done by globalization discourse in which it is argued that there is no alternative to capitalism. These ideological formulations receive their strength from the decline of the welfare state and socialism, and at the same time, contribute to that decline by not considering them as alternatives, so the process works dialectically. The end declarations such as the end of history, end of geography and end of politics, together all serve to idealise capitalism.

In contrast to the early emphasis on modernization for development and democracy as an output, and capitalism as something desirable to achieve better things, globalization theorists present capitalism as being inevitable, and almost obligatory for the survival of the state.

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Instead of national development, the states, it is now argued, are required to obey the rules of globalization by gaining a commercial mentality. Although the global understanding which discredits the nation-state and supports the neo-liberal policies is criticised, and internal contradictions are shown in this chapter, state-centric understandings are also objected to. In fact, the main emphasis in this chapter is to reject the binary oppositions such as state and market, nation-state and globalization, and at the same time to challenge some parallels such as capitalism and democracy. States can be commercial and integrated to the global economy, and at the same time can be strong politically. Even when the states are declared to be weak in the economy, they can remain strong in politics. This contradictory character of the state matters more for this study, as will become clearer in the next chapter, which provides a concrete case for these discussions by examining the state, capitalism and democracy in Turkey's own historical context and peculiar conditions.
CHAPTER THREE

Capitalism, State and Democracy in Turkey

A study of the state, politics and the media in Turkey can not be complete without considering the official ideology, Kemalism, which takes its name from the founder of the Turkish Republic (1923), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kemalism, as the founding ideology of Turkey, has been criticised and challenged by those people whose aspirations it does not meet. When the lack of correspondence between Kemalism and the diversity of the people living in Turkey is considered, the rising discontent is very understandable. Although these complaints, reactions and resistance to Kemalism have always existed, after the 1980s critiques of statism were added. Kemalism, with its principle of statism, was seen as an obstacle to the liberalisation of the regime in the 1980s.

In this chapter, I will examine the so-called liberalisation process by trying to show its idiosyncracies in Turkey and address questions such as whether the liberalisation process is a challenge for Kemalism, and if so, in what ways. The big question is whether, as many argue, economic liberalism brings political liberalism in Turkey. In other words, does restricting the role of the state in the economy have the natural outcome of restricting the political power?

Firstly, I will consider Kemalism and its principles, with a special focus on statism. Evaluations of the Democrat Party (DP) government will follow. The DP period is important since it is claimed that it was a breaking point for statism, and is important for understanding the liberalisation process after the 1980s. In fact, as many argue, The DP period and the 1980s, as liberalisation attempts, have some similarities. So, this part, as the ‘introduction’ to liberalism, will form a background to understanding the 1980s’ claim of ‘more comprehensive and successful’ liberalism (Sezer, 1992:6).

This chapter does not aim to give a complete history of Turkey, but rather to highlight some turning points. In order to understand the liberal discourse of contemporary Turkey, the principles in Kemalism, especially that of statism and its development, should be reviewed. The military coups deserve special attention in
this context since they were carried out to protect Kemalism or Atatürkism as the state’s response to the crisis of capital accumulation and hegemony. In particular, the 1980 military coup is important since the liberalisation process of the 1980s emerged from it. At the end of the chapter, this liberalisation process will be linked with the privatization of the state economic enterprises and the attempts to be part of Europe through the Customs Union. This will be done by evaluating recent tendencies in the light of Turkey’s aim of Westernization.

1. Kemalism, The Official Ideology of Turkey

Kemalism has unique characteristics and provides very rich and complex material for studies on ideology. It is not simply an ideology of national independence and sovereignty, but is also a backbone of social change in an enlightening, modernizing and Westernising way. It does not remain in the past as the founding ideology of Turkey, but maintains its dominance even today with different variations. There are many different perceptions and applications of Kemalism including the military one.

There is debate as to Kemalism’s status as an ideology though here it is considered as such. Some argue that Kemalism is not even a system of ideas, but a political practice aimed at reform and progress (Dumont, 1984: 25). According to some, although it presents a ‘guiding vision’, it is limited and therefore is not an ideology (Akural, 1984:146).

A deeper discussion would evaluate Kemalism within the context of its change over time. Heper suggests that ‘Atatürkist thought’ initially was not ‘a quality or type of thought but a technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusions’, and adds that the charismatic rule of Atatürk and also Atatürkist thought were ‘routinized’ and ‘supplemented’ by the bureaucracy: “What must be an example of a Weltanschaung par excellence, was gradually transformed into an ideology” (Heper, 1985: 70-71).

Although Kemalism has been re-invented and re-interpreted many times during the history of Turkey, the principles of Atatürk remain a major source for understanding Kemalism. These six principles were formulated as the six ‘arrows’
of the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was founded in 1923 and remained as the ruling party until the advent of the multi-party system in 1946.

They were included in the RPP Party Programme for the Third Party Congress in 1931. In the constitutional amendment of 1937, the principles were also incorporated into the Turkish Constitution (Özbudun, 1981:88-9). They are - with the order rearranged according to the priorities of this study - republicanism, revolutionism, nationalism, secularism, populism and statism.

These principles shed light on the Turkish state's concepts of the ideal state and ideal society in the frame of ideal economic and political relations. They present a radical departure from the Ottoman past. As a result of these principles and their applications, some issues arose which are discussed even today, such as the fact that Turkey is the only secular state in the Middle East, and integration with the West. Some of the principles constitute issues of major political conflicts such as nationalism (mainly with regard to the Kurdish question) and secularism (with the rise of radical Islam). The principle of statism, is currently undergoing the biggest transformation of all. This will be discussed in greater detail below. Whether or not this is a development contradictory to Kemalism is an important question which should be addressed. A starting point for that discussion might be to say that all these principles are key elements for the main objective of modernization and Westernization. It is rather difficult to summarise Kemalism in terms of attitudes towards Westernisation. Since the war of independence established the Republic of Turkey, naturally the Kemalists did not want Turkey to be a colony of the West, and were, therefore, anti-imperialist. Before the war, the free trade policy of the Ottoman Empire had ended in economic ruin and bankruptcy, and a foreign takeover of the economy (Özay, 1983:54). At one and the same time, therefore, Turkey was to travel down the paths of anti-imperialism and capitalism (Ahmad, 1981:150). For example, almost one-third of the corporations established between

17 Ahmad considers Kemalism to be the extension of the developments which started in the Ottoman Empire period. He mainly emphasises the Young Turk era (1908-18) by arguing that some ideas refined by Mustafa Kemal were first discussed then. He states that Mustafa Kemal was involved in the discussions with the prominent intellectuals during the period when the Ottoman empire was undergoing a radical transformation (Ahmad, 1981: 145). See also Dumont (1984) for a similar discussion.
1920 and 1930 were partnerships with foreign capital. (Boratav, 1981:168). Foreign capital was ‘welcome so long as it did not come with political or economic strings’ (Ahmad, 1981:150). During the 1930s the policy regarding foreign capital changed for many reasons as will be explained in the section on statism. Foreign investment and trade were discouraged, economic policy was determined as a “closed-economy” framework (Özay, 1983: 54). However, even at that time, and subsequently, the main motive for Westernisation did not change.

As Keyman states: “(the)...making of Turkey was based upon both a war of independence against Western imperialism and acceptance of its epistemic and moral dominance” (Keyman, 1995:96-97). These principles to implement the target, or in Atatürk's own words, to “reach a contemporary level of civilization”, will be summarised in the next few paragraphs.

Republicanism replaced the personal rule of the Sultan in 1923. Monarchism was outlawed, and the Ottoman Empire period ended. According to the RPP Party Programme, “the Republic is the form of government, which represents and realises most safely the ideal of national sovereignty. With this unshakeable conviction, the party defends, with all its means, the republic against all danger” (Landen, 1970:238-39).

According to the principle of revolutionism, all changes toward Westernisation have been seen as revolutions. Revolutionism is a principle which has been interpreted in different ways. Some declare it to be a 'reformism' (İnkılap), others a 'revolutionism'. Most of the leftist Kemalists use the word 'revolution', but generally the former is the one that has been used; this version is also the military's choice.

The first Regulation the RPP adopted in 1923 stated that the organisation was “not a party of revolution but of reform” (Akural, 1984:141). However, the 1935 RPP Programme, stated that “The party does not consider itself bound by progressive and evolutionary principles in finding measures in the State administration. The Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles
which have since been elaborated". (Landen, 1970: 238-39). In 1937, revolutionism was incorporated into the constitution as an official policy (Akural, 1984: 141).

Whereas religion was the bonding element during the Ottoman Empire period, Nationalism became the new bond of the republic. The principles of nationalism and secularism have overlapping elements as will be seen in the paragraphs on secularism. In addition to replacing religion, the principle of nationalism, which also means ‘Turkishness’, is recognised over differences of ethnic groups.

Turkishness is created as a national identity by Kemalism. The constitution of the Turkish Language Institution (TLI) and Turkish History Institution (THI) can be seen as attempts to create Turkishness. After the Latin alphabet had been adopted and taught, the TLI worked to replace Arabic words with Turkish words. This nationalist attempt reached its most extreme point in 1935 when the Sun Language Theory was developed, which claimed that in Central Asia all languages were derived from a common origin and Turkish was its closest modern expression. The Turkish Historical Thesis also claimed that Turks had lived in Central Asia, but because of hunger and drought, had been forced to migrate to other areas and in so doing had created the world's great civilizations. Zurcher states that the theory aimed to give Turks a sense of pride and national identity, separate from the recent Ottoman past (Zurcher, 1993: 193-200). However, it is more than establishing the identity of 'we' as opposed to the Ottoman identity, especially when the Turkish state's approach to the largest ethnic group, the Kurds, is considered. Beşikçi argues that these theories were aimed at assimilating the Kurds as Turks (Beşikçi, 1991: 167). Indeed, the existence of the Kurdish people was denied; until recently they were called 'mountain Turkish'. Furthermore, after recognition of their difference, they became the responsibility of the military in its brief to end 'terrorism' rather than being viewed as a political or cultural issue. 18

Secularism, like nationalism, aims to cut the ties of the new Turkish Republic with the Ottoman past by ending religion as a base for society. This principle, more obviously than the others, was designed as a constituting part of the modernization

and Westernisation processes. In accordance with this principle, in addition to the introduction of the new alphabet, the legal system was changed: the Swiss civil code was adopted; the political rights of women were recognised; the caliphate and Islamic law and courts were abolished; religious shrines, convents, religious education centres were closed down; the weekend holiday was changed from Friday to Sunday; the calendar and measures were adapted according to the Western model (Toprak, 1992:244, Akural, 1984:127).

All these have been implemented "in conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the fundamentals and the methods provided for modern civilisation by the Science and Technique", as the principle of secularism expresses (Landen,1970:238-39).

The understanding of secularism is not pure and singular. In fact, over the years, what has been observed is not simply 'to separate ideas of religion from politics and from the affairs of the world and of the State' (Landen,1970:238-39) as is generally accepted and as is included in the RPP Programme. Religion is not removed from public life, on the contrary, religion is used by politicians and by 'Atatürkist' military practitioners.

As Mete Tunçay states, secularism in Turkey means the organisation of religion by the state. More specifically, it means 'the state's control of religious practices, restricting the activities of Islamic ruhban by including them in the state, and some of the religious principles directing public life according to the needs of state's political legitimacy' (quoted in Insel, 1995c:113).

*Populism* (*Halkcilik*) was derived from Ziya Gökalp's¹⁹ idea of corporatism, which is, according to Belge, the dominant ideology in Turkey, and can be traced in the different political formations with the motto of 'national unity' (Belge, 1989:129-133).

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¹⁹ For a more detailed article which contains an extensive bibliography of Ziya Gökalp see Andrew Danison, "Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: The Ideas of Ziya Gökalp", *Economy and Society*, vol.24, no.2, 1995, pp.189-224.
"...It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of the labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people.

The farmers, handicraftsmen, labourers and workmen, people exercising free profession, industrialist, merchants and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish Community. The functioning of each of these groups is essential to the life and happiness of the others and of the community.

The aims of our Party, with this principle, are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude to the amount of work" (Landen,1970: 238-39).

Populism may have functioned during the national struggle against the imperialist powers and old order since it provided solidarity (Ahmad,1981: 156). However, it has been maintained even after the national struggle ended.

During the one-party period, populism was a justification of the single party system. Since Turkish society was ‘classless’, there were no differing interests, therefore, there was no necessity to have parties advocating them (Dumont, 1984: 33).

Despite the principle of a classless society, in fact there are classes and Kemalism does not abolish class differences and inequalities. The existence of classes and inequality is, in fact, not surprising as the capitalist mode of production was chosen as a way from the beginning. What this principle does, as will be very clear with the future applications, is to create an illusion of sameness in order to establish consent, prevent conflicts, and ‘secure social order’.

2. Statism for Capitalist Development

“Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interest of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible.
The interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual builder, as well as to encourage private enterprises, and also to regulate and control the work that is being done.

The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the State depends upon the requirements of the greatest public interest of the nation. If the enterprise, which the state itself decides to undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in the hands of private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend upon the enactment of the law, which will indicate the way in which the State shall indemnify the loss the possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration" (Landen, 1970: 238-39).

As seen in the RPP Programme, statism is essentially a step to strengthen free enterprise and to participate in the Western capitalist world, but there are differences in the understanding of statism in relation to the developments experienced.

Köker divides (Köker, 1990: 104-105) the different perceptions of statism under two titles:

1. Statism as a pragmatic solution for economic development: Mixed economy
2. Statism as a special way of capital accumulation/strategy of capitalist development.

The first approach explains the emergence of statism with the desire for fast economic development in general, and the problems which the world crisis created in the country in particular. Statism is evaluated as an authentic, different system which is peculiar to Turkey, neither capitalist, nor socialist. Both public and private enterprises exist together (Köker, 1990: 105). Statism, as Insel states, defined in the 1961 Constitution, is an example of the kind of statism which advocates that the state should arrange the economy and control and protect the private sector.

20 There was an anti-western group called the Kadro movement that can be included in this first approach as well. They were inspired by the anti-imperialist theories (Köker, 1990: 100-101). For the detailed discussion of the Kadro group see Haldun Gülalp, "Ulusculuk, Devletcilik ve Türk Devrimi: Bir Erken 'Bağımlılık' Teorisi", Nevin Cosar (ed.), Türkiye de Devletcilik, Baglam: Istanbul, 1995, pp.173-188
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This system, İnсел argues, unifies the principles of the market economy and social state 21 (İnssel, 1995a:189-192).

According to the second approach, it is incorrect to evaluate statism as a different system from capitalism and socialism. Instead, statism is a capitalist development strategy (Köker, 1990:106). For İnssel, political statism as an authoritarian, centralist and elitist conception provides the basic motivation and legitimisation of economic statism (İnssel, 1995a:188). Since political statism is expansive, its existence is not only restricted to the political area, but is also in the cultural and economic areas. As İnssel suggests, this ‘holistic statism’ is the most appropriate concept to explain the Turkish state’s intervention in politics, economy, culture, public and private life (İnssel, 1995a:189-190).

The discussions on the state in Turkey should be expanded to include the internal and external factors in order to understand statism as an economic policy for fostering capitalist accumulation in the country, and to place Turkey in the global capitalist system.

The 1920s can be summarised as ‘the period of creating an enterprise class’:

"Where Turkish merchants or industrialists were lacking, it was necessary to create them via the enrichment of particular individuals through state resources and support, and the natural candidates for this role were to be found within the ranks of the leading cadres and politicians" (Boratav, 1981: 169-170).

There are many examples that show the free enterprise orientation of the 1920s: Kemalist development strategy such as the establishment of the İş Bank in 1924, the law for The Encouragement of Industry in 1927 and the Foreign Trade Regulation Law of 1929. According to Özay, the establishment of the banks, credit institutions and industry was neither at the expense of agricultural development, nor state enterprises. They all existed together (Özay, 1983: 50-52).

21 There are differences in the priorities of these two. The people who see the market economy as a target argue that the role of the state should decrease after the development is realised and sufficient capital is accumulated. Others consider the intervention and protection should be permanent since they believe statism is vital for a socially distributive system (İnssel, 1995a:189-192).
Ahmad calls this phase the ‘laissez-faire’ period. He states that the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1927, provided the conditions for local capitalists to encourage private enterprise. Furthermore, he argues that the government went so far that the state support was implemented through politicians against the state (Ahmad, 1993:96-97):

“The government’s policy worked all too well and local businessmen made huge fortunes during this period. With inside information available to them, thanks to their sources in the government, they knew all about the new tariffs that would be imposed on imports in 1929. Consequently, they imported and hoarded foreign goods before the tariffs went up. That led to a sharp deterioration in the balance of trade and a decline in the value of the lira aggravated by the world depression. This may have been good for business but it was disastrous for the national economy. The cost of paying the public debt rose sharply and the government was forced to suspend payments to its foreign creditors in 1930. Turkey’s credit abroad was seriously damaged, making it even more difficult to borrow money or attract investment (Ahmad, 1993:96-97).”

The economic policies changed as a result of the world crisis (Birtek, 1995:143), which brought the fall of external and internal prices for agricultural products, and caused Turkey to limit its imports (Gülalp, 1985:333-335). Thus, a closed, protectionist economic policy and industrialisation were embraced by the state.

According to Boratav, this protectionism, was the ‘correct defence mechanism’ against the world crisis: “it enabled the partial ‘delinking’ of the Turkish economy from the imperialist system when the latter was in a depression” (Boratav, 1981: 188-189). In accordance with protective measures and restrictions on foreign trade, the nationalisation of foreign investments was implemented. Industrialisation and capital accumulation were realised by the state (Boratav, 1981:174-175).

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22 for the criticism of this idea, see Finefrock, 1981:384

23 Besides the world crisis there were other reasons which brought about the consideration of the ‘open door’ policy (Boratav, 1981:174). 1929 was the year the first instalment of the Ottoman debt was to be paid. It was also the year Ottoman tariffs expired, therefore a new scale of import duties needed to be implemented (Boratav, 1981:169-170).
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At a local level, the state intervened directly in the economy through state economic enterprises. (Ozbudun, 1981:89). Sümerbank was established in 1933 as a combined state bank and holding company (Özay, 1983: 52). The state controlled the agricultural, industrial, financial and banking activities by becoming the ‘major productive and investing agent’ (Boratav, 1981:175). However, even then it was not in total control in all these areas, and this did not constitute direct intervention of the state in all of the economy (Boratav, 1981:178, Ahmad 1993:96-97). The private sector participated in some sectors with the state. There were also some areas in industry without any state intervention (Boratav, 1981:178).

Although the state carried out industrialisation itself, this was due to the insufficient supply of capital. Otherwise, there was no change in the state’s role of helping the private sector to ‘grow and mature’ (Ahmad, 1993:96-97).

If the 1920s was the period of ‘creating’ an enterprise class, the 1930s was the period of ‘supporting’ it (Boratav, 1981:169-170). Thus, Boratav argues, statism in Turkey “did not obstruct the development of the bourgeoisie” (Boratav, 1981:169-170).

The opposite view sees the change of policy towards statism in the 1930s as a destructive step against free enterprise, and considers it to be one of the indicators of the state’s major influence and the weaker power of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. The Great Crisis was seen as a justification for statists to apply their policies (Özay, 1983:52-63). It is argued that the temporary measures became permanent ‘because of the strong state tradition’ of Turkey (Saracoğlu, 1994: 63-64, Heper, 1985).

3. The End of Statism and The Beginning of Democracy?: The DP Government’s ‘Liberal Statism’:

The view which considers the 1930s as the period in which private enterprise was discouraged, has parallels with the view which evaluates the DP government as the end of statism. The DP government is important in terms of ending the one-party regime of the RPP and starting the multi-party democracy, as the party which
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gained popular support. However, the question arises as to whether the end of the one-party rule of the RPP meant the end of statism.

There are two opposing comments about this period. The one, which does not view statism as being separate from capitalism, argues that the DP government was the 'decisive shift' in this process "from elite rule to full class rule", but this shift was "from one pattern of capitalist development to another" (Keyder, 1979: 19). For the second approach, the period which starts with the DP government is viewed as a challenge to the statist policies of the bureaucratic elite (Heper, 1985: 19), as being the liberal economic transformation, and as a new period in which closer relations were established with the West (Özay, 1983: 54).

If the questions of whether and how liberalism was realised are left aside for now, what remains is whether the DP period was as radical a rupture as claimed. In answer to this, it should be considered whether the liberal economy and relationships with the West were started during the DP period. In fact, there are many indications that these two developments started before that. The explanations of Kemalist principles previously given show that Kemalism was a project which aimed to incorporate Turkey into the capitalist western world. Statism, in that sense, aims to encourage the private sector. In fact, before the DP government, in the 1947 RPP Party Congress, this became more obvious, statism was clearly described as a principle to help the private sector (Boratav, 1993: 77-78).

Gülabp argues that before the Second World War in 1939, Turkey was already preparing to implement some changes in economic policy. This included the transfer of some of the established industries to the private sector, and a relaxation of the restrictions on foreign trade in accordance with the relatively recovered world economy. However, the outbreak of the war caused the abandonment of these plans and the government had to apply emergency measures (Gülabp, 1985: 335). The end of the Second World War meant the end of statism, though the changes did not take place immediately (Gülabp, 1985: 333).

In terms of establishing relations with the West, it is known that the RPP was also applying liberal policies for Turkey's IMF membership, such as devaluation and some measures for foreign trade liberalisation, from 1946 (Gülabp, 1985: 336). IMF
membership was realised in 1947 (Boratav, 1993:79) and at the same time the RPP was seeking foreign aid (Gülap, 1985: 336). In fact, it was after Marshall aid that the government allowed the foundation of an opposition party, which was the DP (Keyder, 1979: 16).

The developments in favour of a liberal economy and close relationships with the West were not contradictory to Kemalism and the RPP, and they did not start with the DP. However, it is true that these tendencies to draw closer to the West increased during the DP government to the extent of dependency (Boratav, 1993:74), especially with the flow of aid from the United States and Europe (Özay, 1983:54). The relationship between Turkey and the USA increased following Turkey’s decision to take part in the Korean War and join NATO in 1952; the same was not true of the relationship with Europe (Özay, 1983:54, Boratav, 1993: 79).

The DP period was ‘the culmination of this liberalisation process’ (Gülap, 1985: 336) and this was in parallel with the developments in the world economy. As a result of the boom in the world market created by the Korean War, Turkey’s earnings from agricultural production and exports increased (Keyder, 1979: 21). These earnings were very effective in allowing the lifting of almost all restrictions on imports (Gülap, 1985: 336).

Here the DP’s liberalism can be questioned by asking whether the DP was anti-statist, and more broadly anti-Kemalist. Before being elected, the DP promised the transfer of state economic enterprises (SEE) to private ownership (Keyder, 1979:18). However, this was not realised. The economic logic of the DP was not so different from the Kemalists’, and although statism was criticised (Keyman, 1995:110), it remained at the level of discourse.

When the DP’s perception of liberalism is examined, it is seen that “the liberal critique” was only used to secure the representation of the private sector as the precondition of the modernisation of Turkish society (Ahmad 1993:103-120).
Ögün argues that, compared to the left, the Turkish right is more indirectly statist in a liberal make-up (Ögün, 1995:101-102). Similarly Insel calls this period liberal statism by considering it as an important step in establishing capitalism with state interference (Insel, 1995a: 209). According to him, the interventionism was not decreased, but increased both in the qualitative and quantitative senses. However, the type of the intervention changed. While the earlier 'traditional' statism functioned to preserve the state against the changing conditions in society and in the world, he argues, 'liberal statism', which replaced traditional statism, focused on enterprise. New and more profitable ways opened up for private enterprises as a result of state support and protection. The DP government did not privatise SEE's, but established new ones (Insel, 1995a:204-205).

It seems, therefore, that the DP period was not far removed from Kemalism in terms of maintaining a statist economic policy. When the political dimensions of liberalisation are considered, it might seem that there was more freedom in terms of religion, but this is an illusion. Religion was used by the DP for its own interests to manipulate the reactions to the RPP. In that specific situation, it was perceived as the way of being popular. The DP took a very tough stance against the oppositional press (Tunçay, 1995:183), as will be considered in the chapter on the Turkish media. As hysterically anticommmunist, the DP could not tolerate any leftist voice, whereas it was very flexible towards the right (Eroğul, 1992:121). There was no improvement in civil citizenship rights (Keyder, 1993b: 149). This was particularly true after the crisis conditions occurred, and the DP's political oppression increased.

The economic boom came to an end and conditions changed in 1953. Following the decline of the prices of primary goods, large trade deficits developed (Keyder,1979:21). After 1955, the foreign aid received by Turkey became insufficient to cover the current account deficit. As a result, the government applied short term borrowing, which later created a repayment problem. This led to a crisis and a 300 percent devaluation in 1958 (Keyder, 1979:22).

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24 For a contrasting view which argues that the DP was successful in economic liberalisation, but because of the statism of Kemalism the DP was not able to end the dominant role of the public sector in the economy,
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The crisis was not only a crisis of capital accumulation, but also a crisis of the DP’s hegemony. Peasants were the main supporters of the DP, because it had gained victory by using the opposition of the peasants to the RPP, through emphasising the RPP’s ‘religious oppression’ (Keyder,1979:18). The government supported the rich peasantry by paying high prices to the farmers, even during the crisis, by printing money for agricultural subsidies. This contributed to the rise of inflation, which reached 40 percent in 1958. As a result, even the liberal factions of the intelligentsia who supported the DP, started to complain. These were added to the complaints of the bureaucracy, business circles in İstanbul, and the military who complained not only about the decline in their real income (Keyder, 1979:22), but also about the DP’s violation of the Kemalist principle, secularism (Gülalp,1985: 338). This, in addition to the government’s having an anti-democratic stance, culminated in the crisis which caused the military coup on the 27th May, 1960 (Keyder, 1979:22).

4. The Military as the Guardian of Kemalism, and The Military Coups as a Solution to Crisis


It is not only in these extraordinary conditions that the military in Turkey has an important role; this role exists even during the civilian periods with the continuing impact of the military on political and economic life.

As Sakallıoğlu states, the military has an ‘indirect influence’ on the government by making ‘demands, policy suggestions, and warnings on political matters’. (Sakallıoğlu, 1997:153). This interference is realised at a non-official level between the politicians and army officers in an unquestioning manner, as can be seen in the frequent examples in Turkey in the 1990s in the case of the Welfare Party. In addition to this, the close relationship has been established on a legal basis. Since the Constitution changed following each of the military coups, military power has been of influence during the civilian periods as well. There are two key

see Sezer,1992:6
mechanisms which were created by the military following the coups, which were incorporated in the Constitution. These mechanisms produce a ‘double-headed political system’ in Turkey. The first one is the creation of the state security courts which led to the operation of military justice alongside the civilian justice system. (Sakallıoğlu, 1997:157). The second mechanism is the National Security Council (MGK), which made it possible for the military to participate in the decision-making process of the civilian authorities. Having been introduced as a ‘platform for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security’ by the 1961 constitution (Sakallıoğlu, 1997:157), it was extended with the 1973 amendments, which included making recommendations to the government, and further empowered with the 1982 constitution with the statement that the military’s ‘recommendations would be given priority consideration by the council of ministers’ (Sakallıoğlu, 1997: 157).

Initially, the military was allowed to voice its ideas about national security, but it has subsequently reached the point that the military’s voice has become almost more important than the civilians. This is not surprising since national security is viewed as a sacred concept which includes all ‘internal’ and ‘external enemies’ of Turkey. The more surprising thing here is the existence and even strengthening of the military which continued even after the ‘democratic’ Turkey of the 1980s.

The military’s links are not restricted to the government, or the parliament. It also has links with business and industry. The establishment of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK) in 1961 made this relationship ‘direct’. With the advantages provided by the government, OYAK has become ‘an integral part of the economy’ (Berberoğlu, 1981: 280) by being ‘one of the largest and most profitable conglomerates in the country’, and providing high profits to the military investors (Ahmad, 1993:11).

25 ‘By the early 1970s, OYAK had acquired controlling interests in the Turkish Automotive Industry (which assembles International Harvester trucks and tractors), an insurance company, a food-canning firm and a cement plant. It also held 42 per cent of the shares of Renault’s Turkish subsidiary OYAK-Renault, 20 per cent of the Petkim Petrochemical plant, 8 per cent of the state-owned Turkish Petroleum corporation and 7 per cent of the Turkish subsidiary of the Goodyear Tyre Company, among others. Thus, while it had
When the military which carried out the coups are examined, some common points emerge. Firstly, the coups were carried out with the claims of saving the state and democracy, and protecting Kemalism. There were IMF measures before the coups in 1958, in 1970 and in January 1980 (Gülalp, 1985:331-332). Although all of them brought pressures against people, it was to differing extents (Timur, 1992:31). The post-coup environment in 1960, brought the period in which many basic democratic rights were recognised and extended to a 'wide-ranging set of groups and institutions in society' (Gülalp, 1985:329). Even though the military coups were realised with the same justification of saving Kemalism, and were preceded by the IMF measures, the outcomes were different not only in terms of 'political regime', but also in terms of 'economic policy' (Gülalp,1985:332). In fact 1960 changed the accumulation pattern from agrarian and merchant capital to industrial capital (Gülalp,1985: 336-337), and brought import-substituting-industrialisation, whereas 1980, as will be seen in detail more later, changed these policies completely, and promoted export (Eralp,1990:220).

In considering the nature of the three military coups, some Turkish scholars are influenced by theories of the crisis of the capitalist state. According to this, the crisis situation arises as a result of the internal class structure and the effects of world capitalism in which the society aims to participate (Gülalp, 1985:331, Keyder, 1979:31).

When there are transitions between the phases of development following crises, the capital accumulation process needs to be restructured. Gülalp argues: "Military interventions coincide with these periods of crisis and transition between phases" (Gülalp, 1985: 333).

The state always plays a role in the capital accumulation process. As Gülalp indicates, this continuity itself brings variation.

"...the variations in political regime do not disrupt the continuity in economic policies introduced by the previous government. On the contrary, they proceed to the

started with an initial investment of 8.6 million T. L., by 1970 this had grown to 502 million T. L. and in 1972 its assets totalled $300 million" (Berberoğlu, 1981:281-282).
It may then be asked why military coups are not applied as a solution everywhere in crisis conditions even though the state is doing the same everywhere in the process of accumulating capital. Here, the role of the state in gaining the consent from citizens plays an important part in sustaining the system in crisis conditions. The ‘representation crisis’ of the government following the economic crisis and the already initiated transition (Gülalp, 1985:344) is exhibited in the 1980 coup. The concept of ‘hegemony’ (Keyder, 1979:28-29) on the other hand, seems broader and more explanatory because, in contrast to the implication of the concept of representation, it includes not only a representation crisis of the government, parties or the parliament, but also more complex processes of the conflicts between classes and inter-class fractions. In some crises, one type of conflict can be more dominant than another. Before the second military coup, the inter-class conflicts, even inter-bourgeois conflicts became dominant because ‘the new phase required a different composition of the market’ and ‘changed the pattern of relationship with the world economy’. Keyder explains the reason for the 1971 military coup on the basis of ‘the inability of any one fraction within the bourgeoisie to establish hegemonic rule’. The banking and commercial bourgeoisie and the industrial bourgeoisie were in conflict. The complaints of the industrialists were that the commercial bourgeoisie benefited from bank credits whereas the manufacturing sector was deprived of them. The commercial sector was also more advantaged because of the protective trade regime and the other state interventions in the economy (Keyder, 1979:28-31).

In the 1970s, the bourgeois class complained about the 1961 Constitution which extended political freedoms, as mentioned above. According to them, “Turkish society was not yet ready for a such a luxury and therefore the Constitution should be changed to limit some of the freedoms enjoyed by those who disturbed the social order”. The military in fact followed this suggestion and intervened in March, 1971. According to the military, this was done because the parliament was unable to cope with ‘anarchy, internecine strife, social and economic discontent’ (Keyder, 1979: 30-31). The same reason was given for the coup of 12 September,
1980. Although there were violent movements in both cases, especially before 1980, there was 'a radicalisation of the political struggle' (Gülalp, 1985:344). These were the outcomes of a crisis, not the reasons for it. It is true that hegemony is always a continuing struggle, and can not be established completely at any time in any society. However, in Turkey's case, hegemony is far from being established since the constitution of the Republic. Since the Republic was constituted by excluding Kurdish, Islamic and other elements, but created a Turkishness by relying on the principle of populism, there is a question of insecurity about the maintenance of the regime against those who want to 'breakdown' the system and create another one. So it can be argued that as a result of the weakness of the regime, the equilibrium of hegemony in Turkey relies on the strong state more than on consent.

After the 1971 intervention during the two years when the military was in power, wages which had risen in the 1960s, dropped again. The resources were transferred from agriculture to heavy industry through, amongst other ways, credits (Gülalp, 1985:340). The environment of freedom of the 1960s ended. Strikes and demonstrations were outlawed, all students' and teachers' unions and left wing political organisations were banned, and their leaders were imprisoned (Berberoğlu, 1981:280). At the end of the 1970s, the economic situation of the country worsened. The annual inflation rate reached 100 percent (which was 14 percent between 1970 and 1972) (Özay, 1983: 54-55)

After less than a decade, another coup was experienced on the 12 September, 1980: "...Turkish bourgeoisie has once again turned to the military for 'a way out' of the current crisis... Under the guise of containing 'extremism' from the left and right, this is once again attacking the left". (Berberoğlu, 1981:290). Here, it should be emphasised that different business groups had put pressure on the government to control the working class before the coup. For example, TÜSIAD, the leading business group, announced their ideas about the 1979 environment with an advertisement entitled 'A Realistic Way Out', which was published in the newspapers. They mentioned that they were 'anxious about the inability of the
government to manage Turkey’s foreign debt or to control trade union militancy’. The solution according to them was free enterprise. A similar complaint was made by TISK (Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Union) which was discontented about the ‘unreasonable wage demands’ and ‘the growing power of trade unions’. According to TISK, workers with increased power were responsible for inflation and the other economic problems (Eralp, 1990:233-234). What followed as a result were Ecevit’s resignation from the government; seeking help from the international finance organisations27; and Demirel’s appointment of Özal to the economic stabilisation programme.

The political environment was so active, organised and strong that it would not have been easy to apply the Stabilisation Programme under these conditions. It was not ‘the severity of the economic crisis which rendered the Programme inadequate’ (Saracoğlu, 1994:64), but the lack of suitable conditions28 to apply such a Programme. In fact, the implementation of the programme was started as soon as the military coup created a suitable environment, as will be seen below (Boratav, 1993:122, Gülalp, 1985:344).

Despite the fact that the 1980 coup produced a reduction of freedom, as mentioned above, Heper makes a very optimistic evaluation. For him, the military’s system of ethics created ‘a new kind of Turk’ who plays the role of ‘citizen’ in the political environment. Heper writes that the military coup produced a reduction of freedom, as mentioned above, and added, “The new kind of Turk is a civilian who is a citizen in the political environment. Heper further added, “The new kind of Turk is a civilian who is a citizen in the political environment.”

26 Also, following the foreign exchange crisis, the foreign debt rose to $13.8 billion in 1978 from $4.7 billion in 1975 (Kazgan, 1993:70-71).

27 The Turkish government negotiated ‘debt rescheduling with external creditors’ which included international financial agencies and more than 250 private western banks in 1978 (Berberoglu, 1981: 282-283). After negotiations a Standby Agreement was reached with the IMF in July 1979 (Özay,1983:54-55 ). In order to extend credits further, conditions were imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Some of them were: “... deceleration of economic growth (which had already fallen from 7 percent year prior to 1976 to about 2 percent in 1978); a wage freeze; 20-30 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira (already devalued fifteen times between 1972 and 1977); a further increase in consumer prices; and large allocations to the private sector from the state budget - a budget already running a deficit of several billion dollars”. (Berberoglu, 1981:282-283).

system, not the role of 'subject'. In addition, this new system is based on 'participation, and tolerance towards others' opinions' (Heper, 1985: 147).

Furthermore, in a rather mystical way, he states:

".... post-1980 military in Turkey did not wish to impose upon society a closed system of thought and believed in the inherent capacity of the people" (Heper, 1985: 152).

Moreover, Heper claims that the military had been trying "to create a political environment in which, through multiple confrontations of civil societal groups, a dynamic consensus may be possible" (Heper, 1985:151). Therefore, the military in Turkey 'has aimed at a democratic reconsolidation rather than a regime breakdown' with the interventions (Heper, 1985:151).

It is difficult to understand how citizenship, political participation and democracy can be spoken of in relation to the 'post-1980 military regime' which removed the channels of representation (Sayari, 1992:32), ended all political activities and organisations, and brought severe restrictions on the freedom of expression. Executions of prisoners under 18 years of age were carried out. The human rights violations record reached its peak in the history of the country. As Gülalp states, the 1980 coup was the worst one in terms of destruction of freedoms. It brought a 'complete breakdown of all forms of democracy' (Gülalp, 1985:329).

Most of Heper's ideas derived from his comparison of the 1960 coup with the 1980 coup. He states that the 1980 coup, 'unlike the post- Atatürk bureaucratic intelligentsia' (he means the military in 1960) trusted in the 'common sense' of the people. Although it is not clear what is meant by common sense here, he might be implying the use of religion by the military. In fact, he mentions that ".... they have even resorted to religion to speed up the process of the inculcation of new norms"(Heper,1985: 152). Obviously, the use of Islam by the military as an antidote to leftism is not something that can be advocated in the name of democracy. The situation of 'inculcation' is certainly in contradiction with the claimed functions of the military, such as consolidating democracy, creation of citizenship and participation. His second point is clearer. In his comparison, he arrives at the conclusion that in the 1960 coup they tried to impose 'the
bureaucratised version of Atatürkist thought', but after the 1980 one ‘they have not insisted on statism’ (Heper, 1985: 151-152). This second point is crucial in terms of understanding the basis of his optimism felt about the 1980 military coup and the following 'civilian' regime.

In contrast, I argue that, the abandoning of statism in economy is far from guaranteeing democracy in itself, firstly because of the maintenance of state power with the use of legal and non-legal repression and violence against the citizens. In addition, the policies that led to the abandonment of statism should be considered. Thus, in the next section the liberal policies will be elaborated on with the conditions of post-1980 Turkey.

5. Liberalism and Democracy in the 1980s: Economic Stabilisation and Political Liberalism

In November 1983, the military government ended with the general elections. The MP (Motherland Party- ANAP) won the election, and influenced the decade. There are differing views about the MP government. In fact, this difference originally emerges from the different perceptions of the military coup, as explained above. Ayata classifies these views into two different groups. According to the first view, the MP is the extension of the military in integrating the Turkish economy into world markets. From this perspective, the MP is seen as “essentially conservative and supported by the religious and nationalist groups, an executive committee of the Turkish bourgeoisie, and a reflection of the rise of the new right in Turkey” (Ayata, 1993:33). There is strong evidence to evaluate the situation from the first perspective. For example, the stabilisation programme, which will be discussed

29 Article 120 of the Constitution which allows the declaration of a state of emergency brings restrictions to basic human rights and freedoms. The newspaper Özgür Gündem is one of the publications which had its distribution stopped and has been banned. It has also had its distribution prevented by other means. The journalists were harassed, some ‘disappeared’ or were killed. It has been confirmed that the state was involved in and responsible for some of the murders, such as that of the Kurdish writer and founder member of the HEP party, and the bombings of the Özgür Gündem offices (for more detailed and recent information on the legal provisions, human rights’ violations and media repression in Turkey see “State Before Freedom, Media Repression in Turkey” written by Hugh Poulton, and published in co-operation by
below, was actually brought before the MP government, but could not be applied until it was guaranteed by the military (Boratav, 1993:120-122). Özal, the leader of the MP, was the ex-chairman of one of the leading employers’ unions, The Union of Metal Goods Industrialist (MESS), top level manager of Sabancı Holding and the designer of the stabilisation programme in the State Central Planning (DPT) (Eralp, 1990:235). This background information is important to understand the relationship between business groups, military and government. As seen above, the business groups complained about high wages and this was another issue addressed in the Stabilisation Programme. It was also included by General Kenan Evren in his first speech to the public following the military coup in 1980 (Boratav, 1993:120-122).

The second group considers the MP as the only party which was ‘opposed to the military’ (Göle, 1994:217), or more cautiously as the party which ‘had distanced itself from the military more than had the other parties that competed in the 1983 general elections’ (Heper, 1994:197). It should be mentioned here that the general elections were very restrictive; as a result of the bans on some politicians, the range of parties was not wide. As Ayata states, this group evaluates the MP as ‘the “initiator” of liberal revolutions. According to this perspective, the MP is considered to be ‘antibureaucratic, pluralist, modern and able to bring together a coalition including a wide range of ideological groups’ (Ayata, 1993:33).

Although it contains people who have different interests with changing emphases and priorities, the second group draws a parallel between economic liberalism and political liberalism. Those who focus on the economy prioritise the successes of the liberal economic policies, mainly the Stabilisation Programme, while those who are more interested in the political dimensions celebrate the differences in the ‘strengthening civil society’ of post-1980 Turkey as an extension of the liberal economy.

The MP was a synthesis of the four ideological strands of liberalism, social democracy, nationalism, and conservatism. These four articulated views were in
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according with the ‘harmony’, ‘peace and order’, of the post-coup conditions. Despite the four different elements, market-oriented policy became dominant in the economic strategy.

Özal liberalised foreign exchange and trade regimes (Kazgan, 1993:74-75). The economic Programme’s so called ‘adjustment’ or ‘stabilisation’ was the embodiment of the tendency towards a ‘free’ market economy. The stabilisation programme was prepared at the end of 1970s, but it could not be put into effect at that time mainly because of the strong leftist movement and resistance, as mentioned before. At that time, it consisted of ‘short term measures’ for inflation and balance of payments difficulties, but later in the 1980s it was extended to the liberalisation of the foreign trade regime, export orientation, and finally, privatization (Şenses, 1993:97).

The main logic of the programme was to create an exportable surplus beyond domestic requirements, and to restrain domestic demand, in other words, wages. Wage restraint was considered vital to ‘combat’ rising inflation and to achieve international competitiveness under an export-oriented strategy with reduced cost (Şenses, 1993: 99).

Both the IMF and the World Bank co-operated to support the stabilisation programme financially30 (Saracoğlu, 1994: 69). Turkey obtained five structural adjustment loans. The World Bank regarded Turkey as ‘a test case for a new type of adjustment programme, which combined short term stabilisation with medium term structural change’ (Öniş, 1991: 165).

As a reinforcing effect of these international finance measures, Özal employed technocrats who had been educated in American universities, and worked in international finance centres such as the IMF and the World Bank. They had influential roles in the economic policy process (Sayarı, 1992:32).

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As a result of the programme, almost all controls on various commodity prices were ended by removing the Price Control Commission. State economic enterprises (SEE) were put in competition. It was decided that the prices of the products of those SEEs which produce non basic commodities would be set by commercial principles (Saracoğlu, 1994: 70).

Most of the relevant literature advocates this programme and endorses these developments. The result of the programme is welcomed since it is believed that it created a ‘remarkable improvement in Turkey’s economic situation’ in terms of ‘dramatic growth in exports of goods and services’ (Saracoğlu, 1994:75). The results are interpreted as indications of the Turkey’s ‘liberal revolution’ (Rustow, 1985:5)\(^31\).

In fact, these evaluations are not at all appropriate. Firstly, the conditions of the past are ignored by making a comparison with the crisis conditions of the 1980s, and secondly these had already been falsified by the end of the 1980s. Thus, the inflation rate reached around 80 percent in 1988. This rate was coupled with rising unemployment figures and affected mostly workers, government employees and retired people. With inflation, the value of their wages in real terms and their standard of living decreased. These conditions were the major reason for the MP’s later loss of support. This policy aggravated income distribution (Sayan, 1992:38-39), and increased the foreign debt to a record level of $38 billion (Eralp, 1990:242)\(^32\).

After the 1980 coup, taxes taken from capital were reduced, business activities were supported with the changes in the tax system at the expense of labour and agriculture (Kazgan, 1993:75). Although exporters were given tax rebates, and credits through the Central Bank were evaluated as a performance success story (Saracoğlu 1994: 71), the exports were, in fact, mythical. The ‘advantageous’

\(^31\) According to that, as a result of export-led growth, inflation fell to 25% by mid-1984 (from around 100% in 1980); exports doubled by 1982; and by 1984, ‘the country was wide open to foreign investment’ (Rustow, 1985:5).
situation created ‘illusionary export’ which not only caused economic damage, but also became one of the influential events which contributed to the shifting values of society. These illusionary exports were in fact very consistent with Özal’s concepts which reflected the new understanding of life in this ‘liberal’ period, which included the ideas of ‘turning the corner’ and ‘making it’. As interrelated concepts, they imply that all means towards achieving liberalism should be regarded as legitimate. This new era is one of opportunities. Wages and salaries can be low, but these are not the only sources of subsistence; if someone ‘uses his/her mind’, there are plenty of ways. In free market conditions, every effort of the individual would be rewarded (Eralp, 1990:239). In the Özal era, ‘making it’, getting results by whatever means, rather than labour itself, had merit. Mutlu states that the rhetoric of ‘making it’ was produced against the pre-1980 political environment by Özal. According to Özal, the politicians had previously only produced talk. The pre-1980 environment was characterised by disorder, unrest, division, false economic policies and unskilful management. Özal’s period represented “thinking big”, "extending to the world" and "globalization" (Mutlu, 1995:58-61).

Finally, ‘örtadirek’ (which directly translated is the central pole of the nomad’s tent) was formulated as a vague and elastic concept to dissolve the class concept (Tünay, 1993:20). The concept of ‘örtadirek’ can be thought of as very consistent with the Kemalist idea of ‘populism’. By addressing people as ‘örtadirek’, Özal tried to unify the people from different sections. It came to a point that both a worker and a boss defined themselves as ‘örtadirek’ (Mutlu, 1995:60).

The ‘liberal’ government did not bring liberalism in the political arena. On the contrary, the aim was to create a socially disciplined and politically depoliticized society with the support of legal instruments (Sakalloğlu, 1996: 143) around the old familiar concepts of ‘national unity, ideological uniformity, and political

32 Also the government expenditures for health and education fell from 16.5 percent to 12.4 percent between 1980 and 1985. Education expenditures fell more dramatically compared to 1970 falling from 3.6 billion TL in 1970, to 2.4 billion TL in 1985 (Toksöz, 1988:47-48).

33 For another scandal which arose as the outcome of bankers’ fixing high interest rates, collecting savings of many people and collapsing, see Eralp, 1990:240.
stability’ (Birtek et al. 1993:195-6). What has been experienced in the post-1980 era is the synthesis of liberal economy and authoritarian political structure (İnse, 1995a: 210-211, Sakallıoğlu, 1996:143).

However, 1983 is seen by many as being the beginning of political liberalisation in Turkey. Some argue that, even ‘under the generals’ supervision’, a political liberalisation phase started in 1983. This can be understood when these ideas are seen as the product of a comparison between the military regime and the elected government, in which case there is no doubt that military is more authoritarian. Evaluations of this type need to be treated with caution since democracy is not simply the lack of military in a direct sense, nor the existence of elections. However, there are some arguments of ‘political liberalism’ which go beyond these by including a further factor. Civil society, it is argued, is strengthened and this leads to ‘greater political opening and redemocratization’ not only by the replacement of the elected government, but also as a result of the economic liberalisation policy (Sayan, 1992: 29-34).

Göle, similarly to Heper, whose ideas have been mentioned above, celebrates the ‘autonomization’ of civil society after the coup in the 1980s: “the liberal discourse, which was rediscovered and became fashionable after 1983, developed simultaneously with market economy” (Göle, 1994:217-218).

“Women, ecologists, veiled students, and homosexuals and transsexuals appeared on the political scene and brought to the agenda themes such as environmental protection, female identity, and individual freedom...”.

Göle also notes ‘the development of liberal, Muslim and leftist movements’ in the autonomised civil society of post-1983 (Göle, 1994:215).

First of all, there are many omissions from this list. The Kurds, as the largest ethnic group of Turkey, is one of these. Their absence prevents us making such optimistic evaluations.

Göle’s claim that the leftist movements developed is very inappropriate after the 1980 coup which paralysed the left. In fact, all the elements mentioned here should
be put in context and understood within that environment rather than putting them in a list in order to demonstrate the evidence for the civil society.

Religion in Turkey can not be understood only as 'the return of the repressed'\(^{34}\) (Robins, 1996: 72) from Kemalist secularism, which was seen at the beginning of this chapter. Islam was used by the 1980 military as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which had been created by a group of intellectuals in the 1970s (Birtek et al., 1993:195-196) in order to ‘create a secure ground for the liberal restructuring of economic life’ (Keyman, 1995:111-112), more particularly, as an antidote to the left. This is not to argue that all Islamic movements are the outcome of that, nor is it to ignore the differences in islamic movements. However, the impact of the coup on the development of Islam should not be underestimated. Currently the situation is changing with differing hegemonic struggles. In the 1980s the domestic market was opened up to Islamic capital (Birtek et al.1993: 197). Nevertheless, recently, the development of Islam, the rising Welfare Party and the growing Islamic capital have been seen as threats to the secular Kemalist establishment. The party was closed down, the military expressed worries about the Islamic capital... etc.

Although Islam was supported as an antidote to the anti-system elements after the coup, it is regarded as being ‘dangerous’ for the system at the moment. This issue is very broad and complex, and is beyond the scope of the present section. The main emphasis here is that the context should be considered and examined when the autonomy or the simultaneity of the differences are declared. In addition, it should be considered that the elements of the civil society are also tools for the dominant block to maintain their hegemony against the existing ‘enemy’ in differing conditions. This is important not only to explain Islam, but the Islamic sect Alawites as well. It is true that there is an Alawite identity which is protected, changed and re-shaped according to the differing conditions by Alawites themselves. This identity was visible in the 1980s. However, at the same time, it is true that Alawite culture as a moderate and more secular one is emphasised against

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34 His view of the situation as ‘the return of the repressed’ is the outcome of his challenge against some West-centric simplifications of Turkey, for example as expressed with ‘the rise of Islamic fundamentalism’. Emphasising the changes in society itself, on the other hand, has the danger of narrowing the complexity of
the radical Islam as a guarantee of secularism by Kemalists or as the guaranteed voter for the social democrat parties.

The issue of prime importance is that there has been no policy change for the benefit of Alawites, such as their representation in the public religious bodies or the use of the state budget for the needs of Alawite communities. Despite the claim that the Alawite culture has appeared, Sunni Islam is still the one which is taught in schools, Sunni festivals are celebrated on public TV, mosques for Sunni Muslims are built with the taxes from all citizens.

When all the groups in Göle's list are examined, it is clear that not only Alawites, but also the others have brought no policy change. Besides that, homosexuals and transsexuals are still subject to ongoing police violence and abuse. Ecologists are welcomed as long as they do not go beyond certain limits and become a potential to harm economic interests. Women's marches or demonstrations are stopped when they are considered to be a threat whereas more Kemalist dominated women's movements are encouraged to protect the system against enemies such as the Islamists. This is not meant to deny their struggles, or the potential for change, but to draw attention to the need to be aware of the strong state, and of the strategies of the dominant block before they are evaluated as the sign of the active civil society. If we do not do this, we may end up celebrating the appearance of these different social and political groups and their manipulation by the dominant groups for their own interests, rather than changes brought about for their benefit.

6. Liberalism and Democracy in the 1990s: Privatization and European Integration

The Özal government introduced some measures, as mentioned above, to reduce inflation, but in the end this was a failure, and Özal's popularity decreased, in a very similar way to Thatcher's (Tünay, 1993: 23-24).

The "Grand Coalition" of the right and the left, the TPP (True Path Party) and the SDP (Social Democratic Populist Party) replaced the MP (Motherland Party) in issues again, of separating the society and the state from each other and of neglecting their interaction and articulation.
November, 1991. The coalition leaders, Süleyman Demirel (now President) and Erdal İnönü emphasized civil rights and liberties in the different areas of life. They went to the South-eastern Anatolia Region and declared that the Kurdish reality was recognised. Some democratic changes related to Kurdish rights were expected, but did not happen. On the contrary, the role of the SDP in the coalition decreased. This situation continued until Demirel became the President in 1991. Then, Tansu Çiller became the party leader in 1993 and continued the coalition with the leader of the SDP, Murat Karayalçın, with a stronger impact from the TPP. The SDP was unable to bring to fruition its democratizing vision due to the party’s subordinated position in the coalition. Just how democratizing was the SDP’s vision is debatable. The leftism of the SDP is not a certainty either, although there is no doubt about its Kemalism. It is true that the social democrat or labour parties in general are undergoing a transformation, but in the Turkish case there is an additional element to explain: social democracy has not developed from the working class and the unions, but more from Kemalism with the corporatist tendencies in Turkey (Belge, 1989:136-137) 35.

The 1980s formulation of a strong state in politics and a weak state in economics was sustained with the coalition of the TPP and the SDP. Since Tansu Çiller had an impact with her stronger position, the remainder of this section will focus on her understanding of economics and politics, and the two key issues of the 1990s, privatization and European integration, will be examined.

If the 1980s are the period that will be remembered for Turgut Özal, the 1990s will be mainly the period of Tansu Çiller, the leader of the TPP (True Path Party, DYP).

Both, Özal and Çiller started their political life with Demirel’s Justice Party (which was the extension of the Democrat Party and later named as the True Path Party). Both of them completed their higher education in the USA. Both were proud of their close relationships with the USA and its President. Their economic policies, which were outward looking and based on export promotion, were supported by

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35 According to Öğün, this coalition showed the sameness of the historical and cultural essence of the parties. We can not talk about left or right Kemalisms since 1980, Kemalism is now monistic (Öğün,1995: 102,108-109).
the USA. The dependency on the USA was not an issue for either of them. The economy was considered in a technical sense in Özal's government, as something which has its own laws, and was unrelated to issues like welfare, egalitarianism, income distribution or poverty. Similar to Thatcher, Özal emphasised that they only obeyed the dictates of economics (Tünay, 1993:22-23).

Çiller's discourse was similar despite the balanced discourse of 'father' state and free market in the TPP tradition embodied by Süleyman Demirel. As Sakallıoğlu also argues, because of her strong commitment to the free market, and to an anti populist and anti-welfare platform, Çiller resembled Özal more than Demirel (Sakallıoğlu, 1996:156).

Özal was more technical, he explained the economic situation with numbers and statistics. Çiller's approach was very different from this in the way she addressed the people about the economy with her nationalist and populist discourse.

Both Özal and Çiller drew an ideal future, but in order to achieve this future, all citizens had to be patient and make sacrifices. Similar to Özal's Stabilization Programme of 24 January, 1980, the application of which was made possible later with the military coup, Çiller applied the Stabilization Programme of 5 April, 1995, which was again determined by the IMF. Both reinforced the privileged minority at the expense of the majority. Both were opposed to trade unions. Çiller created a division between workers and government employees by claiming that since the workers unions' demands were too high, the government could not pay a sufficiently high salary to government employees for whom unionisation has always been hampered.

Çiller was sympathetic to the military. She also increasingly used nationalist and religious elements like 'patriotism', 'flag', 'blood' and 'sacrifice', 'Allah' and 'being a Muslim' (Sakallıoğlu, 1996:152-3), especially when she gave speeches against 'terrorism'.

36 Çiller: 'In the past our ancestors shed their blood, now we expect the same patriotism from our citizens in a different way... This is a social war... Patriotism is not just shown on the battlefield... We have to do the same in the economy' (Sakallıoğlu, 1996:154).
Sakallıoğlu's comment on what is missing in Çiller's liberalisation experiment in the 1990s is very similar to that which was missing from the one in the 1980s. In the 1990s, again:

"...there is an absence of a 'civil philosophy' for a limited state; no western-type liberal democracy; and a lack of fundamental concern for the rule of law, democratic legitimacy, human freedom with dignity and civil associations". (Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 156)

In the remainder of the chapter, two key issues of the 1990s, privatization and European integration, will be examined.

6.1. Privatization

As stated before, privatization was, for the first time in Turkish history, brought to the agenda by the DP government, but as an issue it remained at the level of discourse. It was an overwhelming issue in the MP government of the 1980s when it began to be applied and was later fully applied within a new legal arrangement with the TPP-SDP government in the 1990s.

Kazgan states that privatization was originally a way of converting some of the foreign debt with a debt/equity swap operation, but it remained even after Turkey arrived at a point of starting to pay the debts back regularly. Privatization then was used to reduce fiscal deficits and inflationary pressures (Kazgan, 1993:91-92).

Boratav argues that there are two reasons for the tendency towards privatization in Turkey. Firstly, it can be understood as the outcome of the MP government's efforts to be in harmony with international capital. Secondly, the Turkish bourgeoisie realised that the problems of the financial burden would be solved with the increases in the taxes on capital if they were not solved through privatization. While the bourgeoisie were not enthusiastic supporters in the 1980s, Boratav

37 Öniş explains the initial reaction of business groups against privatization as being a result of the Özal government's emphasis of foreign capital. This led business groups to feel that they were being excluded from privatization or they thought that they would make a better deal without foreign capital (Öniş, 1991a:250).
argues, they supported militantly in the 1990s because of their fear of tax reforms (Boratav et al., 1993:268-269).

The international finance organisations, the World Bank and the IMF, played important roles in privatization by including it in the stabilization measures which were prepared as a response to the credit demand (Kepenek, 1993:149). The institution responsible for privatization, the DPT (State Central Planning), appointed the Morgan Bank to prepare a master plan for privatization, in 1986. The report emphasised the need for foreign investors rather than domestic ones by stating that they would be the ‘principal participants in the privatisation process’. Foreign investment was evaluated positively in terms of ‘managerial and technical know-how’ and ‘enhancing the competitiveness’ (Öniş, 1991a:165-166).

The Board of The Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund replaced the State Planning Organisation in 1984 in order to ‘allow the central government to bypass both the traditional bureaucracy and the Parliament and to enhance its own autonomy’. This bypassing was effected by empowering the Public Participation Fund through directing the extra-budgetary funds which were established after 1983. Thus, expenditures could be directed into specific uses by the government without parliamentary approval (Öniş, 1991a:166-167). In 1988, the Mass Housing and Public Participation Agency, an agency under the Prime Ministry, was created by an Act of Parliament (Ilkin, 1994:79). After the law was passed in November, 1994, this body was transformed into an institution called the Privatization Administration, chaired by the Prime Minister 38.

The objectives of privatization have always shifted. In the beginning, the main emphasis was ‘on the sale to the general public’, then ‘the development of a free market economy and increased efficiency’ became dominant, and finally ‘to alleviate public sector deficits’ (Ilkin, 1994:85).

A speech made by Özal in 1986 is an example of the early ‘popular capitalism’ discourse:

38 For the legal aspects of privatization in Turkey see Bulent Serim, Anayasa ve Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararları Işığında Özelleştirme, İzgi: Ankara, 1996
'In the model we adopt, the worker is the owner of the company; he also shares in the profits... Thus the company would operate more efficiently, and both the enterprise and employees would benefit from it... Another advantage of this practice is that it would spread the ownership of capital to wide segments of society, and in the process would enhance general welfare... the general public’s participation in ownership will strengthen democracy; this is economic democracy; it will be the greatest economic reform in Turkey' (quoted from Ilkin,1994: 80-81).

In the 1990s, Tansu Çiller used the discourse of popular capitalism with the words of ‘extending capital’ to the masses. She also claimed that privatization would ‘end the state’s being a burden on people’, ‘transform the big losses to profits’\(^{39}\). She emphasised inappropriately many times that with privatization ‘the last socialist country in the region’, Turkey, will end its socialism. “Not only as an economic reform, but also as a political reform”. Privatization, according to Çiller, would lead to power passing from ‘state to public’\(^{40}\).

Privatization was put in the sixth five year plan (1990-94), as “a key instrument in reforming the economy”. The primary aims of privatizing the SEEs in the plan were to increase effectiveness and to disperse ownership (Shaker, 1995: 34).

Öniş argues that the result of the liberalisation and privatization ‘is not a retreat of the state, but rather its reorganisation or reconstitution’ (Öniş, 1991a: 167). In a similar way, Shaker describes it as ‘a reordering and reorganisation of the role of the state in public sector’ (Shaker, 1995: 41). Large public sector and rent seeking behaviour remained as they were before the 1980s (Shaker, 1995: 41), and privatization caused a reduction in employment. These increased the already existing problems of unemployment, high inflation and the unequal distribution of income. (Shaker, 1995:63).

The 1990s saw an intensification of the process of privatization with the passing of the privatization law\(^{41}\) and the approaching membership of the Customs Union and

\(^{39}\) Sabah, 3.2.1995.

\(^{40}\) Milliyet, 27. 11. 1994.

the subsequent discussions about membership of the European Union. Çiller was easy to able to invite foreign capital to buy SEEs by giving an increased emphasis to the integration with Europe, and it did not bring as much reaction as it had done previously.

I argue that integration with Europe and the Customs Union Agreement were the most influential discursive elements in the 1990s privatization discourse. The fact that the Customs Union Agreement was soon to be signed contributed to establishing the discourse, as the Customs Union agreement was regarded as the first vital step on the road to integration with Europe through gaining membership of the EU. It is not an accident considering the fact that the eventual target of the official Kemalist ideology is Westernisation. Thus, the way to convince people on the debatable issue of privatization was to use familiar and accepted elements, such as being Westernised.

Çiller’s discourse, which considered privatization as a necessary step for the Customs Union and European integration, was taken up by the officers responsible for the privatization administrative bodies and ministers, some major business groups, academics, and as we can see later, the mainstream media.


42 It should be mentioned here that the EU has a neutral stance on ownership, and accepts the current situation which is a mix of state and private sector ownership in differing levels in different countries across Europe (Parker, 1998: 20).

43 She described her mission mainly as privatization and the formation of Customs Union, and put these as the condition of the existence of the coalition government (Sabah, 18. 9.1994) by stating that these two had to be realised by the end of 1995 (Sabah, 29.10.1994, Milliyet, 27.11.1994). Privatization was considered as a preparation for Customs Union (Sabah, 3.2.1995) which would mean ‘enlightenment’ and a ‘contemporary world’ according to her (Hürriyet, 22.5.1995).

44 see Hürriyet, 28.4.1995, and 13.3.1995, also see Esmoil Çelebi, Yeni Bir Duzen Anlayısı Ozelleştirme, Milliyet pub., Istanbul, 1995, 2.ed., p.52

45 “If this bill is enacted by the Parliament and applied properly, our country will get out of difficulties. But, if we can not succeed, then neither can we enter the Customs Union, or the European Union which we will have to enter in the near future” head of Adana Trade Organization Haci Sabancı, Zaman, 10.11.1994. It
6.2. To Be Part of Europe

As seen above, the target of the country as determined by Kemalism is westernisation. Westernisation and development are ‘inseparable from one another’ because “for nearly a century, ‘Western-ness’ has served both as a frame of reference and also as an image of future for generations of the Turkish elite, coupled and identified with progress and development” (Öncü, 1993:258).

As explained before, Turkey has linked itself with the Western world more since the 1950s. The ‘Truman Doctrine’ and the subsequent economic and military alliances intensified this process. After the ‘Truman Doctrine’ (1947) the earlier $100 million of military ‘aid’ to Turkey in 1948 reached an annual total of $687 million in 1952. NATO (1952) and Cento (1955) memberships were important in reinforcing Turkey’s ties with the US (Berberoğlu, 1981: 278).

President Johnson’s letter on 5 June, 1964 shows that this tie reached a state of Turkish dependency on the USA:

“NATO allies have not had chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet Intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies”(Steinbach, 1994: 104).

According to calculations made for the period between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, Turkey is the third largest recipient of American military assistance, amounting to $7.8 billion, and the United States’ fifth largest client for arms purchases, almost $7 billion (Roulaeu, 1996: 83). As an extension of this close military relationship, Turkey allowed the USA to make ‘use of its territory for military/ strategic purposes’ (Berberoğlu, 1981:278) even when it is, as seen during the Gulf war, at the expense of Turkey’s own economic interests.

According to Berberoğlu, the fact that the influence and control of Europe over Turkey was weakened during and after the war was also effective for the US

should be mentioned here that the Customs Union and integration with Europe are not considered good for the rival business group Koç.
penetration and control of Turkey (Berberoğlu, 1981:278). The military coups have been effective in weakening relationship with Europe, since Europe, in contrast to the USA, emphasises human rights (Eralp, 1990:248).

Despite this, Turkey's intention is to integrate with Europe and become a full member of the European Union. Europe is an issue upon which the majority of people in Turkey, including the military, agree. The Prime Minister of the military regime, Bülent Ulusu said in 1980, that ties with NATO and its member countries, particularly the United States, would be expanded, as well as the attainment of Turkey's aim of 'taking its place in the European Community' (Kushner, 1984: 236).

There have been many agreements and protocols with the Community since 1960. In 1963, an Association Agreement was signed which started a relationship with Europe. The decision following Turkey's application for membership on 14 May, 1987, was to postpone the review of Turkey's membership until at least 1993 (Kushner, 1994: 685). In November, 1992, Turkey joined the European Union as an associate member (Shaker,1995: 66), but is still striving for full membership 47.

It would seem that Turkish membership of the EU would result in an economic advantage for the other EU countries (Denton, 1990:195-196). It would mean that foreign investments could expand without any restrictions and capture a larger share of the local market; there would also be direct access to abundant cheap labour, oil and other raw materials (Berberoğlu,1981:283-4). The geographical strategical place of Turkey in terms of being 'between Europe and Asia' (Spencer,1993) is also considered as an element which increases the importance of Turkey. According to Cremasco, Turkey has a 'barrier function' geographically between Russia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: 'European security requirements cannot, in fact, be completely and credibly satisfied without Turkey's participation and contribution...’(Cremasco, 1990:137).

47 For the whole story of Turkey’s applications to be full member of EU see İihan Tekeli and Selim İkkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulugu, Umit, Ankara, 1993
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Despite the advantages the EU could accrue, it is also argued that, Turkey's membership of the EU is seen as being rather difficult: firstly because of the economic differences such as low GDP per capita, unemployment, rapidly increasing population (Denton, 1990:198-200), differences between the levels of industrialisation, economic development, and inflation (Oniş, 1995:53-54). In addition, the free movement of Turkish workers is seen as a problem. In the case of Germany, it is argued that it has 'reached its absorption capacity limit as far as foreigners are concerned' (Ergun, 1990:193). This is not at all surprising since globalization is mainly realised on the level of business interests for multi-national companies whereas globalization of labour creates a 'problem'. This simple fact should bring about a discussion on the genuineness of liberalism and freedom in the developed countries.

Furthermore, many Europeans believe that Turks do not 'share European culture and would not fit into the Community' and 'cultural differences between Europe and Turkey are such that they would constitute an insurmountable obstacle for Turkey's accession to the Community' (Evin, 1990:31). Evin states that cultural uniformity can not be the criterion as there are already differences between EU countries. However, it is not that simple, culture here means religion, and Islam specifically. As Heper mentions, Europeans "worry about the 'compatibility' of Muslim 'values, attitudes and behaviour patterns' with the West" (Heper, 1993:4). Another element which obstructs Turkey's full membership is human rights violations in Turkey (Balkır et al., 1993:37).

48 For a critical evaluation of 'the closure of European culture', see Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe", (eds.) Stuart Hall, Paul de Gay, Questions of Cultural Identity, Sage, 1996, pp. 61-86. For a study which traces 'the other' of Europe, 'the Turk', in the Ottoman Empire period, see Iver B. Neumann, Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society". Review of International Studies, vol.17, no.4, 1991, p. 327-348

49 Military government and Ozal government evaluated the reports of EU on human rights violations as "interference in sovereign country's internal affairs" in the 1980s (Balkır et al. 1993:32). Although it is a reaction that can be seen in the 1990s as well, there is a moderation in the reactions. Even, there are explanations made by politicians and business groups in the direction of democratisation in order to end the obstacle for the integration with Europe.
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It has been argued that the economic changes of the 1980s prepared Turkey for EU membership. In that sense, the Stabilisation Programme is regarded as the minimum requirement for participating in the EU in terms of bringing Turkey’s economic policies closer to those of the EU (Korner et al., 1990, Balkır, 1993: 101, Kazgan, 1993: 93). In fact, Özal himself declared that the motives of the 1980s liberal economic reforms were to adapt to Europe as well as being a solution for inflation and the payment crisis (Müftüler, 1995: 85-93). As mentioned previously, the reforms were not imposed by the EU, and Müftüler is aware of that. However, she insists that ‘these reforms enabled Turkish governments to pursue their desire to be accepted as the 13th member of the EU and to prepare for the customs union’. Thus, the EU is seen a motive for the liberalisation policies which include import liberalisation (Müftüler, 1995: 92-93).50

Müftüler also evaluates the 5 April, 1994 Stabilisation Programme, which included privatisation of the SEEs for the purpose of European integration. According to her, Turkey had to make readjustments in its economy firstly in order to survive in the post 1992 European economic order, and secondly to adjust to the customs union and to full membership in the EU51 (Müftüler, 1995: 97).

Shaker similarly makes a parallel between liberalization, privatization and European integration and argues that these are appropriate strategies for the economic development of Turkey since she expects to become a member of the European Community. He considers free market economy and trade liberalisation, and more specifically, privatization as a necessity for the forthcoming Customs

50 Turkey’s adoption of value added tax (VAT) is evaluated in this perspective as the EC’s impact on Turkish economic policies. Müftüler states: “According to Özal, this was a measure taken in reference to the EC since the Turkish VAT legislation was prepared with respect to the laws and practice of the EC, even though Turkey was not a full member” (Müftüler, p. 92-93).

51 For Öniş, the changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provide ‘important opportunities’ for Turkey in terms of establishing a relationship with Central Asian republics on the base of trade expansion. He also argues that membership of the European Union is ‘neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for achieving rapid economic development’ (p. 48). Furthermore, he argues that ‘expanding relations in several directions through loose agreements with several “clubs” or regional arrangements is probably more conducive to Turkey’s economic interest than a strategy dictated by the interests of the larger community’ (Öniş 1995: 56-57)
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Union agreement. He states that, 'privatization in this context means self-imposed reforms and not a set of deregulations or a prescription from any of the multilateral organisations' (Shaker, 1995: 66).

The latest development in EU-Turkish relations in the 1990s is the Customs Union agreement, which was signed on 6 March, 1995. This signing was presented as the success of Tansu Çiller, and used to increase her prestige before the elections in December, 1995, against the rising 'Islamist' Welfare Party. Çiller herself used the threat of Islam, and the West sympathised with that. The agreement signed against the threat of Islam as a guarantee of a secular country in Europe, was presented as a success story by the press as if it were full integration with Europe. Even the cautious described it as an important step on the path towards EU membership.

It is argued that the mentality of being part of an agreement with the Customs Union is of vital importance for trade, because trade between the members of the union will grow; whereas there will be a decrease in trade between the members of the union and non members (Müftüler, 1995: 87). Nevertheless, the advantages of the Customs Union for Turkey are considered 'rather slim and uncertain' by some (Rouleau, 1996: 82). It may have a widening effect on Turkey's trade deficit. In fact, according to a calculation made in 1995, 'European exports to Turkey were nearly 50 per cent higher than imports from Turkey' (Roulaeu, 1996: 81-82). According to Manisahl, the decision to sign the Customs Union Agreement without a guarantee of full membership of the EU was wrong. Turkey's status in the Customs Union as the only country which is not the member of the EU is unlike the other countries, since Turkey can not participate in the decision making bodies. According to Manisahl, this leads to a situation where Turkey has to obey the decisions against its own national interests, and where Turkey's imports and foreign relations are prejudiced (Manisahl, 1996: 51-58). It is argued that the Customs Union agreement will have a negative effect not only on 'national interests', but also on small and medium size companies, (Roulaeu, 1996: 82). Berberoğlu suggests that possible EU membership in the future, would bring negative effects for small farmers, businesses and workers. It would worsen the country's balance of trade and payments, and increase foreign debt (Berberoğlu, 1981: 283-4).
7. Conclusion

This chapter examined the recent claim that 'liberalization in economy brings liberalisation in politics' by returning to the origin of this discourse, Kemalism and the DP period. It argued that this claim was strengthened in the 1980s after the liberal economic policies following the coup. This discourse has been traced in the 1990s as privatization and European integration.

Despite the claims, liberalisation in the economy does not bring, as a natural outcome, liberalisation in politics. Nor has it brought democracy for Turkey. The lack of democracy is explained with the particular position of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. It is true that the bourgeoisie was weak when the Republic was established, and it has been developed by the state. The bourgeoisie gained its power from the state. Thus, the bourgeoisie did not have the democratising mission that those in Western countries had, instead it acted as an obstacle (Boratav, 1993:149-150). Although in the West there were other democratising forces as mentioned in the second chapter. The idea of liberalism as a different experience in Turkey, is maintained by Keyder, who argues that the liberalism of the peripheral countries does not have the political extensions that it has in countries at the centre, such as the idea of citizens rights and freedoms (Keyder, 1993b:47-49). It is true that civil rights are considered as a threat to national unity and security, and to the state in Turkey (Keyder, 1993b:139). However, Keyder's ideas can lead to an idealisation of liberalism in the centre countries. I would argue that the nature of liberalism itself, the view of the bourgeoisie as bringing freedom, and the limits of the rights and freedoms of the citizens in the centre countries, should be questioned.

The detractors of the role of the state in economy failed to criticise political statism in Turkey. In contemporary Turkey, Kemalism still gives priority to economic development, empowering the nation state, and gives a secondary position to the ideals of democratization and individual freedom (Köker, 1990: 121). The strong state tradition in politics has been reinforced more by the military, and will not disappear with a reduction of the power of the state in the economy. The efforts to reduce statism may seem contradictory to Kemalism when the principle of statism
is recalled. However, in the end, it is not contradictory to the whole structure of Kemalism, since Kemalism is mainly aimed at developing Turkey, like the Western countries, in the direction of capitalism and away from the Ottoman Empire or Islam. In contemporary Turkey, rather than state dominating through the state economic enterprises, it is intended that market should become dominant in economy.

The business groups recently started to advocate democracy, and human rights. TÜSİAD, mentioned above concerning the advertisement that complained about wages and the militancy of the workers before the 1980 coup, announced a 'democracy' project including advice on the revision of the electoral system, civilisation, the Kurdish issue and human rights. TÜSİAD explained the reason for preparing this: 'Since the things reached the point that if we do not make any improvement to human rights, we will lose both our social and commercial relationship with Europe. It would be awful for Turkey to lose such a market'. As seen here, the discourse of political liberalism in Turkey is being used mostly by politicians and businessmen when the issue is European integration, namely articulation with global capitalism. It would be a mistake to rely on this democratization discourse for extending citizens' rights, since it is not genuine, is unclear and it may not persist.

European integration has been used as a strategic discursive tool in order to implement privatization which would be objected to by many people. Privatization has been advocated as the necessary condition for becoming a part of Europe. Since there has been an enormous consensus about EU membership at a parliamentary level, excluding a small minority of Islamic radicals (Öniş, 1995:53), and in the military, this discourse has been very effective. Also, integration with Europe was already a very consistent theme with Kemalism. European integration has been a hegemonic tool to unite people in the path of the development of capitalism in Turkey in harmony with the old discourses such as populism, Turkish-Islam synthesis, and secularism. EU membership is a new target for the people who do not have hopes that the current system will bring about

positive changes in their lives, thus enabling them to accept the current situation so that they can reach to the 'bright future'. It may also soften the tensions of cultural identities by providing an extra or upper identity as Europeanness since Turkishness is not working to unite the different people. It is the guarantee of the negation of what Turkey should not be, such as statist, socialist or Islamist. The persistence of this discourse depends on the balances of local capital. In another words, continuity of this discourse will be affected by the differing interests of the business groups in Turkey. Also, it depends on the responses given by the EU in terms of maintaining the possibility of full membership. Neither economic liberalisation and privatisation of the SEEs, nor the ideal of European integration mean that Turkey is democratising. However, these are considered to be the parts of the same process, as will be seen in detail in the analysis of the Turkish press in the later chapters.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Media in Modern Turkey

The media were used in establishing and then modernizing the Republic of Turkey by the Kemalist elite. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, published the newspaper Hakimiyet-i Milliye and established a news agency called Anadolu Ajansı in 1920. These media were used in the independence movement against the Empire and occupier states through the control of the news networks. After the establishment of the Republic, the media worked for modernization and for the establishment of the Kemalist ideology by disseminating Western values and ways of life (Karpat, 1964:282, Oktay, 1987: 46, Heper et.al., 1997: 109-110). Radio, which commenced in 1927, had a very important function in the process of modernization and nationalist doctrination. Radio broadcasts not only spread the political principles of the new regime, but also encouraged modernization in general through cultural expression in music, drama and other forms53 (Karpat, 1964:275).

After 1922, the minority press, such as Armenian and Greek, and Turkish newspapers, which were against the Republic or were supporters of the Caliphate and socialism, disappeared. Some opponents were sent into exile abroad, some were imprisoned (Koloğlu, 1994: 61-65). Until 1945, the press was controlled by the one party government, the RPP (Republican People’s Party) and became its instrument as a ‘government-sponsored organization’ (Karpat, 1964:272). One striking feature of this period is that some of the newspaper owners were members

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53 In the mid 1930s Turkish music was banned on the radio. The ban lasted almost two years. At the same time education on classical Turkish music was also banned. Özbek suggests that since the tradition was considered as backward in accordance with the ideology of modernization, the new Republic wanted to disassociate itself from the Ottoman culture completely. She argues that this ban was an indicator of the preference of a new path which is based on Western (Özbek, 1991:146).
of the parliament, including Yunus Nadi, the owner of Cumhuriyet. They were used by the government to legitimise the one-party regime with the public (Güvenir, 1991: 69-70). There were 40 journalists, media owners or senior columnists who worked as members of parliament in different periods until the death of Atatürk. After Atatürk, the largest number of members of the parliament was related to the military, and then journalism until 1957 (Kocabasoglu, 1984:62).

Besides this close relationship between the press and the government, there were some mechanisms which made the press dependent on the government such as the distribution of official advertisements and paper supply. At that time, there was a fall in circulation as a result of the adaptation to the Latin alphabet from Arabic in 1928. It is argued that this led the government to help the press financially (Kocabasoglu, 1984:47, Koloğlu, 1994: 61-65). However, after a few years, the negative effect of the change of alphabet on press circulation diminished, and the circulation rose again to a large extent (Kocabasoglu, 1984:48).

The newspapers started to gain a ‘mass’ character after the multi-party system, by increasing their circulation (Karpat, 1964: 277). They became popular in the 1950s and 1960s. This was compatible with the economic and cultural anticipation of the people in a ‘free’ environment (Oktay, 1987:49-51). The first examples of this period are: Hürriyet, which was established by the Simavi family in 1948, and Milliyet, which was established by the Karacan family in 1950.

54 Yunus Nadi, MP and businessman, established Cumhuriyet in 1924 to struggle against the Caliphate supporters and Republic enemies (Cumhuriyet means Republic in Turkish). Kemalism, especially with the principle of secularism, gives Cumhuriyet its character (for the details on Cumhuriyet see Karaca, 1994).

55 The Hürriyet was founded by Sedat Simavi in 1948, and after his death in 1953, it was continued by Haldun Simavi. In 1968 he sold his shares to his brother and left because of a disagreement. He then established Güneyd. In 1988 he sold Güneyd to Asil Nadir. His brother Erol Simavi sold Hürriyet to the Doğan group on 9 August 1994. Until then, it was the biggest newspaper, but in 1994, Sabah had the greatest circulation, and Hürriyet became the second largest (Sabah, 10.8.1994, Zincirkiran, 1994).

56 After the death of the founder of Milliyet, Ali Naci Karacan, the new owner, Ercument Karacan appointed Abdı İpekç to write the editorials from 1957. Abdı İpekç was known for ideas which advocated the independency of the editorial board from the ownership mechanisms. In an editorial dated 6.4.1964 he gave the list of the principles of Milliyet: Atatürkist, nationalist, communitarian, independent, and a belief in the freedom of religion, democracy and mixed economy (Karaca, 1995: 102). The after the murder of Abdı
In the beginning, the new DP (Democratic Party) government seemed democratic. It enacted a new press law which extended the limits of press freedom. However, the freedom and optimistic environment did not last long. Although it ended the one-party rule of the RPP, the 1950-1960 period of the DP was not so different from the period of the RPP in terms of democracy. Since the government was not very successful in economic policy, discontents arose, as seen in the earlier chapter on Turkey. The DP government did not tolerate the existence of criticism. Thus, new legal arrangements were brought in, in order to restrict press freedom. Furthermore, a committee of inquiry was authorised to suppress publications and arrest journalists who were 'dangerous to national security' (Karpat, 1964:280). During the 1955-1960 period, 867 journalists were imprisoned. Both parties, the RPP and the DP used radio and news agencies as tools of their parties during their rule. Both of them also established economic control. In addition to legal pressures, the operation of an oppositional press was inhibited through the distribution of official advertisements. Some newspapers were rewarded with official advertisements\(^\text{57}\) while others were punished (Koloğlu, 1994: 69-70, Oktay, 1987: 49-51, Tunçay, 1995: 179).

As explained in an earlier chapter, the DP government ended with the military coup on 27 May, 1960. Koloğlu argues that the dictatorial pressures of the DP on the press and the DP’s attitudes towards religion were not in accordance with the principle of secularism in Kemalism and so played important roles in leading the press to sympathise with the military. In fact, after the 1960 military coup, the MBK (National Unity Committee) members declared that they were influenced by the ideas in the press (Koloğlu, 1994: 77-79). In the editorial dated 28 May, 1960, one day after the military coup, Nadir Nadi, the owner of Cumhuriyet and an ex-MP, welcomed the army by criticising the corrupted multi-party democratic

\(^{57}\) The official advertisements started to be distributed by the Press Advertisement Institution (Basin Han Kurumu) after the 27.05.1960 (see Topuz, 1996:122-123 for the details). At least, some criteria such as circulation, were considered in the distribution of the official advertisements, although it may not be maintained as the main criterion in practice.
system. He described the army as the brave army which had an extraordinary responsibility to prevent the fratricidal quarrel which was going to explode (Kahraman, 1996: 82-83).

It is quite interesting that similar words were used by the press for the 1980 military coup. On the 14 September, 1980, two days after the military coup, the editorial in Milliyet was entitled ‘the success of 12 September is a requirement’ (Karaca, 1995: 236-240). During the 1980s military government, the press was given directives by the military officers on how to write the news. The control continued using various methods such as legal restrictions, written or oral requests and personal meetings. The self-censorship of the press was also a much greater issue. On the first anniversary of the military coup, there were headlines which described the environment as peaceful and happy days of unity, and which thanked the army because of their liberation of the state (Tartanoğlu, 1994: 124-126).

1. The Changing Media Scene in the 1990s

In the 1990s, some important changes have been witnessed in the media scene. The biggest change is the end of the state monopoly of TRT (Turkish Radio-Television). TRT started television broadcasting in 1968. The state control of TRT broadcasts has always been an issue, with the government applying a variety of control mechanisms. After autonomy ended with a legal change following the military intervention in 1971, TRT became more open to government intervention. The council of ministers appoints the director general and the members of the administrative council of TRT (Çaplı, 1994:135). Following the 1980 military coup TRT had its third director general, who was a former military officer (Aziz, 1993: 55).

The outcome of this central structure was not public service broadcasting but state broadcasting. The comment of Aksoy and Robins on TRT is true: “TRT has operated according to an authoritarian state broadcasting model rather than a public service model” (Aksoy et.al., 1997:81). It is ‘the voice of the state’, ‘the medium for the official definition and interpretation of the central Kemalist bureaucracy’ (Şahin et al., 1993: 32).
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TRT news is an indicator of the statist structure, with the order of the news like a state protocol: firstly the prime minister, the government, then the main opposition party and then others. It is hard to say that the TRT news covers parliament properly; it is the government which takes the prime place in the news. This situation has been a source of criticism by the opposition parties in all periods. Thus, TRT is not even a voice of the state, but the voice of the government, in terms of the news (Aziz, 1993:59).

The TRT monopoly was broken by using satellite from abroad in 1990. In contrast to many countries, it was not deregulation, rather “…Turkey took a short cut through what might be called delegalization” (Şahin et al., 1993:34).

Şahin and Aksoy explain this transformation by the technological change and globalization. The effects of which, according to them, are the expansion of the range of the ideological debate, dissolution of the official dogmas and the relativization of Turkish culture (Şahin et al., 1993: 34-35).

It is certainly impossible to ignore the changes that the private media has brought about. The range of the ideological debate has been widened and, different forms of popular culture, which are not contained in TRT, have been included in the

58 The new legal arrangement which allows private TV stations was enacted in 1994, four years after commercial broadcasting started. The fact that the regulation was so late is worth considering. The close relationship between the media bosses and the government and the political parties might have played a role in this long delay. As Aksoy states, this four year period without rules was sufficient for the private media companies to gain time to settle down. The new Radio and TV Law brought a condition for the private channels which take national allowance from RTUK (High Board of Radio-Television), to extend their transmissions to at least 70% of the country. If it had taken place in 1990, the channels would have needed to develop their infrastructure. They were mainly Istanbul-based. In 1993, Star1 could be watched in Istanbul by 86% of the population and by 55% in Turkey as a whole. The percentage for Show was 82% in Istanbul and 50% in Turkey as a whole (Aksoy, 1995:18).

59 The effects of the private media on TRT have not led TRT to broaden its perspective, but instead ‘commercialising the public sector’ (Murdock, 1990: 11) by ‘making the success in the market place the major criterion for judging the performance of all communications’ (Murdock and Golding, 1989: 180). As the TRT director general states, TRT aims to increase its rating and advertising income in order to compete with the private channels, and plans to rent some hours of the TRT channels to companies. He mentions that TRT news should contain all ideas and parties equally, but adds that they have a responsibility to work on behalf of the state. The problems with TRT news, according to him, are that it is too long, and the
private media. In the news on private television channels audiences have seen crowds in the streets taking part in demonstrations.

However, these comparisons with the state channel, TRT, should not lead us to ignore the following:

- the limits, shortcomings and dangers of commercial, concentrated and conglomerated structures for democracy.

- the private media’s close relationship with the state, and the continuation of the statist tradition, and private media incorporating elements from the official ideology.

In this chapter, firstly the structure of the private media industries will be examined by underlining the dominance of the two groups, and by showing the media owners’ business involvements in the other sectors, namely conglomeration, with the resultant negative implications. Secondly, the close relationship between the state and the private media will be traced by the use of examples.

1.1. Concentration and conglomeration of the media

There are two tendencies in the media environment of contemporary Turkey. Firstly, the media institutions, which were initially press institutions, have expanded to cover all spheres of the media sector and enlarged their activities further by becoming involved in other businesses. Secondly, the holdings have started to enter the media sector.

The media were on a smaller scale in the earlier periods. The newspapers were principally family owned. Although they also had other businesses outside the media sector, these were far more limited in scale and range compared to the current situation. The Simavi family owned the newspapers Hürriyet and Günaydın; the Karacan family owned Milliyet; the İlicaks owned Tercüman; and the Nadi family owned Cumhuriyet. Now, with the exception of Cumhuriyet, all
these have changed. Tercüman disappeared, as will be explained later; the Doğan group purchased Milliyet, and recently Hürriyet; a new newspaper called Sabah, which is owned by Dinç Bilgin, emerged.

The Doğan and Bilgin groups which own the largest newspapers, expanded into the other media by setting up TV channels. They increased their power by establishing shares with the holdings (Doğan with Doğuş Holding, Bilgin with Çukurova Holding). The most striking thing in these alliances is that these two holdings own large financial institutions and banks. The tables show that all media institutions are backed by the banks and other financial institutions. İhlas, Aksoy and Uzan, which entered the media sector by extending their holdings, also own banks. These holdings have companies which extend beyond the national boundaries. All of these groups have tended to expand to different sections of the media industry including newspaper, television, publishing, news agencies, distribution and marketing. The Bilgin and Doğan group seem already to have succeeded in doing that. These two are especially powerful in the printed media. They own more than half of the press sector on a national scale. In addition to the many newspapers, they also own magazines which are the extensions of foreign magazines on fashion, sport, travel, cookery, health etc.

The biggest media groups, Doğan and Bilgin and their relationship in terms of ownership with other businesses are listed below:

60 This is a turning point in the concentration of the two groups. The owner of Hürriyet, Erol Simavi, explained the decision as a result of his old age and health problems and of his son’s lack of interest (10.8.1994, Sabah). According to one explanation, the Simavis were deeply in debt because of promotion campaigns (Otan, 1995: 49).

61 see Appendix 1.

62 These tables and the tables in the Appendix concerning the smaller groups, were formulated using information collected from different sources in the summer of 1996 in Ankara and Istanbul. Although attempts have been made to update the information by trying to follow the Turkish media mainly from the Internet, the industry is changing very quickly and sometimes it is difficult to find every change reported. Therefore, the information given here might not be completely up to date.
Table 1 Doğan Group
Table 2 Doğan Media Group
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Table 3 Doğu Holding
Table 4 Bilgin Group
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In addition to those shown below, there are other private media institutions, but these are smaller and not completely independent from the large ones. In fact, the small and medium size media institutions have been used as a balance between the big groups. The two groups have attempted to persuade the small and medium ones to support them in order to strengthen their position in competition (Yurtsever, 1995: 10). These small and medium sized media institutions are as follows:

### SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED MEDIA INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TELEVISION CHANNELS</th>
<th>OWNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kanal 6</td>
<td>Mehmet Kurt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBB</td>
<td>Böke Has</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanal E</td>
<td>Besim Tubik/Aktif Holding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanal 7</td>
<td>Yeni Dünya İletişim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samanyolu</td>
<td>Fetullah Gülen supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number One</td>
<td>Karacan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash TV</td>
<td>İstanbul Teknik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEWSPAPERS-MAGAZINES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dünya</td>
<td>Demirkent Nazih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aşkam</td>
<td>M. Ali Ilicak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet</td>
<td>Beşir Nada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Güneydiniz,Ekonomin Ekobütü,Super Tan</td>
<td>Mehmet Saruhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.Daily News</td>
<td>Çeliğ's family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Gazete</td>
<td>Hazım Olay Baser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akşam</td>
<td>Mustafa Karahasanoblu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Şafak</td>
<td>Iz Publishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İnter Medya, Makro Ekonomi,Global</td>
<td>Murat İlgı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nokta, Hürse,</td>
<td>Masum Toker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descansyon, Carmen</td>
<td>Büşen Özkan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>M. Ali Altuca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İktisat</td>
<td>Etsam Wamil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İletişim</td>
<td>Kavala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEWS AGENCIES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANKA</td>
<td>Müşref Hekimoğlu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBA</td>
<td>Ali Haydar Veziroğlu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RADIOS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul FM</td>
<td>Sabri Demirdoğan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beat FM</td>
<td>Eminh Hattat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akem FM</td>
<td>M. Ali Ilicak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number 1 FM</td>
<td>Ömer Karacan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power FM</td>
<td>Can Haktı</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Small and Medium Sized Media Institutions (Source: Up-dated Information from Yurtsever, 1995: 10-12).

63 Dünya was established in 1981 as an economics newspaper to 'reflect the developments in the business world' (Demirkent, 1995: 282-283). Its circulation is around twenty thousand. The Dünya group has Dünya Super Distribution (it distributes 1200 foreign publications with the network which consists of 800 retailers, 20 Dünya Aktüel Bookstores), Pres (imports best sellers, publishes books on Turkey, address books, almanacs and historical novels and imports accessories, stationery, children’s books, calendars, hobby books, playing cards, greeting cards), Dünya Infotel (imports professional and academic books in all languages), Dünya Aktüel Basin Yayın Ticaret ve Sanayi (the retail bookstore chain, sells domestic and foreign newspapers and magazines, foreign language books), Dünya Bilişim a.s. (provides services for education), Eko (door to door delivery service for the Dünya group publications), Iba (teaching centre for language, banking, business management and secretarial training), Dia-Dünya Economic Researches (management training and market research centre to provide commodity and consumer market research reports to specialised domestic and foreign clients).
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The comments made by Sönmez indicate some of the reasons for the holdings entering the media sector. According to him, the holdings have recently recognised the power involved in owning media institutions. Sönmez also argues that the motive for maximum profit is not valid in the media sector because the reason for investing in the media sector is not for material profit, but gaining power which can be used to influence the masses, or as a defence or attack against rivals (Sönmez, 1996:76). He considers them as a weapon for the large media groups64 by emphasising that making profit is a secondary aim (Sönmez, 1995:4-6, 1996: 77). Görgüülü’s research, which is based on a comparison between 1965 and 1989, shows that there has been a decrease in the profit rate, with expenses increasing while income has decreased. When inflation is considered, and the real rate is calculated, it is found that the profit of the newspapers decreased by 69.67% between 1965 and 1989 (Görgüülü, 1991: 65-67).

Even though the profit in the media sector has decreased, it can still be argued that using the media as a weapon brings profit. Even though media bosses do not make profits from the media itself, their activities in the media help them to increase their profits in their other sectors. One, and the simplest, way of doing that is through promoting and advertising their other products and services in their media, as will be seen below. There are other ways in which the media companies can increase their profit and gain advantages for their other businesses. As Tuncel states, the media can be used as a tool to apply political pressure, it can reduce the risks to the capital in other sectors, it can be used for advertisements of the owner’s other interests, and it can increase their possibilities for obtaining state credits and

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64 In fact, many examples of this situation have been witnessed; media groups used or threatened to use their media against each other. For example, Doğan Group’s magazine called EP Ekonomi Politika published an investigation on 28.3.1993 about Kemal Uzan who is the owner of Star TV, a banker, and a tradesman as shown in the tables. The magazine was giving information on how Uzan became rich with the support of the state during the MP (Motherland Party) government in a corrupted way. Kahraman states that the day the magazine was published, Uzan made contact with Aydın Doğan who is the owner of the magazine, and threatened him with using Star TV against the Doğan group. Then, the directives were given by Aydın Doğan to collect all the magazines in the market. The editor of the magazines, and the journalist who carried out the investigation and wrote in the magazine were dismissed (Kahraman, 1996: 256). This shows how the owners can use their media as weapons against each other, and by doing so how they can limit the media content.
other opportunities (Tuncel, 1994:37). Thus, using the media as a weapon for politics and for commercial interests appears not to be exclusive, but on the contrary, they reinforce each other.

In the next section, I will trace the rise of the advertising industry and its implications for democracy. The bitter competition of the commercial media will be examined through promotion campaigns. At the same time, the unification of the power of the two media groups will be taken into account with its implications for news coverage.

1.2. Rising advertising sector

The advertising sector is another important element to be taken into account in order to draw a map of the media industry in Turkey. As mentioned previously, the conglomerates promote their other businesses, products and services in their media. This reduces their expenses in the other areas.

The table below shows the top ten products or services which paid most for advertising in 1994 and 1995. Interestingly, almost all of them are media companies. As can be seen, Sabah, Hürriyet and Milliyet are in prime positions. Fewer advertisements are given to TRT by media and other companies compared to the private television and press. So, they mainly use their TV channels to advertise their newspapers (mostly the promotion campaigns) or other media, and they use the press for advertising their TV channels. In addition, their other companies which are not in the media sector can also be advertised by their media groups, such as İmar Bank which is the bank of the Uzanlar group, which also owns İnterstar TV. Thus, the conglomerated structure allows the groups to advertise their companies in their own newspapers and television channels, so reducing their advertising expenditures.
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The Advertisement Expenditures of the Top Ten Products-Services in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>PRODUCTS/ SERVICES</th>
<th>TRT TV EXP.</th>
<th>PRIVATE TV EXP.</th>
<th>PRESS EXP.</th>
<th>TOTAL EXP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Milliyet</td>
<td>15,850,927</td>
<td>3,341,580,253</td>
<td>65,797,950</td>
<td>3,423,709,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sabah</td>
<td>2,693,310</td>
<td>3,168,804,140</td>
<td>4,455,292</td>
<td>3,175,952,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>İmar bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,799,195,404</td>
<td>188,287</td>
<td>2,799,383,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ala-Show</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,250,613,085</td>
<td>54,089,962</td>
<td>2,304,703,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hürriyet</td>
<td>35,800,385</td>
<td>1,726,811,855</td>
<td>23,072,709</td>
<td>1,785,694,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lever product</td>
<td>2,783,325</td>
<td>1,012,173,277</td>
<td>46,399,212</td>
<td>1,061,355,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Alo-Bilgel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>903,428,419</td>
<td>99,786,101</td>
<td>1,003,214,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Duru soap</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>915,273,350</td>
<td>48,750</td>
<td>915,322,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sana margarine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>730,544,823</td>
<td>3,413,381</td>
<td>733,958,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cine 5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,074,973</td>
<td>668,756,162</td>
<td>707,831,135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 The Advertisement Expenditures in 1994

The Advertisement Expenditures of the Top Ten Products-Services in 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>PRODUCTS/ SERVICES</th>
<th>TRT TV EXP.</th>
<th>PRIVATE TV EXP.</th>
<th>PRESS EXP.</th>
<th>TOTAL EXP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sabah</td>
<td>990,000</td>
<td>4,010,899,377</td>
<td>8,131,336</td>
<td>4,020,010,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Milliyet</td>
<td>93,960,477</td>
<td>2,366,905,588</td>
<td>20,038,500</td>
<td>2,482,147,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hürriyet</td>
<td>42,852,870</td>
<td>1,889,461,981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,932,314,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kanal D Tv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,508,841,969</td>
<td>1,508,841,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cine 5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>820,968,767</td>
<td>301,036,849</td>
<td>1,122,005,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Coca cola</td>
<td>1,040,000</td>
<td>1,170,122,448</td>
<td>26,268,281</td>
<td>1,197,430,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Star Tv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,050,546,853</td>
<td>1,050,546,853</td>
<td>2,101,093,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>AVM Tv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>96,427</td>
<td>943,557,792</td>
<td>943,654,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kanal 6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>867,669,256</td>
<td>857,669,296</td>
<td>1,725,338,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ala-Show</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>808,505,389</td>
<td>31,553,113</td>
<td>840,058,502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 The Advertisement Expenditures in 1995

Source: These tables were formulated using the monthly data of the Bileşim Marketing Research Company.

The number of advertising agents, and the shareholdings with the foreign advertising firms have risen over recent few years. Table 7 below shows the rising advertisement sector in Turkey in the last three years with the income of the top ten advertising agents, and table 8 indicates that more than half of the twenty five largest advertising agents also have foreign shareholders:
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THE RISING ADVERTISING SECTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>1994 Income BILLION TL</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>1994 Income BILLION TL</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>1994 Income BILLION TL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CENAJANS/GREY</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CENAJANS/GREY</td>
<td>1,551.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CENAJANS/GREY</td>
<td>3,331.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ADAM TANITIM</td>
<td>527.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GRAFIKA/LINTAS</td>
<td>678.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GRAFIKA/LINTAS</td>
<td>1,265.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>GRAFIKA/LINTAS</td>
<td>513.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GUZEL SANATLAR</td>
<td>1,351.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GUZEL SANATLAR</td>
<td>2,855.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GUZEL SANATLAR</td>
<td>611.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>LOWE ADAM</td>
<td>713.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>LOWE ADAM</td>
<td>1,487.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MANAJANSTHOMPSON</td>
<td>518.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>MANAJANSTHOMPSON</td>
<td>629.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>MANAJANSTHOMPSON</td>
<td>1,491.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MORAN OGILVY &amp; MATHER</td>
<td>481.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PARS/MCCANN-ERICSON</td>
<td>559.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PARS/MCCANN-ERICSON</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PARS/MCCANN-ERICSON</td>
<td>345.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>PENAJANSDMB&amp;B</td>
<td>546.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>PENAJANSDMB&amp;B</td>
<td>977.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SAATCHI&amp;SAATCHI</td>
<td>346.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SAATCHI&amp;SAATCHI</td>
<td>494.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SAATCHI&amp;SAATCHI</td>
<td>1,696.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Y&amp;R REKLAMEVI</td>
<td>302.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Y&amp;R REKLAMEVI</td>
<td>613.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Y&amp;R REKLAMEVI</td>
<td>1,547.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>YORUM</td>
<td>603.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>YORUM</td>
<td>1,760.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 The rising advertising sector

SOURCE: Yeniyüzyl 18 September 1996 (these are the agents' own declarations, and do not include VAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENTS</th>
<th>OWNER</th>
<th>FOREIGN SHAREHOLDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENAJANS/GREY</td>
<td>NAIL KECELI</td>
<td>GREY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUZEL SANATLAR</td>
<td>UNVER ORAL, ALINUR VELIDEDEOAGLU</td>
<td>BACKER SPIEGEL BATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWE ADAM</td>
<td>NAZAR BUYUM, ERSIN SALMAN</td>
<td>LOWE ADAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAFIKA/LINTAS</td>
<td>SEDAT SAMI SIALOM</td>
<td>LINTAS WORLDWIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAJANSTHOMPSON</td>
<td>ELI ACIKMAN</td>
<td>J. WALTER THOMPSON CORP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y&amp;R REKLAMEVI</td>
<td>ATILLA AKSOY, ONER BROL, SERDAR ERENER</td>
<td>YOUNG&amp;RUBICAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YORUM</td>
<td>ZUHTU SEZER, MEHMET URAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARS/MCCANN-ERICSON</td>
<td>PINAR KILIC</td>
<td>MCCANN-ERICSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENAJANSDMB&amp;B</td>
<td>AYSEGUL DORA, BATU ISMEN, BULENT OZVEREN</td>
<td>DMB&amp;B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAATCHI&amp;SAATCHI</td>
<td>JOHN MCNEEL</td>
<td>SAATCHI&amp;SAATCHI ADVERTISING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REKLAM MORAN</td>
<td>YUKSEL DINCHEL</td>
<td>OGLIVY&amp;MATHER WORLDWIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKOM/LEO BURNET</td>
<td>AYHAN DUYGU CİCAN, PAOLA VOLPARA,</td>
<td>LEO BURNET WORLDWIDE INC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTA REKLAM</td>
<td>CİNAR KİLIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBDO GRUP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM/RADAR</td>
<td>FUSUN GENCSU, PAUL MCMILLEN</td>
<td>CDP EUROPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDINA&amp;TURGUL</td>
<td>JEFFI MEDINA</td>
<td>DDB NEEDHAM WORLDWIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJANS ULTRA</td>
<td>SÂLİH ECER, FARUK KAPTAN, SINAN UNAL</td>
<td>BOLET DRU DIPUS PETIT WORLDWIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANEL</td>
<td>ÖMERSENGÜLER</td>
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<tr>
<td>REPRO</td>
<td>AFFAN BASAK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REKLAMCIK</td>
<td>ALİCAN TURALI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YARATIMPCB</td>
<td>HULKI AKTUNCE</td>
<td>EURO RSCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BİRLESİK REKLAMCIK</td>
<td>ENGİN OZDEN, İZMİR TOLGA</td>
<td>BBDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İLANCIK</td>
<td>YAKUP BAROUH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJANS EKOL</td>
<td>ÇİKANİR ALTAN, BULENT GURAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRA NOVA</td>
<td>HULUSI DERICI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 25 Largest Advertising Agents

SOURCE: EKONOMİK FORUM, NOVEMBER 95: 25
CHAPTER 4 THE MEDIA IN MODERN TURKEY

The table below shows the advertising income of the six newspapers (this is the sample analysed in the following chapters) in order to give an idea of the rise over the last three years. Although Zaman's income from advertising is increasing very fast, again most of the income is gained by the newspapers of the Bilgin and Doğan groups, Hürriyet, Sabah and Milliyet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advertisement Income of the Six Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEWSPAPERS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hürriyet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sabah</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Milliyet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cumhuriyet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zaman</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dünya</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1994</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 Advertising Income of the Six Newspapers

This table is formulated from the monthly data of the Bileşim Marketing Research Company.

Advertisements in the newspapers occupy a significant place. According to research carried out at the end of 1989, 18.99% of the space in the seven most circulated newspapers is occupied by advertisements (Tutar, 1989: 34). According to another piece of research, advertisements occupied more than 20% of the space
in 1990. This figure is higher in some newspapers. For example, advertisements occupy almost half of the newspaper in Hürriyet (Görgülü, 1991: 34).

It is argued by the managerial staff of the media institutions that the media cannot exist without advertisements, and democracy can not exist without the media. Advertising income is considered as a financial support and a guarantee for the independency of the media from the government. 65

The accounts which suggest that there is a positive link between advertising and democracy, or that advertising and media institutions can be independent from the state, are not convincing. Firstly, the state takes part in this process, giving varying amounts of financial assistance, as will be seen later. Also, the relationship between media institutions, advertising agents, and the companies which place advertisements can cause restrictions to the news. 66

The advertising agents mediate with the big trade groups for the media. These agents organise and direct the whole advertising budget of the company for which they work 67. This obviously gives them power over the media institutions. The advertising agents or their customers can use their influence over the media institutions and affect the news.

Demirkent indicates the level of control of the media over the advertising agents, by stating that big media groups put the advertising agents in a difficult position by intervening in their job, by making requests or sometimes threatening the advertising agents. Mostly, this is done through creating false news about the

65 The editor of Sabah said in an interview conducted in the summer of 1996 that: “If the private sector does not develop, the powerful and independent press can not develop either. In that case, all the infrastructure would be in the hands of dictatorial military governments, and such a government would keep all the advertisements and other means for itself like a communist state. The less the state has a role in the economy, the more there is economic freedom and press freedom. The necessity of minimising the state is the idea which is supported by our newspaper all the time”. For similar statements, see also Marketing Türkiye, 15.04. 1997: 28-30, Hazar, 1994.

66 During the interview conducted in the summer of 1996, the editor of Sabah said that the effects of the advertisements on the press content is not an issue at all. He said: “Our best customer is a cigarette producer, yet we still write news about the dangers of smoking”.

67 see Ekonomik Forum, Nov 1995: 24-25
products publicised. They may publish a series of news items about the dangers of a product advertised in the other newspapers (Demirkent, 1995: 149-150). The reverse also occurs at the same time. That is, the advertisements can affect media coverage. Some news may not be written in order not to prejudice the relationship with the company which advertises in the newspaper (Demirkent, 1995: 124). That some issues may be raised while others are played down or disappear does not appear to be democratic as it threatens the diversity of and access to information.

In addition, a new kind of news can emerge as a result of the commercial interests of the media institutions. A company -not necessarily the media group’s company- may itself become the news with its product or activity. According to the archive organised by the Sabancı Holding Press Adviser, Sabancı and his companies featured as in the news in the press 2825 times in 1994. 912 of these reports were on Sabancı himself. In the first five months of 1995, there were 607 news items on Sabancı, and 937 items on his companies (Ekonomist, 30.7.1995). The two large media groups have a close relationship with two different big business groups. It is known that the Bilgin Group has a close relationship with Sabancı, and the Doğan group is supported by Koç (Nebiler, 1995: 73, Demirkent, 1995: 279). Sabancı and Koç are the richest business groups in Turkey.

68 Sabancı’s main businesses are textiles and banking. He has shares in companies co-owned with multinational companies such as Turk-Philips, Bifa, Ankara Hilton, BNP-Dresdner-akbank, Susa, Dusa, Beksa, Brisa, Cigna-sa, Mersin Otelcilik. Sabancı has companies in other countries as well, such as Exsa Handels Gmbh in Germany, Universal Trading ltd. and Ak International in Britain, Holsa International in USA and Switzerland, Hefi Weaving in Switzerland (Sönmez, 1992).

69 In the 1960s, Aydın Doğan, the owner of the Doğan group had a firm in the automotive sector which was a sub agent of Koç group. This was the the business which made Aydın Doğan rich, and which later made Doğan and Koç shareholders in the automotive sector (Kahraman,1996:245-246). Koç established the first American-Turkish investment with General Electric a.s. in 1947. Koç’s companies are Turk Traktor, Turk-Siemens, Tofas, Simko, Sark Sogorta, Otoyol, Otozan, Mako, Goodyear, Etmcs, Doktas, Koç-Amerikan Bank, Altinyunas, Koç-GKN, Garanti Insaat, Bozkurt Mensucat. Koç has companies outside Turkey as well, such as Kofisa Trading co. and Inex Investment Extension co. in Switzerland, Ramerica and Ram International in USA, Interbrucke Gmbh in Germany (Sönmez, 1992).
1.3. Fierce competition of the media groups: Promotion campaigns

The promotion war which started between the media groups in 1993, illustrates the degree of competition between the media groups. The change made in the TRT regulation in May, 1988, removed the restrictions on advertisements and led to the media institutions organising promotion campaigns. It was advocated by the media as a new way to increase circulation. Since that time, they have been involved in very intense competition to sell more and to get more advertising.

The campaign was started by Sabah at the suggestion of the owner, Dinç Bilgin, at the end of 1992. The Meydan Larousse encyclopaedia promotion increased Sabah's circulation while adversely affecting that of the other newspapers, especially Hürriyet and Milliyet. They also arranged similar promotion campaigns by claiming that the encyclopaedia they were offering had a better paper quality. The war continued with the Doğan and Bilgin groups promoting their newspapers very aggressively and attacking each other on their TV channels.

When the encyclopaedia campaign started, there was little criticism because it was a cultural promotion. Subsequently, there has been a wide range of promoted products, including bed spreads, duvets, cutlery, pans, ovens, blenders, bags, bicycles, calculators, music sets, TVs, computers, houses, and cars. The media institutions themselves became traders. The companies whose models were being given away through the promotion were advertised during the campaigns. This brought unfair competition against other companies, especially the smaller ones. These campaigns have also prevented the media institutions from reporting certain news about the producers or the quality of the products since they themselves market that product (Demirkent, 1995: 124).

70 Generally everybody who collects the coupons from the newspapers for a certain period such as a few weeks, months or a year can obtain the product through the distribution agents of the newspapers. The big prizes can be organised with draws.

71 Sabah's circulation was 697,061 in 1992. According to the information given by Press, Broadcasting and Information General Management the rate increased to 1,030,833 with the promotions in 1993.
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The low circulation of the newspapers has been presented as the justification for the promotions. The most dominant explanation put forward for low circulation, particularly by media professional, is the low level of education of the country in general. However, economic factors, mainly the fall in real wages against inflation, have played a big role in the low circulation rates. The table below gives an indication of the changing wages and the prices of the newspapers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary time of working for minimum waged person to buy a newspaper (minute)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary time of working for average waged person to buy a newspaper (minute)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of newspapers bought with a minimum wage (daily)</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of newspapers bought with an average wage (daily)</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 Wages and Newspaper Prices in Years Source: Görgülü, 1991: 99

The reasons which derive from the media themselves also affect the circulation. These can be listed as the media losing prestige and trust, low quality reporting, lack of investigative journalism, failure to capture people's hopes and aspirations in the newspapers and, ironically, promotion (Hazar, 1994). Although promotion campaigns were presented as a way to increase the low circulation, it did not guarantee keeping the circulation at a high level. As soon as a promotion campaign finishes in one newspaper, the readers won through that campaign stop buying that newspaper. The promotion campaigns have reached the point where they are no longer aimed at gaining new readers, but at preventing the loss of existing readers (Görgülü, 1991: 95).

The newspapers lost their reliability especially as a result of their quarrels because of promotion, and the ongoing advertisements which attack the other group's newspapers. The readers have started to perceive the newspapers as providers of products rather than purveyors of news. Cumhuriyet, which does not run promotion campaigns, had an advertisement on TV with the slogan “Cumhuriyet: It only gives the newspaper”.

72 For another study which makes a similar comparison see Tutar, 1993:40
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The struggle between the newspapers of the two groups has become more intense. They renewed their efforts: now, the groups have their own small newspapers to gain more income through promotion campaigns. They started to publish small scale newspapers with different names like Posta, Takvim, İyi Gazete and Ateş. The same group charges more for the newspaper which has promotion coupons than for those which do not. The news reports in these newspapers of the same group are almost identical. They just make changes in the layout of the news and the photographs.

1.4. The coalition of the media groups

As seen above, the two groups get more advertisement income than the others. Although they are in competition as can be seen with the promotion campaigns, they aggregate their power to maximise their profit at the same time. This has been affected in two ways: in advertisement and in distribution. In the next subsection, this co-operation will be described together with the publishing of a common declaration in the newspapers.

1.4.1. Co-operation for profit:

The two big groups have already taken the biggest slice from the advertising pie. They also made an agreement together through the establishment of a common marketing company called Bimaş, to increase their profits. This company approaches firms asking them to advertise on the TV channels, in the newspapers and the magazines of the two groups. It attempts to capture all the advertising budgets of the firms through offering discount incentives. This method exempts them from paying a fee to the Radio Television Supreme Board. As a result of this co-operation, the two groups maximise their profits. The other media institutions, on the other hand, receive a smaller income from the advertisements.

73 Bimaş is owned by Kanal D and ATV with 50% shares each. Before that, Mepas was the common company of Kanal D, ATV and Show-TV. Since 1996 January, Mepas continues only as the company of Show-TV (Şöylemez, 1998: 109).

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Another type of co-operation has occurred in distribution. The two big media groups, Doğan and Bilgin, unified their distribution companies into one, Bir-Yay 75. Now, Bir-Yay dominates the sector as the biggest distribution company. They argue that this unified distribution system is fair, and will improve distribution, fasten investments, and increase circulation. The editor of Sabah states that:

"The unification of the distribution companies is highly functional and efficient. They label it as monopolization. This is wrong. There is no journal we do not distribute because of its ideas, leftist, communist, Islamist, seriatist, all who criticise us. Neither do we prevent their publication. Distribution is very expensive, it needs infrastructures. So, they should pay the prices of these infrastructures."

However, since distribution is expensive to establish separately, the middle and small scale institutions have to accept the conditions and price increases that Bir-Yay brings. This is obviously another element which prejudices these media institutions while being advantageous for the two large groups.

1.4.2. The alliance for national interests

The optimistic evaluations on the private television channels mentioned at the beginning of this chapter found their reflection in the press with the emergence of the newspaper called Sabah in 1985. Sabah is a popular newspaper which describes the three necessary elements of its first page as being interesting, amusing and sexually provoking (Miinir, 1993: 50-60, 140).

Aksoy and Robins argue that the low circulation has led the newspaper industry to accept state credits from the government. According to them, making the newspaper more popular can increase the circulation, and Sabah succeeded in that. Sabah was not part of the national media elite, and had not been compromised by drawing on state financial support. This afforded the newspaper a valuable peripheral perspective that allowed it to challenge the limits of the ‘official’ culture” (Aksoy et al, 1997:84).

75 for details of distribution see Yurtsever, 1995:10-12, Marketing Türkiye, 1.11. 1991:3

76 the interview conducted with the editor of Sabah in the summer of 1996.
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This might have been the case initially, but later it has been seen that neither high circulation, nor Sabah being new and not part of the media elite could prevent it asking for state credits. Thus, Sabah is no different from the other newspapers in terms of its relationship with the government, as will be seen in detail in the next subsection. The authors give examples of these challenges to the limits of the official culture such as Sabah’s decision to publish the newspaper on religious holidays or printing a photograph of President Demirel in his swimming costume. Although these developments are new, they are indeed indications of the sensationalism of the newspaper. These examples seem too weak to draw the conclusions that Sabah ‘broke the taboos’, ‘it began to show Turkey as it “really” was’, and ‘it articulated the perspective of those who had been marginalised in Turkish society’ (Aksoy et al. 1997: 84).

The biggest ethnic group in Turkey is the Kurds. There is ongoing violence between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Turkish army. The Kurdish issue has been reduced to a military problem. The way Sabah covers the Kurdish issue is not so different from the other mainstream newspapers. The ‘success’ stories of the military have been printed with headlines such as ‘spring cleaning’. The legal party which mainly focuses on the Kurdish issue has been targeted and framed as being an extension of the PKK.

Gerger labelled the Turkish press as a national security press, state press or official press. He asks: “How would the state do differently if it published these newspapers?” He says that some formal differences could be found. It would be more dull, there would not be any photograph of naked women, but the essence would not be different (Aksoy, 1993: 41). This evaluation sounds simplistic since it almost equates the state and the press, and despite many common features, the popular press discourse and the state discourse can not be the same. However, it has some truth, especially in terms of the coverage of the Kurdish issue and the PKK. The Turkish media relies on the state and military officers as news sources,

77 These days were holiday for the journalists. In addition, the Turkish Journalists Association used to publish newspapers on these days and use the income for the association. This challenge by Sabah can be explained more in terms of its ambition as a newspaper to compete with the other well established newspapers.
therefore the coverage is one-sided, namely official. The policies of the newspapers on the Kurdish issue might be explained with the existence of legal pressures over this subject rather than it being just voluntary self-censorship. However, this is the case not only in coverage of the Kurdish issue, it is possible to see other cases in which the newspapers work for and even ally themselves with national interests.

As they do it for profit (as seen above on the alliances in advertisement and distribution), the newspapers of the two big media groups, Sabah, Hürriyet and Milliyet form a coalition on the news coverage when the issue is about 'national interests' or 'national security'. The common declaration made by the media bosses after the economic stabilisation programme is an example of this situation. It shows how the so-called watch-dog supports the government on national interests. The common declaration of the two media groups with the title "An Invitation to the Nation! Come on Turkey! We Will Win This War" which was published in Sabah, Hürriyet and Milliyet on the 22 April 1994 was as follows:

Our country is at one of the most sensitive turning points of Republican history. We are at war. This is not only a war to overcome economic hardship. This is, at the same time, a war for Turkey to prove itself once more to its friends and enemies in the political, social and democratic arenas.

The media is conscious of its duty and responsibility.

As media institutions which have this common declaration on our pages, we want to put forward the following points to the public.

78 Kahraman (1996: 275-276, 347-348) traces the recent policy of the media on the Kurdish issue. He states that, when Demirel was the Prime Minister, he asked for support from the press for three months until the struggle with the PKK was over. The support meant not writing anything except the official announcements. The press obeyed. Later, Demirel asked for another six months full support from the press. After that, there was no need to ask, he argues, because the press had become like a voluntary guard. Press support has been seen as one of the most important elements of total war by the MGK (The National Security Council). The task of the press was described as maintaining the psychological war in the name of the state. According to this, the press was expected to publish only the information provided by the state. There was not to be any research or interviews in the press. The psychological war would be intensive, using just official information. MGK declared that the number of deaths reported amongst the PKK was to
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Turkey is in need of a national mobilisation today. We will be the vanguard, defenders and followers of this.

Turkey is in need of unity, belief, trust and determination today. We will be defenders and followers of this.

Turkey is in need of brave and effective decisions far beyond the daily political disputes today. We will be defenders and followers of this.

Turkey is in need of prioritising the integral interests of the country over the interests of people and institutions. We will be defenders and followers of this.

Turkey is in need of talented political and bureaucratic staff who are conscious of responsibility. These staff should be mobilized to leave all kinds of political differences aside. We will be defenders and followers of this.

The Duty Falls Upon All of Us

Let's not forget. We all, as institutions, foundations, individuals and citizens, are cogs in the wheel, the giant mechanism called 'economy'.

All our behaviour affects the operation of this mechanism deeply. A simple rumour leads to panic. A few hundred dollars which is taken from a bank and hidden under a pillow affects the whole system negatively. While we suppose that we will get through today, the things we have done threaten our tomorrow. All of us should be conscious of it, should be aware of it.

Industrialists should not stop production.

Working people should be more efficient and contributive than ever.

Politicians should not confine themselves to the barren government opposition disputes.

The parliament should enact the waiting bills as soon as possible.

Occupational and social associations should mobilise all their power for Turkey.

The state and the government should use their minds and hands more efficiently than ever in order to overcome the problems, to preserve the social peace and justice.

be increased in the press. The military attacks on the Kurdish villages were to be represented as PKK attacks.
Universities, intellectuals, teachers should produce and suggest solutions, they should keep the environment of productive discussion lively.

Citizens should think “What can I do for my country today?” without being seized by pessimism and weariness.

Our youth should not believe the provocations of those who try to exploit the sensitive situation of our country.

There Is No Other Turkey

This country is our country. And this crisis is our crisis. It can take a long time to overcome the hard days, it can be difficult. Let’s not forget, no war can be won without wounds and bruises. We should believe and trust that we will win. Turkey has to win. Because there is no other Turkey! Our greatest support on this road is our common will and moral power. We have to cast off the pessimistic shroud that has spread over Turkey, and we have to embrace again our will to win and our determination which made this nation ‘great’. All of us have to be conscious of the responsibility which falls upon us and behave according to that. All together, employees, employers, farmers, officers, tradesmen, managers, bureaucrats, industrialists, bankers, merchants, politicians, presidents, journalists, doctors, housewives, lawyers, sportsmen, artists, teachers, students, should walk shoulder to shoulder towards the light at the end of the tunnel. Because we have a common fate!

Because all of us are in the same boat!

We are ready to make sacrifices as a society and as individuals, we have started that in order to pass the hard test that we are facing. Now, today is the day of being aware of our power, producing and implementing the solution. This consciousness should expand to all sections of the society.

Come on Turkey!

This common declaration basically aims to support the government's economic stabilisation programme, which was announced at the beginning of the month. It uses the official and nationalist discourse which is mainly based on conspiracy theory. The metaphors of war and enemies of Turkey are used although it is not clear what the war is, who the enemies are. They declare the necessity of national unity which is the main and the most repeated element of official ideology, as can be seen in the Constitution and the state institutional discourses. They talk in the
name of the country by emphasising that the interests of the country as a whole should come before the interests of individuals or institutions. The term 'interests of the country' again could have been used by the military in a war, in accordance with the declaration's description of the situation.

Thus, the declaration speaks in the name of Turkey for the unity and the integral interests of the country. It should not be confused with public interests here. They address the public from a high level by emphasising the duties and responsibilities by inviting them to behave appropriately. Moral power and responsibility are emphasised rather than differing interests or unequal distribution of wealth or the rights of citizens. The state is not seen as being for the people, rather people are seen as existing for the benefit of the state, by advising the citizens to think 'what can I do for my country?'.

It is emphasised that all people are the same, the fate of all people is common. This idea echoes the principle of populism in Kemalism. The people are appealed to as members of professions and told what to do. Even the parliament is addressed and told to enact the waiting bills. The media appear to be above everything. The citizens are advised to think, the universities, intellectuals, and teachers are allowed to discuss, but thinking is restricted: it should be for Turkey. Discussions should be productive. Young people are warned against the provocations of those who try to exploit the sensitive situation of the country. This is a typical provocation hysteria which is used to explain all disorders. The social movements somehow are not considered as an outcome of discontent with the conditions in the country itself, but instead seen as an extension of 'our external enemies'.

The declaration also demands sacrifices without mentioning what these sacrifices might be. It is only implied that some things will be good for the country. The writers of the declaration, the media elite of the two big groups, consider themselves not only as followers of national mobilisation, but as the creator, the vanguard and defenders of it. This declaration, which sounds like the propaganda

79 For a different view which argues that Turkish journalists perceive themselves as the guardians of the public interest see Heper, 1996: 121
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of an authoritative state, seems to be an attempt by the media to gain the consent and support of the citizens in the name of the state.

The extract below is another example of the media protecting national interests: some journalists went to an island called Kardak and planted a Turkish flag as a reply to the Greeks planting the flag of Greece. It produced another crisis in the already tense relations between Turkey and Greece. Whether the island belongs to Turkey or Greece is not the issue for this thesis, but the important thing is the attitude of the Turkish media during these discussions and their defence of the action of planting a Turkish flag. The editor-in-chief of Hürriyet, Ertuğrul Özkök advocates that action in an interview:

Q: Your attitude towards the Kardak crisis was criticised, you were labelled 'Rambo journalist' and you got angry with that. Why?

A:...we sent our journalists, saying 'go and take a photograph of Kardak island'. They went to the island in very bad weather conditions taking a risk. This is the excitement of journalism. They went there, and when they saw the Greek flag, they planted the Turkish flag.

Q: Is it a correct journalistic practice not to consider the issue for a month and at the end of the month going and planting the flag?

A: What should they have done in your opinion?: Should they have taken the photograph of the flag and left it there?

Q: Yes.

A: Think about what would happen in Turkey when the photograph of the flag was published. A Turkish gun boat would go there, the soldiers would remove the Greek flag and plant the Turkish one. Now, we did this as people who do not have any official character. This provides an opportunity for negotiation between the states. It can be said 'My friend, I did not do this. Two journalists went there, that does not concern me. And also, your Antenna TV went and planted the flag there. You ask them for an account, and I ask my people'...

Q: You were criticised for contributing to the creation of a dangerous crisis, but you are claiming that you prevented a much bigger incident....

80 from Aktüel, 14.03.1996.
A: What we did might have been a mistake. You can say that this is not the duty of journalists.

Q: It is not.

A: Then I can say that if we left the Greek flag there, we would have the opposite of the current reactions from intellectuals. It would be from the nationalists this time. The telephones would be jammed. These guys would be criticised with the same strength 'Don't you have any feeling of honour? You have left the Greek flag there'... Do you know, we have had a great deal of support from the people for our behaviour? Only the columnists have criticised us.... This is not abuse. It is called 'reflex of citizenship'....

Q: You are of the opinion, Turkey first, journalism later. Does journalism not mean impartiality though it is difficult?

A: Being a journalist in Turkey is not the same thing as being a journalist in America. There is such a geography around you that you can not understand this if you do not carry a responsibility to maintain the existence of this country. Journalists are not the citizens of the world. There is no such thing! There is no one who lives on the moon, whose passport is not stamped with any country...

...The owner of this newspaper pays me to find the events that others can not follow, every day. It is a forest. If you are not the best, you go....

...I can show the most impartial attitude, pretend to be impartial, in the world. See how it makes the most biased news against Turkey. I am a Turkish journalist. You can not expect the journalists in Turkey to be Supermen and adopt the journalism ethics of other parts of the world. There is Syria at your door. There are Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Greece. There is a circle around you. A Turkish diplomat is not the same as a Portuguese diplomat. He/she has a meal and a nice invitation and sleeps at the end of a nice day. For Turkish diplomats, cryptos work until the morning.

This extract again contains nationalism and conspiracy. At the same time, it shows the media acting like a government even at the expense of the values of professional journalism, such as impartiality. The first extract was the outcome of a very planned and organized act of the two media groups to support the policies of the government whereas this one is of a spontaneous reaction. They are both nationalist. That the media’s owner is not the state does not mean that the media is
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completely separate from the state. On the contrary, there is a close relationship between the state and the private media.

2. Media-state relationship: Not a contradiction

As explained at the beginning of the chapter, the media in Turkey has been linked with the state from the beginning. It was used for the establishment of the Republic and then had a mission to modernize the country. There have been many changes since then. The media centres are not near the political establishment anymore, but in the area called İkitelli, which is far from the centre of Istanbul, full of technologically advanced equipment. It is obviously possible to trace the other differences. In this chapter, although the changes are recognised, they are not seen as being a fundamental change from the state to the market. Instead the close relationship between the state and the market, the continuity of the past or more particularly the statist tradition through the private media institutions, will be considered. In fact, the biggest change in the 1990s Turkish media scene, the end of the state monopoly in broadcasting, was facilitated by the Prime Minister of the period, Turgut Özal. The first private television channel, Magic Box (now İnterstar) was owned by Uzanlar and Ahmet Özal, who is the son of Turgut Özal. The strengthening private media institutions with the rising advertising industry, promotion campaigns and rising circulation are not completely independent from the state, on the contrary, they can live together by reinforcing each other.

One of the origins of considering the private media separately from the state, I would argue, is the lack of conditions of freedom in Turkey. Since civil rights and freedom have still not been fully established because of the reasons discussed in the chapter on Turkey, the state has had a banning, censoring and restricting role on the media. Not just historically, but also in the 1990s, Turkey is full of examples of imprisoned, tortured and killed journalists. It is the radical media which suffer

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81 It was in fact Özal himself who showed the way for private broadcasting. He mentioned that although it was not legal to set up private television channels on Turkish soil because of the Constitution, broadcasting from abroad is not illegal. Following his explanation in late 1989, Magic Box started broadcasting from Germany (Şahin et al, 1993: 33).
more from the legal and illegal power\textsuperscript{82} of the state whereas for the mainstream media self-censorship is an issue more related to financial worries. An interesting point which should be mentioned here is that the mainstream media can use the discourse of press freedom even though the issue is only of commercial interests being in danger. For example, after the elections which brought the Erbakan (the Welfare Party leader)- Çiller (the True Path Party leader) coalition government, Erbakan stated that they would restrict the promotion and the public opportunities for the media. The media refer to this as war and censorship. The Doğan Group in particular reacted strongly to this. Erbakan was labelled as the enemy of the media and democracy\textsuperscript{83}. After a month, the law to restrict promotion was vetoed by the president.

Sönmez summarises the economic relationship between the state and media very well: according to him, the state has a power over the media through the price of the paper, official advertisements, cheap credits of the state banks, the advertising budget of the state institutions, investment promotions, and, probably peculiar to Turkey, through hidden payments from the Prime Ministry as an incentive or punishment (Sönmez:1997:77).

There are doubts about the fairness in the distribution of the official advertisements \textsuperscript{84}. The three newspapers get most of the official advertisements as they gain the

\textsuperscript{82} According to the Press Council Report, 25 journalists were killed, 68 were attacked by police, 67 publishing institutions were closed in one year. 262 journalists were taken into custody and 127 were put into prisons. The newspaper called Özgür Ülke was bombed (Demokrasi, 15.03. 1996). Özgür Ülke was the extension of Özgür Gündem which was closed in 1993. That newspaper has always been targeted by the state since its news was mainly on the Kurdish issue, and their ideology was different from the mainstream one. The state accused it of being separatist and supporting terrorism. Their journalists were attacked, killed, became 'lost', taken into custody and tortured. This newspaper still continues with the name of Demokrasi. Similar legal and illegal pressures have been exercised mainly on the leftist magazines (Kahraman, 1996: 210-214, 274).

\textsuperscript{83} Also, an alliance has been witnessed: Their worries over profits were linked with the secular worries of the Kemalist social democrat parties (see Milliyet, 7.7.1996, 8.7.1996, 13.8.1996).

\textsuperscript{84} see Erinç, 1996: 100-101
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most from the private advertising. The advertisements which are paid for from the budgets of the state institutions also cannot be said to be fairly distributed. In fact, these two, the official advertisements from the Press Advertisement Institution and the advertisements from the budget of the state institutions can affect each other. The politicians at the top level can intervene in the distribution of both.

The power of the Prime Minister in combination with all these methods has been predominant especially over the last two decades in Turkey. Despite the examples of the past, this situation increased more especially after 1980.

Some media professionals at the managerial level mention that the erosion of the values in the press occurred during the Özal period. In contrast to the earlier periods, the media professionals state that, they were called by Özal in the middle of the night, or certain columnists and editors in chief had to have special meetings.

85 This example illustrates the dominance of the three newspapers Sabah, Hürriyet and Milliyet. These three got 31 billion, 101 million, 125 thousand 875 lira which is almost half of the advertisement budget of the Prime Ministry Privatization Administration in 1994. At that time Hürriyet was Simav’l’s. If the Doğan group and the Bilgin group are examined at by including all their newspapers, magazines and TV channels, it is found that Doğan got 9 billion 645 million 166 thousand 272 lira, Bilgin got 15 billion 238 million 752 thousand 899 lira. These two groups received more than one third of the advertising budget of the Privatization Administration. In 1995, the budget was higher as a result of the World Bank credits. The two groups got most of the budget again. The three newspapers got 57 billion 541 million 970 thousand lira. With their newspapers, magazines and TV channels, the Doğan group received 47 billion 279 million 78 thousand 644 lira, while Bilgin got 51 billion 110 million 167 thousand 808 lira. Together they got almost half of the total advertisement budget in 1995 (data collected from the Prime Ministry Privatization Administration, Press and Public Relations).

86 A press officer who works in the official institution which is responsible for privatization states: ‘when the prime minister or minister call our managers, we may give advertisements to the other newspapers as well’ (the interview conducted with the Press and Public Relations Officer in the Prime Ministry Privatization Administration Council in 1996 summer).

87 Sabah reported the news on a sex scandal involving the Minister Güneş Taner and Cenajans Advertisement Agent’s owner Nail Keçeli in 1990. After the news, the minister gave a directive that no official advertisements should be given to Sabah any more. According to Münir, in fact, the reason for writing that news was the advertisements of a state institution: Sümerbank, state economic enterprise, which was the institution under the ministry of Güneş Taner, which gave its advertising campaign only to Hürriyet. Sabah reacted to that by reporting the news about the minister. Since Sabah was going to be damaged, negotiations took place in the end. An apology was published the following day, the Minister forgave Sabah, and advertising flow restarted (Münir, 1993: 160-161).
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with Özal as a result of some special issues' taking place in the newspapers. The fact that Turgut Özal had close relations with some columnists (Demirkent, 1995: 239) was because of his awareness of the power and the influence of the columnists in the press.

Groc explains the MP government's differing pressures on the press with the transformation from Kemalism to liberalism of the MP. He evaluates the period of 1980-1990 as a conflict between the press and the new government. The government's aim, for him, was to 'reduce the critical influence of a mainstream lobbying group which had formed around Kemalist traditions' (Groc, 1994:200).

It is true that (not only directly through the pressures, but also through the increasing logic of competition) the developments which were encouraged by the MP government, such as technological modernization and competition for advertisements, made the newspapers more vulnerable to the pressures from the government. The sector foundered in an economic crisis (Koloğlu, 1994:86-86), even a Kemalist newspaper, Cumhuriyet, reviewed its policy. However, Groc's descriptions of the Özal government as distancing itself from the earlier military rule, and some definitions attributed to Özal such as 'the reformer of the old order, who aimed to liberate social, political, and economic life from the weight of the state, from which society had long suffered' (Groc, 1994:204) are completely misleading. Although there were tensions between the government and the press, it would not be correct to define the MP government in that way: "Thus, the government began to accuse the press of total indifference to the processes of social and political emancipation it was bringing about and to its parallel efforts at dismantling certain structures of the Kemalist state" (p.205). The nature of the MP

88 see Aktüel, 14.03.1996

89 Even Cumhuriyet which is known as a Kemalist and statist newspaper declared that it was going to support the liberal economy under the threat of closure. During 1983-1985, Cumhuriyet was preparing for the technological modernization of the newspaper, and it was in need of financial help. The decision taken at a managerial level was to not support the SDP (Social Democrat Populist Party) alone before the October 1991 elections, but instead to advocate coalitions. In particular, the suggestion of the TPP- MP (True Path Party-Motherland Party) coalition instead of the TPP-SDP led to quarrels between the columnists of the newspaper, and some resignations followed. Those who resigned claimed that the news was being thrown away because of the financial relations of the newspaper (Karaca, 1994: 206-207, 212-215).
government was discussed in an earlier chapter. I would argue that when Groc explains the criticism in the press in the 1990s against the MP and Özal with the Kemalist tendencies of the press, he ignores the fact that the policies of the MP did not work in many aspects, which brought a strong reaction from the public. The press, then, could not ignore such popular discontent if it was to be popular. The claims of Kemalism versus liberalism are already a focus of the thesis and will be examined in detail in later chapters.

It is true that Özal punished some newspapers. In fact, one concrete example of Özal’s punishment of the press was experienced with the end of the newspaper Tercüman. Tercüman was a supporter of the DP (the Democratic Party), and later the extension of it the JP (the Justice Party). The owner of Tercüman, Kemal Iicak was close to Demirel, and, as a contractor, he got many jobs and credits from the state. However, when Özal came into power, he punished the newspaper by withdrawing credits. The credits were given only under the condition of cessation of the column by the owner’s wife Nazlı Iicak, who is the daughter of the DP minister, and also a strong Demirel sympathiser. The debts, in the end, caused the sale of the newspaper. Kemal Iicak died bankrupt. The readers of Tercüman turning to the new newspapers called Türkiye and Zaman, was also a factor in

90 Its origin is a tarikat (Islamic community) called İsküdar which began publishing a newspaper called Hakikat in 1970. Hakikat was renamed Türkiye in 1972, and raised its circulation with Turkish-Islam synthesis, one of the constituents of the official ideology of the 1980 military coup, as mentioned in the earlier chapter (Kahraman, 1996: 290-292). Now, it belongs to the large holding İhlas, as seen in the tables in the appendix 1.

91 In fact, the editor of Zaman states in the interview conducted in 1996 that Ozal made their establishment easier. Although the official owner is not Fethullah Gülen, known as Fethullah Hoca, Zaman, Zaman Marketing, Cihan News Agency, Diniya Radio, Samanyolu Television are all linked with the Fethullah community as the journalists in Zaman confirmed during the interviews. The community also has many colleges and universities in Turkey, Albania, Malaysia and in some of the new Turkic republics in Russia. Laçınler describes this religious community as a post modern religious movement: for him, it is an articulation of Turkish nationalism, traditional political Islam, neo-liberalism and elitist strong state project (Laçınler, 1995a: 11). Despite the Welfare Party, the Fethullah community tries to gain access to the upper levels of the society: economic, political and cultural elites. Fethullah Hoca’s understanding of Islam is flexible. He believes that the religion changes according to life conditions and he does not deny the necessities, institutions and the norms of modern life (Laçınler, 1995b: 6-7).
Tercüman's fall, but the main reason was Özal's punishment in a response to Tercüman's insufficient support\(^{92}\) (Kahraman, 1996: 177-179).

The relationship with the media continued in a similar way to that which existed in the Özal period with Tansu Çiller (whose policies were closer to Özal than to her own party's leader Demirel as explained in the chapter on Turkey). Their understanding of the media, and their attempt to obtain the media's support was very similar although Çiller used rewards more. When she was the Minister of Finance, she introduced a new practice. Ministers of Finance sign the documents which offer some facilities (like custom exemption or state fund-originated low interest credits) to those media companies which will make investments\(^{93}\). Although signing of these was routine work until then, Çiller gave a special directive to the Treasury, according to which, the owners of the media companies had to contact her before she signed the documents (Erel, 1994b:130). When Tansu Çiller was a candidate for the TPP leadership, the 'press started to pay their debt to Çiller', Erel argues, with the news and columns describing her as 'the symbol of change', 'the wind of renewal' and 'charming professor'\(^{94}\). Later, these financial rewards caused confrontation between Çiller and the media groups. Also, the media groups have been involved in acrimonious debate in their newspapers\(^{95}\).

\(^{92}\) Now, their son, Mehmet Ali İlickal owns the newspapers called Akşam, Takip and Ateş, the distribution company called Dost Distribution and Alem Radio. Akşam has a very high circulation at the moment because of its promotion campaigns.

\(^{93}\) It is not clear whether this money is used for investments in the media sector. For example, Cumhuriyet claims that Zaman established a Mazda automotive branch with the investment promotion money which was supposed to be used to establish a printing office (Cumhuriyet, 23.10.1995).

\(^{94}\) The journalist Erel states that Çiller signed 2.6 billion TL investment documents. Most of them were given to the newspapers Sabah, Milliyet, Hürriyet, Türkiye and Interstar TV (Erel, 1994b:130). She also argues that problems of İmar Bank (the bank of the Uzanlar holding which owns InterStar TV channel as listed in the tables before) was solved by the Treasury, and some privileges were given following the positive coverage of the Inter-star TV on Çiller. (Erel, 1994a).

\(^{95}\) The media groups attacked each other by questioning the amount of money they obtained as investment promotions, state credits or funds in 1995. They questioned each other by asking whether this money, taken directly or indirectly from the government, led the media institution to support a political party, leader or the government, and, if so, at what expense, whether they gained advantages from the state for
The ‘carrot and stick policy’ referred to before, was very powerful after the 1980s through Özal and Çiller and this affected the media coverage by causing the media institutions to support certain candidates or policies. There are two points which should also be mentioned in order to take into account the continuity and the complexity of the relationship:

The first thing is that the favouring of some candidates by the newspapers has examples in history, although there are a wider range of methods used now.

The second point to be stressed is that the relationship between the media and the state, more specifically between media and the government, is not stable. The relationship changes according to the articulation of the different interests. The relationship between capital and the media owners as explained in the first part of the chapter, is important in that respect because the partisan attitudes of the media, especially during the elections, do not always have to derive from the financial reward or punishment mechanisms of the government. Besides, it might be related to the differing interests of the different sections of the capital.

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96 Zincirişkan explains how they supported Demirel as the head of the JP (Justice Party) when he was the editor in chief of Hürriyet in 1964. He explicitly mentions how they discussed this with the owner of the newspaper and supported him because ‘Turkey needed dynamic and new politicians’. The supporting headlines during the election, and the news which represented Demirel as the best candidate gave him a high public profile. After he was elected, ‘the newspaper proved its power once again’ (Zincirişkan, 1994: 126-127).

97 Not only through the news or the columns, as used to be the case, the press currently uses opinion polls which are conducted by research companies of their groups or companies they are in a close relationship with. These polls, which are not objective, function as a lobbying activity for the candidate or the political party that the newspaper supports. For the examples of the media’s involvement in the government-building process, more actively and directly through informal meetings between the owners, influential columnists, editors, and the politicians see Kahraman, 1996:371-381 and Nebiler, 1995:130-131

98 For example, the two groups supported two different right wing parties, and confronted each other by publishing opinion polls which showed that the party they supported would have more votes than the other, before the elections in December 1995. Sabah advocated the TPP, Hürriyet and Milliyet advocated the MP. There could have been a financial rewarding relationship with the government at the same time, as the
3. Conclusion

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to draw a map of the media in Turkey. In doing this, the main concern was to warn against the idealisation of the private media. The private broadcasting which started in the 1990s can be a cause of this idealisation since it is more diverse than and different from state broadcasting. Another source is the strong state which has violated basic civil rights. In this environment, it is rational to claim freedom from the state even if this has been done for commercial interests. Thus, I argue in this chapter that the absence of the understanding of public, and public service broadcasting, and the absence of civil rights can make the private sector seem as if it were democratic. Although there is nothing wrong in describing the state and state broadcasting as official or totalitarian, automatically attributing to private broadcasting characteristics such as freedom or diversity, is wrong.

There are many reasons why we should be cautious about the private media in terms of democracy. Firstly, the private media is concentrated, and at the same time it is conglomerated by media owners being involved in the other businesses or holdings’ involving the media sector. The main motive of the private media institutions is maximising profit. This was seen in their competition in the promotion campaigns. This motive, together with the advertising relations, has a restricting effect on information.

The private media has a close relationship with the state despite the media professionals’ claim that as the media is strong, and has its own financial resources such as advertisements, it is independent of the state. As seen in this chapter, in fact, they can unify their power for the national interest or for the government. This is consistent with the way the media has been established and developed in Turkey.

leader of the MP explained Sabah’s favouritism for the TPP as being a result of the credits (Nebiler, 1995:130-131) . However, the division of the newspapers in this case coincides with the division of the centre right. As Çalışlar states, the TPP aims to integrate with Europe and advocates Customs Union whereas the MP addresses the sections of capital which will be damaged by this change, like the automotive industry (Çalışlar in Cumhuriyet, 29.12.1995). The close relationship of the powerful national business group Koç with the Doğan group, and Sabah’s parallel attitude with the other business group Sabancı might be a reason for that partisan coverage of the media.
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the media worked to establish modern Turkey. This may be explained with the general situation of the private sector in Turkey. They were always linked with the state. They were created and developed by the state, and partly because of that, they did not challenge the state. Since the private media was subject to economic reward or punishment by the government, it reported news in a partisan way, imposing one candidate, party or programme.

Showing the limits and the dangers of both the state and the market is a starting point for creating the conditions for democratic communication. What is to be done to create democratic communication in Turkey is to change the restrictive legal structure, to end the legal and illegal power of the state over civil rights and to transform state broadcasting into public service broadcasting. In addition to these actions, it is necessary to curb the concentrating and conglomerating power of the media.
CHAPTER FIVE

Media Professionals and News Production Dynamics

As a complement to the earlier chapter which analysed the general structure of the Turkish media, this chapter considers news production dynamics via interviews conducted with journalists and editors. It also examines changes in the media industry and their influence on the work of media professionals.

Before starting the analysis of the interviews, some preliminary information about the conditions in which the journalists work is necessary to provide a context for their comments.

Firstly, in parallel with the concentration and conglomereration of the media, there is a trend against trade unionism. One of the media professionals at the top managerial level claims that unions affect them negatively, and they could not work with the union in 'the current conditions of the country' (Otan, 1995: 72-73).

De-unionisation of journalism has been achieved in a variety of ways. In the 1980s, the big media groups made a commercial decision and established different companies for the different sections of the newspaper. Thus, for example, the journalists who worked in the advertising section of the newspaper were not considered to be journalists, and could not be members of the union according to the existing legal framework since that section was another company. The union was prohibited from recruitment at the newspaper called Sabah. Other newspaper bosses who employed journalists who were union members threatened the journalists with dismissal, and the journalists had to leave the union. Only two newspapers, (Cumhuriyet and Evrensel), have employees who are members of the union. At the moment, there are no members working for the private TV channels.

This has many negative effects for the journalists, since they can no longer act in a collective way. There are huge differences in salaries between the media professionals especially since the emergence of the private TV channels and their
'stars', even in the news as a presenter or anchorman. These stars of the television channels, who are at the same time columnists in the newspapers, are paid thousands of dollars, and get very high transfer payments, such as one hundred billion lira, when they transfer from one company to another. However, the journalists who work all day and sometimes night without any definition or certainty about working hours, are very poorly paid.

Another tendency in the new media environment, partly as a result of the high rewards mentioned, is the increased identification of the managerial staff at the top levels with the owner. They regard themselves as being the same as any other company manager. Thus, although the separation of ownership and the management is claimed to exist, in practice, it does not, since the managerial staff, mainly editors-in-chief, have a strong identification with their 'bosses'.

Although the journalists can not unite to confront problems, the media bosses do, so the situation leads to the further empowerment of the already powerful. For example, as mentioned above, the media groups have similar newspapers with and without promotion coupons. The importance of this for the journalists is that their reports from the big newspapers have been used in the small newspapers with minor changes. Thus, the already cheap labour of the journalists has been exploited two or three times.

99 Interview with Ercan İpekci, the head of Turkish Journalists Union Ankara branch in the summer of 1996.

100 For details see Aktuel Para, 8.9.1996, Babiali Magazin, April 1996, 7: 82, and Oran, 1995:27.

101 The editor in chief of Sabah, Zafer Mutlu describes his job as a responsibility for making the newspaper rich like any other company manager: "...Thus, I always have not differentiated myself from a general manager of Arçelik. My main job was to make my boss a lot of money. My company will grow, my company will earn more money, and I will also earn money besides the basic salary" (Münir,1993: 138-140). Of course Zafer Mutlu is not the only one. The editor in chief of Show TV, Ufuk Güldemir published one of his close friends (Hasan Cemal) photograph taken in a party environment and used it in Milliyet without his permission when he was an editor-in-chief of Milliyet. Güldemir's defense for using a photograph taken in a private place was that Cemal had damaged Milliyet with his writing. He says that he would not hesitate to do the same to other people who damage the company he works. So, ethical values, professional values, seem to have been replaced by the company's interests (Aktuel, 14.03.1996).

102 Information given during the interview with Ercan İpekci, the head of the Turkish Journalists Union (TGS) Ankara branch in the summer of 1996.
CHAPTER 5  MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

There is no job security for the journalists in Turkey at the moment. The situation became worse when the two big groups (Doğan and Bilgin) signed an agreement. If a journalist leaves any organization of one group, the other will not accept him/her to work in any organization in their group. Since they cover a large proportion of the sector, the chance of the journalist finding another job when they leave would be very low.

The analysis below is the outcome of the in-depth interviews (lasting from 60 to 90 minutes) with two journalists and an editor from each of six newspapers (Sabah, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Dünya) in Ankara and İstanbul during the summer of 1996. All of them have written on economics, seven of them are special economics journalists. The others write both on economic and political news. Two editors were mainly responsible for economics, the others for politics, when they were working as active journalists. All of the interviewees were university graduates, 11 out of 18 from departments of journalism, or radio-television, the other seven graduated from politics, economics and law departments. All the journalists have at least four years working experience, most of them have six or seven years', seven of them have more than ten years’ experience, one who is an editor has twenty three years experience. Only for four of them is the newspaper they are working for now their first job as a journalist.

Although the questions were prepared before the interviews, they were not asked in a specific order. Instead, a question of ‘how do you spend your ordinary working day, can you tell me what you do?’ was asked as a first question, and the journalists had the opportunity give information on things which had not been anticipated prior to the interviews, and construct the issues in their own words. The other questions were asked during the conversation, so the interviews can be described as semi-structured.

1. Journalists, Their Definitions of The Newspaper and Autonomy

The definitions, stances and approaches of the newspaper in which the interviewees worked was not something asked for in the interviews, but it was commonly volunteered by the journalists and the editors. They used different
criteria, such as market, ideology, style and organization to describe the newspaper in which they worked, and its difference from the other newspapers, sometimes with reference to the other newspapers.

When considered in that respect, it is possible to see a similarity between these interviews and those with the Hürriyet and Sabah journalists.

They emphasised the popularity of the newspapers, which was related to their size in both cases. The Hürriyet journalist mentioned the newspaper being well established whereas the Sabah journalist talked more about the political orientation of the newspaper:

"In a big newspaper like Hürriyet, target mass is larger. Hürriyet is a well established newspaper which has an institutional character" (a journalist from Hürriyet)

"Big newspapers are the newspapers of the masses. They are free of fringe ideas. We identify ourselves with an urban, democrat, liberal, contemporary new world order" (a journalist from Sabah).

Having a different or striking style was also a common theme in their descriptions of the newspapers Hürriyet and Sabah.

"Bureaucrats prefer Dlinya, because they find their speeches faithfully reported in the newspaper whereas we write more briefly, and they are annoyed when the message they had given is lost" (a journalist from Hürriyet)

"Our style at Hürriyet is different, it is to emphasise the most striking feature, make it dominant in the news." (Editor from Hürriyet.)

"We choose the topics which can be interesting for people. Some topics can be very important for the business world, but not very important for the normal citizen, so we do not need to put this on the first page. The things which should be given in a sensational way are put on the first page. Reaching the reader is very important for us. The important thing in journalism is to be creative. Planes do not crash every day, the government is not overthrown everyday, so the important thing is adding to emphasise some points in the news, and we are the best in the Turkish press at that." (Editor from Sabah)

Another similarity can be observed in the responses of the Zaman and Cumhuriyet journalists. They focused more on the basis of their policy and their ideology. The
emphasis on the middle ground in terms of religious understanding and income was striking in the words of Zaman’s editor when describing the readership:

"Zaman addresses the Islamic intellectuals. There are some radical, aggressive Islamist media. The existence of Zaman decreased this radicalism. Zaman is against radicalism, and terrorism, it does not matter where it comes from, it advocates that the essence of the religion is in the middle. Zaman’s readers are young, between 25 and 35 years old, university students from the middle income group" (Editor from Zaman).

"...we are more leftist." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet.).

Making a comparison with the others was a very common strategy especially when they were describing their newspaper. While the Zaman journalist took the more marginal newspapers as a point of comparison to emphasise that they are in the middle, the journalist in Cumhuriyet wanted to show that they are on the left.

The editor of Cumhuriyet, when referring to the description used by others, used the term Kemalist. Although he accepted this description of the newspaper, he argued at the same time that writing news which has a range of different issues can not be ideological, so can not be Kemalist.

"...They label Cumhuriyet as Kemalist. Okay, it is Kemalist, what is the harm of being Kemalist then? Also, when we talk about the news, we can not say that the news is Kemalist. How come the news can be Kemalist? Today, we have written fifty news items so far, we cover all the issues. Since this is the case, it can not be a Kemalist comment of Çiller’s press meeting. These are all the extensions of the fashion to swear at Atatürk nowadays (Editor from Cumhuriyet).

Another common theme in their description of the newspaper in Zaman and Cumhuriyet was their independence as a result of the owners’ lack of involvement in any other businesses. Dünya’s editor stressed the paper’s economic content while agreeing with the Zaman and Cumhuriyet on this issue103.

103 The claim of having no other business is not true especially for Zaman, as seen in the chapter on the media industry. This emphasis might be because of showing their differences from the other newspapers of the two groups, Sabah, Hürriyet, Milliyet. As will be seen later, the newspapers of the two groups were mentioned very often by the others working for Cumhuriyet, Zaman and Dünya.
"We have connections with the other media institutions such as Samanyolu TV, Cihan news agency. These are the institutions of the same community, but their views and ways of doing things are different. We are even different from Istanbul Zaman, here we have more autonomy. We do not have any financial link with these. We obtain our income from advertisements and circulation. Sometimes a businessman who has religious beliefs may give some help as hayrat (charity in Islamist sense), and this businessman may have schools, but there is no link between their finance and Zaman's." (Editor from Zaman).

Being financially independent was seen as something which guaranteed writing without considering any interest group.

"We do not have any interest with anybody, so we can write easily." (a journalist from Zaman)

"This newspaper only has a publishing company which always makes a loss. So, the news is not written by considering the financial balances here." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

Not being involved in another business was given as evidence of the ability to write the truth without comments:

"Dünya does not have any business except in the media sector. In the other newspapers they write the news according to the bosses' or owners' wishes. We try to access all the views about an event as much as possible. As Dünya journalists, we do not have comments on the news, we write what we hear... we do not write our news on the basis of speculations." (a journalist from Dünya)

"Dünya does not depend on any group or institution. We do not have any interest in sensational personal news, we try to deal with truths: How the Turkish economy is doing, what it is being affected by...etc. rather than the meaningless political quarrels..." (a journalist from Dünya).

The owners' lack of involvement in other businesses can be considered as one dimension of autonomy according to the journalists. While this does affect the ways journalists work, another element mentioned as being more related to their professional autonomy was the issue of 'making special news'. The former is seen only in the interviews with the journalists from Zaman, Cumhuriyet and Dünya, the latter can be found in the interviews with the journalists from the other newspapers as well. All journalists mentioned the 'routine' news and 'special' news. The news
based on press briefings was considered as routine news whereas the news produced by contacting people and investigating was considered as special news. Making special news was seen by some as determining the agenda:

'I can determine the agenda and create the special news from the routine news' (a journalist from Zaman).

'I do special news, so I determine my agenda' (a journalist from Milliyet).

When the journalists, especially economics journalists, emphasised their individuality and autonomy, it also meant writing their own news which was not determined by the agenda meetings. They mentioned that the conditions for that are knowledge, expertise, gaining confidence and trust, and education in the institution.

"I can work on any topic I want. In the morning I am asked what is happening in the economy, I say that I will search this and that. Also, they offer me other topics..." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

"We do not restrict ourselves to that day's agenda meeting. Every piece of news has a chance to be published. The important thing is gaining the confidence of the editor, if you gain it, he would not ask you whether that news is correct. If you are at that stage, you can write your report, leave it and go." (a journalist from Sabah)

"Hürriyet trusts its journalists. Since it educates the journalists according to their expert areas, journalists already follow the developments and write when it is a continuation of a file, or is important for the agenda, or has news values. We exist in an autonomous sphere. They do not say do this, do that... (a journalist from Hürriyet).

The idea of being a specialist journalist having the specialist knowledge and writing specialist news, of having autonomy, was very dominant in the interview with the journalist from Cumhuriyet. It was combined with her satisfaction and a strong sense of identification with the newspaper:

"I have an advantage over the others since I know about the economy. I do not ask questions like 'what will happen?', I ask things like 'this is going to happen, isn't it?'. I know which topics I should search for, because I know what will happen. Rather than taking what the news sources say, I look at what the data, indicators show. I write my news pointing out that 'this data means this, this data means that...'. I can interpret the numbers and write my reports because of my knowledge of
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There is an understanding in Cumhuriyet that the ideas and suggestions from the journalists are always taken into consideration. We are lucky since there is nothing like censorship. It is a good feeling, I can produce, affect and direct” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

However, later she adds that:

“I can do that since I know the priorities of the newspaper. This is a collective study in the end.” (a woman journalist from Cumhuriyet)

Even the journalists who claimed that they have autonomy were aware that it was restricted. They either took these restrictions for granted with their description of the profession, or they mentioned that there was nothing they could do or that they resisted in their own ways. The mechanisms that shape, affect or restrict the news writing process, and the ways the journalists understand and deal with these mechanisms needs to be examined.

2. The Mechanisms of Constraint

The mechanisms of constraint in the news production process will be considered in three categories: Editorial control, self-censorship by the journalists and professional values.

2.1. Editorial control

The first thing the journalists, especially the editors, mentioned about the news production process is the morning meetings. It was mostly considered as a neutral process in which the news stories were distributed in an environment of free discussion and collective decision.

“Every section has morning meetings separately. All journalists give their own report.” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet.)

“At the morning meetings, everybody speaks and discusses, then we decide quickly.” (Editor from Cumhuriyet)

“Our structure is more democratic, our meetings are free. The editor in chief, editors and sub-editors can give their opinions freely in the meetings and make their points about the first page” (Editor from Sabah)
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The editor in Sabah considered that the discussions of the editor in chief, editors, and sub-editors are sufficient to label the process as democratic or free by completely taking for granted the exclusion of the journalists from this process.

The editor in Zaman similarly mentioned that in the morning meetings only the editors and sub-editors discuss. However, he mentioned that they have meetings every Monday which include the journalists as well. He said that in these meetings everybody can say whatever they like, even express opposing ideas:

"We do not have certain boundaries. We negotiate and tolerate by revealing the differences, so we find the middle, centre point (Editor from Zaman).

The differences were something to tolerate in order to achieve the centre point. He also added:

"...there is no conflict. We already speak the same language".

Thus, the opposite ideas are the differences of the people who already actually "speak the same language". The journalists, who come to work there, are already supposed to "speak the same language", and/or the editorial staff in the newspapers work with them in order to encourage their socialisation or integration into the institution. In fact, when the editor of Zaman was talking about the decision to employ some women journalists, he said:

"There are six women journalists on the Istanbul Zaman. Now we are carrying out a training programme for four full time and four part time women to be journalists here (Ankara). We even decided what they are going to read". (Editor from Zaman)

It may be an extreme example that the editor decides what the journalists read, most probably in accordance with the newspaper's ideology. This does not necessarily happen as formal training in all the newspapers. Instead, a more indirect and informal institutional socialization process occurs through the advice of the more experienced journalists, or editors:

"I can access some places which can not be accessed by my young friends as a result of the fact that I can easily get the information which they could not. The essential point to the journalists is about how he/she frames the news. I always help my friends about that. Five or six people call me everyday and ask how they can get the
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...information. In a sense I supervise them. Sometimes they access their sources via my references.” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet)

This advice was not considered as control, interference or direction by the journalists:

“I did not experience any direction from the editors both in Hürriyet (the newspaper she worked before) and Sabah, but there can be some editorial advice” (a journalist from Sabah)

“The people who are on the higher level sometimes advise us to look at the other dimensions as well. Maybe that day you were in a hurry, you could not consider the other dimensions properly. These are technical shortcomings. As a result of forgetting or distraction, you can write a very closed or unclear sentence, there may be a gap, then it should be made explicit and clear. Or, the people [he means editors or sub-editors] can hear things that are spoken at the top levels. They do not say ‘write this’, ‘write that’, ‘write like that’, at least in our newspaper.” (a journalist from Dünda)

In contrast, the editor of Hürriyet indicated the large extent of editorial interference:

“I discuss with my friends (journalists) who are following an event, and make an agreement about how to write, what to emphasise. We even decide to write some things in the news and not write others. It changes according to my contacts with İstanbul (he means with the editors and editor-in chief in İstanbul)” (Editor from Hürriyet).

Writing the report is the most active step for the journalists. After the report is written, the negotiation process occurs on an editorial level between Ankara and İstanbul. The role of the journalists then decreases:

“The first page in every newspaper is determined and arranged by the editor-in-chief. I have meetings with news sub-editors and editors there (in İstanbul) via teleconference.” (Editor from Milliyet)

“In the meeting the editors and editors-in-chiefs discuss all the news and decide whether it is going to be published and on which page. If the editor thinks that one piece of news is very important and it should be published, then he establishes a dialogue with İstanbul” (a journalist from Zaman).

He also mentioned that they are not involved in this process,
"We write and leave. In fact we can not even find time to intervene in the process after writing the report." (a journalist from Zaman).

All the journalists and editors mentioned that Istanbul decides the final form of the newspaper. However, they did not tend to say that changes were made to their reports after the editing process.

In some situations, they declared that the news they wrote would not be changed at all:

"I do not face any situations like that, my reports are not changed" (a journalist from Milliyet)

"After you, they only edit your report. Every single word, and headline remains as it is, without any change, when the report is written by a good journalist." (a woman journalist from Sabah)

Since most of them did not consider this editing as changes, some really could not find any example when asked:

"Sometimes they change the titles and they want to give another style, in Istanbul, in page organisation. However, I have not experienced any situation in which the essence, and the emphasis of my reports have been changed and have felt annoyed." (a journalist from Milliyet)

The changes made in the editing process, such as to headlines, were seen as very small details. The main change was described by one journalist as the change in the topic:

"My reports are not changed. The headline is the appreciation of the page editor. He can decide according to page setting or the way the report is written. We can never say 'what is this? I did not write such a report'. We do not have such things. If the report is about a divorce because of disagreement, it can not be changed to being because of adultery. The news appears as I write it" (a journalist from Zaman)

Mostly they thought that these were only changes in the form of the news rather than in the meaning:
“the meaning does not change at all. The fact that they are having the last word does not mean that they are telling everything. The pages are edited to make the news better to read.” (a journalist from Dünüya)

“The news we send is almost the same in the newspaper. However, we may not see some situations very well. İstanbul gives the shape, develops and refines the news, adds some dimensions which are related with İstanbul” (Editor from Dünüya)

“İstanbul does not change, they only edit. They can change the headlines. They can put a more impressive headline, which I did not think of before. I do not feel disturbed by that.” (a journalist from Dünüya).

Besides the explanations of professional refinement, the changes were also seen as a result of technical reasons, such as space:

“It is edited, sometimes there is not enough space on the page so it can be shortened or the headline can be changed” (a journalist from Zaman)

“I do not have anything like that. My reports are not changed, even the headline. Sometimes some changes are made because of some space problems, when the report is too long for the space” (a woman journalist from Cumhuriyet)

While the journalist in Cumhuriyet did not at first think the editing because of space restrictions altered her reports, later she mentioned that there can be big, surprising changes. However, she emphasised that this was not ideological, but technical, and they could not be informed because of time shortage:

“Sometimes I am surprised, I say ‘look, it is different, where did they get this headline’, but it is not ideological, these are the headlines which can be seen as suitable by the page secretary because of the space problems. We are not informed about these changes because of the time shortages” (a woman journalist from Cumhuriyet).

In contrast, the experienced journalist, and columnist in the same newspaper in İstanbul, said that journalists are called and asked about the changes:

“The news that comes from Ankara is placed without changes, but if it has many inappropriate things, the journalist who reported that news is called and asked: Shall we do it like that? They never make any changes without asking me (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).
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Some accepted that it is possible that the emphasis in the news can be changed during this process although they did not want to elaborate, and instead mentioned it as a small detail:

Sometimes there are changes in the emphasis. Apart from that, it is OK, there is no problem about that." (a journalist from Zaman)

Also, sometimes they give importance to one thing, they make something the headline, and bring something to the fore.” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

During the conversation, even the journalists who argued that their news had not been changed, talked about the changes. The interesting thing here was their use of very definite language structures (such as the words ‘never’, ‘not at all’, ‘it is not’) when they mentioned that their news would not be changed, as seen above, whereas they used less certain expressions (such as the word ‘sometimes’) when they expressed the changes.

The journalist at Zaman talked about the experience of his friends rather than discussing his own:

“Sometimes my friends get annoyed about the changes, because their news can be changed and lead to some misunderstandings, the following day they can not even look their news source in the face [a Turkish phrase to express embarrassment], because their name is written and they may not be able to stand the reactions after the news appeared. My newspaper, particularly, has very sensitive readers”.

Another journalist also mentioned that they can be in a difficult position in their relationship with the news sources after some changes occurred in the news:

“My reports are sometimes changed in format and in Istanbul they change the headline. It bothers me sometimes. They may rewrite and change the meaning, you

104 The striking thing here is that they did not object to the changes made in the editing process saying that ‘it was not exactly what happened’ or ‘the report did not reflect the event exactly’. They did not raise the issue by using these arguments maybe because they assumed that, despite the dominant professional rules, the news is a construction, and the reality is constructed differently. The framed news according to the interests of the owners in the recent years especially in the private TV channels might also have played a role in their conceptions.
may not recognize your report, and this puts you in a difficult position with respect to your news sources” (a woman journalist from Sabah105)

Thus, some journalists accepted that the meaning of the news can be changed, the news may not be published at all, and there might be reasons other than technical ones:

The editor of Milliyet in Ankara said:

“They do not say do not write this or that, but they may throw the report into a rubbish bin in Istanbul. Nobody tells you, you see the end result”.

“Sometimes it is because of the shortage of space, sometimes the guy does not put the report in the newspaper because he does not like it or because it was not suitable for the newspaper’s general policy. Well, this is the pain of journalism.” (a journalist from Zaman)

Although the comment ‘the pain of journalism’ implies he takes it for granted, this is not exactly the case. In fact, he said he was angry about the changes.

“I sometimes get annoyed at the end of the process, I swear because I make a big effort in writing the report.. I may not see the reports, which is very important for me, in the following day’s newspaper.” (a journalist from Zaman)

Although their anger over these changes shows that they were not indifferent to them, these journalists also said that there was nothing they could do to prevent it occurring:

“Actually I do not resist editorial change, I do not call and ask the editor in Istanbul, because there is a hierarchical relationship. I do tell the people here, and they tell the others... If you start to discuss such things like why your report is not published, they start to freeze you out. You can never be offended by them even though you write the news all week and nothing is published. Their agenda can be different, this is the appreciation of the editors in the end. You may think that this is the news that should be put on the first page with big headlines and it may not even be published at all. If

105 This journalist is also the one who mentioned that there would be no single change in the report and the headline if the report was written by a good journalist, as a reply to the question about editing and the relations in the newspaper. However, when she was talking about the relations with news sources, she complained about the editing process by saying that the news can not be recognised after it.
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you offend, you offend yourself, you affect yourself, nothing else, and you can reach a situation in which it is very difficult to write a report.” (a woman journalist from Sabah)

There were issues which another journalist in Cumhuriyet was unhappy with, but again he felt powerless to alter them. Also, for him, the newspaper he worked for was relatively better than the others:

“It is not an easy thing to join the management of the newspaper, even in this newspaper. In other newspapers you cannot even open your mouth about the policy. Everybody can write the things they want here, but the managerial staff can still say ‘what kind of thing is this?’ or they can offer another thing...this is the newspaper in which I can get my reports accepted most of the time. I can not say that the policy of Cumhuriyet is very good, but there is nothing else I can do about that at the moment. If I were on the managerial board, I would have some responsibilities about that, but now I am interested in my own working area.” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet)

The idea of the journalists being unable to join the management was considered by some journalists as a necessary thing:

“There is a reason for this. There are filters, as a journalist you are at the bottom, then there are sub-editors, editors, editor-in-chief. Since of these filters have a function, these people occupy these places. These filters are natural, necessary, and function to make changes.” (a journalist from Hüriyet Woman)

As seen in the extract, she thought that the hierarchical organisation in the newspaper was necessary. The filters here are used to define a very natural and necessary process.

Others also legitimised these changes by regarding them as an extension of the division of labour in the newspaper, or a necessity of the nature of the profession.

“We are not in a position to take decisions. We only take the picture of an event.” (a journalist from Sabah)

“In the end I am a journalist. There are editors in Ankara and Istanbul, and their business is to control. The report might not be published, this is not our business, this is the business of people in Istanbul. Our job is to write a report.” (a journalist from Zaman)
2.2. Self-censorship

The issue of self-censorship was revealed in the interviews in relation to the editorial control mechanisms. Issues such as indirect control by editors, or more broadly, professional socialization were not discussed.

The lack of conflict between the journalists and the sub-editors or editors is seen as the absence of any control mechanism. However, professional socialization prevents this conflict:

"In time, you seize the style, and you write the report as they want." (a journalist from Milliyet)

When the editor of Milliyet talked about self-censorship, he considered it as something peculiar to the journalists. According to him, it means excluding or reducing some elements in the news rather than constructing them differently. He did not see self-censorship as being the only thing responsible for narrowing the news content, but considered it one of the restrictive filters, together with the editorial filter. This was in contrast to the journalist previously quoted, who talked about the filters as necessary elements. The interesting thing in this interview was that he made a very critical comment. Even though he was an editor, he did not include himself in his criticism, as if he was somehow outside the process:

"The journalists sometimes apply self-censorship. If I write this, the boss will get annoyed. There are already many things to obstruct the journalist in his writing. So, if a journalist applies self-censorship, it is worse, as you yourself then restrict the people's freedom of receiving the news. You have a filter, the editor has another filter, then the news loses its content when it arrives at the reader and it makes us think 'what is the point of this news? Why is this news in the newspaper?'" (Editor from Milliyet)

Despite this, self-censorship was seen as something which depends on each individual journalist and something which they can prevent. Although it was recognised that the news may not be published or some elements excluded, it was not problematic, it was another process which was outside their responsibility. The interesting thing here is that the journalists, even the ones who did not talk about the changes made by editors mentioned editorial control in order to prove that they
do not carry out self-censorship. They said, the journalists should not think about it when writing the news:

"Self-censorship is the most important thing. This should not be applied by the journalists. Journalists should not be interested in which interest group is affected by the news, a journalist should care about writing the report, nothing else. He/she should write the report even though he/she is sure 100% that the report will not be used in the newspaper. Using the report or not, excluding some elements or not is some other people's business, like the editor, or editor-in-chief. As a journalist you do not have other any mission such as making these people's business easier. It is very important that individual journalists have this idea. The newspaper is published by the journalists" (a woman journalist from Hürriyet)

"I always write the news even though I know that it will not be used. Hürriyet generally, make it shorter, with small headlines, maybe not on the first page, but uses it on another page whereas other newspapers would throw it away. The important thing is not to self-censor, but to carry on writing." (a journalist from Hürriyet)

The editor of Dünja, related self-censorship to the newspaper's policy, but added that its existence is up to individual journalists:

"Maybe we can talk about self-censorship by the journalist. It derives from the newspaper's policy and the interests as an outcome of the policy. Although we seldom experience these kinds of things, it does not reach the extent which harms our professional understanding. Of course it depends on the journalist's own manner. I can say on behalf of myself and my friends here that we try to be independent as much as possible " (Editor from Dünja).

In contrast to the ideas which assume that self-censorship depends on each individual journalist, and it should not occur, a journalist from Zaman mentioned that

"For example, there are some news stories that I can write in this newspaper, some others that can be written by another journalist who works in another newspaper" (a journalist from Zaman) 106.

106 This does not mean that the self-censorship mechanism only works in Zaman and not in the other newspapers. The issue here is the journalists awareness of self-censorship or application of it unconsciously. I think the second happens in all newspapers, including Zaman and including those which deny that it occurs, with all informal, unstructured mechanisms. The difference in Zaman might be, as
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This was an issue mentioned by other journalists when they talked about the ways of resistance, as will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

The long extract below from another Zaman journalist is an example of self-censorship when journalists have a strong identification with the newspapers for which they work. Thus, in this case self-censorship becomes not only an individual issue, but the articulation of the individual approach with the institutional identity, as seen with the use of the words 'my readers' and the explanations about not writing negative news on the Welfare Party and police:

"For example, there is tension in the Prime Ministry now between the bodyguards of Erbakan [the leader of the Welfare Party] and Security guards. It is quite difficult for me to write about this, because some of my readers are supporters of Refah [the Welfare Party], and they can react against this news. For me again, it is difficult to write directly about the wrong behaviour I observed in the police. Why? Because the police consider Zaman as their friend. Zaman is liked by the police because of its news which does not criticise the police\textsuperscript{107}. So, I do not write that. There are some things left unwritten. There is no such thing written as 'you can not write about the police'. There are some things that you can write, others you can not because of the conjunctural situation of the newspaper, its general policy" (a journalist from Zaman).

These "unwritten" things actually affect the way journalists write although the existence of such things was not addressed much.

\textsuperscript{107} These ideas of the legal owner of Zaman below give the context, and show the relationship between the comments of the journalist from Zaman and the ownership mechanisms and organizational ideology:

Kaya argues, in his article, on the police-media relationship, that news about mistakes or late interventions of the police at some events such as murders, takes more prominence in the press, and this situation creates an image which is inaccurate. Especially the news on terror, according to him, contributes to the unsuccessful, weak and passive image of the police. He states that the image of people who are unarmed and beaten in the streets helps to create an atmosphere against police, and becomes a material 'to be used in pleasure' by 'the professional police enemies' who are waiting to reduce the prestige of the police. According to him, 'what is expected from media', instead:

'is to inform the public in a positive way about police and police services. Only the public who are informed positively can support police, and therefore police can be successful in their job...'(Kaya, 1996: 1148, 1151).
"I hear that the police are behaving wrongly ethically, they become drunk or disturb people. I can prevent this without writing a report, without revealing it. I can call the head of the security and say 'look, there is something like that. These can humiliate you. In recent days an event occurred around here. People who had relatives in prison were beaten. I told them that time that 'if you abuse the old ladies, this will not be good for you', but they did not listen and abused them anyway. The police behaved towards the people as if the people were armed. In fact these people were suffering because of their children. Of course there were some young provocateurs who were shouting, and they caused confrontation between the police and the old people, and after that they left." (a journalist from Zaman)

He emphasised the beatings of the old ladies, not the others.

"You never know, my son could be there".

On the one hand, he had a degree of sympathy for them in a common-sense way because the demonstrators had not used violence. On the other hand, he curtailed his identification with them by returning to the issue of their real aim:

"What is this for? It is meaningless to divide the society".

The aim of the people was to divide society. In fact the reason for the old ladies being beaten by the police was their children. The others, present, were labelled by the journalist as young provocateurs, who had caused the confrontation between the police and the old ladies on purpose. The journalist was annoyed by this event, because it would not be good for the police, so the participants were presented as the ‘young provocateurs’ whereas the police were seen as the victims of the event. The way to prevent these things was to talk to the police directly without publishing it. Then, I asked the question: “Isn’t reporting this event in the newspaper, using the power of the newspaper, the best way of preventing this happening again?”

The reply was:

"Of course we write the things if we believe in them. We tell them [the police], if they do it again, we will write about it or send it to another newspaper to form a pressure group"."
CHAPTER 5 MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

It is like solving family matters at home before going out. Since he described the newspaper as police-friendly, to write things that could contradict this policy, would be quite difficult, and would therefore only be used as a last resort 'to constitute pressure groups'. Since the journalists stated that they would only write something if they believed in it, reporting is not a completely objective reflection of reality, but rather something that can be constructed socially. This will be considered further with the examination of professional values.

2.3. Professional values

"The things that we have written is half of the things we could write" (a journalist from Sabah)

It was professional values which, according to him, prevented him writing the other half.

"but the principles of the profession bind us. There needs to be very concrete evidence to publish a report in the newspaper. Sometimes you may not find the evidence even though you know it exists. If I write a column, or a book in the future, I can write them, but then it will not be news, but a story or comment. News reporting is a serious thing, you should follow your claims to the end with the evidence." (a journalist from Sabah)

The ideas that emphasise the nature of the news as a concrete form of evidence were reinforced with the differentiations made between the news and columns. It was stressed that the news is not comment, and should not be incorrect, distorting reality or directing readers, but should be objective:

"We try to give the event as it is, without distorting. Our work is to present news material in a different format or to work on points which can be difficult for the readers to understand. However we never touch the essence of the news. We write differently in our comment columns." (Editor from Dünya).

"If you are writing a report about an event, elements which direct readers should be avoided. Zaman is working with a mission of objectivity" (a journalist from Zaman).

The professional values expressed with news value and objectivity were presented as factors which balance the potential restrictions that might result from the
newspaper's policy or from misuse of the news for the personal aims of the journalists:

“Although we support privatization, as a result of the criterion of the news value, we cover the anti-privatist ideas and the shortcomings that have occurred during privatization” (a journalist from Dünya).

“This is a newspaper which believes in the development of the private sector, but the working criteria and tradition which have been established in Dünya makes people ultimately objective. The thing is, the news you have written is either correct or incorrect. The important point is to have personal and professional moral values. For example, journalists can not use the news for their own personal aims, say, in the stock market.” (a journalist from Dünya).

According to the editor of Zaman, different topics could be covered as a result of objectivity:

“Objectivity and scepticism are the most important things in journalism. As long as we are objective, different ideas do not matter, so every topic can be news.” (Editor from Zaman)

Using news sources as evidence was seen by one journalist as a guarantee of the news being correct:

“The journalists should not write the news without basing it on a source which is confirmed and checked. The news should be correct” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

The news sources have a limited range, as will be seen in the analysis of the news in the next chapter. Almost all journalists interviewed mentioned politicians, bureaucrats, managers, experts, officers in public institutions and academics as news sources. As an addition to this list, only one journalist said that a worker could be a news source (from Sabah), and another one from Cumhuriyet said that everybody, even the journalists themselves were the news sources for him. They also mentioned the relations with news sources as one of the most important factors in following their profession. To contact and to be close to the news sources was very important so that they could write their reports.

“Relations with the news sources needs a lot of work, confidence. In fact, news sources can prefer the journalists who they rely on (a journalist from Hürriyet).
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MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

Close relations with the news sources at a high level were considered essential for the journalists in order for them to be well informed.

“You should go and chat with him in the mornings, things can come up during these chats, and you can ask his permission to write. If he is sick, you should visit, or if he/she is dismissed from his job, you should call and give your good wishes to him...”

(a journalist from Sabah)

“It is the case that I even discussed our family problems with my news sources on the phone before meeting face to face”. (a journalist from Cumhuriyet)

“We have very close relations with them, we go to meals to have fun together. We become friends and do things that friendship brings. Then they call and inform us. In time, they start to think like journalists and call and ask us ‘can this event be news’”

(a journalist from Zaman)

According to the journalist, news sources have a purpose behind wanting to have contacts with journalists:

"They have reasons for doing that, they either want to use this for their personal interests, or to put someone in difficulty. Sometimes it is possible to sacrifice a person with a report...” (a journalist from Zaman)

They also mentioned the dangers of being directed by the news sources. According to the journalists, knowing the area can prevent these dangers:

“News sources have offered to write a partial report. We had a very informal, close relationship until that time. I finished my relationship with them immediately. If they ask for favourable news, it finishes naturally in accordance with professional principles.... The risk of being manipulated by the news sources is the case mostly when the journalist does not follow the event from the beginning.” (a journalist from Dînya)

“When I first started my job, some businessmen and public relation officers involved in lobbying activities wanted to meet me. I did not understand at that time, then the offers started, for example they said that his company has such a big profit, ‘why don’t you write this’, ‘write that’, I had to end my relationship so as not to be involved in such things...As long as you know the data, you can not be directed...” (a woman journalist from Cumhuriyet).
CHAPTER 5  MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

In contrast to these explanations, which consider the manipulative or directive effect of the news sources, one journalist evaluated the news sources more broadly by questioning their limited range and priorities:

"The important thing is the words of the leaders. If you go to a meeting in the ministries council and miss the words of the prime minister, the remainder of the report is not important at all. Like Çiller, Erbakan said they are focusing on which leader said what rather than the topics that are more related to people. In my opinion, the people queuing for the cheap bread should be more newsworthy than a Çiller Yılmaz word duel." (a journalist from Sabah)

She also stressed the importance of impartiality. As seen above in the comments on objectivity as something which guarantees different topics becoming the news and extends the limits of the policy of the newspapers, impartiality is another professional value, considered in a positive way in terms of preventing the newspapers from being partisan:

"Newspapers should be impartial, at least they should not make politics when they write the news on politics. Newspapers now are making politics themselves. Of course you can not make the news without making politics, but the things they have done are too much...." (a journalist from Sabah)

Some evaluated professional values, mainly impartiality, not in terms of the institution, but in relation to themselves. A journalist in Hürriyet said that when he was working in Dünya,

"The policy of Dünya did not fit with my ideas, but as a journalist you think of your profession as separate".

A journalist who writes reports on privatization in Dünya said that he was against privatization:

"However, when I look at the issue as a journalist, I write the news about privatization as a requirement of my job. It cannot be the case that the journalist leaks his or her own views into the news he or she writes. It should not happen anyway. Even though the news has contradictions, I write like that, I have to reflect like that as a requirement of my profession." (a journalist from Dünya).
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A journalist in Cumhuriyet considered the restrictive effects of the professional value of impartiality on the news content. He was against impartiality, but this did not mean that the evidence should be distorted:

"Why should I become impartial? Say, on the one side there is war, on the other peace. On the one side human rights, on the other torture. It is impossible. Even the naked truth is impartial. I never distort the evidence, but I have partiality" (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

He questioned the role of the media in politics by giving examples:

"There is no such thing as the so called fourth estate. The media has never become a fourth estate in Turkey. Journalism is always a power against the people in the streets. The press always gets credit from the state and has always depended on the state, trade institutions, and the private sector. A newspaper can ruin a politician, but it does not mean that they are powerful. Having power means being one of the elements which determines the system. We are in the 63rd day of the death strikes. There should be a way to change the system of law, but it is not the case in this current situation .." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

It should be mentioned here that the journalist from Cumhuriyet mainly criticises the other newspapers rather than the one for which he works. In the remainder of the paper, the interviews with the journalists will be summarised by focusing on how they criticise the media institutions for which they work, in what ways, and how they resist the structures.

3. Criticism and Resistance

This section aims to summarise the ideas of the journalists by focusing on which dimensions of constraints they criticised most, how they criticised and in what ways they attempted to resist them.

The journalists interviewed did not talk about the restrictive power of the state on the media, although this is the case in Turkey as explained in the earlier chapter. This can be explained by the fact that the mainstream newspapers are not as subject to pressure from the state as the more radical and small scale newspapers and the magazines. Instead, the issue of the state was represented in the interviews as the relationship between the government and the media, characterised as party
favouritism. The media here was labelled as 'they' even though it was the newspaper the journalist worked for:

"They prefer to align themselves to one side rather than writing the news related to the majority.....it came to the point that when the newspaper wrote favourably about a party leader, it could have more subsidies, or in the opposite scenario, it could receive nothing. This is the contradiction with the order of things. Generally the government should be criticised by the newspaper and the opposition, but now the opposition political parties have started a war with the newspapers, as seen in the Mesut Yılmaz and Sabah relationship." (a journalist from Sabah).

"In recent years there have been very rigid attitudes towards parties and politicians. It was not that extreme before. The partiality of the press has stemmed from the government, and reduced the prestigiousness of journalism." (a journalist from Hürriyet)

The reasons for party favouritism varied in the interviews with the journalists, and were seen as the government itself or the financial interests of the media groups, as seen above. The result of this tendency of the media was seen as the end of professional values such as objectivity, as will be seen in the words of the editor of Zaman. It should be emphasised here that, especially when the journalists from Zaman and Cumhuriyet mentioned these points, it was an issue for the big media groups, such as the Doğan and Bilgin groups, rather than something which is related to the media institution for which they work. In fact, the changing ownership dynamics were repeated themes in the interviews with the journalists from Zaman and Cumhuriyet:

"The press have become politicised, the situation is terrible, they are not objective. I can recognise false news that can manipulate the citizens. However, do the readers have this privilege? No" (Editor from Zaman).

"In recent years the Turkish press support a political party like a sports team. Sabah used to support Yılmaz, but now favours Çiller against Yılmaz. If they are the voice of certain interests, power or people who are united around an idea, or belief, the press cannot be free. Then you have to do what the boss of that structure tells you to do...we were talking with a journalist from Hürriyet the other day. He said they were journalists during the Simavi period, but now they are working as servants of the boss. ...They even forced Taha Akyol to write a column against Sabah during the promotion quarrels. We do not have such things here" (a journalist from Zaman).
He also emphasised the big business characteristic of the other newspapers. Unlike the journalists in Cumhuriyet, he included the İhlas group with the other two media groups. It seems that when the journalists refer to the other newspapers, this reference is also related to their becoming a kind of competitor in the market. Thus, only the Zaman journalist referred to Türkiye, which is the newspaper of the İhlas group:

"These are all because of the benefit relations...They regard journalism with the logic of a businessman and have jobs, investments and institutions in every sector. Doğan, İhlas, and Sabah are the same, they are supported by advertisements, state subsidies, they always need more capital and credit since they have many businesses, they have to depend on the government, how can they be independent?" (a journalist from Zaman)

This criticism was stronger among the Cumhuriyet journalists since it suited the 'leftist' discourse of Cumhuriyet. They focused on commercialisation of the media as an economic issue. This explained everything, according to them, so there was no need to talk about political elements such as party favouritism:

"There is no party favouritism in the media, everything is money. Since they have many businesses, the state can harm them easily. How can you be a journalist in these conditions?" (Editor from Cumhuriyet)

"Monopolised press means being a part of that monopolised capitalist system. That part can not criticise the whole they themselves take part in. The problem is about the whole. That is, the whole is the reason for the police beatings, the war that has existed in the South-eastern area for 14 years...The press does not have any values, especially the people who are at the top levels, they have no values at all. It is worse than any private company, because when the private companies use corruption, the effects of it are small whereas when the press becomes a nest of corruption, everything becomes spoiled. In order to bring it to reason, a great power is necessary, I guess it is necessary to make a revolution because everything runs off the rails." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet).

As seen here, most of the journalists, especially the ones from Cumhuriyet are very critical about the general conditions of the Turkish press, but not about the newspaper for which they work. Their high identification with the newspaper may
CHAPTER 5 MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

be the reason for that. Although it is debatable whether the newspapers Cumhuriyet and Zaman are radical, the words of the Cumhuriyet journalists suggest so:

“We work as a representative of certain political ideas, we are more leftist and work in this direction. There is no contradiction between the institutions and the journalists in certain radical ideological structures such as Zaman and Cumhuriyet” (a journalist from Cumhuriyet)

Cumhuriyet and Dünya journalists did not complain at all about the institution for which they work, and there was no suggestion of resistance. For the former, it was mainly because of the identification with their paper, whereas for the latter it was professional values, as seen previously.

The solutions or resistance to the concrete problems they themselves experienced as a result of the daily mechanisms in the newspapers, were limited. There was no unitary element which reduced their resistance. The elements included editorial control mechanisms, their socialisation in the organisation, self-censorship as an extension of this socialisation and professional values. A further factor is that, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the journalists are no longer members of a union. There is a lack of security in their employment. This situation can reduce resistance and introduce competition between the journalists. However, at the same time, it can bring a sense of solidarity. This solidarity is not a collective solidarity under the umbrella of the leadership of the trade unions since union membership is not acceptable to their bosses. Nevertheless, at least recognising their common problems and their decreasing status can bring some solidarity as a source of resistance on a small scale. Although it does not change their working conditions, it might work to reduce the restrictions originated mainly through editorial mechanisms. In fact, one journalist mentioned that solidarity might have increased recently despite the fact that journalism is very competitive:

“Since journalism is a very individualistic, competitive profession, and depends on individual success, there has always been big competition between the journalists. We regard each other as a threatening element, and keep our reports from each other. Maybe solidarity has increased a little bit in recent years.” (a woman journalist from Milliyet).
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The journalists interviewed expressed that they realise this solidarity and resistance by exchanging news with other journalists in order to allow that news to be published in another newspaper, if not in their own\textsuperscript{108}:

"I have solidarity with other journalists who work in different newspapers, even the ones that have an opposite idea. I, for example, give the news to the news agency which is leftist, then a report that is not suitable for our newspaper can be published somewhere else. There is not a great competition between journalists. Also these things are important to create a public opinion." (a journalist from Zaman)

"We help each other and exchange the news. For example, there are some news items that I can write in this newspaper, some others that can be written by another journalist who works in another newspaper." (another journalist from Zaman)

"If I am obstructed, I can tell the other journalist to write in another newspaper..." (a journalist from Hürriyet)

"Nothing remains hidden" was repeated by many journalists. Possibly this reflected their optimism. Nothing could remain hidden because they would let other newspapers know, or wait for the power dynamics to change:

"However, nothing remains secret. Once, they did not want to print my news and said 'let's not write these things about this guy'. Then the balance of the benefits changes so fast that I wrote this again two months later, and it was accepted. This is a wild atmosphere, sometimes its wildness gives us advantages" (a journalist from Hürriyet).

"Nothing can remain hidden because you can confirm the information later. The actors, and their positions and expectations will have changed in a few years. They may, for example, situate themselves in an opposite camp" (a journalist from Sabah)

Nothing would remain hidden. They themselves would write somewhere else if not in the newspapers:

"if I am obstructed.....I can write with another name somewhere else." (a journalist from Hürriyet).

\textsuperscript{108} Similarly, Tunstall observes that information exchange exists between journalists who are in competition. However, in contrast to his study which revealed that routine information is shared instead of potential exclusives (Tunstall, 1971:229), this study of interviews shows that the journalists in Turkey exchange even the special news which would not be published in the newspaper for which they work.
CHAPTER 5 MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

4. Conclusion

The main issue that was omitted in the interviews with the journalists and editors was that of the state. Although the legal and illegal restrictions of the state continue, the media professionals interviewed tended not to talk about that. This might be because their newspapers are more mainstream, and do not object to state pressure as much as the small scale and more marginal newspapers and magazines do. If this is the case, it is striking since the discourse of press freedom has been used for a long time against the state, and particularly recently it has been used by the large media groups as well when their commercial interests are threatened by the regulative structures of the state.

The main reason, for their reluctance to talk about the state and its pressure on the media, I argue, besides the fact that these newspapers are not damaged much by the state, is the current media environment in Turkey. As seen in the earlier chapter, the media owners have had a close relationship with the prime ministers over the last decade in order to maximise their interests. The concentration in the sector gives them an advantage, especially before elections. This close relationship between the media owners and politicians can affect the conceptualisations of the journalists. For these journalists conceptualisation of the state is reflected in political candidates or party favouritism.

As explained in the earlier chapter, the emergence of the private TV channels, the strengthening of the media groups with the ownership of the newspapers, magazines, and TV channels, their concentration as the oligopoly of the two groups, their involvement in other businesses, the other businesses entering the media sector, their profitable and irresponsible broadcasting during the long unregulated years, their involvement in promotion campaigns as a result of the severe competition...etc., allowed us to see the negativities of the market.

109 Only the editor of Sabah talked about the state, but not in terms of its legal or illegal power. He mentioned the necessity of minimising the role of the state in the economy in order to achieve press freedom, and create an independent and powerful press.
CHAPTER 5 MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION

I argue that, besides the close relationship with the government, there have been two other developments in this environment which have been influential in leading the media professionals interviewed to criticise the current media environment rather than the state. The first development is the media changing their content according to the commercial interests of the owners. The second is the increasing differentiation in terms of reward between the star media professional and the ordinary journalists, as mentioned in the introduction to the chapter. Whereas the highly rewarded and high status media professionals at the top managerial levels have a high identification with the media institution for which they work, the journalists tend to see themselves as being less attached to the media institution which does not attach a true value to their labour, and creates an unsafe working environment.

Besides contributing to the negligence of the state, the developments mentioned above have had an opposite impact on the professional values of the journalists interviewed. The violation of professional values for party support, for a close relationship with the government, or for the profits of the owners, made them advocate professional values. Like all journalists everywhere, they supported these values, such as objectivity and impartiality. They assumed that criticising professional values would empower irresponsible and partial journalism. The main question here is whether the professional values function to internalise the commercial dictates, as mentioned above, with the use of the discourse of press freedom, or function as a protection against it, by the attempts of some individual journalists who do not have strong identification with the newspaper. It is difficult to say that the second is likely when considering their limited autonomy and power. In addition, it should be pointed out that the potential power of the journalists to resist the commercial dictates is limited as a result of their restricted critical stance i) on the market mainly with the ownership; ii) on the state with the government and party politics; iii) on the control with the editorial interventions.

110 This idea is from Robert W. McChesney who argues that the ideology of professional journalism functioned to internalise the commercial dictates in 1930's America: "despite the ostensible claim that ideology of professional journalism protects the news product from the pressures of advertisers and media
The professional values can have a protective or resistive effect, but the issue is how they are used.

The critical stance in the interviews was not towards the market in general. For example, there was no criticism about the role of the advertisements. In particular, the journalists from Zaman, Cumhuriyet, and from Dünya, perceived the restriction and control as being derived from ownership. Since they are not in one of the two dominant groups, they talked about ownership, the owners having other businesses, and the financial dependency on other sectors, in a critical way, by referring to the Doğan and Bilgin groups. At the same time, they declared that they have autonomy because of that. Although ownership was an issue in terms of restricting the content, the other processes were not considered from a critical perspective. All the journalists, including the ones from the two groups declared that they have autonomy because they make special news. They tended not to talk about the other dynamics, such as the socialisation process, structured mechanisms, such as agenda meetings in the morning, the editing process, and informal and unstructured ways of control. They either considered these merely as details, or approved or legitimised them as a result of time and space concerns, or the division of work within the professional understanding (the discourse of ‘this is not my job, it’s their job’), or in some cases they were aware of their limits and had to accept the control mechanisms.

They were critical about the working processes when their reports were rejected. Some explained this with the ‘policy’ and applied self-censorship, whereas it led some to exchange the news with journalists in other newspapers. This process was a method of resistance. This could be seen as the journalists’ conformism as opposed to resistance. However, even though there is a recognition and acceptance that the news would not be published in that newspaper, they again did not have to work to publish somewhere else. This shows that they are not indifferent, and some make an effort to make a small change. If the conditions are considered, this could be understood as their only way of resistance since they are not allowed to organise themselves collectively and join the union. When they can do that, the journalists...
will have the power to make changes in the general structure of the media industry in a more democratic direction. However, in order for this to happen, there have to be changes not only in the conditions which restrict their collective action, but also in their identification of the variety of the constraints.
CHAPTER SIX

The News and Ideology in the Turkish Press

Despite what the journalists and the editors said, as reported in chapter six, not only the editorials and columns, but also the news is ideological. The news is not simply the objective reflections of reality, but rather it is an ideological construction. This chapter contains a content analysis of the news on privatization of the state economic enterprises in Turkey. My aim is to provide a concrete example for the ideological positions on the state and capitalism in Turkey by showing who speaks about the issue, in which ways and on which aspects in the news.

In this content analysis, the criterion for the selection of the news is that it should be related to privatization. The news which will be analysed was restricted to the six months before and after the law (the period of 15th May 1994-15th May 1995) on privatization, which was enacted by the parliament in November, 1994. The importance of the legislative process is that it provides an intensive coverage of the issue. The sample was narrowed down by taking the news from the six newspapers every second week for a period of a year. The purpose of doing this, rather than, for example, taking a full six months, was to gain an overview of the whole year and to trace the possible differences before and after the law was enacted. Although I carried out all codings of the 1,114 news items, the coding schedule was read by two other people and applied on a few news items to ensure that the categories were understood by others in the same way.

111 see Appendix 2 and 3.
CHAPTER 6  THE NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH PRESS

1. The Newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEWSPAPERS</th>
<th>OWNER</th>
<th>ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>CIRCULATION*1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hürriyet</td>
<td>Aydın Doğan</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>556,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyet</td>
<td>Aydın Doğan</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>475,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah</td>
<td>Dinç Bilgin</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>673,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet</td>
<td>Berrin Nadi</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>55,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaman</td>
<td>Alaattin Kaya</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>353,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dünya</td>
<td>Nezih Demirkent</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 General Information on the Sample Newspapers

Information obtained from Press, Broadcasting and Information General Management

Three (Sabah, Hürriyet and Milliyet) of the six newspapers in the sample are the newspapers of the two biggest media groups in Turkey. The circulations of these three newspapers make up more than 70% of the total circulation of the newspaper industry. It would be considered sufficient since these cover more than half of the newspaper industry. However, with this research I also wanted to trace the differences between the newspapers. If these three newspapers are described in terms of their ideology, it can be said that Sabah is liberal, Hürriyet is centre, Milliyet has a more social-democrat leaning. However, there are no big differences between these three. As explained in the chapter on the media industry, Hürriyet and Milliyet are newspapers of the same group. In addition to these, I have included Cumhuriyet which is known to have a social democrat and Kemalist elite character, and Zaman which is the newspaper of the Islamic Fethullah sect which is known to be liberal Islamic. Dünya, as an economics newspaper, was also included in this research.112

The photocopies below may give an idea of the format of the sample Turkish newspapers.

112 Research which is based on 1,200 newspaper readers, lists the newspapers according to their positions on the left or right of the political spectrum from Cumhuriyet on the left, Milliyet, Hürriyet and Sabah, to Zaman on the right (the research did not include Dünya), Marketing Türkiye, 1 Agustos 1995, vol.5, no:103.
Send this filth back!
Kaplan’s extradition from Germany confirmed—Man who tried to turn 75th anniversary celebrations into a blood bath is face trial

Suicide pilot a heroin addict

Asilturk and Evcil in England
Malki killed by own stinginess
Kirca starts hunger strike today

Verin şu pisliği
75’indı yıl kutlamalarını kana bulamaya kalkan Kaplan’ın Almanya’dan istenmesi kararı alındı

İntiharuka her nelleme pilot
Asilturk ve Evcil İngiltere’ye geçti
Kirca, bugün ahlak grevine başlayacak
We want the traitor

Demands for extradition from Germany of false caliph responsible for raid on Antikabir ceremony

Kirca carried shouldered high in Ankara

Haini istiyoruz

Antikabir'deki lörene bomba yüklü saldırdı saldı veren sahte hanı Metin Kaplan'ın Almanya'dan iadesi için gizemlere başladı.

Kirca, Ankara'da omuzlara alındı
78 Trillion lira to MIT

1999 intelligence budget
more than 4 ministries funds

Cetin
requests
Kirca

Two Messages
for Turkey

Evcil in England

We want Kaplan

Mit’e 78 trilyon

1999 bütçesinden istihbarata ayıran
ödenek 4 yetenek bakanlkından fazla

Çetin’in
Kirça’ya

Türkiye’ye

iki mesaj

Evcil, İngiltere’de

İlinden 1000’si
Amerika’sı

Kaplan’ın istiyoruz

İlinden 1000’si
Amerika’sı

Kaplan’ın istiyoruz
Two years on and Susurluk is still in the dark

Central America: victims of typhoon

The state knew going on

MPs go in fear

Driver in difficult position

Environment

a blank

Erol Evcil and Aali Aturk
In England

US browser:

Saddam

CHP yeni

belgeler

acilayacak

Erol Evcil

ve Aslı Türk

İngilterede

ABD'den

Saddam'a

görev

bir araya
gelicecek
They showed their professionalism.

Special Demonstration

From Special Team

Women support Saygin

Profesyonel olduklannı gösterdiler

Özel Tim'den özel gösteri

Gerçek silahlar kullanan 80 Özel Tim elemanı, dün nefes kesen gösteride büyük beğeni topladı.

Kadınlardan Saygin'a destek

Yitik Kıl placeri aldı

Evcil and Aslıturk in England

Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Adalat Sekerliği'ne bildirdi

Evcil ve Aslıtürk İngiltere'de
Constitution Court may cancel transfer to Central Bank
Bankekspres faces problem

Güçbirliği invests 40 million dollars in Romania

Independent central control system for aviation

Shell Bata-Cyprus Consortium may be in talks over the world

Giant investment of Benetton: Elena Margar in the OSB

Hayacılık için bagimsiz merkezi kontrol sistem

Güçbirliliğinden Romanya'da 40 milyon dolarlık yatırım

Bozetto-Ema ortaklığı Tine OSB'ye devredildi
As seen in the table, if the newspapers are ranked according to their circulation, Sabah has the highest, followed by Hürriyet, Milliyet, Zaman, Cumhuriyet and then Dünya. If the newspapers are compared in terms of their size, it is seen that Hürriyet is the largest newspaper with an average of 42 pages. Milliyet follows that with 35 pages, Sabah with 32 pages. Cumhuriyet has 23, Dünya has 18 and Zaman has an average of 16 pages. When this information is considered, in conjunction with the figures below showing the number of the news items on privatization, Zaman’s lesser coverage may be explained by it having relatively less space. On the other hand, it can be seen that the largest newspaper, Hürriyet, does not have the greatest number of news items on privatization. Instead, Cumhuriyet and Dünya have much of the news. Dünya’s high level of concern about his issue can probably be explained by its character as an economics newspaper. Cumhuriyet, on the other hand, is sensitive about the issue for another reason. Since it is a Kemalist newspaper, the privatization of the state economic enterprises and its effects on the Kemalist principle of statism are of great importance for Cumhuriyet, as will be seen in detail in the chapter 7.

113 Basin İlan Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğü (General Management of Press Advertisement Institution).
2. Actors in the News

As can be seen in the table below, the main actors in the news adopt supportive positions about privatization. They are the Prime Minister, True Path Party members, business people, business organisations, managers of SEE (state economic enterprises), heads of the administrative bodies of privatization, and heads of trade unions and ministries.

There are few actors opposed to privatization. In fact, only Mümtaz Soysal (member of the Social Democratic Populist Party) and the DLP (Democratic Left Party) are against or neutral to privatization rather than being supportive. There are other actors who are against, but on very few occasions: For example, the Prime Minister two times, the MP (Motherland Party) five times, business people and companies are reported in opposition only twice.
There are many people who are never seen to be against privatization. These are the heads of the administrative bodies of privatization, TPP members, other MPs and ministers, the Deputy prime minister, international businessmen, the Head of the Constitution Court, the President, Treasury experts, international finance experts and economists. It is true to say that actors who are against privatization are rarely reported in the newspapers. There is not even a balanced distribution between the politicians in Parliament. There are major frequency differences between the Prime Minister and other politicians, between the TPP, the ANAP (Motherland Party) and the other parties, WP (Welfare Party), DLP (Democratic Left Party) and RPP (Republican People’s Party).

The frequency of the Prime Minister occurring as a main actor is higher than business people and companies, but in total, business people and companies are the most referred to. The workers, who are the people most affected by privatization, were referred to 24 times whereas business people were referred to 172 times. It was interesting that economists appeared only once as actors, and even then it was in a supporting position as a secondary actor. The newspapers do not tend to have scientists or experts as actors. Instead, the actors in the news are mainly businessmen and politicians. It seems that the news does not even cover the ideas of privatization theorists. The whole story is reduced to simple selling: the main actors of the story are those who will sell/regulate selling and the ones who will buy.

The reason for making a division between the people and the institutions was to reveal the tendency of the Turkish press to focus on the former rather than the latter. The indicators of this personalising tendency can be found in the table. The number of people referred to in the news (1,316) is three times as high as the number of institutions (427) referred to.

The institution, called KIGEM (The Centre for Developing Public Enterprises—a think-tank), which takes a critical stance against privatization and works to control privatization procedure, does not feature in the news very much (3 times as primary actor, 6 times as secondary actor).
CHAPTER 6  THE NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH PRESS

In total, it can be seen from the table that the number of supportive actors is greater than the actors who are opposed to privatization. Supportive actors mostly are primary actors (507 actors are supporting, and 106 actors are against as primary sources, while 147 actors are supporting, 64 actors are against as secondary sources).

The number of actors in neutral positions is also very high, as can be seen in the table. The high rate of the heads of the administrative bodies (21 times as main actor, 18 times as secondary actor) and administrative bodies of privatization (61 times as primary actor, 60 times as secondary actor) in neutral positions contributes to the increase in the number of neutral actors. In fact, not only the technical information such as numbers and prices about privatization, but also everything declared or done by these actors and institutions becomes news, as observed during the coding process of the content analysis. In addition, the fact that the press gave a great deal of attention to the legislative process reduced the issue to a technical one rather than a controversial issue with all the different and opposing views. As can be seen in the table of themes, legislative issues with different dimensions were repeated 297 times as the main issue in the news.
ACTORS AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS

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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| GENERAL TOTAL | 507 | 100 | 106 | 100 | 479 | 100 | 147 | 100 | 84 | 100 | 441 | 100 | 1744 | 100 |

Table 12 Actors and Their Dispositions

114 I have been influenced by the work of Deacon and Golding in developing the dispositions as "supporting", "against" and "neutral". According to that, the content not only has an "interpretative" dimension which addressed the question of what aspects of the issue are covered, but also an 'evaluative' dimension which asks whether the accounts are pro or anti the issue covered. For the details of this formulation see Golding, 1990: 97, for the use of it in a study of poll tax see Deacon & Golding, 1991: 308 or Deacon & Golding, 1994:125-126, 141-142.
3. Themes of the News

As can be seen in the table below, the reasons for privatization are both positive statements and targets, and negative ones. Although it may seem strange that the reason ‘to end the SEE’s burden on the budget deficit’, which is the most popular main reason, repeated 49 times, it is in fact expressed exactly in these words. The word ‘burden’ was used in the news instead of more value-free words such as ‘effect’ or ‘impact’.

There are only two categories which are critical of privatization (‘to provide opportunities for the businessmen who are close to the government’ and ‘ideological’). There were 34 instances of these two statements. There were 52 statements which expressed that the SEE should not be privatized. Thus, there were only 86 critical or oppositional arguments against privatization. Whereas all the other statements (after excluding the 5 unclear ones) were supportive of privatization (365). This number can be added to the other supportive statements (see the section on the definitions on the SEE in the table) for privatization such as the privatization of the SEE being slow (28 times) and that the privatization should have happened sooner (57 times). So, in order to give a picture of the evaluations of the news, it can be said that the critical or oppositional evaluations take place a total of only 86 times while the supportive evaluations occur 450 times (365+28+57). This means that more than 80% of the ideas the newspapers included supported privatization.
Table 13 Reasons of Privatization

SEEs are referred to more with negative statements than with positive ones. There were only 187 positive statements out of a total of 633. That the SEEs make a loss was the most repeated one and was the most frequently occurring as the main theme (90 times, 20.3 as the main theme). The least repeated negative theme was the low quality products and services of SEEs. The most frequently repeated positive theme is the profits of SEEs. It might be argued that the reality of SEEs was simply reduced and seen from a mainstream economist perspective, mainly for its losses and profits. The dimensions which are more related to people as citizens were not dominant. The least repeated positive dimensions of SEEs were their high quality and cheap products and services. The workers in SEEs were mentioned for their high wages. The issue of employment also existed in another category 'interference of the government or politicians in the operation of SEEs by leading
to excess employment for the political interests'. The possible positive correspondence of these statements such as SEE's becoming a source for employment and workers’ having a productive force, did not occur at all.

### Themes of the News

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES (SEEs)</th>
<th>MAIN</th>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSITIVE EVALUATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE's Making profits</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE's valuable lands</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and productivity of SEE</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich investments and infrastructures of SEEs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE as the property of public who pay taxes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High quality products and services of SEEs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheap products and services of SEEs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE's making loss</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization of SEEs should have happened sooner</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference of the government or politicians on the operation of SEEs by controlling SEE budget and using it in other areas</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their becoming burden on the economy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The slowness of the privatization of SEEs</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old technology of SEEs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference of the government or politicians in the operation of SEEs by leading to excess employment for the political interests</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference in SEEs by the government or the politicians through frequent changing of the managers and staff</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inefficiency and unproductivity of SEEs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption SEEs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stepped investments of SEEs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEs deprivation from state credits</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent managers of SEEs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expensive products and services of SEEs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too high wages of SEE workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low quality products and services of SEE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>443</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 14 State Economic Enterprises*
Table 15 Legal Issues

Legal issues are very important in the news. This can be considered as quite normal since the sample was chosen on the criterion of the law. Here though, it is striking that almost all the legal issues occurred as the main news, which shows the importance of the legal issues in the press. In particular, the bill and the discussions before the law were covered widely by the press (151 times). The news about legal issues constituted a considerable amount in the total sample (297 in 1744). The tables on the following pages also show the importance of the legal procedure.
## Chapters 6

### The News and Ideology in Turkish Press

#### Themes of the News

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION</th>
<th>MAIN</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADMINISTRATIVE/TECHNICAL/PRACTICAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malpractices and disorders</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Selling cheaper than its value and obtaining less income than anticipated</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>Administrative mistakes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>The sectoral unsuitability of privatizing some SEE in terms of national interests</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>That buyers do not follow their responsibilities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal errors in sellings</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>The mistakes of selling the SEEs which make profit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mistakes about the priorities of the SEEs to be privatized</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too high expenses for the organization and the announcement of the privatization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sectoral unsuitability of some sellings in terms of the market's incapability</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>ECONOMIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment of workers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions becoming owners of the SEE</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obtaining income from the sales</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Monopolization and cartelization tendencies</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in efficiency and productivity</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extension of capital to people</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in employment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speeding up the flow of foreign capital and investment</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early retirement of workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in investment and technology</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in profit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in economic growth</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatized SEEs making loss</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of quality of products and services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of free market and competition</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopolization of foreign companies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions losing their function after their ownership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production cessation in the privatized SEEs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of cheaper products and services</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Economic integration with Europe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Reduction in wages</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>Workers losing their unions</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inconsistency with the principles of the social state</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>550</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16 Effects of Privatization
The effects of the privatization were mainly administrative, technical, practical or economic rather than political. It should be mentioned here that the category 'the effects of privatization' does not necessarily imply the effects after privatization of the SEEs. The effects can be addressed generally without any reference to the stage of privatization or any specific SEE. These can even be addressed for SEEs which have not been privatized. Thus, after the figure below, which shows the news over time, it is necessary to look at the stages of privatization in the news (see the figure 4), and then to see the relationship between stages and the effects of privatization (see the table 17, 'The First Five Main Effects and the Stages of Privatization').

THE NEWS OVER TIME

![The News Over Time](image)

*Figure 3 The News Over Time*
CHAPTER 6 THE NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH PRESS

The first week in the sample is the period in which public announcements appeared for some SEEs to be privatised. There was news about the economic situation of the SEEs which would be sold.

The meat and fish industry was privatised in the second week. Since that sale was very debatable, there was more news, mainly about the polemics over that selling.

There was no new development in the third week, so the news decreased until the rise due to the selling campaigns of the steel factories.

The fourth week brought the cancellation of the privatization of the meat and fish industry, the abolition of the authority law and also an application by some MPs' to the Constitution Court for the abolition of the legal manifestos on privatization.

The following week was the period in which the privatization procedure was stopped by the decision of the Constitution Court to abolish the legal manifestos, on the 22nd July.

August and September were very stable, there was no major rise or fall in the news. The parties met for negotiations, and exchanged their ideas on the bill on privatization. The Parliament's summer holiday was also a factor in making that period quiet.

As soon as the Parliament started working, the news increased. It was at a peak between 24-30 October. The tension over the bill rose because of the intensified meeting procedure between the political parties during that period.

After the fall in relevant news items in the period of 7-13 November, the number of items rose again in the following week. In fact, that week saw the enactment of the law on privatization (the 24th November).

The four weeks following the enactment of the law were quiet. In the periods of 30 January-5 February and 13-19 February, there was an increase in the news mainly due to the trade unions' purchase of the Meat and Fish Industry and related polemics.
CHAPTER 6 THE NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH PRESS

During the following two weeks, the privatization procedure was slower because of the administrative mechanisms, according to the news. April was full of news about the criticisms of the 'slow' administrative mechanism and consequently the removal of the Head of the Privatization Administration, and the resignation of the Transport Minister. Also there was news on the privatization of the tyre industry and telecommunications. May brought a decrease in the news. The privatization slowed down, and reached an 'impasse' according to the comments in the news.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEWS ACCORDING TO THE STAGES OF PRIVATIZATION

From the above figure, it can be seen that the Turkish press did not cover the stage after privatization as much as it did the stage before privatization. This can be considered quite reasonable since the criterion used for the research sample was the legislation process, and it could be assumed that privatization would be implemented after the law. However, this was not the case at all. Although there

Figure 4 The Distribution of the News According to the Stages of Privatization
was no law permitting privatization, the government made privatization possible with a series of legal manifestos published from 1986 onwards.

The term ‘unspecified’ indicates the news which did not mention the stage of privatization, and mostly the news which was not about any specific institution, or any specific privatization story. It can be said, by relying on the notes taken during the coding process of the analysis, that most of the ‘unspecified’ news items in terms of stages were the ones about the legislation procedure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN EFFECTS</th>
<th>PRE PRIVATIZATION</th>
<th>AFTER- PRIVATIZATION</th>
<th>CANCELLATION OF PRIVATIZATION</th>
<th>UNSPECIFIED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union's Ownership Of SEEs</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Of Workers</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining Income From The Sales</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Cheaper Than Its Value</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malpractices And Disorders</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17 The First Five Main Effects and The Stages of Privatization

This table indicates that most of the declarations about the effects and the results were mentioned before privatization. It shows that the newspapers followed the developments after privatization less than they did before. In particular, the news items containing the categories ‘the unemployment of workers’, and ‘obtaining income from the sales’, did not occur after privatization. However, it is known that unemployment occurred following privatization. It seems that the press considered neither of these to be news, maybe because these two contradict the ‘ideal’ of privatization.

115 14 of these took place in relation to the legal issues (7 in the news about the law, 6 in the news about the bill and 1 in the news on the abolishment of the legal manifestos).
4. Conclusion

The actors and the themes of the news were very closely related. Which actors the news contained may not have determined what was said, but it at least affected it. This study revealed that people who are not businessmen or politicians do not have much chance of being included in the news. Those who oppose privatization also do not have much chance. The limited number of opposition actors in the news were mainly members of parliament. Opposition was recognised when it was raised by the members of the parliament.

In the news, privatization is represented as simple selling. There are people who will sell or who will regulate selling, and there are those who will buy. The main issue is of loss/profit. SEEs are referred to for their negative features, mainly for their losses rather than their goods or services. In fact, the losses of SEEs were the main reason given for privatization in the news.

The news was more concerned with the period before privatization. The SEEs which were already privatized were not as newsworthy as those that were still to be privatized, despite the so-called watch-dog function attributed to the press. The considerably higher amount of themes of ‘SEE’ and the ‘effects’ compared to the ‘reasons’ leads us to think that the question ‘why’ is not so important. There is no room in the news for discussing what privatization is, whether it is necessary. It is taken for granted with all the technical and administrative aspects.

The higher amount of ‘effects or results’ of privatization before privatization shows that the news is about promises/anticipations rather than daily life, concrete effects of privatization on workers, or generally on citizens who produce and use public goods and services. This is not very surprising since people as workers and citizens do not have access to the media as actors, and they are not considered as news sources by the media professionals, as seen in the earlier chapter. There it was seen that the news production process is the same in all newspapers. The fact that there is little difference in actors and themes of the news between the newspapers might be partly because of the strong similarity of the mechanisms and news sources. It is observed that the news in Dünya and Cumhuriyet is more
detailed than the others. However, the difference between these two and the others is mainly the extensions of the differing quantity or the length of the news rather than showing any qualitative difference. In the next chapter, the differences of the newspapers will be examined and further discussed through an analysis of the editorials and columns of the newspapers.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Media Elites and Privatization: Analysis of the Editorials and Columns

In this chapter, the editorials and columns about privatization in the six sample newspapers (Sabah, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Dünya) will be analysed. The criterion used to select the sample is the same as for the sample of the news: that is, selecting the editorials and columns that were published in the six months before and after the enactment of the law on privatization (the 24 November 1994). By doing this, the aim is to ascertain whether there are differences in the ideas before and after the enactment. This can show us how the media elite situate themselves during a legislative process.

The media elite in Turkey play a key role in debates, they have more power than the news journalists, and they are influential in politics, sometimes as if they were members of parliament. Their role is mostly like a lobbying activity for the government rather than being a 'watch-dog'. As a general characteristic of the Turkish press, it can be said that the editorials and columns are very important for the readers. These occupy more space in the newspapers compared with, for example, the British newspapers.

The analysis of the editorials and columns is complementary to the analysis of the news. As seen in the earlier chapter, there were no significant differences in the ways the news was covered among the different newspapers. The existence of differences will be examined in this chapter by focusing on the discourses of the editorials and columns in the different newspapers.

116 Metin Heper states that the journalists in Turkey aspired to a more dominant role than that of journalists in the continental European style, their wish is 'not only to influence but to shape political regimes, policies, and the course of events in the policy and society' (Heper, 1996:120)

117 According to this study, there are few columns in Zaman (which has the least news as well) whereas the columns had greater importance and covered more space in Cumhuriyet and Sabah. However, this does not mean that the editorials and columns are not important for Zaman, but can be explained as a result of the size of Zaman.
The news is about what happened today, it does not contain much information about the history of the event; therefore it has a restricted intertextuality. The professional values and the use of the language of factuality in news writing are factors which make the news genre limited. On the other hand, the editorials and columns as different genre do not have to use the language of factuality even though they also sometimes include factual information from the news, books, encyclopaedias or statistical documents. The ideological discourses are more visible in the editorials and columns since it is more permissable as a genre to do so. They can frame the events and give a certain angle by telling the reader how to make sense of an event. They can offer a perspective without having to ‘balance’ it with the principles of objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. They do not have to deal only with today even though they mostly write about events that have just happened. Compared to the news, they have a higher level of intertextuality, they can relate the event more to the other events that have happened previously or elsewhere, and can put the issue into a context. The editorials and columns thus give more opportunity to focus on a more detailed representation of an issue.

The editorials in the newspaper indicate many things about the position of the newspaper. However, for this analysis, it is important not only to examine the position of the newspaper, but also to see the differences within a newspaper, so as to examine whether the particular views which might be different from that of the newspapers, can be represented. Although it can be said that this is limited, and each columnist works within permitted margins, their ideas do not always have to match with the institutional policy. Thus, this analysis also tries to capture whether there are different parameters for the issue examined by including columns in the investigation.

The analysis is based on the investigation of meaning at a macro level of discourse, by focusing on topics and themes rather than the form, linguistic or grammar (van Dijk, 1997: 8-10). Extracts are included in the analysis in order to illustrate the ‘gist’ of the discourses (van Dijk, 1997: 10). This analysis is not a summary of what was written in the editorials and columns in the sample. The focal points were taken for consideration, and these were the outcome of some research questions:
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• Whether an editorial or column advocated privatization or not.

• Were there reasons given when privatization was advocated or whether privatization was taken for granted as an inevitable or an obligatory change?

• What reasons were given, and which comments were used in support of or in opposition to privatization?

• Were there differences in the ideas presented before and after the enactment of privatization?

While this analysis focused on the political arguments and evaluations (A), it excluded some other statements in the editorials and columns. Those which gave information on party politics, political forecasting, polemics and allegations (B), the statements which repeated the news as facts or story; which gave information or summary of the developments about an event (C), the statements which gave detailed information on the specific examples or offered statistical information and listed numbers (D) and repetitions (E) were excluded.

Although it is hard to make a clear cut division between these statements, and also to categorise the editorials and columns, below, two examples will be given of those statements which were taken into consideration, and those which were excluded by the researcher:
The First Dialogue in Privatization

Ertuğrul Özkoç, 10.8.1994, Hürriyet

The first non-official response to the surprising suggestion of Mesut Yılmaz, which was published in yesterday's Hürriyet headline, came yesterday from someone who is 'very close' to the Prime Minister Çiller.

The person I talked to, who is very close to Çiller, responded to Yılmaz's suggestion about his support for the government on privatization with these words: "I bet Mrs. Çiller welcomes this suggestion".

A short time after this response, the State Minister Aykon Doğan called Oltan Sungurulu from the MP and gave the message 'Let's solve this issue together'. As soon as Sungurulu got this message, he called the leader Mesut Yılmaz, and immediately a general evaluation meeting was held.

At the end of that evaluation meeting, İsm Türel and Mehmet Keşeciler were assigned to discuss the issue of privatization with the TPP.

If the TPP gives an official response, these two MP members will start meetings with the full authority of the MP.

Discordant Voices in the TPP

Nevertheless, at the same time, The General Secretary of the TPP, Hasan Peker gave an explanation which was the opposite of his earlier one and said exactly that: 'Yılmaz, who sleeps until noon everyday, has attracted some reactions from the public as a result of his obstructions to privatization, and he is now manoeuvring to compensate for his mistake. When the conditions he put forward are considered, it is seen that he is not serious. He is saying that they will give support and not bring the issue to the Constitution Court if their conditions are met. From our perspective, this does not seem genuine'.

Peker is throwing away Yılmaz's suggestion on privatization, which is one of the most important issues in Turkey, in a very thoughtless way with this primitive polemic. Which one of these is Çiller's view?

Has Negotiation Started?

The person I talked to is very close to Çiller, and has a position through which he/she can know Çiller's ideas. This person seems to be taking Yılmaz's suggestion seriously. Furthermore, this person mentions her/his idea about which of the conditions imposed, the TPP General Secretary did not 'find serious':

'The privatization of state banks can be started with Halk and Emlakbank. Vakıfbank, because it has charitable status ('vakıf' in Turkish), Ziraatbank because it gives a public service for farmers, can both remain as state banks'.

A short- Çiller's friend is giving the impression that the suggestion of Mesut Yılmaz has now started to be discussed. He/she is avoiding engaging in the simple polemic of the TPP General Secretary.

This incident reveals one more time how important the high ranking officials of political parties are. These officials who do not have any merit except the ability to talk, can kill a dialogue before it is born. These dialogues could be productive, in the most important issues of the country.

The TPP Board of Directors will meet tomorrow, and some changes in the party's officials are expected at this meeting. I hope, more careful officials will be found instead of the ones who obstruct the productive dialogue on privatization with irresponsible speeches.
The Balance of Bankruptcy

The words I have heard from Çiller's circle were promising. Turkey is wasting time in privatizing, time is as valuable as gold, the time for privatization will never return. Every day which has been lost is written in the list of debts. These debts are accumulating and making the country bankrupt.

The main opposition party is now bringing a constructive suggestion. However, a party official who possibly does not know what privatization means, is ruining this with a speech you might hear in a street coffee house. Politics should not sink that low. The leaders of parties should not allow their colleagues to make any speeches about the issues which concern the fate of the country.

Turkey has to make a definitive decision on some important issues and apply them. Privatization is one of these issues. The words of Çiller's close associate promise that a good process can start.

The Briefing on the Customs Union

A second important issue is developing these days. The process of counting down to Turkey's customs union with Europe will start on 12 December. The Foreign Minister Mümtaz Soysal received his first briefing on this issue. Cem Duna, who is the regular representative of Turkey in European Community, joined this briefing as well.

The Customs Union with Europe is at least as important as privatization. In fact, these two are not independent of each other.

Turkey needs to be in definitive agreement on some issues. A Turkey which has realised privatization and the Customs Union with Europe will be very different from that which exists today.

What should be done is not to create unnecessary polemics on these two issues and to lead unnecessarily to time being lost with street politics”.

Can the Sea Dry up?
Sükrün Soner, Cumhuriyet, 30.7.1994

Our ancestors who pretend to be smart while saying that 'The property of the state is the sea, the one who does not exploit it is a pig' [Turkish expression meaning: one should use all of the opportunities/assets of the state to the fullest possible extent] did not only lead to the society having some values which are contradictory with their real long term interests; unjust and unethical, but also they seriously deceived the society. The property of state is not like the sea so it will end. The ideologues of privatization lament uselessly because of the non-legal, non-Constitutional applications of the government; of the annulment of the privatization decisions by the Constitution Court; and privatization being delayed. The politicians have already eaten up state economic enterprises. At the end of the day, no state economic enterprises will remain to be sold and operated.

When I read the recent news on the Karabük Iron-Steel Enterprise, my heart bled. The 57 year old high temperature oven has leaked because the necessary maintenance has not been done. The maintenance dates are past for all three ovens. There is a risk of explosion at any minute. The ovens, and thus, the Karabük Iron-Steel Enterprise are being left to die because, forget about not making technology renewal and investment, even the investments which are necessary in order to continue production have been banned by government decisions. The credits provided from abroad in order to allow it to survive are not being used. Today is the last day to use the foreign credit, which
has already been extended three months. While the credit has not been used, there is no attempt whatsoever to extend the due date or to use it later.

I want to refresh your memory. Prime Minister Çiller mentioned Karabük in the list of the enterprises which were going to be closed down according to the 5 April Economic Package Decisions. The responsible minister Aykon Doğan and the bureaucrat responsible for privatization, Tezcan Yaramancı put forward that the closing down of Karabük was unavoidable and Karabük could not easily find a buyer even as scrap.

Initially Karabük workers, trade unions, public, expert economists and old bureaucrats challenged that claim. A series of reports and documents, which the government could not refuse, appeared and it was proven that Karabük could be run, and if it is wished, could be made an efficient enterprise. It was revealed that there was credit waiting to be used, and the technology was not outdated and old-fashioned at all. The government, especially the social democrat side, found it difficult to face the scientific reports, and it was necessary to prepare another official report. The bureaucrats who gave the instruction to close down the DPT could not insist on their first reports, and accepted the reconsideration of the situation. Finally, the last official report prepared with Karayal's request mentioned that Karabük remains operational. Despite all this, look at what is happening. While the credit which can keep the enterprise alive is being abandoned, the ovens are left to rot as a result of not being maintained. Karabük is being left to die despite the official reports. The property of the public, the life source of the region, the national wealth, is being killed.

Is it only Karabük? The same thing is valid for many other state economic enterprises. Forget about the continuation of production after privatization, there is no enterprise left to produce anything anymore. State economic enterprises are deliberately led to collapse and death. Forget the conditions to keep up with new technology and make a profit in production, even the necessary investments to keep them alive have not been made for years. The losses are doubled through becoming indebted to private banks with high interest charges.

While the total national and foreign debt was 222,265 billions in December 1993 the rate become 303,084 billions in March 1994, an increase of 80,819 billions. It is estimated that it will increase to 400 million with doubling interest debts by the end of this year. State economic enterprises are being sunk with these interest debts to private banks. As a result, there is no enterprise remains to privatize anyway.

Our ancestors who pretended to be smart not only misled us, but also they deceived us. The property of the state is not like the sea, so it will end.

1. Advocating Privatization

The extracts from the columns in two different newspapers below state the necessity and unavoidability of privatization without presenting any reason for it. The first one states that privatization is an economic issue that can be understood and therefore advocated by economists. It implies that there is no such thing as being against privatization. The only issue is to understand it or not as a value-free thing. People who are opposed to it are indeed the ones who do not understand economics.
“Privatization is particularly an economic issue. Almost all economists support privatization. Look at the people who are against it! How many of these people are economists? Many people whose main professions are not economics, but are involved in economics in some way advocate privatization, because there is no need to hammer it home...” (Muharrem Karsh, Zaman, 7.11.1994).

According to this extract, there should not be any discussions about privatization because its inevitability is taken for granted. While the emphasis of this column is on the scientific economic knowledge, the next one does not reduce it to a technical issue, recognising it as a political issue. However, the conclusions of both are the same: privatization is unavoidable.

“Is privatization basically a politics laden enterprise or is it a necessary step to be taken in accordance with the objective principles of economic science? I accept that every topic in social sciences is unavoidably politics laden, in particular a branch of science such as economics, which is in the end related to the distribution of income, is closer to politics. However, it is possible to explain why an initiative which is basically political is objectively unavoidable.” (Serdar Turgut, Hürriyet, 5.8.1994).

Although it has been argued that privatization is an inevitable thing and is seen as an obligation, at the same time it has been rationalised by giving reasons for it since the country has a long statist tradition. The reasons shown for privatization in the editorials and columns will be looked at below. Firstly, those which discuss the negative aspects of the economy, offering privatization as a solution to them, will be considered, and then the editorials and columns which regard privatization as an inevitable step to achieve good things, will be examined.

1.1. Eliminating the Problem of State Economic Enterprises

Privatization in Turkey is presented as a solution to the problems or a precondition of solving problems, by the editorial in Dünya:

“...because the needs which existed in the past still remain today... As long as the privatization is not realised, these hardships will always stay” (Nezih Demirkent, Dünya, 26.10.1994).
This idea occurs in the columns in *Milliyet* as well:

"...today privatization is a necessity for Turkey to get out of the difficulties" (Taha Akyol, *Milliyet*, 23.7.1994).

Another example in *Milliyet* uses a similar phrase, 'getting rid of the difficulties', and this phrase in the following sentences includes the idea of getting rid of SEEs. SEEs are equated with difficulties:

"...privatization is the minimum condition for getting rid of the difficulties of the economy...unless SEEs are got rid of, nobody should blame the government saying that they could not defeat inflation" (Mubarrem Karsi, *Milliyet*, 7.11.1994).

Considering SEEs as the main cause of all troubles, not just economic ones, can also be seen in the other editorials and columns.

The column of Ali Rıza Kardız with the title of “SEEs have eaten up the economy” gives a list of SEE losses, and argues similarly that unless the ‘SEE problem’ is solved, it will be impossible to get the millstone from round our necks just by using stabilization packages (Ali Rıza Kardız, *Sabah*, 26.7.1994).

When the statements on the problems with SEEs are examined, it is possible to divide them into two categories: SEEs’ losses and inefficiency and SEEs as the source of excess employment:

**1.1.1. The losses and inefficiency of SEEs**

As has been seen in the content analysis of the news, one in five of the statements about SEEs was about their losses. This is an idea repeated in the editorials and the columns as well. Besides the losses, the inefficiency of SEEs is mentioned in many editorials and the columns. It is argued that SEEs cause budget deficits or inflation, and negative terms such as ‘burden’, or ‘problem’ are widely used in reference them.

*A Dünya* editorial mentions “getting rid of this burden”, implying SEEs, and that the solution to the ‘burden’ of SEEs is privatization:
"...according to some calculations, 250 billion TL is lost every day. With the selling of a few institutions, efficiency will be created. Moreover, the budget deficits will be removed..." (Nezih Demirkent, Dünya, 26.10.1994).

Other columns mention the same point:

"Public finance deficit is increasing because of the loss of the institutions, the so-called SEE... The state will get rid of 90 billion TL loss with the privatization of 17 SEEs" (Öğuz Çetinoğlu, 30.11.1994, Zaman).

"The privatization should be realised quickly, and almost all SEEs which have made a loss in 1995 should be eliminated in order to reduce the SEE losses from over 70 billion to 20 billion" (Osman Arolat, "Arolat’tan", 17.10.1994, Dünya).

Another column states that:

"The aim of privatization is efficiency, to save the state budget from the losses and deficits of the inefficient enterprises" 

He also adds in the same column that:

"...As long as it is applied with good intention and insight, the state enterprises can even be transferred for free" (Muharrem Karsh, Milliyet, 3.10.1994).

Although it is not clear what ‘good intention’ and ‘insight’ mean, why the word ‘transfer’ is used rather than ‘selling’ and, who the SEE will be transferred to, this extract is very interesting in terms of showing the intensity of the complaints about the SEEs.

In a column in Sabah, the issue of SEE’s making a loss is stated with the emphasis on ‘paying tax’. "Which is good?". He considers two alternatives. One is SEEs making a loss and becoming a ‘burden’ for the budget, the other is making them firms which pay tax to the state after the deliverance from the losses through privatization. He favours the second option by stating that the good thing for the

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118It implies that all the profitable firms pay tax. This is ironic since, as mentioned in the chapter on Turkey, one of the most important economic problems in Turkey is tax deficits. Korkut Boratav argues that the Turkish bourgeoisie views privatization as an alternative way not to pay taxes. If taxation was decided on as a solution to the financial crisis, they would have to pay them (Cumhuriyet, 19.6.1994).
national economy is a firm which makes a profit, which does not become a burden on the state, and indeed, pays its taxes (Taha Akyol, Milliyet, 10.6.1994).

Another column in the same newspaper frames the issue from the view of the ‘tax payers’ and mentions the bad effects of SEEs on the Turkish people. It is stressed that the cost of the ‘millstone SEE’s losses’ are silently paid by the people through taxes. The column continues:

"Because of these SEEs, both Turkey and the Turkish people are getting poorer. There is no possibility for society to become richer with the mentality of using the economic resources so badly" (Mehmet Altan, Sabah, 5.9.1994).

1.1.2. The SEE as a Source of Excess Employment

"The plunder in SEEs sets the country on fire" (Necati Dogru, Sabah, 23.7.1994).

A column in Sabah stresses corruption and offers privatization as a moral obligation for the establishment of a ‘clean state’.

"Privatization has become an obligation to stop the moral corruption in the public sphere immediately (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994).

The editorial of Sabah states:

"Privatization is a door which is open towards productive economy and clean politics" (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 22.7.1994).

Another column from Sabah similarly argues that the state has been a source for ‘bribes and corruption’ and suggests ‘removing the state from economy’ (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 23.7.1994).

The discourse of plunder and corruption of SEEs is mainly used for ‘excess employment’ in SEEs rather than being considered in the context of the government using the budget of SEEs in other areas, of controlling the managerial staff, or the corruption of the managerial staff. It seems that the content of the news
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is more diverse about that119 while the editorials and columns120 which advocate privatization focus more on the excess employment.

The excess employment is seen as plunder, as the cause of the losses and inefficiency of the SEEs, as exploitation of the majority by a minority, and as a problem that can be solved by privatization as implied below:

“People who pretend that privatization is a disadvantage for the working masses are lying. The enterprises which do not accommodate the rules of efficiency and the conditions of competition should not survive. If they exist with the state support, then it means that a big majority is definitely being plundered, and exploited on behalf of a certain minority. We as a nation are going to pay 100 trillion as the bill for undeserved salaries in the SEEs” (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 25.8.1994).

Güngör Mengi does not say explicitly whose undeserved salary in SEEs ‘we’ will pay as a ‘nation’. He takes the trade-unionist criticisms which maintain the idea that ‘privatization is a disadvantage for workers, because it brings unemployment’, and alters the term workers to ‘working masses’, and implies that workers are the minority and are mainly responsible for the exploitation of the masses.

Hürriyet’s editorial of is a very good example to show the exaggeration in the Turkish press about ‘excess employment’:

“Thousands, ten thousands of people are employed in SEEs. Ten people started to carry one egg. The costs have reached an unbelievable level” (Emin Çulaşan, Hürriyet, 25.11.1994).

119 Besides excess employment which is repeated 20 times, the interference in SEEs by the government or politicians through controlling their budget and using it in other areas is repeated 30 times, through controlling the managerial staff is repeated 16 times in the news. The corruption of the managerial staff is a theme repeated 12 times (see the content analysis in chapter 6).

120 The interference of the government in the operation of SEEs by controlling the managers, was found as a theme of a column about corruption in Zaman. This column, which differentiates political mentality and ‘commercial reality’, and regards the latter as something exempted from politics states that:

“Is it not the reason for this situation of SEEs that the political mentality has taken priority over the commercial reality for many years when SEEs have been administrated? The general managers have been changed every three months because the state has managerial control. These general managers could not say ‘no’ to these political pressures. Eventually, SEEs have become the private farms of the politicians to feed their supporters, not economic enterprises any more”(Fazıl Karaman, Zaman, 3.10.1994).
Thus, the main reason and responsibility for the situation of SEEs lies with excess employment, trade unions, and even workers. A column in *Sabah* mentions the issues of ‘SEE loss’, ‘SEEs as a mill stone round our neck’, ‘budget deficits’, ‘bankrupted social security system’ and concludes with the criticism of the trade unions:

“The account of the state and the efficiency of the economy are not issues only for government and bosses today. The officers, workers and unionists of the state have to think about these from now on”.

He also criticises people thinking of nothing but their salary or wage, and emphasises:

“...if we want to achieve a higher welfare level, we should keep in mind that we are all in the same boat” (Hasan Cemal, *Sabah*, 23.7.1994).

The metaphor of ‘being in the same boat’ is an extension of the liberal idea of ‘common good’, or ‘common interest’. It assumes that everybody is equal ‘in the same boat’. However, even though everybody is in the same boat, the boat has safer and nicer places for the rich, and the opposite for the poor.

The dismissal of workers is sometimes implicitly suggested as a solution, as we have seen above, or more often the issue is ignored, or is mentioned as one of the items of technical detail in the budget.

“Only with the elimination of SEEs, the employment burden, will the interest burden which derives from their inefficiency vanish. The loss which is more than 70 billion this year will lessen to 20 billion with the reduction in the number of workers and the end of the interest burden” (Osman Arolat, 17.10.1994, *Dünya*).

The dismissal of workers is mentioned very clearly, especially after the enactment of the law. This can be explained with our assumption that most of the newspapers worked as a lobbying activity for the enactment of the law on privatization. They did not mention these issues before the law, possibly so as not to encourage any fear about resistance to or distancing from privatization by the public.

A column from *Hürriyet* legitimises the unemployment, and tries to convince people of the necessity of it in the short term.
"To sum up, privatization has to cause some people to lose their job in the short term. On the other hand, unless 'surplus value', namely capital formation which will emerge with more efficient use of the national sources, is provided, employment can not be created for the millions of unemployed" (Ege Cansen, Hürriyet, 23.2.1995).

The editorial, "Sabah Diyör ki" (Sabah Says) did not even try to legitimise it and trivialises the issue of unemployment and the 'threat' of 'social explosion'. Güngör Mengi states that

'there are at least 5 million young people who are ready to work 12 hours a day with 5 million lira as a monthly salary'.

He argues that since they do not create a social explosion, the elimination of excessive workers who have been employed in SEE's by their supporters, will not create a social explosion (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 8.2.1995).

1.2. Towards a Minimal State in the 'Global' World

The editorials and the columns which advocate privatization state that the SEE's had important functions in the past, but have now completed their mission. The state in the economy is no longer historically valid. Thus, privatization is a natural historical step to be taken.

Emin Çoşlaşan from Hürriyet evaluates SEE's from the past using the word 'statism' in an economic sense:

"SEE's were established in the period of Atatürk. One of the six arrows of the regime was statism. It was necessary for that time. We did not have money to give outside, nor foreign currency for imports. We had to produce our products ourselves" (Emin Çoşlaşan, Hürriyet, 25.11.1994).

Ertuğrul Özkök mentions that the SEE's were the most important economic tools in 1923 because there was no capital accumulation in the private sector. Then, the state had a mission to mobilise the economy, and completed this 'historical mission'.

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"Now, things have changed, and these 'honourable enterprises' of the 'first white revolution' have become an obstacle for the 'second revolution' and had a 'counter-revolutionist' position" (Ertuğrul Özkoğ, Hürriyet, 25.10.1994).

The use of the words 'revolution' and 'counter-revolution' emphasise the current huge transformation, but can also be considered as an ironic reply to Turkish leftists, employing their own discourse.

Hasan Cemal from Sabah similarly mentions that the state in the economy has completed its appointed time.

"In the past, it made large contributions in terms of capital accumulation and a qualified workforce, but 'the father state' has been an obstacle for the development of the economy for a long time" (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.11.1994).

These ideas are not against development or modernization in a general sense, rather they are against the state being an active agent for development. They believe that the state has completed its function in the modernization process. It should be minimised and replaced by the market. Privatization is seen as a step for minimising the state.

"Unless the state is minimised in the economy, inflation and the cost of living will continue to ruin the people. Unless the state withdraws from production in the economy, the abnormal losses of the SEEs will not end" (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.11.1994).

The editorial of Hürriyet asks in relation to the bill on privatization:

"What sort of revolution is Turkey making with this bill?".

He replies:

"The state will be minimised, will be relieved, and it will return to its essential functions" (Ertuğrul Özkoğ, Hürriyet, 29.10.1994).

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121 In another editorial, he calls the process "The Second Republic in the economy" (Ertuğrul Özkoğ, Hürriyet, 24.11.1994). The advocates of the Second Republic criticise Kemalism, and support market against statism. For the Second Republic approach, see Metin Sever, Cem Dızdar, 2. Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları, Basak pub., Ankara, 1993, 2.ed.
Although there is no further discussion about what the ‘essential functions of the state’ means, a column from Sabah gives clues, suggesting that the state should not be involved in production. The state should be small, but efficient. The column does not suggest that the state should be minimised as a political force over citizens, instead it suggests it should be strengthened.

"...it is correct to strengthen the state in defence and security, justice, education, health and social security" (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 23.7.1994).

The editorials and columns advocating privatization mostly talk about the role of the state in the economy, they do not tend to talk about the state as a political force. Although one column which advocates privatization also mentions the democratization of the state, it does so in the context of local government (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 27.11.1994). Political statism is predominantly not a topic which is criticised by the advocates of privatization. The main focus is economic statism. Only when it obstructs privatization and the market in general, is political statism brought forward as an issue. For example, the column below criticises the legal system in Turkey for restricting the market economy following the annulment of the authority law by the Constitution Court. The column entitled “‘State law’ is against liberal economy” argues that statism was not and will not be restricted to the economy; political and economic statism always exist jointly.

The effect of statism on the law is mentioned in the column and it is asked:

“How does the current system of law in Turkey adjust to liberal democracy and liberal economy, to what extent? In a different way, I can ask, is the law philosophy which has been framed and embodied by the 1982 Constitution an obstruction to the global values that are defined by democracy and market economy?..." (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 17.7.1994).

As this and the following example show, democracy here is something to facilitate the operation of the market. It is an element of ‘global values’ that the character of the identity of Turkey should be in accordance with:

“There is a new world beyond the boundaries. This is a world in which thoughts, power of enterprise, capital and information move intercontinentally without any
As seen here, privatization is not only advocated in order to eliminate some negativities such as state economic enterprises, but is also presented as a means to integrate with the global world. These are expressed in the editorials and columns as democracy and integration with Europe.

1.2.1. For Democracy

As seen above, minimising the political power of the state as a legal and illegal force are not expressed by the advocates of privatization. Rather, the words 'democracy' or 'freedom' are used in a loose way mostly in relation to the 'free' market:

“Freedom in the mentality of the economy brings democracy in the mentality of politics. Have you ever met any free economy in despotic regimes? The supreme authority in a closed economy decides everything: how you walk, how you sneeze, what you buy and sell, how, in the end what you believe, how.....The political boundaries do not matter in a free economy. The understanding of integration with the world and freedom of enterprises are dominant” (Fazil Karaman, Zaman, 21.11.1994).

Similarly, Akat states that:

“The experiences of the last half century have brought very strong evidence that ‘private ownership-market’ is not only an economic category, but the precondition of a liberal democracy” (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994).

It can be questioned how free the market actually is, what the understanding of freedom includes and whether freedom is sufficient alone without equality. The more important thing here, however, is the use of these arguments to support privatization. That is, the assumption that free market will bring liberal democracy is extended to another assumption which argues that firstly privatization should be realised, then it will automatically bring democracy.
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According to Akat, privatization "is one dimension of the democratization attempt", and therefore privatization should be supported by many sections of society:

"It is of great importance that people who advocate change, democracy, integration with the world and a strong and modern Turkey, understand very well the crucial role of privatization in their project" (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994).

The column below does not only consider privatization as one dimension of democracy, but also asserts that privatization is necessary and vital for democracy, otherwise (without privatization) democracy should not be expected:

"...privatization is of crucial importance not only in terms of the economy, but also in terms of the realisation of democratization. Nobody should anticipate democratization of the Turkish state unless a real privatization has been realised" (Mehmet Altan, Sabah, 27.10.1994).

Another example similarly states that the nature of the state will change after privatization. Gökmen states that after privatization the Constitution will be changed, the state will become an organ responsible for the happiness of individuals rather than a source of pressure (Yavuz Gökmen, Hürriyet, 16.9.1994).

As mentioned above, democracy as one of the reasons and outcomes of privatization is supported by the idea of being a part of the world. Thus, taking its place in the global world with a strengthened position is seen as the ultimate target. To achieve this, privatization is seen as necessary for democratization, and democratization is seen as a condition of being European 122, as can be seen in the extracts below:

122 These ideas are very similar to the ideas of the Prime Minister of the period, Tansu Çiller as seen in the third chapter. In fact, the writers give quotations from the speeches of the Prime Minister in their columns. For example, Sedat Ergin summarises his meeting with Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in his column in Hürriyet. According to this, Çiller establishes an important parallel between privatization and democratization by considering these as parts of a whole. Democratization is also related to the Customs Union. Çiller states: "You assume that everything can be done immediately about democratization. It does not happen as you think. However, with the Customs Union, democratization will gain a great speed" (Sedat Ergin, Hürriyet, 2.3.1995).
"We need to know where we are in privatization before asking where we are in Westernisation, or where we are in democratisation" (Canan Barlas, Milliyet, 30.4.1995).

Asaf Savaş Akat emphasises that political liberalization should follow economic liberalisation and adds:

"As far as it can be done, privatization will accelerate democratization, and it will make Turkey's entering the world's 'first division' easier" (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 25.11.1994).

1.2.2. For Integration with Europe

The necessity of privatization for the integration with Europe takes place with the emphasis on the Customs Union. These extracts show the interrelationship between them and the priorities that are assumed.

"Privatization being on the Turkish agenda has an importance beyond chance in this period in which Turkey is coming closer to realising the Customs Union with the EU. It is impossible for many SEEs to enter the Custom Union and become successful with their current structure in the current situation of the public sector in Turkey...." (Osman Ulagay, Milliyet, 29 11 1994).

Similarly another article in Hürriyet states:

"The Customs Union with Europe is at least as important as privatization. In fact, these two are not independent of each other. Turkey needs to be in definitive agreement on some issues. A Turkey which has realised privatization and the Customs Union with Europe will be very different from that which exists today. What should be done is not to create unnecessary polemics on these two issues and to lead unnecessarily to time being lost with street politics" (Ertuğrul Özkök, Hürriyet, 10.8.1994).

The Sabah editorial is very certain about the Customs Union. It regards the Customs Union as a step for membership of the EU. Güngör Mengi mentions that the Customs Union is one of the stations on that road. The idea of historical necessity exists in the Sabah editorial, like many others.
“The main target should be European Union... The target for Turkey that is shown by the history is Europe. Nobody should feel comfortable before arriving at that target” (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 8.2.1995).

In another editorial, he describes the law on privatization, and the changes in the law against terrorism as two harnessed horses:

“The confidence and speed that we will provide on the road towards integration with Europe depend on the harnessing of these two horses at the same time in safety... Privatization will reconcile Turkey with international financial institutions. The consensus that will be provided on the Law on the Struggle against Terrorism will correct our record which prevents integration with Europe since it will free the people who end up in prison because they have written a book” (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 19.10.1994).

2. Critical Accounts on the Privatization of SEEs

There is no editorial or column in Cumhuriyet which argues for or lists the reasons for privatization. The critical accounts on the privatization of the SEEs are mainly the ones in Cumhuriyet, although it is possible to see critical ones in other newspapers (except Sabah) since they are not homogeneous structures and the column writers in particular have some autonomy.

Some mention the drawbacks or possible negative effects of privatization:

Mümtaz Soysal,123 as a professor who studies Constitutions, criticises the privatization decisions on some SEEs for being illegal and being against the Constitution (Mümtaz Soysal, Hürriyet, 14.9.1994). Also, he stresses the necessity of ‘protecting consumers’ and of ‘preventing monopolization and cartelisation’ (Mümtaz Soysal, Hürriyet, 14.9.1994).

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123 Mümtaz Soysal writes columns regularly in Hürriyet. At that time, he was an SDP member of the parliament, which was a partner of the coalition government with the TPP. Then, he became Foreign Minister, then resigned. During the period analysed, he attempted to make some democratic changes in the Law Against Terrorism, and he tried to persuade his party to present this democratization as a condition of accepting the legal arrangements on privatization.
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Taner Berksoy, from *Cumhuriyet*, states that privatization without complete competition reinforces the inadequacy of the distribution of income (Taner Berksoy, *Cumhuriyet*, 1.12.1994).

Taylan Erten states that:

“It is inconvenient for competition to sell more than an institution (SEE) to one firm or group in these kinds of sectors” (Taylan Erten, 21.4.1995, *Dünya*).

Öztin Akgüç, in *Cumhuriyet*, lists the drawbacks such as monopolisation, the exploitation of consumers, the profit drive of the companies, the increase in public finance deficits and decrease in production (Öztin Akgüç, *Cumhuriyet*, 16.10.1994).

Some columns question the mainstream discourse on *state economic enterprises*:

Mümtaz Soysal states that what has been opposed are ‘the obsession’ that ‘public enterprises are always bad, private enterprises are always good’, ‘illegality’, selling of SEEs which are ‘necessary for balanced development’ in a hurry (Mümtaz Soysal, *Hürriyet*, 5.5.1995).

Zülfikar Doğan, from Milliyet, questions the idea that SEEs are millstones. He argues that there are state economic enterprises which have a renewed technology, which produce the essential inputs for the economy and even make a profit (Zülfikar Doğan, *Milliyet*, 4.7.1994).

One column from the same newspaper challenges the aim of SEEs as making profit:

“The aim is not to make profit in the SEEs. The main idea is to bring advantages to the public” (Oktay Akbal, *Milliyet*, 6.10.1994).

Some evaluate the *past of SEEs* differently from the editorials and columns of *Sabah*. They accept the inadequacy of SEEs, but argue that this is the outcome of deliberate policies:

A column from *Cumhuriyet* explains the reasons for the current situation of SEEs, as the result of the policies that have been applied since the Özal period in the
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1980s. According to him, since Özal cut the support for SEEs, their investment has decreased, SEEs have obtained credit with high interest rates from the banks. Many SEEs have made a loss because their earnings are eaten up in interest payments. He also emphasises that the economy did not worsen because of SEE losses. SEE losses are the outcome of the fact that the economy has been governed badly or the losses have been produced deliberately (Mustafa Balbay, Cumhuriyet, 25.11.1994).

Öztin Akgiç argues in a similar way that the attempts to destroy the SEEs that were 'the signs of our economic independence' intensified after the 1980s. Industrial investments were not made. Unskilful managers were appointed. They are full of debts (Öztin Akgiç, Cumhuriyet, 2.12.1994).

Oktay Ekşi from Hürriyet argues that the assets of the state are being plundered through privatization. He states that this is the end of the plan. Firstly, the enterprises are badly managed, they are forced into debt, then the quality of the products and services decreases:

"This policy is applied for a while. After the bad image is created, it is the turn of selling, privatization" (Oktay Ekşi, Hürriyet, 23.2.1995).

Very similarly, a column from Cumhuriyet argues that the SEEs have been destroyed deliberately by the politicians as a result of not renewing their technology, not making necessary investments, and creating high interest debts with private banks (Şükran Soner, Cumhuriyet, 30.7.1994).

These different evaluations of SEEs lead to more critical accounts on privatization. Bekir Coşkun in Hürriyet addresses the claims that privatization ended the socialist state. He argues that what is collapsing is the social state:

"...social state is collapsing step by step...look at the fate, even with the support of the social democrats" (Bekir Coşkun, Hürriyet, 25.11.1994).

In a column on privatization, Mümtaz Soysal talks about 'globalized international exploitation networks'. The last obstacle for this network, according to him, is the 'nation-state' which has a protective function (Mümtaz Soysal, Hürriyet, 5.5.1995).
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Anti-imperialist discourse is more obvious in another column in Cumhuriyet:

"Their aim (foreigners) is to realise their production with a lack of conscience about the environment in countries like ours, using cheap labour, and the state which is unable to collect taxes".

He adds that this will bring benefit for some groups in Turkey because:

"...with the end of SEEs, an important power against the private sector will have been eliminated....workers organisations will have been destroyed.. Another concept that is removed with privatization is the development programmes to end the regional unbalances" (Izzettin Onder, Cumhuriyet, 14.12.1994).

Some columns in Cumhuriyet emphasise the republic:

"The prime minister told foreign investors that ‘Your being here and the historical moment in which we live make me excited’. We do not know whether she felt the same excitement as well during the celebrations of the 71st anniversary of our Republic?” (Türkel Minibaş, Cumhuriyet, 31.10.1994).

İlhan Selçuk from Cumhuriyet stated that the government wanted to sell the assets of ‘70 years Republic’ carelessly with arbitrary decisions. (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1.11.1994).

Even those who are not advocates of privatization, describe privatization and democracy as being in the same plane. They underline the democratic developments while those in favour prioritise privatization. The nature of the link between these two remains largely unquestioned.

İlhan Selçuk points out the necessity of enacting a law on democratization as something to balance the negative effects of privatization (İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 1.11.1994).

A similar argument can be found in the columns in Dünya as well. Osman Arolat points out that democratization is necessary to make privatization beneficial for all people, and for reducing the state. He adds:

"...the success of privatization in Turkey is impossible unless a step is taken on the way of democratization, and unless the legal reform has been realised" (Osman Arolat, 17.10.1994, Dünya).
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It seems that even in the columns which are critical of privatization the issue of democratization is addressed as something to balance privatization, and to moderate the criticisms on privatization. This can be argued easily since the same theme exists not only in Cumhuriyet, which is a Kemalist social democrat newspaper, but also in Dün ya, which is a liberal, economics newspaper. The insistence of the coalition partner, the social democrat party, on making changes in the law against terrorism in the direction of democratization, at the same time as the enactment of the privatization law, might be of importance for the people who are against privatization, leading them to accept privatization and democratization together.

3. ‘Obstacles’ to Privatization

The people who evaluate privatization differently, more cautiously or critically, are personalised and seen as obstacles in the editorials and columns, mainly in Sabah. How the accounts which do not support privatization are evaluated is important because it can reveal what or who are perceived as the enemies for the advocates of privatization.

A column from Sabah states that the people who obstruct privatization are, “SEE managers, the companies that sell products to the SEEs and some trade unions that suffocate the SEEs”. Also it is mentioned that some politicians are hunting for votes by being against privatization (Ercan İnan, Sabah, 8.6.1994).

According to the editorials and columns, these ‘obstacles’ are mainly preventing progress, integration with the world and also Turkey catching up with the rest of the world (Taha Akyol, Milliyet, 23.7.1994).

One of the obstacles, according to Akat, is the advocates of the statist tradition which has been dominant since the 1930s. The other is the advocates of ‘political Islam’ who oppose statists on other issues, but adopt ‘economic statism’ as much as the statists. He argues that the ideas which see the public ownership as a taboo and as a sacred value are ‘cutting Turkey off from the world’ (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 25.11.1994).
In another of his columns, progress is the main theme and people who are opponents of privatization are seen as the opponents of democracy.

He states that, in fact, people who are against privatization, "are trying to obstruct the democratization of Turkey". He argues that those sections which can not accept change, democratization and Turkey catching up with the rest of the world stand as ‘protectors of the current populist plunder economy’ (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994).

Similarly, for Hadi Uluengin, there are two options; one is a closed and inward looking society, the other is an open and outward looking society which provides a technological base for Turkey to catch up with the rest of the world. The first option means going back, the other brings progress. He says that status quo militants who are "rowing against the current" and 'resisting the progress of humanity', serve to 'cheat the citizens' by embracing the 'taboo of the sacred state'(Hadi Uluengin, Hürriyet, 28.2.1995).

Barlas stresses a similar issue by addressing the obstacles which are ‘people from the Welfare Party’, ‘bureaucrats’, ‘status quo politicians’. He declares:

"Whatever anyone does, the road for fusion with modernization has been opened for Turkey and cannot be closed. The future of Turkey is neither a theocratic state model nor a primitive Middle East socialism. (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 11.7.1994).

According to him, there is no left-right polarisation in Turkey anymore. Rather the ‘old’ opposed to the ‘new’, that is a statism which advocates maintenance of the status quo, opposed to integration in the global economy.

He argues that it is ridiculous to obstruct privatization in 1994 and to struggle for the existence of SEEs, and to present this as progressiveness despite all the experiences of the world (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 11.7.1994).

Another column entitled “If the obstructions continue, this (privatization) will not last” states that:
“Let’s stop misleading ourselves. It is not meaningful to object to privatization for silly reasons...when all the world is working very hard to get rid of state enterprises” (Erdogan Alkan, Milliyet, 10.10.1994).

The idea that ‘all the world, even socialist countries are privatizing’ is a very common theme in these editorials and columns. It assumes the naturalness and unavoidability of privatization as a global necessity. It is linked with an emphasis on Turkey’s delay in privatizing state enterprises.

One column argues that the old socialist countries could only start to talk about privatization after the 1990s, but some of them started privatization quickly and have gone even further than Turkey” (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994).

Another column in the same newspaper states that the privatization of SEEs, which made the economy ‘bankrupt’, should not be obstructed because of ideas that ‘can no longer be encountered even in Moscow and Beijing’ (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 11.7.1994).

It seems that the ‘collapse’ of the socialist countries reinforces these ideas. One claims that Turkey is a socialist country:

Ercan İnan from Sabah asks:

“Let’s see when Turkey will be freed from being socialist?” (Ercan İnan, Sabah, 8.6.1994).

Here, socialism is presented as anti-democratic, and the people who are opposed to privatization are attacked under the assumption that they are socialist and, as an automatic result of this, undemocratic.

Mümtaz Soysal is a personalised target in these editorials and columns, although he is not a socialist. He is seen as the main obstacle to privatization and described as “the current prophet of the religion of statism” (Muharrem Karsh, Milliyet, 3.10.1994)

In fact, he is used as the embodiment of other enemies.
Cengiz Çandar from Sabah criticises Mümctaz Soysal in the column entitled “The democratization lie of the national left”. Çandar argues that Soysal is not ‘aware of the world’ since Soysal said that he could not feel comfortable with privatization because of the IMF. ‘As if privatization was the idea of IMF’ Çandar adds. He claims that Soysal is

“the last remnant of the mentality of the socialist-communist system which collapsed in 1989-1990 and was consigned to history. The economic mentality of this system was exactly the one Mümctaz Soysal advocates today. Also, that system was insensitive to individual freedom and human rights” (Cengiz Çandar, Sabah, 11.10.1994).

The fact that Mümctaz Soysal is a lecturer has been used in the columns as well:

“Is he not Mümctaz Soysal who has taught for many years that the parliament is a ‘harmony’ institution? In his Constitution lectures, he must have said thousands of times that a member of parliament who does not want to join common responsibility should immediately resign” (Oktay Ekşi, Hürriyet, 18.10.1994).

A column in Hürriyet entitled “Lecturers can not prevent privatization” addresses Mümctaz Soysal and states that with objecting to privatization, in fact Mümctaz Soysal “objects to democracy in Turkey”. He states that people who obstruct privatization know that when the privatization is realised and the state has given up being boss, the people will be boss (Yavuz Gökmen, Hürriyet, 16.9.1994).

Güngör Mengi of Sabah, after the annulment of the authority law, reacted very strongly in an aggressive way by focusing on Mümctaz Soysal:

“Ten thousands of hidden unemployed who work in the public sector, to be more exact, who do not work at all, and are fed by our taxes from the state treasury, should make a statue of lecturer Mümctaz Soysal by collecting one hundred lira each from this month’s salaries...like the father of Cuba, Castro, like Kim Il Sung...These fossils who put on the progressive mask should only remain in history books”.

He describes ‘these fossils’ with these characteristics:

Those ‘who suppose that the social state means producing pyjamas, shoes, tea, milk, meat’, those ‘trade dinosaurs who can not renew the technology since they
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do not make a profit’, those who use SEEs like ‘the private farm of the party’, and
‘feed many partisans from that farm’.

He argues that there are few people who ‘advocate the corrupted statist economy’
aside from ‘despots who do not have any aim except sustaining their dictatorship,
and in third world democracies the people’s flatterers who do not have the
creativity needed for the competitive market’. “Soysal and his like-minded friends
are making a mistake”. He declares that there is a large group which uses the
advantages of the state, and they are the ‘millstone’ of the economy and politics.
He asserts that M. Soysal and his friends are supporting these ‘parasites’ because
of their concerns about votes (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 22.7.1994).

These obstructions are seen as causing a delay in privatization, and parliament is
requested to speed up the process:

“...even the Constitution Court is not an excuse anymore. If this obligation which we
have been supporting but not realising for ten years is put off one or two years more,
the dimension of the disaster will enlarge”(Güngör Mengi, “Sabah Diyör ki,
16.6.1994).

4. Addressing the Parliament for the Enactment of the Law

The idea of being late was repeated 57 times, and of being slow was repeated 28
times according to the results of the content analysis of the news. This is
emphasised and became a repeated theme, especially before the enactment of the
law, in the editorials and the columns:

“Turkey is wasting time in privatizing, time is as valuable as gold, the time for
privatization will never return. Everyday which has been lost is written in the column
of debts. These debts are accumulating and making the country bankrupt”(Ertuğrul
Özkök, Hürriyet, 10.8.1994).

“Every day which has been delayed adds 510 billion TL to the bills as SEE losses, as
interest expenses as a result of being unable to privatize”(Şeref Oğuz, Milliyet,
10.4.1995).

“When we look at the adventure of privatization, we see that the process is not
short...However, when we look at the results and the achieved end in this long
process, it becomes obvious that we are moving at snail’s pace” (Osman Arolat, 9.7.1994, Diinya).

In another column, we can see the same expression:

“Moving towards privatization at snail’s pace has another reflection in the stock-market” (Ercan İnan, Sabah, 8.6.1994).

The editorials and columns analysed diagnose the other reasons for the delay, and show solutions. N. Demirkent, in the editorial of Dünya, states that the path the government followed was illegal, so the main problem is the coalition government:

“...The TPP-SDP (True Path Party-Social Democratic Populist Party) coalition government is not the fate of this country. TPP should realise that SDP, which is being weakened, is a tie” (Nezih Demirkent, Dünya 12.7.1994).

This idea is clearer in his other editorials. In one editorial, he targets the Prime Minister Çiller and states:

“...it is obvious that there is no chance for Çiller to deal with these things with this partner” (be means SHP-Social Democratic Populist Party) (Nezih Demirkent, Dünya 10.9.1994).

Other editorials and columns instruct the government about privatization especially after the annulment of the authority law, by stressing the need for a law on privatization:

Hasan Cemal mentions the importance of privatization despite the fact that the Constitution Court obstructed the attempts of privatization, and adds:

“If a legal frame was prepared properly, the result would be different” (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 23.7.1994).

He says in another column that:

“Let’s not sacrifice privatization with partisan tactics. Our economy and so our people are losing out” (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.10.1994).

Following the Constitution Court’s decision which states that privatization will be considered illegal when it is done on the basis of the authority law, the Sabah’s
editorial states that every month which is lost risks the benefits of privatization. It emphasises that there is a need for an urgent solution to facilitate privatization.

"... we need to see an enactment of a law on privatization. The Prime Minister can enact this law by sitting one day in parliament until midnight, of course if her aim is to make privatization, not to seek an excuse" (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 22.7.1994).

Güngör Mengi addresses the same issue in “The end of the road”:

“Parliament has to enact the privatization law in September, because we have come to the end of the road, and the end of patience”(Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 25.8.1994).

Before the decision on the law, Ertuğrul Özkök wrote in his column under the large headline “Yes for the White Revolution”:

“I decided to write although today is not my day for writing. The reason is simple. Today, in 72 hours, Turkey will enter a very important, if this is the correct word, a ‘historical’ decision making process”.

Like others, he points out that the countries around Turkey which have realised privatization, have made big steps in their economies:

“If they can not enact the law, Turkey will remain a Third World country with an unnamed old fashioned socialist economy...”.

Then he continues:

“This is why the following 72 hours are of great importance to the fate of Turkey, for the quality of life of the next generations, and for integration with Europe...Also I invite all members of the parliament to this historical mission” (Ertuğrul Özkök, Hürriyet, 25.10.1994).

This extract taken from the editorial of Özkök shows that privatization is of vital importance.

Another column addresses the oppositional parties by saying that signing it will not mean giving credit to the government. He states that they should sign it since they believe in it. He addresses them:

“Do not worry gentlemen. We are here. We are witnesses. You are the essential owners of the idea of privatization. Lift your fingers, let’s finish this matter...What
will happen to the interests of the country? Thus, we advise insight for both sides. Turkey does not have any patience to delay even one day. Enough" (Rauf Tamer, Hürriyet, 25.10.1994).

Some editorials and columns in Sabah and Hürriyet worked as a kind of lobby for the enactment of the law, although it is explained with common sense by people in the column in Sabah one day after the law.

Asaf Savaş Akat in his column entitled “A historical step on the way to privatization” states that the ‘symbolic value of the law is very high’:

“It indicates that the Turkish economy will keep on with the process that started in the 1980s, of integration with the world”.

The enactment of the law, according to him, shows the power of the wave of ‘democratization and modernization’. He also claims that

‘the enactment of the law shows that the common sense of people, their aspirations of ease and welfare can affect the parliament’ (Asaf Savaş Akat, Sabah, 25.11.1994).

5. After the Law

The extracts from the editorials and columns written after the law will be considered by looking for differences in the ideas and in the emphases after the law. It was mentioned above that the way in which the issue of unemployment was addressed differed before the law and after the law.

After the law, Sabah’s editorial drew attention to the great anticipations of the people who were fed up with the problems of subsistence of their life and says that:

“Therefore the thing that should be done is not to provoke excessive anticipations in the society, on the contrary to reduce these anticipations to a realistic level” (Güngör Mengi, Sabah, 26.11.1994).

Although most of them worked as if they were carrying out lobbying activities, the editorials and columns have a more cautious position after the law on privatization was enacted. This is also clear from the titles of the editorials and columns:

“The law has been enacted, but...”
"The enactment of the privatization law is of course important, but..."

"Is the Privatization Law a Miracle Solution?",

"Correct messages, correct anticipation".

The ideas in these editorials and columns will be summarised in order, with extracts taken from each one.

In his editorial Nezih Demirkent states that the law is necessary, but the application is more important:

"The Privatization Law is an important event for the history of the economy. However, history is not always full of successes" (Nezih Demirkent, Dİnya, 25.10.1994).

In his column Hasan Cemal states that:

"The law should not be underestimated. However, it should not be seen as a magic wand at the same time!" (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.11.1994).

Osman Ulagay replies to the title of his column "Is Privatization Law a Miracle Solution?"

"No! This is not only my personal idea. Many people, native people, foreigners who are closely interested in privatization, have the same idea" (Osman Ulagay, Milliyet, 28.10.1994).

Another column uses the word 'miracle' as well:

"Privatization is not the miracle medicine that we anticipated, it can not save Turkey itself...privatization is a tool for long term social transformation....So we are privatizing in order to save our future, not our today. Getting results from privatization and producing benefits depend on securing economic reforms and stability...Privatization should not be shown as a miracle medicine. Our agenda and targets force us to give messages which enable us to perceive privatization as a natural part of a process full of hardships and sacrifices"(Korkmaz İkorur, Milliyet, 20.11.1994).

Although the law was presented as a miracle solution for all problems before, after the enactment of the law, as this column suggests, it is the time for hardships and sacrifices again for the people. As seen earlier, the inevitability of the dismissal of workers appeared as a suggestion after the law.

This means that most of the newspapers continued their duty as a justifier of the so called stabilisation programmes (seen in the chapter four). It can be argued that most Turkish newspapers work to solve the crisis of the capitalist state by serving to prevent legitimation crises in an era in which capital is accumulated differently.
6. Conclusion

When this analysis is compared with that of the previous chapter, it can be seen that the editorials and columns contain more political dimensions than the news. The news is written on the basis of the sources who mostly gave technical explanations about the process. Privatization in the news was considered in a narrow sense as an economic and technical issue. Also there were no significant differences in the news between the newspapers, whereas here it is possible to observe the differences. However, these differences do not have a wide range, rather two polarities. Although it is possible to see different ideas in the same newspaper - apart from Sabah and Cumhuriyet - as a result of the greater autonomy of column writers as opposed to the journalists who are tied up with the news production dynamics as seen in the earlier chapter, there are two main discourses found in this chapter. Sabah and Cumhuriyet clearly show these two main discourses on privatization.

All these extracts from the editorials and columns, except the ones in Cumhuriyet, show that Turkish elite journalists mainly support privatization and present the market as the source of efficiency, profit, employment, pure and clean politics, democracy, integration with Europe...etc.

According to the analysis, Sabah is the biggest supporter of privatization. Dünya, as an economics newspaper, considers the issue as something technical, and an issue of expertise, and is not as involved in party politics as the others. Hürriyet and Milliyet adopt supportive positions which are balanced by the columns of Mümünz Soysal in Hürriyet, and the more social democrat character of Milliyet. Zaman, which is supported by the Islamic Fethullah sect, is again pro-market and pro-privatization.

Some editorials and columns which advocate privatization try to activate the parliament and to affect its decisions with their articles. It is mainly Sabah which leads the government to hasten privatization. The editorials and columns in Sabah indicate to the government that the solution is to enact a law. They present the law
as a very vital step for Turkey until the enactment, and then they have a mission to reduce the high expectations and excitement of the public after the law.

For the supporters of privatization, including mainly the ones from Sabah, privatization is necessary to deal with the negativities in the economy. The SEEs are referred to in that sense as burdens or millstones with their losses and inefficiency by employing parasitic workers. The SEEs are presented as the reason for all problems not only the budget deficits or inflation, but also for Turkey being closed to the world. Thus, privatization is advocated not only to end the negative things in the economy (like the SEEs), but at the same time to achieve the positive things and ideals.

While there are reasons given for privatization in the sense of the elimination of some negative features in the economy, privatization is seen as desirable for these reasons, it is also framed as the inevitable, almost obligatory, thing in order to integrate with the rest of the world. The developments in the socialist block, hence the discourse of the ‘triumph’ of capitalism, strengthen the pro-privatization discourse with the emphasis of ‘all the world is doing the same’. The statism principle of Kemalism is criticised while globalization is stressed. In fact, the idea of integration with the global world is already consistent with the general target of Kemalism to reach the modern and civilised level. Thus, the popular and desirable discourses such as modernization and globalization are used together to advocate the change in the capitalist development through privatization.

There is a linear development in the pro-privatization editorials and columns: firstly privatization, then democracy and integration with the EU. In other words, free market, liberal democracy and integration with the global market.

The more critical accounts, which mainly take place in Cumhuriyet question the discourse on the SEEs by focusing on the policies of the government concerning SEEs. They do not say that they are against privatization. This can be understood to some extent since being against privatization brings all negative definitions such as being old fashioned, statist, anti-democratic, closed to the world, anti-European, anti-progress. Nevertheless, the critical accounts restrict themselves and mostly talk about the issues or the agenda which were already set up by the pro-
privatization arguments. When they reply to these ideas, mainly that SEEs should be eliminated, they argue that these are the outcome of the mistaken or consciously wrong policies. Although they show the main reasons for the situation of the SEEs, they do not offer solutions or voice others’ solutions for the reform of the SEEs.

They consider democracy differently from above. They do not consider it as the outcome of privatization, but they see democracy as something to balance the inadequacy of privatization. Thus, it happens that privatization is approved of silently for democracy.

These discourses and their significance in the current conditions in Turkey and in the world will be elaborated in the next chapter, which concludes the thesis.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

The claim that 'liberalization in economy brings liberalization in politics', which was pronounced in the 1980s 'liberal' environment following the military coup, has been maintained in the 1990s with the emphasis on privatization and European integration. The main aim of this thesis has been to explore the operation of this ideological discourse in the contemporary Turkish press by showing how this link between liberal economy and democracy has been constituted using broader discourses, such as modernization and globalization.

The thesis traced the dynamics which constitute and spread these discourses on a national and global scale. It investigated the structure of the media industries in which the meanings are produced, and the news production process, by investigating the daily practices of the media professional. By analysing public communication, it examined how these discourses are constructed by privileging some choices in the political economy; which mechanisms they use to achieve hegemony; how the state and market are presented; whether different discourses, apart from the liberal one, exist, and if so, in which ways.

A context for the examination of the discourses was provided by tracing the dynamics which generated them. This was carried out by looking at the changes in the global political economy and in the Turkish historical context.

The ideas which consider the development of capitalism as a condition for democracy were traced in the first part of the thesis by starting from modernization theories and moving to more recent globalization theories. It was argued that the globalization theories have many similarities with the early modernization theories in terms of their assumption that capitalism will bring democracy. The difference is that modernization theories held the concept of development as being something good, whereas globalization theories expressed the 'victory' of capitalism more assertively as inevitable and the only alternative in the global era. In addition to criticising their common theme, namely the causal relationship between capitalist development and democracy, the thesis also included the ideas which challenge the
huge assumption of globalization theorists that the declining nation-state obeys the dictates of globalization.

One of these challenges emphasises the competitive character of the nation-state, or the changing competitive strategies of the states. This approach was criticised in the thesis as making a dichotomy of the state and market. The second challenge was considered more developed since it does not make the mistake of establishing dichotomies such as the state and market, or the nation-state and globalization, and it stresses the capitalist character of the state by considering it as strong in the political sense.

The modernization and globalization story of Turkey has provided a specific case to exemplify the discussions. The principles of Kemalism with a special focus on statism, the period of the DP government in which the end of statism was claimed, and the military coups, were taken as the major turning points in order to provide a background to evaluate the liberalism claims after the 1980s, which were the immediate concern of this thesis. The ideas which argue that economic liberalism brings political liberalism or autonomization of civil society were questioned. The continuing strong character of the state in Turkey after the 1980s when the liberal economic policies started to be applied, was pointed out. The continuing interference of the military in political life in different ways was also mentioned.

While the connection made between democracy and liberal economic policies in the 1980s exists also in the 1990s, there are new elements, such as privatization of the state economic enterprises, membership of the Customs Union, and the European Union. In the 1990s, the extension of the liberal economic policies including privatization has been seen as essential to the development of democracy, which would be a requirement for membership of the European Union. These were the issues which were elaborated on through the textual analysis of the news, editorials and columns in the Turkish press.

Before looking at the operation of the ideology in the press, the media industry and the news production dynamics in which the meanings are produced were investigated. It was found through the interviews with journalists and the editors that the daily practices of news making were almost identical in the different
newspapers with the same substantive constraints such as editorial control, professional socialisation and professional values. Although the first of these constraints, the editorial control, is recognised by the journalists, the others operate more indirectly, either being taken for granted or remaining unquestioned most of the time. In addition to the restraints imposed by the current situation in the media industry, particularly as a result of the current concentrated and conglomerated structure, the news production process itself adds new restraints and further limits to the news coverage.

It can be seen from the analysis of the news on privatization that the actors in the news are mostly politicians, businessmen, or bureaucrats. Only very few of the actors in the news oppose privatization, and these are mostly from the parliament. The analysis has also shown that most of the news contains supportive statements on privatization. The newspapers in the sample contain predominantly negative descriptions of the state economic enterprises, for example stressing that they 'make a loss'. When the state economic enterprises are evaluated positively, their profit making is again the focus. So, the issue of loss or profit is the key element to assess the state economic enterprises in the news rather than, for example, the quality or the price of the goods and services. The reasons for privatization were focused on less compared to the issue of the state economic enterprises.

The media elites have always been influential in Turkish political life as seen in chapter four. Their influence started with the contribution to the establishment of the Kemalist regime and later the modernization of the country. Their continuing influence can be seen in the analysis of the editorials and columns. Most of those who support the liberalization of the economy work to assist in enacting the law of privatization by addressing the parliament and telling it what to do. After the Constitution Court's annulment of the law which gives authority to the government to carry out privatization, some media elites have urged a new law to be passed. They underline the idea that Turkey is 'wasting time' and that all the world, even the ex-socialist countries, are carrying out privatization. They invite the government to prepare a law, and the parliament to enact it. Neither the news, nor the editorials and columns give as much attention to the issues of what will occur after the law has been passed as they did before the law. In fact, some editorials
and columns convey the message that privatization is not a magic formula and therefore instant dramatic improvements will not occur as a result of it, despite the fact that it was represented as a big hope before its enactment.

Although editorials and columns include more detailed coverage of political elements compared to the news, which frames the issue as an economic, administrative and technical issue by relying on mostly technical explanations of the narrow ranged sources, they exhibit two polarised stances. This polarisation of the debates around statism and liberalism in the newspapers which have more than half of the aggregate circulation, is of a great importance to this thesis.

The origin of this polarisation, liberalism versus statism, can be found in Turkish history with the Kemalist Republican People's Party, and the so-called liberal Democrat Party, and the political system which has developed from their legacies. Although the statism of the RPP is real, the liberalism of the DP and the other subsequent parties, which were inspired by the DP, such as the TPP, remains problematic. As this thesis has tried to show, the statist mentality exists in these parties in the political dimension despite the fact that they have recently rejected statism in economics.

The first pole which can be labelled as statist is embodied in Cumhuriyet whereas the liberal one is mainly represented by Sabah. Statist discourse tends to maintain the status quo without developing anything. The advocates of privatization and a liberal economy not only argue for the negation of the negativity such as state economic enterprises, which are seen as a burden and have many negative effects, but also offer a modern Turkey full of promises. As seen in the analysis of the news, and the editorials and columns, the ideal of modern Turkey which is integrated with the global world is enriched with other positive outcomes of liberalism, such as efficiency, productivity, increased income, profit, economic growth, extension of capital to the masses, increased free competition, foreign capital and investment, and integration with Europe and democracy. Even though it is debatable whether all these developments are positive, at least the liberal discourse puts forward suggestions of possible positive outcomes. On the other hand, when we look at the statist discourse, it can be seen to remain cautious about
privatization, and does not develop a discourse that has a positive target or a solution. It focuses on the legal incoherence, possible negative effects of privatization, and dwells on how to reduce the dangers of privatization. Some statists consider it as an imperialist attack on the Republic by advocating the Kemalist state. When they talk about the issues, they mostly respond to the agenda which was set up by the pro-liberals. For example, while responding to the ideas which argue that SEE’s should be eliminated as they cause all the problems in the economy, from inflation to budget deficit, the statist discourse argues that these are the outcomes of some deliberately wrong policies or a conspiracy, without elaborating on the problems of SEE, or the existing economic system. Predominantly they fail to set up an agenda which questions the main assumptions of the liberals. Although they do not consider democracy as the outcome of privatization, they see it as something to balance the inadequacy of privatization. Thus, privatization is approved of silently for the sake of a few democratic amendments. In some ways, the statist discourse contributes to the ideological connection of privatization and democracy.

The liberal discourse considers privatization as inevitable, and as an obligation in the ‘global’ age. The discourse of globalization is strong in itself, especially with the declaration of the ‘victory’ of capitalism and with the discourse of ‘there is no alternative’. However, the ‘liberal’ editorials and columns do not only rely on the strength of this discourse, but they rationalise and give some reasons for privatization and a liberal economy in a general sense because of the existing statism. Therefore, privatization has been advocated not only as an unavoidable thing, but also as something desirable because of economic, political and even moral reasons including the elimination of the SEEs which are seen as a problem for the economy with their loss and inefficiency, and as a source of surplus employment, bribes and corruption. Also it has been argued that privatization is a tool for achieving integration with Europe and democracy.

The main weakness of the liberal understanding, according to this thesis, derives from i) its assumptions that economic development will bring democracy as an extension of the modernization paradigm, ii) its neglect of political statism, and its
focus only on economic statism, and iii) the idealisation of the market by separating it from the state completely.

It is true that the conditions for freedom have increased, and the diversity of identities have arisen in the centre capitalist countries. However, even there, democracy developed from the contradictions of capitalism as a result of popular struggles rather than being a natural extension of capitalism. The link between capitalism and democracy has been maintained more assertively for the peripheral countries by some modernization theorists. According to their formulation, the issue of democracy is postponed on the understanding that it will appear as a natural outcome of the market. Thus, the only way to develop democracy, from this perspective, would be to support a liberal economy since it is believed that this will naturally and spontaneously produce democratic developments. There are different resistances in Turkey with the movements of Kurdish, leftist, women's, Islamic...etc. groups. However, they do not exist and operate comfortably as extensions of liberalism. They are in conflict with the state in different ways; some have to work illegally since there is little chance to work legally due to the violence of the state.

The challenging of Kemalism by liberalism is restricted to the economic role of the state; it does not include the political role. Liberals criticise statism when the state restricts the economy. Democracy is seen to appear as the outcome of the development of the market. It is not the first or even the main target. If not seen as an extension of the economic changes in the final stage, democracy here is construed as a pragmatic tool for facilitating the operation of the market rather than as a project which counters the political pressure of the state. In fact, many of the editorials and columns analysed supported the development of democracy in order to correct Turkey's record on human rights in order to prevent it being an obstacle for the integration of Turkey into the global market via the Customs Union and the European Community.

The editorials and columns which endorse liberalism consider the market not only as the source of economic development, with increased efficiency, profit, and so on, but also as the source of pure and clean politics, democracy and integration
with Europe. In fact, this idealisation of the market derives from the separation of the market and the state, which is the main fault with this polarisation. These two, liberalism or statism, or market or state, are not separate from each other. Although there is a general transformation from national development to integration with the global world, it is not the state versus globalization; the state is still at work. This was discussed in detail in the section on the role of the state against globalization along with the claims of the withering state in chapter two.

To claim the separation of the state and market becomes more difficult in Turkey’s case. Firstly, it is hard to make that claim in the political economic circumstances of the country, particularly because of the peculiar condition of the bourgeoisie. In fact, the bourgeoisie was created in the 1920s and supported in the 1930s by the state through encouraging regulations and policies and other devices. Secondly, even the liberal discourse, which is linked with the globalization discourse, has a Kemalist statist character which is already consistent with the new global discourse. Initially, it may appear rather contradictory since one of the principles of Kemalism is statism, and this principle is challenged by privatization and other economic changes in the global era. However, when the overall nature of Kemalism, namely the aims of modernization and civilisation are considered, it can be seen that the new global discourse which discredits statism in an economic sense still has the same target of Kemalism. In this thesis, the existence of the same elements or common patterns in the discourse of liberals has been noted. It is essential to emphasise this continuity of the statist mentality for creating different projects.

The market is not a guarantee of developing all democratic, anti-statist elements. It can contain elements that have negative effects on democracy, as has been seen very clearly with the examples provided by the recent actions of the big media groups. As seen in chapter four, big media groups get hidden payments from the Prime Minister in addition to the common economic support mechanisms like official advertisements, the advertisements of state institutions, using credit from state banks, and investment promotions. The return for these payments can be seen as support for: the government; economic stabilisation policies; political party or political candidates; and embracing the government’s policy or even the military
view when the issue is of national interests. The private media can threaten democracy with their concentrated and conglomerated structure. Media owners being involved in other businesses and at the same time the holdings owners being involved in the media sector lead them to promote their other businesses by using the media; limiting the issues that would be news, or distorting them as a result of their commercial interests. The media bosses aggregate their power for maximising their commercial profit through advertisements, and other strategies for competition, as can be seen from the examples given previously.

Attributing all positive and democratising characteristics to the private sector by representing the issue as the dichotomy of the state and the media in Turkey has been a strategy used frequently by the private media in recent times. The large media groups have used the discourse of press freedom even when their economic profits are under threat as a result of the regulations of the state. The discourse of press freedom is very common and powerful in Turkey in an environment in which the citizens can not fully exercise their rights and freedom because of the strong state. The state being strong prevents the development of the understandings of citizenship and ‘public’ e.g., public interest, public communication, and in some sense contributes to a view of the market as a democratic alternative. The popularity of private TV with an illusion of democracy and diversity, is a good example of this situation. The private channels which emerged in 1990 have declared themselves and have been seen as the voice of diversity in a context which was dominated by the state, if not government, broadcasting of TRT. Thus, in comparison with the TRT channels, they have been called champions of democracy.

Since it postpones democracy as an outcome of the market or considers it as a tool to facilitate the market, in the reality of Turkey today liberalism is far from achieving free and equal conditions for the citizens from a strong statism which pervades all aspects of life. It seems that the liberal project designed for Turkey aims to bring about a policy change by eliminating the potential of the state to distribute welfare, whilst at the same time not including any proposal to reduce the political power of the state over its citizens.
This thesis challenges both liberal and statist conceptualisations which limit the issue around these two poles. Therefore, it does not suggest supporting state against liberal conceptualisation, but instead stresses the need to develop a concept of public in Turkey as something different from the state and market. As long as the pressure of the state on citizens is reduced and citizenship is revealed initially by removing the legal restrictions, democracy can be strengthened, not through privatization, or for the sake of integration with Europe. This will focus on citizenship and democracy as an end rather than as an extension of capitalist economic development or as a tool to increase economic profits, or achieve integration with global capital. The media as a key holder in the political communication process can work in the direction of developing citizenship and democracy by providing a broader range of information to the public.

Suggestions for Further Research

As seen throughout the thesis, for the examination of the discourses, this research mainly relied on the newspapers as the medium of public communication. Since communication is not only limited to the newspapers, but includes magazines, radio, television, the internet etc, there are many other areas to be examined in future research. In particular, the news coverage on TV channels merits further research especially in view of the present popularity of television. This could not be included in this research due to bureaucratic difficulties in accessing the archives of the state channel TRT, and the lack of archiving in the private TV channels during the period in which the research was conducted.

This study considered the political economic context with global and local dimensions, the media structure, the working practices of media professionals and the newspaper text, but did not include the readers of the newspapers, mainly because of the insufficient literature on readers and the time constraints in developing a framework for such a study. How the newspaper readers and TV audiences interpret meanings deserves special attention in further studies since they are a constituent part of the communication process.

The textual analysis in this study focused on the investigation of meaning through the examination of themes, actors, and political arguments. Textual analysis can be
used in further research to investigate the formal characteristics of text such as grammatical features through linguistic methods. The closer focus on the sentence structures, use of tenses and narrative can be made by taking each item, e.g. the news, editorial, or column, as a whole from the beginning to the end rather than giving extracts from some parts. However, the number of the items analysed will be reduced in this way, and it will be difficult to draw out more general characteristics.

This research has dealt with a large quantity of data, especially in terms of the news, editorials and columns, but it is based on a case study. Although it gives clues to understanding the triangular relationship between the state, market and media, with concrete examples, further studies which search different dimensions and use different techniques are needed in order to understand and explain this triangle further, and to develop the theories of political communication.

I have focused on the investigation of the mainstream discourses. Further research could investigate the radical, alternative or marginal voices through their media. Or, if they do not have their own media, the way in which these groups contact, and use the mainstream media to transmit their ideas, could be investigated. This can be done through interviews conducted with the representatives and members of the pressure groups. Also, the relationship between these groups and the media can be investigated in the media institutions themselves. For this investigation, the technique should be different from the one used in the current research, since obtaining information through interviews on this issue would be difficult and insufficient. A participant observation in the media institutions would provide more information on the relationship between pressure groups and the media. However, this technique does not work retrospectively, therefore cannot be used for the specific issues or events which have passed.

The participant observation technique could better explain the operation of the media institutions. It can also tell more about the autonomy and resistance of media professionals, which merits further research in order to lead to some change in the
exploitation of their labour and to empower them in the increasingly powerful and concentrated media institutions.

Despite all the limitations of a case study in explaining the wider phenomenon, it is hoped that by investigating how ideology is used to limit the economic policies by asserting that capitalism is the only way, this thesis makes a contribution to the ideas which focus on the development of democracy in Turkey and the creation of a just society and of alternative ways of living.
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Appendix 1

İhlas Group
APPENDIX

Erol Aksoy Group

EROL AKSOY
SHOW GROUP

EUROPE&AMERICA HOLDING

FINANCE
- FACTOFINANCE RENT
- IKTISAT FINANCE RENT
- M.S.M MALİYE COM.

TOURISM
- EDATUR

MEDIA
- AKS TV
- ALO-SHOW
- MEPAS MEDIA MARKETING
- ULUSLARARASI MODA PUBLISHING
- MARIE CLAIRE
- SHOW RADIO

ATLAS FINANCE RENT
- IKTISAT BANK
- 2 BANKS in France and U.S.A.

INSURANCE
- EMEK INSURANCE
- EMEK HAYAT INSURANCE

EKTISAT
- CINE 5 FILM PRODUCTION
- EKSEN PUBL.H.DIST.
- UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING
- SHOW TV

CHARITY
- EROL AKSOY VAKFI

MARKETING
- SHOW-PA
*They are preparing to publish a daily newspaper currently
Appendix 2

Coding Schedule for the Content Analysis of the News

I. Number

II. Newspaper
1.) Sabah
2.) Hürriyet
3.) Milliyet
4.) Cumhuriyet
5.) Zaman
6.) Dünya

III. Date
01.) 23-29 May
02.) 6-12 June
03.) 20-26 June
04.) 4-10 July
05.) 18-24 July
06.) 1-7 August
07.) 15-21 August
08.) 24 August-4 September
09.) 12-18 September
10.) 26 September-2 October
11.) 10-16 October
12.) 24-30 October
13.) 7-13 November
14.) 21-27 November
15.) 5-11 December
16.) 19-25 December
17.) 2-8 January
18.) 16-22 January
19.) 30 January-5 February
20.) 13-19 February
21.) 27 February-5 March
22.) 13-19 March
23.) 27 March-2 April
24.) 10-16 April
25.) 24-30 April
26.) 8-14 May
27.) 22-28 May

IV. Stage in the process:
1.) Pre-privatization
2.) After privatization
3.) Cancellation of privatization
9.) Unspecified

V. Sectors:
01.) Airline
02.) Automotive
03.) Banking and insurance
04.) Catering
05.) Cement
06.) Education
APPENDIX

07.) Electricity
08.) Electronics
09.) Energy
10.) Forestry
11.) Health
12.) Housing
13.) Meat-fish
14.) Metal
15.) Mining
16.) Petrochemical
17.) Petroleum marketing
18.) Petroleum refineries
19.) Sea freight
20.) Social security
21.) Supermarket chain
22.) Steel
23.) Telecommunication
24.) Textile
25.) Tourism
26.) Trade
27.) Tyre
28.) Farming
29.) Other
30.) Unclear
31.) Not any sector.

VI. Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Main</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-privatization</td>
<td>Anti-privatization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.) President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02.) Prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>03.) Deputy prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>04.) Mümtaz Soysal (member of the SDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>05.) Yekta Güngör Özden (The Head of the Constitution Court)</td>
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<tr>
<td>06.) TPP members</td>
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<td>07.) SDP members</td>
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<td>08.) MP members</td>
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<td>09.) WP members</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.) RPP members</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.) DLP members</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12.) Heads or spokesman of the administrative bodies of privatization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13.) Managers of SEEs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14.) Business people/companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.) Economists</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.) International finance experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17.) Academics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18.) Heads or spokesman of occupational associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19.) Officers of local government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20.) Heads or spokesman of trade unions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.) Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22.) International businessman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23.) Treasury experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24.) Technicians</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25.) Ministers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX

Institutions
26.) Parliament
27.) Administrative bodies of privatization
28.) Business organisations
29.) International finance institutions
30.) Universities
31.) Constitution Court
32.) KIGEM (The Centre for Developing Public Enterprising)
33.) Trade unions
34.) Occupation associations
35.) Other government institutions
98) Other
99) Unclear
00) Not anybody or any institutions
APPENDIX

VII. Themes of the news:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons/Aims of privatization</td>
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<tr>
<td>01.) To end the SEEs burden on budget deficit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>02.) To end the SEEs other negative effects on economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.) To obtain income</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>04.) To increase profit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>05.) To increase efficiency and productivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>06.) To increase economic growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>07.) To develop infrastructural investments and technology</td>
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<td>08.) To increase social justice by extending capital to people</td>
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<tr>
<td>09.) To bring better quality of products and services for the consumers</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.) To bring cheaper products and services for the consumers</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.) To provide new employment opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.) To bring free competition, liberal economy by decentralising the state power in economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.) To decentralise the state power over the citizens in the political area by bringing democratisation as a complementary element of liberal democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.) To decrease inflation</td>
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<td>15.) To fasten foreign capital and foreign investments</td>
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<td>16.) To integrate with Europe economically</td>
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<td>17.) To bring European values of democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.) SEEs should not be privatized</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.) SEEs should be privatized because of the interests of workers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>98.) Other</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>99.) Unclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>00.) Not any reason or aim.</td>
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State Economic Enterprises (SEEs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.) SEEs making loss</td>
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<tr>
<td>02.) Incompetent managers of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>03.) Old technology of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>04.) Stopped investments of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>05.) Expensive products and services of SEEs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>06.) Low quality products and services of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>07.) Interference of the government or politicians in the operation of SEEs by leading to excess employment for the political interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>08.) Interference in SEEs by the government or politicians through frequent changing of the managers and staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>09.) Interference of the government or politicians on the operation of SEEs by controlling SEEs budget and using it in other areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.) Corruption SEEs</td>
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<td>11.) Too high wages of SEE workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.) The laziness of SEE workers</td>
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<td>13.) Deprivation from state credits</td>
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<td>14.) Debt</td>
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<td>15.) Cheap product and services of SEEs</td>
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<td>16.) High quality product and services of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.) Investments of SEEs</td>
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<td>18.) Making profits of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.) Privatization of SEEs should have happened sooner</td>
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<td>20.) Valuable fields of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.) Inefficiency and unproductivity of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.) The slowness of the privatization of SEEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.) Efficiency and productivity of SEEs</td>
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<td>24.) Their becoming burden for the economy</td>
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<td>98.) Other</td>
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<td>99.) Unclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>00.) Nothing about SEEs</td>
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APPENDIX

Effects of privatization
01.) Selling cheaper than its value and obtaining less income with privatization
02.) Too high expenses for the organisation and the announcement of the privatization
03.) Legal errors in sales
04.) Administrative mistakes done in organisation
05.) Malpractices and disorders in the sales
06.) The mistakes about the priorities of the SEEs to be privatized
07.) The mistakes of sale of the SEEs which make profit
08.) The sectoral unsuitability of privatizing some SEEs in terms of national interests
09.) The sectoral unsuitability of privatizing some SEEs in terms of market’s incapability.
10.) Inconsistency with the principles of social state
11.) Unemployment of workers
12.) Reduction in wages
13.) Workers losing their unions
14.) Early retirement of workers
15.) Decrease in efficiency
16.) Increase in injustice
17.) Low quality products and services
18.) More expensive products and services
19.) Decline in production and efficiency
20.) Production cessation in the privatized SEEs
21.) Decrease in investments and technology
22.) Decrease in economic growth
23.) Monopolisation and cartelisation tendencies
24.) Expansion of imperialism
25.) Insufficient flow of foreign capital and investments
26.) Obtaining income from the sales
27.) Increase in profit
28.) Increase in efficiency and productivity
29.) Increase in economic growth
30.) Increase in investment-technology
31.) Speeding up the flow of foreign capital and investment
32.) Increase of better quality of products and services
33.) Increase in social justice
34.) Increase in cheaper products and services
35.) Economic integration with Europe
36.) Increase in employment
37.) Trade union’s losing becoming owner of the SEEs
38.) Monopolization of foreign companies
39.) Trade union’s losing their function after their ownership
40.) Privatized SEEs making loss
41.) That buyers do not follow their responsibilities
42.) Extension of capital to people
43.) Development of free market and competition
48.) Other
98.) Unclear
00.) Nothing as effects of privatization

Legal Issues
1.) The abolition of the authority law
2.) The abolition of the legal manifestos
3.) Bill
4.) Law
5.) Changes in the law
6.) Special arrangements for some SEEs
7.) Legal cases of the cancelled sales
98.) Other
99.) Unclear
00.) Nothing about legal issues
## Appendix 3

**CODING SHEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE NUMBER</th>
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<tr>
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