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A Discursive Analysis of Prejudice and Moral Exclusion: Romanian Talk of Nationhood, Difference and ‘Others’

By

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the particulars of prejudiced discourse regarding the two main ethnic minorities in the Romanian socio-cultural context, the Hungarian and the Romany minority. The thesis aims at comparing and contrasting the way Romanians talk about the Hungarians with the way they talk about the Romanies on a series of interviews on controversial social and political issues surrounding ethnic minorities.

It examines in detail the discourse of middle-class Romanian professionals taking up different ideological subject positions on the issue of the avowed support for the extremist policies of the representatives of the Romanian right-wing towards ethnic minorities. A comparison is made between participants 'supporting', 'ambivalent' and those 'opposing' this kind of policies to see whether there are differences in the way participants use prejudiced discourse across the ideological spectrum in talk about the Hungarians, on one hand and the Romanies, on the other. The analytic discussion ranges from investigating the dynamics links between nationalism, politics and prejudice within a various set of discourses and discursive resources of 'nationhood' and 'difference' in the case of the Hungarian minority to the investigation of a shift to discourses of 'nature' and 'moral exclusion' in as far as the Romanies are concerned.

The analysis, inspired by a critical discursive approach examines the construction of stereotypical ideological representations of both minority groups together with a concern for the located construction of otherness. The analysis suggests that talk about Romanies is more extreme than talk about the Hungarians, more extreme than the anti-alien, anti-immigrant prejudiced talk studied by numerous Western (critical) researchers. It is more extreme because Romanies are not merely portrayed as being 'different', but also as being beyond the moral order, beyond nationhood, difference and comparison. Talk about Romanies employs a style, which, at the same time, denies, but also protects extreme prejudice.

The thesis concludes by raising some implications of this kind of analysis and approach for the discursive social psychological study of different kinds of prejudice. Questions for future analysis relate to a different conceptualisation of stereotypes and stereotyping, the study of political ideologies and the details of extreme prejudiced talk.
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Chapter one

Introduction

Introducing the thesis

During the last years of the twentieth century, issues of prejudice and racism have been at the centre of the attention of the Western and non-Western mind. The repeated ethno-nationalistic tensions in Eastern Europe together with the ethnic conflicts in the Middle East and recent (and not so recent) controversies concerning race, racism, multiculturalism and issues related to immigration in Western Europe and elsewhere have captured the imagination of social scientists from all over the world. Since their conception, the social sciences have felt that they have something very important to say about ‘solving’ the problem of prejudice and racism, about tackling prejudice and racism as important ‘social issues’.

Psychologists (and social psychologists) have sought to describe and explain the nature of prejudice by focusing on different elements that were believed to be part and parcel of the phenomenon of prejudice. Issues related to personality, information processing, social cognition, social identity etc. were considered pivotal in understanding the dynamic and ‘essence’ of prejudice and prejudiced thinking.

This thesis argues that, very often, social psychologists have been looking in the wrong place for the essence of prejudice. This thesis will make a case for a reinterpretation of some of the traditional notions used by prejudice researchers in order to open a discussion for an alternative view of analysing prejudice and racism based on the importance of discourse, discursive practices and ideological representations. This thesis aims to show how prejudice can be studied by examining the dynamics and details of talk about ‘others’, but also about one’s own group.

Taking the manifestations of Eastern European prejudice against ethnic minorities very seriously, this thesis aims to investigate the particulars of prejudiced discourse regarding
the two main ethnic minorities in a Romanian socio-cultural context, the Hungarian and the Romany minority. The thesis aims at comparing and contrasting the way Romanians talk about Hungarians with the way they talk about Romanies. It examines Romanian talk of nationhood, prejudice and difference as part of a series of interviews on controversial social issues.

In doing so, it does not start with the assumption that all prejudiced talk is the same. Some discourses of ‘difference’ might be infused with a (local) political dimension and agenda while retaining many of the well-researched features of ascribing critical stereotypes to ‘others’. Some other discourses of ‘difference’ might work by morally excluding ‘others’ and placing them beyond the moral order. The present thesis can be seen as an attempt to understand the discursive dynamics of talking differently about different ethnic minority groups together with a look at their social and ideological effects.

**Overview of chapters**

Chapter two provides a critical review of the literature on prejudice and racism organized around the essential role of the study of stereotypes and stereotyping for the study of prejudice and racism. The chapter starts by reviewing the classical approach to stereotyping followed by a focus on the four most important theoretical and empirical approaches to stereotyping and prejudice: the authoritarian personality approach, the social cognition approach, the social identity and self-categorization approach and the ‘modern’ racism approach. Critical issues will be raised in relation to the five particular approaches to stereotypes and prejudice described in the course of this chapter. Finally, a case is made for an alternative view of analysing prejudice and racism based on the importance of discourse.

Chapter three offers a review of the main theoretical tenets and approaches drawn upon in the thesis. It reviews the main discourse analytic approaches to the language of prejudice (such as discursive psychology, critical discourse analysis and critical discursive social psychology) and introduces the main contextual (theoretical and empirical) background for the analytic chapters. This chapter raises, among others, two specific theoretical issues around the discursive analysis of stereotyping, prejudice and racism. On one hand, this
chapter has emphasised the importance of studying prejudice and extreme prejudice through the study of discourse. On the other hand, this chapter places a special emphasis on the ideological dimension of discourse and the importance of studying the workings of ideology in text and talk. A discussion of ideology (ideologies) as discursively accomplished, the functioning and processes of ideology and the effects of drawing upon ideological representations of social issues and social actors are also concerns of this chapter.

Chapter four provides an historical and political reading of the Romanian socio-cultural context in as far as the Hungarian and the Romany minority are concerned. The first part of the chapter deals with a general historical account of Romania and its experiment with democracy. This is followed by the specific historical and political context surrounding the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, the controversy regarding the ‘national’ problem and interethnic cohabitation. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated entirely to the Romany minority. It covers the post-totalitarian situation of Romanies in Eastern Europe followed by an rather extended account of the historical and political situation of the Romanies in Romania. The chapter closes with a section on social psychological research on the Romanies which includes a review of research from Western Europe and other Eastern European countries and research from Romania.

Chapter five describes the methods and procedures used in this thesis. After an introductory section that points to the gaps in the Romanian socio-psychological literature on prejudice and discrimination (with a special focus on the Romanies) and an orientation to how a focus on extreme prejudiced discourse can make a contribution to Western discursive approaches to the language of prejudice, the chapter continues with two sections: one on the research interview as a general research instrument and one related to discursive psychology and interview research. The chapter closes with a presentation of the materials, data sources and participants.

Chapter six presents an account of the content analysis of the qualitative data used for this study. A short introductory section on content analysis as a research technique is followed by the content analysis itself which sets the stage for the in-depth qualitative analysis. The chapter closes with an orientation to the difficulties and shortcomings of using a content analysis in qualitative research and in as far as interview-talk is concerned.
Chapter seven looks at Romanian talk about the Hungarian minority by documenting some of the subtleties and dynamics of the relation between stereotyping, nation and place. This chapter points to some of the ways in which participants taking different ideological positions managed in a similar way ideological conflicts, how they constructed and justified their position towards the Hungarians and their political project, in an attempt to legitimate specific practices and reproducing the status quo with the range of cultural resources provided by the Romanian culture. The focus is on the discursive and rhetorical moves used by the participants and the collectively available interpretative resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions, such as discounting in-group responsibility, denying prejudice and discrimination or displaying reasonableness. At the same time, this chapter shows that the discourse about Hungarians has much in common with the particularities and emphasis of the Western anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses of 'difference'.

Chapter eight examines the rhetorical and ideological shift from a discourse of 'nationalism' and 'politics' to a discourse of 'nature' and 'moral exclusion' using talk about Romanies as a case in point. It is suggested that talk about Romanies is more extreme than the talk about Hungarians and the anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses studied by Western critical researchers. The aims of this chapter are twofold. On one hand, this chapter illustrates and discusses some of the extreme discursive, rhetorical and interpretative resources used to talk about and legitimate the blaming of Romanies and on the other hand, it documents the constructive ideological processes used to position the Romanies as beyond the moral order. This chapter points to some of the ways in which participants taking different ideological positions use a very similar expression of moral exclusionary discourse, the same axiomatic division between 'us' and 'them' underpinned by an ideology of place, a very similar discourse of 'nature' to blame the Romanies and position them beyond difference and the moral order.

Taking on the analytic 'discoveries' of the two previous chapters, chapter nine complements the analytical insights from these chapters by 'mapping' some other discursive and rhetorical ways through which Romanies are constructed as beyond the moral order and exclusionary discourse is put together. Operating distinctions, setting up contrasts or emphasising similarities between social groups are ways in which one reproduces relations of power between specific groups and moral standing in the world. In
this chapter, it is argued that comparing and contrasting the Romanies with other ethnic minorities on different social dimensions achieves the rhetorical, but also political and ideological effect of presenting Romanies as ‘beyond difference’, beyond the moral order. The end of chapter nine brings to the fore a critique of the issue of the inevitability of prejudice based on its rhetorical dimension. It is argued that if one talks about commonplace prejudiced discourse, one should also talk about common place discourse of toleration and solidarity.

Chapter ten draws together some of the theoretical and empirical threads related to the analysis of prejudice developed in this thesis. The chapter considers their most important implications for the discursive study of prejudice and closes by setting out some questions for future research.
Chapter two
Revisiting the traditional approaches to the study of stereotyping and prejudice

Introduction

Social psychologists have immensely contributed to the existing wealth of knowledge on the issue of prejudice and racism. With perfect regularity, the 'state of knowledge' of social psychological theorizing on prejudice, discrimination and racism is 'assessed' and critically reflected upon in edited volumes (see Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001a for a recent example). Each time that the 'state of theorizing' is called to the fore, the pressing question is how to satisfactorily deal with this 'pressing social issue' and how social psychological knowledge can be put to practical test and service in understanding conflict, discrimination and oppression.

Social psychologists (mainly those coming from 'mainstream' approaches) have usually started (and also ended) their analyses of prejudice and racism by putting forward complex (or not-so-complex) definitions of the phenomenon they were investigating. In this chapter, the concern will not be with listing the various definitions of prejudice, but with the attempts of 'defining' the phenomenon of prejudice through the various theoretical and empirical approaches that have tried to capture the dynamics and subtleties of the prejudice problematic. This chapter is designed to orient the reader to the conventional or traditional theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of prejudice, racism and social conflict.

This review of the literature will be organized around the pivotal role that the study of stereotypes and stereotyping had insofar the study of prejudice and racism was concerned. I will start by reviewing the classical approach to stereotyping and then I will focus on the four most important theoretical and empirical approaches to stereotyping and prejudice: the authoritarian personality approach, the social cognition approach, the social identity and self-categorization approach and the 'modern' racism approach. These perspectives have shaped and influenced not only social psychological research, but also the views
about prejudice and racism. The circulation ‘between social psychology and common sense, each making the other more available and mutually reinforcing their chains’ (Henriques, 1984, p. 74) has allowed for these approaches to become dominant perspectives in the social psychological study of prejudice and racism.

Critical issues will be raised in relation to the five particular approaches to stereotypes and prejudice described in the course of this chapter. A case will be made for a reinterpretation of some of the traditional notions used by prejudice researchers in order to open a discussion for an alternative view of analysing prejudice and racism based on the importance of discourse, discursive practices and ideological representations. Limitations and shortcomings of these approaches are identified together with a shift towards a new conceptualisation of issues around prejudice, stereotyping and social conflict.

The classical view on stereotypes

As Augoustinos and Walker (1998) argue in the introduction of their paper on the construction of stereotypes within social psychology, ‘no other concept in social psychology has evoked so much ambivalence as that of stereotyping’ (p. 629). Before going any further, let me note that the most familiar use of the term refers to characteristics that we apply to others on the basis of their national, ethnic, or gender groups. According to a classical view on stereotypes, when applied to people, stereotypes are said to be rigid, and they stamp all to whom they apply with the same characteristics. Stereotypes render uniform everyone associated with a particular feature, such as being a woman, Italian or German. Individuals in those categories are being reduced to the ‘essential’ characteristics isolated by the stereotype. Social stereotypes exaggerate and homogenise traits held to be characteristic of particular categories:

Stereotypes are usually considered inaccurate because of the way they portray a social group or category as homogeneous. Certain forms of behaviour, disposition or propensity are isolated, taken out of context and attributed to everyone associated with a particular group or category.

(Pickering, 2001, p. 4)

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1 Schneider (2004) notes that the actual term was used as early as 1824 to refer to formalized behavior, and by the early part of the 20th century it was regularly used to refer to rigid, repetitive, often rhythmic behavior patterns.
Walter Lippmann was the first author to make reference to stereotyping in its modern sense in his book *Public Opinion* (1965, originally published 1922). His interest in stereotypes was not that of a psychologist, but of a scholar interested in the role of the media in the political process, interested in the common-sense social and political uses to which they are put. As Pickering suggests, outside social psychology,

he deserves credit for his serious re-evaluation of the liberal model of citizenship and his considered appraisal of some of the obstacles standing in the way of effective political democracy, particularly in relation to the role of the media in the political process. Media stereotyping was one of the specifically modern political problems which he dealt with in connection with this process (2001, p 17).

Psychologists and social psychologists have acknowledged Lippmann as the precursor of modern research on stereotypes and stereotyping, but they have not really paid much attention to the different ways in which he conceived stereotypes.

Lippmann identified stereotyping as a serious problem in opinion formation and expression. He conceived the stereotype in two opposed ways (see also Pickering, 2001). On one hand, he emphasised a ‘political’ sense to stereotypes, viewing them as inadequate and biased, endorsing the interests of those who use them and as obstacles to rational assessment and resistant to change. This political sense of stereotypes was opposed to what he called ‘individualised understanding’. On the other hand, he regarded stereotyping as a necessary mode of processing information, an inescapable way of creating order out of the ‘buzzing confusion of reality’ (Lippmann, 1965, p. 63). In this ‘psychological’ sense, stereotypes are equated with our general ways of thinking and making sense of the world and social actors within it.

Lippmann viewed stereotypes as general cognitive structures, and he used the term to account for errors and biases in our conceptions of the world (cf. Schneider, 2004). According to him, these ‘pictures in our heads’ are not inevitably false and function as rationalizations to maintain social standing and status. As Pickering argued, stereotyping, in the first sense advanced by Lippmann, involves ‘a loss of an individualised understanding of other people, whether these are foreigners or those in other social classes and communities outside our own situated experience’ (2001, p. 18).
In the second sense, it would seem to involve ‘a gain in helping us to make sense out of the diversely blooming and buzzing forms of life that swirl around us in the modern social world’ (ibid, p. 18). Lippmann seemed to be aware of the contradiction between the two ways of thinking about prejudice. Stereotyping was seen as an endemic problem in (modern) societies and the aim was to devise solutions for the dilemma it posed. Lippmann recognized the central dilemma posed by the relation between cognitive reality-capturing and complexity-reducing processes and the role of the media in reinforcing the ‘pictures’ in our heads (cf. Pickering, 2001).

Contrary to the social psychological common-place view on Lippmann’s contribution to the study of stereotypes which relates to the so often quoted ‘pictures in our heads’, Lippmann was very much aware and understood the ideological strength of stereotypes. For him stereotypes were not just something to be ‘holding lightly and modifying gladly’, but they were also ‘the projection upon the world … of our own value, our own position and our own rights’ (Lippmann, 1965, p. 64). Even though a great part of his discussion of stereotypes dealt with various errors of thinking, he also pointed to the importance of subverting stereotyping which was seen as an obstacle to the workings of effective social democracy. Lippmann has had a great influence, both in social psychological, but also in communication research. What was common to the two strands of research was the concern with stereotypical content viewed as intrinsically negative or erroneous. Lippmann was not specifically concerned with traits ascribed to groups of people, but most of the first empirical studies did concern such trait attributions particularly to ethnic groups, while still preserving Lippmann’s notions of error (Schneider, 2004).

During the 30s and onwards, a major interest was developed in the measurement of attitudes as a bridge between culture and individual behavior. With the pioneering studies of Katz and Braly (1933, 1935), who were principally concerned with national stereotypes, the study of individual attitudes and values held towards racially stereotyped groups became of central concern.

Using checklist methodology, Katz and Braly (1933) asked Princeton University students to check traits they thought described ten national groups. Those traits with considerable consensus of endorsement for a particular group were seen as stereotypic of that group. For example, 78% of subjects thought that Germans were scientific-minded or that 54%
thought that Turks were cruel. In a second study (Katz and Braly, 1935), discovered that the rank order of preferences for the ten groups rated was identical to the rankings in terms of the average desirability of the traits ascribed to the groups. It was believed that the ascription of traits to groups reflects culturally derived stereotypes or images about people representing those groups. The stereotype was seen as a fixed impression which conforms very little to the facts it pretends to represent and results from our ‘defining first and observing second’ (Katz & Braly, 1935; see also Schneider, 2004). Thus, conceived as ‘biased’ attitudinal products, the study of stereotypes was used to explain the effects of culture on prejudice and discrimination. Stereotypes which were assumed to be largely reflections of the culture rather than of individual experiences with people from diverse groups, promoted a negative evaluation (prejudice), which in turn justified discrimination. Although various definitions of stereotypes were offered, the most common working definitions were those in terms of traits ascribed to various racial and ethnic groups (cf Schneider, 2004). This was the beginning of a long tradition of seeing stereotypes and prejudice as closely linked. For example, Ashmore and DelBoca conceive stereotypes as ‘a structured set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people’ (1979, p. 222). In a similar fashion, stereotypes have come to be defined as ‘sets of traits attributed to social groups’ (Stephan, 1985, p 600) or as ‘a collection of associations that link a target group to a set of descriptive characteristics’ (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986, p. 81).

As Brown (1995, p. 82) suggests,

To stereotype someone is to attribute to that person some characteristics which are seen to be shared by all or most of his or her fellow group members. A stereotype is, in other words, an inference drawn from the assignment of a person to a particular category.

One of the most recent basic definition of stereotypes claims, in the same way, that they are ‘qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people’ (Schneider, 2004, p 24).

All these definitions of stereotypes embody one crucial assumption, namely, that stereotypes involve associations between categories and qualities. This is truism nowadays, but only because of the classical view on stereotyping. A very important addition to the kind of research conducted by Katz and Braly in the 30’s was offered by
the work of Gordon Allport in his classic, *Nature of Prejudice* published in 1954. In this book Allport devoted himself to a discussion of the various cognitive factors involved in prejudice and stereotyping. Most notably, he noted that it is a part of our basic cognitive nature to place things and people into categories, which are the cognitive ‘containers’ where the building blocks of stereotypes (various traits and features of people and things, expectations or values) are to be found.

For Allport, it is the individual-level thought and need that leads to prejudice (even if he also recognizes the cultural and social aspect of prejudice). One could argue that he attempted to challenge the inherent ambiguity of Lippmann’s argument regarding the processes involved in organizing and putting order in a ‘chaotic’ world. He puts forward a distinction between categorisation as a ‘rational’ and normal process and irrational stereotyping. Stereotypes as the outcome of categorisation only turn to prejudice when new knowledge does not lead to revision and change. Allport’s move in distinguishing between a normal, evolutionary process of categorisation and irrational stereotyping works at the same time to normalize, to naturalize, but also to pathologize prejudice. Allport’s approach takes the individual ‘perceiver’ and the individual ‘mind’ as the backdrop for his analysis of stereotyping and prejudice. This interplay between the naturalization and the pathologisation of prejudice has allowed Allport to point mainly to individual weaknesses, failings and ‘biases’ and thus displaces stereotyping and prejudice from being rooted in relations of power. It should be noted though that Allport’s problem is not that he omits the historical/cultural dimension, or that he reduces it to personality, but that he does not notice the contradictions between his different arguments.

One could argue that, in a way, the classical view on stereotyping has heightened the awareness that stereotyping was an everyday cultural process. But the emphasis on the ‘cultural’ dimension of stereotyping was made through the intermediary of seeing stereotypes as qualities associated with categories, essentially deficient and inaccurate, rigid and ‘hasty’ over-generalisations, but nevertheless rectifiable and subject to change. There are some problems with this classical view on stereotypes (see Pickering, 2001 for a round-up). For example, it was claimed that the alleged simplicity and inaccuracy of

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2 It is important not to forget that Allport’s book came after the publication of ‘The Authoritarian Personality’, which most certainly was the first attempt to make the connection between stereotypes and cognition.
representation can be overcame through the addition of new (sufficient) information. The claim that there is always firm ground for rectifying stereotypes does not take into account their ideological dimension. Instead, it follows the logic of the psychological sciences who are said to have enough power to devise appropriate measures from changing stereotypes. At the same time, what this claim does not take into account is the effect of using stereotypes and reproducing prejudice. Prejudice is something that does not have to be judged in terms of the amount of information that the individual has at its disposition in order to form an image, a representation of a particular group or category of people, but in terms of what the use of specific knowledge about social groups does in relation to issues such reproduction of dominance and status quo.

The view that the classical approach to stereotyping offers is that of the simplicity of stereotypes. Stereotypes are not just simple, they do not represent only associations between certain qualities and certain people, they are not just attitudinal products, they are not just mental states, but they are more complex. This complexity derives not from the mechanisms that researchers have used in order to explain the phenomenon, but it derives from thinking of stereotypes as belonging to the public and cultural realm, from them being part of particular discourses (tolerant or prejudiced), being ‘traded’ (and being part) within specific interpretive repertoires and rhetorical resources that society is imbued with. They are not only complex in themselves, but they are complex in the consequences of their use.

The classical view on stereotyping which tended to assume a reality ‘out-there’ against which representations can be measured also poses problems. As some authors have noted (Pickering, 2001), at the same time, stereotypes could be condemned for not being realistic or being too realistic. They may be ‘condemned because they are untrue and because they are true’ (p. 15).

The question and challenge set forward by the legacy of a classical view on stereotypes was how to account for the distinctive features of stereotyping, in terms of what sort of processes should one account for the workings of stereotypes. The different theoretical and empirical modern (and post-modern) answers offered to this challenge are going to be reviewed in the remainder of this chapter. What is important to note at this stage is that the kind of issues that Lippmann, Katz and Braly or Allport, for that matter, set themselves to
study were issues pertaining to the use of language and its importance in the expression and reproduction of prejudice. The only problem was that the discussion of stereotyping and prejudice did not revolved around issues of the use of language. Language was not seen as primordial, as the cornerstone of conducting our social, public 'business' with others. There has been a slight recognition that it is language that allows us to have, express and reproduce stereotypes, but there was not a concern with language in its own right (not just as a 'transparent' vehicle for expressing attitudes and cognitive states), nor with its situated and rhetorical nature. As the remainder of this chapter will try to show, all the approaches to prejudice that originated from the classical view on stereotyping have taken issue with language, but have not stressed enough the central role it plays in the expression and reproduction of stereotypes and prejudice. The implications of this will be explored in detail throughout this thesis and some of this criticism will be taken further when discussing the more modern approaches to the study of stereotyping.

The 'Authoritarian Personality'

Most prevalent between the 30's and the 60's were theories dominated by the Freudian psychoanalytic (psychodynamic) tradition. From this perspective, prejudice, like other behaviour was seen as being intrapsychically determined. With the publication of 'The Authoritarian Personality' (Adorno et al., 1950/1982), stereotypes began to be considered manifestations of a general prejudiced attitude. Stereotypes were viewed less as pictures in people's heads and were still thought to predict discriminatory behavior, but their source tended to be seen as localized more in personality dynamics. One of the concerns of the 'authoritarian personality' research was to document how personality dynamics and unresolved inner conflicts determined the extent to which stereotypes were used to discriminate self from out-groups (by making such groups homogeneous and negative). Within the context of the 'authoritarian personality', stereotypes were considered major pathologies of social cognition: they were rigidly held as protection against ambivalence and ambiguity and were considered fundamentally incorrect and derogatory generalizations about groups of people; in essence, they were profound corruptions of social experience. As Pickering (2001) argues, stereotypes were seen through the 'prism of rigid prejudice and dogmatic conventionalism'. They were the
irrational cognitive product of certain people whose intolerance was deeply rooted in a
typical personality structure formed in . . hierarchical and conformist societies’ (p. 24)

In Adorno et al.’s attempt to offer a general theory of prejudice rooted in the dynamics of
the personality and the unconscious mind, stereotyping was considered to be a general
process. Because the prejudiced person had to deal and resolve a number of intra-psychic
conflicts, the choice of a particular target group for the projection of aggressive and
destructive impulses (tendencies) was considered to be secondary.

As Billig (1978) suggests, with writers such as Fromm (1942) and later Adorno et al
(1950), ‘ideas directly derived from psychoanalytic theory found their way into the
traditions of empirical social psychology’ (p 31) Imbued with influences from Marxist
social theory, Freudian and neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, the ‘authoritarian personality’
analyses of racism (Adorno et al., 1950) have attempted to link prejudice and socialization
practices. Adorno et al.’s (1950), ‘authoritarian personality’ is a good example, which
includes elements from both perspectives, the psychodynamic and the socialization one,
with an emphasis on the broader ideological and characterological patterns that would
explain prejudice. Adorno et al. (1950)'s The Authoritarian Personality is, in Billig
(1985)'s view, the book that has contributed probably more than any other single work to
the idea ‘that prejudiced thinking is achieved through rigid categorization and an
intolerance of ambiguity’ (p 94).

Since the work of Adorno et al., to establish a clear link between authoritarianism and
prejudice was a pervasive research orientation. This has arisen out of the awareness of the
danger that ‘the authoritarian type of man’ (Adorno et al., 1950, p. x) would replace the
‘democratic person’ (Allport, 1954, p. 477). Here it is in Adorno et al.’s words who have
set the problem of researching prejudice as being one of seeking

to develop and promote an understanding of social-psychological factors
which have made it possible for the authoritarian type of man to threaten to
replace the individualistic and democratic type prevalent in the past century

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3 Nevertheless, as Billig (1978)'s discussion of the ambivalences in Adorno et al.’s scale items has shown,
'the authors were recognizing, despite their psychological theory, that prejudice views would express the
ambiguities of intolerance, rather than be based on a straightforward intolerance of ambiguity' (Billig 1985,
p 95)
Adorno and colleagues were interested in mapping the psychological basis of what they came to describe as ‘authoritarian’ forms of political ideology. Starting with the rather simple question of why do competing political ideologies have such differing degree of appeal for different individuals (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 2), they were interested in charting the individual differences in ideological affiliation. It all started from the assumption that there was an intricate relation between the content of an ideology and psychodynamic factors of personality structure. Adorno et al.'s basic hypothesis was that the political and social attitudes of an individual cluster together and are the expression of ‘deep lying trends in personality’ (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 1). The assumption behind Adorno et al.'s analysis was that ‘prejudiced people are those whose personalities render them susceptible to those racist or fascist ideas prevalent in a society at a given time’ (Brown, 1995, p. 19).

Adorno et al.'s theory was concerned ‘to account for individual differences in the receptivity to those ideas’ (Brown, 1995, p. 19). They were interested to describe the authoritarian personality of the potential fascist, to describe the potential fascist with an emphasis on psychodynamic factors and the importance of the cognitive style in which social attitudes were constructed and expressed. The ‘authoritarian personality’ was seen as a complex syndrome of behaviours, attitudes and dispositions: an over-rigid cognitive style, which does not easily accommodate ambivalence and ambiguity, conventionalism, authoritarian submission and aggression, stereotypy and destructiveness (cf. Adorno et al., 1982).

The rationale of Adorno et al. was ‘that it is possible to measure prejudice by tapping into the fascist (authoritarian) personality without reference to any specific ethnic group’ (Heaven, 2001, p. 92). The main goal was to establish a link between authoritarianism and prejudice. The only problem with most of Adorno et al.'s exegesis seems to be that very few social psychologists showed a genuine interest in the underlying theory, but rather ‘seized upon the F scale turning it into the measure of ‘authoritarianism’” (Heaven, 2001, p. 92; see also Billig, 1978).

Adorno et al. (1982) found F scores to correlate with scores on measures of ethnocentrism and anti-semitism. Some other research (e.g. Siegman, 1961) concluded that, although the
basic theory of Adorno et al. was confirmed, not all prejudice is related to the authoritarian personality. Dab (1959) has demonstrated that authoritarianism may predict different types of prejudice. In his study, authoritarianism predicted prejudice towards Jews, but not towards the other groups. Research conducted by Pettigrew (1958) in South Africa and Southern US has offered evidence that in some cultures the pressure to conform to racist views is so powerful that it has a significant effect on personal views. In such cultures, 'where prejudiced is tolerated, if not endorsed, personality factors appear less influential than group norms in determining prejudiced attitudes' (Heaven, 2001, p. 93).

Research has also revealed a range of methodological and theoretical flaws (Brown, 1965, Christie and Jahoda, 1954, Rokeach, 1956; see also Billig, 1978 and Altemeyer, 1981) in Adorno et al.'s research. Problems were identified with the design and validation of the F-scale and mainly the reported correlations with variables such as intelligence, social class or level of education, which, at closer attention, suggest alternative explanations for the genesis of authoritarianism. For example, Altemeyer (1981) has levelled important criticism related to the F scale. He argues that the nine components said to comprise authoritarianism are too vague and he offers evidence in support of the idea that successive factor analytic studies have failed to uncover the nine dimensions, which are said to form the core of 'authoritarianism'.

A more important criticism of Adorno et al. was that it dealt with only variant of authoritarianism, namely right-wing authoritarianism. The argument that people with other political views are also authoritarian and hence also prejudiced was developed and turned into a systematic psychological theory by Rokeach (1956, 1960). Rokeach's main hypothesis was that what apparently very different kinds of prejudice had in common was a similar underlying cognitive structure in which different beliefs or belief systems were well isolated from one another so that mutually contradictory opinions could be tolerated (Brown, 1995, p. 26).
The syndrome of intolerance was labelled the ‘closed mind’ or dogmatic personality. At the other end, Rokeach talked about the ‘open mind’ or the non-prejudiced person (Rokeach, 1960)⁴

Altemeyer (1981) has revived the interest in authoritarianism and in the ways to measure it. He proposes the notion of ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ (RWA), which is comprised of three dimensions: authoritarian submission to authority, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism (adherence to social conventions). Right-wing authoritarianism does not refer ‘to support for right of centre political or economic movements, but rather to support for the legitimate authority in any given society or community’ (Heaven, 2001, p. 99, see also Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer (1981, 1996) moved authoritarianism from a psychodynamic perspective to a social learning one. As Reynolds and Turner (2001) argue, the RWA scale ‘could be interpreted as a measure of widespread societal values and ideologies rather than an assessment of an individual’s personality’ (p. 177; see also Billig, 1976). Altemeyer himself was cautious about whether RWA was a personality scale. He also pointed to the fact that the relations with racial prejudice were comparatively weak.

Notwithstanding the quite significant links between RWA and prejudice in a variety of settings and with diverse samples from different cultures, laboratory research has demonstrated that RWA predicts prejudice under particular conditions. The main conclusions of such research state that: personality characteristics such as authoritarianism may not always be predictive of prejudice and that, the salience of social identity is also important in understanding prejudice (cf. Reynolds and Turner, 2001; see also Verkuyten and Hagendoorn, 1998; Haslam and Wilson, 2000).

Personality accounts of prejudice have been criticized on different counts and a series of limitations and shortcomings were identified (see Billig, 1976 and Brown, 1995 for discussions of major limitations). First of all, it is argued that ‘it underestimates ... the

⁴ Another attempt to link personality to prejudice was made by Eysenck (1954). In a similar fashion to Rokeach, Eysenck argued that people’s propensity towards intolerance was independent of their endorsement of left- or right-wing ideology. This tendency was called ‘tough-mindedness’ as opposed to tender-mindedness and was associated with the personality trait of extraversion (and later, psychoticism). He went as far as to suggest that people’s attitudes, including their level of prejudice, could be genetically determined.
power and importance of the immediate social situation in shaping people’s attitudes’ (Brown, 1995, p 31). This criticism is linked with the unaccounted for influence of other people’s attitudes, the norms of the group and inter-group relations. As research has demonstrated, situational norms, intergroup contact, the relations with the others proved to have a more critical influence than any personality disposition (e.g. Siegel and Siegel, 1957; Minard, 1952).

The second limitation of the personality approach is an extension of the first criticism to a broader cultural or societal level. For example, Pettigrew (1958), which studied prejudice in South Africa and the US concluded that the origin of racism for specific groups, lays much more in the prevailing societal norms than any personality dysfunction. Studies of social conformity also observed high correlations between prejudice and measures of social conformity. Other research conducted in South Africa (Duckitt, 1988; Heaven, 1983) have documented the existence of sub-cultural differences which adds more power to the argument that social norms rather than personality dispositions determine prejudice.

The historical specificity of prejudice poses another problem for the attempts of personality research to account for prejudice – the rises or falls of prejudice over time are problematic in personality research. For example, Altemeyer (1988) observed a steady increase in authoritarianism over a fifteen year period with Canadian undergraduates. Vollebergh (1991) conducting research on Dutch adolescents over a two-year period observed a small, but highly reliable decrease in authoritarianism. Summarizing this kind of research, Brown (1995) has noted that, ‘historical changes pose ... a critical problem for the personality approach because they suggest that authoritarianism may actually be an effect of changing social conditions rather than deriving from particular child-parent relations’ (p. 35).

Another limitation of any personality account is its inability to explain the uniformity of prejudiced attitudes across whole groups of people. As Brown puts it,

the very nature of such theories – explaining prejudice via individual differences among people – makes them particularly unsuited to explain how prejudice can become virtually consensual in certain societies (1995, p. 33, italics in original).
Related to this, another important limitation is related to the issue of why certain groups rather than others become the target of prejudice. For example, Adorno et al. have tried to offer hard evidence of the ‘functional’ character of antisemitism, that is to say, its relative independence of the object. As Adorno et al. claim, they have limited themselves to offering ‘some extreme but concrete evidence of the fact that antisemitism is not so much dependent upon the nature of the object as upon the subject’s own psychological wants and needs’ (1950, p. 609). They have discovered a number of cases in which the ‘functional’ character of prejudice is obvious. In these cases, Adorno et al. have found subjects ‘who are prejudiced per se, but with whom it is relatively accidental against what group their prejudice is directed’ (ibid., p 609). As argued before, the rationale of Adorno et al. (1950/1982) was that it was possible to measure prejudice by studying the ‘authoritarian’ personality without reference to any specific ethnic group.

In addition, as Augoustinos and Reynolds (2001b) have put it, such theories ‘neglect the potential interplay between individual psychology and social structural factors in the etiology of prejudice’ (p. 8). There is some recognition that economic and social factors may be contributory elements to a description of authoritarianism, but ‘these issues are never dealt with explicitly or integrated into the psychological analysis’ (ibid., p. 8). As the analytic chapters of this thesis will try to make it clear, a focus on authoritarian ideology, ‘authoritarianism’ or ‘dogmatism’ is a too narrow one in approaching the issue of prejudiced and racist discourse. Prejudiced legitimations of the status quo do not always work through the inflexibility of the authoritarian mode of thinking. As discourse analytic studies of racism have shown, racist legitimations of social formations and unequal power relations can be both liberal and authoritarian in form (see Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Racist discourse is flexible and it is not to be pinned down in the dynamics of relatively enduring structures of an ‘authoritarian’, or ‘dogmatic’ for that matter, personality (cf. van Dijk, 1984, 1992; Billig, 1991; Verkuyten, 1994a, b). Moreover, ‘authoritarian personality research pathologizes both the ideology and the characters who endorse it, thus severely limiting the range of critical investigation’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 56).

The ‘authoritarian personality’ research does not take into account the dynamics of ideology, the rapidity and pervasiveness of ideological change and the explicit and implicit power of social norms (Billig, 1978). The ‘authoritarian’ personality perspective ‘works through argument against the person’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 52). Surface
expressions are said to disguise hidden real motives, the movement is from the surface of the discourse to the supposed latent content. As it will be shown, personality research has nevertheless the advantage of not assuming that all individuals ‘work’ in much the same way (Wetherell and Potter, 1992) thereby avoiding the universalistic assumptions of social cognition and social identity research. In the analytic chapters, the emphasis will stay with the social constitution of subjectivity (as opposed to a biological and cognitive one), but it will be argued that in order to offer a satisfactory study of prejudice (of different kinds of prejudice) it needs to be placed within a theory of situated identities and ideological representations as discursive products.

The cognitive approach to stereotyping

With the cognitive approach to stereotyping there is a move from looking at stereotyping and prejudice as placed in the within the dynamics of ‘authoritarian’ personalities towards a more general, universal descriptive and empirical model of stereotyping and prejudice. From the ‘potential’ fascist of the authoritarian personality there is a move and concern with how the ‘average’ individual uses stereotypes, how he makes use of a ‘normal’ psychological function (categorization) and ‘normal’ information processing mechanisms. In its concern with the ‘average’ individual ‘activating’ and ‘using’ stereotypes, the cognitive approach is closer to the classical view on stereotyping than to the authoritarian personality research.

The conceptualisation and definition of stereotypes in social psychology has had pretty much the same fate as the conceptualisation and definition of prejudice. In the same way that prejudice was defined as the ‘negative’ attitudes towards members of particular groups, as an ‘antipathy’ based upon ‘faulty and inflexible generalization’ (Allport, 1954, p 10), an ‘unjustified negative attitude toward an individual’ (Worchel et al., 1988) and serving an ‘irrational function’ (Ackerman and Jahoda, 1950), stereotypes were viewed as rigid, faulty and inflexible ways of thinking about individuals and groups (cf. Allport, 1954; Stroebe and Insko, 1989) The ‘irrationality’ of prejudice, the ‘rigidity’ of the thinking of the prejudiced, the issue of ‘cognitive distortion’ in social judgements and the idea of stereotypes being condemnable as aberrant and abhorrent forms of thought have

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5 see Brown (1995) for a review and critique of traditional definitions of prejudice
been since constituting some of the main ingredients of social psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice.

Beginning with the pioneering work of Gordon Allport, many theorists have tried to explain stereotypes, stereotyping and prejudice in terms of concepts inside the heads of individuals. Allport (1954) sees categorization as inescapable to daily functioning, but he also discusses how we categorize people into in-groups and out-groups and how the words used to describe people shape the ways in which we see them. Linked to the issue of categorization was the issue of stereotyping. Stereotypes as generalized descriptions of a group (and its constituents) are the inevitable outcome of the categorization process.

One important historical, but also theoretical landmark that accounted for turning stereotypes and stereotyping into a cognitive notion was the work of Henri Tajfel on the cognitive aspects of prejudice. Tajfel's classic article 'Cognitive aspects of prejudice' originally published in 1969 (but which also features as a key chapter in Tajfel's Human Groups and Social Categories) was written before social psychology's cognitive turn in the 80s and set forth the principles of cognitive social psychology, but without using the technical term social 'cognition' (cf. Billig, 2002a). Revisiting Tajfel's work on the cognitive aspects of prejudice, Billig has noted that its seminal paper 'combines the themes of social judgement with those of intergroup conflict, as Tajfel argued that the principles of cognition can illuminate the psychological nature of prejudice' (p. 172). As Tajfel (1981a) suggests in the summary and conclusion of his chapter on the cognitive aspects of prejudice, 'three cognitive processes were considered from the point of view of their relevance to the genesis of prejudice in an individual: categorization, assimilation and search for conceptual coherence' (p. 141). The aim was to stress the 'importance of the adaptive cognitive functioning ... in the causation of prejudice' (p. 141). Insofar social stereotypes were concerned, Tajfel believed that general cognitive processes cannot be neglected if one wants to study the formation, diffusion and functioning of social stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981b). For him, 'the understanding of the cognitive 'mechanics' of stereotypes is essential for their full and adequate analysis' (Tajfel, 1981a, p. 145). Nevertheless, at the same time, he also asked the question of 'whether such a study is all that is needed' (ibid., p. 145).
Starting with Lippmann (1922)'s 'pictures in our heads', continuing with Allport's notion of 'an exaggerated belief associated with a category' (p. 191), and Tajfel’s seminal work on the cognitive aspects of prejudice, the notion of stereotype and stereotyping has been turned into a completely cognitive notion (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Stereotypes as cognitive mental representations of groups and individuals are viewed as social schemas based on ‘normal’ information-processing mechanisms, as having stable internal organization and as being the outcome of a ‘natural’ categorization process (Hamilton and Trolier, 1986). Conceptualised as ‘normal’ and functional processes, categorization and stereotyping have become over the years the cornerstone of research in social cognitive approaches within social psychology.

As several researchers have argued, over the years cognitive theories of stereotyping have dominated the study of prejudice (see Augoustinos and Walker, 1995, for a review). Stephan provides a summary of the cognitive approach by arguing that

the cognitive approach ... encompasses the organization of knowledge about groups into higher-level cognitive structures such as schemata, scripts and prototypes, as well as providing new insights into the operation of expectancies and biased perceptions of intergroup behavior. It is also useful in understanding the affective complexity of intergroup cognitions as reflected in theories stressing ambivalence towards groups.

(1985, p 600)

Numerous researchers have discussed the nature and functioning of stereotyping, categorization and the links with prejudice. For example, Ehrlich (1973) discusses the growth and nature of stereotypes, seen as a cognitive process, as generalized attitudes (mainly negative) that are associated with categories in our heads. Researchers have also tried to explain why and how stereotypes function. The traditional explanation for why people use stereotypes is for simplicity of processing information about individuals (Allport, 1954, see also Macrae, Milne and Bodenhausen, 1994 for a more recent account).

In reviewing the current literature on stereotypes and stereotyping from a cognitive perspective, Locke and Johnston (2001) argue that,

one of the most important implications of the social-cognitive approach is that stereotypes are seen as relatively mundane inhabitants of our mental world ..
Stereotypes, like other mental representations, are shortcuts the mind uses to simplify and understand the social world

(p. 109)

Stereotypes are not something negative, because they offer a simple and straightforward way of judging people and allow decisions to be made without a minimum of effort. In other words, stereotypes exist because they offer the individual a shorthand of engaging with and understanding the world around them.

( Ibid., p 109)

The now famous early stereotyping studies (e.g., Katz and Braly, 1933), research undertaken on object classification and categorization (Cantor and Mischel, 1979) or studies on the schematic organization of stereotypic knowledge (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) have solidified the belief that the central feature governing the content of people’s cognitions about social groups is constituted by the cognitive organization and functioning of associations which link categories with presumed characteristics of individuals or groups.

Research done on stereotyping and the particular sensitivity people seem to have towards statistically infrequent events or attributes (cf. Brown, 1995), known as the ‘illusory correlations’ studies (Hamilton, 1981b; Hamilton and Gifford, 1976) have shown that the psychological distinctiveness of infrequency gives rise to stereotyping (Hamilton and Gifford, 1976). There were suggestions that this is a fairly robust and general phenomenon (Hamilton and Sherman, 1989) and it can be observed for positive, as well as negative traits. Subsequent research has tried to demonstrate that the illusory correlation effect can be obtained without the use of ‘distinctive’ stimuli. According to this view,

the formation of stereotypical associations between groups and attributes is a result of subjects’ attempts to impose some order on the stimuli by categorization rather than an automatic property of the stimuli themselves.

(Brown, 1995, p. 89-90)

Insofar the relation between stereotypes and social judgements was concerned research has aimed to prove the hypothesis that ‘a stereotype, whether prejudiced or not, is a cognitive association of a social category with certain characteristics’ (Brown, 1995, p. 90).

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For example, Darley and Gross (1983) have found that social class stereotypes can influence people's judgements of children's academic performance. Darley and Gross concluded that people do not use stereotypes in an unthinking way, rather stereotypes serve as hypotheses for which we then seek out further information (see also Leyens et al., 1994). A corollary of this would be that people do not look for information in order to prove false their hypotheses but rather to confirm them. As research has demonstrated, in our social reasoning confirmatory biases are also the norm (see Brown, 1995 for a discussion).

Stereotypes can be linked to memory processes, they can bias our recall of the past (Hamilton and Rose, 1980). At the same time, they can influence people's explanations of social events (Tajfel, 1981b). There has been a lot of research looking at the influence of stereotypes on attributional judgment. Research conducted by Duncan (1976) and by Pettigrew (1979) have shown how stereotypes can influence the social attributions that people make in relation to group categories when providing explanatory accounts for ingroup and outgroup behaviour. For example, Pettigrew (1979) basing his research on the 'fundamental attribution error' (Ross, 1977), suggested that group members were susceptible to an 'ultimate attribution error'. As Brown suggests,

> the gist of this notion is that negative behaviours ... by outgroup members will be seen as internally caused ('they are like that'), while the same behaviour from the ingroup will be justified with reference to some external cause ('we were provoked'). Positive behaviours will tend to be explained in just the opposite fashion


Stereotypes can serve to generate behavioural expectancies, which can function as self-fulfilling prophecies (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Recent research has demonstrated the importance of processes of stereotype activation and use (Devine, 1989, 1995; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). A distinction was put forward between explicit processes and implicit processes of stereotyping. Insofar explicit processes of stereotyping are concerned, a link between stereotypes and prejudice is established, but the contention is that the mere possession of stereotypes need not inevitably lead to prejudice (see Devine, 1989, the dissociation model – Devine, 1995). According to Devine's position, whilst

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6 see also Islam and Hewstone, 1993, Hunter et al., 1991 for supporting evidence of this effect
automatic stereotype activation is unavoidable (and that irrespective of personal beliefs),
the interplay of controlled/conscious strategies based on personal beliefs will determine
whether the particular information remains activated to help guide judgements. As Locke
and Johnston argue, one of the conclusions of research on the ‘activation’ of stereotypes is
that ‘prejudiced people, but not unprejudiced people, automatically activate the stereotype
of a group when explicitly engaged in the process of judging the stereotyped group’ (2001,
p 118) The main assumption behind issue of implicit stereotyping and prejudice
(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) was that

since everyone has stereotypes of the major groups in our society, then their
influence may be equally unavoidable for all of us when we are unaware they
have been activated, or unaware they may influence our behaviour
(Locke and Johnston, 2001, p. 122)

Despite the implicit recognition that stereotypes derive their form and content from the
social processes and that their endorsement often leads to social injustice, the social
cognitive study of stereotypes is solely concerned with individual cognitive activity (cf.
Augoustinos and Walker, 1998) The only functional role of stereotypes seems to be that
of allowing us to perceive some things more readily by freeing up cognitive resources to
concentrate onto other concerns (see Macrae et al., 1994). But stereotypes are not just
pictures in our heads, they are not just mental shortcuts, they can also serve an ideological
function, to justify or criticize the state of things. As Brown (1995) has noted, ‘stereotypes
are rooted in the web of social relations between groups and do not derive solely or even
mostly from the workings of our cognitive systems’ (p. 86, see also Tajfel, 1981a, b)

As Augoustinos and Walker (1998) suggest, stereotypes are not the product of individual
cognitive activity alone, but are also social and collective products which function
ideologically by justifying and legitmizing existing social and power relations within a
society. In their view, ‘stereotypes, as constructions of groups, constitute social or
ideological representations which are used to justify and legitimize existing social and
power relations within a society’ (p 630).

The implication that can be drawn from this is that stereotypes are more than just cognitive
schemas, they are widely shared cognitive, affective and symbolic representations of
social groups (Moscovici, 1984). As Augoustinos and Walker put it,
stereotypes do not simply exist in individuals’ heads. They are socially and discursively constructed in the course of everyday communication. Stereotypes are flexible and dynamic representations which are constructed in situ, within a specific relational context at a particular point in time.

For other authors, stereotypes provide a system-justificatory function (Jost and Banaji, 1994) and can be considered ideological in that they reinforce existing social arrangements, rationalizing and legitimizing the status quo. Jost and Banaji (1994) link stereotyping to the information-processing needs of an ‘ideological environment’. In a rather similar way, Augoustinos and Walker (1998) view stereotypes ‘as a cognitive and social activity which is driven by the ideological and political needs of a particular social context and environment’, with the only difference that they are trying to extend the analysis further and claim that ‘stereotypes are not only ideologically functional, but they are in and of themselves ideological representations’ (p. 637).

Discourse analytic approaches to the study of prejudice have also levelled an important and thorough critique against cognitive approaches to stereotyping and prejudice. The main idea around which the critique was constructed was that what is missing from the traditional approaches to stereotyping is a concern with the social, political and ideological dimensions of stereotyping. As Billig (1985, 1987a) has noted, the dominant image in social cognition accounts is that of the bureaucrat and bureaucratic process. Racism is thus explained in terms of ‘our’ mundane limitation of mental organization rather than in terms of complex ideological factors. Within this perspective, prejudice and racism are seen as inevitable consequences of ‘normal’ and functional cognitive processes such as categorization and stereotyping (Hamilton, 1981a). Social cognitive approaches to prejudice place an emphasis on the automatic processes of information encoding, retrieving and storing rather than on the specific content and dynamics of prejudice associated with particular social groups (see Billig, 1985, 1987a).

What is also missing from a social cognitive approach to stereotyping is a conceptualisation of stereotypes as discursive constructions, a focus on the active construction and use of categories in discourse and the ideological effects these
constructions might have. When one talks about the social and political validity of stereotypes, when one talks about their justificatory and political function one cannot escape seeing stereotypes as discursive and rhetorical constructions which people use ‘to do things’, such as to blame, justify, exonerate etc. For example, Adorno et al. (1950/1982) saw stereotypes as ideological but did not specifically discuss their rhetorical nature. Billig’s foundational criticism levelled at the classical cognitive research and the more recent kind is part of an argument about the rhetorical and political nature of stereotyping and prejudice. As Augoustinos and Walker (1998) put it, “stereotypes are essentially ‘political weapons’, which function to locate, position, subjugate and dominate certain groups” (p 647) Discourse researchers have advocated a different approach to the study of stereotyping and prejudice based on viewing stereotypes as discursive ideological constructions (representations), with an emphasis on the active and flexible way of categories in discourse (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). The action orientation of categorization in discourse is a pervasive concern for discourse researchers and how categories are flexibly articulated in the course of certain sorts of talk and writing to accomplish particular goals is one of the main question that guides analysis (Wetherell and Potter, 1992) As it will be shown in the next chapter, different strands of discourse research have tried to approach stereotyping by going ‘beyond stereotypes’, looking at how people actively construct realities of intergroup cohabitation or political issues, how they account for controversial issues and how they ‘do things with words’ when accounting for their own and their group’s position. People’s descriptions are inconsistent, ambivalent and context-dependent. Discourse analysts try to make sense of these inconsistencies by focusing on what people are trying to do and what effects they are trying to produce with their talk. Categorization and stereotyping are viewed as situated discursive practices rather than cognitive processes (Edwards, 1991, Wetherell and Potter, 1992)

In summary, the overall story told by social cognitive approaches to stereotyping has suffered numerous alterations over time, but basic ideas around perceptualism and cognitive categorization have remained the same. As Locke and Johnston argue,
from the view that stereotypes are a necessary evil that everyone learns and activates when judging members of the stereotyped group, we have moved to a view of stereotypes as tools that prejudiced people employ, perhaps, in an automatic fashion, to facilitate negative and stereotypical judgements of the groups they are prejudiced towards.

(2001, p. 125)

In fact, social cognition has moved from an 'old-fashioned' interpretation of the workings of stereotypes to a new one, based on the same cognitive processes and the same assumptions: universalist assumptions and the inevitability of prejudice. Here it is in Locke and Johnston's words 'There is also some evidence that we may all be open to the influence of stereotypes, regardless of whether we are prejudiced or not, when they are activated outside of our awareness' (p. 125). As Leach suggests,

in the latest version of objectivist-cognitivism, technologies of cognitive science (mainly measures of semantic 'priming' and 'associative strength') are used to assess 'true' (that is, interior) levels of prejudice.

(2002, p. 440)

There is no genuine concern with the social and ideological dimension of stereotyping, as only the cognitive dimension of stereotyping is said to be the most important one in approaching issues related to prejudice and racism. The potential for misjudgement, the potential for 'bias' is placed within (and traced back to) universally shared shortcomings in human cognition and is regarded as 'unfortunate, but inevitable' adaptive product of evolutionary history (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1992). By focusing on discrete processes of categorization, perception and judgment,

racism become strategically reduced to categorical attitudinal statements and is no longer studied as a problem of broad ideological frameworks in which ethnocentrism and the denigration of minority groups become linked to other justificatory doctrines.

(Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 36)

The 'negativity' of common place stereotyping and prejudiced thinking, 'becomes equated with particular instances of faulty generalization and biased stereotypic judgement' (ibid., p. 36). Although cognitive theorists claim that stereotypes are in the head of individuals, what they look at when they study stereotypes are actually discursive constructions.
Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theory

As the comments contained within the two previous sections have shown, cognitive approaches to stereotyping and prejudice, as well as personality and socialization ones, constitute explanations located at the individual level of analysis (Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981; Billig, 1985, 1987a, Brown, 1995, Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986). One could argue that one is dealing with two interacting types of prejudice, one based on personality structure and needs, and the other, based on misinformation, bias, cognitive distortion and the need to keep the cognitive load to a minimum. As Henriquez (1984) suggests, ‘two premises are common to both approaches; the belief in rationality as an ideal for democratic society and the emphasis on the individual as the site of the breakdown of this rationality and therefore as the object of research’ (p. 66). As some researchers have noted, cognitive approaches to stereotyping, like the personality approaches, tend to ignore or downplay the wider social context of intergroup relations (cf. Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001b; Augoustinos and Walker, 1998).

Processes of categorization and stereotyping were taken a step further with social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981a; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brown, 1995) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1999b). It was a step forward from the individualistic limitations of previous research to the greater emphasis on the social context (Tajfel, 1981a) of group interaction and correlate issues of power, status, differentiation between social groups (Tajfel, 1978; Billig, 1976)8.

The path for a flourishing wealth of research into the social psychology of groups was opened by the ‘minimal intergroup experiments’, which were designed to demonstrate that processes involved in cognitive categorization had a role in the creation of psychological distinctiveness between groups (Tajfel et al., 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973). The importance of categorization and stereotyping was again brought to the fore, with the addition of the social dimension of these processes. For example, Tajfel (1981a) considers not only the cognitive functions of stereotypes, but also talks about the social functions of stereotypes. He is talking about social stereotypes and social groups and tries to link these

8 See Brown and Capozza (2000) for a round-up of social identity research and growing interest in this approach.
concerns with issues pertaining to ideology and ideological climate. Other researchers view stereotyping as a psychologically valid way of apprehending the psychological realities pertaining to intergroup life (cf. Oakes et al., 1994). The functionality of categorization and stereotyping is based not on a process of simplification and mere categorization of information, but on a process of enriching our perception of the social environment and the actors involved in it. Moreover, as Oakes et al. (1994) argue, all perception (whether group-based or person-based) involves the dual cognitive processes of categorization and stereotyping.

If within the cognitive models of prejudice, stereotyping and prejudice were often constructed as the ultimate consequence of failing to perceive people as individuals with unique characteristics and traits, within group-based approaches, such as social identity and self-categorization theories, there is a fundamental questioning of these central assumptions of social-cognitive models, by emphasizing the psychological validity of group-based perception (cf. Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001b; Augoustinos and Walker, 1998).

Social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) have found themselves playing on two interrelated fronts. First of all, a cognitive front which kept intact all the assumptions regarding the basic processes of classification and categorization. Second of all, the motivational front, which started as a motivational theory of self-esteem, mainly from the idea that one’s own self-worth is defined in the arena of intergroup comparisons. According to this, group members will be motivated to maximize the differences between groups by favoring the in-group, and emphasize the positive distinctiveness of their own group on any valued dimension. The theoretical perspective of SIT and SCT is structured, shaped by the encounter between the ‘individual’ and the ‘social’. As Hogg and Abrams (1988) contend, it starts from the assumption that society is constructed and structured into ‘discrete social categories, which stand in power, status and prestige relations to one another’ (p. 18). The cognitive and the motivational arena were not treated separately, but they were complementing each other and taken together in order to account for the most important of the issues that SIT and SCT set themselves to study: the issue of social antagonism, inter-group relations and their implications for prejudice and racism.
Early research on prejudice and inter-group relations started with ideas about the existence of conflicting group interests than would explain the animosities and conflicts taking place between groups. For example, Campbell (1965)’s ‘Realistic Group Conflict Theory’ had as its main hypothesis the idea that intergroup attitudes and behaviour will tend to reflect group interests. As Brown (1995) argues, ‘where these are incompatible, where that one group gains is at the expense of another, then the social psychological response is likely to be negative: prejudiced attitudes, biased judgements, hostile behaviour’ (p. 163).

In 1966, Sherif (but also previously, Sherif and Sherif, 1953) was arguing that prejudice had its roots in the real or perceived conflicts of interests between groups. His famous ‘summer camp’ experiments have set the standards for a conceptualisation of group conflict in terms of conflict of interests, but also to devise future ways to decrease hostility and distrust among groups. For example, as Sherif and others have demonstrated, having a superordinate goal, being in a situation of mutual interdependence can lead to a diminution of hostile feelings and negative stereotyping. Laboratory studies of intergroup relations have confirmed Sherif’s basic findings (see Brown, 1988; Doise, 1976). Other research has added to Sherif’s and Campbell’s emphasis by claiming that more general ethnocentric attitudes may be also related to the economic and political relations between groups (see Brewer and Campbell, 1976). On the other hand, critics of the realistic group conflict theory have claimed that it does not provide a complete explanation for all forms of prejudice (see Turner, 1981 and Brown, 1995).

The main body of research on prejudice and intergroup relations is linked to processes of social categorization and prejudice. Starting from the idea that categorization and stereotyping constitute a fundamental process (Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957) and from the observation that the ‘the world is simply too complex a place for us to be able to survive without some means of simplifying and ordering it first’ (Brown, 1995, p. 41, Hamilton and Troller, 1986), social identity research have set a goal from themselves to uncover the cognitive and social processes that account for the existence of prejudice.

The beginning of the work on processes of differentiation and assimilation was set by Campbell (1956) who noted that an important facet of stereotyping was the enhancement of contrast between groups. Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) have taken this idea further to derive a set of social consequences from it. They observed that, when judging a set of physical
stimuli (a set of lines), participants were prone to certain kinds of ‘errors’ intracategory assimilation and intercategory differentiation. Later experiments found the same effects (Eiser, 1971, Doise et al., 1978, McGarty and Penny, 1988).

Research has also been done on the links between social categorization and intergroup discrimination. The series of experiments initiated by Tajfel (Tajfel et al., 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973), which came to be known under the name of ‘minimal group paradigm’ has set out ‘to discover if simply belonging to a group, and nothing else, might be enough to instigate a rudimentary form of behavioural prejudice – that is, the differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup members’ (Brown, 1995, p. 45). The hypothesis was confirmed, the experiments demonstrating that, on a point allocation task, participants favoured their own group and ‘discriminated’ against the group to which they did not belong. There was thus strong evidence that mere awareness of being in one group as opposed to another could produce intergroup discrimination. Such intergroup discrimination in the minimal group setting has proven to be a very robust phenomenon and has been widely replicated all over the world (see Brown, 1995, Tajfel, 1982). The apparent spontaneous discrimination is entirely consistent with the more general differentiation phenomena associated with the categorization process (cf Brown, 1995; see also Doise, 1976).

What this kind of research suggests is that ‘at least some of the origins of prejudice are to be found in the operation of a normal cognitive process’ (Brown, 1995. p. 48) These findings fuelled a breadth of experimental research on issues related to the workings of categorization as a normal cognitive process. Cross-categorization research (Doise et al., 1976, Deschamps and Doise, 1978), research on the perceived intragroup homogeneity (Jones et al., 1981; Linville et al., 1989) and research on category ‘accessibility’ and ‘fit’ (Campbell, 1958; Brown, 1995) are all instances of socio-cognitive research on categorization processes. For example, for the latter, ‘accessibility’ and ‘fit’ research, the adoption of a particular categorization in a given situation depends upon the ease of its cognitive accessibility to the person concerned and the degree of fit between that category system and the actual differences and similarities between people in that situation (cf. Brown, 1995). Some have claimed that categorical differences are less important basis for prejudice than perceived differences in beliefs.
It was hoped that complete explanations of prejudice would come from a more encompassing perspective on prejudice and group life. There was enough evidence and good reasons for supposing that social categorization and its outcomes, differentiation and stereotyping underlie much prejudiced thinking and judgement. There was also an awareness of the limitations of such an approach. As Brown notes,

theoretical models based solely on the cognitive activity of the person can explain why groups are perceived as more different from each other that they really are and why they may be seen in crude and over-simplified terms. But they cannot so easily account for why those perceptions have a consistently positive flavour when they refer to the ingroup and a negative, or at least, a less positive hue when they focus on the outgroup.


That is why the concept of social identity was needed. This was defined as ‘those aspects of an individual’s self image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging’ (Tajfel and Turner, 1986, p. 16). The theory also stated that ‘the achievement or maintenance of a satisfactory identity requires that group members will search out various forms of positive distinctiveness for their ingroup’ (Brown, 1995, p. 170). Turner et al. (1987), drawing on the work of Rosch (1978) claim that the basic level of categorizing people is that of the social group.

A number of explanations were offered along the way for the dynamic of social identities within inter-group contexts. For example, it was experimentally demonstrated that threats to people’s social identities are responded with attempts to differentiate the ingroup positively from outgroups (e.g. Bourhis and Giles, 1977, Breakwell, 1978). It may happen nevertheless that similarity (whether of status or attitudes) seems to promote attraction between groups (Brown and Abrams, 1986, Brewer and Campbell, 1976). Sometimes, outgroups which are seen as somewhat similar to the ingroup are treated more favourably than those which are perceived to be quite different (cf. Brown, 1995).

Issues related to the dynamics of the social identity of inferior groups, groups of subordinate status were also approached experimentally. For example, Tajfel and Turner (1986) suggest that a possible response in cases of low self-esteem of subordinate group belonging is to abandon the current social identity or to find and promote different dimensions of comparison (see Lemaune, 1966 for an example). Research has also
documented that prejudice towards an outgroup can be caused by a sense of relative deprivation, the perception that one own group is not doing so well as one believes it should be doing (Brown, 1995, p. 203-204)

Recent developments in self-categorization theory have put forward new ways of thinking about stereotyping and prejudice and understanding the issue of intergroup phenomena and the issue of social antagonism that preoccupied social psychologist since the pioneering work of Sherif. For example, Reynolds and Turner (2001) state that the “progress in understanding ‘prejudice’ requires recognition that it is a group process that originates in the psychology of the group, intergroup relations, and the reality of human social conflict” (p 178). For the two authors, prejudice is not

an outcome of irrationality, deficiency, and pathology, it can be understood as a psychological rational and valid product of the way members of certain groups perceive the social structure of intergroup relations

(2001, p. 178, italics in original)

Reynolds and Turner (2001; see also Turner, 1999b) appear to dismiss prejudice and stereotyping as fundamental problems. As the two authors suggest,

rather than being a product of asocial attitudes and actions, intergroup phenomena can be understood as an outcome of normal and adaptive cognitive processes that enable self-categorization of oneself and others in group-based terms ... it can be viewed as a product of collective psychology and the realities of intergroup relations


In this new view, stereotypes are not to be seen as inaccurate, or invalid for that matter, but as the outcome of the ‘rational selectivity of perception’ (Turner, 1999b, p. 26). According to this view, stereotyping does not ‘impoverish, but enriches social perception’ (Turner, 1999b, p. 27). For Reynolds and Turner (2001), social antagonism, as a psychologically rational and valid product of the way members of certain groups perceive the social structure of intergroup relations ‘arises from and reflects their subjectively-

* As Billig (2002a) suggests, part of self-categorization research is devoted to exploring the extent to which stereotyping might be ‘veridical’ It is worth noting that Billig places this kind of work as being antithetical to the work of Henri Tajfel (see Stangor, 1995, Augustinos and Walker, 1998 for a critique of research that attempts to conceptualise stereotypes as accurate or veridical)
apprehended understanding of the relationships between groups in society’ (p. 160, italics in original, see also Turner and Reynolds, in press; Turner, 1999a, b) Reynolds and Turner (2001) propose an alternative analysis of prejudice. The contention is that both prejudiced and unprejudiced groups are engaged ‘in the same psychology’ (p. 173, emphasis in original) Their perspective stems ‘from the same categorization process in interaction with intergroup relations and social structural factors’ (ibid., p. 173, italics in original; see also Oakes and Haslam, 2001)

Other recent cognitive approaches to social categorization, stereotyping and prejudice tend to introduce ‘emotional variables’ that would in a way complement the cognitive analysis of prejudices. For example, insofar hatred and violence against out-groups is concerned, Leyens et al. (2000) have provided sustained evidence that there is a tendency for in-group members to attribute more prototypically ‘human’ emotional attributes to their fellow group members than they do to out-group members. The implication of this research, is that, “such beliefs ultimately could legitimise the ‘inhuman’ treatment of certain out-groups” (Brown, 2002, p. 197, see also Billig’s critique of these approaches in the same issue of the British Journal of Social Psychology)

As Brown notes, one of the most serious problems with social identity theory and part of its exegesis is that the main focus has usually been on measuring in-group bias, whether in evaluative judgements or reward allocations. But the question is, do these commonly used measures of in-group bias really represent prejudice as the holding of derogatory attitudes or beliefs ... or the display of hostile and discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group


As Billig argues,

social identity theory is not a theory of prejudice ... It is, at root, a theory of group freedom. It tells of the way that oppressed groups can find ways to challenge groups that have the power to ascribe identities and stereotypes.

(2002a, p 179)

The main assumption and conclusion of social-cognitive approaches to group identity and group processes is that, in a way, prejudice is inevitable and thinking about social groups
involves stereotyping and categorization in one way or another. But, even if one were to concede that prejudice is inevitable and that thinking about social groups involves functional processes of social categorization and stereotyping, it does not mean that all prejudices (and stereotyping) are equivalent. As Billig (2002) put it, the term 'prejudice' may be too anodyne to cover all forms of intergroup stereotyping. Stereotypes, even if they are broadly 'negative', can be distinguished in terms of their intensity and ideological importance (p. 177).

Following on this idea, Billig (2002a) talks about a gap in social identity theory, which deals on one hand with how this social cognitive approach failed to directly address extreme bigotry. On the other hand, there is a further absence. The absence of a distinction between prejudice and bigotry which is 'parallelising the cognitive approach's failure to distinguish between prejudice and bigotry' (p. 180).

Another element that social identity theory continues to hold in common with social cognition research 'is a tendency to universalise the conditions for racism and a lingering perceptualism' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 47). The process of categorization and the cognitive consequences of group membership are seen as universal and inevitable processes. For example, the minimal group paradigm and research that has originated from this argue that the possibility of in-group bias rests on the possibility of group categorization. The notion of 'meta-contrast ratio' is used to explain this (only in Turner's version of self-categorization theory) and further the idea that all psychological processes involved in intergroup contexts are triggered by the recognition of this fact. As a consequence, racism is broadly seen as a problem of ethnocentrism, racist discourse is 'discourse which favours ingroups and demigrates outgroups; it is discourse which categorizes, evaluates, ranks and differentiates between groups' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 43).

There are also some ambiguities insofar the representation of social categories is concerned. One of the problems is that the 'existence of social categories and groups, along with individuals, is ... taken for granted' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 46) and social processes are believed to be mediated by psychologically rational and valid products of subjectively grounded perception of the social structure of inter-group
relations. The traditional, but also the new theoretical and empirical position of social identity and self-categorization theory is an ‘uneasy mix of acknowledging the socially constructed nature of categories and groups and emphasizing the foundational basis of individual perception’ (ibid., p. 47). As it will be argued in chapter three, this theoretical ‘compromise’ derives from a failure and lack of concern with putting together a theory of language, which would consider categorization as a discursive practice (Edwards, 1991; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995).

In a very recent critique of social identity theory, Billig (2002a, b) criticizes Tajfel (1969) and by extension the social identity theory exegesis for attempting to offer a ‘universalist’ explanation of prejudice. For him, this leads to two very important consequences insofar the study of prejudice (and extreme prejudice) is concerned. First, the inadequacy of explaining the cultural, historical and ideological specificities of prejudice. Second, it leads directly to the implication that prejudice is the outcome of natural cognitive processes and thus inevitable. Other criticism of social identity and self-categorization theory comes from the failure to satisfactorily distinguish between prejudice and bigotry and elaborate on the possible continuum between depersonalization and dehumanisation. These are vital shortcomings of the social identity approach, as ‘for any social psychological theory of social conflict, let alone a theory of genocide, such a continuum would be vital it would demarcate the ‘ordinary’ from the ‘abnormal’, or the mild from the strong’ (Billig, 2002a, p. 181).

Going back to the main argument of this section, what is important to note in relation to SIT is that in all its versions it stresses the importance of categorization for processes related to stereotyping and prejudice. What it does not take nevertheless into account is the idea that categorization is essentially something discursive. As discursive psychologists

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10 See also the responses to his article by Rupert Brown (2002) and Stephen Frosh (2002) in the same issue of the British Journal of Social Psychology

11 In his critique of social identity and self-categorization theory Michael Billig points to the issue of extreme prejudice and extreme prejudiced talk for which social identity theory cannot offer a satisfactory account. As he argues, in order ‘to understand the nature of bigotry, one needs to pay close attention to what bigots say and, in particular, to the ideology of bigotry’ (Billig, 2002b, p. 202)

12 In his response to Brown and Frosh, Billig (2002b) re-emphasizes the gaps in Tajfel’s and his followers’ theorizing. The main point to which Billig wants to draw the attention is that ‘there can be no psychology of bigotry, if social psychology is confined to identifying universal processes in specific contexts’, there cannot be a psychology of bigotry if ‘the specific psychological features of bigotry will then be reduced to contextual issues, lying outside the general psychology of prejudice’ (p. 200)
have stressed, categorization is not simply a cognitive process, but a ‘discursive action’, which is ‘actively constructed in discourse for rhetorical ends’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 77). Potter and Wetherell (1987) see categorization as a ‘complex and subtle social accomplishment’. Their question is how ‘categories are flexibly articulated in the course of certain sorts of talk and writing to accomplish particular goals, such as blamings or justifications’ (p. 116). In the same vein, Edwards (1991) describes categorization as ‘something we do, in talk, in order to accomplish social actions (persuasion, blamings, denials, refutations, accusations, etc)’ (p. 517).

The changing nature of racism

Another attempt to move away from the conceptualisation of prejudice as an individual phenomenon was the attempt to differentiate, to distinguish between ‘prejudice’ and ‘racism’. For example, Jones (1972) has been influential in making the case that racism should not be equated with prejudice. In his view and others, racism is thought to be a broader construct that links individual beliefs and practices to wider social and institutional norms and practices. One of the central assumptions in defining racism was the belief in a racial hierarchy between groups. It was argued nevertheless that this definition of racism based on the belief in essential differences and biological superiority/inferiority (Miles, 1989) which leads to the categorization of people into groups based on essential features (Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1997) is quite restrictive. As a number of researchers have demonstrated, the justificatory and legitimatory basis of contemporary racism is based and constructed upon beliefs in a cultural rather than essentialist and biological hierarchy (cf. Essed, 1991). Another contemporary variant of racism, known as ‘new racism’ (Barker, 1981) attempts to go beyond the idea of cultural hierarchy emphasising the need for separate cultural and social development of social groups.

With the defeat of fascism and the collapse of legal segregation in the United States, outward racism became unacceptable. As a consequence, new ways of expressing racism were apparently found. Racism has been documented and conceptualised under different and diverse ‘names’ A plethora of terms were coined to capture the diversity of ‘racisms’ that were considered to form the basis of different expressions of prejudice. It was mainly American researchers that started to investigate the particularities of ‘racism’ and the
guises in which it can be found and researched in society. For example, McConahay and Hough (1976), McConahay (1981, 1982), Kinder and Sears (1981) looking at people that voice anti-black sentiments were proposing a distinction between 'new racism' (which includes people who typically deny their own prejudices) and 'old-fashioned red-necked racism' (which includes people who unambiguously use and declare their adhesion to racial values). Gunnar Myrdal (1944)'s *The American Dilemma* is another example of the way in which people defending discrimination chose their words with great care when talking about blacks.

If in the previous approaches to the study of stereotyping and prejudice there was a concern with the individualized, but also group-based cognitive correlates of stereotyping, prejudice and racism, the approaches that come under the heading of 'modern racism' have been mainly concerned to document and measure the changing manifestations of racism. Their work was based on an historical assumption and observation that prejudice is declining and that racial values and ways of talking that could be defended without embarrassment a hundred years ago were no longer socially acceptable. This observation was not taken to mean that 'some unpleasant dilemmas of common-sense have been cleared up, as the racial store of common-places has been declared locked until further notice' (Billig, 1996, p. 247), but that 'detached from their old value, some racist images, beliefs, and even feelings may now travel under the protection of acceptable, and formerly contrary, values' (ibid., p. 247).

As various researchers working within this framework have shown, 'modern racism' is expressed in covert ways, which avoid a direct appeal to racial values. As Billig (1996) suggests, 'acts of discrimination and voicing of prejudice will be justified in terms of any value but a racial one' (p. 248). This has also raised the issue of how racism may be combined with 'liberal' principles and how the discursive thesaurus of democracy with notions such as rights, equality or freedom can become applied to oppose particular attempts to compensate ethnic minorities and affirmative action programmes. Insofar the explanations for this kind of 'new racism' are concerned this approach can be placed within the strand of the cultural theories of prejudice. The backdrop of cultural theories of

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13 Dovidio and Fazio (1992) have compiled historical evidence for a more positive trend in changes in white American ethnic stereotypes. Their conclusion was these changes were present only in relative terms and only in relation to some groups.
prejudice is viewing 'the internalisation of group norms and values and conformity to such norms... as fundamental in the widespread adoption of prejudiced values within society' (Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001b, p. 9; see also Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981). The acceptance of such norms is said to reinforce particular cultural formations and help reproducing unequal relations of power and relations of dominance. For example, the notion of 'symbolic racism' (Sears, 1988, Sears and Kinder, 1971) is based on the common assumption that values, standards and group norms that are widely shared within a community (or group) can shape prejudice and the way it is expressed. Prejudice is conceptualised as a social or cultural norm (cf. Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001b).

Nevertheless, as Wetherell and Potter (1992, see also Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986) have argued, the modern racism approach is not confined to a socio-cultural explanation of racial prejudice, as it is said to be a mixture of old themes in the social psychology of racial prejudice by taking up 'the motivational and psychopathological strand evident in studies of the authoritarian personality and also the socialization and social learning themes in the socio-cultural strand of explanation' (p. 196). Conflicts were seen as acquired from one's culture, through the process of socialization and subsequently they become built into the character structure of the individual.

The direction of the analytic discoveries was from documenting an old fashioned, red-necked racism to what was later called 'new' or 'modern racism' (for reviews see Brown, 1995; Duckitt, 1992; Walker, 2001). 'Symbolic racism' (Sears and Kinder, 1971), 'modern racism' (McConahay, 1982), 'ambivalent racism' (Katz and Hass, 1988; Katz et al., 1986) were all notions ready to capture the particularities of a changing 'racism.' The American notion of 'modern racism' was applied in other intergroup contexts, such as race relations in South Africa (Duckitt, 1991), the UK (Brown, 1995) and Australia (Pedersen and Walker, 1997). In the UK, Reeves (1983), in his thorough analysis of British racial discourse, observes a 'sanitization' of the discourse of legitimation, similar to the one identified by other researchers in other countries (cf. Essed, 1991). Other researchers, such Gaertner and Dovidio (1977, 1986) distinguish between 'aversive' and 'dominative' racism. Building on Allport, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) and Pettigrew et al. (1998) distinguish between 'blatant' and 'subtle' prejudice, which are seen not as separate, but inter-related constructs.
Wetherell and Potter argue (1992) that a distinction between types of people is common to all the perspectives grouped under the label of 'new' or 'modern racism'. This view is also supported by Brown (1995) who argues that what all these approaches have in common is 'an individual differences perspective in the sense that the research goal has been to find reliable ways of distinguishing people who score high or low on some psychometric scale, and then to examine correlates of that distinction' (p. 217). McConahay (1986), for example, identifies three groups: there are the 'tolerant' who are said to experience 'low negative affect' towards blacks and hold strong values of equality and consequently have positive anti-racist reactions, there are those who fall into the ambivalent class, who experience conflict because they have moderately negative feelings towards blacks but also value equality, finally, one can find those whose strong negative feelings towards the blacks 'overpower their values' and as a consequence experience no conflict (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1992). The main contention was that it is the ambivalent class who is covered by the label 'modern racism' and that this ambivalent class has become the norm in American society. The conflict that gives rise to 'modern racism' is one between anti-black sentiments and liberal values.

This has lead to a distinction put between 'modern' racists and 'old fashioned' racists. Modern racists share some negative feeling (although not all theories concentrate on 'feeling') towards Blacks, but they do not endorse the traditional negative stereotypes and nor do they agree with segregationist views. The modern racist outlook is basically a form of resistance to change in the status quo, which is based on feelings of blacks violating deeply held traditional American values (cf. Kinder and Sears, 1981; see also Brown, 1995). The more recent distinction between 'subtle' and 'blatant' prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995) mirrors the traditional one between 'modern' and 'old-fashioned' prejudice. As the authors argue, subtle racism includes an exaggeration of cultural differences between the majority in-group and the minority out-group and a denial of any positive emotional response towards outgroup members. In contrast to blatant racists, subtle racists do not express overtly negative feelings towards minority groups, they merely withhold any positive feelings (cf. also Brown, 1995).

Gaertner and Dovidio (1977, 1986)'s analyses, which distinguish between 'aversive' and 'dominative' racism, place more emphasis on situational factors and prejudice is seen as an 'aversive' response. It is worth noting that, despite the different labelling, the 'aversive
The analysis of 'modern' racism and the discourse analytic approach to racism are both concerned with the changing discourse of racism and manifestations of racism and share
the same attempt to understand how racism might combine with 'liberal' principles of democracy and equality of rights and diverse political commonplaces.

In the 'new' racism approach, it is assumed that psychological factors are overwhelmingly the primary, nearest cause. For example, in the case of 'aversive racism' negative affect is said to be characterized as fear, discomfort or unease; in the case of 'symbolic racism' and 'modern racism' the underlying negative affect is hostility or dislike. Negative affect itself is said to reside within the psychological make-up of the individual. There is also an awareness of the importance of social factors, cultural norms, processes of socialization. As Wetherell and Potter cogently observe,

modern racism theorists do note that social factors are mediated through psychological factors, they point to the process of socialization, for instance, but the thrust of their argument concerns the potent mix of conflicting values and feelings supposedly found within modern individuals. (1992, p 197).

Conflict and ambivalence along with the dilemmas that characterize 'new' racism are placed within the 'emotional and cognitive apparatus of the individual' (ibid, p 197).

In contrast to this, the discourse analysis of racism locates the conflicts and dilemmas within the argumentative and rhetorical resources available in 'liberal', 'democratic' and 'egalitarian' societies. As Wetherell and Potter have put it,

the conflict is not between a feeling and a value, between psychological drives and socially acceptable expressions or between emotions and politics, but between competing frameworks for articulating social, political and ethical questions (1992, p 197).

The psychological, but also the public, the social realization of these conflicts and dilemmas comes into being in social interaction when members of society begin to discuss, explain and justify controversial issues or the common-places of everyday 'political' life.

One of the questions that discourse researchers analysing the discourse of racism have asked was whether one is dealing with ambivalent individuals or ambivalent discourse
(see Wetherell and Potter, 1992). As previously noted, the tendency within the ‘modern’ racism approach is to understand ambivalence as a conflict between anti-minority sentiments and traditional, entrenched societal values. As a consequence, racism becomes conceptualised narrowly as ‘negative feelings and cognitions ... which mingle in the final attitudinal expression with more general political values and their associated feelings and cognitions’ (p. 198) The answer put forward by discourse researchers points to the pervasiveness and the endemic character of ambivalence, inconsistency and contradiction in discourse (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) These features do not seem to be associated with one group of individuals (or type of person). The appeals to conflicting principles, practical considerations or commonplaces of politics are to be seen as useful rhetorical ploys, which can be used by anyone in different contexts (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1992).

A final difficulty, related to the first pointed out criticism, is constituted by the idea that within the modern racism type of approach, it is claimed that the conflictual expression of racism is ‘new’ and this is the feature that actually distinguishes present racism from the past expressions. As a contrasting and alternative hypothesis, discourse researchers have suggested that ‘the interpretative resources used to argue for racism may have always been varied and contradictory, and mobilized in a flexible and dilemmatic manner, as suits the character of natural discourse, and the ideological demands of the moment’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 199).

Discourse researchers place the conflictual expression of racism not within a ‘new’ genre of discourse, but within the flexible and dilemmatic mobilization of discourse for different interactional and ideological purposes, in the service of ‘power’. This brings the issue of ‘power’ to the fore and its role in inter-group relations. The main idea behind the concept of ‘power’ in intergroup relations is constituted by the exercise of this ‘power’ over the out-group (Reicher, 2001). According to this view, racism needs to be defined with necessary reference to the dynamics of power differentials between groups. The issue of power is theoretically used to link the study of individual prejudice with broader social practices (Jones, 1998). As Augoustinos and Reynolds (2001b, p 4) argue, ‘racism, practiced at a structural and cultural level, maintains and reproduces the power differentials between groups in the social system’. A reinterpretation of the notion of ‘power’ and its role for group relations will be attempted in the next chapter that introduces a discursive approach to the study of prejudice.
As Walker (2001) has pointed out, ‘modern’ racism, but also old-fashioned racism have been usually theorized as an individual phenomenon, a characteristic that pertains to individuals (whatever nationality or ethnic allegiance they might have). This raises the issue of the unaccounted for role played by institutions and cultures in reproducing unequal relations of power and prejudiced social relations. There have been attempts at distinguishing between different types of racism (e.g., Jones, 1997) such as individual, institutional, and cultural, but the prevalent framework and way of doing research has been one that focuses exclusively on individual prejudice which help reproducing the location of prejudice within the individual and ignores the historical, ideological, structural, and cultural forces that influence the enactment and legitimation of racism (Hopkins et al., 1997).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the major traditional approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. Limitations and shortcomings of these approaches were identified, mainly those related to the analysis of stereotyping, prejudice, and racism based on the importance of language, discursive practices, and ideological representations. What is important to note at this point is that, in reworking and altering the classical approach to stereotypes and stereotypes, the main modern approaches to prejudice reviewed here have at the same time virtually lost from sight the tension of the epistemological dilemma of the ‘political’ and ‘psychological’ sense of stereotypes. Instead, the psychology of stereotypes and stereotyping was used to justify the politics of stereotypes. The problems raised by these social psychological approaches to stereotyping ‘stem from the splitting apart of the two opposed dimensions in the stereotype concept, so that the psychological process of stereotyping becomes conceived as decontaminated from the politics of stereotypical representation’ (Pickering, 2001, p. 37)

As some authors have noted, there is the need to develop forms of analysis that could ‘overcome the ideological separation of the politics and psychology of the stereotyping process itself’ (Pickering, 2001, p. 35, see also Reicher, 2001) Traditional (conventional) approaches to prejudice are ahistorical in their approaches and implications, neglecting the specificities of representing cultural identities, and assuming universal psychological
similarities in group identification. As this chapter has hopefully shown, most of the traditional and mainstream work in social psychology has neglected the ‘social dilemma of stereotyping’ (Pickering, 2001; see also the work of Michael Billig) by having recourse to the dual strategy of ‘pathologizing’ and ‘naturalizing’ stereotyping. At the same time, this was achieved through a strategy of de-politicisation of stereotyping, that is divorcing it, on one hand, from the issue of the influence of politics and political issues for public discourse and on the other hand, from the implications of the language of stereotyping for politics and political issues. Stereotypes, stereotypical forms of talk do not operate in a vacuum, but are to be found in the social and public domain. Stereotypes have an historical basis and their use can have important (and sometimes dangerous) political and ideological effects.

One way to dealing with the social dilemma of stereotyping and going beyond it is by documenting the social and discursive links between stereotyping and Othering. The problems that the study of stereotypes has encountered are very similar to the problems pertaining to the concept of ‘Otherness’. It is ‘Othering’ (rather than ‘Otherness’), that is making someone ‘Other’, investing someone with the epitome of otherness which is at stake when one talks about stereotyping, ideological representation and extreme prejudice.

As the chapter dedicated to the discursive approaches to the study of stereotyping, prejudice and racism (and also the analytical chapters) will show, the ‘Othering’ process operates in relation to the available cultural and discursive resources of society, in relation to the ambivalence and flexibility of ‘located’ repertoires and common-places of prejudice and tolerance based on common-sense rhetorical and discursive strategies of legitimating common-place nationalism and extreme prejudice. No theoretical and empirical discussion of ‘representing the other’ can be based on considering the ‘Other’ as a “totalizable intelligible object” that “simply ‘exists’ out there, waiting to be represented” (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996, p. 15). As the same authors point out, ‘Others are constructed – by those who do the Othering, by those who reflect upon that Othering, and by the Others’ own representations of themselves’ (p 15, italics in original).

As a consequence, one needs to actively engage with the process of ‘Othering’ as topic, one needs to pay attention to the ideological constructive processes of making someone ‘Other’, investing it with the epitome of ‘Otherness’ and the ideological and social effects
of these constructions. In Wilkinson and Kitzinger’s words, ‘only by making Othering (rather than Otherness) the focus of our attention, and by exploring the ways in which it is done and undone, reinforced and undermined, can we open the possibility, finally, of interrupting its oppressive discourse’ (1996, p. 27-28, italics in original).
Chapter three
Discursive approaches to the study of stereotyping, prejudice and racism

Introduction
This chapter is concerned with presenting a review of the main theoretical tenets and approaches drawn upon in this thesis. At the same time, it is aimed to provide a contextual background for the analytical chapters. Through this chapter I want to raise, among others, two specific theoretical issues around the discursive analysis of stereotyping, prejudice and racism. On one hand, this chapter will emphasise the importance of studying discourse and proposes that an analysis of prejudice and extreme prejudice be done through the study of discourse (of prejudice and extreme prejudice). On the other hand, this chapter will place a special emphasis on the ideological dimension of discourse and the importance of studying ideology in text and talk. A discussion of ideology (ideologies) as discursively accomplished, the functioning and processes of ideology and the effects of drawing upon ideological representations of social issues and social actors will constitute a central concern of this chapter.

These issues are central to the ways in which data on controversial, political issues can be analysed and provide a detailed account on the analytical choices made in this thesis. It is believed that the issues raised here have significant implications for the study of stereotyping, prejudice and racism. In a nutshell, they demonstrate the centrality of discourse and ideology to our interpretation and understanding of prejudice and extreme prejudice as something that people do in talk with diverse ideological effects.

Discourse analysis
As Potter (1997) notes, in order to answer the question ‘what is discourse analysis?’ one has to look to its developments within different disciplines, such as linguistics, cognitive psychology, socio-linguistics and post-structuralism. For example, in linguistics, the label
‘discourse analysis’ was applied to the study of the ways in which sentences give rise to a coherent discourse (Brown and Yule, 1983) Other discourse analytic research within linguistics has looked at pedagogical interactions in order to discover and document certain interactional patterns in the learning process (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975). The intention was to set up a model that could explain discursive structures in different contexts (Coulthard and Montgomery, 1981). In cognitive psychology, the attention was focused on the ways in which mental scripts and schemas are used to offer narrative understanding (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).

In post-structuralism and literary theory another tradition of discourse analysis was developed This perspective is associated with the name of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1971), and the focus is less on discourse as specific interaction, but on showing how certain diverse cultural entities get constituted discursively (this also includes the ‘history’ of this constructive process) and how certain types of discourse give birth to ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’. Sometimes, the label ‘discourse analysis’ is used more inclusively for all the above mentioned perspectives in combination with perspectives such as speech act theory, pragmatics or conversation analysis (for more examples see Stubbs, 1983; van Dijk, 1985).

Discourse analysis has been influenced by philosophical and sociological traditions, which have been concerned with participants’ everyday language practices. Its direct theoretical and analytic ‘roots’ can be found in developments in sociology of scientific knowledge (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, Potter and Mulkay, 1985) and its development in social psychology (Potter, 1984, 1987, 1988a, b, Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1988). Speech acts theory (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1969) and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984) were also developing functional perspectives on language and on the practices of everyday life Language was considered a (social) practice that constitutes and is constitutive of ‘reality’ A major part of this focus on the details of language and social life can also be found in conversation analysis (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984, Levinson, 1983; Sacks et al., 1974; Sacks, 1995; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998) where the meticulous analysis of the details of interaction through the use of conversational transcripts has demonstrated the extremely organized nature of discourse as sequential social action (Edwards and Potter, 1992a). This strand of research aims at understanding the way talk forms a central part of social interaction in both everyday and institutional settings (e.g
Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Drew and Heritage, 1992) Conversation analysts see talk, and especially, mundane, unconstrained talk, as the foundation of social life and social structure. Discourse analysis also benefited from a rhetorical perspective on language use (Billig, 1987a) which emphasizes the way claims tend to be embedded in arguments and argumentative positions, and has also been influenced by a range of notions from post-structuralism (particularly the work of Foucault and Barthes).

The development of a discursive social psychology was facilitated by the intellectual climate created by the works of Gergen (1973), Harré and Secord (1972) and Shotter (1977). All these orientations have their roots in the philosophy of language within which the problems related to knowledge were reformulated as problems related to language, more precisely, in terms of the use of language (Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1953).

**Discursive psychology**

For the purposes of this thesis, I am going to focus my attention on a variant of discourse analysis developed, first in sociology, and then in social psychology (see inter alia Billig, 1992; Edwards and Potter, 1992a; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, Potter and Wetherell, 1987). The first article of what is known now under the name of ‘discursive psychology’ was Litton and Potter (1985), but the moment that marked the steady development of the discursive perspective in social psychology was the publishing, in 1987, of the well-known *Discourse and Social Psychology* by Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (1987). In the same year, Michael Billig publishes *Arguing and Thinking* and a new perspective (rhetorical psychology) was entering social psychology.

There are a plethora of books and articles that present the general characteristics of discursive psychology (for example, Antaki, 1994; Billig, 1991; Edwards and Potter, 1992a, 1993; Parker, 1992; Harré and Gillett, 1994, Potter and Wetherell, 1994; and more recently, Billig, 1997b, Potter, 1996b, 1997; Potter and Edwards, 2001; Edwards and Potter, 2001, in press). I am not going to discuss in too much detail the general characteristics of discursive psychology, but what I want to stress is the idea that the psychologists who are part of this discursive strand share a common interest which refers to the importance of language as a topic of inquiry in its own right. It is claimed that most of the psychological phenomena which psychologists have traditionally considered as
'internal states' are in fact constituted and are part of social activities, through the intermediary of discourse. Studying the way people talk and use language in interaction constitutes a new way of approaching psychological issues and processes which were said to reside 'in the head' of individuals. Discourse is analysed in its own right and is not seen as a pathway to something that lies behind talk. Discursive psychologists suggest that what social psychologists are studying are phenomena constituted through social interaction, and especially through the intermediary of discursive interaction.

There is also an important body of work on the different methodological and analytical aspects of discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992a, Gill, 1996; Potter, 1998b; Potter and Wetherell, 1994, 1995; Wetherell and Potter, 1992, Wooffitt, 1993; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995; more recently Wetherell et al., 2001a, b) Again, without going too much into detail let me note that discursive psychology does not use a 'method' in the traditional sense of the term. As Billig (1997a) observes, discursive analysis 'is more than following procedures for collecting and categorising discursive data; it involves a theoretical way of understanding the nature of discourse and the nature of psychological phenomena' (p. 43) Discursive analysis is more than a method, in the traditional sense, which can be applied in every instance, but constitutes an epistemological turn. The analysis of discourse and rhetoric involves a critical and thoughtful 'reading' of 'texts', rigorous scholarship rather than following of formal procedures (Billig, 1988d). As Billig puts it, 'discourse analysis, as used in social psychology, is much more than a methodology . . it is a wider, theoretical approach towards psychology' (Billig, 1997a, p. 39).

Discursive social psychology is a broadly constructionist approach associated with a relativist meta-theory rather than a positivist one who still dominates experimental social psychology (Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995; Gergen, 1994). Discursive social psychology is constructionist in two ways. On one hand, it starts from the assumption that individuals construct their own reality through the intermediary of the descriptions they use. 'Reality' is part of our practices through the categories and descriptions, which are part of these practices. As Jonathan Potter (1998b, p. 235) argues, reality is not pre-ordered, pre-categorized in a way to make it being passively accepted, but it is 'constituted in one way or another as people talk it, write it, argue it and undermine it'. On the other hand, these very descriptions and accounts that people use in various situations 'are
themselves constructed; that is fabricated in occasions of talk, or in specific texts, from words, metaphors and a range of discursive resources’ (ibid, p 235, emphasis in original).

As previously noted, discursive social psychology has its origins in applying ideas from discourse analysis to some of the aspects of social psychology (Antaki, 1994; Billig, 1997a, 1999a; Edwards and Potter, 2001, in press; Potter, 1996a, 1998; Potter and Edwards, 2001) Discursive psychology treats talk and texts as social practices and, as Derek Edwards (2003, p. 1) suggests, studies the ‘relationships between mind and world, as psychology generally does, but as a discourse topic—as a participant’s concern, a matter of talk’s business, talk’s categories, talk’s rhetoric, talk’s current interactional concerns’.

Discursive psychologists have focused their study on the subtle, complex, context-sensitive nature of talk and its orientation to ongoing actions and issues of identity (Edwards and Potter, 1992a, 1993) People do things with their talk, they make accusations, justify their actions, ask questions, excuse, persuade etc. People use language to do things, to construct versions of the world (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) depending upon the function of their talk. Talk or text becomes a ‘topic in its own right’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p 35).


They have also provided critical insights into the psycho-sociological study of notions such as categories (Billig, 1985, 1987a; Condor, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Widdicombe and Wooffit, 1995, Edwards, 1991, 1997, 1998), the attribution process (Potter and Edwards, 1990; Edwards and Potter, 1992a, 1993; Edwards, 1997), social representations (Billig, 1988c, 1993a; Litton and Potter, 1985, Potter and Litton, 1985,
Some discursive psychologists, like Rom Harré believe that ‘all psychological processes are essentially discursive’ (1998, p. 136) Harré sees conversation as the leading model for discursive psychology. He holds the belief that “what we are studying when we are ‘doing psychology’ are discursive practices of various kinds, some of which could exist only in actual or potential interpersonal interactions” (ibid., p. 137) The same argument can be made in relation to the study of prejudice. What one is studying when one is approaching issues such as stereotyping, prejudice and racism are discursive practices of various kinds and of various content, ways of talking that reproduce dominance and unequal relations of power. These can only exist in social interaction, as people are constructing and describing those designed as ‘others’. The discursive turn in social psychology (see Harré, 2001 for a recent account) with its attention to discourse has been accomplished through a shift from the inner world of mental states and cognitive abstractions to the outer world of outward processes of language (in) use. This shift has wider implications for the analysis of prejudice and racism and for the issue of what stereotyping, prejudice and racism is. An analysis of prejudice and racism from a discursive perspective should follow the same movement, from the study of the inner realm of the cognitions and emotions of the (prejudiced) individual towards the study of the outward expression of prejudice, of the public and accountable ways in which inter-ethnic and national realities are constructed when we talk about ‘others’ (and about ourselves), towards the study of social and discursive practices that constitute, enact and reproduce prejudice and racism. This shift should be accompanied not only by the awareness of the importance of discourse for the study of prejudice and racism, but also of the awareness of the social, political consequences of talking about others in different ways with different ideological effects.

**Discourse studies and prejudice**

At the beginning, as van Dijk et al. (1997) notes, ‘within discourse analysis, as well as within the study of racism in the social sciences, the relations between discourse and racism have received relatively little attention’ (p. 166). Most of the earlier studies were based on quantitative (content analytical) accounts of the portrayal of minorities in
textbooks and mass-media. The conclusion of most of these studies was that minorities tend to be portrayed in highly stereotypical roles and in terms of problems (cf. van Dijk et al., 1997, see also Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Wilson and Gutiérrez, 1985).

One of the first discourse analytic attempts to study and 'map' prejudiced discourse was that of Uta Quasthoff (1978, 1989). Quasthoff distinguishes between 'attitudes', 'convictions' and 'prejudices' and sees 'stereotypes' as a typical element of common knowledge and the verbal expression of a certain conviction directed towards a social group or individual belonging to that social group. Quasthoff explains the function of social prejudice through invoking, on one hand, the inner psychic functions of stereotypes, and on the other hand, the social functions of stereotypes. The outward expression of prejudices in the form of stereotypes functions socially as a means of phatic communion and also as a way of simplifying communication with the in-group and delineating the out-group (Quasthoff, 1989, see also Reisgl and Wodak, 2001). Nevertheless, her discussion of the social functions of prejudices and stereotypes does not very often surpass the linguistic horizon. Most of her analyses of social prejudiced do not transcend the sentence level.

A few detailed discourse analytic studies of the properties and organization of text and talk about ethnic relations were being carried out in a broader strand of research known as critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis (Kress and Hodge, 1979; Fowler et al., 1979). For example, Fowler et al. (1979)’s seminal work on the role of power and control in language also included an analysis of a press coverage of an ‘ethnic’ event (the disturbances at the Notting Hill festival in London). Among other things, Fowler et al. ’s findings related to how the syntactic structure of the sentences reflected the ‘white’ dominant perspective of the journalists and to how active and passive agency and responsibility was managed through the use of passive forms and emphasized syntactically.

The study of Sykes (1985) about discrimination in discourse comes to similar conclusions involving the role of grammatical form in the textual presentation of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In his work, Teun van Dijk took the observation of the importance of grammatical and syntactic features in the textual presentation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ further, but placed it this time at the level of discourse and turn it into a functional strategy. As he argues,
at all levels of discourse, this overall principle will remain the same, namely a strategy that combines positive-self presentation with negative other-presentation. Obviously, it is this strategy that plays a primary role in the socio-cognitive function of discourse about others, namely the formation of negative cognitions (specific mental models of concrete events, as well as more general group prejudices and ideologies) about outgroups.

(Van Dijk et al., 1997, p 166)

In a series of studies, Teun van Dijk, the advocate of a socio-cognitive discourse-analytic approach to the discourse of prejudice and racism, examined the ways majority group members in the Netherlands and the USA talk about minorities and ethnic relations in everyday conversations, the press and parliament and elite discourse (van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993a). In van Dijk’s early work, the construction of difference is done by the speakers along the lines of positive self-presentation – negative other presentation together with the categories used to rationalize prejudice against minority groups. He refers to these categories as ‘the 7 D’s of discrimination’: dominance, differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion, depersonalisation and daily discrimination (cf. Van Dijk, 1984). As he suggests, these strategies serve in various ways to legitimise and enact distinctions from those designated as ‘the other’.

This kind of discourse analytic study focused primarily in documenting the local argumentative and semantic moves, as well as some of the stylistic and rhetorical properties of text and talk about out-groups. Van Dijk has tried to link the expression of prejudice to the flexible and active use of discursive units larger than the sentence. It also dealt with the preferred types of topics involved in describing ‘others’ (such as deviance, difference and threat), storytelling and narrative organization. The detailed analysis of prejudiced stories has provided for a description and understanding of the functioning of a series of rhetorical devices such as apparent denials, apparent admissions, contrast structures, transfer or apparent concessions (van Dijk, 1987, 1992). In addition to this, van Dijk turned his attention to the long-term memory processes relevant to the production and retention of ethnic prejudices. According to him, semantic memory (which for him was the same as social memory), episodic memory and the control system are all functionally relevant to the retention and reproduction of prejudices. He also talks about situational and
contextual models and group schemata in order to explain the socio-cognitive dynamic of ethnic prejudice\(^1\) As van Dijk et al. put it,

\[
\text{this work was not intended as another ‘application’ of discourse analysis, but as a multidisciplinary approach to the study of the reproduction of racism in society, involving the complex relations between discourse structures, cognitive representations and societal structures (1997, p 167).}
\]

Elsewhere, Jager and colleagues (Duisburg, Germany) examined in detail the ways in which Germans spoke and wrote about minorities and refugees in the 1990’s and arrived at essentially similar conclusions The Duisburg researchers have used a mixture of Foucault’s theory of power and discourse with elements of Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model as their theoretical basis. According to their approach, the problem of racism is intimately linked to power and hegemony. The dominant group is considered to be employing collective symbols to marginalize and exclude minority groups. The main focus of many of the Duisburg studies is discourse semantics, especially the uncovering of ‘collective symbols’ (designated as cultural stereotypes in metaphorical and synecdochic forms) tied together in ‘discourse strands’ (interrelated sequences of ‘discourse fragments’) (cf. Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, Wodak and Reisigl, 1999).

Part of a extended and laborious program of critical discourse studies, Ruth Wodak and her associates from the University of Vienna have engaged in a series of inquiries into the social, political and historical dimensions of anti-Semitic discourse in Austria (Wodak, 1990, 1991; Wodak and Matouschek, 1993; see also Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Wodak and colleagues are the proponents of a discourse-historical approach of the rhetoric of racism and anti-semitism. As Wodak and Reisigl (1999) argue, the discourse-historical approach should be seen as an extension of Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model (see also Mitten and Wodak, 1993). This discourse analytical approach to the study of prejudice and racism is based on a more context sensitive approach, including, among other dimensions of context, the broader socio-political and historical context, but also the history of the discursive practices that reproduce dominance.

\(^1\) Van Dijk has also analyzed the language of racism in the press (van Dijk, 1991), the discourses of the elites and racism (van Dijk, 1993a) and integrated the concept of ‘ideology’ into his socio-cognitive model (van Dijk, 1998)
The discourse-historical analytic approach applied in a series of studies (de Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak, 1996, 1997a, b; Wodak et al., 1999) focused on the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse with racist, nationalist or anti-Semitic underpinnings, the discursive and argumentation strategies actively used, the linguistic means and specific linguistic realisations (cf Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The discourse-historical method has not only confirmed the complexity of prejudiced discursive patterns, but has as well suggested that the prejudicial content which expressions of prejudice transmit is largely determined by the historical and linguistic contexts of their emergence (cf Mitten and Wodak, 1993, Wodak and Matouschek, 1993)

At this point, it is also worth mentioning the work of Blommaert and Verschueren (1992, 1998), who within a framework of a research program on the pragmatics of nationalist discourse examined how white people in Belgium talk about minorities and immigrants.

The work undertaken in Britain by Michael Billig and others (Billig, 1985; Billig et al., 1988; Cochrane and Billig, 1984; Condor, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) was also a firm step to establish discourse analysis as a useful tool in the analysis of prejudice and racism. The work of Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter on the language of racism in New Zealand has also been of central importance in investing discourse analysis with the power to question unequal relations of power and document the reproduction of dominance through talk. 'Discursive psychology' constituted an analytic trend that attempted to go beyond the semantic, pragmatic, grammatical and propositional levels of analysis advocated by the previously mentioned approaches to the analysis of prejudices and racism. It also constituted an attempt to go beyond the socio-cognitive assumptions contained in much of the work on prejudice and racism and beyond a simple interpretation of complex discursive strategies.

For example, as Van Dijk put it (1987), 'talk about ethnic groups involves complex strategies and moves aiming at positive self-presentation within the overall of negative other-description' (p. 22). When delicate topics are under discussion, and when social norms are rather strict, face saving is essential. As Van Dijk concludes, 'the expression of even the most racist opinions tends to be embedded in moves that are intended to prevent the inference that the speaker is a racist' (p. 22). In discussing Van Dijk, Billig (1988a) argued that the assumption of a contradiction between racist attitudes and interactional
strategies should be seen as a contradiction within the different ideological themes people draw on Billig et al. (1988) suggests that common sense is dilemmatic and people possess contrary themes as part of their commonsensical stock of knowledge. The argumentative nature of attitudes is stressed, as attitudes represent positions in a matter of controversy (Billig, 1987a). The rhetorical context of attitudes implies that people will justify their stance and criticize competing views. As he argues,

beyond the issue of self-presentation there is an argumentative or rhetorical dimension. If views are to be presented as being rational and unprejudiced, then they must be seen to be justified, or at least to be justifiable.

(Billig et al., 1988, p. 113)

The statements that follow the 'but' must appear as arguments, for which reasons are expected to be given.

Since the pioneering work of van Dijk (1984, 1987) and Michael Billig (1985) on the links between prejudice and language (discourse and racism), discourse has come to be seen as a 'prominent way in which ethnic prejudices and racism are reproduced in society' (van Dijk et al., 1997, p. 144). Discourse research on ethnic relations has demonstrated the social-action level of attitudes. Racist attitudes are seen as interpretative effects of descriptions and explanations (Van Dijk, 1984, 1987; Potter and Wetherell, 1988, Wetherell and Potter, 1992). People's talk is not 'just' talk, but rather talk as social action. People use language to do things, to construct versions of the world (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) depending upon the function of their talk. Talk or text becomes a topic in its own right, a site for the examination of the workings of ideology.

As many other, more recent investigations, have shown, constructions of tolerance and denials of feelings of prejudice are part of the common identity work of contemporary racist discourse (LeCouteur, 2001; LeCouteur and Augoustinos, 2001; Blommaert and Verschueren, 1993, 1998; Rapley, 1998, 2001). Some researchers have identified different modes of expressing prejudices and stereotypes, which have been labelled (Wodak, 2002) 'discourses of silence' or 'discourses of allusions'. In this kind of discourses, prejudicial contents can only be inferred to by listeners/viewers/readers who know the background and also the genesis of such allusions/insinuations or presuppositions.
Discursive psychology and prejudice

Discursive psychology has developed and provided a critique of the traditional conceptualisations of attitudes. It was argued for a re-specification of attitudes in terms of 'evaluative practices' (Myers, 1998, Potter, 1998b). Discursive psychology views opinions, beliefs and attitudes ('prejudiced' or otherwise) not as a priori phenomena which need explanation, but rather as resources which members can draw upon in talk, in order to achieve contextual relevant rhetorical and social action. The discursive psychological move is from considering underlying, stable, cognitively represented attitudes, to evaluative practices that are flexibly produced for particular occasions (Potter, 1998b; Speer and Potter, 2000). In the study of prejudice and racism, discursive psychologists have moved beyond the experimental, cognitive approaches or highly standardized survey research using attitude scales. From a discursive perspective, it is argued that traditional ways of conceptualising prejudice and racism by the use of attitude scales tend to reify the object they attempt to measure, 'by presenting its contours as relatively self-evident and objectively measurable prior to -- and not as a result of -- an analysis of actual instances' (cf. Speer and Potter, 2000, p 545).

In traditional analyses of prejudice, social psychologists have been reluctant to deal with actual conversational interaction, preferring to approach it via experiment, scales or questionnaires. As Jonathan Potter argues, 'part of the reason for this has been the prevalent cognitive assumptions which have directed the research focus away from interaction and on to generative mechanisms within the person' (1998b, p 239). In what discursive social psychologists are concerned, it has to be said that they have emphasized the primacy of practices themselves and, as a consequence, have focused on conversational interaction in interviews or natural settings, or documents of various kinds (Potter, 1998b).

Take for example the use of interviews in discourse research. Interviews are used for identifying and exploring participants interpretative practices rather than an instrument for accessing a set of attitudes and beliefs (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and Mulkay, 1985). It is questionable to treat interview questions and answers as passive filters towards some truth about people's identities and attitudes (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995;
Silverman, 2001). Instead, interviewer and interviewee are to be seen as actively constructing some version of the world appropriate to what the parties involved take to be self-evident and the context of the question (Burgess, 1984; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Interviewees' subjectivity is seen as locally produced sequentially in and through talk (Baker, 1997; Rapley, 2001).

Wetherell and Potter (1992), Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995), both extended discourse-based studies, which work principally with interview material, illustrate some of the analytic possibilities they provide. Edwards (2003), referring to the use of interviews in analysing racial issues, suggests that interviews on controversial topics such as prejudice, discrimination, ethnic categorization or stereotyping are not easy to interpret. These kinds of interviews often entail contradictory, ambiguous and ambivalent statements.

Discursive psychologists have looked at how evaluations of prejudice are produced in interaction. This line of work shows the way evaluations are produced to perform actions (Potter, 1998b). It also shows that evaluations are typically produced in the context of at least potential argument (Billig, 1991) and providing an evaluation for something is, often, implicitly providing an evaluation against something else (Billig, 1988c). As discursive psychologists have argued, it is better to treat evaluative talk in terms of its role in interaction rather than trying to characterize it using notions such as attitudes and opinions (e.g., Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1988; Puchta and Potter, 1999, 2002; Verkuyten, 1998b).

With the increasing importance of discourse studies into the landscape of social psychology, it has become probably commonplace to affirm that 'it is not fully adequate to analyze stereotyping, prejudice and racism as more or less inevitable consequences of faulty generalizations or biased judgments' (Verkuyten et al., 1995, p. 252) as the majority of the cognitive social psychological exegesis of Allport (1954) seems to suggest.

Discursive psychologists have opposed socio-cognitive approaches that prioritise the cognitive dimension in the analysis of racism and tend to universalise the conditions for racism (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987, Wetherell and Potter, 1992). From a constructionist point of view, they argue that attitudes and stereotypes are not simply mediated via cognition, but that discourse is constitutive of both social and psychological
processes. As a consequence, discourse is also actively constitutive of racist prejudices. Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that racism is organized through discursive patterns of signification and representation thus making discourse analysis a valuable instrument for the investigation of the myriad of ideological effects with flexible and varying contents.

As Billig (1985) suggests,

> it would seem to be more profitable to relate prejudice to language, for the possession of linguistic skills is a necessary condition for the possession of prejudiced beliefs. The expression of prejudiced attitudes is not some sort of epiphenomenon, but constitutes a central component of prejudice.

(p. 85).

Even if since then the vocabulary has changed, the main idea is the same. Here is, expressed by the same author in a 2002 critical paper on Henri Tajfel’s classic ‘Cognitive aspects of prejudice’, when pointing to the discursive basis of ideology ‘Ideologies are above all discursive, instantiated within discursive actions ... Thus, the categories of ideology, together with shared stereotyping and commonplace social explanations, are framed in language’ (2002a, p 184).

Reading the previous comments, one could get the impression that racism is a simple matter of linguistic practice. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) emphasized, it should be kept in mind that racism is not just a matter of discursive practice and that ‘investigations of racism must also focus on institutional practices, on discriminatory actions and on social structures and social divisions’ (p. 3). The study of all these things is intertwined with the study of discourse seen as action constituting reality.

Negotiation and identity construction around the topic of prejudice has been documented through many studies (Billig, 1985, 1988a; Billig et al., 1988; Cochrane and Billig, 1984; Gill, 1991, 1993; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992, more recently, Edwards, 2003; Speer and Potter, 2000; Verkuyten et al., 1994a, b, 1995). Billig (1988a) has shown that prejudice has come to be defined in terms of irrationality, irrational feelings or attitudes. Prejudice and racism are seen as opinions that are lacking rational judgment and that are unsupported by reality. Following Billig
(1985, 1991) it is argued that prejudiced ideas can only be understood in their argumentative context. As Billig et al. (1988) suggested,

> it is not difficult to view prejudice in a comparatively undilemmatic way, which assumes that the unprejudiced are liberal, healthy and egalitarian, whereas the prejudiced are the repositories of the very opposite values. Prejudice is not undilemmatically straightforward; there is a dialectic of prejudice.

(p. 100)

Moreover, it is easy to assume that prejudice is just a matter of words, such as the verbal expression of commonplace stereotypes, while discrimination involves behaviour (the putting of the prejudiced words into practice). But as Billig argues,

> in our language-saturated society, actions such as racial and sexual discrimination do not exist apart from utterances. They are performed through complex sequences of utterances, including, typically, utterances which deny that discrimination and prejudice is taking place.

(1997a, p. 46)

**The discourse of ‘difference’**

Numerous Western research projects on the discourse of racism have shown that denials of prejudice constitute a pervasive feature and presence in the discourse of those who want to argue against ethnic minorities interests or against non-white immigration. As noted in chapter two, American researchers (e.g. McConahay and Hough, 1976; McConahay, 1981, 1982; Kinder and Sears, 1981) looking at people that voice anti-black sentiments have proposed a distinction between ‘new racism’ (which includes people who typically deny their own prejudices) and ‘old-fashioned red-necked racism’ (which includes people who unambiguously use and declare their adhesion to racial values).

Van Dijk’s (1984, 1987, 1993a) studies of discourse of Dutch white working-class share a similar pattern to that of the ‘modern racism’ American studies. What makes them similar is the finding that racist sentiments are simultaneously expressed and denied. Similarly, Billig (1988a, 1991), Billig et al. (1988) and Cochrane and Billig (1984) analyze occurrences of denials of prejudice as a preface to complaining about blacks and ethnic minorities and find the same expression and simultaneous denial of prejudice. In the
context of New Zealand, the same pattern was found in the discourse of white, middle-class New Zealanders talking of Maoris (McFadyen and Wetherell, 1986, Potter and Wetherell, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1986, 1992).

What all these studies have demonstrated is that conflicts and dilemmas come into being when people begin to debate, explain, justify and develop accounts in the course of social interaction. As Wetherell and Potter have argued,

> the social psychologist and the lay person become like two sides of the same coin. The social psychologist accuses and the lay person defends, but both draw on the same resources to mount their arguments. The forms of both accusation and defence are structured by the tensions within the prejudice problematic.

(1992, p. 214)

An attempt was made to understand the ideology of modern racism. This ideology is not straightforward, for it is an ideology that includes the word 'prejudice' and the associated value attached to the word (Billig, 1988a). As Billig suggested, "any analysis of modern racism should not be focused entirely upon majority groups' images and stereotypes of minority groups. It should also include an analysis of what modern people understand by the very concept of 'prejudice'" (1988a, p. 94). The concept of 'prejudice' is not only used by social psychologists and social scientists, but is also a significant part of ordinary discourse. The usage of the concept indicates ambivalence. On the one hand, accepting the moral evaluation attached to the notion of prejudice: it is wrong to be prejudiced, and on the other hand, expressing (and realizing that expressing) views that might be considered prejudiced.

Discursive psychologists have examined the discursive processes through which ethnic minorities are represented and made real in actual talk (Verkuyten, 1998a, 2001; Verkuyten et al., 1994a, 1995, Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Most studies to date have used pre-defined groups, without investigating their socially negotiated construction. In contrast, discursive psychology is interested in 'how categories become constructed in different social contexts and how the method of construction creates a subjectivity for oneself and for those defined as Other' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 74). As stressed in the previous chapter, categorization is not simply a cognitive process, but a discursive action actively constructed in discourse for rhetorical and interactional ends.
Categorization is seen as a subtle, yet complex social accomplishment, something we do in talk in order to accomplish certain goals and social actions, such as persuading, excusing, justifying or blaming (Edwards, 1991).

The kinds of categories people use to communicate about the social world reflect underlying ideological assumptions. Categories are very important in this study because they communicate something of the taken-for-granted, shared meanings that people have of the world. Categories are powerful in themselves because they are able to define and control conceptions of reality. The label one uses to describe individuals and groups has sometimes clear political and evaluative connotations (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998). When one looks at argumentative patterns in this kind of discourse it does not correspond to the neat patterns that might be expected from individuals working from consistent beliefs or attitudes, nor to the organization that would follow from sets of underlying representations shared across social groups. What is striking is the complex and fragmented organization of common-sense, what Billig (1992) calls the 'kaleidoscope of common-sense': a swirling pattern where premises and inferences regularly change places, where shifts are fluidly made between arguments form principle and practice, and where liberal, humanistic and egalitarian values are drawn on for potentially racist effect or to justify and legitimate inequality (cf. Potter and Wetherell, 1998). People's descriptions are inconsistent, ambivalent and context-dependent. Discourse analysts try to make sense of these inconsistencies by focusing on what people are trying to do and what effects they are trying to produce with their talk. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) suggested, categorization works to 'catch' reality in discourse: 'the discursive act creates groups, interests, emotions, similarities and differences, a social landscape, an anthropology, a psychology of identity and even a geography' (p. 146).

Extensive research conducted on the language of prejudice in different countries suggests that the language of contemporary racism is flexible, ambivalent and contradictory. As discursive psychologists argue, variability is a way into examining what talk does rhetorically, sequentially and in context. Speakers can articulate both prejudiced and tolerant themes when discussing about 'other' people (Billig et al., 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1988, 1992; Van Dijk, 1984, 1987). It can be said that in order not to appear prejudiced, speakers will need to vary their 'repertoires of interpretation' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and switch between different 'registers of voice' (Bakhtin, 1981).
A number of discursive psychological studies of racism have highlighted the way in which concerns about being heard as speaking from a prejudiced position are managed by constructing evaluations as mere factual descriptions, unmotivated by an inner psychology of ethnic or racial hatred (Edwards, 2003, LeCouteur and Augoustinos, 2001; LeCouteur et al., 2001). For example, as Edwards (2003) shows, participants may inoculate themselves against the potential of their remarks being interpreted as prejudicial or biased, by constructing their views as rationally arrived at. Discursive psychologists have shown that in 'racist' talk, denials of prejudice often appear together with 'practical', 'factual' reasons which constrains the speaker's espoused desire for egalitarianism, but which ultimately justify, the status-quo (Billig, 1991; Edwards, 2003; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Speakers can be seen as orienting to a dual concern: to both express a (prejudiced) view and also to manage it in a way that portrays the speaker as caring and egalitarian.

Discursive psychologists do not try to see if the speaker is 'really' prejudiced, whether openly or behind the camouflage of his talk. Prejudice is approached analytically as something that may be attended to in various ways, in talk itself (Speer and Potter, 2000). The aim is to avoid conclusions such as that the speaker is basically prejudiced, but camouflaging it in the way they talk and that analysis can reveal their true beliefs and attitudes (cf. Edwards, 2003). This move should not be seen as an avoidance of dealing with actual prejudice, rather it becomes a re-definition of what prejudice is. In the analyses that discursive psychologists offer, no formal definitions of 'prejudice' or 'discrimination' is given; instead the definitions and reactions from the speakers are used as the main ground for determining meaning. This is not to say that the analysis involves no interpretation, because the analysis is being informed by the available cultural repertoires shared by the members of specific societies.

As chapter two has shown, the majority of traditional studies of prejudice have treated members' talk as a resource rather than a topic of inquiry in its own right. These kinds of abstractions do not throw light on how the participants in different social settings describe prejudice and social relations for each other. Psychologists' and sociologists' classificatory schemes, abstracted from the members' descriptive practices, entail a neglect of the phenomenon of prejudice as it is known, understood and talked about by members themselves. It was Garfinkel (1967) who emphasized analysts' preference for generalized descriptions entailed a neglect of the specifics of activities and settings. In terms of his
conception, members' categorizations of 'prejudice' require investigation as a topic in their own right. The aim is not to theorize 'prejudice', but to describe and analyze what prejudice is for the members of society. One of the aims of discursive psychologists is to examine the ways in which concerns with 'prejudice' inform members’ locally ordered practical action and reasoning. The interest is on describing the mundane practices in and through which persons are oriented to issues of what 'being prejudiced' means and engage in its analysis in the course of activities such as describing, interpreting and explaining. The aim is to draw attention to the various situated ways in which prejudice is identified, described, explained, and made sense of. People engaged in conversation with others construct and negotiate meanings and the 'reality' that they are talking about. The main focus of a different range of discourse studies is prejudice as a problematic, prejudice as a to-be-accounted-for phenomenon.

The study of participants' talk opens the opportunity for the detailed inspection of the way the mind-world relationship, the nature of the social actors and their positions involved within it, issues of prejudice and discrimination are constructed and contested in actual social practices (Edwards, 2003). The discursive approach has helped the process of mapping the production of 'prejudice' as an everyday phenomenon as it is produced by members in talk-in-interaction. As Rapley (2001) suggests, 'to say that the deployment of discursive devices in talk is what 'modern racism' is ... is to miss the point of the discursive critique. there is no such 'thing' as modern, post-modern (or even antique) racism per se' (p. 241, emphasis in original). What counts as 'racism' is inextricably, locally produced, as such, in talk.

Racism is treated as something other than linked with the psychological internal workings of some individuals, and by extension, not others. Discursive psychology orients to the construction of psychological and social 'facts' (such as racism) via the mundane, situated interaction of participants. As Edwards and Potter (2001) argue, 'people construct versions of the world that attend to their factual status, to the psychology of participants in reported events, and to the current interaction in which versions are offered' (p. 16). The analysis of discourse-in-action looks at the local codes of argument and practices of rhetorical organization of selected interactions. For example, some ways of talking may counter the possibility, which may be at stake in interaction, 'that you believe what it suits you to believe, or what you believed before you looked, that your beliefs are a function of mental
predisposition rather than external reality – that is they attend rhetorically to a possible dismissal as pre-judgement, or prejudice’ (p. 16).

The locatedness of stereotyping, prejudice and racism

I have closed the chapter on the traditional approaches to stereotyping, prejudice and racism by trying to establish a link between the study of stereotypes and the ‘Othering’ process. In reviewing the general discourse studies approach to stereotyping, prejudice and racism and the more specific, social psychological discursive psychology take on the issue, some ways of going beyond the social dilemma of stereotyping were identified.

What seems to be missing though from some discursive psychological research within a discursive paradigm to the study of prejudice and racism is an emphasis on the ideological dimension of discourse and the located nature of stereotyping, prejudice and racism. I will leave the problem of the ideological dimension of discourse for later, let me focus now on the locatedness of the process of stereotyping and ‘Othering’ process. If ‘Othering’ needs to be studied within a framework that includes a historical, a discursive/cultural perspective and also a political one, it also needs to be studied as located. This is seen as yet another way in which one can go beyond the ‘social dilemma’ of stereotyping and prejudice.

As chapter two has demonstrated, an immense body of research has been concentrated on issues revolving around how in-groups use stereotypes to construct an image of the out-groups. Work in the social identity theory tradition, self-categorization theory or social cognition have not conceptualised place as part of their analyses of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. As Dixon (2001) has emphasized, ‘existing research on intergroup processes is somehow aspatial’ (p. 589) This should not come as a surprise if one ponders a little about what was the place where stereotypes were to be found. With their predominantly cognitive orientation, the majority of these approaches have conceptualised categories, representations, and thus stereotypes within the heads of their participants. To continue with a spatial metaphor, stereotypes were confined under the skull, ‘inside’ the minds of people. The discursive approach relocates stereotyping by removing it from ‘inside’ the head of participants and placing it into the flux of conversation and
argumentation (Billig, 1996; Danziger, 1997), but does not place too much emphasis on
the locatedness of the stereotyping and Othering process.

Many of the social psychological categories investigated by social psychologists such as
‘community’ or ‘nation’ are inextricably bound to notions of place (Dixon et al., 1994;
Dixon, 2001, Dixon and Durrheim, 2000, 2003). As Dixon and Durrheim suggest,
‘questions of “who we are”’ are often intimately related to questions of “where we are”
(2000, p. 27). The notion of ‘place-identity’ has been proposed (Dixon and Durrheim,
2000) to account for the located nature of subjectivity, thus challenging the disembodied
and abstract notions of identity from different social psychological approaches. Drawing
on recent developments in discursive psychology, Dixon and Durrheim (2000) argue that
research, mainly in the realm of environmental psychology, but also inside social
psychology (including discursive psychology) ‘has largely ignored the rhetorical traditions
through which places, and the identities they embody and circumscribe are imbued with
meaning’ (p. 28). Moreover, it has disregarded how ‘place-identity constructions as
deployed within everyday discourse, are used to accomplish discursive actions, including
the justification of certain kinds of person-in-place relations’ (ibid., p. 28). But most
importantly, it has marginalized not only the political dimension of one’s representations
of place, but also the political and ideological dimension of one’s representations of those
designed as ‘others’ and the correlate issue of how one locates oneself and others. As the
subsequent analytic chapters will show, constructions of place-identity (in the case of
Hungarians) and constructions of people as out-of-place (in the case of Romanians) act as
symbolic resources for reproducing dominance and moral exclusion. As Dixon (2001)
argues,

it is perhaps not incidental that the conceptual language of the common
identity model has strongly spatial connotations, for the process of common
identification may often entail the development of a more inclusive sense of
where we are (and who belongs there with us).

(p. 598-599, italics in original)

Our constructions of ‘Others’ are intimately linked to our constructions of places (Said
1979; see also Durrheim and Dixon, 2001). The place that is referred here is not just any

2 Dixon and Durrheim (2000, p. 33) talk about grounds of identity in a double sense first, as a sense of
belonging to places, and second as a rhetorical warrant through which particular social practices and
relations are legitimated.
place, but it is the national place (space). The importance of the national space in our constructions of ‘others’ has as backdrop geography and a geographical imagination, an imagination of places and identities, of places constrained by identities and identities constrained by space. As Dixon has noted,

> the history of collective relations in many societies is, at least in part, a history of struggles over geography: struggles for ownership and control of land; struggles for inclusion within spaces of exclusion; struggles to purify or reclaim spaces that have been occupied by others; and struggles to create spaces of solidarity and exchange.

(2001, p 600-601)

An historical imagination is also necessary if one is to understand the ways in which ideologies of common-place nationalism or moral exclusion acquire the status of common-sense. As Durrheim and Dixon (2001) have argued, ‘a historical imagination is necessary if we are to understand how ideologies are constantly adapting, colonizing new discourses and languages of legitimation’ (p. 435).

Discursive studies define racism as a series of ideological effects sustained by flexible, localized and ambivalent styles of arguing and thinking (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Durrheim, 1997). The ‘social construction of the foreign’ (Dixon, Foster and Reicher, 1997; Dixon and Reicher, 1997) is accomplished not only through certain ways of talking about ‘others’, but also through invoking notions of place-appropriate conduct. ‘Foreignness’, as Durrheim and Dixon have argued, ‘is produced through a dual discursive process which involves 1) the construction of a normative place classification; and 2) the exposure of an action, event or human presence that transgresses this system of classification’ (2001, p. 448). Most of the discursive studies of racism have not paid much attention to the localized, located nature of stereotyping and prejudice. The analysis of stereotypical and stigmatistical thinking, of those ways of talking that reproduce dominance and place ‘others’ beyond our moral order must be complemented by an analysis of their ‘spatial’ and localized grounding.

An historical and geographical imagination is seen as complementing an awareness to the ideological dimension of talk. Notwithstanding some notable exceptions (Billig, 1991, Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Gill, 1991, 1993, Wetherell, 1998), work on discursive psychology has not paid too much attention to the ideological dimension of discourse and
the diverse ideological effects of using some organizations rather than others. Ideology was treated as secondary or was considered as totally irrelevant to the analysis at hand.

The critical work undertaken within discursive psychology and the concerns with ideology were influenced by ideas developed within critical discourse studies. In this category of critical discourse studies I want to include the kind of work that is commonly known under the name of Critical Discourse Analysis and the work of critical discursive psychologists, such as Michael Billig and Margaret Wetherell. Put simply, the main idea behind this body of work is that when one studies discourse one studies ideology and ideological meanings. When one is studying the discourse of stereotyping, prejudice and racism one is studying processes of ideology and ideology in action.

Critical Discourse Analysis and ideology

Before touching on the issue of ideology let me offer a brief general account of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA).3 As van Dijk (2001) argues,

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytic research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.

CDA sees discourse as a form of social practice. The role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance (van Dijk, 1993b) is placed at the very core of CDA.

Discourse is constitutive of and constituted by social and political ‘realities’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, Barker and Galasinski, 2001). As Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argue, ‘discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and

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3 It is important to note that the label ‘critical discourse analysis’ is used in two different ways. It is used both to describe the approach pioneered by Norman Fairclough (1995a, 1995b) and as the label for a broader movement within discourse analysis of which several approaches, including Fairclough’s, are part (see Fairclough and Wodak, 1997 for a round-up).
the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people’ (p 258, italics in original)⁴.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action⁵

All these ideas and others can be found in a vast body of research programmes, inside, but also outside the mainstream CDA work. For example, research on media discourse (Fowler et al., 1979; Fowler, 1991, Fairclough, 1995b, van Dijk, 1988; 1989, 1991) and political discourse (Wilson, 1990, 2001; Chilton and Ilyin, 1993; Chilton and Schaffer, 1997; Wodak, 1989, 2002) has been a constant preoccupation of CDA researchers. The study of ethnocentrism, anti-semitism, nationalism and racism was also a central concern for critical discourse analysts (using a diverse range of material such as conversations, interviews, parliamentary debates, news reports, scholarly text and talk, images) (see inter alia, Reisigl and Wodak, 2000, van Leeuwen, 2000; van Dijk, 1997; Wodak, 1996, 1997a, b, 2000; Wodak et al., 1999, Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000)

Most kinds of CDA, will ask questions about the ways in which specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance. The typical vocabulary of CDA researchers includes notions such as ‘power’, ‘ideology’, ‘social structure’, ‘dominance’, ‘reproduction’ etc (Van Dijk, 2001)

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⁴ As Barker and Galasinski (2001) have argued, ‘discursive acts are socially constitutive in a number of ways they play a decisive role in the genesis and construction of social conditions, they can restore, justify and perpetuate the social status quo, they may be instrumental in the transformation of the status quo’ (p 65)

⁵ For details about these and other more or less general principles of CDA see Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, Fairclough, 1992, 1995a, van Dijk, 1993b, 2001, Wodak and Meyer, 2002)
Let me now turn to the problem of ideology and exemplify the concerns of CDA with issues around ideology by offering a brief account of three different kinds of CDA, that of Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak and colleagues.

Van Dijk (1995a, b, 1998) sees discourse analysis as the analysis of ideology. According to him, ideologies are reproduced in discourse, through text and talk and non-verbal semiotic mediums of communication (van Dijk, 1995c). Van Dijk’s approach for analysing ideologies is composed of three parts: social analysis, cognitive analysis and discourse analysis. Van Dijk has devised a theoretical framework for the study of ideology and discourse that critically relates discourse, cognition and society (van Dijk, 1998). In a nutshell, van Dijk sees ideologies as mental systems that organize socially shared attitudes. He has also argued that a simple and straightforward distinction between distorted discourse and truly descriptive discourse or ‘true’ and ‘false’ ideology has become increasingly untenable (van Dijk, 1995a). Even emancipatory, liberal arguments can be used in a discriminatory way. Therefore, it is the discriminatory effect that must be regarded as the main criterion making discourses discernible as prejudiced or racist (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Gotsbachner, 2001). For van Dijk, analysing and making explicit the ideological dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ requires examining the historical, social and political context; analysing the power relations and conflicts between groups; identifying negative and positive cognitions about out-group members; making explicit the presupposed and the implicit; examining discourse structures and rhetorical mechanisms used to reproduce dominance and reproduce the status-quo. In van Dijk’s opinion, the importance of studying ideology (or ideologies) arises from the belief that ideologies constitute the basis of the social (cultural) representations shared by members of a group. As part of a socially shared belief system, ideologies are both cognitive and social and they fulfill social and cognitive functions.

Norman Fairclough does not see ideologies in the same way as Van Dijk does. His approach to issues of ideology centres around notions such as language and power (e.g., Fairclough, 1989), the Gramscian notion of ‘hegemony’ (Chouliarakis and Fairclough, 1999) and notions such as ‘structures’ and ‘events’ of discourse (Fairclough, 1995a). His conception includes the idea that ideologies are connected with social practices: they are...
part of social practices and ‘discourses’⁶, and at the same time, they help reproduce the very practices and ‘discourses’ they are part of. For Fairclough, ideologies are ‘tied to action’ and therefore need to be ‘judged in terms of their social effects rather than their truth values’ (1995a, p. 76). The concept of ‘hegemony’ emphasizes the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining unequal relations of power and domination. As Chouliarakis and Fairclough have argued, ‘hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather than coercion, involving the naturalization of practices and their social relations as well as relations between practices, as matters of common sense’ (1999, p. 24). Insofar the location of ideology is concerned, Fairclough places ideology ‘in both structures (discourse conventions) and events’ (1995a, p. 25). The conventions drawn upon in actual discursive events “structured together within ‘orders of discourse’ associated with institutions, are ideologically invested in particular ways” (ibid., p. 25). At the same time, ‘ideologies are generated and transformed in actual discursive events’ (ibid., p. 25). Discursive practices are not ideological in themselves, but they are ‘ideologically invested in so far as they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations’ (1992, p. 91). Fairclough understands ideologies

⁶ As Fairclough argues, a ‘discourse’ is a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective.
Fairclough also believes that the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which underlie them are often unclear to people (cf. Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258). At the same time, subjects are ideologically positioned or 'interpellated', to use the Althusserian notion, but they are also capable of acting creatively and resist different ideological positionings, by making different connections 'between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed and to restructure positioning practices and structures' (1992, p. 91).

The position that Ruth Wodak and colleagues take, within what is called the discourse-historical approach to the analysis of anti-semitism and racism, is one that favours a context sensitive approach to ideology. Among other dimensions of context, the context that Wodak and colleagues refer to is the broader sociopolitical and historical context which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to; that is to say, the fields of action and the history of the discursive event as well as the history to which the discourse topics are related.

(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 41)

Within the discourse-historical method (as in Fairclough's CDA approach), it is believed that language manifests itself in social processes and interactions and constitutes those processes as well (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). This echoes Thompson's view on the location and operation of ideology in and through language:

Once we recognize that ideology operates through language and that language is a medium of social action, we must also acknowledge that ideology is partially constitutive of what, in our societies, 'is real'. Ideology is not a pale image of the social world but is part of that world, a creative and constitutive element of our social life.

(Thompson, 1987, p. 523; see also Thompson, 1990)

According to this view, language always involves power and ideologies. The articulation of ideologies in discourse is done through the enactment of different discursive practices.

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7 According to this idea, one of the aims of CDA is to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse. As Fairclough argued in his book, *Discourse and Social Change*, 'it should not be assumed that people are aware of the ideological dimensions of their own practice. Ideologies built into conventions may be more or less naturalized and automatized, and people may find it difficult to comprehend that their normal practices could have specific ideological investments' (1992, p. 90)
with different ideological effects. Racist or anti-Semitic beliefs and ideologies are expressed and used for different aims. These have historical traditions and multiple roots. It is believed that through discourse analysis one is able to make explicit the whole range of linguistic devices used to code such beliefs and ideologies as well as the related practices’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 266). Both Fairclough and Wodak sustain the idea that

discursive practices may have major ideological effects that is they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p 258)

**Critical discursive social psychology**

In social psychology, with the development and renewed importance of discursive psychology, discourse and ideology have also become prominent concerns. In discursive psychology, ideology is conceptualised as a property of discourse in the social and political context. The work of Michael Billig and Margaret Wetherell has been of central importance in discursive social psychology for promoting a view of ideology as discursively constituted and for setting the grounds for a ‘critical’ discursive social psychology.

In Michael Billig’s view, our thinking is rhetorical, argumentative and dilemmatic. For him, studying thinking and the holding of opinions in its wider social context points to the idea that “processes of everyday thinking can be processes of ‘ideology’” (Billig, 1991, p. 1). He also agrees with idea that

> to study ideology is, in some part and in some way, to study language in the social world. It is to study the ways in which the multifarious uses of language intersect with power, nourishing it, sustaining it, enacting it. It is to study the ways in which certain relations of power are maintained and reproduced by the endless array of expressions which mobilize meaning in the social world. (Thompson, 1987, p. 517)

Billig has highlighted the contrary nature of ideological themes, pointing to the ways in which people apply these in different contexts. Inconsistencies and contradictions point to
the inherent *dilemmatic* quality of ideological thinking. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) have argued, 'the contradictory nature of ideological discourse permits considerable rhetorical flexibility and argumentative power' (p. 177). As Condor (1990) points out people may not simply endorse or reject dominant views, but rather develop complex configurations of thought in which some dominant ideological elements find expression in conjunction with individual and group-based understandings (cf. also Augoustinos, 1998). As Billig (1991) suggested, 'the common sense of a community is said to maintain the social relations of power' (p. 7). As Thompson (1987) argues, ideology operates through the mobilization of discourse. Thus, 'the processes of ideology, as means of mobilizing meaning are also means of mobilizing consciousness' (Billig, 1991, p. 14).

In order to further develop the argument outlined above, let me point to the distinction introduced by Billig et al. (1988) between two meanings of ideology, the 'lived ideology' and the 'intellectual ideology'. The 'lived ideology' refers to 'ideology as a society's way of life' (p. 27) including what passes for common sense within a society. 'Intellectual ideology' is a 'system of political, religious or philosophical thinking and ... is very much the product of intellectuals and professional thinkers' (p. 27). As Billig argues, the distinction between 'lived' and 'intellectual' ideologies is 'the difference between a formalized and a non-formalized consciousness' (Billig et al., 1988, p. 28). The dilemmatic approach does not start with the assumption that there is an inner coherence to ideologies (Billig, 1991, 1992). Ideologies are fragmentary, they contain contrary themes. They may produce conformity and unthinking obedience, but they also can provide the elements of dilemmatic thinking both between and within lived and intellectual ideology (Billig et al., 1988). The ordinary person is not a blind dupe, whose mind is being filled by outside forces and who reacts unthinkingly. The 'subject' of ideology is a rhetorical being who thinks and argues with ideology (Billig, 1991). As Serge Moscovici has also written, 'social and intellectual activity is, after all, a rehearsal or recital, yet most sociopsychologists mistakenly treat it as if it were amnesic' (1984, p. 10).

One of the questions that originated from this distinction, was why not study the non-formal, dilemmatic, contradictory aspects of ideology. In the words of Margaret Wetherell, why not focus, that is, more thoroughly on ideology with a small 'i' (the mosaic of contradictory commonplaces and interpretative repertoires which
organize everyday sense-making) rather than ideology with a capital ‘I’ (coherent and global political systems of thought)?

(Wetherell, 1999, p. 403)

There is also a concern with locatedness and specificity of ideological processes. The ‘Ideology’ (with majuscule) might be universal, but ideology (or rather, ideologies) with the small ‘i’ are local, embedded and reflect very much of the social, political and ideological climate of specific societies. Looking at fragmentary, dilemmatic, local ideologies one can get a sense of the (social) representational processes involved in the production of ideological representations of social life and of the actors participating in it. As Martha Augoustinos (1998) noticed, some social representations, which are consensual, widespread and prescriptive, may contribute to the social cohesion of a society. These are not automatically ideological representations, but they can be considered ideological in nature if they ‘contribute to the support and maintenance of the existing institutional arrangements, power and social relations within a society’ (p. 157).

For discursive psychologists that take a critical stance to the analysis of the discourse of racism, ideology is located in argument, in the process of argumentation, in the intricacies of discourse about social issues such as prejudice (or what it means to be prejudiced), discrimination or inequality. But discourse is not inherently ideological, ‘it becomes ideological in argument, debate and application’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 139) In the same way,

no argument is inherently ideological by virtue of the characteristics of its speakers, their interests or their perceptions and experiences. Rather, an argument becomes ideological (linked to oppressive forms of power) through its use, construction and mobilization.

(Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 171)

Moreover, ‘the inconsistencies, contradictions, gaps in knowledge, what is said as opposed to what is never mentioned, are aspects of argumentation which reflect the parameters within which ideology operates’ (Augoustinos, 1998, p. 168).

There is another important distinction to be made, between a narrower conception of ideology (based upon evaluative aspects and a fact/value distinction) and a broader one (encompassing the social constructions of facts). A narrow view of ideology defines concepts such as opinion, attitude and ideology in terms of clusters of evaluations. Thus, ideologies function to control the overall coherence of evaluative complexes (see van Dijk,
A broader view of ideology considers the processes of ideology to be at work in the social construction of 'facts' themselves (Billig, 1995b, p. 164). It is for this very reason that the word 'ideology' is used "to describe those practices of thought, action and discourse by which the socially constructed, contingent world becomes experienced as 'natural', 'inevitable' or 'factual'" (p. 165, see also Eagleton, 1991, McLellan, 1995).

Most critical discursive social psychologists have opted for a broader conception of ideology, which includes a wider critical stance that goes beyond the analysis of attitudinal complexes and expression of opinions and attitudes by charting the ideological nature and functions of attitudinal talk itself. The separation of fact and evaluation, and the location of ideology within the domain of evaluation, encourages a restricted view of 'ideology' (Billig, 1995b).

This broader conception of ideology can be found, for example, in a series of critical discourse analytic studies of racism (for excellent examples see Augoustinos et al., 1999; Augoustinos et al., 2002; Rapley, 2001; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) which have tried to map the themes and theories speakers use to structure and formulate a worldview when accounting for prejudice and discrimination, in terms of a set of shared resources available to them and in terms of the ideological effects of using some organizations of discourse rather than others.

In the section on discursive psychology and prejudice, it was argued that some of the discursive analyses of prejudice take as their main analytical principle the way in which participants manage or handle common sense concerns with prejudice. As noted, prejudice is approached analytically as something that may be attended to in various ways, in talk itself. Speakers' orientations, definitions, reactions are used as the main ground for determining meaning. These studies treat members' talk as a topic of inquiry in its own right and their aim is not to theorize 'prejudice' per se, but to describe and analyze what prejudice is for the members of society. In this kind of discursive analyses (having a pronounced conversational analytic character), there is no concern for a broader societal context and there is a neglect of the wider social and ideological consequences of language.

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8 As Wetherell et al (1987) put it, "these themes or theories have obvious affinities with Moscovici's concept of 'social representations', in that they can be seen as interpretative systems which may be used for formulating and understanding the nature of the phenomena" (p. 61). Selections are made from the available themes to best suit the function to which the discourse is put (Linton and Potter, 1985, Potter and Linton, 1985).
use (Wetherell, 1998). Context is treated both as the project and product of the participants’ own actions and therefore as locally produced and transformed at any moment (Schegloff, 1999a). At the opposite pole (inside ‘critical discourse analysis’) there are discursive analyses whose contention is that context both produces and is produced by the participants’ actions (for a fine discussion of the treatment of context in conversation analysis and critical discourse analysis see Blommaert, 2001).

There is a significant and interesting ongoing debate⁹ (for further details, see Billig, 1999b, c, Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999a, b, Wetherell, 1998) between advocates of critical discourse analysis and advocates of conversation analysis. In what follows, I will not do justice to the variety of approaches as well as to the acute differences of nuance and analytical sophistication within both schools, but I will focus instead on a critical discursive approach that tries to reconcile conversation analysis and critical discourse analysis and offer a thorough understanding of the nature and functioning of ideology as a discursive phenomenon.

A number of discursive psychologists have favoured an analytic approach based on two levels of analysis, which enable the identification of the action-orientated nature of accounts and the social practices empowered or challenged by the forms of understanding developed by participants (Wetherell, 1998; Edley and Wetherell, 1997). The first level draws heavily from conversation analysis to identify the working of talk and the interactional practices assembled to warrant particular versions being produced. The second level relates to the identification of ‘interpretative repertoires’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), patterns of sense-making that produce the internal coherence of an account. For example, Edley and Wetherell’s (1997) form of critical discourse analysis focuses on delimiting the interplay between interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas, and subject positions in order to look at the fragmentary and contradictory nature of our shared cultural conceptions of masculinity and gender relations.

Drawing on Wetherell (1998), some authors have argued that a ‘synthetic analysis’ (cf. also Riley, 2002) presents analytical advantages. First, it enables an emphasis on the highly occasioned and situated nature of meaning-making, while relating these locally

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⁹ For more details and interesting reviews of the CA-CDA controversy see Korobov (2001) and Mey (2001)
managed positions to the background normative conceptions that organize such accounts’ (Riley, 2002, p 447). Second, the discursive practices identified can then be positioned within a ‘genealogical’ context As Wetherell argues, ‘the genealogical approach ... suggests that in analyzing our always partial piece of the argumentative texture we look also to the broader forms of intelligibility running through the texture more generally’ (1998, p 403). Using the notion of ‘social fabric’, Wetherell (1998, p. 405) has argued ‘that analysis works by carving out a piece of the argumentative social fabric for closer examination’. But analysts should not stop to the detailed examination of the ‘argumentative threads’ which run through the ‘warp’ and ‘woof’, but should connect these threads with the ‘broader cloth’ using the notions of positioning, interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas and so on (cf. Wetherell, 1998, p. 405). Participants’ talk should be understood and analyzed as embodying certain interpretative repertoires and as the attempt to manage the dilemmatic nature of conflicting lived ideologies (Edley and Wetherell, 1997, 1999, Edley, 2001)

This is what Margaret Wetherell calls ‘critical discursive social psychology’, a discipline which focuses on the situated flow of discourse, which looks at the formation and negotiation of psychological states, identities and interactional and intersubjective events. It is concerned with members’ methods and the logic of accountability while describing also the collective and social patterning of background normative conceptions (their forms of articulation and the social and psychological consequences).

(Wetherell, 1998, p. 405)

As Wetherell continues, in this kind of analyses analysts should include an ‘investigation of the social and political consequences of discursive patterning’ (1998, p 405)

A critical discursive psychological approach to racism involves the two levels previously invoked. The first level is based on conversation analysis enabling the identification the action-orientated nature of justifying claims together with a detailed look at the

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10 Critical discursive social psychology is ‘critical’ in the sense that it aims to pinpoint to the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of ideological meanings that shape social relations and contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups (for example, between ethnic minorities and the majority). It is seen as a means of criticising the present social order. It does not claim to be critical because of methodological differences from other approaches to the study of language. It claims to be critical (like critical discourse analysis, critical psychology or critical social policy) because it is rooted in a radical critique of social relations (Billig, 2002c)
accountable conversational practices that warrant the particular version being produced. The second level focuses on the ideological patterns of sense-making and their specific functions such as rationalizing, legitimating, naturalizing prejudice. This second level of analysis rests overwhelmingly on the assumption that ideologies are above all discursive, instantiated in discursive actions (Billig, 1991, 2002a).

As critical discourse analysts suggest it is through discourse that ideologies are formulated, reproduced and reinforced. In this framework, the term ‘ideology’ has to be understood as the social representations shared by the members of a group and used by them to accomplish a series of social practices (Billig et al., 1988; Augoustinos, 1998, Van Dijk, 1998). The focus is more on the ‘lived ideology’ (Billig et al., 1988), as a complex, contradictory and constitutive part of the ‘account-able’ (Garfinkel, 1967) practices of everyday life. The discourses that critical discursive psychologists analyse do not present participants’ ‘intellectual ideologies’, as coherent and formal systems of beliefs about the matters discussed, but rather their ‘lived ideologies’. In this sense, discourse can be seen to accomplish and linked with ideologies (Billig et al., 1988, Billig, 1990a, b, 1995b, 2002a).

Examining the functions of ideological and rhetorical available resources has analytical consequences. It is argued that while an analysis of the details of interaction and taking account of participants’ orientations is essential, it is equally important to consider talk as a culturally (cf. Abell and Stokoe, 1999, 2001) and ideologically (cf. Billig, 1991; 2002a; Fairclough, 1992, 1995a; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak and Reisigl, 1999) situated practice. One could argue that it is not enough to say that the discursive positions, identities, categories that are constructed in situ by the speakers can simply ‘speak for themselves’ (Abell and Stokoe, 2001; Wetherell, 1998) as conversation analysts would propose. Common-sense knowledge with different ideological meanings or a cultural and political perspective on society and its actors is displayed when speakers problematize some aspect of the interaction and when they gloss over issues introduced by the interviewer. Thus, to understand the rhetorical and ideological thrust of participants’ arguments and the complexities of their positioning (and that of their own group), and also the positioning of ‘others’ (whomever they might be, immigrants, ethnic minorities etc.), the analyst (as well as the reader) must engage in a wider understanding of the cultural and ideological interpretative framework within which all this becomes relevant. As Verkuylten
Cogently put it, "[the] wider ideological context is both inside and outside the talk".

Understanding how specific representations of prejudice against different groups and the issues of accountability linked to it are constructed and sustained, can provide clues for trying to 'reconstruct' the existing ideological representations pertaining to prejudice, discrimination and related issues, and point to the social, political and ideological consequences of this kind of discursive patterning, such as maintenance of the status-quo, the reproduction, naturalization and legitimation of dominance. As a number of critical discursive psychologists have argued, group descriptions are usually developed as part of stories and accounts that are ideological in nature (cf. van Dijk, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) As Wetherell (1996) notes, "the term 'ideological' suggests that this discursive work needs to be understood in terms of the patterning of social relations, power and inequalities within a society" (p. 221) Ideology is understood as a practice and the interest of critical discursive psychologists is to unveil the ideological effects of people's accounts. The ideological content or import of a discourse is 'measured' by its effects. Discourses that categorize the world in ways that legitimate, maintain and perpetuate social inequality patterns and unequal relations of power are said to function ideologically. The focus is on both the discursive practices that construct representations of the world, social actors and social relations and the role that these discursive practices play in protecting and reproducing the interests of particular social groups.

The workings of ideology

For the remainder of this chapter, I want to offer a brief account of some of the processes of ideology involved in the production and reproduction of prejudiced discourse, which will provide an explanatory background for the analytical chapters. Traditionally, ideology has been considered a socio-cognitive construct, which permeates human consciousness. According to this, ideology can be found in the values, beliefs, opinions and attitudes of individuals (Augoustinos, 1998) As it was argued across this chapter, the recent study of ideology has come to the conclusion that discourse is the 'mode of its existence and a medium of its operation' (Shu-xu, 1994, p. 648). As Thompson (1984, p 2) has put it, "...ideas circulate in the social world as utterances, as expressions, as words which are
spoken, or inscribed. Hence to study ideology is, in some part and in some way, to study language in the social world.

In order to account for the functioning of ideology, some authors have proposed in their analyses of ideology the notion of 'dominant ideology' (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1980, 1990). As Billig (1991) notes, the 'dominant ideology' thesis fails to acknowledge the constructionist and reflexive capacities of people. An argument was mounted against (see Billig, 1991, Billig et al. 1988) this version of ideological domination, which treats people as passive pawns, duped by an array of ideological institutions and individuals which serve the interests of the dominant classes. Even Moscovici (1988) has referred to hegemonic representations, but he rejects the view that everyone is always under the sway of a dominant ideology. The individual is not a blind marionette in the hands of external forces conforming and reacting without deliberation. As alluded to before, the subject of 'ideology' is a rhetorical being who thinks and opposes ideology (Billig, 1991).

Another very common way of understanding the functioning of ideology is thinking about it in terms of 'false consciousness'. The problem here is not that people are seeing the world wrongly (for example, making thinking errors and being cognitively biased), it is rather that their way of seeing is (mis)guided by ideologies which reasonably mystify 'reality'. Augoustinos (1999) has developed a persuasive and impressive critique of conceptions of false consciousness in social psychology. Augoustinos does not aim at abandoning the notion of false consciousness, but rather aims at a reworking of the notion. In a commentary of Augoustinos’s article, Margaret Wetherell points out that

false consciousness, in her view, does not mean illusory perception or mistaken information processing but refers instead to a collective and discursive (rather than individual and cognitive) response to the real mystifications and distortions found in late-capitalist societies.

(1999, p 403)

There has been a move is from a theory of ideology traditionally concerned with consciousness (false consciousness) and processes of mystification of reality to a theory of ideology in terms of discursive performance, in terms of social interaction. This came to the front with an awareness of the idea that ‘ideology ... concerns the actual uses of language between particular human subjects for the production of specific effects’
(Eagleton, 1991, p. 9) Ideology is a discursive or semiotic phenomenon, is “‘performative’ rather than ‘constative’ language: it belongs to the class of speech acts which get something done” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 19)

One could argue that it is not by chance that ideologies can be found at the level of discourse. Discourse is the location where (social) representations, interpretative repertoires and resources are brought together in order to build a ‘world view’ of social antagonism and unequal distribution of power. In other words, discourse is the site for the enactment of power, for reproducing dominance and inequality. As Paul Ricoeur cogently emphasised,

ideology is not the distortion of communication, but the rhetoric of basic communication. There is a rhetoric of human communication because we cannot exclude rhetorical devices from language; they are an intrinsic part of ordinary language. In its function as integration, ideology is similarly basic and ineluctable.

(1986, p. 259)

As a consequence, it is more helpful to view ideology ‘less as a particular set of discourses, than as a particular set of effects within discourses’ (Eagleton, 1991, p. 194, italics in original). Ideological power, as John B. Thompson suggests, is not just a matter of meaning, but ‘to make meaning stick’ (1984, p. 132).

As noted earlier, the term ‘ideology’ (‘ideological’) is often used to describe practices by which the contingent, the socially constructed gets reified as ‘natural’ or ‘factual’ (Billig, 1982; McLellan, 1995). As Eagleton argues, “successful ideologies are often thought to render their beliefs natural and self-evident – to identify them with the ‘common sense’ of a society so that nobody could imagine how they might ever be different” (1991, p. 58). The analytic and theoretical interest regarding ‘naturalization’ processes has tried to go beyond other approaches to ideology such as ‘ideology as integration or identity’ (Ricoeur, 1986, p. 254) or Geertz’s (1975) ‘ideology as a cultural system’. The new dimension that was introduced was that of ‘ideology as legitimation’.  

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11 As Norman Fairclough (1989) argues, ‘when ideology becomes common-sense, it apparently ceases to be ideology, this is in itself an ideological effect, for ideology is truly effective only when it is disguised’ (p 107)
As Eagleton (1991) argues, the process of legitimation seems to involve different strategies. A dominant power may legitimize itself by ‘promoting’ beliefs, values and meanings congenial to its structure and social arrangements; ‘Naturalizing’, universalizing such beliefs to render them self-evident, immutable and inevitable; ‘denigrating’ ideas which might challenge it and ‘excluding’ opposing forms of thought; ‘obscurring’ social reality in ways convenient to itself.

As the analytical chapters will show, this ‘normalizing’, ‘naturalizing’ process does not work in the same way as the one described by Eagleton (1991) or Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999). As these authors (and others) have argued, ideology can ‘naturalize’ forms of social life. Here is a quote from Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) that refers exactly to this aspect: “Ideologies are constructions of practices from particular perspectives (and in this sense ‘one-sided’) which ‘iron out’ the contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms of practices.” (p. 26). What I am arguing for is that the rendering of ideological beliefs natural or self-evident is a process which does not necessarily has to be ‘one-sided’, ‘ironing out’ the contradictions or dilemmas which are part of common sense and ideological practices. As Billig et al. (1988) have argued, common sense contains contrary ideological values constituting ‘ideological dilemmas’.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has been concerned with offering a theoretical round up of the main theoretical tenets and approaches drawn upon in the thesis. Two interrelated theoretical issues around the discursive analysis of stereotyping, prejudice and racism were raised. On one hand, this chapter has emphasized the importance of studying prejudice and extreme prejudice through the study of discourse (of prejudice and extreme prejudice). On the other hand, this chapter has placed a special emphasis on the ideological dimension of discourse and the importance of studying the workings of ideology in text and talk. A discussion of ideologies as discourse bound and discursively accomplished together with the functioning and processes of ideology has also constituted a concern of this chapter.
Chapter four

Historical and political context: a reading

General overview

Romania is an ethnically homogenous country with a population of almost twenty-two million people. Ethnic minorities have always represented a significant part of the Romanian population. According to the last census (2002), ethnic minorities represent about 12% out of the total population. The most important ethnic minorities are the Hungarians, the Romanies, the Germans, Ukrainians, Jews, Turks, Tatars, Serbs, Slovaks etc. In present-day Romania there are eighteen officially recognized ethnic minorities, which are all (with the exception of the Hungarian minority) automatically represented in the Romanian parliament. The 2002 census has established that 89.5% of the population is represented by the Romanians (19,409,400), followed by the Hungarians (1,434,377) which represent 6.6% of the population (7.1% in the 1992 census) and the Romanies (535,250) representing 2.5% (1.8% in 1992). Insofar as the Romanies are concerned the unofficial number (NGO estimates) is said to be between 1,800,000 - 2,500,000 people (cf. Liegeois and Gheorghe, 1995).

Over history, Romania’s experiment with democracy was a tortuous one. After 1878, year in which the complete independence of Romania was granted and recognized by the European powers, nationalism became the primary state policy and attempts were made to Romanize minorities (see Gallagher, 1995, 1998 for more details). During the entire span of the constitutional monarchy (1881-1938), ‘the nation was the underlying theme of political life and every government styled itself as the national movement pursuing the historic mission of the Romanian nation’ (Gallagher, 1995, p. 17) It was a period of unfulfilled promises and hopes, which, historically, can explain why the actual democracy in Romania is predominantly marked by nationalist values. The adoption of Romanian nationality was considered a sine qua non criterion for exercising full citizenship. Those who claimed that their nationality was not Romanian (for example, the Hungarians or the Jews), even when performing their duties as citizens and being loyal to the Romanian state were considered as outsiders or intruders (cf. Gallagher, 1995, p 23)
Democratic ideals came under serious threat in the 1930s, when a radical fascist right-wing movement, such as the Iron Guard, was able to acquire extensive mass support (Ioanid, 1990). For Corneliu Zelca Codreanu, the ‘visionary’ leader of the Iron Guard, Western political forms were seen as corrupting the Romanian creative destiny and democracy, destroying the unity of the Romanian nation (Gallagher, 1995; Volovici, 1991). Extremism and political violence directed towards those who held liberal, democratic views became common currency. The anti-minority and anti-foreign feelings reached unprecedented levels. The most notable stance was the fundamental ‘Jewish threat’ upon the Romanian nation which had a tremendous impact on Romanian nationalist thinking and cultural life. The 1930s represented the climax of fascist ideology in Romania (Ioanid, 1990, Volovici, 1991).

The period between 1938 and 1947, which culminated with the inexorable imposition of communist rule has witnessed a series of tragic events that shaped the future (and the possibility of a democratic Romania). The hostility between the Hungarian minority and the rest of the population reached its peak, but by far the most important and tragic events were the organized pogroms against the Jews and the Gypsies in the 40s under Marshall Ion Antonescu’s pro-Nazi government (Ioanid, 2000). 12

The post-nationalism era imposed by the Soviet Union (the new communist order) did not mean that ethnic minorities in Romania would enjoy a full recognition of their ethnic and cultural identity. This new communist order was based on politics based on an unalterable Romanian ethnic identity, coupled with a tradition of dominance of the collective rights over the individual ones and of the state over society (civil society). The idea of an ethnically homogeneous Romanian society was introduced which coupled with the newly established Romanian socialist work ethic had as target the gradual elimination of national differences. Are worth mentioning, among others, the Romanization policies directed towards the Hungarian minority and the destroying of the specificity of the Roma culture and way of living through methodical delegitimation and forced territorial systematisation. As some authors have pointed out, this was actually a program designed to eliminate altogether ethnic minorities (see Pons, 1999).

12 In the 1990s, Ion Antonescu had its lot of admirers among Romanians (not only politicians, mainly right-wing, but also ordinary people, who were not necessarily members of fringe groups) They all felt that Romania’s post-communist reconstruction should be achieved along the historical, nationalist lines of which Antonescu was an ‘illustrious’ example.
The Romanian revolution of 1989 has been a turning point in Romanian history and politics. It was, unfortunately, an ‘unfinished revolution’ (Roper, 2000), part and parcel of a change process at a political and economical level, but also in as far as different ways of negotiating difference and otherness with the internal ‘others’ was concerned. The exodus of a very important number of Germans and Jews under Ceausescu’s communist regime meant that after the Romanian revolution in 1989, a ‘free’ Romania would have to deal with two main ethnic minorities – the Hungarian minority and the Roma minority.

In 1995, in a book about the Romanian ‘mentality’ after 1989, Alina Mungu-Pippidi, a well-known Romanian sociologist, wrote that ‘present day Romania is a formal democracy rather than an authoritarian system’ (p. 320-321). After the revolution and long after that, Romania was indeed a formal democracy, but one in which echoes of Ceausescu’s nationalist communism and reverberations of ‘30s fascist right-wing ideology (Volovici, 1991) could still be heard and seen alongside pro-Europeanist, democratic and liberal rhetoric (Gallagher, 1995)

**Romanian and Hungarian nationalism**

With the regime change in 1990, nationalist rhetoric has increasingly saturated Romania’s political field (Gallagher, 1998, Mungu-Pippidi, 1999; Tîmâneanu 1998). Political appeals and counter-appeals of Romanian and Hungarian nationalism have since become commonplace in contemporary Romanian politics. Much of this nationalistic debate has been centred on competing social, political and economical claims in relation to Transylvania (region situated in the north-western part of Romania). As the region changed hands three times in the past century, Romanian and Hungarian elites concentrated their political and propagandistic efforts on legitimating their respective historical, cultural, and political claims (Boia, 2001; Mitu, 2000, Mungu-Pippidi, 1999).

Over the centuries, Hungarians and Romanians have nurtured mutually antagonistic collective identities in Transylvania. Nevertheless, Transylvania has survived as an ethnic mix of Romanians, Hungarians, Szekelys, Germans and various religious communities (Roman and Greek Catholic, Protestant, Christian Orthodox) (cf. Mungu-Pippidi, 1999). The Gypsies were also part of the ethnic mix of Transylvania, but they had the lowest
rank, the lowest status among the other groups, which made them to be, in the eyes of their Transylvanian ‘others’, the most unnoticed and unimportant of the ethnic minorities. The Jews used to be very much part of Transylvania’s ethnic mix, but they were either decimated during the Holocaust under Antonescu and Horthy’s regimes, or they left under Communist rule (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999). During communist times, the Germans were either deported or voluntarily left the country. Both Romanians and Magyars have tasted alternatively from the bitter cup of the condition of subordinated minority: the Magyars under the Habsburg Monarchy (from 1699 to 1867), the Romanians under Magyar rule (from 1867 to 1918), and then the Magyars under Romanian rule (1918 to present).

The mutual stereotypical portraits of the Romanians and Hungarians from Transylvania are ones that mix positive and negative traits on both sides (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999). Results of a fairly recent survey shows that Romanian Hungarians have a distinct national identity (Hungarian), but acknowledge their contract as Romanian citizens in a large majority and consider Romania as their country. Nevertheless, practically no Hungarians define themselves as Romanian (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999).

The Romanian-Hungarian nationalist tug-of-war has been constructed historically around two main elements: the territorial disputes that involved the possession and ruling of Transylvania and, intimately related to this, the conflicting historical mythologies.

Even today, one can hear two very different versions of Transylvania’s history, a Romanian and a Hungarian one that still present fundamental different points of view over the matter. For example, Romanian historiography claims that Hungarians arriving in the eleventh century as a migratory people defeated the local tribal chiefs, who were Romanians, and became for almost nine hundred years the ruling class. During Middle Ages this social and ethnic element continued to be combined. At the end of the First World War, Transylvania was occupied by Romanian troops13. The Trianon Treaty of 1920 reunited Transylvania with Romania, then the Axis Powers granted Northern Transylvania again to Hungary in 194014 (the Vienna Diktat), to return again to Romania at the end of the war. One the other hand, the Hungarian historiography tells a different

13 By that time Romanians made of Transylvania’s inhabitants more than all the other ethnic groups taken together (2,830,040 of 5,263,602, 53, 8 % in 1910 – source Livezeanu, 1995)
14 Romanian historians also claim the take over of Northern Transylvania created the opportunity of massacres of Romanians in several villages
story. According to the majority of Hungarian historians, Hungarians, at their arrival in the 11th Century found a Transylvania that was mostly uninhabited except by small groups of Slavs. They started to colonize it, and together with the later coming Germans and Szekelys have created the Transylvanian civilization. Romanians have only arrived in large numbers in Transylvania in the 13th century crossing the Carpathians.

The American anthropologist Katherine Verdery cogently remarks how difficult it is to investigate the 'reality' of Transylvania since most topics touch the explosive Romanian-Hungarian dispute. As she puts it:

Transylvania's history is one of the most politically explosive topics in any conversation with Romanians and Magyars (Hungarians) because both countries claim or have claimed rights of sovereignty over the region. The more I have read on Transylvanian history, the more convinced I have become that an objective rendering of this history is almost impossible (1983, p 19)

Part of the problem and source of ethnic conflict in Romania (primarily in Transylvania) has been the Romanian ethno-national argument that 'we [the Romanian ethnic group] have been here all along!' This ethno-nationalist claim was seen by some political analysts as being a feature of the Romanian 'main tenant mentality' (Cornea, 1995a, b) which has played a very significant role in the crystallization of a chauvinistic and xenophobic nationalist discourse. Both groups used history as a rhetorical and political resource in order to build nationalist arguments. Appealing to historical resentments to blame difficulties of the transition was a constant policy of the Romanian post-communist governments (Gallagher, 1995; Mungiu-Pippidi, 1995, 1999).

Since 1990 there has been a disturbing rise in anti-Hungarian (and a more general anti-minority) feeling among the Romanian majority population. The Hungarian minority had organised itself politically shortly after the days of the revolution (25 December 1989). The newly formed Hungarian Democratic Forum in Romania (HDFR) later known as the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania soon started to show that they were able to speak on behalf of a large section of the Hungarian population and become a specific threat in the eyes of the Romanian nationalists. The reaction to the early Hungarian political organisation came through the setting up of the extreme nationalism of Vatra Românească (The Romanian Cradle), an extremist organisation formed in Târgu
Mureș in early 1990. Starting with ‘Vatra Românească’, going through its political adjunct, the ‘Party of Romanian National Unity’, to the more influential and more mainstream nationalist extremism of ‘Greater Romania Party’ a discourse of division and incitement to hatred towards the Hungarians constituted the main political and electoral agenda. From the outset, both political groupings employed the historical argument that ‘Romanians were first in Transylvania’ and therefore the Hungarians have no right to be there and claim an autonomous political and cultural identity. They considered that the will of the Romanians should always have prevalence over the one of the minority, since Romanians are the majority. They have also held the opinion that no ethnic minority group should receive special privileges and that the Romanians should actually have more rights than other ethnic groups.

The ethnic nationalism of ‘Vatra Românească’ and the continuous, but rapid deterioration in relations between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority since 1989 led to violent interethnic conflict in Tîrgu Mureș (an overwhelmingly Hungarian city in Transylvania) in March 1990. Series of violences erupted in Tg Mureș as a demonstration of the ‘Vatra Românească’ was turned into a siege of the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania’s offices. Even today, one realises that it is almost impossible to known for sure what happened in Tg. Mureș. What is known though is that this interethnic conflict certainly put the ethnic issue at the forefront of the political arena and the issue of ethnicity was shrewdly used by Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front to gather electoral support and win the elections two months later (Gallagher, 1995).

This ethnic clash seemed minor compared to other Balkan contemporary violent disputes, but nevertheless was notable insofar as the political constellation of the new Romanian democracy and the treatment of ethnic minorities was concerned. It was also notable beyond the Transylvanian context, as the first inter-ethnic violent conflict after the year of the ‘revolution’, 1989.

Since 1996, the Hungarian Alliance (DAHR), an ethnic party, has become a member of the government coalition and enjoyed seats in the Romanian government. It was hoped

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15 For a full account of the 1990 inter-ethnic violence in Transylvania see chapter 3 in Gallagher (1995)
16 The first Romanian political organisation to be formed after the 1989 revolution
that relations would significantly improve for the better, yet internal fighting has plagued
the ruling coalition established at that time. The political program of the DAHR was
organized around a series of claims relating to enhancing the autonomy and the
development of a separate Hungarian cultural identity. Their claims (which were not
received and later, in part, resolved without controversy) referred to separate higher
education in Hungarian (the issue of an Hungarian university in Cluj-Napoca was brought
to the front), local public autonomy, the use of the Hungarian language in public
administration and courts, the use of bilingual signs, support for the Hungarian cultural
organisations, and promulgation of a law on minorities (see also the data provided by
Ethnobarometer, 2000 and Metro Media Transilvania, 2001)

As noted previously, Transylvania is the field for ethnic competition between Romanians
and Hungarians. The sharing of this physical space between the two groups has a symbolic
significance, as Transylvania is the ‘cradle’ of both groups (cf. Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999).
Transylvania is at the heart of political and nationalistic debate, a place for national and
Identity constructions of the two groups. The national theme, the ‘national’ problem
dominate the Romanan political debate since 1990 to our days, and is responsible for
shaping a whole range of domestic policies (some of them with little connection to the
‘national’ theme).

It is often not very clear what is meant by this ‘national’ problem. In her book,
Transilvania subiectivă [Subjective Transylvania], Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (1999) tries to
make a differentiation between different meanings attributed to this ‘national’ problem
theme. As she suggests,

to the Romanian nationalist parties, mostly post-communist parties, but partly also
anti-Communist, the national problem means the lack of loyalty towards the
Romanian state and from here the danger of territorial separatism of the Hungarian
minority

(p 13)

In the case of the Romanian intellectuals the national problem seems to take the form of a
quest towards regaining of some meaning of the Romanian identity ‘in a world in a world
so different from the one before the 2nd World War, the last moment said, -although little
evidence supports this- to have presented such a clear identity’ (1999, p. 13).
For the Hungarian intellectuals and political elite from Transylvania the national issue is linked with 'creating a legal framework in order to guarantee the preservation and development of a distinct and very accentuated national identity' (1999, p. 13). For the international community, the 'national problem' in Romania 'is an attempt to limit a possible ethnic conflict between Romanians and Hungarians and to maintain it as a form of confrontation strictly within a Romanian, but also European, legal and administrative framework' (ibid., p 13).

In Mungiu-Pippidi's view the Romanian debate around the Hungarians is centered on two basic ideas, one excluding the other. From the perspective of Romanian nationalistic and chauvinistic parties and journals the 'problem' is that Hungarians from Romania want Transylvania to return to Hungary. From the perspective of Romanian and Hungarian intellectual journals the debate revolves around the Hungarians' striving to acquire 'normal, ordinary, human rights'.

In her analysis of the Romanian political class, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (1999) distinguishes between different trends or types of 'nationalists'. The first category that she identifies is that of the 'assimilationists' and 'chauvinists', the representatives of the ideology advocated by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Gheorghe Funar and others. According to them, Hungarians are in fact Romanians, because 'we are all Romanians'. As Mungiu-Pippidi comments on this issue: 'the Hungarian minority, organized and self-aware of her difference is thus a perpetual cause of instability, congenitally disloyal towards the Romanian state, which shouldn't be permitted to organize itself not to threaten the Romanian state' (1999, p. 187). For example, 'chauvinists' consider ethnic parties should not be allowed to exist and cultural difference should be reduced as not to have any political implications.

The second category of nationalists that Mungiu-Pippidi identifies is the 'statist nationalists', which in her view is represented by the majority of the political class. As Mungiu-Pippidi points out, 'statist nationalists do not necessarily identify the state with the dominant nation, but their political conception is that of total subordination of regions to the center, the center being usually the expression of the dominant culture' (1999, p. 189). From this perspective any region or minority, which tries to emancipate itself, is a
threat to the state: ‘[The state] treats the individuals based directly on citizenship and not through the means of their ethnic identification’ (ibid., p 189)

The third category that she identifies is that of the conservative nationalists or autochthomsts. In this category you can find the intellectuals, the Greek-Catholics and some of the old members of the historical parties. The conservative nationalists can be at times tolerant towards the Hungarians,

if only Hungarians don’t seem to be placed on the line of the Hungarian classic nationalism of under-evaluation of Romanian culture ... they call themselves ‘patriots’ and they think of themselves as representatives of civic nationalism.
(1999, p. 190)

One of the most dangerous types of nationalists that had an instrumental role in reproducing discrimination, dominance and inequality in as far as Hungarians, Romanies and other ethnic groups were concerned is the above mentioned category of the ‘chauvinists’, the representatives of the ideology advocated by Comelie Vadim Tudor, Gheorghe Funar and others. Comelie Vadim Tudor is the president of the ‘Partidul România Mare’ [Greater Romania Party] and is one of the most important representatives of the extreme right-wing ideology in Romania. Together with Gheorghe Funar (the mayor of Cluj-Napoca, the unofficial capital of Transylvania, former leader of its own nationalistc party ‘Vatra Românească’ [The Romanian Cradle] they form an extreme nationalist tandem whose extreme prejudiced discourse touches invariably on issues related to the three traditional ‘scapegoats’ of the Romanian psyche, the traditional ‘sensitive files’ (Boia, 2001) the Gypsies, the Hungarians and the Jews.

During the 1990s, and even after that, Comelie Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar were the fiercest advocates of a ‘politics of intolerance’ (Gallagher, 1995) through the intermediary of a nationalistic, racist and xenophobic discourse in relation to the two main ethnic minorities living in Romania: the Hungarians and the Romanies.

As Gallagher notes,

the most authentic heirs of the national communist era are the ultra-nationalist parties which allege numerous conspiracies against the country and which insist that multiple threats to Romania’s national integrity can only be repulsed by suspending normal political rules and forming a united front behind individuals and social forces with a proven record of standing up for national values.
For the nationalist extremists, civic nationalism, promoting values based on citizenship regardless of the ethnic background was considered inauthentic. For them, ethnic origin should be the most important factor in deciding what one ought to do as a citizen and the majority population should be the one to dictate the identity and the values of the state (Gallagher, 1998)

The Romanies in Eastern Europe

The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has brought with itself a rise of ethnically based discrimination and exclusion of ethnic minorities. Romanies deserve a special mention in this context, as they were probably the most affected by the discriminatory and exclusionary repercussion of post-totalitarian freedom (Hockenos, 1993; see also ERRC, 2001b). As MacLaughlin (1998b) argues,

the resurgence of ‘blood and soil’ nationalism, together with the reconstruction of communities as ‘kith and kin’ entities, has .. fostered a Manichean view of the nation as a place inhabited by friendly and ‘safe’ natives and hostile and dangerous ‘foreigners’.

(p. 1019)

In several Central and Eastern European countries (but not only there – see MacLaughlin, 1998a, 1999a, b and Sibley, 1995 for examples of the Western world), the Romanies constituted the epitome of foreignness. The Romanies (or the Gypsies) were the unmelttable ethnic minorities (MacLaughlin, 1998b), the inner enemy (Sigona, 2003), the alien next door (Bauman, 1990) they were a ‘problem’ that needed a ‘solution’. As Sigona argues,

the otherness of the Gypsy thus can be configured as in the middle between the enemy and the stranger, as defined by Bauman. The Gypsy is an enemy, but living within the dominant society. He is the one that assumes, despite his proximity, various shapes according to the political expediency of the majority.

(2003, p. 71)

For centuries, the Romanies were the victims of a special kind of racism, one “which juxtaposes nationalism and colonialism in such a way as to draw clear distinctions (and
boundaries) between the 'civilized native' and the 'barbaric other'" (MacLaughlin, 1998b, p. 1023) The cultural and political identity of the Romany people in most Eastern European countries (and elsewhere) was, for most of its part, constructed within a setting pertaining to a geography of closure and politics of exclusion (MacLaughlin, 1998a) It was constructed within a political and social climate that produced (and reproduced) attitudes and practices, which, in turn, reproduced the pariah status of the Romani people. These practices constitute deeply entrenched anti-Roma feelings, (or anti-Gypsism as some authors prefer to call it –see Petrova, 2003 for an example) which have lead to systematic abuse of Roma human rights, persecution, racial and ethnic discrimination. Discrimination, exclusion and marginalization of the Romani people have taken place at the same time with the opposite forces of advancing Roma rights, constructing and consolidating a Romany ethnic identity (Petrova, 2003)

In many countries Romanies are not recognized as a minority at all. As Petrova argues,

some states explicitly recognize the Roma as a national or ethnic minority (Hungary, Macedonia, Romania) or as a culturally autonomous nation (Russia), but there is no successful model of either autonomous self-government or equal participation in mainstream institutions

(2003, p 143)

If one looks at the situation of Romanies in the world today, one can note the ubiquitous nature of anti-Romany bias. As some authors have argued, one of the essential elements of anti-Gypsy sentiments that Western and Eastern European public opinions have in common is the perception of the Roma's parasitic existence and, hence, the deep-seated attitude that the Gypsies are subhuman (Petrova, 2003, Sibley, 1992, 1995).

The pervasive anti-Gypsism can also be interpreted as a set of misconceptions and myths (Petrova, 2003) One of the most widespread misconceptions is the one related to the nomadism of the Romanies It has become commonplace to affirm that Gypsies are quintessentially nomad people, but what is forgotten is that the people that are subject to unfair treatment and discrimination in Eastern European countries are not necessarily nomad, but are mainly people who have lived there for many generations and which should be entitled to the same treatment as the 'natives'. Another widespread misconception is that of Romany crime which has a very harmful impact on the social representation of Romanies in post-communist societies. A very strong and influential
misconception is related to Roma’s so-called unwillingness to integrate. In most countries with relatively big Roma populations this is one of the most common argument used to justify policies of exclusion, discrimination and separation. Another argument used for the same purpose, is the misconception of the Romany attitude to education which, as the other misconceptions, has a negative impact on the overall public representation of the Romanies, but also insofar as policies of development, providing of resources (financial and social support) is concerned. One should not forget that the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe have overwhelmingly occupied the lowest strata of the working classes with the lowest levels of education and income. They were mainly employed (when employed) as unskilled workers and in unattractive occupations such as garbage collectors (this is nevertheless not applicable to all of them).

There was always a sort of ambivalence insofar the representation of Romanies was concerned. In the majority of Eastern European states, the Roma have been described as one of the most threatened ethnic minority groups (Erjavec, 2001). At the same time, they were also described (not necessarily by the same people) as the most threatening of ethnic minorities. As Erjavec (2001) notes, from a political, social and legal perspective, many similarities in the treatment of the Roma throughout the region are noticeable. The Roma are generally marginalized in Eastern European society and, in most of the cases, have no legal protection. Even if some progress has been made in an attempt to integration, their access to education is still limited and undertaken in separate educational institutions, they are subject to overt and covert discriminatory discourse in the public and media discourse and are the target of extreme violence and hate crimes (Erjavec, 2001).

The example of the media coverage of Roma in Eastern Europe is one of the most cogent when it comes to reproducing racist and discriminatory language, reinforcing stereotypes of the Roma and promoting a discourse of hate and moral exclusion (see Erjavec, 2001 and Leudar and Nekvapil, 2000 for examples). For example, in Romania, discriminatory language and a stereotypical, negative image are overwhelmingly present when the Roma are mentioned (Media in Romania, 1998).
The Romanies in Romania

As noted in the previous section, the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has brought with itself a rise of ethnically based discrimination and exclusion of ethnic minorities. Romania, the country with the largest Roma population in Eastern Europe, has not constituted an exception from this pattern (CEDIME-SE, 2001). The widespread Eastern European anti-Gypsy sentiment has manifested itself in Romania too having a very strong discriminatory and exclusionary character and accompanied by outburst of extreme violence against the Romanies (see ERRC, 1996 and 2001a). As Hockenos argues, Romania’s Roma ‘had to pay for post-totalitarian freedom as no other people in Romania’ (1993, p. 201).

One could argue that in Romania, as in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe the traditional myth of the Gypsy, expressive of a feeling of superiority towards a very different, primitive and marginal other, but also a certain romantic-humanitarian sympathy and a civilizing intention has been giving the way to a mixture of fear and hostility (Boa, 2001). The creation and reproduction of discriminatory and exclusionary social and discursive practices insofar the Romanies in Romania were concerned was determined, among other factors, by the increasing political power of the right-wing nationalist parties and their representatives which promoted an ideology of hatred with eliminationist connotations. One of the most dangerous types of nationalists that had an instrumental role in reproducing discrimination, dominance and inequality in as far as Romanies were concerned is the category of the ‘chauvinists’, the representatives of the ideology advocated by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Gheorghe Funar and others. What is to note tough is that ‘although the ultra-right has led the charge against those they deem their genetic inferiors, hatred and wrath against the Roma comes from all segments of society and from across the political spectrum’ (Hockenos, 1993, p. 201).

Historical and political context

At the time of the arrival of the first Romanies, Balkan (and Romanian) society was technologically backward and mainly agricultural (Hancock, 2002). As the economical order began to change, the skills that the Romanies have brought with them become
Important. From the first attestations of the Romanes in Romania they were held as serfs, and were “owned” by landlords, being included “in parcels of property given as gifts or as payment by one owner to another” (Hancock, 2002, p. 17-18) Most were kept (or given away) because of their specific professions. Slavery emerged out of the strict measures taken by the landowners, monasteries and the aristocracy to prevent the Romany labour force from leaving the Romanian principalities (Hancock, 2002). As a consequence, by the 1500s, the word ‘tigan’ (gypsy) came to be synonymous with ‘slave’ (Romany slave). There were different kinds of slaves depending on their various occupations, depending on where they used to work (indoors or outdoors) and for whom (the type of owner). Until the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century new groups of slaves have been brought with the Ottoman Empire. Achim (1999) gives an overview of all the kinds of serfs that existed, depending on the type of owner, profession, and kind of tribute the Romanes had to pay to their owners, or whether they were sedentary or wandering around the country.

Complete legal freedom came in 1864, when Romanes where reinstated as free people on the estates where they had previously worked. As Hancock argues, ‘following their liberation nothing was done to educate and reorient the freed slaves and bring them into society’ (2002, p. 26). Once slavery had been abolished many Roma left Romania for Western Europe or North America. For the majority of those who stayed, abolition meant an aggravation of their exploitation, the maintenance of their condition of poverty and discrimination. They were set free, but they were not given any land Large numbers moved to the margins of the cities and villages, and as a result in every village some metalworkers and other craftsmen settled themselves, where the agricultural population needed their skills They also started to be involved in activities with a low economical potential such as procuring and selling empty bottles or metal or marginal exploitation of the public (divination, begging) (cf. Zamfir and Zamfir, 1993; see also CEDIME-SE, 2001).

The period between the two World Wars was characterised on the one hand by a further assimilation of the Roma population and on the other hand by the manifestation of their own emancipation movement. Nevertheless, the authorities were holding the belief that, as Roma did not possess a culture or a history that was defined in written terms, they were therefore not entitled to the same rights as the Romanians and the other minorities in Romania (CEDIME-SE, 2001) Between 1934 and 1939 the General Union of Roma in
Romana worked to promote equal rights for the Romanian Roma, but the growth of fascism and the inevitable outbreak of the Second World War saw Roma organisations being dissolved and the process of emancipation coming to a halt\(^7\). The Roma Holocaust, the Nazi attempt to eradicate, exterminate the European Romany population was met by full support in Romania. The pro-Nazi government of Marshal Antonescu, fervently anti-minority, and principally anti-Roma has been instrumental in putting together a policy of Roma deportation and extermination. In 1942 some 25,000 Romani were deported to Transnistria (land captured from the Soviet Union) without sufficient means of subsistence and without places to work. Approximately 19,000 Romani died there. In total, a number of 36,000 Roma died during the war, the highest number from any other European country (cf. Helsinki Watch, 1991; see also CEDIME-SE, 2001).

During the Communist regime, especially in the 60's and from there on, nationalism and a politics of assimilation became the foundational ideological tools used to deny the Roma process of emancipation, but also that of preservation of their culture and identity. According to the state ideology, Roma were considered to be foreign elements that had to become Romanian, that had to learn the Romanian 'ways'. Their culture was being considered as one of poverty and underdevelopment (Pons, 1999, p 29).

One of the ways in which the communist Romanian government set out to deal with this problem of assimilation was through destroying the specificity of the Roma culture and way of living. The specificity of the Roma community was thus denied and disappeared altogether from the official documents of the Romanian legislators. According to the principles of the communist regime 'private' occupations, like those of the Romanies, had to disappear. All privately owned factories or small businesses were confiscated by the state. The state also confiscated the tools and the materials used for the traditional occupations of the Roma (metalworking, carpentry, jewelry making), especially the gold used by the Roma for jewelry (CEDIME-SE, 2001). The Roma were forcibly integrated in agricultural activities by the agriculture production cooperatives. Until the collapse of the communist regime, 48-50 per cent of Roma workers worked in agriculture. Trade, small business enterprises were prohibited activities for them. Moreover, the law proscribed them, considering them to be 'social parasites' (cf. Pons, 1999, p 34, CEDIME-SE, 2001).

\(^7\) In this same period, industrial progress made a number of their manufactured goods obsolete and non-competitive. Roma craftsmanship was on the decline, some trades even disappeared completely.
Programmatic state policies have destroyed the ethnic identity of the Romanies. Many of the traditional occupations and traditional elements of the Roma life style were being denied and replaced with a collectivist, socialist work and life ethic. Against their will, the Roma had started to get integrated into an imposed life style. This was happening, as the Romanian communist regime continued to deny the Romanies the status of ethnic minority. As a consequence no education was given in their mother tongue and no account was taken of their specific culture. The Roma population had the lowest rate of educated people. They were not present in the high schools and especially in the universities. Many Romanies worked as unskilled labourers in big factories or on the co-operative or state farms.

Towards the end of the 1970s, beginning of the 1980s the Roma people came under the influence of an organized politics of systematization of the territory by force. Districts where they lived were destroyed, and they had to move into new buildings that were not necessarily better but in which Roma needed more time to get used living in different conditions from their way of life (cf. Pons, 1999; Zamfir and Zamfir, 1993). The different groups of Roma have adapted themselves in different ways to the new situation. Some have struck luck, while others were the victims of poverty and discrimination and had no means of survival.

Whereas the Hungarians have enjoyed for a long time the status (and sometimes the benefits) of being classed as a national minority, for the Romanies, it was only shortly after the overthrow the communist regime that the Romanies were recognized as a national minority. Even if this recognition has entailed a gain of political and civil rights, the deterioration of the social and economical status of the Romanies has continued. Discriminatory legislation, coupled with people's ingrained prejudices on the streets and in the workplace has led to a situation in which the social and economical uplifting of Romanies was almost impossible. The intervention of state institutions in the process of building of a Romany political and social movement has meant enforced control from the state and a slow rhythm of organizing the social and political identity of the Romanies. Nowadays, there a plethora of Romany civic and political organizations dealing with different issues with which the Romanies are faced in the Romanian society and, since the year 2000, the improvement of the Romany social and economical status is part of a national strategy of the Romanian government.
Since the Romanian revolution in 1989, the Romanies (and their behaviour) became one of the preferred topics in the Romanian press (especially, but not exclusively in the right-wing press – ‘România Mare’ [Greater Romania], the leading newspaper of Vadim Tudor’s ultra-nationalist party is one of the most fierce examples of programmatic defamation, derogation of the Romanies and incitement to hatred) Even Romania’s independent and liberal press has unscrupulously written against the Romanies, in editorials or articles that rival the ‘România Mare’ litaines going from ‘thieves’, ‘criminals’ or ‘beggars’ to more extreme racist appellatives such as ‘brown’ or ‘crows’ (cf. Hockenos, 1993; see also Media Monitoring Agency, 2000 and 2003a).

Even if the state recognizes the Roma as a national or ethnic minority, their position in society is very much determined by the way Romanies are represented by different people and constructed in discourses of ‘difference’ (Crowe, 1999, Pons, 1995, 1999). For example, as Mungiu-Pippidi (1999) argues in her excellent study on Transylvania, the presence of Gypsies does not somehow matter for Romanians and Hungarians, who are often united in their resentment and contempt for them Both Romanians and Hungarians share the same basic opinion (the same basic negative stereotypes) about the Roma population dirty, thieves, and lazy (Ethnobarometer, 2000, see also Culic et al., 2000).

**Violence against the Roma**

The overthrowing of Ceaușescu’s communist government in 1989 brought new hope for Romania’s citizens. Nonetheless, after the revolution, the Roma discovered that their situation did not improve very much or at all and, in many cases, became markedly worse (CEDIME-SE, 2001). The newly acquired freedom has fuelled not tolerance, but instead widespread discrimination against Romany individuals and groups. This has lead to biased treatment in the media, denial of access to public establishments and services, discrimination in the workplace, schools and health programs. The Romanies soon became the scapegoats for some of the political and economical misfortunes of Romania, as the country struggled with the transition to a market economy. Violence against Roma, which had not necessarily been a feature of communist Romania, became more widespread and even tolerated

As argued before, the creation and reproduction of discriminatory and exclusionary social and discursive practices insofar the Romanies are concerned was determined, among other
factors, by the increasing political power of the right-wing nationalist parties and their representatives which promoted an extreme prejudiced discourse based on an ideology of hatred with eliminationist connotations. Nevertheless, the hatred and wrath against the Roma has come from all the segments of the Romanian society and from across the political spectrum (Hockenos, 1993). It was not only the ‘power’ of the political extremists that lead to the instantiation of an extreme prejudiced discourse and the reproduction of discriminatory and exclusionary practices, but also the ‘power’ of the common-sense, common-place extreme ideology of ‘difference’ held by people who were not ‘political’ extremists or members of fringe groups. The case of the violence against the Roma in Romania is a very suggestive example of the enactment of a kind of violent ideology of social exclusion coming from people who were not ‘political’ extremists, but nevertheless were the main actors in particularly prejudicial episodes of extreme violence against the Romanies.

Since 1990 there have been over thirty conflicts in Romania in which Roma have been either injured, sometimes fatally, or driven from their homes. (ERRC, 1996 and 2001a; Helsinki Watch, 1994; Amnesty International, 1995; CEDIME-SE, 2001) Such incidents typically begin as an argument between one or several Roma and one or several non-Roma and often escalate to the point where whole communities are involved. Romanian authorities have consistently denied the inter-ethnic nature of such incidents and tended to underplay their frequently racist character. Moreover, no one has been seriously punished for committing a crime against a Roma. This kind of action (or should I say, non-action) from the part of the state has reinforced the belief that violence against the Roma is not a crime (Amnesty International, 1995, CEDIME-SE, 2001)

According to a report issued by the Project on Ethnic Relations (1992), since the beginning of 1990, in various regions of Eastern Europe, Roma have suffered more than forty-five attacks, resulting in the deaths of twenty Roma and the destruction of over four...

18 For example, in 1998, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the ultra-nationalist Greater Romania Party issued a statement outlining the program to be carried out if his party was to be victorious in the elections of the year 2000. Part of the program proposed the isolation of ‘Roma criminals in special colonies’ in order to ‘stop Romanas being transformed into a Gypsy camp’.

19 This is an important element that seems to delimitate the violence against the Roma in Romania from the violence against the Roma in other Eastern European countries. In Romania, it was the common people, the local inhabitants, the neighbours who attacked and burned down the houses of the Roma, not necessarily members of fringe groups, whereas in other Eastern European countries, it was mainly skinheads, members of various neo-nazi groups. Also, in Romania, violence against the Roma was predominantly a rural phenomenon, instead of an urban phenomenon in other Eastern European countries.
hundred Romany dwellings. Violent attacks on the Roma have been carried out by community vigilante groups, by skinheads and other extremist groups, and in some cases by police and other law-enforcement officers (Project on Ethnic Relations, 1997). The violence has been especially well documented in the former Czech and Slovak lands and in Romania and Hungary, but it has also taken place in Poland, Bulgaria, and former Yugoslavia (Project on Ethnic Relations, 1992 and 1997; ERRC, 2001b). In most Eastern European countries, the violence against the Roma was mainly an urban phenomenon. In Romania, however, as Nicolae Gheorghe (Project on Ethnic Relations, 1997) pointed out, violence against the Roma was generally a rural phenomenon, usually consisting of assaults on local Roma inhabitants after some real or imagined precipitating event. For example, in Bolintin, at the beginning of April 1991, after a Rom allegedly raped a village woman, the villagers drove one hundred and thirty-seven Roma families from their homes (allegedly, the entire Roma population of the village) and burned the homes of twenty-six Roma to the ground. In the same year, in Bolintin Deal, a twenty-three-year-old music student was murdered and, as retaliation, eighteen houses were burned to the ground in a single night (see Isabela Fonseca, 1995 for a narration of this extremely violent episode). Neither the police nor any other agency took action. Apart from the murderer, a Roma, none of the assailants was brought before justice (Helsinki Watch, 1994).

Other instances of mob violence (Huedin and Mihail Kogălniceanu in 1990, Ogrezeni, 1991) can be added to a long list of non-prosecuted cases of extreme violence against the Roma. In 1993, at Hădăreni, Mureș County, three Roma are killed by a mob of Romanians and Hungarians. Justice is slow and even today the case is not closed and someone held responsible for violent behaviour against the Roma (for a longer list and particulars of these violent events see Helsinki Watch, 1994).

The intervention of Roma organisations (especially Romani CRISS21) (and also the pressure coming from the international community) in localities where interethnic conflicts occurred, like the Mihail Kogălniceanu commune (Constanța County) or the Văleni Lapușului village (Maramureș County) (events which took place between 1990

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20 For a full account of violence against the Roma in Romania see ERRC country report, 1996
21 Romani CRISS (Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies) is an non-governmental organization that monitors cases of human rights violations
and 1994) has influenced in some ways the attitude and response of the governmental authorities to similar situations.

During 1995 and 1996 (and in some occasions even later), past abuses which have remained unsanctioned and the pogroms have been replaced with police raids without apparent justification. An official institution, the police, was a threat to the Romanies. Police raids on Roma settlements have occurred with disturbing frequency. In most of the cases no explanation was given and the police was unable to produce warrants, but people were violently removed from their homes, being detained or relocated until further notice. There are several reports of severe injuries or even death as a result of these raids (see ERRC, 1996 and Helsinki Watch, 1994). According to the Human Rights Watch reports for 1998 and 1999, Roma continued to be the victims of police violence during that year. Both the European Roma Rights Center and the Romanian Helsinki Committee urged investigation into such cases and the prosecution of those suspected of having committed crimes on racial grounds. The government has tended to respond to such requests slowly and with inaccurate information, or sometimes not at all (Human Rights Watch, 1999; CEDIME-SE, 2001).

Mob violence against the Roma minority and police violence has nevertheless decreased considerably during the last years (since 2000), but no one should forget or underplay the series of violent attacks, which repeatedly targeted entire Romany communities. There are still many things to be done in order to secure legal protection for Roma individuals and communities and bring to justice those who committed violent acts against the Romanies.

Social psychological research on the Roma

Western Europe and other Eastern and Central European countries

Research on the Roma has been a continuous preoccupation of diverse researchers from all over the world coming from different disciplines in the social sciences. Work has ranged from various general historical accounts on origins, migration and European persecution (see inter alia, Crowe, 1995; Fraser, 1995; Kenrick and Puxon, 1972, Yoors, 1967) to more specific, monographic and sociologically oriented analyses (Fonseca, 1995; Hancock, 1987; 2002; Liegeois, 1994; Liegeois and Gheorghe, 1995; Okely, 1983; Stewart, 1997).
Other kind of research on the Roma coming from the realm of human geography has dealt with issues related to social exclusion (Sibley, 1992, 1995, 1998), the political geography of racism, the politics of exclusion and geographies of closure (McLaughlin, 1998a, b; 1999a, b), Romany migrations (Klimova and Pickup, 2000, 2003) and its pariah status (Mack, 2003).

In the Eastern European countries the literature on the Roma has also flourished, mainly after the overthrowing of the communist regimes. Apart from the usual books and monographs on the history of Gypsies in Eastern Europe (Crowe, 1995), there has been an impressive wealth of research (including work in discursive studies) A distinction can be made between studies of (or rather ‘on’) the Roma and studies of representation and majority views about the Roma. In the first category one can include, among others, the work by Petrova (1997, 2003) and also various research carried out intensively at the European Roma Rights Centre in Budapest by a group of international researchers has provided insightful material into the difficult post-1989 realities of the existence of the Romanies in Eastern Europe such as discrimination and prejudice, violence against the Roma and different issues related to the economic and social status of the Romanies in contemporary Eastern European societies. In the second category, one can include, for example, the work of Drăgulescu et al. (1996) in Romania, of Erjavec in Slovenia (Erjavec, 2001; Erjavec et al., 2000), of Leudar and Nekvapil in the Czech Republic (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2000, Nekvapil and Leudar, 2002; see also Fawn, 2001 on the Czech attitudes towards the Roma), of Petrova in Bulgaria (Petrova, 2000), of Koulish in Hungary (Koulish, 2003) or Sigona’s work on the Kosovo Roma and labelling policies (Sigona, 2003). These are only a series of examples from the abundant literature on Romanies issues from different perspectives and approaches.

Some more ambitious research projects have tried to put together the data obtained from both Western and Eastern Europe insofar Romanies were concerned. A wide ranging project funded by the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and the European Laboratory of Social Psychology and coordinated by professor Juan Antonio Perez from the University of Valencia has aimed to study, from a trans-national perspective, the social representations of Romanies in Western and Eastern Europe. The first phase of this project (1994-2003) included researchers from Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech republic and Romania. The main results of this trans-national research were presented in 1995 at an
international colloquium on the social representations of the Gypsies organised in Romania by the University of Iași (see Neculau and Ferreol, 1996 for an account) The second phase of the project includes research undertaken in seven Western countries having as outcome a publication project to be undertaken in 2004-2005 - some results have been already been published by Moscovici and Perez (1997, 2004) and by Perez et al. (2001)

Romanian research

According to a relatively recent report offering a multidimensional analysis of the body of research on the Romanies in Romania (Mărginean et al., 2001), the Identity approach and the socio-economical perspective were to be found as part of the majority of the studies on the Roma. In terms of content, the studies on the Romanies can be divided into four main categories: cultural/ethnic Identity, majority-minority relations, the quality of life and the issue of social integration. The majority of the studies were conducted after 1990, when the Romany issues and difficulties were being recognized. The data collection techniques were very diverse ranging from observation, questionnaires, and content analysis to the use of individual and group interviews, the analysis of official documents, case studies (cf. Mărginean et al., 2001)

To this, one has to add research conducted by the Media Monitoring Agency on the diverse ways of representing and stereotyping the Romanies in the Romanian mass-media. The conclusion of the 2000 Media Monitoring Agency report states that Romanian mass-media is in general tendentious in regard to the Roma ethnic group. The majority of the newspaper articles included in the analysis were in their majority presenting conflictual events and situations, where the nature of the conflict was either criminal or economic. The types of actions in which the Romanies are involved are predominantly of a negative nature. The words through which the Romanies are identified bring to the forefront a dominant trait, which is their aggressiveness (cf. Media Monitoring Agency, 2000). In a 2003 report about Roma images in the Romanian press issued by the same Media Monitoring Agency, the authors reach pretty much similar conclusions. A negative and conflictual stereotypical representation is still present together with a very similar denigratory discourse, which reinforces, reproduces a very negative image of the Romanies (cf. Media Monitoring Agency, 2003a). The image of the Romanies in the news
bullets of the main Romanian TV stations was also a concern for analytical research. The latest report of the Media Monitoring Agency shows that there is a predominance of presenting conflictual events and situations, in which, in eighty percent of the cases, the main actors are the Romanies, on one hand, and the Romanian or foreign authorities (such as the Police for example) on the other. As in the case of the written press, stereotypical language and derogatory descriptions of Romanies were also present in most of the news bulletins (for more details see Media Monitoring Agency, 2003b).

Insofar as the majority-minority relationship studies on the Roma are concerned there have been a series of studies conducted under different theoretical and empirical headings such as social representations, social distance, stereotypes, attitude and survey research (Table 1 exemplifies the proportion of this kind of studies)

Table 1  Percentage of majority-minority relationship studies by type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of majority-minority relationships</th>
<th>Percent of total studies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social representations</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social distance towards Romanies</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude concerning the collective rights</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of the socio-cultural profile of the Roma</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude of the Roma towards the minorities and Romanies</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Mărginean et al., 2001

These kind of studies, as those investigating the image of the Roma population in the mass-media, show that in Romania the perception of the majority population towards the Roma is rather negative. For example, measuring the ‘social distance’ towards the Roma showed that the Roma are one of the most rejected groups (Chelcea, 1994a; Zamfir and Zamfir, 1993). According to the authors, the Romanies are predominantly judged negatively, but without nevertheless the prevalence of a marked xenophobic attitude.

Conventional attitude and survey research have constituted the predominant means through which researchers have chosen to document the different kinds of attitudes that Romanians have in as far as the Romanies are concerned. It is worth mentioning the
sociological research conducted as part of large scale Ethnic Relations Barometers (Ethnobarometer, 2000; IMAS, 1996; Metro Media Transilvania, 2001), but also smaller scale projects on Romanians’ attitudes towards the Romanies (Abraham et al., 1995; Chelcea, 1994a, b; Cîobanu-Bacanu et al., 1995; Neculai, 1996; Popescu, 1999; Turliuc, 1999; Zamfir and Zamfir, 1993). For example, research conducted by Abraham et al. (1995) found that forty percent of the non-Roma population had ‘very unfavourable’ feelings towards the Romanies and a further thirty-four percent had ‘unfavourable’ feelings. As the authors suggest, in all the regions of the country feelings regarding Roma inclined towards ‘unfavourable’ although some groups, such as the Hungarians, were weakly positive in their attitudes (Abraham et al, 1995). One of the suggestions of the authors is that these feelings of ‘dislike’ are not inspired by the fact that these people are the exponents of a Roma ‘ethnicity,’ but rather by the ‘way of life’ of the Romanies and the manner in which they assert themselves in society and in their relations with others (Abraham et al, 1995). In 1997, a similar poll has found similar results, with sixty-seven percent of those questioned or interviewed declaring an unfavorable attitude towards the Romanies (Rostaş, 1998).

In the year 2000, the Research Institute for Quality of Life analysed the research and the surveys done from 1993 to 1999. The research was aiming to see if there was any evidence that the level of prejudice against the Romanies had changed. The conclusion of this research was that there is considerably less prejudice than there used to be and that levels of tolerance have increased considerably since 1993. Nevertheless, there has been research contradicting the idea that there is considerably less prejudice. According to the Ethnobarometer (2000), the rejection degree of the Romanies still registers a high level. For example, there is still a significant percent (38.8) of Romanians who would not allow Roma population to live in Romania or to enter the country. This results coupled with the persistence of negative stereotypical traits attributed to the Romanies such as dirty, thieves and lazy (see Metro Media Transilvania, 2001) tell us something about the still persistent prejudiced attitude of the Romanians towards the Romanies.

Alongside classic attitude and survey research, studies drawing on the theory of ‘social representations’ have come to represent one of the most common and widespread analytic and empirical way of charting the ‘reality’ of the Romanies’ image in the Romanian society. Research conducted at the University of Iaşi on the social representations of the
Romanies has been at the forefront of imposing this socio-psychological trend for the study of majority-minority relations and representations (with a special concern for the social representations of Romanies) in Romania (Drăgulescu et al., 1996; Ferreol, 1996, Neculau, 1996).
Chapter five
Methodological considerations

Introduction

In the previous chapter I have presented an overview of the historical, social and political
Romanian situation as far as the interethnic relations with the two main ethnic minority
groups (the Hungarians and the Romanies) are concerned. The case of the Romanies
constituted a special focus. An historical overview of the Romany situation was offered
together with a short review of relevant research literature on the Romanies from Western
and Eastern Europe (with a special concern for Romanian socio-psychological literature
on the subject).

Taking on the comments from the previous chapter, let me note that this thesis tries to fill
a gap in the Romanian socio-psychological literature on prejudice and discrimination,
majority-minority relations (with a special focus on the Romanies) which was mainly
conducted within the framework of a socio-cognitive approach. Discursive analyses of
prejudice have been very rare and attempts to map the language of prejudice have almost
invariably been placed within the framework of attitude research and that of social
representations theory, coupled with an attempt at quantification and statistical modelling.
Romanian research on ethnic prejudice (see inter alia Abraham et al., 1995; Chelcea,
1994b; Neculau and Ferreol, 1996) has not shown a concern with discourse as a topic in its
own right, but rather considers it as a means to getting to the underlying attitudes
expressed by participants when filling in questionnaires or responding to interview
questions. The majority of studies of prejudice treat members’ talk as a resource rather
than a topic of inquiry in its own right. This kind of abstraction does not throw light on
how the participants in different social settings describe, explain and justify prejudice for
each other. Psychologists’, social psychologists’ and sociologists’ tendency to use
classificatory schemes and explanatory frameworks, abstracted from members’ descriptive
practices, has entailed a neglect of the phenomenon of prejudice as it is known, understood
and talked about by members themselves.
In the vast majority of Romanian research on prejudice, opinion, beliefs and attitudes were seen as a priori phenomena in need of explanation and not as resources that participants actively and flexibly draw upon in their talk to construct ‘realities’ of inter-ethnic cohabitation (Chelcea, 1994a, b; Culic et al., 2000; Turluic, 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi, 1995, 1999). The premise for this kind of work is that attitudes, beliefs constitute something somehow stable, underlying cognitive entities, which, with the help of proper, standardized means of measuring can be brought to the front in order to offer sociopsychological explanations for social phenomena such as nationalism, social exclusion, prejudice and discrimination. Romanian research on prejudice undertaken within the attitude research framework (including research based on Moscovici’s theory of ‘social representations’ – SRT henceforth) have tended to reify the object of their study, by presenting its contours as non-controversial, as self-evident and objectively measurable. For example, the main outcome of research looking at the social representations of Romanies in the Romanian society was to provide and account for a set of traits, a set of stereotypes used by the participants to describe the Romanies (by choosing from a list of attributes and ranking them in terms of their importance; answering questionnaire items or interview questions) (see Dragulescu et al., 1996; Neculau, 1996).

The charting of the ‘social representation’ of the Romanies in Romanian society (and also elsewhere) has been made through the use of a range of different methods such as surveys, interviews, experiments or ethnography. One of the problems that social representations theory poses is not related to its choice of a particular method, but its failure to conceptualize the activities that are being done, and orientated to, when participants develop representations in talk and texts in any of these methods (cf. Potter and Edwards, 1999). As the same authors argue, ‘the action orientation of accounts, descriptions and versions is systematically overlooked in the attempt to use social science methods to reach hypothetical underlying, yet shared, cognitive representations’ (Potter and Edwards, 1999, p. 450).

What social representations and attitude researchers do not take into account is the way descriptions, accounts and explanations of and using ‘prejudice’, describing people and justifying people’s descriptions, might figure in their participants’ everyday discursive practices. The use of quantitative methods whose aim is to establish the central tendency

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1 The same applies to the ‘social representation’ of the Hungarian minority.
and the use of broad categories to code qualitative data sweeps aside the variability of people's 'attitudinal' expression. By doing that one has a very simplified image of people's attitudes and representations, which tells us very little about the ambivalent and context-dependent nature of opinions\(^2\). When using interviews, for instance, SRT researchers do not consider the way producing descriptions of people and events is related to particular activities. Instead the participants are treated in the traditional manner as disinterested people doing their best to answer questions. The interviewer's question does not get the same analytic attention as the body of the answer, segments of talk being offered and analysed isolated from what might have occasioned them.

Even if the importance of language in the reproduction of meaning and the social construction of reality has been recognized by one of the most important approaches used to chart the representation of Romanies and of other ethnic minority groups in the Romanian society (the social representations approach), social psychologists and sociologists have been rather reluctant to deal with conversational interaction. The main focus was instead placed on the representational and cognitive mechanisms within the heads of individuals which were made to stand as explanatory principles of social behavior. SRT on issues related to prejudice and racism, group relations and representations of people is overwhelmingly cognitive in its theorizing, while its analytic materials are overwhelmingly discursive.\(^3\)

In order to go beyond mere stereotyping and conventional attitudinal research in the study of social, interethnic relations and prejudice, an approach is needed which would pay increased attention to describing the mundane and localized practices of constructing the reality of the 'other' within different discourses of difference. The analysis of such practices would be performed in the course of activities such as describing, interpreting and explaining in actual conversational interaction. The aim is to draw attention to the various situated ways in which the issue of prejudice is made sense of, explained or justified in order to construct an image of the 'other'. The main focus would be on

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\(^2\) As the studies of Billig (1982) and Billig et al. (1988) (and subsequent work within discursive psychology) have shown, the majority of social psychological theories have started with the main assumption of a human propensity for cognitive equilibrium and consistency. This might be one of the reasons for why there has been an extremely reduced interest in the dilemmatic and ambivalent nature of people's opinions and attitudes.

\(^3\) For more details and an extensive critique of the general SRT approach see Potter and Edwards, 1999, 2001, see also Flick, 1998, especially the contributions by Potter and Wetherell (1998) and Harré (1998).
prejudice as a problematic (prejudice as a to-be-accounted-for phenomenon) and on the
diverse ways in which difference (and extreme difference) is constructed in majority
members’ discourse.

At the same time, this thesis aims to be a contribution to Western discursive approaches to
the language of prejudice. The question that I am asking is is talk about Romanies more
extreme than talk about the Hungarian minority and other minorities, and by consequence
more extreme than the anti-alien, anti-immigrant talk researched in the West? In trying to
answer this question (or at least trying to qualify a possible answer to such a question),
this thesis aims to be a short incursion into the intricacies and complexity of a type of
discourse employing a style, which, at the same time, denies, but also protects (extreme)
prejudice. Let me note, at this point, that I do not necessarily start from the assumption
that participants’ talk about the Romanies is intrinsically ‘extreme’. ‘Extremity’ (as
‘moderation’ or ‘ambivalence’ for that matter) is something that has to be judged in the
interplay of discourses and judged not as something inherent to discourse, but as the effect
of using specific discursive and rhetorical devices in order to achieve specific purposes.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals one needs to take a closer look at the ‘views’
that participants express, at their opinions, but not those coming from opinion scales or
questionnaires items, but those coming from the intricacies of interview talk
centralized as social interaction, from the active negotiation of meaning in discursive
interaction. Following Billig (1989), the term ‘view’ is used in a non-technical sense,
denoting the object or topic of enquiry rather than a theoretical tool for studying that topic.
As ordinary people claim to hold views (or for that matter, attitudes), so one should study
‘what is going on when such claims are made in ordinary life’ (1989, p 204), how
versions of opinions are formulated, how they are organized rhetorically and used to
accomplish different things. The focus is on ‘lived ideology’ (Billig et al., 1988), as a
complex, contradictory and constitutive part of the publicly available practices of
everyday life. In this sense, discourse can be seen to accomplish ideologies (Billig, 1990a,
b) and thus ‘opinions’ are seen to be intimately linked with ideologies (Billig, 1995b).
Studying thinking and the holding of opinions in its wider social context points to the idea
that “processes of everyday thinking can be processes of ‘ideology’” (Billig, 1991, p. 1).
In both the case of the Hungarans, but mostly in the case of the Romany minority, it becomes necessary to look at ‘ordinary’, ‘lived’, ‘dilemmatic’ ideologies of constructing difference coming from ‘ordinary’ people, majority group members. In order to understand the various ideological dynamics of constructing ‘otherness’, one has to focus on the ‘ordinary’ (as opposed to the ‘extraordinary’ ones — those historically sedimented in the ‘intellectual ideology’ of the Romanian far-right) forms of the language of prejudice (which is sometimes extreme in its enactment and ideological effects). It is not to the extreme bigot, the ‘professional’ denigrator that one has to look at, but to the ordinary, run-of-the-mill type of person. The language of prejudice is embedded in enumerable discursive practices, is part and parcel of a ‘lived ideology’ of making sense of social relations, politics and social life, constructing difference and extreme difference within a set of shared historical and discursive resources used by participants each time they talk about controversial issue surrounding ethnic minorities in the Romanian context.

Notions such as ‘moral community’, ‘moral order’, ‘moral boundaries’, ‘social inclusion/exclusion’ come to the fore when one attempts to study prejudice and the social construction of difference within reference to the ‘lived ideology’, lived discursive practices of everyday life. It is important not to oversee the fact that when one is talking about ‘others’ one is expressing moral meanings. For example, one should not forget that

it is the society’s appreciation or disdain of an individual’s (norm-conforming or norm-breaking) behaviour that may change this individual’s moral standing. This means, in a generalized mode, that whenever respect and approval (or disrespect and approval) for an individual are communicated, a moral discourse takes place (regardless of the feelings and thoughts of the participants.

(Bergmann, 1998, p 286)

The issue of the ‘lived morality of everyday life’ (Bergmann, 1998) and the issue of ‘moral discourse’ as used and constructed in and through social interaction become relevant here (Bergmann, 1992, 1998; Drew, 1998; Linell and Rommetveit, 1998; Jayyusi, 1991). The analysis of the underpinnings of moral discourse has to focus on the intricacies of (everyday) discourse. The analysis of the ideologies of nationalism and moral exclusion and their social and political effects has to be placed at the level of discourse.
The research interview

The vast majority of studies use interviews in order to elicit respondents' perception, respondents' views on different matters. The traditional and orthodox view on interviews and interview data requires that 'it produces clear and consistent responses that can allow the researcher to make inferences about underlying beliefs or previous actions' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 99). In some situations researchers want to get access to what Holstein and Gubrium (1997) have called 'the subject beyond the respondent', perspective in which the participants are conceived as 'passive vessels of answers for experimental questions who, under ideal conditions, serve up authentic reports' (pp 116-117). For traditional approaches to the interview and interview data the concept of validity is a very important one. Their concept of validity is concerned with bias, establishing trust and therefore the truthfulness of their data (Rapley, 2001).

There is an important methodological issue attached to this, about whether interview responses are to be treated as giving direct access to 'experience' or as actively constructed 'narratives' involving activities which themselves require analysis (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Silverman, 2001) Silverman (1993) has warned us against the various dilemmas that researchers have to face (and ultimately resolve) concerning what to make of their interview data. Different positions have offered different ways of solving dilemmas of interview research As Miller and Glassner (1997) argue, "positivists have as a goal the creation of the 'pure' interview – enacted in a sterilized context, in such a way that it comes as close as possible to providing a 'mirror reflection' of the reality that exists in the social world" (p. 99). On the other hand, radical social constructionists suggest that no knowledge about a reality 'out there' in the social world can be obtained from the interview, because the interview is obviously and exclusively an interaction between the interviewer and interview subject in which both participants create and construct narrative versions of the social world (ibid., p. 99)

For researchers working within the interactionist tradition, participants in interviews are constructing not just narratives, but social worlds (Silverman, 1985, 1993; Miller and

4 This is what Silverman (1993) describes as 'interview-as-technique'
Glassner, 1997). Interactionist research will not be able 'to provide the mirror reflection of the social world, but it may provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and social worlds' (Miller and Glassner, 1997, p 100). Nevertheless, even having a strong relativist penchant, interactionism tends to retain an orientation to similar threats to validity that worry positivists (cf Fielding and Thomas, 2001) In a nutshell, one is talking about 'a kind of positivism-plus, where the plus is a full attention to the context of the interview as a form of interaction' (Fielding and Thomas, 2001, p 142).

Other analytic stances towards interview data derive from a perspective on social order preoccupied with the mundane production of orderly and meaningful interaction (Sacks, 1995). For ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, for example, 'interview data do not report on an external reality displayed in respondents' utterances but on the internal reality constructed as both parties contrive to produce the appearance of a recognisable interview' (Fielding and Thomas, 2001, p 142) Drawing on previous work on the 'theory' of interviews and interview data, Rapley (2001) has put forward the distinction between a) interview-data-as-resource: the interview data collected are seen as (more or less) reflecting the interviewees' reality outside the interview and b) interview-data-as-topic: the interview data collected are seen as (more or less) reflecting a reality jointly constructed by the interviewee and interviewer. In ethnomethodologically inspired research, interview data is treated as a topic, not as a resource (for examples see inter alia Baker, 1997; Hester and Housley, 2002). The problem of 'facts', the problem of the truthfulness of participants' accounts and that of the 'reality' beyond the interview is resolved because everyday knowledge, the publicly available societal and discursive resources are not identified with truth. The issue of truth 'does not arise, except in so far as a community version of reality is assumed' (Fielding and Thomas, 2001, p. 143).

Both interactionists and ethnomethodologists have emphasised the interview as being a form of social interaction, a site reflecting (in different ways and degrees for each of both approaches) a reality jointly constructed by the interviewee and interviewer. Whereas for positivists, the 'status of the interview as a piece of social interaction should be minimal' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 99), in the case of interactionists and ethnomethodologists, interviews are seen 'as social events' (Fielding and Thomas, 2001, p 142), orderly pieces of social interaction. Whereas for the positivists, 'having asked their clear and unambiguous questions in the correct manner the interviewer's part should be of no further
interest in the research’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p 99), its role becomes pivotal within the latter approaches (especially within ethnomethodology and conversation analysis). Without taking into account the role of the interviewer, analysis of interviews ‘can become an analysis of some decontextualized-features-of-talk’ (Rapley, 2001, p 304, emphasis in original) In this way, “the local context of the talk – that these ‘features’ were produced in negotiation with an interviewer – becomes silenced” (ibid, p. 304).

Favouring open-ended or semi-structured interviews\(^5\) to the more orthodox prescheduled standardised interviews and assigning a more active role to the interviewer, both interviewer and interviewee are seen as cooperatively engaged in producing the ‘interview’. In general, constructionist approaches in psychology and the social sciences have seriously undermined not only the stances that assign a passive role to the interviewer\(^6\), but also the similar stances on the role of the interviewees’ subjectivity. As Silverman suggests,

> according to constructionism, interviewers and interviewees are always actively engaged in constructing meaning. Rather than treat this as standing in the way of accurate depictions of ‘facts’ or ‘experiences’, how meaning is mutually constructed becomes the researcher’s topic. 

(2001, p 87, emphasis in original).

For example, Carolyn Baker (1984, 1997) has focused on how interviewers’ questions, how the categories they implicitly invoke in their questions were central to producing interviewees’ talk (that is, the categories they invoke and identities they speak from). Watson and Weinberg (1982) have shown how interviewees and interviewers actively collaborate in the interactional construction of accounts of homosexual identity. Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995)’s study of the talk of ‘youth subcultures’ is another good example of how identities are being constructed (assigned and also resisted) in talk and being displayed on a turn-by-turn basis through the collaborative work of both interviewer and interviewee. Hester and Francis (1994) have offered an insight into the

\(^5\) Semi-structured interviews can be seen as minimizing the extent to which the participants have to express themselves using the terms put forward by the interviewer. At the same time, they can be seen as encouraging the participants to raise issues that they themselves consider important. This type of interviews become very useful when one wants to discover participants’ interpretative repertoires (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, Potter and Mulkay, 1985) or repertoires of narratives that participants use in producing accounts (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984).

\(^6\) Both when the interview is conducted (when asking questions, when challenging the participants, when being neutral, but also in as far the analysis of interviewer’s accounts, which should be a constitute part of analysis per se.)
mundane work of one sociological interview, the local management and the interactional accomplishment. Mazeland and ten Have (1996; see also Antaki and Rapley, 1996, Houtkoop-Steenstra and Antaki, 1997; Suchman and Jordan, 1990; Rapley, 2001) have shown how an interview is a negotiation between the extra-local research agenda and the local interaction, pointing to what they call ‘the essential tension’ in interviews.

In all these studies (and others), it was highlighted that the interviewee (together with the interviewer) is active in the process of constructing meaning (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Holstein and Gubrium, 1997, Potter and Mulkay, 1985) This critique was based on the assumption that the interview is a kind of ‘conversation’, with two contributors, each equally important (Burgess, 1984, Mishler, 1986; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995).

As a consequence, interviewees’ talk should never be seen as a mere reflection of life outside the interview (Miller and Glassner, 1997), a ‘reality report’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995, 1997), but rather as a product of a specific interaction and ‘spaces of interaction’ in their own right (Rapley, 2001)7 One should also not forget that, “whatever we do with ‘interview talk’, whether we analyse it through a ‘realist’ or ‘constructionist’ perspective, we must be aware of how the talk is locally produced by both the interviewee and interviewer” (Rapley, 2001, p 309, emphasis in original).

**Interviews and discursive psychology**

As pointed out previously, discursive psychology tends to focus its attention mainly towards the fine-grained study of tape-recorded natural interactions or different types of texts: newspaper articles, therapy sessions, police interviews, and transcriptions of everyday conversations. When discursive researchers use interviews, the difference between these and ‘natural’ interactions is not as big as it would seem8. This is because interviews are not considered neutral devices through which one gains direct access to the answers of the participants, but are seen as ‘arenas’ of interaction in their own right, within which both the contributions of the interviewer and interviewee are considered as equally

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7 The interplay of identities, saving face, justifying accounts etc become of central importance as ‘at certain moments in that interaction speakers may be concerned to produce themselves as a certain type-of-person’ (Rapley, 2001, p 308)

8 For the debate on ‘natural’ and ‘contrived’ data see the comments from Speer, 2002a, b
important (Potter and Mulkay, 1985; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995) As Silverman (2001) argues, ‘particular focus is on how interviews construct narratives of events and people and the turn-by-turn construction of meaning’ (p 87)

For discursive psychologists, the interview is ‘a species of interaction within the social world and not outside it’ (Avery and Antaki, 1997, p. 5) That is, the topics about which the participants are to talk about are ones publicly available and designed to be tellable and justifiable within this kind of specific conversational interaction and organization. Moreover, and probably more importantly, the research interview is ‘a discursive act ... jointly produced by the participants, and the interviewer is as involved in the production as the interviewees’ (van den Berg et al., 2003, p 3)

As previously pointed out, in most social science research, the ‘logic’ of the interviewing process seems to hold a promise for a direct access to the ‘real’, ‘unaltered’ experiences, opinions and attitudes of the interviewee. Researchers working in ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and discursive psychology have countered this trend and demonstrated the constructed nature of interviews (see inter alia Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; Baker, 1997; van den Berg et al., 2003)

For discursive psychologists with a ‘critical’ penchant, the use of interviews in the research of stringent social issues such as inequality and prejudice, discrimination and racism, reproduction of dominance becomes extremely relevant. Its use becomes relevant if one considers these sorts of interviews as ‘based on the conversations of daily life’ (Kvale, 1996, p. 5), on society’s conversations about social matters, about the very matters and issues that the researcher attempts to unveil. It is at the same time, in itself, a ‘professional conversation’ (Kvale, 1996), one that plays upon different degrees and levels of involvement, neutrality, facilitation from both the interviewee, but also the interviewer.

Treating it as ‘active’ (and allowing it to be ‘active’) (see Holstein and Gubrium (1997)’s idea of ‘the active interview’), the researcher comes to see the participant (the ‘subject behind the respondent’ as Holstein and Gubrium would say) as ‘not only holding facts and details of experience, but, in the very process of offering them up for response,

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9 As a consequence, ‘it is highly appropriate that the methods and theories of discourse analysis are applied to this practice’ (van den Berg et al., 2003, p 3)
constructively adds to, takes away from, and transforms the facts and details’ (Holstein and Gubnum, 1997, p. 117)\textsuperscript{10}. As Silverman notes, ‘we need not hear interview responses as simply true or false reports on reality. Instead, we can treat such responses as displays of perspectives and moral forms’ (2001, p. 112, emphasis in original)

Treating the interview as a ‘social encounter in which knowledge is constructed’ (Holstein and Gubnum, 1997, p. 114), suggests that the interview does not constitute a neutral and biased prone source of information, but instead a ‘site of, and occasion for, producing reportable knowledge itself’ (ibid., p. 114). A neat way of understanding and treating the interview (and interview data) differently comes from research on the use of ‘membership categorization devices’. For example, referring to the way in which ‘membership categorization devices’ are actively used and played upon in interviews, Baker (1997) suggests that ‘interviewing is understood as an interactional event in which members draw on their cultural knowledge, including their knowledge about how members of categories routinely speak’ (p. 131). The issue of how one should treat the questions, the invitations to talk are clarified by Carolyn Baker. As she rightly notes, ‘questions are a central part of the data and cannot be viewed as neutral invitations to speak – rather they shape how and as a member of which categories the respondents should speak’ (p. 131) As a consequence, interview responses are to be treated as accounts more than reports, that is, they have to be understood as the work of accounting by a member of a category for the incumbent activities attached to that particular category, but also others. Interviews constitute a specific social context within which answers are locally and collaboratively constructed. When interviews get transcribed using the conversation analytic principles ‘you begin to see them as spaces of finely co-ordinated interactional work in which the talk of both speakers is central to producing the interview’ (Rapley, 2001, p. 306, emphasis in original).

Since the pioneering work of Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter concerning race talk in New Zealand (Wetherell and Potter, 1992), one could argue that analyzing racism and prejudice in talk (through the use of interviews, but also through other methods of

\textsuperscript{10} As Holstein and Gubnum conclude, “respondents’ answers and comments are not viewed as reality reports delivered from a fixed repository. Instead, they are considered for the ways that they construct aspects of reality in collaboration with the interviewer. The focus is as much on the assembly process as on what is assembled” (1997, p. 127)
analysis) has become a subject of research in its own right. Different researchers have reported a number of different new empirical findings on the rhetorical organization of discourse on race and race related issues (and more generally on 'controversial issues') in interviews (see for example the very recent collection of texts on analyzing race talk - van den Berg et al, 2003).

While many studies treat 'society' or 'prejudice' simply as an external social fact, discursive work have shown how both interviewer and interviewee rely upon their conversational skills and common-sense knowledge of social structure in order to produce locally 'adequate' utterances (Baker, 1982, 1984; Silverman, 2001). 'Society', majority or minority 'culture', 'prejudice', 'discrimination' are (seen as) constructed from within, from within a set of discourses with different ideological effects. From the point of view of interview-as-local-accomplishment (cf Silverman, 2001), interview data are not just 'one part of the story', to be contrasted and balanced with what respondents actually do. Instead, 'such data show how participants sensitively reproduce and rearticulate identities within the interview' (Silverman, 2001, p. 104).

As Holstein and Gubrium have argued, 'interview participants are practitioners of everyday life, constantly working to discern and communicate the recognizable and orderly features of experience' (1997, p. 121). In the course of conversational interaction the interviewee and the interviewer display a range of interpretive practices and at the same time articulate ongoing interpretive structures, resources and orientations to 'practical reasoning' (Garfinkel, 1967) As Wetherell and Potter suggested, interviewing can be seen as a way of developing a 'participants' comprehension' of a culture (see also Collins, 1983) The interviews not only allow the analyst to record a different range of accounts (drawing on a variety of interpretative repertoires), 'but they also provide[d] an arena for reflexively considering the nature of local ethnographic knowledge, for they involve the researcher being a participant all over again' (1992, p. 104).

As Edwards (2003, p. 32) suggests, interviews on controversial topics such as prejudice, discrimination, ethnic categorization or stereotyping are not easy to interpret. These kinds of interviews often entail contradictory, ambiguous and ambivalent statements. Meaning (and the construction of meaning) depends on the interview as an interaction. The suggestion is to 'locate the analysis in the details of the transcripts ... and in the
participants' own interactional orientations' (ibid., p. 46) One thing that a non-critical discursive analysis of such interviews would specifically not (want to) offer is an historical or cultural (and ideological, for that matter) analysis 'of where ... participants' resources (devices, categories, positionings, rhetorical moves etc.) might come from' (p. 46). Any investigation of cultural and ideological resources in talk should be 'grounded in examining what those resources are, in terms of how they are used' (p. 46).

More critically minded researchers understand interviews as discursive units that can tell us 'crucial things about a segment of society's conversations with itself, about the ways in which the world is typically legitimated, organized, and justified' (Wetherell, 2003, p. 13). Moreover, 'interviews tell us about the cultural resources people have available for telling their patch of the world' (ibid, p. 13). The most important point made by 'critical' researchers was that related to the interview being a 'highly specific social production', but which also 'draws on routine and highly consensual (cultural/normative) resources that carry beyond the immediate local context, connecting local talk with discursive history' (p. 13) One should also keep in mind that the speakers, the participants are not inventing the resources each time they talk. As Wetherell (2003) argues, 'the argumentative fabric of society is continually shaping and transforming, but for recognizable periods it is the same kind of cloth' (p. 13)

The coding process and content analysis

As discursive psychologists have argued, in discourse research the principal task of coding is to make the task of analysis more straightforward by sorting through relevant materials from large bodies of transcripts (Potter, 1998a). Coding, as a cyclical process, usually involves sifting through the materials for instances of a phenomenon of interest and arranging them into separate folders (archives) for later analysis. It is suggested, that at this stage, the selection should be inclusive, that is, including material that can turn out to be irrelevant at a later stage rather than exclude it for ill-formulated reasons early on (cf Potter, 1998a).

One of the ways in which one can accomplish the task of coding is to use content analysis. At its most basic, content analysis was identified as being a research technique 'for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication' (Berelson, 1952, p. 18) an for 'systematically and objectively identifying
specified characteristics of messages' (Holsti, 1968, p. 601). For 'classical' content analysis, as Berelson (1952) suggests, criteria of objectivity, systematicity and quantification are appropriate. Krippendorff (1980) provides one of the first summaries of the ‘methods’ of content analysis, in which his discussion of the quality criteria of content analysis is of particular importance.

Traditionally, the goals and methods of content analysis have been developed and concentrated on assessment on the basis of frequency analysis (Berelson, 1952). Nevertheless, "'patterns' or 'wholes' in texts could be demonstrated, not by counting and measuring their manifest contents, but by showing the different possibilities of interpretation of 'multiple connotations'" (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 62; see also Kracauer, 1952)

**The content analysis of qualitative research data**

As Mostyn (1985) pointed out, "content analysis is the 'diagnostic tool' of qualitative researchers which they use when faced with a mass of open-ended material to make sense of" (p. 117). The interest is not with what is going on in the head of the respondents, but rather with what the respondents tell us, their words, their discursive world. One needs to find meaning within the multitude of questions and answers that the participants are offering. Moreover, 'the overall purpose of the content analysis approach is to identify specific characteristics of communications systematically and objectively in order to convert raw material into scientific data' (Mostyn, 1985, p. 117)

The main idea of such a procedure of analysis is thereby, to preserve the advantages of quantitative content analysis as developed within communication science and to transfer and further develop them to qualititative-interpretative steps of analysis (Maynng, 2000, paragraph 2). Basic content analysis and qualititative content analysis can be combined with other qualitative procedures (Maynng, 2000; Mostyn, 1985)

Content analysis combines what are usually thought to be antithetical modes of analysis (Weber, 1990). It involves in the first place a qualitative judgment followed by a quantitative expression. As Berelson (1971, quoted in Mostyn, 1985, p. 115) says, 'content analysis does not differ from close reading plus judgement ...'. When the material to be summarized, organized and, in last instance, analyzed, is the result of a qualitative
research investigation – in the form of questions and answers as part of semi-structured interviews, the content analysis requires not only the function of inference, but also that of interpretation, giving meaning to content (Mostyn, 1985)

Simple counting techniques can offer a means to survey the whole corpus of data. Analysts are thus able to gain a sense of the flavour of the data as a whole and test, revise analytic insights. This is a good way to removing doubts about the accuracy of their impression of the data and finding new relationships within the data (Silverman, 1993) As Mostyn cogently argues, ‘the purpose of content analysis of open-ended material is to understand the meaning of the communication; that is, ... meaning within the context of the respondent’s own frame of reference’ (1985, p. 118, emphasis in original).

As some researchers have noted, ‘quantification can neatly tie in with the logic of qualitative research’ (Silverman, 2001, p. 36). In as far as interviews are concerned, the issue of quantification can be a valid and relevant one. For example, instead of conducting standardized surveys or opinion polls (or experiments), the analyst starts counting participants’ own categories as used in interview-talk. Data acquires more meaning and more usefulness when it is subjected to both quantitative and qualitative content analyses (Bryman, 1988; Bryman and Burgess, 1994). To think that only by applying statistical techniques or quantitative procedures to social science data one ensures rigour and guarantees objectivity is misleading (cf Mostyn, 1985). By the same token, it is similarly misleading to believe that only by using qualitative procedures one ensures a different kind of ‘objectivity’ and ‘validity’, which has nothing to do with using numbers. In both cases the argument is fallacious, because, in content analysis, quantitative and qualitative ‘procedures’ go together ‘since the determination of all categories involve qualitative judgments in the first instance’ (Mostyn, 1985, p 121). In most cases, content analysis ‘bridges statistical formalism and the qualitative analysis of the materials. In the quantity/quality divide in social research content analysis is a hybrid technique ..’ (Bauer, 2000, p 132)

In the last instance, in as far as qualitative research is concerned, the ultimate reliability test of a good content analysis relates more to whether the data obtained through the intermediary of this method provides a trustworthy basis not only for drawing inferences and supporting hypotheses, but mainly for the interpretation and detailed analysis of the
material. As a consequence, 'qualitative data must be interpreted, and not just reported' (Mostyn, 1985, p 131, emphasis in original). As Bauer has put it, the validity of a content analysis "must be judged not against a 'true reading' of the text\(^{11}\), but in terms of its grounding in the materials and its congruence with the theory of the researcher, and in the light of his or her research purpose" (2000, p. 133)

There is a dilemma between reliability and validity in content analysis of qualitative material where one has 'a trade-off between the two' (Bauer, 2000, p. 145). For content analysis of qualitative material the coding itself is the value: "content analysis cannot assume a 'true value' of the text that is confused by coding error" (ibid, p. 145). Reliability indicates an objectified interpretation, but not necessarily the condition of a valid interpretation: 'Inter-objectivity defends the researcher against the allegation of arbitrariness ... however, unlike in psychometrics, low reliability does not invalidate an interpretation ... the ambiguities of the material are part of the analysis' (ibid., p 145-146)

**Limitations of content analysis in qualitative research**

I want to close this chapter by pointing to some of the difficulties and shortcomings of using a content analysis in qualitative research (and especially in as far as interview-talk is concerned) Let me start by saying that, it seems unlikely that complicated patterns of social practices could be easily approached through identifying particular sorts of responses to questions, and then coding and counting them. Such a traditional and basic content analysis would not reveal the interpretative work done by the various discursive and rhetorical resources that participants draw upon (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). What is needed instead is an approach that touches upon the uses of repertoires in context, paying particular attention to specific (ideological) constructions and their rhetorical organization. Patterns of variation and consistency (which are not very obvious when one is doing content analysis) in a range of accounts would help mapping the patterns of cultural and interpretative repertoires that the participants are drawing on. As Mostyn (1985) has argued 'it is not enough to merely take in words before drawing inferences ... to gain any real insights into the meaning we must analyse the communication presented to us' (p.

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\(^{11}\) According to Bauer (2000, p 136), there are two kinds of texts: texts that are made in the process of research, such as interview transcripts or observation protocols, and texts that have already been produced for some other purpose, such as newspapers or memos.
One needs to take into account the patterns of argument and justification of which these different types of answers were part.

Silverman (2001) suggests that different attempts to quantification have a limited value. Providing the frequency of a certain kind of talk (in our case, the justifications), obscures the contingent nature of the interaction, and ignores the functions of language. Atkinson (1992, p. 459) (quoted in Silverman, 2001, p. 123) points out, one disadvantage of the coding schemes used in content analysis is that, because they are based on a given set of categories, they furnish 'a powerful conceptual grid'. As Silverman (2001) continues, "while this 'grid' is very helpful in organizing the data analysis, it also deflects attention away from uncategorized activities" (p. 123).

In as far as interview-talk is concerned, content analysis disaggregates the text into a series of fragments. What one cannot get in content analysis is a study of social interaction that considers the way that particular mental objects (such as opinions and attitudes) are invoked and produced by both the interviewer and interviewee (Potter, 2003, Puchta and Potter, 2002). A broader and in-depth discursive analysis would aim to look not only at what their interactional role might be, but also at their social and ideological role.

One should not forget that interview interaction (as social interaction in general) gets its sense from its sequential context. This has critical implications for approaches such as content analysis, which involves making categorizations, and considering relations between them. Such categorizations tend to cut across precisely the sequential relations that are important for the sense of the turn of talk (Potter, 1998a) As Bauer (2000) has argued, 'the relationship between segmented text units coded into a frequency distribution and the original text is lost . categorization loses the sequentiality of language and text' (p. 148) The nature and complexity of justifications is also lost when coded in terms of frequency. Rather, justifications and flexible argumentation need to be understood in terms of their positioning in argumentative discourse (Antaki, 1990; Antaki and Leudar, 1992)

Nevertheless, quantification is perfectly appropriate in a range of situations, dependent on appropriate analytic and theoretical judgements (Potter, 1998a). The content analysis of a corpus of materials can, in most of the cases, take the researcher back to the original transcripts and recordings, as a better and thorough understanding of the phenomenon.
under discussion requires more examples and a more detailed discursive analysis. Concerns, which initially might seem disparate and unrelated can merge together in the course of analysis while topics which might seem related in a first instance can be separated in the course of analysis (cf. Potter, 1998a).

Numbers are integral to qualitative research as they are used to establish the significance of a research project, to document what is known about a problem, and to describe a sample (Sandelowski, 2001). They are also useful for showcasing the labour and complexity of qualitative work and to generate meaning from qualitative data; to document and test the initial assumptions or interpretations of the analyst (Sandelowski, 2001). There are, nonetheless, a lot of arguments for being cautious about quantification when studying discursive and interactional material (Potter, 1998a, see also Schegloff, 1993 and the papers in Wieder, 1993). Some of the grounds for caution come from a range of qualitative studies of quantification in various settings (see inter alia, Ashmore, Mulkay & Pinch, 1989, Potter, Wetherell & Chitty, 1991). Some other grounds for caution come from the observation that content analysis, by focusing on frequencies and the explicit dimensions of talk, tends to neglect the unspoken, the implicit and ideological dimension of talk. One could argue that, by using content analysis one constructs paradigms of potential meaning rather than actual meaning (Bauer, 2000) The 'actual' meaning is to be found in the 'actual' interview interaction, with both interviewer and interviewee constructing meaning and actively making use of rhetorical and cultural resources as the interaction progresses.
Chapter six
The content analysis of qualitative data

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have offered a general account of some methodological considerations related to the research interview (and its uses in discursive psychology), the coding process and the use of content analysis (and its limitations) in qualitative research.

In this chapter, I will be offering an account of the actual content analysis of the qualitative data obtained through the use of semi-structured interviews. But before getting to that, let me first outline the objectives of the research and the specific materials and analytic procedures involved in this study.

As argued in the first pages of this thesis, this study aims at comparing and contrasting the way Romanians talk about the Hungarian minority with the way they talk about the Romanies. One of the aims of this research is to see whether participants expressing support for the right-wing policies of Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar differed in their (prejudiced and extreme prejudiced) views about the ethnic minorities (Hungarians and Romanies) from those not expressing support for the right-wing policies. This thesis does not start with the assumption that all prejudiced talk is the same. It can be seen as an attempt to understand the discursive dynamics of different ways of talking about different ethnic minority groups and their social and ideological effects. The analytic discussion ranges from investigating the links between nationalism and prejudice in the case of the Hungarian minority to the investigation of a shift to discourses of ‘nature’ and ‘moral exclusion’ in as far as the Romanies are concerned.

Materials, data source and participants

The data that forms the basis of this study was collected through recorded semi-structured discussion/interviews with middle-class Romanian professionals, both male and female,
selected to cover a variety of social backgrounds in the region of Transylvania (north-western part of Romania). This multi-ethnic region is at the heart of the political and public debate regarding prejudice and discrimination against the main ethnic minorities (the Hungarians and the Romanies) in Romania.

Thirty-eight recorded semi-structured discussion/interviews were conducted by the author between February 2001 and October 2001. The first series of interviews (the first ten) constituted a pilot phase in which decisions were taken as far as the interview schedule was concerned. Taking account of the wealth of recorded data and the importance of the information provided, these interviews were included alongside the others in the process of analysis.

The participants in the interviews were all majority group members (ethnically Romanian). No member of ethnic minorities was interviewed as part of the project. Taking part in the interviews was made on a voluntary basis and the recruitment was based on a ‘snowball’ sampling technique. The initial selection of participants was made inside a school establishment. On most occasions, interviews with one person led to suggestions for other people to be interviewed. Interviews were usually conducted in people’s homes (mainly in the evening) at a time agreed in advance with the interviewer. Some interviews however were conducted at the person’s workplace during the day. The interviewer introduced himself as a research student interested in the participants’ opinions. The interviews were introduced as being short and rather general discussions about ‘social issues’. The participants were warned that the discussion will be taped and that the data will be treated strictly confidential. They were offered the opportunity to sign and agree to an informed consent form before the interview started. All of them agreed to go on with the interview and consented to the data being used only for research purposes. Each individual interview lasted between one hour and one hour and a half. The table below details the participants’ (pseudonymized) names, their sex, age and their profession (occupation).

Table 1 Name, sex, age and occupation of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Logopedics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As it is known, by now a common-place, in discursive work ‘the success of a study is not in the least dependent on sample size’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 161), italics in original). While the specific focus of this research was not to sample a large sector of the majority group Romanian population, my data corpus includes participants of different ages and different professional backgrounds. The participants are describable as middle-class, ordinary, majority group members. These were not bigots, ‘professional’ denigrators (as some of their more higher status fellow countrymen), but the ordinary, run-of-the-mill
type of person. Nevertheless, the point of the analytic focus was not the human participants *per se* but their use of language. Generalization is, therefore, not from a sample of people to a population but from a sample of talk to existing or new theories, constructions or understandings of racism and prejudice in Romania, what it is, how it ‘works’ and so on.

The interviews discussed generally ‘controversial’ issues regarding prejudice and prejudice-related issues in Romanian society such as the avowed support for the policies of the representatives of the Romanian right-wing, the (contested) existence of prejudice and discrimination against the Hungarians, and respectively the Romanies, the issue of interethnic conflict, the issue of minority rights and other general issues related to politics, prejudice and culture. Each interview, while ‘conversational’ in nature (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), was structured around a pre-designed and piloted schedule of questions and comments, albeit often introduced in different ways and sometimes in a different order, which allowed the exploration of a relatively standard range of topics with each participant. Box 1 below offers some sample questions of the interview schedule (for the complete interview schedule – see Appendix C).

Not all the questions were raised with each participant. The standard order of questioning included a short introductory section when the person was asked to describe herself in terms of age and occupation, which was then followed by questions from the schedule itself. The main questions (and answers) that I have focused on were those related to the issue of the attitudes that Romanians have towards the two aforementioned groups, the issue of prejudice and discrimination, the issue of minority rights, the issue of inter-ethnic conflict, the issue of bilingual signs, and last but not least, the issue of nationalism - there was a tendency to start with the questions referring to the Hungarian minority and then continue with those referring to the Romany minority. I have also tried to make sure that at some point in the interview the question relating to the avowed support for the representatives of the Romanian right-wing was asked. I have tried, as much as possible, to keep the order of the questioning the same for each participant, but because of the conversational and rather informal nature of the discussion this was not always possible.
### Box 1

**Interview schedule: Sample Questions**

- Do you think that there is a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians? Or between Romanians and Romanies? Do you think that there is a case there or not really?

- After the Revolution, the inter-ethnic conflicts of March 1990 in Tg Mures, and the most recent ones, between Romanians and Romanies from Hadareni (Mures county) or Mihail Kogalniceanu (Constanta county) raised contradictory comments...Who do you think is responsible for what happened? How do you explain what happened?

- What do you think most Romanians' attitudes are to Hungarians (Romanies....)? Positive or negative?
- Do you think that Romanians (or people) are prejudiced against Hungarians (Romanies)... or not really?
- Do you think there is (much) discrimination against Hungarians (Romanies) ..?

- Do you think that the rights of (ethnic and national minorities) should be extended?
- Do you think that ethnic minorities enjoy the same rights as the majority?

- Do you think that the nationalist policies of Vadim Tudor towards Hungarians and other ethnic groups are the fairest ones? (in some variant of the question the name of Gheorghe Funar was mentioned alongside that of Vadim Tudor)

The interview schedule was not intended to be a rigid guide in order to collect 'standard' answers, but rather as a general prompting device, which in most of the cases was departed from. These 'departures' were very often accompanied by my own (unprepared) comments or invitations for clarification.

Each interviewee was given a pseudonym, which will be used throughout the thesis to protect the anonymity of those who volunteered. In one case the tape was inaudible and the interview with that person was not included in the analysis. In one occasion the husband of one of my interviewee present at the time of the interviewee expressed an interest in being jointly interviewed with the person initially contacted. There was only one joint interview in the corpus of data (interview 34)

Interviews were used for identifying and exploring participants interpretative practices rather than an instrument for accessing a set of attitudes and beliefs. The aim of the
interviews was to facilitate and bring forward some of the most ordinary ways of expression, the ordinary common sense of the participants. What I tried to do though was to challenge the participants on some the issue that I have considered relevant. Challenging the participants from time to time felt appropriate for the task at hand, given that my aim was not to develop a critique of them as people, but to develop a critique through the analysis of the discursive resources that the Romanian language and culture offered them.

**Procedures**

*Transcription and translation*

Each individual interview was tape recorded and later transcribed. The tapes of the individual interviews were all transcribed to first pass (words only), then smaller or larger parts to be included in the thesis were fully transcribed. A cut-down version of the well-known set of conventions developed by Gail Jefferson was adopted in order to transcribe the recorded material (see Appendix A for transcription conventions; see also Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). In order to facilitate the coding process, notes were taken during the transcription process together with repeated (re)readings of the transcripts and (re)listening to the tapes.

The whole corpus of transcribed recorded material was not translated in its entirety. Only the parts used for analysis were translated. In translating the material an effort was made to keep the translation as close as possible to the original Romanian material (text). The excerpts presented were translated from the original Romanian into English by the author of this thesis. An attempt was made to keep the translation as accurate as possible in order not to distort meaning. Some issues relating to translation were highlighted using footnotes. The same transcription notations were used for both the Romanian original and the English counterpart. The analysis was conducted on the original, but the references in the text are made mainly to the English translation. The extracts chosen for analysis were selected for their ability to illustrate and develop the main analytical topics. It should be stressed that the translation was mainly for purposes of communicating to English speaking readers – not for the purposes of analysis, which was undertaken on the original Romanian.
The initial coding stage and selecting instances

Using the transcribed material, the initial coding stage involved repeated readings of the transcribed data, looking for patterns and themes, but also for variations and deviant (or extreme) cases (cf Wetherell and Potter, 1992). To facilitate this I have started working from the most important questions that I have asked and compiling the answers to these in two different groups (questions and answers referring to the Hungarian minority, on one hand; questions and answers referring to the Romanies, on the other hand). My first concern was to class these answers to the different questions. In order to do that a basic content analysis was performed. One of the main questions that guided the analysis process was the one related to the avowed support for the representatives of the Romanian right-wing, Corneliu Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar in the case of which three ideological (subject) positions were identified: speakers supporting, those ambivalent and those opposing Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar. The main idea behind this was to see whether participants expressing support for the right-wing policies of Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar differed in their prejudiced and extreme prejudiced views about the ethnic minorities (Hungarians and Romanies) from those not expressing support for the right-wing policies.

Interpretation and analysis

Extracts from the transcribed tapes were analyzed using ‘critical’ discursive psychological and conversation analysis techniques (Edwards and Potter, in press; Potter and Edwards, 2001; Wetherell, 1998, 2003) The analysis involved repeated careful readings and, in a way, entailed the development of a specific ‘analytic mentality’ (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; Wetherell, 1998)

The development of this analytic mentality was helped by the theoretical and methodological insights coming from critical discursive psychological analyses of talk (and prejudiced talk in particular), which constituted a continuous source of inspiration, but also of confrontation and critique. Following a more critical discursive stance the analysis has aimed to proceed through two related movements. As Wetherell (2003) argues, ‘one is the identification and analysis of pattern (cultural resources), while the other is theorizing and explaining this pattern’ (p. 13-14). As noted previously (see chapter
three), a ‘critical’ discursive social psychological approach to the language of prejudice, discrimination and racism involves two levels of analysis. The first level is based on conversation analysis enabling the identification the action-orientated nature of justifying claims together with a detailed look at the accountable conversational practices that warrant the particular version being produced. The second level focuses on the ideological patterns of sense-making and their specific functions such as rationalizing, legitimating, naturalizing prejudice. The analysis (and subsequent interpretation) is based on a view of ideology as ‘practical discursive action linked to power’ (Wetherell, 2003, p. 14). The main interest is on how ‘the effect of truth is created in discourse and how certain discursive mobilizations become powerful – so powerful that they are the orthodoxy, almost entirely persuasive’ (ibid., p 14), beyond which participants can barely think.

**Ethics and confidentiality**

This project complies with the Romanian Psychological Society’s code of conduct (which is a hybrid between the American Psychological Association code of conduct and the British Psychological Society’s code of conduct). In order to comply with the British Psychological Society’s rules the British Psychological Society’s ‘Code of Conduct, Ethical Principles and Guidelines’ (1998) was consulted and ultimately used. All participants were informed of the purposes of the research and possible uses and were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. All participants completed consent forms and specified their level of consent (the translation of the original Romanian consent form can be seen in Box 2 - the original Romanian consent form can be found in Appendix B). All participants were given the opportunity to withdraw or to stop at any point in the interview, but nobody chose to do so. They were also given the opportunity to withdraw all or part of their tape-recorded conversation. Again, nobody chose to do so.

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1 For similar multi-level discursive analyses see Riley (2002), Willott and Griffin (1997)
Box 2  Informed consent form

Thank you for taking part in this research

My name is Cristian Tileaga and I am a psychology student at the University of [last]. My research focuses on people’s opinions on different social issues in Romanian society.

Before we begin I would like to make you aware of the fact that
- your participation is entirely voluntary
- you are free to refuse to answer any question
- you are free to withdraw at any time.

Let me also point that it is your opinions that I am interested in. There are no right or wrong answers. Please feel free to bring up any issues that you might find relevant to our discussion.

The interview will be taped and the data will be treated strictly confidential. It will only be used for research purposes and will only be available to people involved in this particular research. Excerpts from the interviews may be made part of the final research report, but under no circumstances will your real name be disclosed or included in the report.

Please sign this form to show that I have read the contents to you.

_________________________ Signed

_________________________ Date

I can be contacted at the address XXXXXX or by email XXXXXX if you have any queries about the research itself or your participation in it.

The content analysis

In order to help the initial coding process a content analysis of the answers to some of the specific questions asked was undertaken. There were two concerns that guided the process of content analysis. First, I have started from the assumption that in a study such as this one, looking at people’s views on controversial ethnic and social issues, it seemed reasonable to expect that a range of opinions and justifications would be expressed and a different range of answers would be offered. One might get people agreeing, disagreeing (implicitly or explicitly), but also being ambivalent or not having an opinion (or at least declaring so) with the various issues raised by the interviewer.

Second, one of the other, very important assumptions of this study was directly linked to one of the questions that figured in the interview schedule, the one related to the avowed support for the representatives of the Romanian right-wing. The main idea behind this was
to see whether participants expressing support for the right-wing policies of Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar differed in their views about the ethnic minorities (Hungarians and Romanies) from those not expressing support for the right-wing policies.

In the case of this study, the interview-talk corpus constitutes the forms of expression of a community [Romanian] that argues and debates on controversial social and political issues relating to its main ethnic minorities, the Hungarians and the Romanies. The corpus of talk subjected to content analysis contains references to values and norms, debate and argument. Within this framework, content analysis ‘allows us to construct indicators of worldviews, values, attitudes, opinions, prejudices and stereotypes’ (Bauer, 2000, p 134) and then compare these across the ideological spectrum.

**Coding categories**

A content analysis was conducted on the responses to the main questions that the interviewer raised. A count was made looking at the responses, which included explicit agreement (when the respondent said ‘yes’ followed by a ‘spontaneous’ justification (qualification) of his position – of the type ‘yes + explanatory connective + justification’ (for example, ‘Yes, there is [conflict] .. because of their behaviour’ as an answer to a question on the (possible) existence of a conflict between Romanians and Romanies). The ‘yes, but + justification (competing version)’ types of answers were nevertheless classed as ambivalent (for example, ‘yes, there is prejudice at the politics level, but not in general’ as an answer to a question about the existence of prejudice against the Hungarian minority).

Instances of implicit agreement were also considered, when the respondents aligned their answer with the position expressed in the question without the use of an explicit ‘yes’ (for example, ‘There is discrimination, I don’t believe that he would be accepted for a job so easily’ as an answer to a question about the existence of discrimination against Romanies). These types of (explicit and implicit) answers will be referred to as ‘agree’ answers.

The same procedure was used to include answers in the ‘disagree’ category. A count was made of the answers that showed explicit disagreement (when the respondent said ‘no’ followed by a ‘spontaneous’ justification (qualification) of his position – of the type ‘no +
explanatory connective + justification’ (for example, ‘No, no, no, because that’s the
construction of the Romanian character …’ as an answer to a question on the (possible)
existence of prejudice against the Hungarian minority). As it was the case with the ‘agree’
type of answers, implicit disagreement (when the respondent didn’t aligned their response
with the position expressed in the question) was also considered (for example, ‘well,
between Romanians and Hungarians one cannot necessarily talk about a conflict, rather a
certain difference of attitude’ as an answer to a question about the (possible) existence of a
conflict between Romanians and Hungarians).

Answers that included both statements of agreement and disagreement (explicitly, but also
implicitly) were also counted. These types of answers will be referred to as ‘ambivalent’
answers. Here are couple of examples of explicit ambivalence a) ‘There is discrimination
when getting a job, but there is no discrimination if he is prepared’ as an answer to a
question regarding the existence the discrimination against the Romanians. b) ‘There is no
discrimination in general, but there are cases and cases...maybe locally’ as an answer to a
question regarding the existence of discrimination against the Hungarians

A couple of examples of implicit ambivalence a)’There are prejudices, but mostly from
people who don’t have contact with them’ as an answer to a question regarding the
existence of prejudice against the Hungarian minority. b) ‘In general there is no conflict,
but in particular it is possible to find people upset with their behaviour’ as an answer to a
question regarding the existence of a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians.

The responses were also coded in terms of whether participants avoided the question. If
the question was answered by an explicit “I don’t know” and were not followed by a
justification, these instances were classed as ‘non-answers’.

Another level of coding was undertaken, and responses were coded in terms of whether
the respondents offered spontaneous justifications for their agreements or disagreements,
without prompting from the interviewer. We counted as a justification any reason or
explanation for the position taken, be it in the form of a causal interpretation (for example,
‘because they have their own schools...they are allowed to participate in the society at all
levels’ on an instance of disagreement to a question about the (possible) existence of
discrimination against the Romanians) or argumentative claim-backing (for example,
‘because there is the prejudice that they are lazy and they steal’ on an instance of agreement to a question about the (possible) existence of discrimination against the Romanians$^2$ introduced by different explanatory or causal connectives (mainly through the use of ‘because’). This was based on the assumption that participants are skilled conversationalists “who are perpetually alive to the ‘running index’ of the talk in which they are participating, and whose utterances have to be supported, justified and argued for” (Antaki and Leudar, 1992, p. 182) The emphasis was placed in demonstrating the immediacy of justifications being a recurrent feature of our participants’ talk.

The questions and the responses

The questions that were included in this content analysis concerned the issues of

- conflict [‘Do you think that there is a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians (Romanians and Romanies)?’]

- prejudice [‘Do you think that Romanians are prejudiced against Hungarians (Romanies) … or not really?]?

- discrimination [‘Do you think that there is discrimination against Hungarians (Romanes) ?’]

The content analysis for these questions was based on thirty-one interviews from a total of thirty-eight carried out with middle-class professionals in a Romanian socio-cultural context. Because of the conversational nature of the interviews, not all the questions were raised with each participant and so each question was asked only for a number of participants out the thirty-one.

The question related to the avowed support for the representatives of the Romanian right-wing was also included in the content analysis (Do you think that the nationalist policies of Vadim Tudor towards Hungarians and other ethnic groups are the fairest ones? (in some variant of the question the name of Gheorghe Funar was mentioned alongside that of

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$^2$ Nevertheless, some of the cases were far from falling neatly into these two types of justifications. As Antaki (1990) suggests, one way to deal with ‘grey areas’, one good guide to choosing between causal interpretation and claim-backing justificatory accounts is to use the device of a ‘gradient of confidence’. As he argues, ‘the gradient of confidence on which a statement might move is one that has to be anchored at each end by categories that are, ultimately, the researcher’s invention and, equally, the criteria that one chooses to use to make statements migrate closer to one category or another are a matter of interpretative choice’ (Antaki, 1990, p. 282)
Vadim Tudor). The content analysis for this question was based on thirty-three interviews out of thirty-eight.

**Responses on questions on issues related to the Hungarian minority**

**Conflict**

One of the question that was asked was ‘Do you think there is a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians?’ This question was not raised with all participants, from 31 interviews in 17 of them, comments on this issue were found.

Table 1: Frequency of answers and number of respondents who offered spontaneous justifications on the issue of conflict between Romanians and Hungarians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=17</th>
<th>‘Agree’</th>
<th>‘Disagree’</th>
<th>‘Ambivalence’</th>
<th>‘Non-answer’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of answers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents offering spontaneous justifications</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three participants out of seventeen (that is 17.6%) disagreed with the idea of a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians and all three gave spontaneous justifications in support of their position. The issue of ‘conflict’ was re-categorized as something else, ‘a difference of attitude’ (1), ‘just some people on the extremes’ (1) or simply, ‘only problems’ (1)

As can be seen from Table 1, the majority of the answers to this question were not so straightforward. Ten of our seventeen answers were included into the ‘ambivalent answers’ category. Nine of them gave spontaneous justifications. In two instances out of these nine the emphasis was that ‘there is a conflict, but it is artificially created’, manufactured by interested parties (both Romanian and Hungarian), and mainly political ones, in order to preserve political advantages by triggering separation between the two groups.
In five instances out of nine, our participants argued that we should make a differentiation between different levels in society. At the higher, ‘macro’ level (the national and political one) there is conflict, but at a lower, ‘micro’ level, ‘there are no problems’ and people go along very well.

In another two instances out of nine participants in the ambivalent category, were making distinctions between a ‘general’ and a ‘local’ level, between general stances and particulars. At a general level (‘in general’) there is no conflict, but ‘perhaps’ there are conflicts at a more local level. ‘We have Hungarians friends, we have Hungarian neighbours’, that’s why there is no general conflict.

Looking again at the Table 1, four of our seventeen participants agreed with the idea that there is a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians and three of them gave spontaneous justifications: ‘it is because our history’ (1), ‘because conflicts always exist’ (1), ‘because of the rules imposed by the majority’ (1)

**Prejudice**

In 15 interviews out of 31, the following question was asked: ‘Do you think that Romanians (people) are prejudiced against Hungarians or not really?’

**Table 2:** Frequency of answers and number of respondents who offered spontaneous justifications on the issue of prejudice against Hungarians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=15</th>
<th>‘Agree’</th>
<th>‘Disagree’</th>
<th>‘Ambivalence’</th>
<th>‘Non-answer’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of answers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of justifications spontaneously offered</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four out of fifteen (that is 26.6%) agree that there are no prejudices against the Hungarians. Three of them gave spontaneous justifications without prompting from the interviewer and one response was a simple disagreement not followed by any justification. There are no prejudices against Hungarians because ‘the average Romanian has nothing against them’ (1) and because ‘that’s the construction of the Romanian character…’ (1).
Another justification that backs up the ‘non prejudice’ of the Romanians draws on the comparison between Hungarians and Gypsies: ‘Hungarians are normal in comparison to Gypsies.’ (1)

Secondly, there are those who fall in the ‘ambivalent answers’ category, 53.3% (8 out of 15) responses that included both statements of agreement and disagreement with the idea of prejudice against Hungarians. Out of eight respondents six gave spontaneous justifications.

In one instance out of eight, respondents draw a distinction between a ‘general’ and a ‘local’ level where there is prejudice ‘at the politics level, but not in general’ (1). In another instance implicit ambivalence was found: 'There are prejudices, but mostly from people who don’t have contact with them' (1).

Other arguments that our respondents offered could be summarised as follows

- ‘Where the population is mixed they don’t have prejudices, but where they are in the majority there are prejudices’ (1)
- ‘There is prejudice, but not that much than from the part of Hungarians’ (1)
- ‘The older population is prejudiced, but not the younger population’ (1)
- ‘Some of Romanians, but not all of them’ (1)

Finally, three participants out of fifteen agreed with the idea that there are prejudices against Hungarians. The three respondents did not offer spontaneous justifications, but they offered justifications in response to the prompting of the interviewer. These justifications related to ‘history’ (3), as the cause for prejudices.

**Discrimination**

19 participants out of 31 were asked the question: ‘Do you think that there is discrimination against Hungarians or not really?’

**Table 3**: Frequency of answers and number of respondents who offered spontaneous justifications on the issue of the existence of discrimination against Hungarians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=19</th>
<th>‘Agree’</th>
<th>‘Disagree’</th>
<th>‘Ambivalence’</th>
<th>‘Non-answer’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of answers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents offering spontaneous justifications</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten participants out of nineteen (that is 52.6%) disagreed with the idea that Hungarians are discriminated against. Only five of them offered spontaneous justifications, the rest of the answers were disagreements, not followed by any justification.

The justifications spontaneously offered could be summarized as follows:

- 'because there are mixed marriages, we work together' (1)
- 'because the relations between us are peaceful' (1)
- 'because they have been accepted everywhere' (1)
- 'because they enjoy the same rights as we do' (1)
- 'maybe another way of looking at things, but not discrimination' (1)

Seven participants out of nineteen (36.8%) gave explicit and implicit ambivalent answers, that is, answers, which included both statements of agreement and disagreement. Two answers were not followed by any justification. The rest of five participants offered spontaneous justifications.

In two instances out of five there was a distinction between the 'general' and the 'particular': 'There is no discrimination in general, but there are cases and cases... maybe locally'. Other justifications spontaneously offered could be summarized as follows:

- 'A lot of talk about discrimination, but concrete cases I don’t know' (1)
- 'There is discrimination, but not a legal one' (1)
- 'Some people discriminate against Hungarians, some others not' (1)

Two participants agreed with the idea that there is discrimination against Hungarians. Just one of them offered a spontaneous justification. He proposed the following argument: if there is prejudice, there is also discrimination. Prejudice leads automatically to discrimination: 'what's discrimination, if not prejudice'.

**Responses on questions on issues related to the Romanies**

**Conflict**
12 of our 31 participants were asked 'Do you think that there is a conflict between Romanians and Romanies?' Just a small minority of them, 12% (2 out of 12) disagreed with the idea that there is no conflict between Romanians and Romanies. Only one of the respondents gave a spontaneous justification. 'It is about poverty', the other answer being a simple 'no', not followed by any justification.

Table 4: Frequency of answers and number of respondents who offered spontaneous justifications on the issue of conflict between Romanians and Romanies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=12</th>
<th>‘Agree’</th>
<th>‘Disagree’</th>
<th>‘Ambivalence’</th>
<th>‘Non-answer’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of answers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents offering spontaneous justifications</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In six instances out of twelve (that is 50%), respondents agreed that there is a conflict between Romanians and Romanies and this happens because of the behaviour of the Romanies: ‘they are involved in crime’ (2), ‘they generate conflict’ (1) and ‘they don’t mix with the majority population’ (1) Furthermore, this happens because ‘they are not wanted’ (1), and because ‘of the rules imposed by the majority that they don’t follow’ (1)

In four instances out of twelve, an ambivalent pattern was found, very much similar to the one discovered in the case of Hungarians. Three respondents offered spontaneous justifications drawing a distinction between the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’, local level: ‘In general there is no conflict, but in particular it is possible to find people upset with their behaviour’ (2) and ‘there is a conflict, but it depends on what people think’ (1). The answer that was not followed by a justification reads as follows: ‘there is a conflict between the law and the Romanies, but not between Romanians and Romanies’.

**Prejudice**

With 15 participants out of 31, the same question was asked in relation to the Romanies: ‘Do you think that Romanians are prejudiced against Romanies or not really?’

Table 5: Frequency of answers and number of justifications spontaneously offered on the issue of prejudice against Romanes
73.3% (that is, 11 out of 15) of the participants agreed that there was prejudice against Romanies and seven of them gave spontaneous justifications. They also agreed that at some point, prejudice is justifiable

- ‘because of their behaviour’ (3)
- ‘because they are involved in crime’ (2)
- ‘because they don’t work’ (1)

A more even-handed perspective is presented in other spontaneous arguments invoked by our participants: ‘because of them, but also because of us’ (1).

Four participants out of fifteen (26.6%) were ambivalent in their responses and three out of four gave spontaneous justifications. They have drawn a distinction between a ‘local’ level, where there is prejudice, and a ‘general’ level where there is not prejudice:

- ‘in some situations they might have prejudices, but not in general’ (1)
- ‘on the street, but not at a state level’ (1)
- ‘there are people that are less educated that have prejudices, but not in general’ (1)

The response that offered no spontaneous justification referred to the idea that there are ‘those who have prejudices, but also those who are not prejudiced’

Out of fifteen participants who answered this question, no one unambiguously disagreed with the idea that there is prejudice against Romanies.

**Discrimination**

20 participants out of 31 answered the question: ‘Do you think that there is discrimination against Romanies?’
30% (6 out of 20) of the speakers agreed with the idea of the existence of discrimination against Romanies. Five out of six participants offered spontaneous justifications. In one instance out of five our respondents agreed that there is discrimination and this happens 'in every domain of the society because people see him as a gypsy'. Furthermore, there is discrimination when people 'see that they are gypsies' (2).

Other justifications spontaneously offered read as follow:

- 'because there is the prejudice that they are lazy and they steal' (1)
- 'because they are not serious and don’t work' (1)

It can be noted that the last justification listed refers directly to the characteristics of Romanies, whereas the rest of the justifications listed refer to the way Romanies are 'seen' by the Romanians.

Four participants out of twenty (that is 20%) disagreed with the idea that there is discrimination against Romanies. Two responses were simple disagreements, without any justification. Just two out of four respondents gave spontaneous justifications. Here is the kind of justifications that were found. There is no discrimination because:

- 'I see them, I travel with them . . . I see them everywhere’ (1)
- ‘They have their own schools...they are allowed to participate in the society at all levels’ (1)
Ten participants out of twenty (that is 50%) gave ambivalent answers and nine of them gave spontaneous justifications. One answer was ambivalent, but was not followed by a justification: 'broadly speaking there is no discrimination, but with some exceptions'. The other nine respondents offered spontaneous justifications.

In two instances out of nine, respondents agree with the idea that there is no discrimination, but it is something else: ‘it is a reaction’ (1); ‘it is a revulsion’ (1). In another 2 instances denial of personal discrimination was found ‘I could trust them, but there is discrimination’ (1) and ‘some people don’t stand them, but I wouldn’t have any reluctance’ (1). In other two instances, we have found reference to the idea that discrimination happens because of them: ‘There is discrimination, but I think it is because of them’ (1) and ‘There is no discrimination, but if there is, they have created it’ (1).

Other justifications spontaneously offered could be summarized as follows:

- ‘Culturally and educationally they are not discriminated against, but economically they do it to themselves’ (1)
- ‘There is discrimination when getting a job, but there is no discrimination if he is prepared’ (1)
- ‘There is discrimination, but it is not the solution, because we ought to offer them a chance’ (1)

Before continuing, let me just note the interesting slight difference between responses to the questions regarding prejudice, on one hand, and discrimination, on the other hand, against Romanies. One can note that when accounting for prejudice against the Romanies no one unambiguously disagreed on the existence of prejudice against the Romanies, but in the vast majority of cases the blame for the existence of prejudice was placed on the Romanies. In as far as the discrimination against Romanies was concerned the positions tend to be more ambivalent, with the participants trying to take different cultural and social dimensions into account when explaining discrimination against the Romanies. But one needs a more detailed discursive analysis in order to draw any kind of conclusions from this kind of pattern.

Nationalist policies (avowed support for the representatives of the Romanian right-wing)
In the vast majority of cases the issue of nationalistic policies was prompted through direct questions that raised the issue of the fairness of Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar’s nationalist policies in Romania. The question: ‘Do you feel that the (nationalist) policies of Vadim Tudor (and Gheorghe Funar) towards Hungarians and other ethnic groups are the fairest ones?’ was addressed in 33 out of 38 interviews.

Table 7: Frequency of answers and number of respondents who offered spontaneous justifications on the issue of the fairness of Vadim Tudor (and Gheorghe Funar)’s nationalist policies in Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=33</th>
<th>‘Agree’</th>
<th>‘Disagree’</th>
<th>‘Ambiv’</th>
<th>‘Non-answer’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of answers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents offering spontaneous justifications</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sixteen respondents out of thirty-three (that is 48.4%) of our respondents disagreed with the idea of nationalist policy being an fair policy. Thirteen of sixteen offered spontaneous justifications and explanations without prompting from the interviewer, even though the question seemed to ask for a simple yes/no answer. Three answers were explicit disagreements, and the justifications were given after the prompting of the interviewer.

Looking at those respondents that gave spontaneous justifications, when referring to the appropriateness of the nationalist policy of Tudor and his party, the main justifications our respondents used were: ‘they are extremists’ (4), ‘chauvinists’ (1), ‘they are mad’ (1) and ‘dangerous fanatics’ (1).

Others emphasized the idea that ‘they are not important, they are not taken into account’ (2). Other justifications spontaneously offered could be summarized as follows:

- ‘because they are trying to be what they are not’ (1)
- ‘because of personal complexes’ (1)
- ‘because they don’t realize what a nation is’ (1)
- ‘because what they do is not useful to us’ (1)
In fifteen cases out of thirty-three, that is 45.4%, ambivalent answers were found. Twelve out of fifteen participants offered spontaneous justifications. Three respondents did not offer spontaneous justifications: ‘It is not appropriate, but it is an answer to what Hungarians do’ (2) and ‘I find positive features, but I am not agreeing with everything they say’ (1) Justifications were given in response to prompting from the interviewer.

Respondents who offered spontaneous justifications think that on one hand it is not good to have such policies, but there are also good things about it. The most frequent move was the use of contrasting pair, the comparison with the ‘other side’, the Hungarians and their nationalism. The emphasis was placed on the idea that they exaggerate, but so do Hungarians and on the fact that they are nationalists, extremists, but only to respond to the Hungarian nationalistic policy. The stress was that the nationalist politics of Tudor is an answer to what Hungarians do:

- ‘It is not appropriate, but it is also good, because of the policy of the Hungarians’ (2)
- ‘I find it exaggerated, but there are also chauvinists on the other side’ (1)
- ‘It is not a solution, but as we have our people on the extreme, so they have them too’ (1)
- ‘I am not supporting them, but they came as a response to what Hungarians do’ (1)
- ‘Maybe they have something against Hungarians, but in the end, I think that they defend the interest of the country’ (1)
- ‘They are nationalists, but they just try to compare the situation Romanians have in Hungary’ (1)
- ‘It is not fair to a greater extent, but they are against the separation tendencies of the Hungarians’ (1)

The other ambivalent responses that triggered spontaneous justifications were not related to the ‘other side’ (i.e. the Hungarians), but were general comments:

- ‘They exaggerate sometimes, but they say good things too’ (1)
- ‘They don’t have a policy, they have just reactions’ (1)
- ‘If there is an attempt to undermine the state this kind of policy is good, otherwise no’ (1)
- ‘They are extremists, but not in regard to all the nationalities’ (1)

Two participants out of thirty-three (6%) agreed that the policy of Tudor is appropriate and gave spontaneous justifications. The policy of Tudor is appropriate because ‘it is a necessary evil’ and ‘every country has this kind of nationalist, extremist elements’.

**Conclusion**
A rather basic content analysis was used in order to devise a simple and straightforward way to categorize the answers to the different questions asked and to orient to the two aforementioned analytic assumptions. As Bauer has argued, 'the theory and the problem – which embody the prejudices of the researcher – will inform the selection and categorization of the text materials, either implicitly or explicitly' (2000, p 136). The rather crude thematic analysis and the results yielded by the content analysis for several of the most important questions (including the one referring to avowed support for right-wing policies) constitute the starting point for more detailed analyses which can be found in the analytic chapters. One could argue that the initial coding process (together with the content analysis) was performed as much for ‘pragmatic’ reasons (organizing the data, getting a sense of the broad patterns etc.), as it was for explicitly ‘analytic’ purposes (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 167).

Through systematic classification and simple counting techniques, it was hoped to reduce the complexity of the collection of interview-talk transcripts and to get a sense of the attitudinal and justificatory patterns that participants might use in arguing for or against controversial issues in Romanian society. This way of organizing and getting a glimpse into the data can be a very effective way to suggest future analytical paths to follow. The content analysis has offered a measure of the types of answers that participants have offered to the specific questions chosen for analysis. One has a measure of agreement, disagreement or ambivalence to the specific issues raised in the questions, but one cannot tell much, at this point, how agreement, disagreement and especially ambivalence were accomplished interactionally and the broader arguments and justificatory patterns they were part of. One has also got a measure of the pervasiveness of the immediacy of justifications in participants’ talk, but again, one cannot tell much about how these justifications were put together, constructed in order to back up, substantiate diverse arguments with different interactional, but also social and ideological effects.

At the same time, and more importantly from the central analytic point of view of this thesis, content analysis has offered a rather simple way of categorizing the participants on the basis of their answers to a particular question, the one related to the avowed support for the representatives of the Romanian right-wing. As previously emphasised, the main analytic idea behind this was to see whether participants expressing support for the right-wing policies of Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar differed in their (prejudiced and
extreme prejudiced) views about the ethnic minorities (Hungarians and Romanies) from those not expressing support for the right-wing policies.

On the basis of their answers to the ‘avowed support for the nationalist policies’ question one can identify three ideological (subject) positions. One can divide the participants into three categories (groups) that are going to be used from now on as the background for analysis: The first group is represented by the ‘support Tudor and Funar’ category, the second is represented by the ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ and the final category, ‘oppose Tudor and Funar’. As the content analysis has shown, 6% of those to whom the question was asked fall in the first category, 45.4% fall in the second category and 48.4% fall in the latter category. One can see that the majority of them are ‘opposing’ the right-wing policies of Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar, followed by those who are ‘ambivalent’ towards the same policies and finishing with a minority of those ‘supporting’ these kinds of policies.

I shall be treating these categories as discrete categories, but my main interest is to look at the detailed conversational dynamic and flexible use by participants in each category of cultural and interpretative resources available in the Romanian society, in order to argue about controversial issues in contemporary Romanian society related to the Hungarian and Romany ethnic minorities. The main assumption is that one will find a very similar expression of prejudiced and extreme prejudiced discourse across the three ideological subject positions, a similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies to problematise the Hungarian political project, to construct stereotypical ideological representations of the Hungarians or to talk of Romanies in extreme ways and placing them beyond difference, beyond comparison. At the same time, subsequent analysis will try to tease out some of the ideological workings of which different descriptions of the faintness of Tudor and Funar’s policies accomplish.

Although the question referring to Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar did not directly asked about participants’ support for Tudor or Funar and their policies, it was nevertheless considered that an explicit or implicit agreement with the issue of the faintness of their policies would be indicative of an implicit ‘support’ attitude towards the representatives of the Romanian right-wing and these particular policies. The same reasoning was applied for the ‘ambivalent’ and ‘opposing’ attitudinal positions towards right-wing extremism.
Chapter seven

Pride and prejudice: The dynamics of ‘pragmatic’ prejudice

Introduction

As emphasised in chapter three, Western research on anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses has widely documented the discursive processes through which prejudiced talk and ‘difference’ is constructed in talk about ethnic minorities (e.g. Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998; Van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1993a; Verkuyten et al. 1995; Wodak and Reisgl, 1999, 2001) The conclusion that can be drawn from most of the discourse studies is that the definition of ‘difference’ is a complex accomplishment dependent on a range of constructive discursive processes and based on a series of discursive moves and rhetorical techniques used in the interactional management of prejudiced talk. The most pervasive aspects of this ‘reasonable’ prejudiced discourse are the denials of prejudice and discrimination, positive self-presentation – negative other presentation, blaming the victim together with explicit or implicit displays of reasonableness or discounting in-group responsibility. In this chapter, it will be suggested that the discourse about Hungarians presents the same features as the well-researched Western anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses of ‘difference’.

For example, one of the simple, analytical ways to think about the participants is as individuals caught in an ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988). On one hand, they do not want to be heard as prejudiced. On the other hand, they generally do not want to support anything that involves abandoning privileges or transfer of power, or threatening social change. In this chapter, I will try to view prejudice towards Hungarians as ‘not undilemmatically straightforward’ (Billig et. al., 1988, p 100). I will try to show that talk about Hungarians is a very good example of how distinctions between social science explanatory categories such as the ‘authoritarian’ and the ‘democrat’ become blurred leaving space for a totalising expression of common-place nationalism and a constant reproduction of an axiomatic division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
I follow Michael Billig et al. (1988)'s concern that it is relatively easy to view prejudice in an undilemmatic way, which assumes that the unprejudiced are liberal and egalitarian, whereas the prejudiced are the repositories of the very opposite values. As it will be demonstrated in this chapter, 'there is a dialectic of prejudice' (p. 100), a dialectic that does not preclude the construction of similar ideological representations of social formations and social relations across the seemingly different ideological subject positions taken up by the participants on different topics and issues raised during the interviews.

As previously noted, one of the questions in my interviews dealt with issues revolving around political nationalism, and mainly the 'assimilationist' type, that of Corneliu Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar. As the content analysis has shown, answers to this question were divided in three categories. The first group is represented by the 'support Tudor and Funar' category, the second is represented by the 'ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar' and the final category, 'oppose Tudor and Funar'. These are the categories that are going to be used in this chapter.

As I hope to have made it clear in the content analysis chapter, I will start treating these categories as discrete categories, but my main interest is to look at the detailed conversational dynamic and flexible use by participants in each category of cultural and interpretative resources available in the Romanian society, the ideological expression of common-place nationalism, in order to argue about controversial issues in contemporary Romanian society related to the Hungarian ethnic minority. The main assumption is that one will find a very similar expression of common-place nationalism across positions, a similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies to problematize the Hungarian political project and to construct stereotypical ideological representations of the Hungarians. The analysis will also try to tease out some of the ideological workings of which different descriptions of the fairness of Tudor and Funar's policies accomplish.

As previously emphasised, stereotypes are shared, cultural descriptions of social groups. As Billig (1995a) suggests, "stereotypes are often means of distinguishing 'them' from 'us', thereby contributing to 'our' claims of a unique identity" (p. 81). It is not my interest to offer further evidence to the idea that, for example, typically, people ascribe more stereotypical traits to out-groups than to in-groups. I am interested in how a specific 'social representation' (Moscovici, 1984) of the Hungarian minority as a whole is put
together in order to achieve different ideological effects. It is not the invoked stereotypical traits *per se* which are important, but the ideological effects of using stereotypical labels in terms of positioning the members of the Hungarian minority in a social and political fixed, immutable subordinate position and presenting their political project as unreasonable. As Augoustinos and Walker (1998) argue, stereotypes are not only ideologically functional, but they are also *ideological representations*.

One should not forget though that 'we' do not merely stereotype 'others' and also 'ourselves'. 'Our' national identity, but also 'theirs' is constructed against an identification with a specific place. As I was arguing in the case of stereotypes as discursive and ideological representations, it is not the invoked stereotypical traits *per se* which are important, but the *locatedness* of the process of stereotyping, the located nature of stereotyping. As previously emphasised (see chapter three), this works to challenge the abstract, aspatial, disembodied notion of stereotyping favoured by some social psychologists. This takes us beyond the issue of mere stereotyping and places stereotyping within an ideology of place.

This chapter will try to reveal some of the subtleties and dynamics of the relation between stereotyping, nation and place. I will start from the premise that nationalist ideology implies a notion of place, which is the backdrop against which nationalist rhetoric is manufactured. The ideology of stereotyping is located within a specific geographical context. As will be shown, geography underpins the stereotypical, antagonistic descriptions that the speakers have to offer. If nationhood is located, so is stereotyping.

Following Wetherell and Potter (1992), I would add a further premise. I take it that 'culture' and 'nation' are not naturally phenomena, but constructed categories that are flexibly drawn in talk for different ends. Having this as a starting point, I would argue that the speakers' images of Hungarians represent discursive and ideological constructions which work in justifying and legitimising existing social and power relations within the Romanian society (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998). As Wetherell and Potter suggest, 'modern accounts of groups are closely related to current social arrangements and must build on past discursive achievements' (1992, p. 118). The idea to bear in mind is that descriptions of groups are not only directly related to current social arrangements, but at the same time these accounts also work ideologically by reproducing current social
arrangements, thus maintaining and legitimising the status-quo. These accounts build on past discursive achievements in order to construct new discursive regimes that reproduce and legitimise dominance. As Dixon and Durrheim have pointed out, ‘the rhetorical traditions through which people locate their selves and others are also ideological traditions that sustain relations of domination’ (2000, p. 33, italics in original).

Having these two premises as the backdrop of the analysis, the question will be, can the same common-place nationalist rhetoric, the same strict, axiomatic division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ within an ideology of the national place informing the different ‘ideological (subject) positions’ (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998) be found across positions or regardless of the ‘political’ stance of the participants towards the right-wing extremism of Tudor and Funar?

‘Supporting’ Tudor and Funar

In this section, the analysis will focus on the way the participants from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category talk about Hungarians when accounting for a range of controversial issues. But before doing that, let me take a look at some of the ways in which participants in the same category discussed the issue of the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. One of the pervasive discursive moves adopted by participants in this category when accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies was an attempt to legitimate, ‘normalize’, ‘naturalize’ this kind of policies by flexibly invoking a set of resources and justifications. Tudor and Funar’s extremism was not constructed as out-of-the-normal way, aligned with dogmatism or lack of tolerance, but on the contrary, the emphasis was on reasonableness and their policies were portrayed as aligned with a more ‘mainstream’ (and also general, one could say, universal) political trend, part of a ‘democratic’ project, as echoing values of patriotism and an ideology of togetherness.

What is to note though is that this ‘normalizing’ process in which the participants are immersed is not a simple one. The participants can be seen as making an attempt to naturalize the dilemmas of common-sense, the contradictions that accompany and define nationalist policies. What the participants are trying to do is to naturalize the controversial and problematic nature of Tudor and Funar’s policies. This is done not by directly suppressing important and controversial aspects of Tudor and Funar’s actions, but rather trying to accommodate controversial elements, such as the nationalism/extremism of the
two protagonists. Nevertheless, even if Tudor and Funar are identified as extremists, the account for the fairness of their policies is still one from within nationalist ideology and in the service of ideology.

This process of legitimating and ‘naturalizing’ Tudor and Funar’s policies is to be found in the next examples, which deal with the particularities and the locatedness of this ‘naturalizing’ move. Excerpt 1, taken from interview 26, sees Marc, an almost-retired, 51 year old high-school teacher accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. In excerpt 2 from interview 38, one can see Sandra, a fifty-one year old speech therapist offering an answer to the same question of the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies (of which some lines were omitted).

Extract 1, interview 26

266 Chris Do you think that the policies of Gheorghe Funar and Corneliu Vadim Tudor towards the Hungarians and the other ethnic groups are the fairest ones?

267 Marc Eh! (2) Now ( ) Well (6 5) They must be everywhere, in every country such personalities who should (2) who should make complete this political (2) pro- scene ( ) In every country there are (1 8) this kind of elements (2 2)

273 Chris So, until a point, they are normal ( ) phenomena? They are (0 7)

274 Marc Yes, they can be found everywhere ( ) everywhere ( ) every country

275 (1 2) has personalities of this kind (1 8) and this is the way they manifest themselves ( ) and a specific segment of the population (1 2) thinks the same way ( ) it is true that this segment is quite small, but (1 2) this is the plura- plurality of sources of thinking (0 8) which exist in every country ( ) one must also ( ) have (0 5) groups like these ( ) nationalist ( ) extremist (1 2) of all sorts ( ) more moderate too, more temperate too [...]

266 Chris Considerați că politica lui Gheorghe Funar și a lui Corneliu Vadim este cea mai justă?

267 Marc Eh! (2) Acuma ( ) pâi (6 5) Trebuie să fie oricând, în orice țară ( ) există de personalități care să (2) să completeze pro- peisajul țării. (2) politică în fiecare țară sunt (1 8) elemente de acest fel (2 2)

273 Chris Deci la știre, sunt aparriții ( ) normale? ( ) sunt (0 7)

274 Marc Da, peste tot sunt ( ) peste tot ( ) în orice țară

275 (1 2) sunt personalități de acest fel (1 8) care așa se manifestă ele ( ) și un anumit segment din populație (1 2) gândesc la fel( ) înainteză că, acest segment este destul de mic, dar (1 2) asta și plura-pluralitatea sursei de gândire (0 8) care există în orice țară ( ) trebue să fie ( ) și (0 5) grupuri din acestea ( ) naționaliste, extremiste (1 2) de toate felurile ( ) și mai moderate, și mai temperate [...]

157
Extract 2, interview 38

[Discussing the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies]

456 Sandra These two men ( ) who have an extraordinary knowledge, a vast
457 knowledge, who are ( ) finally this year, their ( ) merits ( ) are being
458 recognised ( ) even if the pop- ( ) people from Romania class them,
459 even their fellow countrymen, class them (0 4) as extremists ( ) I could
460 tell you a lot of things on this but ( ) I abstain myself
461 Chris [Is their politics ( )
462 Sandra Yes
463 Chris = the fairest one ( ) towards the Hungarians, (towards the other
464 minorities)?
465 Sandra [Yes ( ) yes ( ) they
466 lead a fair politics ( ) why every nation is able to ( ) sing the
467 national anthem with the hand near the heart ( ) why their ( ) flag
468 ( ) is hoisted ( ) with tears in the eyes ( ) mm ( ) why (1 5) I
469 repeat myself ( ) history comes first and foremost ( ) They, >this
470 is what they wanted ( ) Quite the contrary, because they also have
471 a lot of Hungarians ( ) friends they go along with , with whom ( )
472 mm ( ) they help each other precisely for the well-being and
473 prosperity of our nation, of which these ethnic groups are part
474 ( ) I think that they are leading a fair politics and through their
475 politics ( ) nevertheless, the Hungarians should know their place in
476 the Romanian nation ( ) they have it ( ) their position is that of
477 brothers of ours ( ) but loyal brothers ( ) because otherwise this
478 will not end up well (mm) ( )

[Discussing the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies]

456 Sandra Aceşti doi oameni ( ) care sunt de o cultură excepţională, o cultură
457 vârstă, care sunt ( ) în sfârşit în anul acesta, știi se recunosc
458 ( ) merelele ( ) deși, pop- ( ) ce din România își, chiar
459 conştenta lor, își (0 4) fac extremistă ( ) aici aș putea foarte
460 mult să-și spun dar ( ) mă rezum
461 Chris [Este politica lor ( )
462 Sandra [Da
463 Chris «cea mai justă ( ) faţă de maghiari, faţă [de celelalte
464 minorităţi]?
465 Sandra [Da ( ) da ( ) duc o
466 politică justă ( ) de ce fiecare neam poate să ( ) știi cine este îm mul
467 cu mâna pe animă ( ) de ce poate să-şi arboare ( ) drapelul ( ) cu
468 ochii plini de lacrimi ( ) mm ( ) de ce (1 5) mă repet ( )
469 istoria este pusă pe primul plan ( ) știi, ștai
470 au vrut ( ) Din contră, că și ei au foarte mulți prieteni ( )
471 maghiari, cu care se înțeleg,
472 cu care ( ) ( ) se ajută tocmai pentru binele și
473 prosperitatea poporului nostru, din care fac parte și aceste etnii
474 ( ) Eu zic că duc o politică justă și ( ) prin politică lor, totuși,
475 ungurii să știe locul pe care îi au în
476 națiunea română ( ) îi au ( ) locul lor este ( ) de
477 frați ai noștri ( ) dar de ( ) frați locali ( ) că altfel
478 nu va aduce bine ( )

In extract 1, Marc can be clearly seen as avoiding the potentially morally implicative activity of volunteering a direct agreement with Tudor, Funar and their policies and the idea that they are fairer than any other possible policies. The question of the interviewer

1 Following Silverman (1997), it will be not assumed that discussing matters of politics (of nationalistic politics) is intrinsically ‘delicate’. Topics of talk are never delicate or sensitive per se (Baruch, 1981, Rapley, 2001) The delicacy and the difficulties of approaching the topic are oriented to by Marc when answering the question

2 Note the use of the superlative (lines 267-268) ‘cea mai justă’ (the fairest ones) which draws attention to an implicit comparison with other forms of political policies By using the extreme phrasing ‘fairest’, the
sets up a ‘moral stance’ and invites a ‘moral’ positioning from the part of the respondent. After the long initial hesitations, he manages to introduce the rather straightforward statement in lines 269-271. ‘They must be everywhere, in every country such personalities who should (2) who should make complete this political (2) pro-scene ( )’ In lines 271-272 his first statement is reiterated ‘In every country there are (1.8) this kind of elements (2.2)’. One could argue that this is a ‘comparison’ move used as a strategy of legitimation (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997, see also Wetherell and Potter, 1989). It involves ‘the claim that (legitimate) others have engaged in similar actions’ (p. 537). One can see how a universal ‘imagined community’ of nation-states is the backdrop against which Tudor and Funar’s localized and specific practices are being justified. Marc can be seen as placing Tudor and Funar’s politics (extremism) within the universalities of an imagined national time and space. Positioning Tudor and Funar at a (general) universal level works to justify and normalize the local and moral implications of their politics.

The description that Marc offers seems to be doing ‘moral work’ (Drew, 1998) and touches upon the accountability of the nationalist policies of Tudor and Funar, without directly mentioning or commenting on the fairness of their policies and also on whether these policies are fairer than the policies of others. This could be seen as a strategy of avoidance of accounting for Tudor and Funar on moral (ethical) grounds. Thus, Tudor and Funar’s policies are not discussed on ethical grounds, but on pragmatic grounds.3

‘Everywhere’ and ‘in every country’ are very interesting and rhetorically powerful formulations. Through their use, Tudor and Funar’s identity is made safe and unproblematic inside a secure social space, the space of the ‘international world of nations’ (Billig, 1995a). The presumed ‘normality’ of Tudor and Funar’s extremism and its justification is based on a ‘banal’ contemporary ideological common sense of a ‘world of nations’ that supports and helps legitimating a not so ‘banal’ ideology of extremism. As Bauman has suggested, ‘spacing and identity-production are two facets of the same social process’ (1995, p. 186). The ‘otherness’ of extremism and social space support each other.

Interviewer is signalling that this is a matter of controversy, that there is an argument about whether Tudor and Funar’s policies are thought to be fair or not.

3 The ‘pragmatic grounds’ in his argument are presented as if one is being required to act without morals. This cannot be stated directly though.
References to other spaces (other countries) confer the power to justify and ‘disconnect’ Tudor and Funar’s extremism from its localized particularities.

Turning now to excerpt 2 from interview 38, it can be easily seen how Sandra’s orientation to the fact that Tudor and Funar are classed as ‘extremists’ by their fellow countrymen (lines 458-459) nicely opens an argument about what is the label that should be applied to Tudor and Funar. Even if Sandra makes reference to Tudor and Funar as extremists, it is rather something just ‘mentioned’, as opposed to an explanation ‘used’ by her in the argument (cf. Potter and Litton, 1985). Yet again, Tudor and Funar’s policies are not discussed on ethical grounds, but on pragmatic grounds. As the analysis will show, the issue of fairness is backgrounded and Tudor and Funar’s actions are interpreted in terms of patriotic allegiance.

Sandra can be seen as strongly agreeing with the idea that nationalist policies towards the Hungarians and other minority groups are fair ones (lines 465-466). In lines 466-469, Sandra’s three-part list formatted rhetorical questions: ‘why every nation is able to (-) sing the national anthem with the hand near the heart (-) why their (-) flag (-) is hoisted (-) with tears in the eyes (-) mm (-) why (1.5) I repeat myself (-) history comes first and foremost (-) ’ contain references to the symbols of a nation. We have ‘the national anthem’ sang with the hand near the heart, we have ‘the flag’ hoisted with tears in the eyes and we have ‘history’ which should come first and foremost. Like in the case of Marc, the ‘enhabited’ character of nationalism, the imagined ‘world of nation-states’ with their patriotic demands (Billig, 1995a) allows for the justification and normalization of Tudor and Funar’s policies. Using the international language of nationhood and patriotic allegiance, which appears non-controversial to the point of banality, Sandra manages to present Tudor and Funar’s nationalism as ‘banal’ and to support a specific representation of Tudor and Funar’s actions as bearing on patriotic allegiance includes an implicit dimension of ‘fairness’. If it is only ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ to defend your own country’s interests, then the actions in the name of this are to be seen as only ‘fair’ and reasonable.

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4 Even if one can see an attempt to ‘universalize’ Tudor and Funar’s extremism, this does not necessarily have to be seen as a move away from its ‘locatedness’. The fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies are justified for what they are in a particular social and national space.

5 Following Potter and Litton (1985) a distinction can be made between ‘representations’ which are actually ‘used’ and those that are only ‘mentioned’. As Potter and Litton put it, ‘a representation which is used is one drawn upon in an explanation of events’. In contrast, a representation which is mentioned is not used to explain events but merely to refer to an available explanation. (1985, p 85, emphasis in original)

6 One could argue that Sandra’s justificatory account of Tudor and Funar’s actions as bearing on patriotic allegiance includes an implicit dimension of ‘fairness’. If it is only ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ to defend your own country’s interests, then the actions in the name of this are to be seen as only ‘fair’ and reasonable.

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Funar, one which justifies and reproduces a particular set of policies and social arrangements.

If ideology can be thought of 'as a process which articulates together particular representations of reality, and particular constructions of identity..' (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p 276), then Marc and Sandra's account of the fairness Tudor and Funar's policies could be seen as an 'ideological representation' serving ideological functions, that is, 'normalizing', 'naturalizing' - and at the same time, 'de-moralizing' (cf. Linell and Rommetveit, 1998) Tudor and Funar's policies - reinforcing and reproducing existing social arrangements.

This 'naturalization', 'normalization' is not only about naturalizing the dilemmas of common sense and tolerating ambiguities and controversies, but it is also very much located. Its locatedness is of major importance, because, as I hope to have shown, it is through the invocation of the 'enhabited', 'banal' assumptions of nationalism, the taken-for-granted-ness of the existence of a 'world of nations' that Tudor and Funar's policies are justified.

Stereotyping the Hungarians

One can see how in extract 2, the justification and normalization of Tudor and Funar's policies is done through an invocation of the Hungarians. This is done, on one hand, through the invocation of the category 'Hungarian friends' (line 471) and on the other hand, when invoking the notion of 'brotherhood' (lines 476-477) In both instances, even if at first sight one might get a sense of 'social insideness' (Rowles, 1983) being constructed, Hungarians are nevertheless seen as being one of 'them' in 'our' space. At this point, an important observation is in order. The Hungarians (or Magyars, in some variants) to which the speaker (and the interviewer) are referring are the Hungarians in Romania (the Hungarian minority in Romania). Sandra's (and other participants')

7 Sandra's argument works as an 'ideological rationalization' (Billig, 1991) From a rhetorical perspective one might say that Tudor and Funar's nationalist policies are not defended in terms of their own common-places, but in terms of other common-places. They need to be justified by more basic and universally accepted values. With the only caveat that Tudor and Funar themselves also use these universal common-places to justify their policies. In this sense, Sandra's talk is very close to the official, 'intellectual' ideology of the Romanian far-right.

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arguments) are very much located and this locatedness allows them to be so rhetorically and discursively powerful in enacting dominance and reproducing the status quo.

In lines 474-476, a spatialized politics of identity (Keith and Pile, 1993) is invoked. This is bound to a particular notion of the national space and national identification. Insofar as the Hungarians are concerned, it is about ‘knowing your place’ (Keith, 1991) as part of an imagined geography of ethnic and national subordination.

In lines 476-478, the positioning of the Hungarians changes again: ‘they have it () their position is that of brothers of ours () but loyal brothers () because otherwise this will not end up well (mm) ()’. By using a kinship metaphor: the nation as a family, we can see how themes of nationalism are strongly established in Sandra’s discourse. As Wetherell and Potter suggested, “the discourse of nation articulates the sense of a ‘we’ travelling together through time, acting collectively in our own space with a common fate” (1992, p. 141). A local sense of place, like the family, is taken to constitute a ‘collective’ identity that should include everyone. But there is more to this. In Sandra’s view, in order to be ‘included’ in the Romanian nation they ‘have to be ‘loyal brothers’, otherwise things will not end up well between ‘us’ and ‘them’. With ‘loyal brothers’ the emphasis is moved from the idea of brotherhood to the idea of loyalty and the implicit idea is that Hungarians are not loyal. Attachment and loyalty is needed in order to be considered part of the nation. Note that she does not say ‘we have to be loyal brothers’, but rather ‘they have to be loyal brothers’. One could argue that there is an inequality of rhetoric that places more responsibility on ‘their’ shoulders rather than ‘ours’. The rhetoric of brotherhood is cashed out in a rhetoric of inequality.

Emphasizing patriotic allegiances opens the ways for branding ‘disloyal’ those whose sense of community is not tied to an attachment to ‘our’ country. The ideology of patriotism, together with an ideology of the national space disavows forms of community inclusion or exclusion into the national ‘we’ is definitely being decided not by a lack of patriotism, but by the ideology of patriotism itself (Billig, 1993b). A ‘Romanian’ identity is made normative, unproblematic inside the secure social space of the imagined community of the nation ‘The otherness of the Other’, in this case the Hungarians, ‘and the security of the social space ... are intimately related and support each other’ (Bauman, 1995, p 189).
Other examples of constructing a stereotypical ‘otherness’ of the Hungarians within a rhetoric of the national place, specific representations with their specific ideological consequences are to be seen in the analysis that follows.

For the sake of space and clarity, I will exemplify the above by looking at how Sandra continues to talk about the Hungarians when accounting for a range of controversial issues in Romanian society, such as bilingualism and its influence on the relations between the Romanians and the Hungarians, the issue of inter-ethnic conflict and cohabitation or when directly asked to describe the Hungarians.

An example is the next excerpt when one can see Sandra offering several stereotypical attributes of the Hungarians to a question that specifically asks for a description of the Hungarians.

Extract 3, interview 38
[how would you describe the Hungarians]

358 Sandra They are very sophisticated and ( ) treacherous ( ) I don’t ( ) I don’t trust them ( ) I go along from a domestic point of view ( ) culturally
359 ( ) I like their culture, they at a lesser degree ( )
360
361 They ( ) In their conception, we are the peasants and they are the townsmen ( ) No ( ) I don’t trust them ( ) I go along well with them, until proven otherwise ( )
362
363

As one can see in lines 358-359, the Hungarians are described as being ‘very sophisticated’ and ‘treacherous’. Note that Sandra does not use ‘but’ to separate the two attributes, but uses ‘and’ instead, which leads to believe that the two stereotypical attributes are to be read in conjunction. Thus, one could argue that ‘very sophisticated’ has a negative connotation rather than a positive one (with an implied meaning very close to ‘cleverly deceitful’). This is followed by Sandra’s avowal of not trusting ‘them’. The important point is not necessarily to draw out the negativity of Sandra’s description, but to see what it accomplishes in this particular context. One can get a sense of what the two

8 They like ‘ours’ less
stereotypical traits together with the avowal of distrust are doing. They act together as constructing a sense of a ‘warning’ based on an assumption of mistrust. As Jayyusi (1984) has pointed out, the use of different categorizations is not only descriptive of people, but it is ‘through and through an ascriptive matter’ (p. 26, emphasis in original). One can see where this assembled opening ‘ascription’ leads if one follows how Sandra continues her argument.

Sandra’s statement from the first two lines is followed by an important caveat. She alludes to a distinction between a private (domestic) realm at which level she goes along with ‘them’ and a (public) realm of ‘culture’. Sandra avows liking their culture, but ‘they like ‘ours’ less. This is continued with a reference to what ‘they’ think about ‘us’ (how they consider ‘us’): ‘we’ are the peasants, they are the townspeople (lines 361-362). One of the implications of this is that the Hungarians look down on us, they consider ‘us’ of a lower status and not of equal worth and moreover, they think that they can deceive us. This is not said directly, but through the use of an idiomatic expression.

Note that Sandra is at pains with emphasizing her own (and also Romanians’ in general) understanding and good will. She goes along well from a domestic point of view and she likes their culture. Her standpoint of reasonableness is constructed through a contrast with the Hungarian side. Her descriptions are based, are embedded in this contrast that points to an unbalanced relationship between the two groups. The implication of this contrast is that it constructs a negative image of the Hungarians: They do not like our culture (as ‘I’ – ‘we’ like theirs) and they consider ‘us’ not of equal worth.

In lines 362, after a short pause, comes the conclusion. An emphasized ‘No’ is followed by ‘I don’t trust them’. With ‘I go along well with them, until proven otherwise’ (lines 362-363), there is a claim of tolerance and understanding from the part of the speaker. As van Dijk’s analyses of prejudiced discourse have shown, passages like these that seem to express only reasonable arguments are actually ‘the tip of an iceberg of underlying, concealed ideological and political presuppositions’ (van Dijk, 1993a, p.78).

What has followed the introductory description, is a good example of a kind of indirect derogation which includes a balance between positive and negative comments, but which is not, at this point, resolved. There is a sense of some kind of orientation to egalitarian
norms and some sort of sensibility regarding overt manifestations of ethnic bias. A standpoint of rationality and tolerance is the yardstick against which the comments against the Hungarians are mounted. Nevertheless, this is a kind of ‘wishful magnanimity that borders on condescension’ (Henriques, 1984, p. 63).

Let me follow Sandra’s arguments to see how this balance resolves itself. First, I want to look at another extract, which sees Sandra taking up the same standpoint of tolerance and reasonableness and in which Sandra is explicitly locating her practical ideology of nationalism. The extract that I am going to analyse is part of a discussion around the issue of assuring a climate of understanding among cohabiting nationalities.

Extract 4, interview 38
[discussing the issue of assuring a climate of understanding among cohabiting nationalities]

Sandra introduces her comments in lines 422-425 with the use of an ‘if-then’ structure (Edwards, 1995, 1997): ‘If I want to live well in my country, and I want (.) to live like brothers (.) we want to live like brothers, then everyone should do something for this good understanding (.) Through tolerance (.) mm (.) through sincerity (.) through mutual help (.) I don’t think that Romanians can be accused (.) of lack of tolerance, but ( ) “you can’t take it forever” ( ) >you cannot take it forever< ( )’

Sandra introduces her comments in lines 422-425 with the use of an ‘if-then’ structure (Edwards, 1995, 1997): ‘If I want to live well in my country, and I want (.) to live like brothers (.) we want to live like brothers, then everyone should do something for this good understanding (.) through tolerance (.) mm (.) through sincerity (.) through mutual help (.)’. This is used as a discursive resource for telling an ideologically laden story of nationalism and togetherness. As ‘useful general scripting devices’ (Edwards, 1997, p 288) Sandra exploits this ‘if-then’ structure to tell us what to do if ‘we’ want to live like ‘brothers’.
The reproduction of dominance is mediated by our understanding and representation of space (Keith, 1991). It is not any kind of place, it the national place, it is the ‘country’, ‘our country’. Sandra’s ‘my country’ is a perfect example of how one locates oneself and others inside the particular space of the nation. Strangely enough, ‘we want to live like brothers’, but it is ‘my country’ [as ethnically Romanian] that she is talking about. Through the use of such formulation Sandra enacts and reproduces dominance. At the same time, it is a warrant of authority and power, authority and power through which difference and belongingness is manipulated in the production and reproduction of ethnic subordination (Keith, 1991).

The metaphor of the ‘family’ supplies the underpinnings of the construction of the national community. I would argue that this so called family, ‘brotherhood’ is a ‘brotherhood’ based on an assumption of difference, one that places ‘us’ within ‘our’ homeland. As previously argued, this conception of brotherhood places obligations on ‘them’, not on ‘us’. It excludes cohabiting nationalities (including the Hungarians) from membership in the national category ‘Romanian’. The imagined space of the nation is placed in a signifying, semiotic chain that generates meaning and creates a specific national identity and ‘representation’ of belonging. This generates a determinate meaning (natural and inevitable) insofar as this particular ‘Romanian’ national identity is concerned. The iconic power of the national place ties together a moment of arbitrary (identity) closure (Keith, 1991; see also Eagleton, 1991) and secures ‘us’ in our homeland (and in ‘our’ national identity).

Sandra can be seen as making an attempt at legitimating a collective representation of the nation that includes ‘everyone’. Doing that, she is not only legitimising the national entity in itself, but also the ‘banal’ nationalist principle that comes with it: ‘any nation-as-people should have their nation-as-state’ (Billig, 1995a, p. 24) which allows the construction of a sense of national identity ‘for those who are said to inhabit ... their own nations-state’ (ibid., p. 24). ‘My’ (and by extension ‘our’) national identity as ethnically Romanian is taken for granted, it is not problematic. What is made problematic, even if not explicitly, is the ‘other’ who is summoned to earn his entitlement to claim such an identity. One can see how power relations are tied to the most mundane of performances. Systems of unequal power relations are produced and reproduced in the unthinking moments of the ‘narration’ of the nation (Bhabha, 1990) and the unnoticed details of talk.
The essentialist image of the nation (anchored in a specific place and belonging to specific people) is itself neither good nor bad, beneficial or dangerous. It becomes so, when it is mobilized for different ideological purposes, mainly in the service of naturalizing and legitimating discourses. One should not forget that conceptions of space can become overtly political and the conceptual, imagined dimensions of the national space can be as important as its physical manifestations (cf. Penrose and Jackson, 1993; see also Dixon and Durrheim, 2000, 2003). As Bauman has cogently proposed, ‘ideologies that currently accompany the strategy of communal identity-building and the associated policies of exclusion deploy the kind of language that was traditionally appropriated by inclusivist cultural discourse’ (1995, p. 188, italics in original).

But let me now return to look at the means proposed by Sandra to achieve ‘good understanding’ (line 424): ‘Through tolerance (.) mm (.) through sincerity (.) through mutual help(.)’ one can achieve this goal. These invoked humanistic principles are also very much located. These are linked with a disclaimer, which is used as a preface for a complaint: ‘I don’t think that Romanians can be accused (.) of lack of tolerance, but ( ) “you can’t take it forever” (.) >you cannot take it forever<(.)’. The same principle of tolerance previously used is invoked in this disclaimer.

As van Dijk argues, ‘such disclaimers are often a clear symptom of underlying prejudices or antagonistic attitudes, if not a sure sign of subtle or not so subtle racism’ (1993a, p. 77). I will not follow van Dijk in assuming that this kind of statements are often a clear symptom of underlying prejudices, but I would argue instead for a focus on what people are doing when they are using such formulations. I would argue that they constitute rhetorical and discursive resources used to accomplish ideological effects.

One can see how the balance between positive and negative stereotyping that one has seen in the previously analysed extracts is turned by Sandra (at the end of extract 4) into a complaint and implicit blaming stance. The “you can’t take it forever” (.) >you cannot take it forever<(.)’ is paradigmatic in this sense. It is a kind of ultimate conclusion (note the use of extreme case formulations twice) that works to imply that one has gone beyond threshold of tolerance. At the same time, it implicitly justifies a discriminatory stance.
From tolerance to intolerance

One can see how notions such as sincerity, mutual help, reasonableness and tolerance build up and are put to work in order to justify intolerance. The same seems to be happening in the next extract where Sandra is discussing the influence of bilingualism on the relations between Romanians and Hungarians. This sequence comes five minutes into the interview, well before the previously analysed question pertaining to the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. The question refers to whether bilingualism could lead to conflicts or tense relations between Romanians and Hungarians.

Extract 5, interview 38

[Discussing the influence of bilingualism on the relations between Romanians and Hungarians]

As one can see in lines 37-38, there is no doubt for Sandra that bilingualism could lead to conflicts or tense the relations between Romanians and Hungarians. The repeated ‘of course’ (bineînțele) invokes what any reasonable person might be expected to think about the nocent influence of bilingualism on the relationship between Romanians and Hungarians.

Her answer is not complete at this point. She continues by offering a justification for her previous remark: ‘If they (.) work on the sense of being Romanian, eventually yes’. Note the phrase ‘the sense of being Romanian’ (sensibilitatea românească) One could argue that it refers to a ‘form of life’, both a metaphoric and metonymic allusion to a special
form of sensibility, an invocation of a Romanian way of seeing the world and social relations, and their place in this world. It speaks of something, which is exclusively Romanian, presented as an essence of character and feeling (language is also part of this Romanian sensibility). The force of this expression comes from its unspecified particularities (or rather a generality without particularities) that allows for implicitly encompassing an overarching Romanian national identity. In the lines that follow, Sandra switches from a general account of the matter under discussion to a personal one: 'I don’t trust them, I don’t trust the Hungarians, because they are entirely phoney (.) until proven otherwise (.)'. She claims not trusting the Hungarians because they are 'entirely phoney (' until proven otherwise'. Hungarians do not get the benefit of the doubt. They are 'guilty' of being 'entirely phoney' until proven otherwise.

The image of the Hungarians is completed with the addition of two seemingly positive attributes 'they are sophisticated (.) they are well-intentioned (.)' which index Sandra as a reasonable person. Note how expressions such as 'entirely phoney', 'sophisticated', 'well-intentioned' occur within the trajectory of a discourse that tries to provide a normative account of intergroup relations together with justifying and legitimating a specific representation of the Hungarians. Again, there seems to be a contradiction between the ascribed characteristics to the Hungarians. How can one be 'entirely phoney' and 'well-intentioned' at the same time? This is a contradiction that does not seem to be resolved by Sandra. But by looking at it more closely, this contradiction dissolves. As previously noted, the only contradiction there is, is that between the literal and intended meaning, between what is said and what is implied.

The answer comes from acknowledging (as it is the case) that Sandra provides an ironic commentary in order to present and build a representation of the Hungarians. Ironic descriptions differ from factual claims, which are retified as solid and literal (cf. Potter, 1996a). She adds an ironic inflection when she talks about the Hungarians being 'sophisticated' and 'well-intentioned'. As Kotthoff (2003) has argued, irony can express negative evaluations by stating them positively. For the opposition potential of irony,

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9 This phrase might not be common in English (in English nationalist discourse), but it is very much part of the panoply of Romanian nationalist discourse. It is a nationalist concept par excellence.
Sandra relies not only on the interviewer’s assumptions about the Hungarians, but also alludes to taken-for-granted group knowledge. Her evaluations are not to be taken ‘literally’, but a pragmatic meaning is conveyed which is based on an interplay between appearance and reality. The story and the representation that Sandra sets up is one, which involves an ironic contrast. Since the subject of the discussion with the interviewer is contentious, irony plays a role here within the staging of the controversy (cf. Kotthoff, 2003). The other role of irony here is to ‘problematize’ what the speaker is purportedly describing (cf. Speer, 1999). Through the use of irony she problematizes the ‘literal’ meaning of these alleged positive characteristics ascribed to the Hungarians.

Sandra continues her argument by reacting to the implicatum (Kotthoff, 2003) of her previous remarks about the Hungarians. Note the ‘but’ in line 41, which introduces a different tone and thrust to her account: ‘we as Romanians we have to be watchful (.) always ( ) watchful (.) We are tolerant, but watchful ( )’. One can see how Sandra switches to the use of the national ‘we’. In line 41, the national ‘we’ is not used without a qualification. ‘We’ as Romanians, ‘we’ have to be watchful ... the ‘we’ is marked (the Romanian ‘not’ which in some constructions does not necessarily need to be present), its presence standing for an emphasized Romanian national identity and an explicit contrast with ‘them’ (the Hungarians). Sandra directly points to who is entitled to claim membership in the national category ‘Romanian’. Taking account of the context, this collective ‘we’ specifically excludes the Hungarians from national deixis.

Now one can get a feeling of what Sandra (really) meant when uttering her previous seemingly positive descriptions of Hungarians. Sandra pursues the rhetorical aim of constructing and warranting a negative representation of the Hungarians by using irony and thus ‘producing a distinction between superficial appearance and an underlying reality which represents the true situation or a preferred version’ (Edwards, 1997, p 248).

The ‘preferred version’ (implicit though) is one that alludes to a potential ‘danger’ coming from the Hungarians. The term ‘watchful’ brings to the fore some interesting implications. One could ask, why ‘we as Romanians’ have to be ‘watchful’, ‘always watchful’, for what purposes? It is not directly said why ‘we’ have to be watchful, but the implication is that
there is a danger coming from the Hungarian side. As Sandra tries to imply, ‘we’ owe it to ourselves to be ‘watchful, always watchful’. Note the extreme case formulation who adds to the importance of the matter and works to present the practice of ‘being watchful’ as part of a regular, recurrent pattern. ‘We’ have to be watchful not being because of ‘our’ character, but because of ‘theirs’.

There is an addition to what Sandra has previously said. ‘We’ are not just watchful, ‘we are tolerant, but watchful’ (line 42). By acknowledging tolerance, respect and humanitarian values regarding the Hungarian are implicitly alluded to. One can see how the workings of the ‘Hungarian mind’ become visible when set against a constructed and made factual backdrop of reality. Descriptions of mental states and dispositions are played out against considerations of the external world and at the same time, ‘oriented to considerations of what the audience might otherwise believe or think’ (Edwards, 1997, p. 73). These considerations are cashed out if one looks at how Sandra finishes her account: ‘tolerant, but watchful’. They are ‘well-intentioned’ and ‘sophisticated’ because it is in their intention to deceive. That is why, ‘we as Romanians’ have to be watchful. Sandra seems to be responding and expressing the requirements of patriotism, ‘denunciation of lukewarmness as treachery and demand for vigilance against turncoats’ (Bauman, 1995, p. 186). ‘Tolerant, but watchful’ has the resonance of a (political) slogan (Ilie, 1998; Xing Lu, 1999). It works rhetorically and ideologically as a nationalist slogan which nevertheless includes an appeal to tolerance.

This neat phrase is very close to what McGee (1980) has termed ‘ideographs’. Ideographs are defined as ordinary terms infused with moral and political value and used (mainly in political discourse) to call for collective commitment to a normative goal (cf. Xing Lu, 1999, p. 490). If one sees ‘slogans’ such as this one as ‘ideographs’ (Xing Lu, 1999, p. 492), one can see how they can be used, rhetorically and politically, for different purposes, such as justifying action, social relations and a shared symbol for participation in a rhetorical and political culture (Condit and Lucaites, 1993, McGee, 1980). This example of common-place nationalism draws on a basic ideological value, that of ‘tolerance’. ‘Tolerance’ is the normative lens through which one needs to see the dynamics of

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10 Nevertheless, there seems to be a contradiction, because ‘watchful’ might be seen to conflict with being ‘tolerant’
intergroup relations between Romanians and the Hungarian minority. The addition of ‘tolerant’ is a signal that ideological discourse contains contrary common-places which are also valued and alludes to a preferred version of an ideological practice. The message seems to be: ‘We’ are not (or should be) just ‘watchful’, ‘we’ are not just responding to the requirements of patriotism, but ‘we’ are also, at the same time, ‘tolerant’. As such, one could argue that Sandra finds herself in an ‘ideological dilemma’ (Billig et al., 1988) which she has to resolve.

Sandra is at pains to paying lip service to the idea of togetherness and tolerance. ‘Reasonable’ prejudice must uphold the values of tolerance and good understanding, even when expressing unequal views. The successful negative stereotypical portrayal of the Hungarians depends very much on the appearance of reasonableness. As I hope to have shown in the analysis of the previous extract, the interplay between appearance and reality, between what is said and what is implied was the cornerstone of Sandra’s argument. All this works ideologically to justify the ‘reasonable’ blaming of the Hungarians, to locate the nature of social relations within a particular ‘imagined community’ and argue against a specific social and political practice, that of bilingualism.

Yet, for all the sincerity and openness of some of Sandra’s declarations, the stereotypical generalizations of reasonable prejudice are still present and made. A strict division between ‘us’[Romanians] and ‘them’[Hungarians] is accepted as axiomatic and there is a subtle shift from airing tolerant views to building arguments (and reaching conclusions) actually based on intolerance.

‘Ambivalence’ towards Tudor and Funar

In the previous section I have looked at how speakers from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar category’, accounted for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies and at the ways they talked about the Hungarians. I want to continue this chapter by offering a short account of how speakers in, what I have termed, the ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ category account for the fairness of their policies and then going on to show how they stereotypically describe the Hungarians when accounting for a range of controversial issues and what are the social and ideological effects of these descriptions.
Let me start by saying that I am going to focus specifically on a couple of examples which are, in my opinion, paradigmatic for the way in which speakers in the 'ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar' category accounted for the fairness of Tudor and Funar's policies. As I have shown in the previous section, the speakers were embarked on an attempt to legitimate, 'naturalize', 'normalize' and at the same 'de-moralize' Tudor and Funar's policies. As analysis has shown, Tudor and Funar's extremism was not constructed as out-of-the-normal way, aligned with dogmatism, dogmatism or lack of tolerance, but on the contrary was seen as, on one hand, aligned with a more general (one could say, universal) political trend, part of a democratic project, and on the other hand, as echoing values of patriotism and an ideology of togetherness. The ideological effects of these two forms of accounting work to justify, legitimate and reproduce the right-wing ideology of Tudor and Funar. As I hope to have shown, the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies was not defended on ethical grounds, but on pragmatic grounds.

The same process of justifying and ‘de-moralizing’ Tudor and Funar’s policies on pragmatic, rather than on ethical grounds was also identified in the accounts of those who were ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’. One of the most frequent moves in justifying Tudor and Funar’s policies was the invocation of the ‘other’ (Hungarian) side. The stress was on the idea that the nationalistic policies of Tudor and Funar are an answer to the Hungarian position. As the subsequent analysis will show, sometimes this position was made explicit, sometimes left implicit, but in both cases, the effect was that of downgrading and discounting the moral implications of Tudor and Funar’s policies and thus exonerating them from any direct responsibility and involvement in these issues. The next extract, which sees Marta, a forty-eight year old accountant answering the question about the fairness of Funar and Tudor’s policies, is an example of this move.

Extract 6, interview 16

654 Chris
Do you think that the policies of Gheorghe Funar and Corneliu Vadim Tudor towards the Hungarians and the other ethnic groups are ( ) are
655
656 the fairest ones?
657 Marta
No ( ) no ( ) But, it is a reverse ( ) a reverse to what
658 they do ( ) it is a reverse ( )
659 [That’s the word
660 Chris [You mean a reaction?] ( ) to the Hungarian position
661 Marta [A reaction to the Hungarian position ( )
662 this is how I see it ( mm) Not that, as if, they wouldn’t,
663 wouldn’t accept ( ) because in Cluj for example, as evidence
664 it is the third time that Funar has been elected, and elected by the
665 Hungarians, by the Hungarians too ( mm)
666 Chris Nevertheless, he has an, let’s say,
667 [extremist position ( ) ultranationalist, if you may call it so ( )
In lines 657, Marta starts answering the question by offering a direct denial of the fact that Tudor and Funar’s policies might be thought of being fair. One can note that at this point her answer is not complete, there is more to come. What looks like a disagreement token, the repeated ‘No’ [meaning ‘No, they are not fair’] implies in fact an agreement with the implication put forward by the question of the interviewer, the idea that Tudor and Funar’s policies are unfair. If one looks at what follows after a short pause and the ‘but’ on the same line, one can see that Marta simultaneously agrees with the implication put forward by the question and at the same time, goes on to offer a justification for Tudor and Funar’s policies. What she is meaning is: ‘yes, I agree that their policies are unfair, but...’ This kind of ‘yes, but’ (Billig, 1999a) mitigates strong disagreement and prepares the way for introducing a justification of Tudor and Funar’s policies. As Billig (1999a, p. 53, italics in original) has suggested, ‘this rhetorical device simultaneously moves the discussion towards a particular topic, while redirecting the conversation away from another’.

Like in the previously analysed examples of accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies there is a shift from the issue of fairness of their policies to a focus on what the Hungarians do. The speaker is treating the moral and ethical grounds of Tudor and Funar’s policies as irrelevant, and a justification is offered on pragmatic grounds. Putting forward her preferred interpretation seems not to be a straightforward matter. One
can note the signs of implicit difficulty\textsuperscript{11} (the repeated long pauses) that are an indication that Marta is searching for a formulation (label) that would describe what Tudor and Funar are doing.

Taking on the interviewer’s remark in line 660, Marta acknowledges that Tudor and Funar’s policies are ‘a reaction to the Hungarian position’ (line 661). This discursive move constitutes a very useful and powerful way of justifying Tudor and Funar’s policies. The supposed ‘problem’ with Tudor and Funar, and the subtext of their active and voluntary involvement with the Hungarians is explained away and downgraded. The specific representation that Marta tries to put forward endows Tudor and Funar with a passive role, whereas the Hungarians are endowed with an active role. There is a passivation (cf. van Leeuwen, 1996) of Tudor and Funar who are represented as a ‘reaction to the Hungarian position’. The implicit idea that Marta tries to put forward is that ‘pragmatic’ reasons are at stake and should be taken in account when arguing for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. The issue of fairness is backgrounded and Tudor and Funar’s policies are not accounted in terms of their ‘moral’ grounds.

By pointing that Tudor and Funar are a ‘reaction’ to the Hungarian position has the consequence of distracting attention from and thereby downgrading the significance of the issue of the ‘unfairness’ and prejudiced nature of Tudor and Funar’s policies. This kind of accounting has an excusing and mitigating effect (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1989). Talking like this Marta is thus implicitly rebutting the relevance of the ‘moral implication’ put forward by the interviewer. At the same time she is rebutting the notion that Tudor and Funar might be thought of being prejudiced. What Marta’s account seems to be doing is, borrowing a term from Van Dijk, a ‘redistribution of responsibility’.

\textsuperscript{11} In order to facilitate the study of participants’ ‘troubled subject position’ and the issue of difficulty, a distinction can be made between (a) implicit demonstration of difficulty, by the use of implicit ‘trouble-spots’ (Ochs, 1979, Schegloff et al 1977) and (b) explicit, outward claims of difficulty. The difference between the implicit and explicit signs of difficulty lies in the observation that in the case of the former, the implicit signs of difficulty, no actual difficulty claim is made by the speaker, but the analyst and the other speaker(s) can infer the difficulty (frequent repetition, false starts and pauses). In the case of the latter, difficulty is stressed by the use of explicit claims from the speaker that they experience difficulty (this could also include the use of ignorance claims). It can be added that implicit and explicit demonstrations of difficulty do not necessarily appear separate, but they are sometimes intertwined and can be found at the same time in the same account.
In the lines that follow, Marta tries to manage the inferential visibility of Tudor and Funar’s moral conduct, handling accountability and agency via descriptive reporting. This includes a disclaimer ‘Not that, as if, they wouldn’t, wouldn’t accept’ followed by a specific ‘evidence’ that refers to Funar and his successive election as mayor of Cluj. ‘it is the third time that Funar has been elected, and elected by the Hungarians, by the Hungarians too’ (lines 663-664) It is clear now that it is external events that account for whatever Funar (or Tudor for that matter) might be doing. The focus is again on the Hungarians who are said to have voted for Funar alongside Romanians.

There is an acknowledgment that there might be a moral problem with Tudor and Funar’s policies (this is done twice – at the beginning of her answer, lines 657-658, and again towards the end of the exchange, line 668) but at the same time Tudor and Funar’s involvement is excused by invoking ‘pragmatic’ reasons which involve the Hungarian side.

The same dynamic can be seen at work in the next extract that I want to bring to your attention. The protagonist is Carla, a thirty-four year old accountant trying to account for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. One can note that the question has a rather different format from the previous one. In lines 341-343, the interviewer is specifically naming the kind of politics (nationalist, extremist) that his follow-up question will touch upon. After that, he introduces the question about the fairness of such policies, very similar to the one answered by Marta and the other participants.

Extract 7, interview 2

341 Chris Ce păreare adevărată despre politica naționalistă, extremistă pe care, pe
342 care o practică anumite partiide, anumite persoane, cum ar fi
343 Corneliu Vadim Tudor  Este politica lor față de maghiari grei
344 celelalte grupuri etnice cea mai justă?
345 Carla Presupun politică cunoscută, nici nu urmăresc, deloc nu mă
346 interesează politica, deci ( ) ce să spun ( ) poate că undeva ( ) și
347 Funar și Vadim să zic ( )
348 poate că totuși au ce au ( ) au
349 ceva cu maghiari, deci mai mult decât ar trebui, să zic,
350 dar poate ca până la urmă vor să apere doar interesele
351 țării ( ) sau nu știu ce să zic ( ) nu prea
352 urmăresc ( ) nu prea ( ) politică deloc ( )

341 Chris What do you think about the nationalist politics, extremist which,
342 which is promoted by certain parties, certain persons, such as
343 Corneliu Vadim Tudor Are their policies towards the Hungarians and
344 the other ethnic groups the fairest ones?
345 Carla I know too little politics, I am not even following, I am not
346 interested at all in politics, so ( ) what should I say ( ) maybe in
Carla starts by avowing her disinterest, indifference insofar politics is concerned ‘I know too little politics, I am not even following, I am not interested at all in politics’ (lines 345-346). She does not seem to have an answer to the question yet, but after ‘what should I say’ she goes on to offer a gloss on Funar and Tudor’s politics: ‘maybe in a way(.) Funar as well as Vadim to say so () maybe that nonetheless they have what they have (. ) they have something with the Hungarians, so more than they should, to say so’

There is recognition that Tudor and Funar ‘au ce au’ (have what they have)12, ‘they have something with the Hungarians’ This is an indication of the possibility that Carla treats the interviewer’s question as bearing potential criticism relating to Tudor and Funar’s policies towards the national and ethnic minorities. The addition of ‘more than they should’ is a clear recognition that there is a moral problem with the policies of Tudor and Funar. Doing ‘more than they should’ implies some kind of excess in them approaching the issues related to the Hungarian minority This is relevant here, because in the context of extremist politics (which, let it be said, already includes a notion of excess), the implied excess is to be read as referring to morally accountable actions.

In line 350, the use of ‘but’ is a sign that Carla’s implicit orientation to Tudor and Funar’s policies as posing a moral problem is not to be accepted without explanation. Even if at first sight, one could argue that by saying ‘they have what they have (. ) they have something with the Hungarians, so more than they should’, Carla seems to be orienting to the idea that there might be something of a ‘problem’ with Tudor and Funar’s policies, looking at what follows the ‘but’ there is a rather clear indication that the ‘problem’ is not ‘really’ a problem: ‘maybe that in the end they just want to defend the interests of the country or I don’t know what to say’ (lines 350-351). This is not presented as a definite version, but nevertheless one could argue that there is a shift from an implied

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12 this is a literal translation of ‘au ce au’ which is a variant of ‘au ceva cu’ (they have something with ) What this ‘something’ means is not clear and is left ambiguous
unreasonableness (they do more than they should) to an implied reasonableness (they just want to defend the interests of the country)

One can see how an orientation to the possibility of the existence of a ‘moral’ problem with Tudor and Funar’s policies, an orientation to the possibility of an explanation of their policies on ‘ethical’ grounds is subsequently turned into an explanation based on ‘pragmatic’ grounds. These ‘pragmatic’ grounds presuppose and at the same hint to the supreme nationalistic value: defending the interests of the country. In this context, these pragmatic grounds are very much located: it is ‘our’ country that Carla talks about.

Note the use of ‘just’ (doar), which in this context of talk has a ‘depreciatory meaning’ (Lee, 1987, p. 378). Carla uses the particle in order to minimise the implicit significance of her previous statements in lines 348-349. As previously shown, the association of Tudor and Funar’s policies with another set of activities (such as those that arise from the demands of patriotism) explicitly downplays the particular implication of alternative descriptions. Carla is minimising the seriousness of the label applied to Tudor and Funar by the interviewer, by asserting that they are maybe just defending the interests of the country. The actions of Tudor and Funar are to be seen in terms of being just this (defending the interests of the country) and not something else (cf Lee, 1987)

Carla’s argument rests on the implicit assumption that it is only natural and reasonable for someone to defend the interests of his own country. One can see how defending the interests of the country works very well as a justificatory principle. The implication is that if they do ‘more than they should’, they are not doing it because of some internal psychology, but because of patriotic allegiance to the interests of the country.

What is interesting is that Carla displays her disinterestedness ‘precisely at a point where it could be a particular issue’ (Potter, 1996a, p. 132). Stake is subtly managed through an account of disinterestedness. She does that twice, at the beginning of her account (lines 345-346) and at the end of her account (lines 351-352). The answer is symmetrical in this sense. Her account can be seen as ‘a disinterested’ account of interest’ (Potter, 1996a, p 132), which works in this particular context as a powerful rhetorical device for warranting her position, but also that of Tudor and Funar.
Descriptions of the Hungarians

Let me now take a look at some of active uses of stereotypical descriptions of the Hungarians. The analysis will be guided by the same concerns that characterised the previous section, mainly an attempt to show how the ‘internal significant other’ (Triandafylidou, 1998) is stereotypically constructed through the constant reproduction of the nation (Bhabha, 1990, Billig, 1995a) within an ideology of (national) place. As previously argued, stereotyping, nation and place go together and determine each other. The relation of inter-dependency allows for descriptions of in-groups/out-groups to be bounded with narratives of nationhood and national space in ways that carry implications for a discursive construction of national identity concerned with whom the national ‘we’ includes or excludes.

It is important not to forget that we are not just dealing with social representations of difference, with stereotypical descriptions of out-groups, located discourses of national identity, but also with all these things as an ‘internalized structuring impetus which more or less strongly influences social practices’ (de Cillia et al., 1999, p. 156). National ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990) is to be seen as a ‘modus operandi’, as a way of perpetuating, reproducing and justifying a certain status quo together with the national identities related to it (cf de Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999)

To start with I will take a look at how Marta is talking about the Hungarians. The interaction is joined at the beginning of the interview and after some general introductory comments from the interviewer, Marta starts her account by pointing to a negative characteristic of the Hungarians.

Extract 8, interview 16

1 Marta I don’t have (0 2) I have (0 4) I have against them ( ) their eternal
2 manifestation of dissatisfacti(m ( ) That’s what I don’t like about
3 them (mm) there are among them good people and bad people too ( )
4 That’s-(cough, clears throat )Instead I admire them for
5 being very united ( )
6 [I am referring to-
7 Chris [More united than we are?
8 Marta Much more united ( ) I am referring to the Hungarian ethnic minority
9 ( ) that’s what I am referring to (mm) But they also have
10 discontents too (0 8) through their behaviour, through ( ) they are
11 the type of people who laugh in your face and do something else
12 behind your back ( ) that’s for sure (inaudible) Right (1) and with
13 this smile on their face-you can always expect something bad from
14 them(1 4) something bad (mm) But on the other hand , they are very
15 clean, civilized though, but this does not mean that we are not
16 civilized (mm) Right ( ) and they have those airs of

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This way of accounting is very similar to the one that was encountered in the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category when describing the Hungarians. There is a clear-cut negative stereotypical trait that Marta draws on to start her argument. There is a mis-start in line 1, ‘I don’t have’, but which is corrected and turn into its opposite immediately: ‘I have (0.4) I have against them () their eternal manifestation of dissatisfaction () That’s what I don’t like about them (mm)’.

This is a pretty straightforward negative stereotypical view of the Hungarians. The problem with the Hungarians is their ‘eternal manifestation of dissatisfaction’. What follows is an attempt to balance her negative description. An attempt is made with ‘there are among them good people’ (line 3) and culminates with ascribing a positive characteristic ascribed to ‘them’: ‘I admire them for being very united ()’ (lines 4-5).

Marta acknowledges that the Hungarians are ‘much more united’ than ‘we’ are and continues by specifically pointing out that it is ‘the Hungarian ethnic minority’ that she talks about. This is a very clear indication that her argument is located and specific. The implication is that she is not referring to the Romanies, or, for that matter, to Hungarians in general, but to the Hungarians here. Everything that she says is to be taken as applying in totality to the Hungarian ethnic minority. This is part and parcel of a discourse of fixing, ascribing and making meaning stick (Thompson, 1984).

There is an implicit contrast embedded in this formulation. It is not necessarily a contrast with the Romanies or the Hungarians in general, but a contrast with ‘us’. As it will be
seen, this implicit contrast is taken up by Marta when she introduces other negative descriptions of Hungarians.

After the ‘but’ in line 9 she goes to introducing other negative characteristics of the Hungarians: ‘they also have discontents too (0 8) through their behaviour’ (line 9-10), ‘they are the type of people who laugh in your face and do something else behind your back’ (lines 10-11) and ‘with this smile on their face you can always expect something bad from them (1 4) something bad’ (lines 12-13). This is far from being a flattering image of the Hungarians and is very similar to the one previous speakers have emphasised when talking about the Hungarians. With this description Marta manages to fix these characteristics into an imaginary Hungarian ‘character (note ‘they are the type of people’ and the extreme case formulation ‘always’). These characteristics are presented as not something accidental, but part of a deep-seated pattern of approaching the social relations between ‘us’[Romanians] and ‘them’[Hungarians]. The locatedness of the stereotypes is (made) obvious and adds to negative connotations of such descriptions. It is very clear that this image of distrust, of treachery and deceitfulness pinned down on the Hungarian minority is one that is built in relation to ‘us’. The contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is stretched to the extremes. Following Bhabha (1992), one could argue that the Romanian and Hungarian identity are constructed as incommensurable identities.

This is not presented in any general sense, it is very much located and so are its ideological effects. Stereotypical ideological representations are contained and constructed within the imagined space of the nation which serves as a repository of politically, rhetorically and ideologically relevant traditions of national identity. These mediate the interplay between the majority-minority social arrangements and power relations (Agnew, 1987, 1989; Agnew and Corbridge, 1995, Agnew and Duncan, 1989)

In lines 14-17, there is another attempt to describe the Hungarians. Marta starts with ‘But on the other hand’ in order to signal that this is something that stands in contrast with her previous description. What follows is an image which is a mixture of positive and negative stereotypes which is based on an axiomatic us’ and ‘them’ opposition: ‘they are very clean, civilised though, but this does not mean that we are not civilised (mm) Right () and they have those airs of superiority (1.2)’. It is said that Hungarians are ‘very clean’, ‘civilized’, but nevertheless they have ‘those airs of superiority’. 
The constructive strategy of identification with the ‘we-group’ that Marta adopts after the intervention of the interviewer, unquestioningly takes for granted the existence of a homogenous imagined national community with a shared mentality. The prevailing implication of ‘we’ remains the national collective of ‘the Romanians’, which “simultaneously implies distancing from and marginalization of ‘others’” (de Cilha et al., 1999, p. 160).

Although the mentality traits attributed to the Hungarians include heterogeneous, both positive and negative stereotypical qualities, the image that the speaker puts forward is a located homogeneous image of inter-group differentiation. ‘We’ can be clearly identified as the national ‘we’, pointing to intra-national sameness or similarity and differentiation from others.

The same ‘us’ vs ‘them’ dynamic is to be found in the next example on a different contrasting dimension that of the use of ‘their’ language (to be contrasted with ‘our’ language). This time, the contrast is implicit and subtler, but it has the same ideological effects: the reproduction of status quo, justifying dominance and problematizing ethnic minority affirmation. This extract does not contain straightforward stereotypical description of Hungarians, but it is interesting in that it argues against ethnic minority rights. Carla is trying to answer a question related to the issue of the existence and necessity of bilingual signs.

Extract 9, interview 2
[discussing the issue of the existence and necessity of bilingual signs]
Some lines were omitted and the interaction is joined at the point where the interviewer questions Carla’s avowal that there is no need for bilingual signs. ‘Why do you think that such thing would not be necessary. We are talking about a minority.’

Carla starts her explanation with a ‘yes’ followed by ‘but’. As Marta before her, Carla is mitigating disagreement and prepares the way for introducing a justification of why there is no need for bilingual signs. She points that ‘since you live in a country, so (.) in my opinion it is necessary to know the language of the country in which you live’ (lines 126-128).

Carla’s argument is built on a normative view of nation-states and languages (national languages). What Carla says is revealing both for what is explicitly said and for what it left unsaid (Billig, 1999a). It is based on the unquestioned assumptions of nationalism, which ‘creates ‘our’ common-sense unquestioned view that there are, ‘naturally’ and unproblematically, things called different ‘languages’, which we speak’ (Billig, 1995a, p 30). Note that there is no direct reference to the name of the country (Romania) or to ‘this country’, but at any time there is no confusion about which country and which languages are at stake in the description (Hungarian and Romanian).

In lines 128-130, Carla concedes that one can speak another language: ‘you can also speak another language or (.) but at least the language of the country, the language in circulation in that country, in my opinion, they have to know it’. Here one can see an explicit reference to the Hungarian minority. they have to know it.

This argument, as the previous one, is built on the assumption that the modern imagining of nation-states is also a world of formally constituted languages, that is, national languages. Nations and national languages are part of our common sense. This has theoretical, but also political and ideological implications. As Billig has suggested, ‘nations may be ‘imagined communities’, but the pattern of the imagining cannot be explained in terms of differences in language, for languages themselves have to be
imagined as distinctive entities’ (1995a, p. 35-36) Note that Carla uses ‘that country’ instead of ‘this country’, but her argument is nevertheless very much located.

There is a doubleness to Carla’s utterances In making claims about ‘countries’ and ‘languages’, she is doing more than making just a single claim. A modified version of Michael Billig’s (1992) notion of ‘double declaring’ can be very useful as this point in order to capture the dynamics of Carla’s claims When making claims about other (unspecified) countries and their languages, she is also making implicit claims about our country and our language. Making general claims about ‘countries’ and ‘languages’, she is at the same time talking about this country (‘our’ country) where there is one language, which should be spoken by all.

This is a move of bringing together a specific geographical and nationalist imagination (Agnew and Duncan, 1989, Billig, 1995a). Sandra uses a rhetoric of the national place to argue against and problematize the Hungarian claims for speaking their own language.

Her final point in lines 131-133 ‘since you know the language of that respective country, so the language that one speaks, you don’t need it written ()’ is based on the same assumptions. It is based on an implied idea of one country, one language, the very foundation of a national language (Billig, 1995a; Blommaert and Verschueren, 1992) If there is only one country (which is ‘our’ country – the country of ethnically Romanians), there should be only one language spoken (Romanian). Place-identity constructions justify a certain kind of language-in-place relations and a person-in-place political dimension of locating oneself and others. As Keith (1991) has emphasized, ‘space is no more material than it is ideological’ (p. 182)

Arguments about bilingualism, bilingual signs and the rights of ethnic minorities to speak their own language are not just struggles about language, but importantly, they are conducted through language (Billig, 1995a). The creation of national and ethnic hegemony, reinforcing the status quo of social relations, reproducing dominance at different levels is also done through creating a ‘hegemony of language’ (Billig, 1995a, p 29).
‘Opposing’ Tudor and Funar

I have started this chapter on the views about the Hungarians by looking at the ways in which the respondents from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category discussed the issue of the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies and talked about the Hungarian minority. I then went to do the same for the speakers from the ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ category. A series of similarities can be identified between the two positions taken up by the participants, both in what accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies was concerned and accounting and building a stereotypical representation of the Hungarians.

For those in the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category Tudor and Funar’s extremism was seen as, on one hand, aligned with a more general (international) political trend, part of a democratic project, and on the other hand, as echoing values of patriotism and an ideology of togetherness. For those ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’, one of the most frequent moves in accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies was the invocation of the ‘other’ (Hungarian) side with a stress on the idea that the nationalistic policies of Tudor and Funar are an answer to the Hungarian position.

In both instances, the speakers were embarked on an attempt to legitimate, ‘naturalize’ and at the same, to ‘de-moralize’ Tudor and Funar’s policies. Tudor and Funar’s policies were not constructed as out-of-the-normal way, psychologically or politically. Time and time again, boundaries were drawn between an account on ethical (moral) grounds and accounts (which took precedence) based on pragmatic grounds.

Insofar as the stereotypical representations of Hungarians were concerned, participants from the first two categories put together a specific ideological portrayal of the Hungarians and their political project by invoking a set of positive and negative ‘stereotypes’ within a strict, axiomatic division between ‘us’ [Romanians] and ‘them’ [Hungarians]. The locatedness of this axiomatic, antagonistic division was emphasised, which places ‘us’ within ‘our’ national context, and also, more importantly, within ‘our’ homeland. As the analysis included in this section will demonstrate, even if participants from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ very much differ in the ways they accounts for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies, their views on the Hungarians and their political project are not very far...
from those expressed by participants in the ‘support Tudor and Funar’ and ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ categories. It will be suggested that the same dynamics of common-place nationalistic discourse are to be found when looking at how participants from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category argue around controversial issues related to the Hungarian minority.

Before going on to show the discursive and ideological similarities between the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ participants and the participants from the other two categories, let me deal first with how the participants from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category accounted for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies.

One of the most common patterns of accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies saw the respondents from the ‘opposing’ Tudor and Funar category constructing an image of Tudor and Funar (and their policies) out of the use of two interpretative resources or accounts of nationalistic politics. One was related to describing Tudor and Funar in politics terms (touching on the issue of the type of politics they are advocating), the other aspect being related to constructing an image of Tudor and Funar in terms of (their) ‘psychology’

*The ‘political dimension’*

One could make a differentiation between an external, ‘political dimension’ on one hand, and an internal, ‘psychological dimension’ on the other hand. These emerged time and time again where the participants were called upon to offer a judgment on the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. One example of the ‘political dimension’ of accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies evident in this corpus can be seen in the next extract

Extract 10, interview 5

82 Chris What do you think about this nationalist, extremist politics which
83 ( ) through Funar, through Vadim Tudor ( ) Are their policies
84 towards the minorities the fairest ones?
85 Mircea No ( ) so in general any extremist party constitutes an
86 extremist nationalism, so it is pushed over the normal boundary,
87 so beyond what’s normal in a modern society ( )
88 [...]
In interview 5, one can see Mircea, a thirty-two year old bank supervisor accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies. As this extract shows, the ‘political dimension’ takes the form of an ‘extremist politics’ repertoire. This was frequently presented in a straightforward way, which portrayed Tudor and Funar’s policies as simply constituting extremist politics.

The question of the interviewer is set as asking for an opinion on the nationalist, extremist politics that Tudor and Funar advocate. As the subsequent analysis will show, talking about Tudor and Funar’s policies does not amount to a simple matter of opinion on nationalistic politics. Asking the question like this the interviewer is signalling that this is a matter of controversy, that there is an argument about whether Tudor and Funar’s policies are thought to be fair or not. The interviewer sets the issue to be discussed as a ‘moral’ issue. It is not just the use of the superlative that achieves this, but also the categories used by the interviewer to phrase its question. He directly refers to Tudor and Funar’s policies as ‘nationalistic’, ‘extremist’ thus, setting up a ‘moral stance’ and inviting a ‘moral’ positioning from the part of the respondent.

The answer comes without delay and the speaker is offering a straightforward denial of the implication put forward by the interviewer that Tudor and Funar’s policies might be thought of being fair. After a small pause, the ‘No’ in line 85 is followed by ‘so’ (deci) which introduces an explanation of the negation ‘in general any extremist party constitutes an extremist nationalism’ (lines 85-86). Looking at the way the negation is explained, one could argue that the moral stance put forward by the question is explicitly taken up by the speaker.

This ‘nationalist extremism’ is subsequently clarified by being something, which is ‘pushed over the normal boundary, so beyond what’s normal in a modern society ( )’. This is done by bringing forward the notion of ‘boundary’, a ‘normal boundary’. Nationalist extremist politics is portrayed as being ‘pushed over the normal boundary’, ‘beyond
what’s normal in a modern society’. In both statements, one can note that what is ‘normal’ (‘the normal boundary’ and ‘what’s normal’) is not explained, but it is used as a reference to point to the idea that extremism is beyond what is considered fair by right-minded individuals.

The implicit moral dimension embedded in the term ‘extremist nationalism’ is made explicit by offering a defence of the normal. As Edley and Wetherell (2001), in their analysis of men’s accounts of feminism suggest, the notion of ‘extremism’ stands, within the context of many Westernised societies, almost as a synonym for unacceptability. The two moral formulations put forward by the interviewee (‘pushed over the normal boundary’ and ‘beyond what’s normal in a modern society’) bring our attention to the existence of a threshold of normality (and fairness) in relation to which extremists like Tudor and Funar have gone away from. In this context, the term ‘normal’ is a term of ideology. It is not used in a neutral way, but its use accomplishes a definite contrast which places Tudor and Funar’s policies on the other side of the ‘normal’ boundary, thus, casting them as not ‘normal’, as deviant, as morally accountable.

The speaker’s argument takes the form of a defence of the ‘normal’ way as opposed to a subverted, ‘abnormal’ way of extremism. This ‘normal’ boundary is also a ‘moral’ boundary. It is implied that it is the boundary of reasonableness. One could argue that this invocation of a ‘normal’ boundary and of something, which is beyond this boundary, appeals to what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) called the ‘universal audience’. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggested that sometimes the act of arguing involves making an implicit appeal to the ‘universal audience’. This means that speakers assume that their argument would be ‘considered reasonable in the eyes of a mythical and totally rational audience’ (Billig, 1991, p. 25). In this case, the argument hints to the idea that any reasonable person would find the ‘normal’ normal.

In the previously analysed extract, there is a clear sense of a moral condemnation of extremism, which, at the same time, brings to the fore and emphasizes the virtues and values of non-extremism. What Mircea (and other speakers in this category) try to achieve,
that is, the discreditation of Tudor and Funar (and their policies) is accomplished through a contrast with rationality and moderation. The contrast is specifically indicated and a notion of a transgressed boundary is brought to the interviewer's attention when teasing out the assumptions behind the use of the term 'extremism' when referring to Tudor and Funar's policies. The explicit element of this contrast is the invocation of the 'normal', 'the normal boundary', which acts like a tool for measuring the 'abnormality' of Tudor and Funar's policies. It also places Tudor and Funar's policies on 'the other side' of the moral boundary beyond the reasonableness and morality of right-minded citizens.

*The 'psychological dimension'*

In the previous section it was argued that the speaker constructed their opposition to the idea of Tudor and Funar's policies being fair through emphasizing a moral boundary. Taking the idea of a boundary further, it will be argued that, in the same way as participants drew attention to the existence of a moral boundary, the participants also emphasized the existence of a psychological boundary in order to account for the existence and unfairness of Tudor and Funar's policies. The previous speaker argued that those on the other side of the 'normal' boundary were 'morally' and 'politically abnormal.' In a similar way, it will be argued, those 'on the (psychological) other side' are said to be and constructed as 'psychologically abnormal'.

Here are some examples of the way the 'psychological abnormality' was introduced when accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar's policies. In the extracts that follow one can see Alina, a thirty-five year old accountant and Ion, a thirty-nine year old engineer accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar's policies. In these accounts the political dimension is backgrounded leaving space for constructions of Tudor and Vadim in terms of their 'psychology.'

Extract 11, interview 17
Do you think that Tudor and Funar’s policies towards the Hungarians and other ethnic groups are the fairest ones?

No ( ) not in the least ( ) they seem lunatics to me ( ) and those who follow them ( ) They are actually lunatics, in my opinion ( )

Consideră că politica lui Tudor și Funar față de maghiari și celelalte grupuri etnice este cea mai justă?

Nu ( ) chiar deloc ( ) se pare niște nebuși ( ) și cei care îi urmează ( ) Sunt efectiv nebuși, după mine ( )

Let’s talk for a while about the nationalistic politics, even extremist as it is so often called ( ) what do you think of Gheorghe Funar or Vadim Tudor ( ) Are their policies towards the minorities fair?

No, they are not ( ) They are ( ) so probably they lead this kind of politics because of, first and foremost, personal complexes (mm)

Să ne exprim câteva momente la politica naționalistă, chiar extremistă cum este numită de cele mai multe ori ( ) ce părere aveți despre Gheorghe Funar sau Vadim Tudor ( ) Este politica lor față de minorități justă?

Nu, nu este ( ) Este ( ) Deci probabil că ei știu dacă politica asta datorită, în primul rând primul rând, urcă complexe personale (mm)

Deci exponenții naționalismului sunt în primul rând niște oameni cu probleme interioare (mm) Dar sunt probleme, într-adevăr, am vorbit despre aceste probleme în general ( ) dar ele nu trebuie exacerbate ( ) cine se ocupă de exacerbarea problemelor, are el însuși probleme pe care încercă să le ascundă (mm)

In interviews 17 and 10, one can find a series of descriptions of Tudor and Funar in terms of their ‘psychology’. In interview 17 (lines 96-97), after vigorously opposing the idea that Tudor and Funar’s policies might be thought of being fair, Alina introduces her evaluation of Tudor and Funar: ‘they seem lunatics to me (.) and those who follow them (.) They are actually lunatics, in my opinion (.)’. As she suggests, the label ‘lunatics’ applies not only to Tudor and Funar, but also to their ‘followers’. The description ‘lunatics’ is upgraded to ‘actually lunatics’, which presents the matter of ‘lunacy’ of Tudor and Funar as something beyond doubt, even if introduced with a personal opinion marker (‘in my opinion’).

In interview 10, it is argued that Tudor and Funar are leading the politics they lead ‘because of, first and foremost, personal complexes’ (line 119). The identification of

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14 The Romanian term 'efectiv' in 'efectiv nebuși' was translated using the English ‘actually’ (actually lunatics) Closest translations are ‘really lunatics’ or ‘truly lunatics’
'personal complexes' as a possible cause for the actions of Tudor and Funar is portrayed as not just another cause of having nationalistic, extremist politics, but as the crucial cause. There may be other causes for the nationalistic policies (the list could continue), but Ion signals that this is one of the main reasons for having politics like this lead by Tudor and Funar. It is stated that Tudor and Funar are acting the way they do because of unresolved inner conflicts. Freudian-like notions of ‘personal complexes’ and ‘inner problems’ place the source of behaviour within the psychological make-up of the individual. The ‘problem’ with Tudor and Funar is, in these accounts, not based on external causes, but on internal, psychological ones.

These accounts are not to be seen as being only about identifying the internal causes of having nationalist/extremist politics. One could argue that the moral implications of invoking such causes are more important than the causes themselves. The use of such psychological concepts from the register of ‘pathology’ foregrounds a rhetoric of refutation and criticism. This rhetoric of criticism of Tudor and Funar’s policies relies on the implications of psychological abnormality (‘personal complexes’, ‘inner problems’) and irrationality (‘lunatics’) that are embedded in the psychological vocabulary used by the participants.

At the same time, an implicit contrast with the reasonable and psychologically normal is also constructed. Invoking the kind of ‘psychological features’ that are linked to the extremists, the speakers are building an implicit contrast with the non-extremists. The seemingly factual statements about Tudor and Funar’s ‘psychology’ carry a moral implication. Both speakers draw upon implicit meanings attached to terms like ‘extremist/nationalistic politics’ to portray Tudor and Funar as being morally and psychologically accountable for their policies.

In both extracts, the condemnation of Tudor and Funar includes a lay psychological diagnosis. The prejudiced are described as being ‘lunatics’ (extract 11) and their policies and actions are seen as triggered by ‘personal complexes’ and ‘inner problems’ (extract 12). Described like this, the implication is that they are failing to show the intellect of rational judgment. One should be wary of treating terms like these as purely descriptive. The kind of psychologizing serves as a moral condemnation of Tudor and Funar’s political views. It is implied that these views are not reasonable and someone holding these kinds
of views is not rational (cannot be rational). What is very important is the general psychological and moral diagnostic of Tudor and Funar, the implicit emphasis on psychological abnormality and irrationality. Condemning Tudor and Funar’s views as unreasonable, the speaker makes a claim for his own psychological reasonableness.

At this point one can clearly see the main difference between the accounts of the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies coming from speakers in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category and the speakers from the other categories. Participants ‘supporting’ and ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar drew on arguments based on ‘pragmatic’ grounds in order to downplay the moral dimension of Tudor and Funar’s policies and thus to justify their policies, ‘normalizing’ and ‘naturalizing’ them. There was no explicit critique of the moral status and implications of Tudor and Funar’s policies. Nevertheless, the values of non-extremism, tolerance, togetherness and mutual understanding were drawn upon in order to construct a specific representation of Tudor and Funar and their policies. In contrast with this, participants from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category based their arguments on ethical grounds, rather than pragmatic grounds. The moral condemnation of Tudor and Funar was at the centre of this form of accounting. As emphasized, this sometimes explicit (sometimes implicit) moral condemnation of Tudor and Funar was achieved through placing the two protagonists beyond a ‘normal’ boundary, both political and psychological. Tudor and Funar are portrayed as being morally, politically and psychologically accountable for their policies.

*The shift from tolerance to intolerance and reasonable blaming of Hungarians*

The previously quoted respondents made relevant an emphasis on values of tolerance, respect and fairness against a backdrop of a ‘normal’ political and psychological boundary. Unambiguous denunciations of the extreme nationalistic right-wing represented by Tudor and Funar are not necessarily followed by similarly unambiguous declarations of tolerance. Placing Tudor and Funar’s policies on ‘the other side’ of the moral boundary beyond the reasonableness and morality of right-minded citizens, building a distance between fair-mindedness, reasonableness on one hand and bigotry, on the other, opens the way for the expression of common-place nationalism.
In the following, I will focus at some the ways in which the respondents in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category shift from airing tolerant views to building arguments actually based on intolerance. It will be suggested that the criticism of the extreme/nationalist policies of Tudor and Funar permits the expression of common-place nationalism. By bringing to the front the unreasonableness of Tudor and Funar’s nationalism, by contrast, the speakers’ common-place nationalism appears reasonable. As the subsequent analysis will show, for all the sincerity and straightforwardness of the respondent’s declarations, and most of all, the construction and condemnation of Tudor and Funar’s unreasonableness, the abstractions and generalizations of reasonable prejudice are still present and made. A strict division between ‘us’ [Romans] and ‘them’ [Hungarians] is accepted as axiomatic. As Verkuyten et al. (1994a) have shown, it is certainly possible to have a strong moral view condemning discrimination and prejudice, and criticizing the bigots, but at the same time to represent minority groups negatively when discussing specific issues. As Billig et al. (1988) argues, the symbols of racism can be forthrightly rejected, but not necessarily its assumptions.

I will qualify this shift from tolerance to intolerance by looking at some of the expressions of ‘reasonable’ blaming of the Hungarians presented as common-sense. As the analysis has shown, speakers from both previously analysed categories expressed a kind of ‘reasonable’ prejudice, endorsing the values of tolerance and good understanding, even when expressing unequal views. As previously emphasised, it is suggested that the specific ideological representation of the Hungarians is a very similar one, both in content and emphasis, to the one constructed and put forward by participants ‘supporting’ and being ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar. The same ‘reasonable’ blaming and pointing to the unreasonableness of the Hungarian minority political project encountered in the previous sections, is also sometimes explicitly, but also implicitly taken up by the participants that explicitly dissuade Tudor and Funar’s policies. A specific ideological portrayal of the Hungarians and their political project is achieved through invoking a set of ‘stereotypes’ within a strict division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which is constructed and accepted as axiomatic in order to tell a politically and ideologically laden story. The argument will be constructed with a concern for the locatedness of this axiomatic, antagonistic division, which allows for the construction of specific ideological representations and the expression of common-place nationalism.
In interview 36 (extract 13), Carmen, a seventy-one year old retired woman was invited by the interviewer to offer an account on whether having Hungarian language in the local administration is a step forward for the Hungarians. In order to construct the image of the Hungarians and their political project, Carmen makes use of what are classically identified as cultural stereotypes. She tells a cultural and political story using a set of shared cultural descriptions of the Hungarians. As argued in the introduction of this chapter, it is not the stereotypical traits in themselves that are important, but rather what they achieve rhetorically and ideologically.

Extract 13, interview 36

In extract 13 one can see Carmen offering a set of stereotypical descriptions of the Hungarians. After previously stating that having Hungarian in the local administration does not constitute a step forward for the Hungarians, Carmen goes on to characterize the Hungarian enterprise of having the Hungarian language in the administration. As she puts it, ‘it is (.) it is something like (. ) hm ( . ) hanging on to something ( . ) this is the crude truth (mm) they hang on to something ( . ) their language to be ( . ) extended in the administration ( . ) why do you think they are ( . ) they are doing this?’

One can see how, from the first lines, the Hungarian political project is made problematic. The expression ‘hanging on to something’ (line 31) and the direct reference to the Hungarians, ‘they hang on to something’ (line 32), does some interesting rhetorical work. The Hungarians thus become accused of having demands from questionable motives. In this political and argumentative context, perseverance of demands can be interpreted as a
blameworthy behavioural trait. One could also argue that there is an implicit reference to the unreasonableness of the Hungarian political project.

An explanation is later given for the behaviour of the Hungarians. This is invoked in terms of a psychological stereotypical trait part of a supposed Hungarian ‘character’. The issue of Hungarians ‘having their pride’, being ‘very proud’, is brought to the fore: ‘Cos’ (...) the Hungarians have their pride (...) they are very (...) pardon (...) they are very proud (...) they are very proud (mm)’ (lines 35-37). What Carmen hints at with this explanation is the idea that the Hungarians request to have language in administration does not arise because they are in need to consolidate their cultural and linguistic autonomy. The implication is that it is ‘pride’ and not a genuine need for affirming and consolidating their cultural identity is what leads the Hungarians to have this kind of demands.

This reinforces her previous statement about the Hungarians ‘hanging on to something’, emphasizing once again that their demands originate from questionable motives. Discrediting and arguing for the untruthfulness of the Hungarian political project is achieved through the rhetorical strategy of calling into question the genuineness of the Hungarian’s motives. Taking account of the rhetorical and argumentative context in which is used, one could argue that describing the Hungarians as ‘having their pride’, as being ‘very proud’ (not just proud) has a rather negative connotation.

As was shown for the case of the participants ‘supporting’ and being ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar, stereotypical descriptions were constructed and linked with an explicit invocation of a strict division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which was accepted as axiomatic. At instances, the middle class Romanians from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category that were interviewed constructed conflictual, ‘us’ vs ‘them’ formulations. In the same way as the participants from the previous two categories, there was a concern for the locatedness of this axiomatic, antagonistic division, which allows for the expression of common-place nationalism. This kind of accounts tended to be framed in the context of the relative position of majorities and minorities. A similar example of this kind of conflictual formulations can be found in Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter’s analysis of the talk of Pakeha New Zealanders. On this subject they argue that “within the frame of democratic politics it becomes ‘ideologically safe’ to talk of a conflict between a majority of ‘us’ who are in dispute with a minority of ‘them’. Majority rule has a
justificatory value which places the outcome for majority-minority conflict beyond dispute ...” (1992, p. 161).

This pattern of accounting can be found in the next excerpt taken from the previously analysed interview 17 and sees Alina arguing about whether there is discrimination against the Hungarians. This excerpt comes several lines before she expresses her views on the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies.

Extract 14, interview 17

Do you consider that there is discrimination against the Hungarians or not really? (1992, p. 161).

No ( ) I consider that there is no discrimination ( ) of any kind as long as one has mixed marriages, as one has ( ) as long as one works together with them ( ) No ( ) I don’t think that we are discriminatory against them (mm) In exchange, it is upsetting the way they ( ) mm ( ) make separations ( ) They converse among themselves ( ) they talk among themselves only in Hungarian ( ) even if they know that around there are Romanians too ( ) It is upsetting like this ( ) it is ( ) what do I know ( ) it is so frustrating for us ( ) To end up in a group, and two Hungarians talk Hungarian among themselves ( ) so, you don’t know, are they calling you names, talking about something else ( ) in fact they are harmless ( ) or they complain (mm)


Nu ( ) Eu consider că nu există discriminare ( ) de nici un fel ( ) Atât timp cât sunt căsătorii mixte, cât sunt ( ) cât se lucrează împreună cu ei ( ) Nu ( ) Nu cred că suntem discriminatori față de ei (mm) în schimb, e deranjant felul în care ei ( ) mm ( ) fac separații ( ) Ei se întrețin între ei ( ) Eu discută între ei numai în ungurește ( ) deși știu că în jur sunt și români ( ) Ei deranjant așa ( ) e ( ) ce știu eu ( ) E așa frustrant pentru noi ( ) Să ajungî într-un colectiv, și doi unguri între ei vorbesc ungurește ( ) Deci nu știu, te înțeaj, vorbesc despre altceva ( ) de fapt îs înofensiv, sau comentează (mm)
Hungarians. As it will be seen from her answer, the speaker aligns her response with this implication and tries to offer justificatory reasons for why this is the case.

In line 70 her answer can be seen coming straightforwardly, without hesitation: ‘No (.) I consider that there is no discrimination (.) of any kind’ ‘There is no discrimination’ she contends. After a small pause, she qualifies her previous statement about discrimination: ‘of any kind’ (de nici un fel). This is a categorical comment and depends upon having a well established idea about what would count as discrimination. A justification for the idea that there is no discrimination, of any kind, is offered in the lines that follow: ‘As long as one has mixed marriages, as one has ( ) as long as one works together with them (.) No ( ) I don’t think that we are discriminatory against them’ (lines 71-73).

Having ‘mixed marriages’, ‘working together’ with ‘them’ are presented by the speaker as peremptory reasons for applying a diagnostic of non-discrimination. The list could have probably continued, but the speaker introduces a conclusion ‘No (.) I don’t think we are discriminatory against them’. One can note a slight shift from ‘there is no discrimination’ to ‘I don’t think we are discriminatory against them’. One could argue that the speaker’s shift to ‘we’ has ideological implications for the speaker’s position on the topic. As Wilson (1990) suggests, people can use pronouns in order to develop and indicate their ideological position on different matters. The choice of pronouns can also indicate how close or distant the speaker is to the topic being discussed (Gastil, 1992; Wilson, 1990). As Gastil argues, ‘speakers can judiciously distribute pronouns, such as we and they, to suggest their membership or identification with different groups, such as organizations, ethnic groups or parties’ (1992, p 484). Here, the speaker uses ‘we’ to suggest an identification with the Romanian national group (of which herself and also the interviewer are part) and the clear delineation from ‘them’ (the Hungarians). As in the previously analysed accounts, the contrast ‘us’ and ‘them’ is still pervasive and axiomatic.

After presenting the in-group’s position on the matter of discrimination against Hungarians as a peremptory conclusion: ‘we are not discriminatory against them’, the speaker goes on to offer a version of how, in her opinion, the Hungarians respond to this position. In line 73, with ‘In exchange’ the speaker introduces the following statements: ‘In exchange, it is upsetting the way they ( ) mm (.) make separatisms (.) They converse among themselves (.) they talk among themselves only in Hungarian (.) even if they know
that around there are Romanians too (). It is upsetting like this ( ) it is ( . ) what do I know ( ) it is so frustrating for us ( . )' (lines 73-78)

The implication that Alma tries to put forward is that while ‘we’ are not discriminatory towards them, what ‘we’ get in exchange are ‘separatisms’. What counts as ‘separatism’ for the speaker is the fact that they converse, talk among themselves only in Hungarian, even if Romanians are present. This implication is very important because it endorses the moral condemnation of discrimination and places the national self (and implicitly the individual self) within the moral community. What is questioned and emphasized is who gets the fairest treatment. It is implied that ‘we’, who are not discriminating against ‘them’, get no respect in return, fact that is ‘upsetting’ and ‘so frustrating for us’. Note the apparent ignorance claim in line 77 (‘what do I know’) nested in an account which tries to explain how ‘we’ feel about this. The display is not so much of not knowing something, but of searching for a formulation that could describe how ‘we’ feel about this. The speaker subtly displays his ‘disinterestedness’ precisely at a point where it could a particular issue (cf. Potter, 1996a). Formulations of ignorance can be exploited as a way of saying that one has not worked up one’s position, as any kind of prepared, prior position on the matter under discussion (Edwards, 2003).

In this way, one’s own reasonableness and morality are related to the unreasonableness and moralism of others (cf Verkuyten, 1998a) The denial of discrimination implies the recognition of equal treatment The value of equal treatment is endorsed and subsequently used to describe and account for what the Hungarians are doing ‘We’ offer them equal treatment, ‘they’ offer us unequal treatment, trying to make separatisms.

Another example of the ‘us’/’them’ contrast embedded in the classic problem of nationalism from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category can be seen in the next extract (extract 15). Sanda, a twenty-two year old teacher is accounting on majority-minority issues as part of an answer to a question that relates to the adoption of the Hungarian language as a second official language

Extract 15, interview 9

[discussing the issue of adopting the Hungarian language as a second official language]
From the onset, Sanda offers a reason why ‘we’ should not allow having Hungarian language as a second official language: it is because ‘it diminishes our national identity, in the very end (.).’ The perspective that Sanda offers is constructed within a discourse of nationalism ‘it diminishes our national identity’ (74-75) ‘we are Romanians’ (line 76) and ‘we need to assert ourselves in Romanian, in every corner of the country (mm) and not to permit others to try to overshadow us’ (lines 76-78) As Billig (1995a) has remarked, ‘nationhood ... involves a distinctive imagining of a particular sort of community rooted in a particular sort of place’ (p. 74).

Note the phrasing ‘in every corner of the country’ (în orice punct al țării) in lines 76-77. In no instance is there any ambiguity about which country this is: This is “evoked as the national place of ‘us’, conceived as a community” (Billig, 1995a, p. 107) It is a place that has to be ‘unimaginatively imagined and the assumptions of nationhood accepted’ in order to do its rhetorical business. Through this routine rhetorical business, the nation ‘continues to be made habitual, to be inhabited’ (ibid., p. 107). I want to suggest that it is not only that through routine phrasing like this the nation is inhabited and made habitual, banal, but that through the same routine phrasing domination is also inhabited, made habitual, natural. Thus the ‘banal’ ritual of reproducing the nation can reproduce division and inequality, rather than an overall sense of community. Or in other words, it reproduces division, domination, intolerance, inequality within an ‘imagined tolerant community’. Speakers are reminding themselves and other members of the in-group that “‘we’ are ‘here’ living at home in ‘our’ precious homeland” (Billig, 1995a, p 126). But at the same

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15 The Romanian ‘să ne afirmăm românește’ can mean ‘to assert ourselves in Romanian’, but can be also understood as ‘to assert ourselves the Romanian way’ or ‘in a Romanian way’
time, through the ‘flagging’ of nationhood speakers are constantly reminding themselves of the presence of ‘others’.

One can see how separation and group distinctiveness is predominantly realized in the rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The use of pronouns such as ‘we’ versus ‘them’ have received substantial attention as a means of articulating in- and out-group differentiation and negotiating intergroup distance (cf. Billig, 1991; Maitland and Wilson, 1987, Muhlhauser and Harré, 1990; Wilson, 1990). Invoking a Romanian national identity, explicitly (line 75), but also through the repeated use of the national ‘we’ achieves a discursive separation (one could say, exclusion) of the Hungarians from membership in the national identity category ‘Romanian’

A normative version of ‘Romanian-ness’ is used in order to render the Hungarian project as morally (and potentially politically) problematic and to, implicitly, justify its inappropriateness, thus reproducing, reinforcing the one-sided Romanian perspective. As previously argued, questions of ‘who we are’ are intimately linked to questions of ‘where we are’ (Billig, 1995a, Dixon, 2001; Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). The national place and national identity are brought together in order to argue for the inappropriateness of the Hungarian initiative. In these kind of accounts, the Hungarians are constructed as an ‘internal significant other’ (cf. Triandafyllidou, 1998)17, viewed as having claims which go against a ‘Romanian’ project. One can see how the Romanian national identity gets constituted by evoking the Hungarians as its ‘constitutive other’ (cf. Chouliarakis, 2000).

This evaluative framework locates the matter in the bed of a totalizing, nationalizing Romanian culture. ‘Cultural totalization’ (Bhabha, 1996) is the backdrop against which arguments are mounted.

16 Talking about nationalism at a general level, Bauman (1992) emphasizes that it can be thought as ‘a specimen of the big family of we-talks, that is, of discourses in which identities and counter-identities are conceived and through which they are sustained’ (p 678, italics in original) ‘We-talks’ are ‘set apart by their exclusivity they tend to promote ego-centred binary divisions, divide the world into friends and enemies – sharply separated from each other by mutually exclusive sets of assigned rights and duties, moral significance and behavioural principles’ (ibid., p 678, italics in original)

17 Triandafyllidou (1998) proposes a distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ significant others. As she puts it, referring to the internal significant other, it disrupts the cultural and political order of the nation, and thus challenges its sense of unity and authenticity (p 603) Putting the two together, she concludes “The ‘external significant other’ is perceived as threatening to ‘wipe out’ the nation, while the internal significant other is viewed as threatening to ‘contaminate’ it” (p 603)
The specific realm of the nation acts as a symbolic anchor around a particular national identity, which is continuously produced and reproduced, but at the same time refused to others (Dixon et al., 1997; Taylor and Wetherell, 1995, 1999). Through seemingly 'banal' discursive devices a 'language game' is constructed, a form of life is perpetuated (Billig, 1995a) which enables 'extending to some individuals the rights of nationality, denying those rights to others' (Dixon et al., 1997, p. 320). Hungarians are not part of this 'language game', they are excluded from national deixis. A 'constitutive outside' (Hall, 1996, p. 4) must be summoned in order to better police its own boundaries.

What the analysis in this section has demonstrated is that even the participants overtly 'opposing' Tudor and Funar, in a similar way to the participants in the 'supporting' and 'ambivalent' towards Tudor and Funar category are at pains with managing the ideological conflict of including/excluding Hungarians by manufacturing an ideological representation of social relations (majority vs minority) which makes the social world appear, to those who occupy it natural and unproblematic (Fairclough, 1992, Oktar, 2001; Law, 2001; Yumul and Ozkýrýmlý, 2000). As Hall (2001) suggested, "naturalization is a representational strategy designed to fix 'difference', and thus secure it forever" (p. 336, italics in original). It is also a strategy that fixes 'us' in 'our' homeland and secures it forever.

Conclusion

As I hope to have shown in this chapter, insofar as the justifying the fairness of Tudor and Funar's policies was concerned, a range of differences between, on one hand, participants 'supporting' Tudor and Funar and participants 'ambivalent' towards them and, on the other hand, participants overtly 'opposing' Tudor and Funar were documented. In what the ideological representation of majority/minority relations across positions was concerned there was an interesting 'consensus'. A similar ideological representation of minority-majority relations, a very similar expression of common-place nationalism within an

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18 If one accepts Julia Kristeva's definition of foreigners, it could be said that Hungarians acquire the status of 'foreigners' in the way that they are described by the speaker 'the foreigner is the one who does not belong to the state in which we are, the one who does not have the same nationality' (1991, p. 96). Hungarians are thus turned (are constructed as) into foreigners. This is not very far from the more extreme way of expressing the same idea when some of the speakers emphasized the idea that they should 'go back to their own country'.

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axiomatic division between 'us' and 'them' and a similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies to problematize the Hungarian political project and to construct stereotypical ideological representations of the Hungarians were identified across the different ideological stances taken up by the participants during the interviews.

This chapter has pointed to some of the ways in which participants taking different ideological positions managed in a similar way ideological conflicts, how they constructed and justified their position towards the Hungarians, in an attempt to legitimate specific practices and reproducing the status quo with the range of cultural resources provided by the Romanian culture. The focus was on the discursive and rhetorical moves used by the participants and the collectively available interpretative resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions, such as discounting in-group responsibility, denying prejudice and discrimination or displaying reasonableness. At the same time, this chapter has hopefully shown that the discourse about Hungarians has much in common with the particularities and emphasis of the Western anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourse of 'difference'. Participants' avowal of reasonableness together with an even-handed stereotypical image of the Hungarians works to position them as rational actors, active part of a political project with 'national' connotations. It is 'wanting' something, which 'we' are not willing to give up on, it is expressing nationalist feelings in the 'wrong' place that constitutes the core of the stereotypical image of the Hungarians across all the different ideological stances taken up by the participants.

The nationalist tug-of-war between 'us' [Romanians] and 'them' [Hungarians] to which the participants have several times made reference is the backdrop against which the Hungarian political project is made problematic and an ideological representation of Hungarians was constructed. The locatedness of this antagonistic division was also emphasised, one that places 'us' within 'our' homeland, one that is constructed and justified in order to create 'difference', ethnic and national subordination, and, ultimately, the exclusion of the Hungarians from the national 'we'.

As Michael Billig (1995a) suggested, a comprehensive analysis of the banal reproduction of nationalism and nation-states demands an awareness of the historical dimension of ideologies together with emphasizing their geographical dimensions. As emphasised throughout this chapter, nationalism is never beyond geography (Billig, 1995a; see also
Stereotyping, nationalism, and prejudice are never beyond geography. The symbolic space of the nation gives way to the consolidation of ideologies in everyday life and discourse. There is a space of identity, which is the national space in which identities are assumed, resisted or denied to certain groups.

Difference can play a very important role in drawing boundaries between two cohabiting ethnic groups. This is analogous to the phenomenon Freud described as the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ (Freud, 1955). As he argues, ‘it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them’ (Freud, 1957, p 199) What is troubling though about this ‘narcissism of minor differences’, is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that is at stake there, but ‘the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness’ (Benhabib, 1996, p 3ff)
Chapter eight

From the discourse of ‘nationalism’ and ‘politics’ to the discourse of ‘nature’ and ‘moral exclusion’

Introduction

I have closed the previous chapter by pointing to a dialectic identity/difference, which, I argue, is at the core of constructing ‘difference’ and drawing boundaries between two cohabiting ethnic groups. As previously shown, the positivity and the pervasiveness of the Romanian national identity rest upon the negative construction of the ‘other’\(^1\), the Hungarian minority.

In this chapter, the dialectic identity/difference will be taken further. At the outset, I have to say that this chapter will be examining the rhetorical and ideological shift from a discourse of ‘nationalism’ and ‘politics’ to a discourse of ‘nature’ and ‘moral exclusion’\(^2\). This shift will be documented using talk about Romanies as a case in point.

It is suggested that talk about Romanies is more extreme than the talk about Hungarians and the anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses studied by numerous Western researchers. Talk about Romanies employs a style, which, at the same time, denies, but also protects extreme prejudice. I refer to it as ‘extreme’ because one can identify not just the well-researched particularities of the discourse of ‘difference’ of the western anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses, but also something beyond difference and more worrying (one could say, dangerous). Romanies are not portrayed as merely ‘different’, but also as being beyond the moral order, beyond nationahood and comparison.

The aims of this chapter are twofold. On one hand, this chapter will illustrate and discuss some of the extreme discursive, rhetorical and interpretative resources used to talk about and legitimate the blaming of Romanies and on the other hand, it will document the

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\(^1\) A similar example can be found in Chouliaraki’s (2000) analysis of the ‘positive constitution’ of the Greek national identity through the negative construction of the “other”, the Turks.

\(^2\) According to Opotow, ‘moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules and considerations of fairness apply’ (1990, p. 1, italics in original)
constructive ideological processes used to position the Romanies as beyond the moral order, as both ‘outsiders’ in society and space (Creswell, 1996; Sibley, 1992, 1995). It is not the extremity per se of participants’ views that made me choose these particular extracts (as can be noted participants talk in a different way about the Hungarians), but because of the ways they accounted for the positioning of Romanies ‘beyond difference’ as common-sense without requiring elaborate justification.

As was suggested, extreme prejudiced discourse about Romanies is both similar and different to the anti-immigrant, anti-alien Western discourse of ‘difference’. Before going on to show in what sense the discourse about the Romanies is more extreme than the Western anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses of difference, let me, first of all, point to some of the features that make it similar to it. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the discourse about the Hungarians presents the same features as the well-researched Western anti-immigrant, anti-alien discourses of ‘difference’. Discursive moves such as denials of prejudice and discrimination, positive self-presentation vs negative other presentation, explicit or implicit displays of reasonableness, blaming the victim or discounting in-group responsibility were all present in the interactional management of ‘reasonable’ prejudiced talk about Hungarians.

It will be suggested that some of the same discursive devices that are characteristic of a discourse of ‘difference’ are to be found when one looks at how the same participants that previously talked about the Hungarians, talk about the Romanies. In a similar way to the discourse about the Hungarians and the Western anti-alien discourses, prejudiced sentiments were simultaneously expressed and denied. I am not going to discuss these features at length, but instead, I am going to look at what are the features that make talk about Romanies more extreme than the anti-immigrant, anti-alien Western discourse of ‘difference’.

What I am going to suggest at this stage is that the rhetorical and discursive moves are similar to those used by talking about the Hungarians, but the ideological effects of using these devices are very different. This is where the issue of ‘extremity’ (extreme prejudiced discourse) comes into play, not to explain why participants talk the way they
do about the Romanies, but to help understanding prejudice (bigotry) as the effect of this kind of discourse.

The analysis contained within this chapter will be based on the same three 'ideological (subject) positions' identified in the content analysis chapter and used as the backdrop for analysis in the previous chapter. As I did previously, I will start treating these categories as discrete categories, but my main interest is to look at the detailed, dynamic and flexible use by participants in each category of cultural and interpretative resources available in the Romanian society in order to argue about controversial issues related to the Romany ethnic minority.

The main contention is that one will find a very similar expression of moral exclusionary discourse (Opotow, 1990) across positions, a very similar discourse of 'nature' embedded in the similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies to blame the Romanies and position them beyond the moral order. In the previous chapter I have looked at some of the subtleties and dynamics of the relation between stereotyping, nation and place. In this chapter I will look at the construction of stereotypical ideological representations of the Romanies with a similar concern for locatedness and the construction of otherness. I will start from the idea that an ideology of 'exclusion' (and bigotry) implies a notion of place, which is the yardstick against which ideological and exclusionary discourse is put together and bigotry enacted. Concerns with being 'in'/'out of place' shape the ideological contours of a moral exclusion discourse and underpin a specific stereotypical descriptions of Romanies which places them beyond the moral order.

It will be argued that even if the positioning of Romanies is very much located into the Romanian context, the 'moral order' which it is said that they transgress, is not just the Romanian moral order, but an universal 'moral order'. This is an argument that pertains to the idea of what is the place of Romanies in contemporary (Romanian) society. The place of Romanies in (the Romanian) society pretty much depends on the symbolic place

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3 Let me note that I do not necessarily start from the assumption that participants' talk about the Romanies is intrinsically 'extreme' 'Extremity' (as 'moderation' or 'ambivalence' for that matter) is something that has to be judged in the interplay of discourses and judged not as something inherent to discourse, but as the effect of using specific discursive and rhetorical devices in order to achieve specific purposes, such as assigning blame and positioning Romanies beyond the moral order (see also Wetherell and Potter, 1992)

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they are assigned when people describe them. The strength of stereotypes is contingent on place. As Sibley (1995) has suggested, "a group can be in the 'wrong' place if the stereotype locates it elsewhere" (p. 100).

As in the case of the Hungarian minority, the speakers' representations of Romanies constitute discursive and ideological constructions which work in justifying and legitimising existing social and power relations within the Romanian society. These accounts also work ideologically by reproducing current social arrangements, thus maintaining and legitimising the status-quo, reproducing and furthering dominance. At this point, I want to reiterate the idea that it is not the invoked stereotypical traits per se which are important, but the ideological effects of using stereotypical labels in term of positioning the Romanies as 'outside' society, as beyond reasonable bounds, in a(n) (a)socially fixed and immutable position. As shown when discussing the talk about Hungarians, stereotypes are not only ideologically functional, but they are also ideological representations (Augoustinos and Walker, 1998). Furthermore, it is not the invoked stereotypical traits per se which are important, but the locatedness of the process of stereotyping, the located nature of stereotyping. The symbolic exclusion of the Romanies from membership in the national category 'Romanian' and their exclusion from 'our' society and from 'our' moral order is achieved through the intermediary of an ideology of place, a specific ideology of 'rootedness'.

The question is then, can the same moral exclusion discourse, the same axiomatic division between 'us' and 'them' underpinned by an ideology of place, be found across positions or, as previously argued, regardless of the 'political' stance of the participants against the right-wing extremism of Tudor and Funar?

Like many sociological and social psychological work on majority group representations of inter-group relations, prejudice and stereotyping, this chapter could have easily been centred and put together around the central themes of the Romanians' stereotype of Romanies: laziness, distaste for work, criminality, inferior mentality and so on. But, as it will be suggested in this chapter, all these issues will be instead approached as members' concerns and stereotyping as 'members' situated and reflexive verbal activity' (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2000, p. 491) with its specific ideological consequences. This is not an attempt to construct an exhaustive (or fragmentary, for that matter) typology of
Romanian stereotyping of Romanies, but to go ‘beyond stereotypes’ (Billig, 2002a, Jahoda, 2001; Leudar and Nekvapil, 2000) in order to look at what they achieve discursively, but more importantly politically and ideologically. As exemplified insofar as the Hungarians were concerned, this is an attempt to go beyond mere ‘attribution’ of stereotypical traits in the abstract to the management of ascriptions in actual interaction and using everyday language as explanatory resources (Antaki and Leudar, 1990, 1992), the uses to which descriptions are put and the ideological effects they engender.

The main interest will be on how specific formulations, descriptions of Romanies are used to assign blame on the Romanies and, more importantly, exclude ‘them’ as ‘people’ (human beings) and ‘fellow citizens’ (cf. Leudar and Nekvapil, 2000). Following Billig (2002a), the focus of this chapter will be “on the ways that particular ways of speaking might depersonalize the ‘other’” (p.184) through an examination of the language of stereotyping as used in conversational interaction. Depersonalization, delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990) and dehumanisation are reconceptualized in discursive terms in an attempt to understand the situated dynamics of bigotry.

This chapter tries to offer some insights into the specific style in which the Romanies were ‘imagined’. As Anderson suggests, communities are to be distinguished ‘by the style in which they are imagined’ (1983, p 16, see also Billig, 1995a) The Romanian ‘imagining’ of ‘themselves’ and ‘others’ is an ‘imagining’ from within, of which style has separatory and exclusionary effects. This ‘imagining’ seeks to exclude the Romanies from membership in the national category ‘Romanian’ and, not only it excludes them from national deixis, but casts them beyond the moral order, beyond what is reasonable in contemporary society. The site for this imagining is the ideological context of cohabitation and that of the Romanian nation. As Billig has put it, ‘... imaginings depend upon wider ideological beliefs’ (1995a, p 68).

‘Supporting’ Tudor and Funar

‘Naturalizing’ the characteristics of the Romanies

In this section, the analysis will focus on the way the participants from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category talk about Romanies when accounting for a range of controversial issues, such as the existence of prejudice and discrimination or the responsibility and causes of inter-ethnic conflict. One of the pervasive discursive moves
adopted by the participants when constructing a ‘social representation’ (Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici and Markova, 1998) of Romanies was an attempt to ‘naturalize’ the ascribed negative characteristics of Romanies together with positioning them, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, ‘outside’ reasonable bounds. This process of ‘naturalizing’ the negative characteristics of Romanies intertwined with a discourse of blame can be found in the next two examples, which see Sandra and Marc (participants from the ‘supporting’ Tudor and Funar category) offering their views on the Romanies.

Both Sandra and Marc are answering a question relating to the inter-ethnic conflict between Romanians and Romanies which specifically brings to the fore a discussion about the accountability of the two groups.

Extract 1, interview 38

[Discussing the inter-ethnic conflicts between the Romanians and the Romanies]

382 Chris To what extent do you think Romanies are to blame for these
383 conflicts and violence?
384 Sandra Cos’ they don’t ( ) cos’ they don’t like to work ( ) they don’t
385 like to work ( ) They ( ) They are not happy with ( )
386 Chris How would you characterize them?
387 Sandra Inadaptable ( ) these ones are inadaptable ( ) they cannot integrate
388 in ( ) in fact, even in the other countries ( ) have their gypsies
389 adapted? ( ) No ( ) Only that, it is the Romanians gypsies that
390 Europe talks about, you have just these ones ( ) it is only our
391 gypsies that are the biggest thieves and bandits who strike ( ) But
392 Romanians have tried to integrate them, we made them schools ( )
393 they have tv shows in the gypsy ( ) language ( ) I have worked at a
394 gypsy school ( ) I use to bring them ( ) I took care of them, every
395 week, on Monday they used to come and after that, they didn’t come
396 all week ( ) They cannot integrate, they like the life they are
397 living ( )

Extract 2, interview 26

[Discussing the interethnic conflict between Romanians and Romanies]

362 Chris În ce măsură sunt vinovați români pentru aceste
363 conflict și violență?
364 Sandra Că nu ( ) că nu lucraza ( ) nu le place să muncească ( ) nu le
365 place să muncească ( ) Ei ( ) Nu le convine ( ).
366 Chris Cum 1-ai caracteriza?
367 Sandra Inadaptablei ( ) știa sunt inadaptables ( ) nu se pot integra
368 în ( ) de fapt, și în celelalte țări ( ) țiganii lor
369 s-au adaptat? ( ) Nu ( ) Numai că, tot de țiganii români se vorbește
370 în toată Europa, numai din știa sunt ( ) numai țiganii noștri
371 sunt cei mai mari hoți, și bandiții care loveste ( ) Dar
372 românia au încercat să-și integreze, le-am făcut și școli ( )
373 au emisiune în limba ( ) țiganescă ( ) eu am lucrat la o
374 școală de țigani ( ) în aduceam ( ) umblam după ei, în fiecare
375 săptămână, lui venesc și după aia toată săptămâna
376 nu mai venese ( ) Nu se pot integra, le place viața pe care o
377 duc ( )

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There is a lot going on in these two excerpts, but for the purposes of this chapter let me focus on the particular issues outlined above. At the outset, let me note that the question to which Sandra has to give an answer in extract 1 specifically refers to the Romanies.

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4 Teach somebody to know his place, to put someone on his place/good behaviour
and the extent to which they are to blame for the conflicts and violences. Sandra’s answer in lines 384-385 does not directly assigns blame to the Romanies, but works to assign blame indirectly through invoking a set of negative descriptions of Romanies. It is said that ‘they don’t work (.) they don’t like to work (.) they don’t like to work (.)’. As Sandra puts it, it is not just that ‘they don’t work’, but ‘they don’t like to work’. The addition of ‘don’t like to work’ and the repeated formulation make this as not something accidental, but something, which is part of a deep-seated, deep-rooted personal psychological disposition. As discursive psychologists have suggested, this kind of ‘disposition talk’ is provided as rationally tied to the way the world is, which is to say, what Romanies generally do. Following Edwards (1997, 2003) it could be argued that disposition formulations are ways in which whatever one is saying about the world is fixed in that world, and rationally inferred from it. It is not something that resides in the speaker’s way of seeing. As Edwards (1997, p. 149) suggests, an important feature of action descriptions is how they make inferentially available particular dispositional states of the actors; their moral character or state of mind

Another ascribed characteristic of Romanies presented as a disposition is put forward by Sandra when asked how she characterize the Romanies. The straightforward answer is: ‘Inadaptable (.) these ones are inadaptable (.) they cannot integrate in (.)’ (line 387) Again, the moral character of the Romanies is very much at stake, because ‘inadaptable’ is an extreme description that implies not just difficulty to fit, but points to the impossibility of fitting. The subsequent description ‘they cannot integrate in’ explains what has come before. Saying that ‘they cannot integrate’ Sandra makes sure that her first description, ‘inadaptable’ is understood in terms of impossibility, not just difficulty of fitting. What is to note is that the moral character of Romanies is at the same time part of this description, but also, more importantly, the outcome of this kind of description.

One could argue that it is implied that the causes of this impossibility to fit, to integrate are not external to Romanies, but are very much part of their character. This implication is clarified in lines 388-389, where Sandra brings forward the idea that the inadaptation of gypsies is a general phenomenon, not just one that can be observed when talking about ‘our’ gypsies: ‘in fact, even in the other countries (.) have their gypsies adapted? (.) No (.)’. In order to explain and justify the inadaptability of Gypsies, Sandra draws on the rhetorical resource of an universal ‘imagined community’ of nation-states which is
the backdrop against which the inadaptability of gypsies is being justified and presented as something ‘natural’, something intrinsic to their character. One can see how the ‘naturalization’ of Romanies’ inadaptability, which is part and parcel of the discourse of ‘nature’, is very much located. Its *locatedness* is of major importance, because, as I hope to have shown, it is through the invocation of the ‘banal’ assumptions of nationalism, the taken-for-granted-ness of the existence of a ‘world of nations’ that inadaptability, the impossibility of integration are presented as ‘natural’ and immutable. Moreover, positioning the issue of inadaptability at a (general) universal level works to justify and ‘naturalize’ the local and moral implications of constructing an ideological representation of Romanies. The moral implication is that it is not because of ‘us’ that Romanies cannot adapt (the same inadaptability can be seen in other countries), but it is peculiar to ‘them’.

As when accounting for the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies, Sandra uses comparison as a strategy of legitimation and justification. What is justified is a certain stereotypical label ascribed to the Romanies, which is made to stand and reflect the character of the Romanies. The ideological use of these descriptions is to present something as though there was never and could never be, any alternative. It is presenting the Romanies and their situation as something that *just is* Inadaptability is thus, not just something peculiar to ‘them’, but (a) *characteristic* (of) for ‘them’.

The conclusion in lines 396-397 does not come as a surprise, ‘they cannot integrate, they like the life they are living’. This comes after Sandra’s avowal of the effort that ‘we’ and ‘I’ made to integrate them (lines 391-396). Pointing to the effort made to integrate them, emphasising the invitation to ‘assimilate’ can be seen as a sign of tolerance. Nevertheless, adaptation and integration stand as absolute conditions, which Romanies have to fulfil in order to rightfully enjoy the benefits of the Romanian society. As Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) argue, this kind of terminology ‘may imply an accusation, it evaluates cultural similarities and differences, and it always points at a condition for acceptance’ (p 111).

The implicit message of the last lines, ‘they cannot integrate, they like the life they are living’ is that ultimately, integration means adopting ‘our’ way of life. ‘Our’ way of life is not in need for justification, for it is the source of legitimation. The invitation to
integrate (to be assimilated) derives its sense and ideological importance from the (unstated) inflexibility of imposed norms of behaviour. One could note that in order to be successful, ideologies of exclusion need not make explicit claims to 'nature'. Sometimes, the 'most powerful expectations remain unnoticed and assumed' (Creswell, 1996, p 159).

If in Sandra’s account the implications are left implicit and assumed, in Marc’s account on the same issues they are made explicit. In extract 2, Marc starts in line 232-233 with a slightly qualified blame of the Romanies: ‘I would blame more the Gypsies (.) they (.) carry the blame (.) when these kind of conflicts arise (.)’ which is then upgraded and transformed into a clear-cut blaming of the Romanies insofar as the inter-ethnic conflict is concerned. In lines 234-235, the blame is placed entirely on the Romanies: ‘always (.) I blame them ( ) because they have this provocative attitude (.)’ and this is presented as being the outcome of ‘at least from what I have read and seen in the mass-media ( )’ (lines 235-236).

After a series of exchanges relating to the behaviour of Romanies, the interviewer probes further about the causes of their behaviour ‘in general’ (line 245). In lines 246-247, the answer is clear: ‘Their lack of ( ) civilization ( ) so either way they are a lot behind the Romanian population in terms of civilization, culture ( )’. What accounts for the behaviour of Romanies is their ‘lack of civilization’, their backwardness in terms of civilization and culture in comparison with the Romanian population.

This explanation is framed and is part and parcel of a ‘culture’ discourse. Inside this discourse of ‘culture’, Romanies are presented as lacking something, which is very important in the eyes of the dominant group. They are presented as ‘lacking civilization’, needing to catch up with civilization (‘our’ civilization). If one would want to go further, one could argue that ‘they’ are said to be lacking something, which for ‘us’ is simple common-sense, taken-for-granted in contemporary society. In the context of majority group moral prescription founded on the nature of things, as Wetherell and Potter suggest, ‘culture discourse . becomes a naturally occurring difference, a simple fact of life, and a self-sufficient form of explanation’ (1992, p. 137).
After another intervention of the interviewer asking for a characterization of Romanies, in lines 252-255, this is followed by a more detailed description of the Romanies: ‘Less hardworking (.) less thrifty ( ) they think less for the future (3 5) All this is linked with (. ) education ( ) so there is no preoccupation for education (.) and for their children (.) I don’t know (. )’. One can see how Romanies are pathologized by making reference to their cultural tendencies (less hardworking, less thrifty, they think less for the future, there is no preoccupation for education). What some discourse researchers have called ‘culture as mentality’ (Verkuyten, 1997) or ‘culture as lifestyle’ (Augoustinos, Tuffin and Rapley, 1999) is used to explain ‘deviant’ behaviour and set up a contrast between Romany backwardness and ‘our’ civilized way of being. At the same time, this discourse of ‘culture’ is employed to implicitly question the feasibility of integration (Dixon and Reicher, 1997). This is part of a discursive ‘lay ontology’ (Durrheim and Dixon, 2000) working to fix and naturalize the nature of Romanies and the stereotypical predicates attached to the category ‘Romany’.

In both extracts, there is a sense of Romanies being presented as ‘beyond’ moral order and ‘outside’ society. Their ‘inadaptability’, impossibility of integrating (extract 1), their backwardness, ‘lack of civilization’ and culture (extract 2) are invoked in order to put together a verbal portrait of Romany character and ‘mentality’. Both Sandra and Marc constructed an image of Romanies through a sometime implicit, sometimes explicit reference to a normative moral order, which generates its inadaptable, uncivilized, beyond the moral order antithesis. The normative ‘moral order’ used as a backdrop for justifying and ‘essentializing’ Romany stereotypical traits is not just the Romanian ‘moral order’, but an universal one, which as Sandra has argued, goes beyond the boundaries of one specific country (‘our’ country). Specific characteristics of the Romany moral character are not necessarily located in ‘our’ space, but are part of a general pattern across contemporary society.

*Seemingly ambivalent ‘moral discourse’*

As the subsequent analysis will show, by the compelling ‘logic’ of participants’ rhetoric Romanies are in a way predestined to remain ‘outsiders’ simply because they will always remain different along one parameter or another. As previously shown, emphasising the effort made by ‘us’ and the speaker himself to integrate ‘them’ can be seen as a sign of
tolerance, understanding and reasonableness. Displays of reasonableness are not necessarily absent from accounts about Romanies, but they are usually followed by negative comments as part of a rhetorical and discursive move of 'blaming the victim'. A very good example of how displays of reasonableness are used by participants in the 'supporting Tudor and Funar' category is to look at them embedded in different concession moves. What van Dijk has termed 'apparent concessions' are a major form of disclaimer and at the same time they allow the possibility of blaming (van Dijk, 1992).

An example of this kind of move is the next extract taken from interview 38, which sees Sandra continuing her descriptions of the Romanies. This excerpt is the continuation of extract 1 with some lines omitted.

Extract 3, interview 38

403 Sandra They can be, as I say, dressed decently ( ) they are clean, as you cannot praise them enough ( ) they send their kids to school (mm)
404 they eat in a civilized way, in the sense that ( ) they appreciate the market ( ) they go and buy for themselves from the market, they don't steal ( ) meanwhile, another part of gypsies, cos' even there, there are different tribes ( ) they don't like to work, they don't wash themselves ( ) they walk in rags

In extract 3, Sandra tries to build a contrast between different categories of gypsies, contrast which is embedded in a concession move. In lines 403-407, she concedes that Romanies can be, 'dressed decently', 'they are clean, as you cannot praise them enough', 'they send their kids to school', 'they eat in a civilized way ... they go and buy for themselves from the market, they don't steal' Taking also into account what Sandra has previously said about the Romanies (extract 1) one could argue that what the concession does in this particular context is to fend off accusations of unreasonableness and is available in order to prevent negative inferences about the speaker "by accomplishing the semantic act of meaning 'Even when I say something negative, this does not mean that I am prejudiced'" (van Dijk, 1987, p 94).
Sandra’s praising comments are to be seen as an overt manifestation of reasonableness. The only problem with this display of reasonableness and praise is that it emphasises as positive dimensions on which Romanies are usually rated negatively. This has the contrary effect, of reproducing and reinforcing those very negative characteristics. As Stuart Hall (2001) suggested, ‘people who are in any way significantly different from the majority ... seem to be represented through sharply opposed, polarized, binary extremes’ (p. 326). The same seems to be case for the Romanies, which are ‘trapped’ inside this ideological double-binding. This ‘binary’ form of representation (Hall, 2001) is made explicit in the lines that follow Sandra’s opening ‘praising’ descriptions.

In lines 407-409, she talks about ‘another part of the gypsies’ which are described as being exactly the contrary of the previously mentioned ones ‘they don’t like to work, they don’t wash themselves (.) they walk in rags’ This stark contrast is constructed through a move of ‘symbolic inversion’ (Jahoda, 2001; Rosaldo, 1978; see also Hodge and Kress, 1988), not between Romanians and Romanies, but within Romanies themselves. Nevertheless, this move of ‘symbolic inversion’ is based on the same implied normality and normativity thesis of a Romanian moral order The implicit backdrop of these positive and negative descriptions of Romanies is a normative, moral ideal, which endows Romanies with the opposite. In this way, the psychological distance between the Romanians and the Romanies is maximized, as is the distance between Romanies and this normative moral order. As previously demonstrated, the normativity of the moral order is the backdrop against which the descriptions are put together and which generates its inadaptable, uncivilized, beyond the moral order antithesis.

Sandra’s interplay of positive and negative comments could be seen as an instance of ‘dilemmatic’ thinking (Billig, 1996) which draws, and at the same time points to the ‘dilemmatic qualities of contemporary common-sense’ (ibid., p 243). Sandra seems to be equipped and drawing on two sets of different vocabularies (Edelman, 1977; see also McFadyen and Gray, 1995). There is a conjunction of sympathy and blame, which allows for making Romanies accountable for their situation. By putting forward a

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5 Murray Edelman’s (1977) example of the discourse of poverty is very close to the implications of Sandra’s praising comments. As Edelman has shown, poverty is most of the times blamed upon the personal characteristics of the poor. Oscillating between the common-places of justice and mercy allows for making the poor accountable for their situation. Success stories of people who have surpassed their
narrative of 'civilized' gypsies, Sandra implicitly display reasonableness and at the same time emphasises the idea that what she has described is something that 'they' all could do and it is up to them to surpass their 'uncivilized' condition.

This normative ascription embedded in a seemingly 'ambivalent' 'moral discourse' (Bergmann, 1998) is a means of expressing 'difference', but its effects stretch 'beyond difference' in prescribing an ideological position for Romanies and construct a specific ideological representation which aims to place them beyond the bounds of society and which justifies, produces and reproduces a hegemonic and oppressive moral order.

Beyond the moral order and dehumanisation

What at prima facie looked as balanced, reasonable discourse was turned into its opposite. Criticizing and denigrating the Romanies, presenting them as beyond the moral order is done through invoking the positive 'special case', but only in order to build a contrast with an implicit negative 'majority' of them. The same strategy of placing Romanies beyond the moral order is used by Sandra later in her interview when she offers an apocryphal story of transgression and misconduct.

Extract 4, interview 38

They have received accommodation in a block of flats ( ) well, after they received it ( ) they had the block brand new ( ) at ( ) after a maximum of two months, the block was looking as if it had been bombed ( ) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs ( ) I have ( ) I have no words ( ) and then ( ) after a while the mass-media was saying that they don't have accommodation ( ) okay, they don't have ( ) they couldn't give to all of them ( ) but what was given, it wasn't kept in good condition ( ) and then, it is always the Romanian who is to blame ( ) not ( ) him ( ) the gypsy? ( )
In lines 427-430 it is said that: ‘they have received accommodation in a block of flats (.) well, after they received it (.) they had the block brand new (.) at (.) after a maximum of two months, the block was looking as if it had been bombed (.) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs (.)’. The description that Sandra gives is a very interesting one and can be understood as doing ‘moral work’ (Drew, 1998). As discursive psychologists have shown, our descriptions are accountable phenomena through which we recognizably display an action’s (im)propriety, (un)suitability or (in)appropriateness and they provide ‘a basis for evaluating the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of whatever is being reported’ (Drew, 1998, p. 295).

Sometimes, the ‘moral work’ that speakers may manage through describing the conduct of others is deeply implicit or embedded in their descriptions. The moral evaluative ‘point’ of an account may not come to be explicitly addressed by the participants (Drew, 1998). In Sandra’s case, her moral evaluative position is not quite explicit: ‘I have (.) I have no words (.)’ (line 431). It seems that Sandra does not have (or find) the words to express what she has previously described. There is a sense of moral indignation in this formulation and this implicitly points to the gravity of the matter under discussion. Even if it is not overtly or explicitly condemnatory, it is nevertheless associated with a complaint about the behaviour of Romanies and thus can be read as having an implicit condemnatory dimension.

The story, on the other hand, is an explicit formulation of transgression. Sandra tells us that ‘they have received7 accommodation in a block of flats, that ‘they had the block brand new’ and that in a short amount a time, ‘a maximum of two months’ the block ‘was looking as if it had been bombed (.) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs (.)’. It is not said what exactly was done in order to obtain such a result, but the description of the state of the block does not need any explanation. There is an implicit

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6 As Drew (1998) suggests, ‘accounts produced in the context of talk in which moral work is quite overt and explicit appear to be generally condemnatory, that is they are associated with complaints about the behaviours of others (in ‘reconstructed’ versions of their behaviour)' (p 296)
7 Note the formulation ‘they have received accommodation . ‘ (from ‘us’) which implicitly points to ‘our’ magnanimity. It is through a contrast between ‘best intentions’ of ‘offering’ Romanies a place to stay and the resulting outcome of their behaviour that the latter is portrayed as being offensive and reprehensible
orientation to the issue of intentional and deliberate conduct in order to make manifest the transgression by the Romanies of normative standards of conduct and hence to warrant her final sense of moral indignation. The outcome of the behaviour of Romanies is described (the block of flats looking as ‘if it had been bombed ( ) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs ( )’) in such a way that ‘the fault is not to be regarded as accidental, inadvertent, or otherwise innocent’ (Drew, 1998, p. 316). By describing the negative and extreme outcomes of the behaviour of Romanies, Sandra has not only exhibited ‘their’ conduct as being reprehensible (Drew, 1998), but also ‘themselves’ as being reprehensible.

Sandra’s seemingly rhetorical question in lines 434-436: ‘and then, it is always the Romanian who is to blame ( ) not ( ) him (.) the gypsy? (.)’ can be seen doing similar things. Note the very interesting ‘collective singular’ the ‘Romanian’ (românul) and ‘him (.) the gypsy’ (el (.) tiganul) which works to introduce an ‘imaginary referent’ (de Cilha et al., 1999, p. 162) insofar as the two groups are concerned. This imaginary referent is not to be taken literally as being ‘the Romanian’ or ‘the Gypsy’, but being ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Moreover, it is not just the contrast ‘us’ and ‘them’ that is hinted at by Sandra but there is more to it. This is the voice of the ‘dispossessed’ (Billig, 1978, p. 296; see also Bell, 1962), an anguished and rather angered voice that points to the fact that the moral order has been turned upside down and as a consequence ‘we’ are the ones that get the blame. The use of ‘always’ points to the unreasonableness of this blaming of ‘us’ and at the same time, in the light of the evidence that she has put forward, the reasonableness of blaming the Romanies for their own predicament.

One could argue that what Sandra puts forward is a kind of protoconspiratorial explanation, adopting a protoconspiratorial explanatory style within a rhetoric associated with the conspiracy tradition (Byford, 2002). This is a good example of absorbing the conspiracy mythology of the official extreme right-wing ideology (Billig, 1978; Byford and Billig, 2001; Voicu, 2000).

By the inverted logic of protoconspirational beliefs, the Romanians are the victims of an overall blame (see also Billig, 1987b). This kind of ideology claims that its viewpoint is
deliberately ignored and that the ‘real’ facts, the proof is not taken into account. This is exactly what Sandra is doing. In the light of the ultimate evidence that she has previously given, Sandra, adopting the interrogative mode is implicitly asking herself how come this is being ignored. Sandra’s comment underpins the idea that nothing more should be added to judging and understanding of the social and ethnic reality of the Romanies. It is something obvious, previously explained and revealed. The implicit message is: it is because of their ‘moral character’ and not because of ‘us’ that everything happens and thus blame is justified. Blame is not only justified, but at the same time, generalized and essentialized. This act of representation implies a synecdochic relationship (Burke, 1969) because is held to be representative for blaming all of them.

In her previous intervention, Sandra has not only exhibited the conduct of Romanies as being reprehensible, but also, through the intermediary of her descriptions, Romanies were constructed as being reprehensible. The behaviour of Romanies was problematized by pointing to an ‘extreme’ case (cf. Verkuyten, 2001). At the same time, Romanies get ‘morally constituted’ (Jayyusi, 1993) as being ‘out of place’. The reference to ‘dirt’ associated with the behaviour of Romanies enforces this idea. Drawing on Douglas’s (1966) anthropology of ‘symbolic pollution’, Sibley (1994, 1995) claims that people who transgress moral (and spatial) boundaries are typically classified as ‘matter out of place’. Examples such as this one, of behaviour (or outcomes of behaviour) that it is seen as violating social and moral conventions, dehumanises the Romanies and places them beyond what is acceptable.

This move of delegitimization and its ideological consequences can also be seen in the next example (extract 5). This is a fragment that comes before the previously analysed one, but even if does not follow sequentially from the previous, it is very important in its ideological (morally and politically) significance, insofar as it constitutes an instance of a dehumanising, eliminationist discourse within an ideology of exclusion. This is part of a shift from a rather ‘reasonable’ (but not even-handed) discourse of ‘culture’ and ‘mentality’ to an exclusionary ‘racial discourse’ of ‘nature’

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8 Spatial boundaries are moral boundaries (Sibley, 1995)
The excerpt starts with Sandra displaying reasonableness by offering a story of helping Romanies which on one hand emphasises her willingness to help ‘them’ and on the other hand, their reluctance (or one should say, refusal) to accept this kind of help.

Extract 5, interview 38

411 Sandra I have brought them a sack of nice clothes they were walking in rags (right) I have given them nice clothes, I have brought them a bag of food, cos’ they were eating from the garbage (just to see the next day the nice clothes that I’ve given to them to wear, to get changed if I stayed with them they’ve changed clothes if not they’ve thrown them into the garbage container well, I don’t really know why do they behave like this? It means that they like living in dirt (mm) in dirt, through (theft) and someone to help them

420 Chris Where from do you think that this originates?

421 Sandra I think that it is something which comes from the ancestral I don’t know from their origin

423 Chris From their nature?

424 Sandra From their nature there is there is something they don’t like that’s why it is said that the gypsies are ‘koszos’

425 [ ]

Sandra’s story (lines 411-416) does not have a straightforward conclusion, but finishes with Sandra’s puzzlement on the issue. ‘Well, I don’t really know (.)’ which is followed, after a small pause, by a question ‘why do they behave like this?’ (lines 417-418).

Sandra volunteers to offer an explanation of their behaviour without the intervention of the interviewer. She is the one that asks the question. ‘Why do they behave like this?’ and she is the one that offers the answer: ‘It means that they like living in dirt (mm) in dirt, through (theft) and someone to help them’ (lines 418-419) What this question

9 That is, ‘I don’t really know what to think about this’, ‘what to say about this’

10 With the sense that they expect someone to help them

11 Dirt, filth

12 Sandra uses an Hungarian word which translates into ‘dirty’, ‘begrimed’, ‘scruffy’
does, is to objectify, to make factual the subsequent explanation, presenting it as independent of her motives or desires, as a neutral and objective comment. Like in her previous account, Sandra explains the behaviour of Romanies using a rather extreme description 'they like living in dirt' which is followed by another reference to Romanies as living 'through theft'. Her account closes on a tone of implicit indignation, which takes its force from the implicit expectancy of Romanies of being helped.

The reference to the Romanies liking to live in ‘dirt’ is a rhetorically powerful formulation that makes this ascribed feature of Romany behaviour as part of a deep-seated personal psychological disposition. As previously emphasised, this kind of ‘disposition talk’ provides for what Romanies generally do. The addition of ‘like’ makes it a feature of ‘their’ own inner psychology and presents it as part of the moral character of the Romanies. Disposition formulations are ways in which whatever one is saying about the world is fixed in that world, and rationally inferred from it (Edwards, 2003). One could go further and say that disposition formulations are also ways in which whatever one is saying about the characteristics of a specific group of people (in our case, the Romanies) is something fixed and intrinsic to those people and not something that resides in the speaker's way of seeing. The ascriptions of inner personal dispositions are powerful tools in the work of ‘essentializing’ the attributed stereotypical traits of Romanies.

The reference to ‘living in dirt’ is an explicit sign of a moral discourse that implicitly draws attention to a transgression of a moral boundary. There is no need for explaining what this moral boundary is and what are the implications of transgressing it, but alluding to implicit moral values attached to it is enough. This register of dirtiness, uncleanness is all the more insidious, as it is the backdrop of different ideological representations of the Romanies. The ascription of an inner personal disposition linked with the idea of ‘living in dirt’ essentializes this attributed stereotypical trait and makes is part of the Romany way of being. An implicit moral boundary is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The significance of drawing moral boundaries is related to the positioning of Romanies beyond reasonable bounds, beyond civilized and ‘clean’ moral order.

After the intervention of the interviewer in line 420 asking what would explain what she has just said, Sandra comes forward with a tentative explanation: ‘I think that it is
something (.) which comes from (.) from (.) the ancestral (.) I don’t know (.) from (.) from their origin (.). Note the implicit signs of difficulty (the repeated small pauses) and the display of tentativeness and uncertainty by using ‘I think’, ‘it is something’, ‘I don’t know’. One could argue that Sandra is displaying a slight reluctance and tentativeness in talking in essentialist terms, displaying reasonableness and orienting to the extremity of her claims, but nevertheless conveying them.

Sandra can be seen accounting for what makes ‘them’ to behave like they do by appealing to an implicit historical perspective on the ‘nature’ of the Gypsies. It is not just contemporary Gypsies that she talks about, but Gypsies in general. It is their ancestry, their origin as a type, as a species, as a race. It is not just the characteristics of Romanies that are essentialized, but also their ontological ‘being in the world’. They are reduced to the essence of their essence.

This is an extreme comment, which can be seen as an essentialist ‘theoretical rationalization’ (Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). The focus is on the Romanies themselves, rather on the activities they are involved in. Romanies do the things they do because that is the way they are. As the analysis of this extract has shown, this leads to a number of inferences regarding on one hand, the way the Romanies are and on the other hand, what Romanies do. These two dimensions are not separate, one is invoking the other. Any other explanation for their behaviour is put aside for example, they steal because they are Romanies and they are Romanies, therefore they steal, they are lazy etc. On one hand, the category ‘Romany’ or ‘Gypsy’ is used in order to argue for the way Romanies are, and on the other hand, is used in order to argue for what they do. This is an ideological double binding, from which Romanies cannot escape and which will be explored further in this chapter.

In line 420 the interviewer seems to be asking for a clarification: ‘From their nature?’ and proposes a different label to summarize what Sandra has just said. This new ‘formulation’ is immediately taken up by Sandra who continues from where the interviewer has left: ‘From their nature’ there is (.) there is something (.) they don’t

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13 This ‘from their nature’ together with ‘there is something’ and the uncompleted ‘they don’t like’ places Sandra within the realm of ‘essentialist’ talk (Fuss, 1989, Verkuyten, 2003). The reference to their ‘nature’ places the Romanies outside what is commonly known as ‘culture’. Most frequently, ‘nature’ is thought as
like (. ) that’s why it is said that the gypsies are ‘koszos’ (lines 421-422). The word that Sandra uses to describe the gypsies is not a Romanian word, but an Hungarian word. It is a rather general practice in Transylvania to use sometimes Hungarian words to convey some meanings that a seemingly equivalent Romanian word does not convey. The same happens here where Sandra uses the more extreme term ‘koszos’ to express and ascribe a moral quality of the Romanies instead of the milder Romanian equivalent ‘murdar’ literally translatable into ‘dirty’

As when giving her first explanation, there is again a sense of slight reluctance and slight ambiguity in talking in essentialist terms that accompanies her comment ‘there is something (. ) they don’t like (. )’ This is nevertheless turned into a more direct expression and characterisation of Romanies in terms of an essential moral quality.

Note the shift from talking about ‘living in dirt’ to the more extreme way of ascribing an essential moral quality to the Romanies through the use of ‘koszos’. What cannot (or should not be) stated in Romanian is stated in Hungarian. There is a shift and upgrade from an inner personal disposition linked with a ‘way of life’ (‘living in dirt’) to a more extreme ascription of an intrinsic moral quality of Romanies. The implication of this upgrading is that ‘dirt’, ‘filth’ is not only something that Romanies like living in, it is something that is essentially part of their being, it is what they are. The upgrade in itself does not account for the extremity of these comments, but what accounts for it is rather the implicit symbolic assumptions linked behind a term such as ‘dirt’ or ‘filth’. As Kristeva has argued, ‘filth is not a quality in itself, but it applies only to what relates to a boundary and, more particularly, represents the object jettisoned out of that boundary, its other side, a margin’ (1982, p. 69).

This is a fierce example of dehumanization, an extreme form of depersonalization, as Romanies are portrayed as ‘somehow less than human’ (Billig, 2002a, p. 185), as abject, as horrible by the standards of ‘civilized’ society (note also the presentation of this as knowledge-in-common, as something of a common-place). This way of depicting the Romanies reinforces a view of Romanies as residual, as discardable, as something that being the opposite of ‘culture’. One refers to ‘nature’ when one wants to convey the idea that the characteristics of humans are to be thought of as instinctual, irpressible, unchangeable, immutable. As Creswell (1996) suggested, ‘nature also means the essence of something’ (p 158) and, in this context, is a powerful rhetorical means to cast Romanies beyond the moral order.
needs ‘cleaning’. ‘Pollution’ is to be seen as a type of danger. There is an implicit allusion to the idea that they are a ‘threat’ to order, to cleanliness. But it is not just lack of cleanliness that causes abjection, but ‘what disturbs identity, system, order … does not respect borders, positions, rules’ (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4).

Romanies are thus ‘matter out of place’, beyond the boundaries of the acceptable. As Mary Douglas (1966; see also Sibley, 1992) suggests, dirt is matter ‘out of place’ As Sibley (1995, see also Kristeva, 1982), has pointed out, ‘the hovering presence of the abject gives its significance in defining relationships to others’ (p. 8).

Thus, it defines and justifies exclusion by defining Romanies as ‘residual’, beyond what is acceptable. The implicit message is that such carriers of danger are to be cast away (and outside from) where orderly life is conducted and outside society’s bounds. One could argue that this way of talking is part of a specifically eliminationist belief system (see Goldhagen, 1998; Billig, 2002a). One could argue that the delegitimizing and dehumanizing premises for an ‘eliminationist’ conclusion are in place. ‘Eliminationist’ concerns are something that cannot be aired directly, but are nevertheless implicitly contained in the premises. Following Billig (1999a), one could argue that a process of ‘social repression’ of immorality that is always present on the edge of over-imposing morality is at stake here. There is an ideological struggle and moral tension between the requirements of a rational discourse of ‘cultural’ differences and an irrational eliminationist ‘discourse’, which ultimately places them beyond moral order and excludes them from ‘civilized’ society. At the same time, this ideological tension also points to whatever is socially forbidden and must not be uttered, but instead needs to be repressed.

One can get a sense of how the previously analysed ‘rhetorical power of essentialism as an expression of disapprobation and disparagement’ (Fuss, 1989, p. xi) together with the power to represent the Romanies as abject, as residual, as a threat to order, less than human and transgressing reasonable bounds are used by Sandra in order to build an ideological representations of Romanies rooted in an ‘essentialist’ and ‘eliminationist’ constellation of views. As I hope to have shown, this is a very suggestive example of

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14 It should not be forgotten that to dehumanize and delegitimize the Romanies means also to legitimate their persecution.
how loathing and bigotry are not be seen as restricted to the dynamics of the self or to some kind of underlying cognitive factors, but as being discursive through and through. As Billig suggests, 'to understand the nature of bigotry, one needs to pay close attention to what bigots say and in particular, to the ideology of bigotry' (2002b, p. 202). The particular extreme descriptions that Sandra uses are ideological insofar as they are not only part of an argument about contemporary society, but also 'evoke discursive history' (Wetherell, 2001, p. 389), current, but also past social relations\(^{15}\).

‘Ambivalence’ towards Tudor and Funar

In the previous section, I have looked at some of the ways in which speakers from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category talked about the Romanies when discussing a range of controversial issues. As the previous analysis has shown, the participants’ ‘imagining’ of Romanies has extreme exclusionary and blaming effects. This ‘imagining’ excludes the Romanies from membership in the category ‘civilized’ and casts them beyond what is ‘reasonable’ in contemporary society together with blaming ‘them’ for the way things stand. When looking at how participants from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category talked about Romanies one has a mixture of ‘culture discourse’ and a ‘racial discourse’ which rest on the foundation of an ‘eliminationist’ belief system. A discourse of ‘culture’ as mentality, as a way of being in the world is intertwined with an ‘essentialist’ discourse and a discourse with ‘eliminationist’ connotations. One could place the interplay between ‘cultural’ discourses and ‘essentialist’ discourses on one hand, and the interplay between ‘essentialist’ discourses and ones with ‘eliminationist’ connotations on the other hand\(^{16}\), within the ideological tensions of displaying reasonableness and at the same time expressing extreme prejudiced views.

\(^{15}\) One can thus understand how processes such as social exclusion are part and parcel of the ideological ‘practical or material efficacy of discourse’ (Wetherell, 2001, p 391)

\(^{16}\) I do not necessarily see these types of discourses as separate, discrete entities. As the analysis has shown, the discourse of ‘culture’ is very much based on ‘essentialist’ assumptions, as the discourse of ‘nature’, the discourse of ‘essence’ has as its backdrop in assumptions of ‘culture’. The discourse based on an ‘eliminationist’ belief system rests on both types of assumptions, both ‘culture’ and ‘essence’ are involved in these discursive constructions, plus an array of symbolic assumptions (for example the reference to Romanies being ‘dirt’). If the essentialist ‘definitions’ of Romanies are all ‘relational and based on constructed cultural differences’ (Sampson, 1993, p 87, my emphasis) under the control of the dominant group, the eliminationist ascriptions constitute a denial of the existence of Romanies as a ‘moral object and a moral subject’ (Bauman, 1990, p 25)
I would argue that one could have expected such extreme talk about Romanies from participants that overtly ‘support’ right-wing extremists such as Tudor and Funar. But what about those participants who were classed as ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar? What are the ways in which they describe the Romanies when accounting for a range of controversial issues and what are the social and ideological effects of their descriptions?

The same processes of excluding Romanies from ‘civilized’ society grounded on a discourse of ‘culture’ as mentality intertwined with an ‘essentialist’ and ‘eliminationist’ discourse was also identified in the accounts of those who were ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar and whose talk about the Hungarians was previously analysed. As in the case of the participants supporting Tudor and Funar, through the inhabited character of exclusionary language, participants in the ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar category, a ‘language game’ was constructed, a form of life was perpetuated which deprives the Romanies of any genuine moral standing in the world. This ‘language game’ of exclusion and closure, of denying coevalness (Fabian, 1983; see also Sampson, 1993) is part and parcel of a ‘habitus’ of dominance and bigotry.

I will continue by looking at how all the above concerns can be encountered when participants in the ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar category talk about the Romanies making flexible and active use of stereotypical descriptions of Romanies. The discursive process of ‘naturalizing’ the negative characteristics of Romanies, assigning blame and ultimately, placing Romanies as abject, as a threat to order, beyond reasonable ‘bounds’ will be exemplified with an analysis of excerpts from the same speakers whose talk about the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies and talk about Hungarians was analysed in the previous chapter.

*Constructing ‘foreignness’*

In the next excerpt one can see Carla accounting for different controversial issues around Romany issues. In extract 6, Carla can be seen as discussing the issue of integration of Romanies into the Romanian society. The idea of ‘them’ being not only ‘different’, but ‘apart’ from ‘us’, outside society is touched upon by Carla. Romanies are constructed as ‘foreign’, as endowed with the attributes of ‘foreignness’ (Kristeva, 1991).
In extract 6, Carla is trying to offer an image of the Romanies based on a repertoire of culture as ‘way of living’. Carla has difficulties in providing a clear answer on the issue of what should be done to solve the integration of Romanies. Her answer is accompanied both by implicit, but also explicit signs of difficulty in lines 67-68: ‘Hh (.) I don’t know (. ) difficult hhh (.) I don’t know (. ) so, it would be difficult (. ) difficult to get them (0 4) very difficult (. ) so (. ) always, so they’ve lived (.) separately from the rest (. ) I mean, in colonies (. ) and (. ) “I don’t know” (. ) very difficult (. ) I don’t know if (. ) hehh (. ) they will be ever (. ) integrated< (0 2) (smiley voice)’. By looking at Carla’s response it can be said that this is not an easy answer.

In lines 69-70 Carla provides an example of lack of integration in the form of a narrative: ‘so (. ) always, so they’ve lived (.) separately from the rest (. ) I mean, in colonies (. )’ According to Buttny, ‘narratives function as an account by verbally reconstructing a temporal sequence of particular events and the actor’s part in them so as to justify actions’ (1993, p. 18) As Mandelbaum (1993) notes, events themselves do not lay blame. Rather, Carla constructs events as negative in order to accomplish blaming.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{17}\) Paying attention at the fact that Carla uses an extreme case formulation (always) when uttering her statement, leads to the idea that Carla is not merely reporting a (possible) cause of the difficulty of integration, but she is instead giving some sort of evidence to defend and justify the idea that the matter of integration is a difficult one. And the kind of evidence that Carla gives is not any evidence, but seems like the ultimate evidence that resolving integration is a ‘difficult’, indeed a ‘very difficult’ matter to resolve.
The term ‘always’ (totdeauna) gives to the behaviour of Romanies the character of a regular, routine reaction, rather like a ‘bad habit’\(^ {18}\). As Pomerantz (1986, p 228) points out, ‘proportional measures reporting the frequency or prevalence or practices are used to propose and substantiate the rightness and wrongness of those practices’. In Carla’s case, this serves to portray the ‘maximum’ character of the state of affairs to which she is referring and also to propose behaviors as acceptable and right or unacceptable and wrong (Pomerantz, 1986). ‘They’ve always lived separately’ marks the idea of ‘living separately’ as a recurrent and consistent feature of the Romanies, as a deep-rooted commitment to this particular practice\(^ {19}\). As Sacks has pointed out, “if ... you get a statement ... ‘they always do things like that’, what’s involved ... is not simply that one is proposing to have categorized it as the actions of such people, but to have explained it as well” (1995, p. 577, emphasis in original)

A rather similar process of attributing ‘foreignness’ to Romanies can be seen in the next extract where Marta talks about the issue of work. As the subsequent analysis will show, endowing Romanies with the attributes of ‘foreignness’ is accomplished in a rather different way than in the previous extract. Marta presents the Romanies as people with a different ‘culture’ and lifestyle upon which ‘we’ must impose our will, which are said to be lacking essential features of ‘civilized’ behaviour. This is not presented as a deep-rooted commitment to a practice as in the case of Carla, but rather coming from a position of a sort of ‘responsibility’ of intervening (very similar to the one encountered within colonialist discourses) in order to change ‘their’ aloof behaviour. The interaction is joined at the point of an exchange about ‘their’ wealth and ‘palaces’. The interviewer’s contention is that there are some other gypsies that are poor, as there are some who work to earn their living. The interaction is joined when the issue of work is introduced.

Extract 8, interview 16

\(^ {18}\) Using a scripted formulation, Carla provides a normative and dispositional frame for understanding the behaviour of Romanies (Edwards, 1997) Script formulations are presented as if based on lots on instances, and lots of people’s repeated experiences. Being a regular pattern (or presented as being a regular one), it is indicative of dispositional tendencies (Edwards, 2003) that can be attributed to the actors. Like in the previously analysed examples, Carla formulates what Romanies do by virtue of their category membership, locating the blame on the side of Romanies, but at the same time, constructing ‘them’ as ‘different’, as ‘outside’ society, spatially, as well as morally

\(^ {19}\) Carla displays reluctance in agreeing with the idea of Romanies being integrated. At the same time, by using this kind of formulation she attends to the idea that it is difficult to resolve the matter of integration because of their behaviour. The ‘real’ problem seems to be getting ‘them’ to live with ‘us’
As there are some of them who work ( )

Who work, yes, but there are very few of them who work ( ) mm

very few ( ) and ( ) >this is a matter of culture< and ( ) we

are talking about nomad people, which is ( ) difficult ( )
difficult to ( ) but here the state is partly to blame, it

should have somehow compelled them to get educated (mm) I'm thinking

( ) slightly compelled ( ) So ( ) you necessarily (0.8) must do

such and such (mm) ( ) you necessarily must wash yourself,

you necessarily must clean after you, they necessarily must go
to school, you must learn a trade, even if not high-school ( )
or college, because ( ) even between them there are some that have

( ) have graduated from college ( ) high-school ( ) they are people

who are (0 4)

Educated ( )

Yes ( ) educated (mhm) ( ) (mhm)

There is a lot going on in this extract, but I want to focus especially on how Marta presents the Romanies as not ‘us’, as ‘foreign’ to a ‘civilized’ way of being. This construction was achieved by using criteria such as ‘culture’ (line 534): ‘>this is a matter of culture<’ and the reference to their origin and way of being in the world, ‘we are talking about nomad people’ in lines 534-535. The emphasis on ‘difference’ continues further into the account where one can find reference to normative deviance.

The issue of normative deviance is introduced by invoking the role that the state should have played in overcoming this unspecified ‘difficulty’ with the Romanies. It is argued that the state should have ‘slightly compelled’ them to get educated. The use of the repeated ‘slightly’ in ‘slightly compelled’ in relation to the state is an indication of the implicit recognition of the fact that compelling someone might not be the proper thing to do, but at the same time, given the circumstances this should have been something ‘necessary’.

20 Even if Marta uses the past tense in talking about compelling Romanies, the implication of this can be seen as applying also to the present state of affairs she ponders about
In lines 538-542, Marta makes reference to (general) values and norms of behaviour:’ you necessarily (0.8) must do such and such (mm) (. ) you necessarily must wash yourself, you necessarily must clean after you, they necessarily must go to school, you must learn a trade, even if not high-school (. ) or college’ If one stays with her previous invocation of the state, then these formulations can be read as coming from an imagining of the state doing the normative prescription, and not necessarily from herself. At the same time, this kind of ‘reported speech’ embedded in a linguistic practice of impersonalization works to avoid attributions that the formulations are interested ones. What can be seen is agency being divested from this version’s constructor (cf Augoustinos et al., 2002). The modal verb ‘trebuie’ (‘must’) is used in conjunction with ‘obligatoriu’ (‘necessarily’) to suggest, on an imperative note, obligation and thus to convey a directive speech act which may be used to enact power and reproduce dominance (Van Dijk, 1993b) The use of normative statements can be seen as a move of delegitimization of the Romanies, presenting them as violators of pivotal social norms (Bar-Tal, 1989)

These kind of normative features are presented as the kind of (universal) routine features that one should generally obey21. Appeals to norms and values are an extremely powerful rhetorical device to construct abnormality and otherness, a sense of ‘foreignness’ and incongruity with a contemporary moral order Marta’s argument is not just about a Romanian normative moral order, but implies an universal normative moral order of any society, part of a prescription of what is normal and what should be counted (and also who should be counted) as ‘normal’. As can be seen from Marta’s description, the evaluation of ‘abnormality’ can be presented as reasonable and accurate by constructing descriptions as factual. These descriptions make the interpretation independent from the speaker and present abnormality as a fact, unrelated to the concerns of the observer (Smith, 1978; Potter, 1996a; Verkuyten, 2001)

21 Norms and understandings are presented as simple common sense They are equated implicitly with normality and as such beyond the need of discussion and definition They are also universal norms, something with which any reasonable person would agree This particular definition of ‘normality’ in terms of universal norms that are beyond breach, forms a standard for behaviour, or a point of contrast, opens the way for justifying the discriminatory treatment that Romanies get and reinforcing power relations. As Wetherell and Potter (1992, p 84) suggested, “power develops through ‘normalisation’, through defining what is usual and habitual and to be expected, as opposed to the deviant and exceptional”
Thus, every social act or behaviour that does not respond to these normative claims is easily classed as ‘deviant’, ‘abnormal’ without the fear of being accused of prejudice or judgmentalism. The issue of what is normal, normative and routine is a fundamental one in human affairs. This matter is bound up with which actions should be treated as accountable and which not (Potter, 1996a). I would add that this kind of descriptions constitute a normative issue not just insofar as actions are to be treated as accountable or not, but more importantly as to who is to be held accountable for doing those actions (in our case, Romanies are made accountable for not displaying normative behaviour. It is implied that Romany behaviour does not reflect the norms and values of ‘civilized’ behaviour).

In lines 542-543, Marta breaks up the category Romany and is careful to particularize, avoiding the impression of sweeping generalization: ‘there are some that have (...) have graduated from college (...) high-school (...).’ What Marta does is very similar with what van Dijk calls ‘apparent admissions’ (Van Dijk, 1991, p. 188), where the speaker will mitigate a prejudiced statement about a group by conceding that it does not apply to all its members. In making claims about ‘them’ and ‘us’, about what is normative and what is not, Marta not only uses ‘theories’ of ethnicity and culture, but is also making claims about herself, attempting to display discursively her own claim for ‘reasonableness’ (Billig, 1991, Van Dijk, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992).

Transgression and constructing the ‘abject’

This move of ‘abnormalization’ of Romanies, of constructing the Romanies as endowed with the attributes of ‘foreignness’ is taken further by Carla when answering a question about the possible causes of discrimination. Carla has previously discussed the issue of the existence of discrimination. Now she is invited to think about the possible causes of discrimination. As demonstrated when analysing the accounts of participants ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’, it is not just that Romanies are portrayed as ‘totally apart’, endowed with the attributes of foreignness and cultural oddness, but they are also presented as ‘foreign’ to a ‘civilized’ way of being. In the next extract one can see Carla doing exactly

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22 The kind of discourse that Marta uses implies a view of the world based on normative dichotomies (normal/abnormal, good/bad) Using this kind of accounting the contrast ‘we-they’ is emphasized (Wodak and Matouschek, 1993)
that, through, on one hand placing the blame entirely on the Romanies for the existence of discrimination, and on the other hand, through emphasising misconduct, transgressive behaviour by the Romanies which does ‘moral work’ in positioning Romanies as out-of-the-normal way, to account for the abnormality of their behaviour and their incongruity with a normative moral (and spatial) order

Extract 9, interview 2

[Discussing the causes of discrimination against discrimination]

80 Chris What do you think the causes of such discrimination that, that you
81 talked about are? ( ) I don’t know, for example, a Romany can be
82 easily refused a job (1 2)
83 Carla *Because to me* ( ) what can I say< ( ) what are the causes?< (0 2)
84 right? I think that everything happens because of them ( ) so because
85 even they don’t want ( ) so they don’t have the desire (0 4) I don’t
86 think that they are accepting ( ) so, they would like to (0 4) to ( )
87 so, they don’t really like to work ( ) so, as far as I know,
88 they don’t own land to cultivate, to farm and when they were offered
89 a place to stay or something ( ) I saw it on television( )
90 Carla [uh huh]
91 Carla that they’ve put their horses in ( ) so ( ) even if there were flats ( )
92 where they managed to or (0 4) so (0 4) even them, what they
93 receive, they ruin ( ) so, they don’t (0 8) ‘they don’t respect, that’s
94 the thing’ ( )
95 Chris [uh huh]
96 (1 2)

80 Chris Care credeţi că sunt cauzele acestei discriminări de, de care
81 aminteşti? ( ) Ţi-eu eu, de exemplu unul rom 1 se poate
82 refuza foarte uşor un loc de muncă (1 2)
83 Carla *Pentru că mi* ( ) ăce ş-aţnic ( ) care sunt cauzele? (0 2)
84 nu? ( ) eu şic că totul păcăre de la ezi ( ) deci pentru că
85 nu eu nu vor( . ) deci nu ş-şi doresc (0 4) nu
86 cred că acceptă ( ) deci ar vrea să (0 4) să ( .)
87 deci, ăio nu prea le place să muncescă ( ) deci din câte ştiu eu,
88 nu-au nici pământuri să cultivate, să lucreze, şî când li s-au oferit
89 locuinţe sau ceva ( ) am văzut la televizor ( )
90 Chris [uh huh]
91 Carla că ă-i-au băgat ceil ( ) deci ( ) chiar dacă au fost apartamentec
92 ( ) unde au reuşi său (0 4) deci (0 4) ăşi e ce
93 primeşc, distrug ( ) deci, nu (0 8) ‘că nu respectă,
94 asta e’ ( )
95 Chris [uh huh]
96 (1 2)

Carla’s answer does not come easily. Note the implicit and explicit signs of difficulty in line 83. Her answer is slightly delayed (note the 1 2 seconds pause), just at the beginning there is a mis-start followed by a small pause, then a mark of explicit difficulty (‘what can I say’). After another small pause there is a contracted reformulation of the question (‘what are the causes?’) followed by a 0 2 pause.

Then, in line 84, without any sign of difficulty, Carla brings forward an explanation: ‘I think that everything happens because of them’. Carla’s explanation of the causes of
discrimination is built around an extreme case formulation and makes a direct reference to 'them' (Romanies). Romanians are not present in her explanation and by the use of 'everything' Carla accomplishes a clear blaming of the Romanies and again, implicitly, suggests the idea that discrimination is not 'really' discrimination if caused by the Romanies.

What follows this, are a series of disposition formulations used to explain the categorical statement that she has just presented. In lines 85-87, the Romanies are the grammatically active agents (cf. Fowler, 1991; Hodge and Kress, 1993). 'they don't want (...) so they don't have the desire (0.4) I don't think that they are accepting (...) so, they would like to (0.4) to (...) so, >they don't really like to work< (...)’ The Romanies are presented exclusively as members of the ethnic group and not as individuals. As Erjavec (2001) suggested, ‘if they are denied individual images, they are also denied the opportunity to escape the habitual portrayal of the ethnic group resting on prejudices and stereotypes’ (p 714-715). As emphasised earlier in this chapter, using psychological dispositions allows for providing an explanation of Romany behaviour as something rationally tied to the way the world is, which is to say, what Romanies generally do. Denying that discrimination 'really' exists is done dispositionally, as due to emblematic Romany characteristics, presented as recognizably essential characteristics of the category ‘Romany’.

Starting in line 88 Carla goes on to talk about the issue of offering Romanies ‘a place to stay or something like that’. Notice the knowledge claim that comes just after Carla’s statement (‘I saw it on television’). By using ‘I saw it on television’ Carla can be seen as orienting to a distinction between who is at the origin of the particular report (television) and who is simply relaying it (herself). What follows is a very similar episode of transgression and misconduct encountered when analysing the talk of participants from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category (see Sandra). The topic is the same, and as

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23 I would argue that it is not just a simple process of blaming that it is involved in this kind of accounts. As Pomerantz (1986) suggested, the use of this kind of extreme case formulation works to propose that “a phenomenon is 'in the object' or objective rather than a product of the interaction or the circumstances” (p 220). As Edwards (2000) has pointed out, extreme case formulations can be used for justifying factual claims. As Smith’s (1978) seminal work has demonstrated, they can be linked to ‘various ways of normalizing and pathologizing people’s actions and character’ (Edwards, 2000, p 348) (see also Edwards, 1994, 1995).
will be shown, the moral evaluative position is again the same, one that casts Romanies beyond a normative moral and spatial order. The description that Carla gives in lines 91-94 is a very interesting one: ‘They’ve put their horses in (...) so (...) even if there were flats (...) where they managed to or (0.4) So (0.4) even them, what they receive, they run (...) so, they don’t (0.8) “they don’t respect, that’s the thing” ( )’

The first line of Carla’s story is an explicit formulation of transgression: ‘They’ve put their horses in (...).’ In what follows, the character of the impropriety is quite overtly formulated: ‘so (...) even if there were flats (...) where they managed to or (0.4)’ It can be seen that by attracting attention to the idea that there were flats involved, and not any kind of residence (and definitely not a place to put your horses in), a normative standard of behaviour is invoked as the basis for complaining about the behaviour of Romanies. Like Sandra did before her, Carla can be seen as orienting to the issue of intentional and deliberate conduct in order to make manifest the transgression by the Romanies of normative standards of conduct and hence to warrant her final sense of moral indignation.

Carla does not report her emotional response, her sense of grievance, by using a first person assessment, but rather uses a generalized assessment “they don’t respect, that’s the thing”. Nevertheless, this kind of generalized statement (as opposed to a more personal one) serves well as an overt manifestation of Carla’s condemnation of Romanies’ conduct.

The upshot of this kind of extreme descriptions of Romany behaviour is a moral normative one that takes the issue of accountability out from the realm of stake or motive (like it was the case when talking about the Hungarians) and placing it into an ‘essentialist’ and ‘delegitimizing’ realm of implicit and explicit arguments about ‘what’ and ‘how’ you are.

24 Following Edwards (1997, p 98), one could argue that the kind of descriptions or narratives that both Sandra and Carla have used are ‘actions’ precisely ‘in that they construct one sense of events rather than another, and ‘provide for’ upshots, conclusions and so on’ I would argue that it is not just that these of transgression narratives provide for constructing one sense of events or another, but that they also provide for constructing the actors involved as a certain type of people. In this case, Romanies are portrayed as transgressive, as not obeying to minimal rules of conduct, lacking respect for property and for ‘our’ (and a general) spatial and moral order.
A further example of this delegitimization upshot of extreme descriptions of Romanies, of their exclusionary and eliminationist ideological effects is to be found in the next extract. What this next extract has in common with the previous extracts from this section is a specific way of constructing an image of the Romanies based on a combination of discourses of ‘culture’ and discourses of ‘nature’, portraying Romanies as beyond the moral order. It is different from the previous ones (but similar to a specific way of accounting encountered when looking at participants from the ‘supporting’ Tudor and Funar category) in presenting the Romanies as alien to the moral order of society, as abject, as a threat to society’s order.

Extract 10, interview 16

491 Chris Credeți că ( ) față de romi există multă discriminare?
492 Marta Nu există o discriminare față de romi, dar e o repulsie (0.4) (mm) (0.4) e o repulsie (mm) și aci ( )
493 pornind (0.4) tot statul e de vină (0.8) Pentru că
494 la romi, statul a dat importanță, sau prioritate altor etnii, și pe așa a lăsat ( ) Cu toate că ( ) și ei
495 erau obligați să meargă la școală și ( ) până în mm 1989
496 (mm) (0.8) Îți lipsa de educație și probabil că îi și (1)
497 structura lor de așa natură ( ) ca popor (0.8) ca popor ( )
498 Înă nu înțeleg de ce Uniunea Europeană nu-1 acceptă
499 așa cum sunt( ) Deci de ce îi acceptă numai
500 ără românii? (mm) (0.4) "Asta nu înțeleg" (mm)
501 Chris Da, bineînțeles (mhm)
502 Marta [Credeți că ceilalți vor să scape de ei?]
503 Chris [Do you think that others want to get rid of them?]
504 Marta Yes, of course (mhm)

In extract 10, lines 492-493, Marta starts her account with a straightforward denial of discrimination: ‘There is no discrimination against Romanies, but there is a revulsion (0.4) (mm) (0.4) it is a revulsion (hmm)’. Marta denies that there might be discrimination against the Romanies, but she introduces another dimension on which the relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ can be understood. The repeated use of the extreme term ‘revulsion’ can be seen as a move towards establishing the out-there-ness of disgust and to place it in the ‘object’. Disgust is depersonalised, it is presented as something that
they’ awaken Marta’s argument seems to be addressed to an ‘universal audience’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971) to which the idea that the behaviour of Romanies is disgusting is non-controversial. It is a claim for reasonableness based on the implicit idea that everyone would feel the same (that is, disgusted) about the Romanies and their behaviour.

In this sense, Marta’s comment can be seen as a further elaboration of the insidious eliminationist register of impunity, pollution used by participants in the ‘supporting’ Tudor and Funar category and a direct reference to Romanies’ impact on aesthetic and moral grounds. Again, one goes back to a sense of Romanies as the ‘abject’ (Kristeva, 1982), ‘out of place’, residual matter. The emotional correlate of the abject, of the horrible is ‘disgust, an emotion that invites contempt, rejection and a withdrawal from contact’ (Dixon, 2001, p. 597). The sense of the abject is described in visceral terms (‘revulsion’). Nevertheless, according to Marta’s psycho-logic, revulsion has to be seen not as something coming from an inner personal, psychological disposition of loathing or abhorrence, but rather as being the effect of something that essentially resides within Romanies.25

Marta does not claim to be personally revolted by the Romanies, but talks about this ‘revulsion’ in general terms. It is presented as a factual comment, something independent of the wishes and motives of the speaker. Distanced or not, the ideological effect of this comment is nonetheless that of denying ‘moral legitimacy’ to Romanies placing them in the realm of the aloof, detestable ‘horror’ (Jahoda, 1999). The only possible result of this ideological positioning is moral and social exclusion.

In what follows her ‘revulsion’ comment, in lines 493-497, Marta can be seen as invoking the state as being to blame for leaving Romanies behind. Then, in line 498, after a small pause, she offers a different kind of explanation: ‘it is a lack of education

25 This is not necessarily to be classed as ‘hate speech’. It nevertheless hints to implicit loathing, abhorrence of the Romanies. One should probably make a differentiation between expressions of ‘disgust’ and expressions of ‘hatred’. Nevertheless, separate or not, disgust and hatred are constituted in and through discourse. As Billig (2002a, see also Billig, 2001) has argued insofar ‘hate’ is concerned, ‘to hate is not merely, or principally, to feel something at a bodily or visceral level – but to believe and to utter particular sorts of things about others’ (p. 179)
and probably it is (1) their character of such nature (. ) as a people ( 0 8 ) as a people (. )\textsuperscript{26}. One can note that accounting is done with reference to a 'lay sociological explanation' (Potter and Wetherell, 1988) The lay sociological theory behind this kind of accounting ('lack of education') provides a mitigation by offering reasons or causes for Romany failure and status, which make it, in a way, understandable and thus less potentially blameworthy (Potter and Wetherell, 1988; Gill, 1993)\textsuperscript{27}. To talk of 'culture', and not of 'nature' is to be heard as displaying sensitivity and tolerance, showing respect for difference and appreciating others (Potter and Wetherell, 1998, Wetherell and Potter, 1992)\textsuperscript{28}.

But, as demonstrated when looking at participants from the 'supporting Tudor and Funar' category displays of reasonableness can be easily turned into arguments that blame Romanies for their predicament. With some signs of difficulty, Marta manages to continue her explanation. From 'lacking education' (like 'lacking civilization' in extract 2) there is a shift to talking about their 'character of such nature (. ) as a people ( 0 8 ) as a people (. )'. Again, there is a shift from a 'culture' discourse to a discourse of 'nature'. The possible existence of discrimination is explained through reference to the 'moral character' of the Romanies 'as people'. In a similar fashion with Sandra's previous characterization of Romanies (when using an explanation in terms of 'their ancestry', 'their origin'), talking about their 'character of such nature as a people' essentializes their ontological 'being in the world' (of peoples, races, nations). Again, they are reduced to the essence of their essence in order to explain their behaviour.

Marta continues her comment by invoking two seemingly rhetorical questions regarding the Romanies: 'why doesn't the European Union accept them the way they are (. ) so,

\textsuperscript{26} Note the uncertainty move 'probably' and the implicit signs of difficulty (the scattered pauses) which point to this being a sensitive matter, for which Marta has difficulty in offering an explanation. It could also be read as an orientation to the potential of her statement as being heard as extreme.

\textsuperscript{27} The implicit idea is that the difference lies in a different process of enculturation and educational practice. This is very similar to the previously analyzed 'culture' repertoire. In this case, this 'culture' repertoire in the guise of ascribed 'lack of education' is used as a resource for interpreting the behaviour of Romanies as something both psychological and sociological, something that could be possibly considered as inherent to them, but also something determined by external factors (note Marta's comment on the influence of the state). As a consequence, it is not the existence of discrimination that accounts for the behaviour, but other psychological and sociological factors (cf Potter and Wetherell, 1998).

\textsuperscript{28} As numerous discourse studies on the discourse of racism have shown, repertoires of culture have something of the status of a socially accepted cliché. They act as commonplaces (Billig, 1991), sets of taken-for-granted and commonly used value terms.
why is it only the Romanians that accept them? (mm) (0 4)'. One can find echoes of the same protoconspirational mentality identified when analysing the talk of participants in the ‘supporting’ Tudor and Funar category (especially Sandra). As several authors have argued (see inter alia Billig, 1987b, Byford, 2002), the regularity of the passive and the asking of rhetorical questions inviting protoconspirational answers, should be seen as a strategy within the overall management of reasonableness which takes place in protoconspiratorial discourse. But to explain what Marta is doing in terms of ‘protoconspirational mentality’ would be surely to miss the point and downplay the seriousness of her argument. I would argue that Marta uses the European Union as a warrant, justification for her further condemnation of Romanies. She is not necessarily making an argument about the European Union and ‘us’ (Romanians) insofar as the treatment of Romanies is concerned. Her account does not hint at an issue of personal opinion or criticism levelled at the European Union and is not necessarily related to assigning a nonrespectable opinion (or position) to the EU, and by contrast, a respectable (reasonable) position which characterize ‘us’, but she is making an ideological and political argument that relates to the intrinsic negative quality of the Romanies.

Marta has put forward all the premises of her argument, but she is stopping short of the conclusion. One of the most important premises is that the (universal) moral order, epitomized by the EU wants to ‘get rid of them’. The implicit problem seems to be then, ‘why should we be different than others?’ in our treatment of Romanies. There is something that nevertheless cannot be stated, the idea that ‘we should get rid of them too’ This conclusion might be unacceptable, but according to Marta’s psycho- and protoconspirational logic it is reasonable. All her argument is designed in such a way to it being diverted from the dangerous moral implication of harbouring socially forbidden desires.

The full implication of Marta’s statements can be grasped if one looks at how the interviewer understands these two questions. The intervention of interviewer is: ‘Do you think that others want to get rid of them?’. Marta’s answer is a straightforward ‘yes’ followed by an emphasised ‘of course’. Offering such an answer, Marta implicitly agrees with the interviewer’s formulation ‘get rid of them’. This is a rather extreme way of
talking which has ‘eliminationist’ connotations, but it is said that it is ‘others’ that want to ‘get rid of’ the Romanies, not ‘us’.

Following Michael Billig, I would argue that in order to analyse ideologies of exclusion, one should not merely look for the themes which are presented as ‘common sense’, but also for what is commonsensically left unsaid and what is assumed to be beyond controversy (Billig, 1997a). In this case, what seems to be beyond controversy, what is assumed is that Romanies are so bad that no one wants them (not even ‘us’ who claim to be ‘reasonable’). What is left unsaid, what cannot be uttered is ‘our’ desire to ‘get rid of them’. It is not only that this kind of accounting affords a reading in terms of what is left unsaid, beyond controversy, but why this is so. Following this line of thought, then, one can link the implications of Marta’s accounting to an orientation to a climate of opinion ‘about the boundaries between acceptable and non-acceptable opinion’ (Billig, 1987b, p. 133).

The collaborative claim about ‘others’ wanting to ‘get rid of them’ is in fact a double-claim (Billig, 1992), for ‘we’ [Romanians] are also implicitly hinted at. The Romanians’ socially forbidden desires have been dropped out of the conversation. Romanians are not seeking to get rid of Romanies: it is the others that, beyond doubt, harbour this kind of immoral thoughts. The ingredients of repression are present. One can see how the two participants in this interview interaction on the issue of Romanies are not only reproducing and alluding to moral and societal norms, but are also reproducing immoral temptations which are routinely resented and repressed. Repression itself need not be understood in biological terms, ‘if one assumes that socially inappropriate responses or thoughts, rather than biological urges, constitute the objects of repression’ (Billig, 1999a, p. 254) It is the process of ‘social repression’ (Billig, 1999a) that becomes the focus of

29 As when accounting for nationalism insofar as the Hungarians were concerned, nationalism was seen as a characteristic of ‘theirs’, not ‘ours’, in a similar fashion the exclusion of Romanies is seen as something that ‘others’ want to do, not ‘us’.

30 As Billig (1997c) suggests, it is not very often that you see discursive psychologists using psychoanalytic concepts. Only occasionally, the ‘repressed repression can be detected lurking on the edges of analysis’ (p 143) For example, Billig (1992, p. 106-108) analysing at how English families talk about the Royal family, using the notion of ‘projection’ to explain how speakers disclaim their own racism and denying that the Royal Family (in not allowing their heir to the throne to marry a non-white) is racist Billig’s analysis suggests that ‘racism’ is projected onto others. As he argues, ‘there is a projection within a projection’ (p 108) Their own desire is denied and ‘projected on to the Queen, and then it is projected back onto the public’ (ibid., p 108) For another example of how psychoanalytic concepts are used by discursive psychologists see Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 54)
attention, process that gets constituted through routine discursive interaction, within the shared discursive ideological practices of avoidances and absences.

There is an ideological struggle and moral tension between the requirements of a rational discourse of 'cultural' differences and an irrational eliminationist 'discourse'. Here, as in the other analysed cases, there is a strong sense that there is something that cannot be directly stated. Following Billig (1999a), one could argue that there is a 'repressed', unstated reference to 'us' harbouring socially forbidden desires insofar Romanies are concerned. These desires which must be repressed 'will reflect whatever is socially forbidden and whatever might not be uttered' (ibid, p. 254).  

As shown when analysing participants from the 'supporting' Tudor and Funar category, 'eliminationist' concerns are something that cannot be stated directly. Discourse with 'eliminationist' connotations directed towards the Romanies is, in most cases, the outcome of ideological descriptions of Romanies. As Kristeva (1982) argues, what (and who) is defined as object is to be 'radically excluded', but it is nevertheless always a presence. It can never be completely removed. This leads the way to the enactment of a sort of 'uncanny strangeness' (Kristeva, 1991, p. 182; see also Freud, 1953)  

‘Opposing’ Tudor and Funar

In the previous sections I have looked at some of the ways in which speakers from the 'supporting Tudor and Funar' category and the 'ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar' category talked about the Romanies when discussing a range of social issues. As the previous analysis has hopefully shown, there were no striking differences between the way those who straightforwardly supported Tudor and Funar and those who were ambivalent towards their policies talked about the Romanies. The topic of their talk

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31 Moreover, as Billig (2002a) observes, 'what is socially forbidden can become an object of desire and pleasure. If there are taboos on the expression of bigotry in contemporary society, outward prejudice may take the form of a forbidden pleasure. Bigotry, then, becomes a temptation' (p. 185)

32 As Kristeva notes, 'delicately, analytically, Freud does not speak of foreigners he teaches us how to detect foreignness in ourselves' (1991, p. 191). It is not only that Freud has taught us how to detect foreignness in ourselves, but also, and probably more importantly, he has taught us to look at foreignness in others, how to construct the 'others' as perpetual recipients of foreignness and how to 'repress' socially forbidden thoughts related to 'removing' foreignness and the 'foreign body' from the boundaries of our self (group) and our space.
might have been different, but not the overall emphasis on placing Romanies beyond reasonable bounds, beyond the moral order. As I hope to have shown, one can identify a mixture of ‘culture discourse’ and a ‘racial discourse’ which rest on the foundation of an ‘eliminationist’ belief system. I would argue that in both cases, there was an ideological struggle between the requirements of a rational, moral discourse of ‘cultural’ differences and an irrational eliminationist ‘discourse’.

The question now is what one can find when one looks at how participants from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category talk about the Romanies? Theoretically, one would expect to find a different discourse when looking at the opponents at extremist ideology and its representatives. Nevertheless, as shown when analysing their discourse about the Hungarians, tolerance is easily turned into intolerance. As argued in chapter seven, placing Tudor and Funar’s policies on ‘the other side’ of the moral boundary beyond the reasonableness and morality of fair-minded people, opens the way for the expression of common-place nationalism and ‘reasonable’ blaming of Hungarians. The same placing of Tudor and Funar ‘beyond reasonableness’ allows the expression of something more extreme and at the same time, more dangerous when it comes to talk about the Romanies. Whilst in the case of the Hungarians the blaming was ‘reasonable’, when it comes to talking about and describing the Romanies one can see the enactment of a very different story, one with different political, ideological contours and effects.

As in the case of the participants ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ and those ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’, a very similar expression of moral exclusionary discourse (Opotow, 1990) is to be found when analysing the discourse of those ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’, embedded in the similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies designed and used not only to blame the Romanies, but also to position them beyond the moral order, to cast them beyond reasonable bounds by presenting them as ‘beyond difference’, as abject, as ‘less than human’. A discourse of dehumanization and delegitimization is again at play, one that portrays the Romanies as a ‘threat’, as matter out of place, ‘polluting’ our moral and physical space.

This section will be dedicated to exploring some of the above ideological constructive processes. I will focus my attention on offering a critical analysis of the active use of
stereotypical descriptions encountered when listening to the participants in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category talk about the Romanies and Romany related issues

Dilemmas of reasonableness and prejudice

My first example is an excerpt from a previously used interview (interview 5) in which one can see Mircea, a thirty-two year old bank supervisor (whose views on the fairness of Tudor and Funar’s policies were previously analysed) accounting for the existence of Romanian prejudices against the Romanies. This is very nice example of how, as demonstrated in the two previous cases, concerns with ‘reasonableness’ are not absent from the discourse of those ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’. In a similar fashion to the previously analysed discourses, there is a sense of an ideological tension of displaying reasonableness and at the same time expressing (extreme) prejudiced views

Extract 11, interview 5

241 Chris Do you think that Romanians are prejudiced against the Romanies or not really?
242 Mircea They are ( ) So, Romanians are prejudiced against Romanies ( ) So they think that ( ) they think that they are ( ) So, they are thieves, they are so ( ) And this happens also because of us, to a large extent, cos’ we fixed them a label for a long time, but also because of them, because they don’t ( ) they also don’t try to especially because they have all sorts of organizations ( ) they are represented in the Parliament and ( ) and at a local level they have all sorts of organizations, support groups ( ) and they don’t try to raise themselves, so no ( ) So, they don’t want to surpass their own condition ( ) So they say, listen, we are ( ) poor, we are as we are, we have many kids, we don’t use soap because it’s expensive, we don’t do that because of this ( ) then they determine,

243
right ( ) a sort of momentary revulsion (mm) and when you see
that he is a gypsy you cross to the other side (mm) even if maybe
he's a poor man, as there are Romanians who are unwashed, there are
also Hungarians who are unwashed (mm) But with them, with them
is the first ( ) also because of their clothes, which attracts the
attention, you cannot help noticing a gypsy woman, and their way of
speaking (mm) So in general they have a way of speaking, they speak
very loud ( ) so they can get noticed as being there, in order to
( ) automatically, to awaken revulsion so you would leave (mm) So
( ) them too ( ) we also have to help them and they have to help
themselves (mm)
[
]

There is a lot going on in this extract, but what I am after here is to offer some insights into
the ideological tension between displaying reasonableness, and at the same time, expressing prejudiced views based on an ‘essentialist’ cultural discourse.

Mircea starts by recognizing that Romanians are prejudiced against the Romanies
followed by a distanced account of why that is the case. After pointing out that
Romanians think that the Romanies are ‘thieves’, in lines 245-247 an overall diagnostic
of the situation is offered in guise of conclusion: ‘and this happens also because of us, to
a large extent, cos’ we fixed them a label for a long time, but also because of them,
because they don’t (.) they also don’t try (.)’. Mircea’s explanation of Romanian
prejudices is presented as an even-handed, balanced statement that tries to take into
account the realities and responsibilities of both groups in order to account for the
existence of prejudices. It is not the Romanians, but ‘us’, ‘we’ who have ‘fixed them a
label for a long time’, but it is also because of ‘them’. One can see how an axiomatic
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ comes together with this display of reasonableness.
As Billig (1995a) has pointed out, ‘a sense of communal identity ... is a prerequisite for
morality and for reason’ (p. 162).

Mircea’s even-handedness opens nevertheless the way for expressing criticism: ‘they
don’t also try’ (line 247), ‘they don’t try to raise themselves’ (lines 250-251) or ‘they
don’t want to surpass their own condition’ (lines 251-252). Note the shift from an
account in terms of ‘not trying’ to raise themselves to an account in terms of ‘not
wanting’ to surpass their condition. In a sequence where the Romanies are the
grammatically active agents (Hodge and Kress, 1993), a series of disposition
formulations are used to explain the existence of Romanian prejudices against ‘them’.
Romany ‘character’ and behaviour is invoked in order to make a case not only for what
Romanies do, but also for what Romanies are.
This is made clear by Mircea in the lines that follow. There is an oblique reference to dirtiness (‘we don’t use soap because it’s expensive’) (lines 253-254) together with direct references to the emotional and physical effect of their presence and way of being: ‘a sort of momentary revulsion’ (line 255), ‘to awaken revulsion’ (line 263). One can note that even for participants in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category, the use of the extreme term ‘revulsion’ has to be seen not as something coming from an inner psychological disposition of loathing, but rather as being the effect of intrinsic Romany characteristics (their way of being (see lines 252-255), their appearance (‘their clothes’) – line 260 and ‘way of speaking’- line 261). This is not an avowal of being personally revolted by the Romanies, but rather an account that warrants the reasonableness of being revolted.

As previously noted, this ‘revulsion’, visceral expression of the detestable, of the aloof, of the horrible comes together with the references to the dangerous register of impurity, uncleanness and pollution. We are back with a sense of Romanies as the ‘abject’ (Kristeva, 1982). One can find the same emotional correlate of the abject, which is disgust, rejection and condescension.

This extreme way of talking is nevertheless accompanied by different qualifications that are part and parcel of a display of reasonableness. As previously shown, sympathy and blame are intermingled to build a seemingly even-handed and reasonable picture of the Romanies. Oscillating between the common-places of sympathy and blame allows for making the Romanies nevertheless accountable for their situation. The use of extreme terms such as ‘revulsion’ embedded in a seemingly ‘ambivalent’ discourse is a means of going ‘beyond difference’ in prescribing an ideological position for Romanies, one which places them beyond the ‘reasonable’ bounds of society.

What at first sight is a balanced, reasonable discourse can be easily turned into its opposite. Criticizing and denigrating the Romanies, presenting them as beyond the moral order is done through the intermediary of extreme descriptions. The issue of inter-ethnic conflict is the subject of my next example. Sanda, a twenty-two year old teacher (whose talk about the Hungarians was previously analysed) is the speaker and the interviewer presses on the issue of ‘responsibility’ insofar as the inter-ethnic conflict is concerned.
In the first lines of her answer one can discern a clear orientation to the moral implications put forward by the question of the interviewer. There is an orientation from Sanda that the question of the interviewer contains implicit criticism and also issues linked with the accountability of the two groups insofar as the interethnic conflict is concerned. This could be seen as a move of prolepsis (Billig, 1996), forestalling possible objections before they are made clear.

Sanda’s move can be seen as a ‘brief exordium to a critical attack’ (Billig, 1996, p. 269): ‘Okay(.) about the scapegoat technique (.) of course we cannot assign all the blame on their side, even though in a way we would be entitled to ( ) to do this ( ).’ Usually disclaimers are seen as interactional moves of displaying reasonableness and fending off potential criticism. But, as Billig (1996) contends, there is a further rhetorical dimension to the disclaimer that implies a ‘commitment to future oratory’ (p. 269). In a way, the disclaimer assures the audience, that ‘the present remarks ... are not the only ones to be found within the speaker’s latitude of acceptance’ (p. 270). Expressions of moderation...
and extremism are not necessarily the outcome of the 'elastic stretching of an attitudinal latitude to encompass moderate expressions, or to a contraction which excludes the moderate views' (p. 270), but the outcome of changes in the argumentative direction of the attitudinal expression. The shift from tolerance to prejudice, from moderation to extremism is done discursively and is not something that can be decided beforehand.

In lines 71-74, Sanda offers a series of stereotypical descriptions of Romanies in order to explain the assigning of blame on the Romany side: 'they are a population who act this way, instinctually (. ) so, especially insofar violence is concerned, they are very violent people (. ) very (. ) impulsive' The Romanians are absent from this explanation and the Romanies are being placed in an active position (van Leeuwen, 1996), which, as Sanda goes on to demonstrate, has direct implications related to their 'responsibility' in the conflict. This extreme way of talking based on an essentialist discourse of nature legitimates the process of assigning the entire blame onto the Romanies.

There is nevertheless a recognition that this is an unfair position insofar as a comparison with her previous account on the Hungarians is concerned: 'now I am not playing fair, because what I previously said about (. ) about the Hungarians, where everyone has his share of blame, now to assign the blame only on the Gypsies (mm) on the Romanies (. ) but I think that, indeed, it is them who should be assigned the most blame ( )' (lines 75-79). Note that she does not claim that 'they' are a problem (or the problem, for that matter), but her display of reasonableness and tolerance nevertheless constructs Romanies as problematic and 'essentially' blameworthy. One can see how displays of reasonableness, tolerance are followed by a conclusion actually based on intolerance.

The speaker's profession of tolerance can be easily turned into an expression of ethnocentrism and prejudice. One can see how prejudice is achieved from a position of tolerance. Commenting on Michael Billig's use of the notion of tolerance, Karen Henwood argues that 'the problem with this notion of tolerance is that it implicitly assumes that there is, indeed, something about minority groups which is to be tolerated' (1994, p 45) Elsewhere, Henwood and Phoenix (1996) (see also Husband, 1986) conclude that 'the concept of tolerance has its own limitations, since it presupposes a hierarchy rather than an equality of difference' (p 852) As Sanda, and other participants before her, have argued for, is the idea that what is to be tolerated is 'their' alien, aloof
way of life, ‘their’ behaviour and ‘their’ being in the world which does not ‘match’ ‘ours’.

As a number of academic studies have shown, people tend to present themselves as overwhelmingly in favour of equal rights, tolerance and fair treatment (see inter alia, Cochrane and Billig, 1984; van Dijk, 1984, 1987, Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Equality and tolerance have become common-places (Billig, 1987a), arguments of principle that are beyond questioning. Nevertheless, one could argue that there is an ideological dilemma between displaying tolerance and at the same time expressing prejudiced views, which needs to be resolved. As the previously analysed extracts from the participants in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category have shown, there is a sense of an orientation to egalitarian norms, presenting yourself (or the in-group for that matter) as tolerant through displaying reasonableness and some sort of sensibility regarding overt manifestations of ethnic bias. Like in the previously analysed talk about Hungarians, a standpoint of reasonableness and shared stereotyping is the yardstick against which the comments against the Romanies are mounted.

As I hope to have shown with the examples that I have provided, this avowal of reasonableness and tolerance coming from the participants in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category has as its backdrop an essentialist discourse of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. Disposition-talk and the discourse of ‘nature’ work together to essentialize, to abstract the stereotypical characteristics attributed to the Romanies. They are being assigned different qualities and these qualities are then used to denote them (van Leeuwen, 1996)33. The ways in which categories and predicates are associated are participants’ resources for building divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. At the same time, it constructs a contrast between ‘our’ way of being and ‘their’ way of being, to ultimately decide into which category ‘Romanies’ do rightfully belong. What I am after here, is not necessarily describing and making an inventory of these qualities (in their vast majority) negative,

33 Participants establish a ‘tie’ between membership in the category ‘Romy/or Gypsy’ and the qualities attributed to it. Inside this documented naturalizing, essentializing discourse of ‘nature’, category-predicate ‘ties’ that could be treated as occasioned, contingent and defeasible are presented and made by the participants to stand as immutable, as (their) nature, as once for all ascriptions. This way of describing the Romanies and warranting descriptions is part and parcel of a situated (ideological) activity of fixating meaning.
associated with the category ‘Romany’, but looking at their specific political and ideological effects.

**Being in/out of place**

Even for the participants in the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category the answer to the previously raised concern seems to be clear: ‘they’ [Romanyes] are not like ‘us’ [Romanians] and ‘they’ don’t belong with ‘us’. As emphasised in the short introduction to this chapter, the place of Romanyes in (Romanian) society depends on the symbolic place they are assigned when participants describe them. As the next extract will try to show, concerns with being in/out of place constitute an important ideological concern in casting the Romanyes beyond the moral order. Thus, one ought to consider the stereotypical ideological representations of the Romanyes within a broader concern for the locatedness of this ‘Othering’ process.

**Extract 13, interview 9**

162 Chris

163 Sanda

164 Chris

165 Sanda

166 Chris

167 Sanda

168 Chris

169 Sanda

170 Chris

171 Sanda

172 Sanda

173 Chris

174 Sanda

175 Chris

176 Sanda

177 Chris

178 Sanda

179 Chris

What do you think are the causes of discrimination against Romanyes? The European Union considers that in Romania the Romanyes are widely discriminated, what would be the causes? First of all because of the fact, let’s not forget that they were a migratory population, so they are not finding their place anywhere ( ) in any country you would go I think that you would find gypsies, they are the type of people who are spreading ( ) who are like an octopus who tries to spread ( ) to spread ( ) Its tentacles?

Yes, tentacles ( ) but they don’t ( ) they don’t have a residence, a land of theirs in order to be stable, just because of the fact that they were so migratory and ( ) permanently there are a lot of gypsies immigrants ( ) this would be one of the aspects (mm) because they are seen like this ( ) and beyond all this, let’s not forget that, looking back at the prisons, in penitentiaries they are the most ( ) the dominant population there ( ) And then, they wouldn’t be labelled ( ) but if there, there so many ( ) normally they are those who ( ) they are the black sheep of society ( ) this is the
The question of the interviewer touches on another controversial issue, that of the causes of discrimination against the Romanies. Before giving up the floor to Sanda the interviewer offers the example of the European Union who thinks that the Romanies are being widely discriminated in Romania.

Sanda does not seem to offer a straightforward yes or no answer, nor to comment on the intervention regarding the discrimination of Romanies in Romania from the vantage point of the European Union. It looks like Sanda is offering an implicit agreement with the idea that Romanies are being discriminated against and what she starts doing in line 165 is to offer justifications for her position. Note that, as in some of the other cases where discrimination was discussed, it is not the moral implication of the existence of discrimination (insofar as the Romanians are concerned), which is touched upon when explaining its causes, but instead it is pointed to Romanies being the cause of such discrimination.

One can see how an universal ‘imagined community’ of nation-states embedded within an historical account of ‘migratory’ practice is the backdrop against which the out of place-ness and the non-belonging of Romanies are being justified: ‘they were a migratory population, so they are not finding their place anywhere ( ) in any country you would go I think that you would find gypsies’ (lines 165-167). Sanda is placing the Romany ‘way of being’ within the universalities of an ‘imagined’ national space and within the ‘history’ of ‘their’ specific ‘nomadic’ practice. The use of ‘anywhere’, ‘in any country’ together with the formulation ‘they are not finding their place’ are rhetorically powerful formulations that work to position the Romanies at the same time, as not having a place (a country) of their own, but also as being ‘out of place’, having difficulties settling down. The Romany identity is thus invested with a ‘mythological’ meaning and made problematic inside the ‘secure’ social space of the ‘international world of nations’ (Billig, 1995a). The implied ‘abnormality’ of Romanies and its justification is based on a ‘banal’ contemporary ideological common sense of a ‘settled’,

34 This can be understood as both meaning, they have difficulty in fitting, but also as not having their own place to settle.
established, fixed and unchangeable moral order of ‘nations’ that helps denigrating an opposed ideology of migration and ‘nomadism’\(^{35}\)

Even if they are recognized as a population, a nation, as people, they are seen as not having a (national) place of their own: ‘they don’t ( ) they don’t have a residence, a land of theirs in order to be stable\(^{36}\), just because of the fact that they were so migratory and ( ) permanently there are a lot of gypsies immigrants (.)’ (line 171-174) The Romanies are again endowed with implicit mythical characteristics associated with an ideology of ‘nomadism’, which play an important part in the representation of Romanies as deviant and not belonging to ‘society’. The previous sense of ‘their’ implied non-conformity, ‘reactivity’ and ‘violent reaction’ is magnified by an implied threat of a nomadic lifestyle, notwithstanding the fact that many Romanies are sedentary A normative ‘spatial ethic’ is used to legislate against the ‘spatial ethic’ held by the Romanies themselves. At the same time, pointing to the ‘location’ (or should I say, to the lack of location) of Romanies places them on the ‘uncivilized’ margins, on the boundaries of ‘our’ spatial and moral world.

As Sibley has suggested, ‘in order to establish the threatening nature of the outsider group, it is necessary to attribute to it mythical characteristics which dehumanise and legitimate exclusion or expulsion’ (1992, p. 120) This is what Sanda seems to be doing in what could be seen as the gist of her previous negative descriptions: ‘they are the black sheep\(^{37}\) of society (.) this is the reason why we discriminate them (mm)( )’ (lines 179-180) Even if at first sight, one could argue that this argument refers specifically to the Romanian society, one could offer another reading that extends it at a more general, universal level. Both the locatedness and the generality of her argument are of major importance It is like implying that they are the ‘black sheep’ not only here, but they are the ‘black sheep’ everywhere Their ubiquity, their omnipresence is emphasized, together with the ubiquity of their negative characteristics.

\(^{35}\)A nice example is Barnes, Auburn, & Lea (1998) Using interviews with the police as textual data, the authors have analyzed representations of travelling people in the south of England, revealing how constructions of travellers as ‘transients’ were used to justify practices of surveillance, control and exclusion

\(^{36}\)In the sense of settling down

\(^{37}\)The expression ‘black sheep’ is a literal translation and has the same meaning, connotation in both Romanian and English language
One can see how place-identity becomes a resource for naturalizing the characteristics of Romanies and at the same time, a resource for exclusionary action. One could also argue that it works to justify and normalize the moral implications of the 'local' discriminatory policies directed towards the Romanies. In order to fully understand what is going on, one should look at the ideological position from which this account is spoken, the position from which the presence of Romanies is considered (cf. Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). This voice is the voice of an 'insider', someone who speaks, not necessarily from within 'his' [Romanian] community, but from within the universal community of the 'civilized', the 'settled', the 'normal' and the 'reasonable'. 'Humanity' is not denied to the Romanies, but they are invested with the wrong sort of humanity. As Rorty has cogently put it, "the force of 'us' is, typically, contrastive in the sense that it contrasts with a 'they' which is also made up of human beings - the wrong sort of human beings" (1989, p 190).

The symbolic place that it is assigned to the Romanies, the symbolic physical and moral boundaries, which it is said and shown that they transgress,38 has important implications for the process of 'Othering'. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, a group can be in the 'wrong' place if the stereotype locates it elsewhere (Sibley, 1995). Insofar as the Romanies are concerned the stereotype does not match the symbolic (and physical) place in which Romanies are located. The stereotype locates them on the margins, as nomads, as perpetual 'strangers'. As the Jews before them (until the nineteenth century at least), the Romanies are the eternal strangers in anybody's land.

There seems to be a problem with the designation of a proper place for the Romanies. The 'banal' language evocative of fear, disgust, withdrawal from contact engenders a fixed, stereotypical, immutable ideological representations of Romanies with extreme political and social consequences. The implication of this difficulty with designating a place for the Romanies together with the reference to an unchangeable stereotypical essence is that they are not just in the 'wrong place', but actually that there is no place for them!

38 David Sibley (1992, 1995) whose work has helped to clarify the significance of boundaries for group processes talks about what he terms the 'sin' of boundary transgression.
This way of accounting sets (or should I say, is) the stage for expressing ideas with ‘eliminationist’ connotations, the evocation of an ‘alien’ defined as inhuman and ‘uncanny’. The next extracts are a clear exemplification of this. It is Alina’s views on the issue of integration of Romanes that are going to constitute the focus of the following pages. Alina, a thirty-five year old accountant, is one of the speakers whose talk about Tudor and Funar and about the Hungarians was previously analysed.

Extract 14, interview 17

413 Alina  Nu-i văd pe țiganii integrându-se între noi, nu le place stilul  c civilizației ( ) de altfel, nu vor să meargă la școală, nu vor să evolueze deloc ( ) Nu pot să am o părire despre ei ( ) ha ha ( ) dacă părosă
414 Chris A cine crede că este vină?
415 Alina A lor, în primul rând, pentru că nu cred ( ) efectiv, au fost duși cu forța la școală ( ) au fost ( ) li s-a cerut să se integreze și nu pot ( ) Există în capitolul Oradea, în nu știau ce cartier, bloc construit expres pentru ei și ( ) și l-au măncat din temelia precum șobolanii ( ) nu?
416 Chris Whose blame it is, do you think?
417 Alina Theirs, first of all, because I don’t think ( ) effectively, they were dragged to school ( ) they’ve been ( ) they’ve been asked to integrate and they cannot ( ) There is at the end of Oradea, I don’t know where, a block especially built for them and ( ) they have eaten it from the ground like rats ( ) isn’t that so?
418

Alina starts by admitting that she does not see ‘the gypsies integrating themselves among us’ (line 413) and what follows are justifications to support this idea: ‘they don’t like the civilized style’, ‘they don’t want to go to school’, ‘they don’t want at all to progress’ (lines 413-415). This is a very similar way of accounting with the previously documented essentialist disposition-talk discourse of ‘nature’. It works to position Romanes as beyond ‘civilization’, beyond our moral order. As Dixon et al. (1997) pointed out, “the category ‘civilized’ relies on that which is banished beyond its threshold” (p. 342). When one describes the space of the marginal and the uncivilized, one is confirming and reproducing through contrast, the space of the central and the civilized. Bauman’s (1995) comments on how ‘we’ –the ‘normal’, ‘civilized’ people-deal with the ‘danger-carrying strangers’ (p. 179) acquire political significance and are of

9 Civilized life style
particular interest. As he argues, ‘we throw the carriers of danger up and away from where the orderly life is conducted; we keep them out of society’s bounds’ (p. 180).

The essence of these ideological stereotypical descriptions is made relevant several lines later. The story that Alina offers in lines 420-422 brings this issue to the forefront: ‘There is at the end of Oradea, I don’t know where, a block especially built for them and (.) they have eaten it from the ground like rats (.) isn’t that so?’. This is not to be seen as a simple story of transgression, but its implications stretch beyond ‘rational’ thought, into the realm of the irrational, the repressed, the unsaid. Note the reference to ‘rats’, which dehumanizes Romanies and places them into the natural, presents them as vermin. This representation of ‘people’, ‘human beings’ as animals, ‘as particular species which are associated with residues or the borders of human existence’ (Sibley, 1995, p. 27) achieves a relegation of Romanies to the status of the abject and denies their ‘human’ qualities. Through this specific representation, one can see that Romanies are again being associated with ‘dirt’ and the register of impurity and cleanliness is brought to the front. Rats are filthy animals, which need to be eliminated for cleanliness and purity. As dirt has to be removed from ‘our’ houses, likewise, people categorized as ‘dirt’ are to be removed from ‘civilized’ society. This extreme description have clear eliminationist connotations. As rats are carriers of terrible diseases, in the same ways Romanies are carriers of an ultimate threat, which must be eliminated\[40\].

This is taken further by Alina when talking on the same subject several lines later.

Extract 15, interview 17

426 Alina

| 428 | Alina | Ce poate să facă societatea cu ei? ( ) să le facă o baie comună, |
| 429 | Ti-o distrugă ( ) le face un bloc ( ) il distrugă ( ) |
| 430 | nu , nu se poate cu ei, e ceva de ( ) de ( ) |
| 431 | pleava ( ) pleava societății, cum să zic (mm) |

428 Alina

| 428 | Alina | What can society do for them? ( ) To make them a communal bath, |
| 429 | they destroy it ( ) it builds them a block ( ) it is destroyed ( ) |
| 430 | No, you cannot take it with them, it is something like ( ) like ( ) |
| 431 | the scum ( ) the scum of society, how should I put it (mm) |

\[40\] In their analysis of anti-semitism, Adorno et al (1950) make reference to the power and ideological consequences of eliminationist imagery. For example, there is mention of “the metaphor of the rotten apple in the barrel conjures up the imagery of ‘evil germs’ which is associated with appalling regularity with the dream of an effective germicide” (p. 653)
The opening rhetorical questions set the Romany 'problem' as an issue without a 'solution'. It is implied that there is nothing that the (our) society can do for them. 'To make them a communal bath, they destroy it (.) it builds them a block ( ) it is destroyed ()' (lines 428-429).

Note the objectivity and factuality of her descriptions. The implication is that the Romanies are the 'problem', a problem, that is, to the rest of society. One can see how thin is the line from this position to the implicit notion that this problem has to be dealt with according to its own special requirements that pertains to the problematic nature of the Romanies leading naturally to a 'solution' outside the bounds of democratic and moral procedure. Being cast as the 'problem' that calls for a solution, the Romanies are not regarded anymore as moral subjects. In lines 430-431, Alina is in a search of a formulation that could capture the previous (and the general feeling about Romanies), formulations, which eventually comes in line 431: 'the scum of society'.

This is not presented as a peremptory description, but it is 'intended' to capture the essence of what Romanies are. Like in her previous intervention, one can see how the use of a metaphor of residue stands as a metaphor for residual people. To categorize them as residual, as abject par excellence is again to ignore their visible human qualities and to allude to a conclusion with eliminationist connotations. All the premises are there, are explicit, but not the conclusion. The conclusion is something that cannot be directly stated. Whilst the consequences of Romany behaviour and way of being are (made) problematic, the consequences of this problematic 'eliminationist' categorization are not. Loyalty to the in-group, to society, to civilization comes to be considered the highest form of morality. Thus members of the civilized, fair-minded, tolerant society are not inclined to raise ethical issues that imply that 'this fine group of ours, with its humanitarianism and its high-minded principles might be capable of adopting a course of action that is inhumane and immoral' (Edelman, 1977, p. 94)

41 Romanies are being denied the status of moral objects and subjects, the power of 'moral command' (Bauman, 1990), an autonomous moral standing in 'our' (this 'our' does not necessarily refers to the Romanian) world, the Romanies are not individual human beings anymore.
There is a call for an implicit solution Evidence was also presented that rational solutions to the ‘problem’ have not worked. There is no rational solution to deal with ‘them’. In such circumstances of delegitimization and dehumanizing talk, immoral and social forbidden desires lurk under the surface of this ideology of ‘moral exclusion’. The immoral, eliminationist conclusion is implicitly contained in the premises. Going on the steps of Freud, Billig cogently argues that ‘immorality always lurks on the edge of overdemanding morality’ (1997c, p. 148) What is not said, what is absent from the interaction cannot be nevertheless absent from the analysis. The repression of immorality, what is not said (but could easily have been) becomes of central importance

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the rhetorical and ideological shift from a discourse of ‘nationalism’ and ‘politics’ to a discourse of ‘nature’ and ‘moral exclusion’. Romanian talk about the Romanies was used to exemplify this shift and to make an attempt at demonstrating that talk about the Romanies is more extreme than talk about the Hungarians.

The main thesis of this chapter was that one will find a very similar expression of moral exclusionary discourse across seemingly different ideological positions, a very similar discourse of ‘nature’ embedded in the similar use of various discursive and rhetorical strategies to blame the Romanies, position them beyond the moral order. Like in the case of talk about Hungarians from the previous chapter, an axiomatic division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was the backdrop against which a specific stereotypical ideological representation of the Romanies was constructed. A style which, at the same time, denies, but also protects extreme prejudice, was identified across the different ideological stances taken up by the participants during the interviews which used similar discursive and rhetorical strategies to problematize the character and the behaviour of Romanies and justify their exclusion.

As I hope to have shown, the same processes of excluding Romanies from ‘civilized’ society grounded on a discourse of ‘culture’ as mentality intertwined with an ‘essentialist’ and a discourse with eliminationist connotations were identified not only in
the case of the participants ‘supporting’ right-wing politics and its representatives (Vadim Tudor and Gheorghe Funar), but also in the accounts of those who were ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar and those ‘opposing’ Tudor and Funar. Going across these different ideological positions, this chapter has illustrated and discussed some of the extreme rhetorical and interpretative resources used to talk about and legitimate the blaming of Romanies. It has also documented the constructive ideological processes used to position the Romanies as beyond the moral order, as both ‘outsiders’ in society and space.

The analysis of the ideological representations of the Romanies was conducted with a concern for the locatedness of this ‘Othering’ process. The main assumption that guided the analysis was the idea that an ideology of ‘exclusion’ (and bigotry) implies a notion of place, which is the yardstick against which ideological and exclusionary discourse is put together and bigotry enacted. As shown, concerns with the symbolic place assigned to Romanies and concerns with being ‘in’/‘out of place’ underpin an ideological representation of Romanies which places them beyond the moral order and opens the ways for expressing views with eliminationist connotations.

Across all three ideological subject positions, a discourse of delegitimization and dehumanization is used to portray the Romanies as matter ‘out of place’, as ‘polluting’ our moral and physical space, as an ultimate ‘threat’ for which a solution is called for. Socially forbidden desires lurk under the surface of reasonableness and morality. The location of the ideological (and moral) tension between the requirements of a reasonable, moral discourse of ‘cultural’ differences and an irrational eliminationist ‘discourse’ is to be ‘found’ in the ‘unsaid’ (Billig, 1999a). The dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee creates its own unsaid matters ‘if conscious thought is shaped by rhetoric, then so might the dynamics of dialogue provide the resources for repression’ (Billig, 1998, p. 206). ‘Eliminationist’ concerns are something that cannot be stated, cannot be aired directly. Extreme prejudiced discourse about Romanies is the outcome of an ideological double bind. On one hand, discourses with ‘eliminationist’ connotations are, in most cases, the outcome of ideological descriptions of Romanies. On the other hand, these very ideological descriptions are based and constructed on ‘eliminationist’ assumptions, which open the way for the ‘social repression’ (Billig, 1999a) of socially forbidden thoughts.
Social repression becomes relevant if one is re-placing issues such as racism and bigotry, social exclusion and politics of identity from within the psychological build-up of the individual, into the dilemmatic and unfinished business of social life, within the workings of discourse with ‘exclusionary’ and ‘eliminationist’ ideological and political effects. Social repression has not to be seen as an overarching universal process, but as a localized process. I am not just referring here to a specific geographical and ideological location (Eastern European post-communist Romania), but to the idea that this process of social repression is enacted in relation to a specific category of people, that ‘we’ (not necessarily Romanians), the settled, the civilized etc. categorize as being matter ‘out the place’, as abject, as deplorable, try to place beyond the bounds of reasonable behaviour and ‘way of being’ in the world. Social repression (not necessarily as an automatic process) comes into place when ‘solutions’ to this ‘problem’ are implicitly felt to fall outside the bounds of democratic and moral procedure.

If this is the case, then, ‘specific forms of repression will – not only – be routinely enacted as the ideological formations of particular times and places’ (Billig, 1999d, p. 325), but also routinely enacted as (or, in relation to) the ideological representations of a certain category of people whose objective and subjective moral existence in the world is denied. As Billig has claimed, ‘social repression’ is something, which is ‘part of ideological and socio-historical currents’ (1997c, p. 152; see also Frosh, 1989). Understanding the dynamics of social repression might help understanding what might be repressed in the Romanian contemporary cultural climate, but also in relation to whom. In doing so, it will not only shed light on the ‘prejudiced’ thinking in contemporary society, but it will also point to an ideological and historical tradition of persecution of the Romanies. The shared repressed patterns are part and parcel of an ideology of exclusion.

In the next chapter I will be identifying and commenting upon some of the differences between talk about Hungarians and talk about Romanies which were only hinted at in this chapter. I will be also documenting some other discursive and rhetorical ways through, which Romanies are constructed as beyond the moral order and exclusionary

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42 A discourse analysis of racism which uses psychoanalytic terminology alerts the readers that the ‘possibility of racist motives, unacknowledged by the holder of the motives, is left open’ (Billig, 1997c, p 144). Thus, discursive psychology that has an overt critical, political stance might benefit from the use of psychoanalytic concepts (see also Parker, 1992)
discourse is put together. I will be arguing that comparing Romanies with other ethnic minorities on different social dimensions achieves the rhetorical, but also political and ideological effect of presenting Romanies as 'beyond difference', beyond the moral order.
Chapter nine

‘Comparison’ and ‘differentiation’: rhetorical manoeuvres in the management of moral boundaries and moral exclusion discourse

Introduction

In the previous two analytic chapters, the discussion has ranged from investigating the dynamic links of between nationalism, politics and prejudice within a various set of discourses and discursive resources of ‘difference’ in the case of the Hungarian minority to the investigation of a shift from discourses of nationalism and politics to discourses of nature and moral exclusion insofar as the Romanies were concerned. The latter ‘beyond difference’ kind of prejudice was explored with an aim of documenting the ideological effects of using particular rhetorical and discursive moves which place Romanies beyond the moral order. Note that the main assumption behind the previous analyses was not that talk about Romanies was intrinsically ‘extreme’, but that ‘extremity’ (as moderation or ambivalence, for that matter) was something to be cashed out in the interplay of discourse, within the argumentative threads of different rhetorical and cultural resources that afford and achieve different ideological effects. As the analysis from the previous chapter has demonstrated, the ideological descriptions of Romanies are based and constructed on ‘eliminationist’ assumptions, which open the way for the ‘social repression’ of socially forbidden thoughts.

In chapter seven and eight different ways of talking about ethnic minorities were identified. It was argued that talk about Hungarians was infused with a (local) political dimension and agenda while retaining many of the well-researched features of the Western anti-alien, anti-immigrant discourses of ‘difference’. The all-pervasive features of ‘banal nationalism’ were identified in the various ideological descriptions of the Hungarian minority and their political project. A very different kind of prejudiced talk was encountered when looking at how participants talked about the Romanies. The participants
speaking from different ideological subject positions further exploited the dialectic identity/difference. This was done by retaining some of the features identified when looking at talk about Hungarians (and Western anti-alien talk), but adding a further dimension. This new dimension was 'moral exclusion', based on a discourse of delegitimization and dehumanisation, which portrays the Romanies as matter 'out of place', as an ultimate threat for which a solution is called for. Excluding Romanies from 'civilized' society was grounded on a discourse of 'culture' as mentality intertwined with an 'essentialist' and a discourse with eliminationist connotations. The general conclusion that can be drawn from these brief observations (and from the two previous chapters as a whole) is that Romanians talk differently about different ethnic minority groups. It is not only the talk per se that it is different, but also more importantly, the ideological and social effects of this talk.

Taking on the analytic 'discoveries' from the previous chapters, the present chapter will be dedicated to how participants speaking from different ideological positions, position themselves and others achieving different ideological effects. This chapter will complement the analysis from the previous two chapters, by documenting some other discursive and rhetorical ways through which Romanies are constructed as beyond the moral order and exclusionary discourse is put together. Previously touched upon issues, like comparisons and contrasts will be taken further, with a concern for how Romanians, Hungarians and Romanies (and other minority groups) are placed in relation to each other through the meanings which specific discourses and cultural resources make available (Hollway, 1984; see also Langenhove and Harré, 1994). Among other things, in this chapter, it will be argued that comparing Romanies with other ethnic minorities on different social dimensions achieves the rhetorical, but also political and ideological effect of presenting Romanies as 'beyond difference', beyond the moral order.

The analysis from the preceding chapters has prefigured some of the ways one might go about analysing the details of prejudiced talk, and extreme prejudiced talk in particular. This chapter will try to add to that by focusing on what the use of distinctions between different ethnic groups (including 'us') achieves rhetorically and ideologically as part of a process of signifying Romanies as culturally and essentially 'other'. As the subsequent analysis will show, operating distinctions, setting up contrasts or emphasising similarities, ideologically positioning various groups, talking about prejudice or other people's
attitudes, subtly criticizing the in-group, involves the enactment, the reproduction of relations of power between specific groups and orientation to relations of moral standing in the world.

In line with the previous analytic chapters, the main contention is that one will find a very similar expression of moral exclusionary discourse across the ideological spectrum, across the different ideological subject positions taken up by the participants. This contention is grounded not only on the assumption that participants talk differently about different ethnic minority groups, but that they specifically talk differently about different ethnic groups, across the ideological spectrum. The participants themselves orient to and operate distinctions and differentiations when they talk about the Hungarians, the Romanies, ‘us’ or any other ethnic groups.

The examples that are going to be presented in this chapter contain ‘comparisons’ made by the participants between different ethnic groups. There is nothing out of the ordinary in noting that participants make ‘comparisons’, but what is worth paying attention to are the uses to which these ‘comparisons’ are put and the ideological effects which they engender.

In this chapter it will be suggested that what can be seen in the following extracts is a complex process, which rests on two sets of shared, underlying assumptions. It will be suggested that the (overall) process under scrutiny is composed out of two inter-related rhetorical and ideological moves. On one hand, one can identify a move of ‘comparison’ (for judgments of similarity) which rests on an implicit shared assumption of similarity between the terms of the ‘comparison’ and on the other hand, a move of ‘differentiation’ (for judgments of dissimilarity) which rests on an implicit underlying assumption of (complete) difference between the counter-posed terms. These discursive moves are not seen as acting independently, but rather they are to be seen as inter-connected, concurring to achieve the same ideological effects, of casting the Romanies beyond the moral order.

Note also that this should not be taken as necessarily being the analyst’s assumptions about the way things work, but it is also a pervasive concern which the participants manage, make salient and orient to in their talk. What this chapter aims to look at is how participants incorporate these two kind of assumptions in their talk, how these assumptions become constitutive of ‘what’ and ‘how’ they talk about the Romanies and
others, how these implied assumptions are brought to the fore as part of an ideological boundary-drawing process with social and moral exclusionary effects.

It is not only that these two shared assumptions of similarity, on one hand, and (complete) difference on the other, are the backdrop against which the arguments of the participants are mounted, but that these shared assumptions are to be found across the entire ideological spectrum, across the different ideological subject positions taken up by the participants. This chapter will try to demonstrate that participants taking different positions manage in very similar ways these shared assumptions of similarity and (complete) difference when it comes to make a point about the Romanies and thus achieving very similar ideological effects. In the course of this chapter it will be suggested that there is an inequality of rhetoric that gives more moral ‘credit’ and status to ‘us’ and the other ethnic groups and denies moral legitimacy and status to the Romanies. The rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ is cashed out in a rhetoric of extreme inequality. In this chapter, it will be also argued that using the move of ‘comparison’ in conjunction with a ‘differentiation’ move constitutes a powerful rhetorical and ideological tool to validate ideological representations in relation to a specific group of people, the Romanies. The issue of ‘moral discrimination’ (Graumann, 1998) becomes relevant here. The judgments of difference and similarity insofar different ethnic groups are concerned are not accidental, they are not made based on fortuitous criteria, but they are made on moral grounds. The comparison/differentiation move in which the Romanies are involved together with other ethnic minority groups are moral evaluations, moral judgements (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; see also Graumann, 1998, 1995). By means of differentiation and extreme negative depiction, delegitimization (and sometimes dehumanisation) is achieved as Romanies are placed ‘outside the boundaries of the commonly accepted groups’ (Bar-Tal, 1989, p. 171).

As the analysis from this chapter will try to show, Romanies are seen to be sharing the same physical space, but not the same symbolic space of identity. From a ‘problem’ in terms of incompatibilities of nationalism, politics (insofar the Hungarians were concerned) and of ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ (insofar the Romanies were concerned) identified in the previous two chapters, it now becomes a ‘problem’ of ‘incommensurable identities’ (Bhabha, 1992), between ‘us’, the ‘civilized’, the ‘normal’ (Romanians, Hungarians, Germans etc.) and ‘them’ (the Romanies), the ‘uncivilized’, the ‘abnormal’, the ‘deviant’.
The social actors are the same, with the only difference that this time they are not considered and judged individually, but played out against each other in order to give birth to different ‘moral universes’ As the subsequent examples will try to show, it is not only that Romanies are part of a different ‘moral universe’, but they are this different universe. The issue of the (ideological) position which is being assigned to the Romanies, the issue of the ‘locatedness’ of identities in this process of ‘Othering’, touched upon in the previous chapters is of particular concern for this chapter too. The backdrop of the location of the Romany identity is represented by the symbolic space of nationhood and the nation-state. This does not mean that ‘nationality’ is a dimension used to stress differences between ethnic groups living within the same physical space of the (Romanian) nation, but it does mean that the backdrop of this dynamic rhetoric of comparison and differentiation is the symbolic space of nationhood As nationhood becomes the paramount basis of group self-constitution, Romanies are being classed beyond nationhood. As the Jews before them, to use Hannah Arendt’s words, they are seen and considered ‘a non-national element’, they are, at best, a ‘non-national nation’ (Bauman, 1989, p. 52). Here it is expressed in the words of Bauman when referring to the Jews: ‘The world tightly packed with nations and nation-states abhorred the non-national void Jews were in such void: they were such a void’ (ibid, 1989, p 53, italics in original).

Implicit and explicit concerns with the ‘place’ that Romanies have (or should have) not only in Romanian society, but also in this world, shape the ideological contours of a moral exclusionary discourse, underpin a specific ideological representation of Romanies which places them beyond the ‘moral order’ This is the moral order of (established) nation-states, entrenched order, which abhors the non-national, non-rootedness and homelessness. I will turn again to Bauman (1989) and paraphrase one of his comments regarding the Jews He argues that ‘the Jews were not just unlike any other nation; they were also unlike any other foreigners’ (p. 52, emphasis in original). The same argument can be applied to the Romanies and this chapter will be an exemplification of this; the Romanies are not just unlike any other nation; they are also unlike any other foreigners.

1 They epitomize difference, they are, par excellence, the second term in these unequal comparisons
‘Supporting’ Tudor and Funar

In this section, the analysis will focus on the way the participants from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category assign different ideological positions to Romanies when accounting for a range of controversial issues, such as the political and economical status of ethnic minorities or the responsibility and causes of inter-ethnic conflict. I will start documenting the rhetorical details of a specific ‘Othering’ process prefigured in the previous chapter by looking at the following stretch of talk.

Extract 1, interview 26

282  Chris  What is your image about the position, the social and economic status of national and ethnic minorities in the past and nowadays?
283  ( ) The social, economic position ( ) I am referring mostly to the Hungarians, the Romanies ( ) the Germans, they are less numbered now ( )
286  Marc  Their situation ( ) talking about the main minorities, so the Hungarians ( ) there is no difference, Hungarians, Germans, Serbs ( ) in comparison with the Romanians ( ) they are similar ( ) they can fulfil themselves and can accomplish a social position ( ) anyone of them ( ) the gypsies ( ) however, in comparison to how they were ( ) years ago, they also risen on the social scale ( ) some of them at a material level ( ) but culturally, there is still something missing ( )
294  Chris  Ce imagine aveți fata de poziția, statutul social și economic al minorităților naționale și etnice în trecut și acum?
296  Marc  Situația lor ( ) la minoritățile principale, deci la maghiari ( ) nu există nici o decădere, maghiari, germani, sărbățători ( ) față de români ( ) tot așa sunt ( ) pot să se realizeze și să-și facă o poziție socială ( ) oricare ( ) țigani ( ) tocmai, față de cum au fost în urmă cu ( ) cu mai mulți ani, și ei au mai crescut pe scara socială ( ) material unul dintre ei ( ) dar cultural, mai lipsește încă ceva ( )

In extract 1, one can see Marc whose talk about the Romanies was previously analysed. He is answering a question relating to the economic and social position of national and ethnic minorities from an historical perspective. One could argue that the question is a rather complex one and, theoretically, not amenable to a simple answer. In lines 284-285, the interviewer offers a list of specific ethnic minorities to be talked about. This can be seen as an indirect invitation to comparing these particular groups on the dimension introduced by the interviewer. Note also that by putting forward a list of different ethnic...
groups the interviewer is in a way implying that there might be some differences between the named groups and Marc takes that up in his answer.

In his opening statement in line 287 he is referring to the ‘main minorities’ in which category, in a first instance, he places the Hungarians. Insofar the position of the Hungarians is concerned, it is said that there is no difference between them and the Germans, the Serbs. A further element for comparison is introduced in line 289: the Romanians. But even with the Romanians it is said that ‘they are similar ( ) they can fulfil themselves and can accomplish a social position ( ) anyone of them ( )’ (lines 289-291).

What follows in line 291 is a comment about the ‘Gypsies’. Note the subtle use of the term ‘gypsies’ instead of taking on the interviewer’s ‘Romanies’. One can see the use of the term ‘Gypsies’ as part of a move of criticism and presents Marc as a critic rather than a sympathiser. The comparison is not yet made with ‘us’ or other ethnic groups, but it is a comparison that involves the present and the past and pointing to change that has occurred in time. Marc talks about the progress that some of them have made on the social scale: ‘they also risen on the social scale (.) some of them at a material level (.)’. What is interesting to note is that the dimension on which the comparison between past and present is made is the ‘material’ one. After the ‘but’ in line 293, a different dimension pertaining to the same comparison is invoked: ‘culturally, there is still something missing (.)’. There seems to be a clear distinction between a ‘material’ dimension on which the Romanies are said to be implicitly comparable to ‘us’ and other ethnic groups and a ‘cultural’ dimension, dimension on which the ‘differentiation’ of Romanies is achieved and made salient. This is not a random comment, but its ideological, contextual force and importance is to be understood if one goes back to Marc’s other comments on the Romanies. This account is very similar to Marc’s previous comments analysed in chapter eight about Romanies lacking and backwardness in terms of ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’.

His statement, ‘Culturally, there is still something missing’ is uttered as a statement of impartial description, based on the assumption that ‘culture’ is something that the other ethnic groups (Hungarians, Germans, Serbs) and last, but not least, the Romanians, who represent the other term of the comparison, own and take for granted. Notwithstanding the

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2 This is presented as an objective, uncontroversial fact and it is distanced from the self (note that he talks about the ‘Romanians’ rather than using ‘us’).
discrete 'cultural differences' between the ethnic groups that are being compared, all these groups (including the Romanians) are said to possess 'culture' understood in an universal sense. They are seen as cultured, civilized.

If in the case of the Hungarians, similarities are emphasised and there is no mention of cultural differences, in the case of Romanies, ‘difference’ is emphasised and not on any dimension Romanies are not said to be poor, to be lacking social skills, to be poorly integrated or whatever, this is something that the speaker would be willing to concede. What Marc is not willing to concede relates to a dimension of comparison, which is an essential one, not peripheral. It is ‘culture’ that distinguishes ‘us’ (and this ‘us’ includes this time the Hungarians and the other ethnic groups) from ‘them’. By making relevant ‘cultural’ differences, Romanies are relegated to a single, ‘special’ category to be differentiated from a ‘composite’ category, which includes ‘us’ and the other ethnic groups.

It is nevertheless true that Marc concedes that ‘we’ are until a point part of the same story, point beyond which ‘we’ differ ‘essentially’. The distinction between the ‘material’ and the ‘cultural’ to which he is orienting seems to be very important. If the ‘material’ is something that can be acquired, ‘culture’ is something intrinsic to the person and to the group to which the person belongs. As previously emphasised when analysing Marc’s comments on the Romanies, to talk of ‘culture’, and not of ‘nature’ is to be heard as displaying sensitivity and tolerance, showing respect for difference and appreciating others. The emphasis of ‘culture’ as something that is missing places Marc’s argument within a discourse of culture with essentialist contours, very similar to the one that he has previously used.

The main assumption that constitutes the backdrop against which Marc’s present argument is constructed, is not only that cultural differences are to be seen as essential differences, but something that stretches beyond this. Marc’s use of the term ‘culture’ (culturally) is slipping between the two meanings of ‘culture’, the particular one (of cultural differences), but also the universal one (of culture as civilization). The second (universal) meaning is the one that permits the implicit invocation of an objective, natural framing of inter-group relations and moral standing in the world. As previously argued, the ethnic groups from which the Romanies are differentiated are said to possess (and own) ‘culture’ understood.
in an universal sense. Romanies lack something, which is very important in ‘our’ [not just Romanian] eyes, something that it is shared, at a general level, by all the ‘others’. What accounts for the ‘status’ of the Romanies is their backwardness in terms of ‘culture’ (in an universal sense) in comparison with the ‘others’ The implicit (cultured, civilized, enlightened) standard of the ‘others’ is accorded privileged standing in the comparison (cf. Sampson, 1993) One of the effects of such construction of the Romanies is to rob them of ‘any genuine standing in the world, thereby permitting the dominant groups to operate more freely to achieve validation for themselves and ensure the maintenance of their privilege’ (Sampson, 1993, p. 4).

‘Comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ are not to be seen as neutral processes, they are not reflections of the reality, nor a straightforward reflection of specific group’s characteristics, but they are *ideological* and used ‘locally’ to achieve ominous and tendentious ideological effects. Through ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’, Romanies are thus made to stand out. And moreover, they are made to stand out on *their own*. The implication of this way of accounting is that the Romanies are not comparable to any other group; there is no one that can be said to be ‘culturally’ (essentially) comparable to the Romanies.

A similar example of the interplay between ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ in constructing an ideological representation of Romanies is to be seen in the next extract. In extract 2, one can see Sandra, the fifty–one years old speech therapist, which has expressed overt support for the right-wing politics of Tudor and Funar and whose talk about Romanies was previously analysed.

**Extract 2, interview 38**

362 Chris After the Revolution, the interethnic conflicts in March 1990 from 363 Tg Mures, the most recent between the Romanians and the Gypsies 364 from Hadaren, or from Mihail Kogalnceanu, Constanta 365 county, have arisen contradictory comments ( ) Who 366 do you think is responsible for the inter-ethnic conflict? 367 Sandra Right ( ) 368 Chris I am thinking about Romanians and Hungarians, but more about 369 Romanians and Gypsies ( ) let’s talk now about the conflict between 370 the Romanians and the Romanies ( ) right ( ) 371 Sandra Of the two ethnic groups, the Hungarian ethnic group have integrated 372 themselves, we could say that they have integrated themselves on all 373 counts ( ) more or less ( ) into the social, economic, 374 cultural life of Romania ( ) The others, the Gypsies, no ( ) I don’t 375 have anything against them, I was telling you ( ) I ( ) I can’t say 376 that I hate an ethnic group, but these ones ( ) from their ranks, 377 very, very few have integrated themselves in ( ) in all the domains
of Romanian life () they () but you cannot agree () you, as
Romanian (mm) () with () with theft () with the antisocial acts
of the gypsies ()

362 Chris Duşă revoluţie, conflictele inter-etnice din Martie 1990 de la

tg Mureş, cele mai recente dintre români şi tiganii
din Hădâreni, sau din comuna Mihail Kogălniceanu, judeţul
Constanţa, au dat naştere la comentarii contradictorii () Cine
cred eş că este responsabil de conflictul inter- etnic?

367 Sandra Da ()

368 Chris Atât români-maghiari, cât mai
369 mult români-tiganii () acum să ne oprim ()
370 români-romi () da ()
371 Sandra Dintre cele două etnii, etnia maghiară s-a
372 integrat, putem spune () că s-a integrat din toate punctele de
373 vedere () mai mult sau mai puţin () în viaţa socială, economică,
culturală a României () Ceilalţi, tiganii, nu () N-am nimenic
375 împotriva lor, ți-ai spus () Nu () nu pot să spun
376 ca urăsc o etnii, dar aceştia () din aceştia,
377 foarte, foarte puţini s-au integrat în () în toate domeniile
378 viaţii româneşti () ei () dar nu pot să fi în de acord () tu, că
379 român (mm) () cu () cu furturi () cu actele antiso ciale ale
380 tiganilor ()

Like in Marc's case, the interviewer starts by asking a general question related, this time,
to the inter-ethnic conflict from March 1990. Then, after a short acknowledgment token
introduced by Sandra in line 367, he goes on to point to specifics in an attempt to channel
the discussion. The interviewer's comments in lines 368-370 that refer to the inter-ethnic
conflicts between the Romanians and Hungarians on one hand, and Romanians and
Romanes, on the other, do not necessarily seem to invite making distinctions between
Hungarians and Romanies, but Sandra is nevertheless keen to distinguish between the two
groups.

In lines 371-374 she introduces a clear contrast. She starts by pointing to the context of the
distinctions that she is about to make. By saying 'of the two ethnic groups' (line 371)
Sandra can be seen as circumscribing her comments which are to be read as being made
with reference to the Hungarians and the Romanies. It is said that it is the Hungarians,
which, out of the two ethnic groups, 'have integrated themselves, we could say that they
have integrated themselves on all counts () more or less () into the social, economic,
cultural life of Romania ()' (lines 371-374). This is a move of particularization
(concretisation – van Leeuwen, 1995, 1996) that sets up a contrast (differentiates) between
the Hungarians and the Romanies on the particular dimension of 'integration'. This move
also leaves open a rhetorical slot for introducing comments about the other group in
question, that is the Romanies.
In line 374, Sandra introduces her comments about the Romanies with what can be regarded as a conclusion insofar the issue of integration is concerned: 'The others, the Gypsies, no (.). This is immediately followed by a qualification in lines 374-378 ‘I don’t have anything against them, I was telling you (.). I (.). I can’t say that I hate an ethnic group, but these ones (.). from their ranks, very, very few have integrated themselves in (.) in all the domains of Romanian life (.).’ One could argue that Sandra is orienting to the fact that what she is saying might be taken as prejudiced, and by using a disclaimer she can be seen displaying reasonableness and fending off potential criticism.

Sandra’s display of reasonableness and tolerance nevertheless opens the way for criticism, for constructing and presenting Romanies as problematic and blameworthy: ‘very, very few have integrated themselves in all the domains of Romanian life’ The comparison with the Hungarians makes the Romanies distinctive and more negative. This is not only due to the present contrast, but also to previous negative descriptions.

Sandra takes the criticism further in lines 378-380: ‘but you cannot agree (.). you, as Romanian (mm) (.). with (.). with theft (.) with the antisocial acts of the gypsies (.)’ Note the shift from the previous personal disclaimer and personal vantage point to a more general, in-group referent: ‘you\(^3\), as Romanian’. One could argue that this comment is stronger in its moral implications than the previous one referring to the issue of integration. If in the case of the issue of ‘integration’, there was an explicit comparison with the Hungarians, in the case of emphasising the ‘theft’, the ‘antisocial acts’ of the Romanies, there is an implicit contrast with the national super-ordinate category ‘Romanian’. It is morally, as well as ideologically, more persuasive to show indignation from the height of the position which is granted to someone (Sandra included) by virtue of membership in the national category ‘Romanian’.

One could argue that in both cases, the central frame of Sandra’s argument is opposition or more precisely, dichotomy. The symmetry of the contrast pair conceals the asymmetry of power that caused it in the first place. The very existence of the dichotomy testifies to the presence of a ‘differentiating power’, to use Bauman’s apt term. In the case of Romanies,

\(^3\) The Romanian ‘tu’ is conventionally used to address (or to point) to a person different from the current speaker. In this sense it is exclusive. But the same ‘tu’ (which is the case here) can be used to point to a general ‘we’, in which case it is used inclusively ‘You, as Romanian’ can be read as including in the category ‘Romanian’ the speaker, the interviewer, but potentially anybody else too
it is the power-laden differentiation that makes the difference and invests the differentiation process with ideological meaning. The meaningfulness of what the participants are saying is nested in the (discursive and rhetorical) practices (of power) capable of making 'difference', that is, by separating and keeping apart. The 'differentiating power' 'hides as a rule behind one of the members of the opposition' (Bauman, 1991, p. 14). The Romanies are but the other of the Hungarians, they are but the other of what (and who) is to be cast under membership in the category 'Romanian'.

As Bauman has cogently noted, 'dichotomy is an exercise in power and at the same time its disguise. Though no dichotomy would hold without the power to set apart and cast aside, it creates an illusion of symmetry' (Bauman, 1991, p. 14). The Hungarians are involved in symmetrical relationships, whilst the Romanies are involved in asymmetrical relationships of power. The power and the ideological significance of these relationships does not come from a straightforward illustration of how things stand, but from a process of fixating and making meaning through representational distillation and abstraction.

As the previous analysis has shown, the rhetoric of 'comparison' and 'differentiation' is to be cashed out in two different, opposite acts: inclusion and exclusion. Processes of 'comparison', on one hand, and 'differentiation', on the other, split the moral order into two. On one side, entities (groups) that are linked to the same underlying principle of 'civilization', 'advancement', 'order', 'organization' and on the other side, the Romanies, linked to the opposite principle of 'lack of civilization', 'backwardness', 'disorder', 'chaos'. In a nutshell, this is a process of classification. Through an ideological process of 'comparison' and 'differentiation', certain entities (groups) are included into a class, 'made a class – only in as far as other entities are excluded, left outside' (Bauman, 1991, p. 2, emphasis in original).

As I hope to have shown, 'comparisons' and 'differentiation' are not to be seen as restricted to the dynamics of 'reality' and group characteristics, but rather as involving the enactment and reproduction of asymmetrical relations of power between the Romanies and the 'others' ('us' and the other ethnic groups). Both processes are discursive through and through, they are 'local' and contextual and they have as backdrop orientations to relations of moral standing in the world.
‘Ambivalence’ towards Tudor and Funar

In the previous section, I have looked at some of the ways in which speakers from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category have managed issues of ‘difference’ by using the rhetorical and discursive moves of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’⁴. Taking this perspective (and probably overstating the case), one could argue that there is no loophole, as it were, in the process of fixing representational, ideological meaning insofar Romanies are concerned. There is no escape from the representation that it is being imposed on them, there is no escape from the power to define the ideological boundaries of the representation of Romanies. The constructed dichotomy between the Romanies and ‘others’, which is the outcome of processes of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’, is spurious because it is highly stereotyped itself and based on ideological and moral exclusionary premises.

A very similar dichotomy based on the rhetorical and ideological moves of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ was also identified in the accounts of those who were ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar. As in the case of the participants ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’, a ‘language game’ was constructed by participants in the ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ category, which has the ideological effect of robbing the Romanies of a genuine moral standing in the world and delegitimizing them as an ethnic group. This is a ‘language game’ of exclusion, classification and closure, of denying coevalness (Fabian, 1983), part and parcel of a ‘habitus’ of dominance and bigotry. The rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ is an essential part of the same ‘moral exclusion’ discourse analysed in the previous chapter, but this time, this moral exclusionary discourse is realized, accomplished, enacted with different rhetorical and ideological means.

I will continue this chapter by looking at how all the above-mentioned concerns can be encountered when participants in the ‘ambivalent’ towards Tudor and Funar category make flexible and active use of the moves of ‘comparison’ and differentiation in order to build a specific ideological representation of Romanies as the outcome of making

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⁴ I do not necessarily see these discursive and rhetorical moves as separate, discrete entities. As the analysis from the previous section has shown, it is the move of ‘comparison’ that allows the move of ‘differentiation’ to be brought in, whilst the move of ‘differentiation’ is the outcome of a rhetoric of ‘comparison’.
(operating) distinctions between the Romames, ‘us’, the Hungarians and other ethnic groups.

Bearing this in mind, I will proceed with my next examples collected from the ‘ambivalence towards Tudor and Funar’ category. The next extract sees Valeria, a twenty-five year old teacher having to answer a question that deals with the problem of extending the rights, the privileges of the ethnic and national minorities.

Extract 3, interview 22

360 Chris Credeți că drepturile ( ) privilegiile minorităților naționale și
361 Valeria etnice ar trebui extinse” ( )
362 Valeria Drepturile lor? ( ) dacă ar mai trebui să fie extinse? (1 8) n u cred
364 Chris "Gânditi-vă și la maghiari, și la germani, și la țigani" ( ) și pe ei ( )
366 Valeria Și, tocmai asta este ( ) că (1) dacă ( ) și din punctul lor de vedere se observă o ( ) o dorință de a ameliora situația, atunci
368 da ( ) hai ( ) să le extindem, n-are nimeni problemă,
369 astă vreme cât asta nu duce la ( ) conflicte, de exemplu, cum a fost atunci ( ) Deci (.) mă refer de exemplu acuma la țiganii,
371 mă gândesc că ei practic nu au atâtea drepturi câte au ( )
372 câte au germanii, câte au maghiarii (0 ?) Dar ( ) nefiind nici
civilizață, ei nu știu să ( ) să aibă pretenția (să profite
374 de asta) da, nu știu nici să profite
375 ( ) pentru că ei se complec în situația respectivă ( ) fiind așa cum
376 sunt ( )

380 Valeria Și dacă le oferi un loc de muncă, vine cât vine, după aia nu
381 mai vine, preferă să știe pe stradă și să cerăsească
382 și să acuze, că uite el știe ca pentru că n-are de lucru ( )
383 decât să tragă puțin și să ajungă până la urmă totuși undeva ( )
385 Sunt foarte mulți români cărora le merge poate mai rau decât
386 țiganilor, dar n-au ce să facă, asta e situația ( )
387 mai trag așa cum pot ( ) și asta este ( ) Dar ( ) nu ( ) nu au
388 ( ) felul lor de a fi (mm)

390 Chris Do you think that the rights ( ) the privileges of national and
391 ethnic minorities should be extended? ( )
392 Valeria Their rights? ( ) If they should be extended more? (1 8) I do nt
393 think so
394 Chris Think of the Hungarians, the Germans and the Gypsies ( ) they are
395 too ( )
398 Valeria Well, this is the point ( ) that (1) if ( ) even from their point of
399 view one can notice a ( ) a desire to ameliorate the situation, then
400 yes ( ) okay ( ) let’s extend them ( ) nobody has a problem with it,
401 as long as this doesn’t lead to ( ) conflicts, for example, as there
402 were then ( ) So ( ) I am talking for example now about the Gypsies,
403 I am thinking that they practically do not have as many rights as
404 ( ) as the Germans, as the Hungarians (0 ?) But ( ) not being
405 civilized, they don’t know how to ( ) to have pretense (to take
406 advantage of this) yes, they don’t even know how to take advantage
407 ( ) because they are complacent in that situation ( ) being the way
408 they are ( )

410 Valeria And if you offer them a job, he comes for a while, after that he
412 does not come anymore, he prefers to stay on the street and to beg
413 and to accuse ( ) that he is like that because he doesn’t have a job
414 ( ) instead to try a little and to get eventually somewhere ( )
416 There are a lot of Romanians who are less well off than the
417 Gypsies, but there is nothing they can do, this is the situation ( )
418 they try as they can ( ) and that’s it ( ) But ( ) no ( ) they don’t
419 ( ) have their way of being (mm)

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In line 362-363, after echoing the interviewer’s question and marking a 1.8 pause, Valerna offers a rather straightforward answer: ‘I do not think so’ In line 364, the interviewer takes the matter further and offers further orientation to the matter under discussion. This can be seen as a sign that the interviewer treats Valerna’s answer as unsatisfactory. He invites Valerna to think not just in general terms, but also in specific terms related to specific ethnic groups: the Hungarians, the Germans and the Gypsies. Let me note that, like in my previous analysed example, the list that the interviewer offers seems to invite a comparison and also to imply that there might some kind of differences between the listed groups insofar the issue brought up in the question is concerned.

Mentioning the Gypsies as the third element of the list seems to trigger an immediate reaction. After a short preface (lines 366-370), which sees Valerna talking about extending the rights of the gypsies with the provision that them too show ‘a desire to ameliorate the situation’ (line 367), Valerna concedes that ‘practically’ Gypsies ‘do not have as much rights as ( ) as the Germans, as the Hungarians (0.7)’ (lines 371-372). At this point, one could say that by comparing the rights of the Gypsies with the rights of some other ethnic groups (the Germans, the Hungarians) Valerna could be seen as displaying reasonableness and understanding insofar the Romanies are concerned. But, as the subsequent analysis will show, the ‘problem’ for Valerna is not to support the idea that Gypsies have fewer rights than the other ethnic minorities, but to demonstrate, in a rhetorical and discursive move of ‘blaming the victim’, why they have fewer rights.

One can see that Valerna’s remarks in lines 366-370 are nevertheless being qualified and this is part and parcel of a display of reasonableness. There is an oscillation between sympathy and blame, which is not used to build a seemingly even-handed and reasonable picture of the Romanies, but to allow for making the Romanies nevertheless accountable for their situation. An implicit ‘differentiation’ from the other mentioned ethnic groups is the backdrop against which conclusions are drawn insofar Romanies are concerned. The issue of rights for the Gypsies is being reframed as something that pertains to their ‘culture’ and their ‘way of being’: ‘But (.) not being civilized, they don’t know how to ( ) to have pretences (to take advantage of this) yes, they don’t even know how to take
advantage (.) because they are complacent in that situation (.) being the way they are (.)’ (lines 372-376)

Their implied backwardness, which comes as a consequence of ‘not being civilized’, is invoked in order to put together a verbal portrait of Romany character and ‘mentality’. This matches the portrayal of Romanies as ‘foreign’ to a ‘civilized’ way of being from the previous chapter. Valeria is constructing an image of Romanies through a sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit ‘differentiation’ from other ethnic minority groups. The backdrop of this ‘differentiation’ is the implicit reference to a normative moral order, which generates its inadaptable, uncivilized, beyond the moral order antithesis. In doing so, the psychological (and social) distance between the Romanies and other ethnic groups is maximized, as is the distance between Romanies and the normative moral order represented by those groups. It is a process of drawing moral boundaries that rests on the assumptions of an ‘essentialist’ discourse: ‘they don’t even know how to take advantage ( ) because they are complacent in that situation (.) being the way they are (.)’ (lines 374-376)

The formulation: ‘being the way they are’ is of importance here. One can read this as a rather extreme comment, which can be seen as an essentialist ‘theoretical rationalization’ (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). As was the case with the previously encountered rationalizations, the focus is on the Romanies themselves, rather on the activities they are involved in. Romanies do the things they do (in this case, they are not doing the things that they are supposed to do) because that’s the way they are. This leads to a number of inferences regarding on one hand, the way the Romanies are and on the other hand, what Romanies do. It is not just the characteristics of Romanies that are essentialized, but also their ontological ‘being in the world’. They are reduced to the essence of their essence. Taking also into account the previous accounts from the different speakers in the ‘ambivalence towards Tudor and Funar’ category, this can be seen an argument about what this Romany ‘essence’ permits. The implicit (general) conclusion is that it does not afford for ‘civilization’, it does not afford for ‘fitting’, it is a backward ‘essence’. This is a very important element of the ideological representation of Romanies as it is part of an imagining that excludes the Romanies from membership in the category ‘civilized’ and casts them beyond what is ‘reasonable’ in contemporary society together with blaming ‘them’ for the way things stand.
There is another instance of this 'essentializing' process embedded in the rhetorical use of a 'comparison' and 'differentiation' strategy, further down in the interview. This time there is an explicit contrast between the Romanians and the Gypsies on a social and implicit economical dimension. Again, a discourse of 'culture' as a way of being in the world is intertwined with an 'essentialist' discourse is used to make the case for intergroup differences and cast the Romanies beyond the moral order. Valena concedes that it might be that there are some similarities between Romanians and Gypsies insofar the economic status is concerned. She even argues that 'there are a lot of Romanians who are less well off than the Gypsies' (lines 385-386). But there is also a very important difference to which she wants to draw attention. the idea that these Romanians might be poor (or very poor), very much like the gypsies are, but 'they don’t (. . .) have their way of being (mm)’ (lines 387-388). As the previously analysed 'essentializing' description, it does not appear alone and it is the more insidious and denigratory as it is part (and the outcome) of a comparison/differentiation pair.

The two kinds of 'essentialist' conclusions of Valena’s arguments that she has put forward (lines 375-376 and respectively, lines 387-388) not only work to justify and normalize the moral implications of the 'local' discriminatory policies directed towards the Romanies, but could also be read as being located within a broader moral space with general ideological consequences. As previously argued, in order to understand the full implications of this kind of accounts, one ought to look at the ideological position from which these accounts are spoken, the position from which the presence of Romanies is considered (cf. Dixon and Durrheim, 2000). One would notice that the voice is that of an ‘insider’, someone who speaks, not necessarily from within ‘her’ [Romanian] community, but from within the universal community of the ‘civilized’, the ‘settled’, the ‘normal’ and the ‘reasonable’. In this particular extract, this is done through explicitly enlisting other ethnic groups (and ‘us’) in order to make a point regarding to what Romanies are and do.

Doing this, Valena has constructed and put forward a perspective which is not only ‘local’, but which is that of the ‘universally’ civilized, adapted. The message that can be drawn from here is rather clear: it is not only that Romanies are unlike ‘us’, but they are also unlike any other ‘foreigners’ (they are also unlike any other nation). The modus existendi of Romanies is the antithesis of a possible modus coexistendi. All this works to
prescribing an ideological position for Romanies, one that places them beyond the ‘reasonable’ bounds of society.

As my first three examples, and the subsequent ones will show, the process of ‘differentiation’ of which Romanies are made part is not established on the premises of equal footing. The Romanies are the marked members in this process, the ‘they’ to be set apart from the reasonable and civilized ‘we’. ‘Abnormality’, deviation, non-conformism is attributed to the ‘other’ as an essential property (cf. Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998, Verkuyten, 2001). The social relations and social formations of which the Romanies (with their intrinsic characteristics) are said to be part of are very far from being relations between ‘territorially’ grounded groups, with which confrontation and counter-position is made on an equal footing. These are relations of power and the ‘differentiating power’ that drives this process gives way to ‘extreme inequality’, which is brought to the fore by the participants’ use of this rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’. The relations between the Romanies and the ‘others’ (a category that includes ‘us’ alongside other minority groups) are relations based on a Manichean logic. They are the essential polar pairs of ‘us’ vs ‘them,’ ‘civilized’ vs. ‘uncivilized’ etc., which give rise to the enactment of extreme prejudiced discourse. The next extract is a very good example of this.

In extract 4 one can see Andrei, a fifty-four year old financial inspector, offering an answer to a question about the existence of prejudices against the Hungarians. I want to focus here on Andrei’s use of this rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ and its rhetorical and ideological effects in the form of extreme prejudiced discourse

Extract 4, interview 4

313 Chris Do you think that Romanians are prejudiced against the Hungarians or

5 This differentiation process is similar to the ‘social differentiation’ that Henri Tajfel was talking about. It is part and parcel of the same dynamic process, which, as Tajfel was arguing, ‘can only be understood against the background of relations between social groups and the social comparisons they make in the context of these relations’ (1981b, p 157, italics in original) ‘Differentiation’ is not to be seen as a cognitive process, but as a discursive process. As discursive psychologists have shown, social categorization is something that it is achieved discursively and has different ideological effects. Nevertheless, there is an important difference from the socio-cognitive studies (including Tajfel’s) insofar this rhetoric of ‘differentiation’ is concerned. The pattern here is not one of ‘shifting the onus’, of defamation of other groups in order to put one’s own social status in a better light, but rather a pattern that goes beyond ‘differentiation’ itself. It is not about downgrading, downplaying the Romany ‘status’ It is about refusing them a place and being in the world. Some of the tenets of group differentiation and social comparison theory may apply here, but to follow that route that would mean to over-simplify the matter. What the participants are hinting at (and myself, in analysing their talk) is that this phenomenon is something that goes beyond mere ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ and its effects are dangerous, as their are ideological.
I want to start by noting that the question of the interviewer is phrased in specific group terms and ask specifically about the possibility of Romanians having prejudices against the Hungarians. The first part of the question seems to invite a criticism of the ‘Romanians’, but with ‘or not really’ another candidate is given. By its ‘openness’ to different versions the question presents the issue of Romanians’ prejudices towards the Hungarians as something to argue about and something with no definite answer. In lines 315-316 the main implicit assumption of the question is denied and in order to argue against the possible existence of (general) prejudices against the Hungarians, Andrei proposes a distinction between the Hungarians and the Romanes insofar prejudice is concerned. Note that, in comparison to the other question-formats analysed in this chapter, this is a very specific question on a very specific issue. The interviewer does not elaborate further than ‘or not really’ insofar the issue of prejudices towards the Hungarians is concerned. The question does not invite a comparison as the previous ones did and does specifically talks about the Romanes, which makes Andrei’s invocation of the ‘Gypsies’ as part of a contrastive pair very interesting.

In line 315, Andrei avows that the ‘simple Romanian, he has nothing against the Hungarian’. But Andrei does not stop here. There seems to be a ‘problem’ with the ‘simple Romanian’(s), because as Andrei is telling us, ‘towards gypsies, they have
prejudices’ (line 316). Even if the question did not mentioned at all the Gypsies, they are nevertheless talked about. Note that, at this point, Andrei acts merely as the animator of the utterance, leaving open the footing roles of author and principal (cf. Ensink, 2003). He nevertheless switches footing when he talks about the cause of these prejudices: ‘because I told you, these ones don’t work (.)’. This is followed in lines 318-324 by a detailed description of the status of the Hungarians who are said not to have problems (line 318), ‘they are integrated in society’ (lines 318-319). Moreover, they are ‘a hard-working people’ (line 320 and again line 324) and they ‘must be appreciated from this point of view’ (line 323). These descriptions of the Hungarians are presented as part of an implied ‘comparison’ with ‘us’ and at the same time, a ‘differentiation’ from the Romanies.

In lines 323-326, the counter-position of the Hungarians and the Gypsies is made clear. The particle ‘so’ in line 323 introduces a conclusion about the Hungarians in the form of a praising comment. What is interesting is that this conclusion does not stand on its own, but it is followed by an explicit contrast with the Romanies. The praising of one group is turned into a criticism and denigration of another. But if one looks carefully, the group that Andrei talks about, the Romanies are not just ‘another’ group to be chosen from the pool of groups that are to be compared based on possible shared assumption of similarity. Andrei can be seen as attempting to define the nature of Gypsy identity (and at the same time to justify, to warrant Romanian prejudices against them) through the use of an ‘unequal’ comparison with the Hungarians. As other studies have shown, comparisons between ethnic minority groups can be used in order to construct a specific and distinctive negative ethnic identity (Verkuyten et al., 1995). In this case, the positive and praising presentation and descriptions of Hungarians places the Romanies at the exactly opposite (negative) end.

The ‘opposition’ is not made relevant from an ideological position situated within the discourse of ‘differences’ as one might have expected, but within the framework of a ‘moral exclusionary’ discourse. The stereotypical descriptions (similar to the ones used at the beginning of his answer) are spared, but what is offered is an overarching, conclusive, peremptory description, something that tells the whole story about the Gypsies. ‘While gypsies, for the gypsies there is a complete revulsion (mhm) (0.4) for the gypsies (0.2)’ (lines 324-326). If his former praising comments about the Hungarians had as backdrop a
shared assumption of similarity, his latter and peremptory statement about the Romanies is based on a (shared) assumption of complete difference.

From Andrei's comments one could infer that the Gypsies are everything that the Hungarians are not, that they are the complete opposite. I want to argue that the implication of this kind of 'differentiation' coupled with the use of the extreme term 'revulsion' reaches beyond the issue of 'complete difference'. The implication of this kind of comments stretch to a realm of 'beyond difference', a realm of incompatibility and incommensurability of identities. The Hungarians (and for that matter, 'us') and the Romanies are not the two sides of the same coin, they are not at opposite ends of a 'difference' continuum, but they are made and said not to share symbolic, moral space of identity. 'Revulsion' is the operative word, a key-term, umbrella term for everything that is negative about the Romanies and need not be stated. Note that, in opposition to the previous uses of this kind of extreme description, in this extract, this description does not appear alone and it is the more insidious as it appear alongside positive descriptions of the Hungarians and it is upgraded by the use of the word 'complete' ('complete revulsion').

The issue of 'complete revulsion' insofar the Romanies are concerned leads us back to a sense of Romanies as the 'abject' (Kristeva, 1982), as matter 'out of place' encountered in the examples analyzed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, according to the intrinsic logic and the implicit and explicit assumptions brought forward by the contrast put forward by Andrei, 'revulsion' has to be seen not as something coming from an inner (personal) psychological disposition of loathing or abhorrence, but rather as being the effect of something that essentially resides within Romanies. Andrei does not claim to be personally revolted by the Romanies, but talks about this 'complete revulsion' in general terms. There is a shift of footing from the personal involvement insofar the story related to the Hungarians was concerned to a more impersonal way of talking about 'revulsion' insofar the Romanies are concerned. One can see this as a way for Andrei to concede that these phenomena exist somewhere, without nevertheless conceding a personal relation to them (cf. Ensink, 2003). This also works to present this phenomenon as being pervasive and general and not just something that could be attached (related) to the feelings, wishes and motives of a particular person.
This is a move of establishing the out-there-ness of disgust and to place it in the ‘object’. It is something to which ‘we’ (and note that here, this putative ‘we’ includes the Hungarians) react against. Andrei’s argument can also be seen as being addressed to an ‘universal audience’ to which the ‘fact’ that Romany ‘behaviour’ is disgusting is non-controversial. As demonstrated, this is not an avowal of being personally revolted by the Romanies, but rather an account that warrants the reasonableness of being revolted. It is claim for reasonableness based on the implicit idea that everyone would feel the same (that is, disgusted) about the Romanies and their behaviour.

The ideological effect of this final extreme comment is that of denying ‘moral legitimacy’ to Romanies, denying them the status of ‘moral’ subjects and objects, placing them in the realm of the aloof, detestable ‘horror’ (Jahoda, 1999). The denigratory and exclusionary effect of this statement comes not only from its in-built extremity and negativity, but also from the use of a specific contrast and the correlated power to define the terms of this contrast. The speaker legislates (as society does) who is to be seen and placed on the ‘civilized’ side, who is to be seen as a success on the motivational schemes of (Romanian) society and community and who, by contrast, is to be cast outside reasonable bounds, as outsider in society, as abject.

One can see how the pair ‘comparison’/differentiation’ can prove to be an extremely powerful tool to avow (in the case of Hungarians), but at the same time to disavow forms of community (in the case of the Romanies). One could go further and say that the ‘comparison’/differentiation’ pair constitutes a powerful rhetorical resource used not necessarily to accomplish a social diagnostic insofar Romanies are concerned, but rather to pass a moral verdict (cf. McCarthy and Rapley, 2001). Thus, the only possible result of this ideological positioning is moral and social exclusion.

‘Opposing’ Tudor and Funar

In the previous sections, I have looked at some of the ways in which speakers from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ category and the ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ category used the rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and differentiation’ to make ideological distinctions between different ethnic minority groups. As the previous analysis has
hopefully shown, there were no striking differences between the way those who straightforwardly supported Tudor and Funar and those who were 'ambivalent' towards their policies positioned the Romanies outside reasonable bounds. The different topics of their talk might have been different, but not the overall emphasis on placing Romanies beyond the moral order by using and emphasising processes of 'comparison' and 'differentiation'. As I hope to have shown, one can identify an interplay of 'comparison' and 'differentiation' processes embedded in different sorts of ideological discourses ('culture discourse', 'essentialist discourse' and traces of an 'eliminationist' belief system) that build a 'social representation' of Romanies which places them in the only available social and political position to them: that of subordination and oppression.

The question now is, can one find pretty much the same features when one looks at the participants from the 'opposing Tudor and Funar' category? Can one find the same interplay of 'comparison' and 'differentiation' used to achieve different ideological effects, but mainly that of positioning the Romanies outside 'our' moral order? These questions and others will hopefully be answered at the end of this section.

Take for example, extract 5, where Corina, a twenty-seven year old lawyer, is offering an answer on the Romanians' attitudes towards the Hungarians. The interviewer is trying implicitly to frame the issue of the attitudes towards the Hungarians as matter of public debate and remain as neutral as possible. A normative stance of the publicly available views is implicated in the incorporation of possible positions offered for confirmation or disconfirmation (positive or negative attitudes). As Pomerantz and Zemel have recently argued, 'an interviewer's framing the issue as a matter of public debate may be an attempt to be even-handed with respect to the various positions within the debate' (2003, p. 225). Note also that the question does not ask about Corina's personal attitude towards the Hungarians, but it is phrased in a general way.

Extract 5, interview 12

425  Chris  What do you think the most attitudes towards the Hungarians are?
426  Corina  Positive or negative?
427  Corina  The majority are positive ( ) so it is obvious that ( ) Insofar they are concerned, nobody I think that ( )
428  Chris  Do you think that there are no prejudices against the Hungarians?
429  Corina  No ( ) so the Hungarians are regarded as normal people, regular people ( ) so in a way like the Romanians, as opposed to the Romanies ( ) so, this is how I see it ( ) the Romanies have their
problem ( ) The Hungarians don't ( ) at least in my opinion ( )
I think they are ( ) the same ( ) how should I say ( ) on a daily
basis ( ) I don't think that Romanians are in any way different ( )

In lines 427-428, Corina offers a straightforward answer. 'The majority are positive (.) So it is obvious that (.) Insofar they are concerned, nobody I think that (.)'. In answering, Corina takes up the footing of the question and there is no sign of explicit personal commitment to the ideas that she expresses Corina acts as the mere animator, leaving the roles of author and principal open (cf. Ensink, 2003). According to Corina, the majority of the attitudes towards the Hungarians are positive, but the matter is not taken further. Her account finishes with a qualification that strengthens the implication of her opening statement The explicit reference to 'them' and the use of the extreme case formulation 'nobody' make the case for a complete absence of negative attitudes towards the Hungarians, but can also be seen as a subtle indication of an implicit 'differentiation' move.

In line 429, the interviewer comes in after Corina's moment of silence This can be seen as a move of confirmation insofar the gist of her previous comments is concerned There is a subtle move from talking about negative attitudes towards the Hungarians to talking about prejudices. This can be seen as an indication that the interviewer has understood Corina’s previous comments as a denial of prejudices against the Hungarians and there is a sense that a justification is required for that particular kind of opinion. The original question of the interviewer, as well as his second intervention, are not to be seen as looking only for a position, but also for the basis of holding the position. In order to answer the query, Corina has to operate adjustments (see Pomerantz and Zemel, 2003) to respond to the implications of the interviewer's intervention and to counter the bases of possible attributions of prejudice Corina counters the assumed basis for her position by explicitly

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offering a basis for it. The explicit basis of her position rests on a comparison/differentiation move.

The confirmation comes quickly in line 430: ‘No’, meaning, there are no prejudices against the Hungarians. In lines 430-432, the opening ‘no’ is being explained: ‘so the Hungarians are regarded as normal people, regular people (.) so in a way like the Romanians, as opposed to the Romanies (.)’, thus bringing out the implication of her comment in lines 427-428. As can be seen from the previously quoted stretch of talk, Corina introduces a double move of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ in order to account for the absence of prejudices against Hungarians. Note that the question that precedes this comment did not invite making distinctions, but Corina uses this comparison/differentiation move spontaneous. Note also that Corina’s footing in answering this question is not different from the footing she has used in answering the (first) original question. Again, she acts as a mere animator, ‘Hungarians are regarded as ( ...)’, accounting in a distanced and general way about the way Hungarians are seen as opposed to the Romanies. She does not talk about ‘us’, but she talks about the ‘Romanians’.

Corina is offering an account, on Romanians’ views on the Hungarians, which can be seen as a report on prejudice (or rather the absence of prejudice in as far as the Hungarians are concerned). The Hungarians are said to be ‘regarded as normal people, regular people’, ‘in a way like the Romanians’. The dimension chosen for comparison is that of ‘normality’ and ‘ordinariness’. The comparison move between the Hungarians and the Romanians is immediately followed by a differentiation move, which places the Romanies at the other end of the continuum of normality and ordinariness.

In lines 432-435, the move of comparison/differentiation is taken further ‘so, this is how I see it (.) the Romanies have their problem (.) The Hungarians don’t (.) at least in my opinion (.) I think they are (.) the same (.) how should I say (.) on a daily basis (.) I don’t think that Romanies are in any way different (.)’. At this point, one can see Corina shifting footing by taking responsibility for her previous statements, but also for the ones

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6 One could argue that these are not randomly chosen dimensions of comparison and differentiation, because through differentiation it is implied that these are features lacking when it comes to consider the Romanies
that follow her avowal of personal belief. There is a switch from talking about the attitudes of Romanians towards the Hungarians (lines 430-431) to expressing her own view on the matter (which is an essentialist view, or rather a view on the similarities of Hungarian and Romanian essences) (lines 433-435).

She introduces, in the form of a conclusion, the idea that 'the Romanies have their problem'. This is to be seen as a continuation of the previous comparison/differentiation move and marks yet another shift, a shift from reasonably talking about prejudice and about people's views on the Hungarians (lines 430-431) to focusing on the object (target) of prejudice when it comes to mentioning the Romanies (lines 432-433). Note also the contrast with the Hungarians: 'the Hungarians don't' (have the same problem) which again present the 'problem' of the Romanies as something that it is only peculiar to them. There is an implicit display of tolerance (note that she does not say that Romanies are the problem, but that they have 'their problem'). It is not a general, peremptory, prejudiced statement, but it nevertheless incorporates assumptions of blameworthiness and accountability insofar the Romanies are concerned. One could argue that in setting up the comparison/differentiation pair, Corina is drawing upon the common-place of the meaning of prejudice. The implication of the comparison/differentiation pair that Corina uses is imbued with powerful assumptions relating not to the activities attaching to the category 'unprejudiced' or 'prejudiced', but to the nature of the object, target of prejudice.

In line 433, Corina is pointing that the comment to follow pertains to her 'opinion' (at least in my opinion). With 'I think' she introduces again a comparison between the Hungarians and Romanians, re-emphasising the resemblance between the two groups: 'I think they are (.) the same (.) how should I say (.) on a daily basis (.) I don't think that Romanians are in any way different (.)' (lines 434-435) Again she does not use 'we' when mentioning the Romanians, even with a more personal approach to the matter aiming to keep the 'comparison' as 'objective' as possible. The conclusion that Corina puts forward is a very important one for the Romanies, even if, there is no explicit differentiation from them in this sequence. This conclusion that emphasises the 'extreme' resemblance between 'us' and 'them' has important ideological implications insofar the Romanies are concerned and conveys a sort of subjective contrast ratio in positioning people. The implicit idea is that the closer 'we' are to the Hungarians, the further 'we' are from the Romanies. The closer 'we' (Romanians, Hungarians etc) are to normalty,
regularity and civilisation the further the Romanies are from all these issues. Positioning and describing the 'normal', as opposed to focusing directly on the 'abnormal' is an effective rhetorical ploy to build a contrast and position Romanies beyond the moral order without directly committing to airing extreme descriptions of them.

As prefigured in the introduction to this chapter and as the previous example has shown, the rhetorical interplay of 'comparison' and 'differentiation' works to constitute different 'moral universes'. For the remainder of this chapter, I want to complement the issue of the (ideological) position, which is being assigned to the Romanies, by bringing to the front the issue of the 'locatedness' of identities in this process of 'differentiation' The questions to ask are What is the backdrop of the location of Romany identity? What is the ideological framework inside which the rhetoric of 'comparison' and 'differentiation' are foundational elements?

The contention is that the ideological 'frame' that allows for constructing 'difference' is the symbolic space of nationhood and the nation-state. As nationhood has become the paramount basis of group self-constitution, Romanies are being classed beyond nationhood. As the Jews before them, Romanies are seen and considered 'a non-national element', they are, at best, a 'non-national nation' (Bauman, 1989, p 52)

It is these implicit and explicit concerns with the 'place' that Romanies have (or should have) not only in Romanian society, but also in this world, that shape the ideological contours of a specific representation of Romanies. This is the basic ideological assumption that allows the Romanies to be presented and considered as not just unlike any other nation, but also unlike any other foreigners. An example follows, in which Nicu, a twenty-four year old teacher, makes this assumption relevant in interaction

Extract 6, interview 8

507 Chris Do you think that there are prejudices towards the Hungarians or not really?
508 Nicu Very ( ) very ( ) very little ( ) very little ( ) cos' again,
510 in the case of the Hungarians there is a state ( ) who could back
511 them up and (mm) Always ( ) if a Romany cries,
512 'discrimination', not too many people care, but if a Hungarian cries
513 'discrimination', already the local community that intervenes, who
514 will ask for the help ( ) of a bigger region maybe, who will ask
515 the help of the Hungarian country, who( ( )

7 State understood as nation, a nation-state

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The question that Nicu has to answer is one that specifically asks about the possibility of the existence of prejudices towards the Hungarians. By adding 'or not really' the interviewer can be as orienting not only to the existence of different versions and opinions regarding the subject of prejudices towards the Hungarians, but also is showing that he is open to the possibility that the interviewee may reject the implicit perspective implied by the first part of his question.

Nicu takes up the implication brought up by the latter part of the question, emphasizing the idea that there are 'Very (.) very (.) very little (.) very little' prejudices towards the Hungarians. What follows his avowal is a justification of why that is the case. In lines 510-511, Nicu points to what he considers as a possible explanation: 'cos' again, in the case of the Hungarians there is a state ( ) who could back them up'.

The matter is taken further in lines 511-515, when the explanation that Nicu offers is embedded in a 'differentiation' move which involves the Hungarians, on one side, and the Romanies, on the other. The distinction between the two groups is not made, like in the previous accounts that were analysed, based on the counter-position of the intrinsic characteristics of each group, but it is based on the nature of their belonging and its relation to matters of discrimination: 'Always ( ) if a Romany cries, 'discrimination', not too many people care, but if a Hungarian cries 'discrimination', already the local community that intervenes, who will ask for the help ( ) of a bigger region maybe, who will ask the help of the Hungarian country'.

By prefacing his comments with 'always', Nicu presents the phenomenon as not as a one-off case, but rather as something scripted, something general and pervasive. By using the
‘collective singular’ (cf. de Cillia et al., 1999) to refer to both groups, Nicu is making the case for different responses to ‘cnes’ of discrimination. If in the case of ‘a Romany’ crying discrimination ‘not to many people care’, in the case of an Hungarian crying discrimination there is a chain reaction in response to that: it is the local community that intervenes, then it will a bigger region, and then it is the ‘Hungarian country’. The interviewer understands and continues the chain by invoking the European Union in line 516. Then, without delay, in line 517, Nicu agrees completely with the interviewer’s continuation and presents the situation as being of such nature.

Even if the speaker does not make the meaning of his ‘differentiation’ explicit, one could still discern its ideological implications. The analysis of these implications will be guided by the same concerns with the locatedness of identities that characterised the previous chapters. The issue of ‘significance’ is a very important one. In a world populated by nation-states the moral significance of a group is a very important element. The criterion on which this significance is judged is the potential identification with a national group. The issue of a group being the ‘internal significant other’ (see Triandafyllidou, 1998) is not just theoretically important, but it is also ideologically and socially important because its implications stretch beyond mere significance and otherness. The ‘internal significant other’ (as chapter seven on talk about Hungarians has shown) was stereotypically constructed through the constant reproduction of the nation (Billig, 1995a). What I would call the ‘internal insignificant’ other is constructed through the same reproduction of the nation. The ‘insignificance’ of the Romanies comes not from their relative unimportance, but it is the outcome of a rhetoric of nationhood and an ideology of a national place.

The extract analysed is not just a gloss on the nature of prejudice, it is not just a neutral comment of how things stand, but it is also an indication of the ideological tension that participants have to manage when talking (directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly) about the controversial issue of prejudices against the Romanies. Even if much greater care is taken not to enact deictic antagonism and to put forward a representation constructed on the basis of this antagonism, a representation that places the Romanies beyond nationhood and beyond difference is still maintained and reproduced by the use of

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8. Note the term ‘cnes’ in ‘cnes discrimination’ whose use orients to the idea that both the claims of the Romanies and the Hungarians of being discriminated are not justified.

9. In the sense of no consequence, not necessarily unimportant *per se*.
the rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’. The antagonism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not explicitly enacted, but it is nevertheless implicitly conveyed through the reproduction of relations of power between specific groups and orientation to relations of moral standing in the world.

**The potential for criticism**

I want to close this chapter by trying to pick up and discuss some of the implications of previous analysis from this chapter (but also from previous ones). The previous two chapters have documented the dynamics of different kinds of prejudice with a particular emphasis on the analysis of extreme prejudiced talk against the Romanies. As the analysis has shown, when one tackles the issue of common-place prejudiced discourses, one gets the impression that these are so pervasive, so entrenched in common sense that one cannot escape them and is prone to reproduce them in a way or another. This raises the important question of the inevitability of prejudice entrenched in hegemonic or dominant discourses, in an ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990) of dominance within a dominant ideology (Abercrombie et al, 1980, 1990) of nationalism and extreme prejudice. Is there a way out, is there potential for criticism, for reflexive inward looking?

My analysis of prejudice in contemporary Romanian society has been an attempt to map the commonly shared repertoires of prejudice that allow the enactment of prejudiced talk against the Hungarians, on one hand, and the Romanies, on the other. The backdrop of this analysis was the assumption of the existence of a dominant code, of dominant rhetorical and discursive resources and interpretative repertoires pertaining to the expression of common-place nationalism and extreme prejudice. What I want to argue is, that even if there are a set of dominant discourses, dominant ways of talking about prejudice and the objects of prejudice that work to reproduce and legitimate prejudice, this does not mean that prejudice is an inevitable process and one cannot challenge it. It is not only the inevitability of prejudice *per se* which is at stake, but also the inevitability of instantiating and reproducing prejudice in a newly democratic state such as Romania.

The *ideologies* that I have talked about in the course of this thesis are fragmentary, they are ‘lived ideologies’, to use Billig’s phrase, and they allow for the enactment of different
kinds of prejudiced discourse towards different ethnic groups based on a variety of rhetorical and cultural resources. The reproduction of discourses, the putting together of diverse resources should not be seen as an automatic process in which the participants are sucked and trapped into, but rather a dynamic process which allows for criticism (of the in-group) and for inward (critical) look upon oneself and fellow countrymen. It also allows for going beyond mere instantiation and reproduction of ideological representations of ethnic groups.

The next extracts, taken from the ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ category are very good example of what I mean. The first one is an example of orientations to issues related to ‘prejudice’ and ‘nation-states’, whilst the second is an example of orientations to explicit criticism of the in-group. Even if they are differently organized and elaborated, they are both glosses on prejudice (on the nature of prejudice), a sort of reflexive comments or observations, trying to unveil the hidden, unspoken assumptions behind the issue of the existence of prejudices.

In extract 7, one can see Maria, a twenty-seven year old literary critic answering a question about whether Romanians are prejudiced towards the Hungarians. The question to which Maria has to answer is very similar to the one Nicu had to answer, with the difference that this time, the interviewer does not talk in general terms, but specifically asks whether she thinks that Romanians have prejudices towards the Hungarians or not really.

Extract 7, interview 3

433 Chris: Do you think that Romanians are prejudiced towards the Hungarians or not really?
434 Maria: They have ( ) they have a lot of prejudices towards the Hungarians, as they have a lot of prejudices towards the Romanies ( ) just that with the Romanies one can settle it easily ( ) they don't ( ) mm ( ) they cannot ( ) they cannot jeopardize our state security, because they don't have regional autonomy claims, and there wouldn't be any claims to have ( ) but with the Hungarian side, things are different (mm) there are a lot of prejudices and the prejudices have persisted for many years and it is very difficult to change them ( ) now ( ) in two, three years ( ) (mm) in order to be received into NATO ( ) to be received into EU, to fulfil all sorts of conditions ( ) right?
435 Chris: Considerați că românilor au prejudicii față de maghiari sau nu prea?
436 Maria: Au ( ) Au o grămadă de prejudiciați față de maghiari, aşa cum au o grămadă de prejudiciați faţă de romi ( ) numai că, cu romi se rezolvă mai ușor, ei nu ( ) mm ( ) nu pot ( ) nu pot să ne periclitezze nouă siguranța statului, pentru că n-au pretenții de autonomie regională, și nici
As with the previous question, by adding ‘or not really’ the interviewer can be as orienting not only to the existence of different versions and opinions regarding the subject of Romanians’ prejudices towards the Hungarians, but is also showing that he is open to the possibility that the interviewee may reject the implicit perspective implied by the first part of his question.

Maria starts by acknowledging from the beginning (lines 435-436) that ‘They have (...) they have a lot of prejudices towards the Hungarians, as they have a lot of prejudices towards the Romanies ()’ Note that she uses the distanced ‘they have’ when talking about Romanians’ prejudices towards the Hungarians and the Romanies.

At the beginning the Hungarians and the Romanies are not commented upon differently. It is said that ‘they’ (the Romanians) have ‘a lot of prejudices’ towards the two groups. What follows in line 436 is a qualification that deals with the ‘significance’ and difference between the two groups and prejudices towards them. It is said that in as far as the Romanies are concerned, ‘one can settle it easily (...) they don’t (...) mm (...) they cannot (...) they cannot jeopardise our state security, because they don’t have regional autonomy claims, and there wouldn’t be any claims to have (...).’ There is an implicit comparison with the Hungarians, which are not named at this point, but which can be recognized as being hinted at by Maria’s reference to the ‘regional autonomy claims’. Note how Maria switches from a more impersonal and distanced way when talking about prejudices towards the two groups, to a more involved way of explaining the ‘differences’ between the two groups when talking about ‘our state security’. Maria is thus downgrading the political significance of Romanies by implicitly contending that Romanies do not constitute a threat to ‘our’ state.

In lines 441-445, Maria makes explicit and emphasises the contrast with the Hungarians: ‘but with the Hungarian side, things are different (mm) there are a lot of prejudices and the prejudices have persisted for many years and it is very difficult to change them (...) now (...) in two, three years (...) (mm) in order to be received into NATO ( ...) to be received into EU,
to fulfil all sorts of conditions (.) right?’. Whereas the implication of the existence of prejudices towards the Romaniies is not spelled out, the implication of prejudices towards the Hungarians is made clearer. The implicit distinction that Mana seems to be making is between prejudices bound to nationhood and the nation-state and other kind of prejudices. The implication of her account is that prejudices against the Romaniies are of a different nature, these prejudices are not bound to nationhood, are not bound to extraneous, constraining factors like in the case of Hungarians. In this account of reasonableness and slight in-group criticism, the Romaniies are not portrayed as the ‘inner enemy’ (see Sigona, 2003). The Romaniies are positioned within the nation.

In order to answer a question about the prejudices towards the Hungarians, Mana uses a ‘comparison’ move with the Romaniies to explain the prejudices towards the Hungarians. In comparison with the other speakers that have used the move of ‘comparison’, Mana does not use the comparison to make a point about the Romaniies and offer glosses on the Romaniies as object of prejudice. The comparison is ‘favourable’ to the Romaniies and is not accompanied, like some of the previous ones, by explicit or implicit stereotyped or essentialist thinking. This is more interesting, as it is spontaneous. In a similar fashion, in the next extract, the speaker uses a comparison move, with the difference that this time the focus is on the Romaniies and prejudiced thinking against them.

In interview 14 (extract 8), George, a thirty-three year old veterinary doctor, accounts for the existence of discrimination against ethnic minority groups. The interviewer makes direct reference to the minorities that his question refers to, mainly the Hungarians and the Romaniies, qualifying thus what he means by ‘ethnic minority groups’. As in previous instances where the interviewer has specified what he wants the interviewee to focus on, there is a sense that an invitation for a comparison is set forward based on the implication there might be some differences between the two groups. The question of the interviewer can be seen as asking not only for a position, but also for a basis for holding the position.

Extract 8, interview 14

| 445 | Chris | Do you think that there is discrimination against ethnic minority groups, I am referring to the Hungarians as well as to the Romaniies? |
| 446 | George | Yes ( ) in this case, certainly Romaniies are concerned probably that there isn’t ( ) if for the Hungarians one can say that there isn’t or that maybe there is not really, there still might be situations in which, I don’t know ( ) Here, as I was telling, it is from case to case ( ) from person to person ( ) so it is an attitude that rests... |
His answer in line 447 is a straightforward ‘yes’, but which is subsequently qualified by introducing a comparison between the Romanies and the Hungarians in as far as discrimination is concerned. Although displaying tentativeness, his comment on the Romanies ends up by being definitive: ‘insofar Romanies are concerned probably that (.) certainly there is (.) there is no way for us to say that there isn’t (.)’. There is an upgrade from ‘probably’ to ‘certainly’, followed by a peremptory statement ‘there is no way for us to say that there isn’t’ (that is, discrimination). This is presented as a fact, as something on which one cannot go wrong. Note the explicit reference to ‘us’, which includes George and potentially everybody else too. His statement opens the possibility of blaming the in-group George is not protecting the in-group from blame. It is a recognition of the ‘reality’ of discrimination against the Romanies and the very ‘use’ of the term ‘discrimination’ can be considered as a moral evaluation of the accountability of the in-group.

From line 449 to line 456, George is furthering the issue of discrimination against the Hungarians and the Romanies, trying to offer a series of explanations for the way things stand. Even though the interviewer did not explicitly asked for an explanation, George finds that it is relevant to provide it. The offering of explanations is embedded in a contrast pair, which opposes the comments about the Hungarians with those about the Romanies. The contrast pair not only opposes comments about the two groups, but, at the same time, it also positions them differently. In that sense, there is an important distinction that George is making. As he argues, in the case of the Hungarians, issues of discrimination and prejudice rest on individual attitude and judgment ‘it is from case to case (.) from
person to person (.) so it is an attitude that rests on (1) everybody’s attitude (.)’. On the other hand, when it comes to consider the Romanies, it is not only individual judgement that it is involved, but (biased) judgement based on the label ‘gypsy’ and the attributes attached to it ‘When one sees that he is a gypsy or that he is dark-skinned, immediately he is seen as a thief, or that he is not an honest person (mm)’. Note that in talking about prejudice, as opposed to Corina, George does not switch from accounting for prejudice to point to the target of prejudice, but when invoking the Romanies he is still talking about people’s views and prejudice insofar as Romanies are concerned. What he is describing in lines 454-456 is the prejudiced attitude towards the Romanies to which he hinted in lines 447-449 when talking about discrimination against the Romanies in order to put forward an explicit critical stance.

George is being asked about positions that are based on particular beliefs and attitudes (this is a question about prejudice which implicitly contains assumptions about the common-place meaning of prejudice). In answering the question, he has to position himself in relation to these particular beliefs and attitudes relating to the meaning of prejudice. George is able to manage his own position as involved in the account and presenting himself as a critical commentator. His last phrase on the Romanies can be seen as an explicit criticism of the in-group. He is not ‘doing being unprejudiced’, but rather he is positioning himself as a critic that sees himself as belonging to the group that he criticizes. Drawing on the common place of the meaning of prejudice, he is positioning himself as a ‘critic’ of the in-group, a critic of the ‘prejudiced attitude’, which places more emphasis on the nature and intrinsic characteristics of the object of prejudice.

He also presents the mechanism behind the enactment of prejudice as being pervasive and general and not just something that could be attached (related) to the feelings, wishes and motives of a particular person. In order to achieve this, George is drawing on essentialist thinking when commenting on the issue of prejudices against the Romanies. Whereas, the previously documented essentialist way of talking was directed (was related) to the object of prejudice (looking for ‘essences’ in Romanies), George’s essentialist way of talking is used in relation to prejudiced thinking (looking for ‘essences’ in the ‘mind’ of the prejudiced), is used in order to mount a critique of the prejudiced attitude. In doing so, he is not distancing himself from the in-group in order to cast himself as ‘unprejudiced’, but rather the critique is made from within and applies to all those concerned including
himself. George’s ‘warranting voice’ (Gergen, 1989) is one that speaks from within the (Romanian) community and thereby, explicitly claims, not only certain knowledge entitlements (Potter, 1996a), but also certain criticism entitlements.

Far from being merely a ‘report’ about prejudice, George’s account displays a version of the ‘practical reasoning’ that members could use to describe the matter of prejudice. The social phenomenon of prejudice being talked here is assembled as a set of contrasting categories, which work to produce a moral order. Working through the activities associated with the ‘prejudiced’ one can work out the attributions that are made in relation to the ‘unprejudiced’. As Baker suggests, ‘the attributions that are hinted at are as important as any stated in so many words’ (1997, p 142).

Conclusion

In this chapter it was suggested and analytically demonstrated that constructing the ‘otherness’ of Romanies is based on a process, which rests on two sets of shared, underlying assumptions and composed of two inter-related rhetorical and ideological moves. On one hand, a move of ‘comparison’ was identified, which rested on an implicit shared assumption of similarity between the terms of the ‘comparison’. On the other hand, there was a move of ‘differentiation’, which rested on an implicit underlying assumption of (complete) difference between the counter-posed terms. As the previous analysis has shown, these discursive moves are to be seen as inter-connected, concurring to achieve the same ideological effect, of casting the Romanies beyond ‘difference’ and comparison, beyond nationhood and as a consequence, beyond the moral order.

In as far as the ideological representation of Romanies as the outcome of a rhetoric of ‘comparison’ and ‘differentiation’ was concerned, a range of differences between, on one hand, participants ‘supporting’ Tudor and Funar and participants ‘ambivalent’ towards them and, on the other hand, participants ‘opposing’ Tudor and Funar were documented. What this chapter has aimed to do is to look at how participants across the ideological spectrum incorporate assumptions of ‘similarity’ and ‘(complete) difference’ in their talk, how these assumptions become constitutive of the content and rhetorical means of expression in their talk.
If in the case of the participants from the ‘supporting Tudor and Funar’ and ‘ambivalent towards Tudor and Funar’ categories, these implied assumptions (together with their associated rhetorical moves) were brought to the fore and enacted as part of an ideological boundary-drawing process with social and moral exclusionary effects, in the case of the participants ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’ there was a slight difference.

Within the opposing Tudor and Funar category one could make a differentiation between participants in the case of which the antagonism between ‘us’ and the ‘Romanies’ is not explicitly stated, but it is nevertheless implicitly conveyed through the reproduction of relations of power between specific groups and orientation to relations of moral standing in the world (extracts 5 and 6) and participants involved in an effort to criticize and undermine the ‘natural’ attitude of prejudice, the ‘doxa’ of common place discourse of nationalism and prejudice (extracts 7 and 8).

In the former category of ‘opposing Tudor and Funar’, one can find participants that do not directly aired prejudiced views, but the positioning of Romanies is achieved through the ‘differentiating power’ of the comparison/differentiation move. The implicit idea is that the Romanies are not just unlike any other nation, but they are also unlike any other foreigners. If one wanted to take the matter further, one could argue that the Romanies are implicitly presented as ‘neighbours outside moral reach’, as the ‘inhabitants of the ethically neutral, no man’s land of moral indifference’ (Bauman, 1990, p. 25) 10. What is important to note is that, as in the case of Bauman, it is not through a process of ‘effacing the face’, through rendering the Romanies ‘faceless’ that they are abolished as ‘the source and the natural object of responsibility’ (1990, p. 30) and the self is freed from moral responsibility for the Other, but through the subtle reproduction of nationhood and national space which gives more moral credit and status to those seen as ‘playing the same game’. The force of the general (but also particular) national imperative ‘conform or be damned’ comes not only from the extreme descriptions of the Romanies, but also from the ‘differentiating power’ of nationhood and national place, the ‘differentiating power’ of a rhetoric of absence of a national space

10 This moral indifference that Bauman talks about constitutes the ‘realm of moral void, inhospitable to sympathy or hostility’ (p 25) I would argue that for the Romanies it is not quite a ‘moral void’, but it is something more precise with circumscribes a sentiment of hostility
In the latter category, one can find participants involved in an effort to challenge prejudice. As emphasised throughout this thesis, the issue of analysing common-places, cultural, social and political assumptions and resources brings to the fore the issue of them being so entrenched, so pervasive, so much part of cultural and political common sense that one cannot run away from them and is bound to reproduce them in a way or another. Bearing this in mind, the question of the inevitability of prejudice becomes relevant. What also becomes relevant is the idea that prejudice and its instantiation is not inevitable because it can be challenged.

As the analysis of the last extracts from this chapter has shown, the reproduction of the common-sense assumptions surrounding the matter of prejudice and discrimination against ethnic minorities should not be seen as an automatic process in which the participants are sucked and trapped into, but rather a dynamic process which allows for not offering rhetorical protection to the in-group in as far blame is concerned, coupled with implicit criticism (of the in-group). A reflexive, inward (critical) look upon oneself and fellow countrymen, allows for going beyond mere instantiation and reproduction of ideological representations of ethnic groups. It also allows going beyond mere critique. A reflexive way of talking about prejudice can be a very powerful means of commenting, criticizing and potentially changing the power relations involved in authoritative, dominant assumptions and discourses (of prejudice, inequality and injustice).11

This critically informed analysis has embraced the notion that social actors in (Romanian) society are always on some side or other, that their views span across the ideological spectrum. Their ideological choices should not nevertheless be seen as automatically, unconsciously reproducing the ruling political and cultural climate (Wetherell, 2001) insofar ethnic minorities are concerned. Even if in minority, there is a continuous attempt to escape the ideological ‘argumentative texture’ of those ways of talking that allow for discursive and social exclusion. There is a continuous struggle not to create accepted truths and dominant discourses, essentialist ways of understanding the sort of people ‘we’ are dealing with, how things work, what are the possible solutions, how things should be

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11 The present research has tried to do exactly the same. In a nutshell, it has tried to be an example of how, ‘a reflexive exploration can be a means of commenting upon the power relations involved in authoritative texts’ (Wetherell, 2001, p 396)
in the future, but to undermine the general truth, to stand in opposition to it, to propose alternative, subversive ways of talking differently about 'difference'.

A critical view constitutes a powerful means to talk differently about 'difference', to subvert the (discursive and cultural) authority, of those 'prejudiced' ways of talking, to combat 'successful ideologies' which 'render their beliefs natural and self-evident', identifying them "with the 'common sense' of a society so that nobody could imagine how they might ever be different" (Eagleton, 1991, p. 58) As Billig (1985) has argued, prejudice is rhetorical and 'a rhetorical approach permits the distinction between prejudice and tolerance on the basis of content, rather than form, and thereby avoids assuming the inevitability of prejudice' (p. 79). Prejudiced talk contains not only the dominant repertories and ideological assumptions that circulate in society, but also the seeds for a challenge, a critique of prejudice. Accounts of prejudice not only contain the *logoi* of prejudice, but also the *anti-logoi* of criticism, tolerance and solidarity. The same discourses that enable some speakers to air prejudiced thoughts, enable some others to express resistance and build a challenge against these prejudiced ways of thinking. Language can express differences of opinions, but it can also express different ideologies.

In the struggle for change and in the attempt to build persuasive arguments for social critique, in the attempt to seek a way out of the 'depressing dilemma' (Billig, 1985, p. 82) that assumes the inevitability of prejudice, one should not discard the (genuine) discourse of tolerance. One should not naturalize the discourse of prejudice, as one should not naturalize ideology (or ideologies) itself. Considering ideologies as 'always naturalizing and universalizing naturalizes and universalises the concept of ideology' (Eagleton, 1991, p. 61). Considering prejudice as being instantiated, reproduced and legitimised in an automatic or unconscious fashion naturalizes not only prejudice *per se*, but its formation, reproduction and legitimation. It universalises prejudice and its reproduction, disconnecting it from its particulars, and it invests it with more force.
Chapter ten
Conclusions

Introduction

This thesis has tried to make a contribution to the analysis of prejudiced discourse against ethnic minorities and its implications for the study of prejudice, nationalism and national identity, and ideologies of moral exclusion.

Two different types of discourses of prejudice were identified. In the case of the Hungarian minority, a 'pragmatic' prejudiced discourse was found, one that originates at the intersection and inter-relation of stereotyping, nation and place. This is a type of prejudiced discourse whose power comes from its anchorage within the symbolic space of the nation which gives way to the consolidation of the ideologies of nationalism, politics and prejudice within a various set of discourses and discursive resources of 'difference'. As argued before, this kind of discourse is part and parcel of a (symbolic) space of identity, which is the national space in which identities are assumed, resisted or denied to certain groups. As chapter seven has shown, this kind of prejudiced discourse presents many of the features of the anti-alien, anti-immigrant Western discourses of 'difference'.

Chapter seven has also demonstrated the relation between national pride and prejudice within dilemmas of reasonableness and tolerance. The 'uses' of a Romanian national identity as a discursive and rhetorical resource to talk about 'us' and 'others' is an example of people's attempt to balance prejudice denials, claims of reasonableness and tolerance with a display of an explicit national footing ('us' vs. 'them') and an all-encompassing, overarching Romanian-ness. One could note the differences between this kind of national accounting and evocations of national pride and the evocations of national pride and national accounting in countries like England, for example (see Condor, 2000, 2001) where 'evocations of national pride are currently regarded with ambivalence, if not suspicion' (Condor, 2001, p. 179-180). For the English respondents in Condor's study, talk about their country was "often treated as a delicate topic, functionally equivalent to,
and subject to the same opprobrium as, talk about 'race'" (Condor, 2000, p. 175). The Romanian way of accounting about 'us' (and 'others') is probably closer to data where participants are attempting to balance prejudice denials with overtly nationalistic assertions (see for example Bozatzi, 1999 for the Greek context or Reicher and Hopkins, 2001 for the Scottish context).

This thesis has shown a special concern for the case of the Romanies and the analysis of ideologies of moral exclusion. In the case of the Romanies an 'extreme' prejudiced discourse was identified when looking at how people taking up different ideological subject positions talked about them. As chapter eight (and nine) have hopefully shown, discourse against the Romanies is more extreme than talk about the Hungarian minority, and by consequence, more extreme than the anti-alien, anti-immigrant discourse of 'difference' of the Western world.

The contrast between extreme prejudiced discourse against the Romanies as opposed to the well-researched anti-alien, anti-immigrant of the Western world becomes relevant if one is placing and grounds issues such as bigotry, social exclusion and politics of extreme difference within the workings of discourse with 'exclusionary' and 'eliminationist' ideological and political effects. The dynamics and intricacies of extreme prejudiced discourse (and its effects) constitute a localized process. I am not just referring here to a specific geographical and ideological location (Eastern European post-communist Romania), but to the idea that this extreme prejudiced discourse is enacted in relation to a specific category of people, that 'we' (not necessarily Romanians), the settled, the civilized etc categorize as being matter 'out the place', as abject, try to place beyond the bounds of reasonable behaviour and 'way of being' in the world.

Another dimension that is relevant here is the so often neglected issue of the locatedness and place-boundedness of the 'Othering' process within discursive studies of prejudiced talk. An ideology of 'exclusion' (and bigotry) implies a notion of place, which is the yardstick against which exclusionary, prejudiced discourse is put together. In the case of Romanies it is rather the absence of a (national) place that shapes the ideological contours of a moral exclusionary, extreme prejudiced discourse (Opotow, 1990), and underpins specific extreme 'essentialist' descriptions of Romanies, which places them beyond difference and beyond the moral order. One of the implications of this extreme
'essentialist' discourse was that, it is their unchangeable intrinsic 'nature' to be so displaced and 'out of place'. When faced with prejudice, discrimination and violence nobody can defend them. They have no (national) place, no one wants them and they have no place to go. As the Jews before them (until the nineteenth century at least), the Romanies are the eternal strangers in anybody's land.

Extreme prejudiced discourse is a type of discourse, which, among others, disavows forms of community. As chapter nine has shown, by comparing and contrasting the Romanies on different social dimensions with other ethnic groups the participants achieve the rhetorical, but also political and ideological effect of presenting Romanies as 'beyond difference', beyond the moral order. They are not seen as being part of the same (moral) 'community'. The 'community' of the Romanies has no moral and social 'equality' with other 'communities'. By virtue of the social categories and the ideological representation to which they belong, the Romanies cannot acquire the same social and moral footing as the other social categories, and particularly not the one of the dominant categories (cf Lemke, 1995, p. 149)

**Implications for the discursive study of prejudice**

I want to start by arguing that it is not sufficient for prejudice and racism to be *just* part of a descriptive project, namely that of identifying and describing how members of a given society make sense of prejudice as part of their social practices. It also needs to be something closer to issues of ideology. This is not to say that analysts should dispense with prejudice being a resource for the local accomplishment of members' talk and action, but they should also be aware, and point to the local accomplishment and reproduction of ideologies of prejudice. As argued in chapter three, if one takes seriously Michael Billig (2002a)’s recent observation that ideologies are above all discursive, instantiated within discursive actions, one could go further and say that while an analysis of the details of interaction and taking account of participants' orientations is essential, it is equally important to consider talk as a culturally and ideologically situated practice (Wetherell, 1998)

One can note within ethnometodologically and conversation analytic inspired discursive studies of prejudice (most notably Edwards, 2003), an increasing neglect of the ways in
which identities around prejudice and prejudice related issues are constructed, negotiated and made relevant in talk as members’ concerns together with a concern for their political significance and effect. This does not necessarily mean that researchers should promote their own political agendas as an pre-established analytic frame. One has to take into account the idea that doing this may actually undermine the political and practical utility of the analyses undertaken. This does not mean that discourse analysis can only be political analysis insofar as it goes beyond the discourse that it analyses. Far from being an obstacle to understanding the political significance of identities a detailed analysis of talk shows the place where issues of power, ideology and inequality are intertwined and played out, in order to go further and offer an account on the possible social and political consequences of discursive patterning. Both discursive analysis which totally overlooks the political and ideological dimension of talk and discourse analysis that does not link it with a close analysis of the minutiae of interaction are in danger of missing significant features of social life (the former misses on the ideological, the latter misses on the mundane and everyday). By not attending, on one hand, to the ways in which ideological and political concerns permeate participants’ talk and on the other hand, to the ways that participants construct, handle or manage identities at the most basic level of interaction, researchers do injustice to the social and ideological context of talk and also, probably more importantly, to the people who they claim are the objects of their concern.

As some (critical) discursive psychologists have pointed out, these two dimensions, the ideological (or the social) and the mundane (the everyday) are to be conceptualised and analysed together. Their forms of articulation and organization should be constitutive part of a critical project. Critical, in the sense that it aims to pinpoint to the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of ideological meanings that shape social relations. The present endeavour is not meant to be critical in order to further erect disciplinary boundaries (or to enforce those already in place). It is critical because it is rooted in a radical critique of social relations (Billig, 2002c).

A critical (ideological) approach to the language of prejudice, or, for that matter, any form of ‘critical’ discursive analysis ‘puts discourse in a broader context’ and ‘involves an evaluation of discourse’ (Wetherell, 2003, p 23, italics in original) If one takes this into account, it means that ‘to describe a piece of discourse as ideological .. is an interpretative act; it is a claim about the power of talk and its effects’ (ibid., p 14).
A critical and ideological approach sees constructive, productive and justificatory discursive processes as extending beyond the bounds of the activities involved in interview-talk (Wetherell, 1998, 2003). This is based on the assumption that

the constructive process emerges historically Past and current collective negotiations organize the spaces (physical, institutional and symbolic) in which conversations take place as well as the ways in which people and events can be represented within them.

(Wetherell, 2003, p. 24)

In order to sustain and justify this idea one needs a broader definition of discourse, one that defines 'all social practices as comprising a vast, interlinked, argumentative cloth' (Wetherell, 2003, p. 24, see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1987) Hence, present instances of talk can be linked to a continuous and historical process that has involved (tragic) historical events (the Roma Holocaust, the massive deportations to Transnistria, the post-communist outbursts of extreme violence – in the case of the Romances, the history of nationalist thinking and the controversial, but shared history of Transylvania – in the case of the Hungarians), radical changes to people and landscapes (the Communist collectivisation and the aggressive policy of land systematisation)

The particular words that are uttered, the here-and-now of the interview situation or conversation 'evoke discursive history and current social relations' (Wetherell, 2001, p 389). At the same time, they also invoke past social relations imbued ideologically: 'Utterances are threads in this respect: they connect with other utterances and other conversations, texts and documents. What things mean and what identities, versions and narratives signify depends on the broader discursive context' (ibid., p. 389)

The broader discursive context, discursive history, representations of past and present social relations are all ingredients of a particular mode of signifying social practices Together, they concur to 'create accepted truths and ways of understanding who people are, what things are, how they work and how they should be' (Wetherell, 2001, p 389), they reinforce the common-sense of a society. At the same time, they can also provide the

1 Laclau (1993) affirms that society can be seen as a vast 'argumentative texture' through which individuals construct their reality. The notion of 'argumentative cloth', 'argumentative texture' collapses any distinction between the discursive and the extra-discursive, talk and things external to talk. As Wetherell (1999, p 401) suggests, one should 'see practical and material activities as discursive through and through'
means for critique, for arguing against and resisting common-sense In as far as an
analysis of the language of prejudice and racism is concerned this idea has important
implications. It warns against analyzing the discourse of prejudice without hinting, or
taking account of the opposite discourse of tolerance, which is also part of discursive
history, past and current social relations.

Such a (non-binary) approach for the study of prejudice and racism (cf. Wetherell, 1999)
places its focus 'on the unceasing human activity of making meanings (the horizon of
discourse) from which social agents and objects, social institutions and social structures
emerge configured in ever-changing patterns of relations' (p 401). Ideological critique,
which lies at its core, is not intended to be 'ad hominen'. Rather, as Wetherell suggests, 'it
is directed at the broader political climate, the organization of society, and the discursive
resources available to its members, not at the individual speaker. It is a political rather than
a psychological critique' (2003, p. 23).

If one takes on board this broader perspective one can see how interview talk 'is in no
sense self-contained' (Wetherell, 2003, p.25) and can be generalized beyond its immediate
conversational activity. The interview, as a highly specific discursive genre, 'rehearses
routine, repetitive, and highly consensual (cultural/normative) resources that carry beyond
the immediate local context, connecting talk with discursive history' (p. 25).

Questions for future research

One of the important implications of this study is related to the different conceptualisation
of stereotypes which challenges the abstract, aspatial, disembodied notion of stereotyping
favoured by some social psychologists and theorists. The theoretical and empirical
approach of this study has placed and considered stereotypes, as discursive and ideological
representations, within an ideology of place and considers them as part and parcel of
different discourses with different ideological effects. For example, in the case of the
Hungarian minority it was suggested that descriptions of in-groups/out-groups are
bounded with narratives of nationhood and national space in ways that carry implications
for a discursive construction of national identity concerned with whom the national 'we'
includes or excludes. In the case of the Romanies, the issue of stereotyping is linked with
putting together a stereotypical ideological representation which places them beyond nationhood, difference and comparison.

This thesis has documented the existence and provided a critical investigation of a dialectic of prejudice achieved from a position of tolerance and reasonableness which, nevertheless, does not preclude the construction of similar ideological representations of social relations across different ideological positions. This raises important implications not only for the study of discourses of prejudice or nationalism, but also for the study of political ideologies and correlate notions such as ‘authoritarianism’, ‘ambivalence’ or ‘liberalism’. A clear-cut delineation between prejudice and tolerance cannot be sustained and distinctions between psychological explanatory categories such as ‘authoritarian’ and ‘democrat’ become blurred leaving space for a totalising expression of common-place nationalism and moral exclusion, a constant reproduction of an axiomatic division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

As argued in the three analytic chapters and throughout the thesis, extremism, ambivalence or moderation, for that matter are accomplished through language, through the flexible of rhetorical and interpretative resources that specific societies provide. I suggest that an extension of this type of research, applied to political science and political psychological concerns (the study of political ideologies) may offer an alternative approach to politically relevant psychological concepts and constitute a productive and fruitful avenue for future inquiry.

This thesis has also (implicitly, but also explicitly) raised the issue of not necessarily why, but how particular groups of people are made the target of extreme prejudice. As argued in chapter two, the cognitive approach, the ‘personality’ approach, as well as social identity and self-categorization approach (and discursive psychology) have offered a generalized view on the targets of prejudice. There is no sense in which one group might be described more negatively (and descriptions leading to different ideological effects) than the other. The indiscriminate use of stereotypes and biased judgment apply to all target-groups, which are placed on the same footing. The issue of precisely how some particulars groups of people become (or are made) the target of prejudice (extreme prejudice) has been under-explored. One can thus ask how negative generalizations made about different ethnic groups are constituted, fabricated in interaction and how are they linked with
different ideological effects and wider ideological concerns? How and to what effect people make use of diverse cultural and discursive resources when talking about, comparing, contrasting different ethnic groups?

Last, but not least, in studying the ensemble of practices involved in constructing Romanians as tolerant, liberal, reasonable, while at the same time the Romanies were being placed beyond nationhood and the moral order, this thesis has documented an 'extreme' prejudiced discourse, which rests on notions such as extreme difference and moral exclusion and is inextricably linked with issues of a contemporary (society) moral order, (ab)normality and discursive practices of exclusion. This kind of accounting has also an important relation to a broader theme, the social exclusion of Romanies.

Understanding how specific representations of prejudice against Romanies and the issues of accountability linked to it are constructed and sustained, can provide a better understanding of the existing ideological representations pertaining to prejudice and discrimination against Romanies and point to the social, political and ideological consequences of extreme discursive patterning. At the same time, one also has to point to the ideological implications of Romanies being represented as a 'nation apart', coming into being inside an ideological representation, which places them beyond nationhood, beyond difference and comparison. As this thesis has shown, the 'banal' language evocative of fear, disgust and withdrawal from contact engenders fixed, stereotypical, immutable ideological representations of Romanies with extreme political and social consequences. The implication of the difficulty that the participants have with designating a place for the Romanies together with the reference to an unchangeable stereotypical essence is that they are not just in the 'wrong place', but actually that there is no place for them! Concerns with the symbolic place assigned to Romanies and concerns with being 'in'/'out of place' underpin an ideological representation of Romanies which places them beyond the moral order and opens the ways for expressing views with eliminationist connotations. This kind of discourse of 'difference' is marked by an absence: Romanies have no homeland like other nations - this is where the extremism is implicit and potentially dangerous. Extreme discourses of difference contain or imply the 'differentiating power'- to use Bauman's apt term - of the absence of a national space.
Notwithstanding the analytical and theoretical insights that this thesis has tried to bring to the study of ‘extreme’ prejudice, I firmly believe that more research is needed (and in different contexts) to draw the full implications of ‘extreme’ ways of talking for the study of discursive construction and representation of ‘difference’ in talk about ‘others’. I want to stress that the term ‘extreme’ was not being used in a comparative sense (i.e., more extreme than the norm). Further research should concentrate on investigating ‘extreme’ beliefs in their own right, ‘extreme’ beliefs that may be the ‘norm’ in certain social and political contexts. Researchers should approach the phenomenon of extreme prejudice with increased attention to the detail of its interactional accomplishment. They should do so, not only because extreme prejudice is very complex in itself, but also because it is complex and at the same time, dangerous, in its social and ideological consequences.

So, what can be said about nationalism, prejudice and related issues in a society such as Romania from the analysis of interviews with Romanian majority group members? In a traditional way, one might argue that interviews like these tell us something about the entrenched (cognitive) attitudinal patterns of thought and opinion of those people holding prejudiced attitudes. But obviously, as this thesis has shown, they can do more than that. First, they can offer a glimpse into the past and current discursive history of cohabitation with the two main ethnic minorities, the Hungarians and the Romanies. Second, they can offer a view on the social and interactional organization of different ways of talking about different people with specific ideological and political effects. Third, they can tell us something not only about prejudice, but also about tolerance (or at least the possibility of tolerance), social change and community building.

One should not forget that

what makes a community is the interdependence and interaction of ... practices [social practices], both their functional integration and their systematic conflict. What makes a community is not homogeneity, but organized heterogeneity, not the sharing of practices but the systematic articulation of differences.

(Lemke, 1995, p 151)

Demonstrating how people make sense of prejudice, difference and ‘others’ changes the sorts of questions that researchers can ask about these issues. It also changes the ways in which one can read accounts, including people’s ordinary conversations or newspaper
headlines. It is a theme that goes beyond prejudice or difference, it interrelates with all the aspects of public life, social behaviour, civil society, political life trends, national myths and national consciousness.
Appendix A

Transcription notation

(.) Micro-pause

(2.0) Pause length in seconds

[overlap] Overlapping speech

" Encloses speech that is quieter than the surrounding talk

yes Underlining indicates stress or emphasis in the speech

>faster< Encloses speeded up talk

Yea- Hyphens mark a cut-off word or sound

.hhh/ hhh In-breath/Out-breath

= Immediate latching of successive talk

(clears throat) Comments from the transcriber

Tot(h)ally Laughter within speech

Really Colons are used to represent drawn-out speech
Appendix B

Informed consent form – Romanian original version

Vă mulțumesc pentru participarea dvs la această cercetare

Numele meu este Cristian Tileagă și sunt un student în psihologie la Universitatea din Iași. Cercetarea mea se apleacă asupra studiului opinii indivizilor în ce privește probleme sociale, controversate în societatea românească

Înainte de a începe, aș dori să vă atrag atenția asupra următoarelor lucruri:
- participarea dvs. e în întregime voluntară
- sunteți liber(ă) să refuzați să răspunși la orice întrebare
- sunteți liber(ă) să vă retrageți în orice moment

Permiteți-mi să mai precizez faptul că mă interesează opinii dvs. Nu există răspunsuri bune sau rele. Sunteți liber(ă) să aduceți în discuție orice elemente pe care le considerați relevante

Interviul va fi înregistrat și ceea ce spuneți va fi tratat strict confidențial. Conținutul va fi folosit doar pentru scopul de cercetare și va fi pus doar la dispoziția persoanelor implicate în acest proiect. Extrase din interviuri vor putea fi utilizate în raportul final de cercetare, dar sub nici un pretext identitatea dvs. nu va fi făcută publică sau inclusă în raport.

Vă rog să semnați acest formular pentru a demonstra că v-a fost citit conținutul

                        Semnătura

                        Data

Pot fi contactat la adresa XXXXXXX sau prin email XXXXXXX în caz că aveți vreo nedumerire legată de cercetarea în sine sau de participarea dvs.
Appendix C

Interview schedule

What do you think about bilingual and trilingual (street) signs in the areas where national minorities live (Mostly Hungarians and Germans....)?

Do you think that this practice and bilingualism in general, should be encouraged?

Do you think that bilingualism is a threat for the regional identity, or at a national level?

How do you think bilingualism might influence the relations between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania?

What do you think about the use of the mother tongue (native language) in the local administration, fact mostly invoked by the Hungarian minority?

Do you feel that using it, it would be a menace to the identity of some areas in which Romanians are in the minority?

What do you feel about adopting Hungarian as a second official language, which Hungarians consider as the only way out (solution)?

What do you think about introducing Hungarian language as an eliminiatory exam in selecting clerks in the city halls (town halls) in areas with mixed population?

Do you think that this is a right that was wrongly refused for so long?

What do you think about creating (founding) some universities where the teaching language is one of the minorities (Hungarian or German)?

Why do you think Hungarians want such a University?

Do you think that they can obtain this kind of cultural autonomy?

Do you consider appropriate the study of Romanian History and Geography in Hungarian, in Hungarian classes?

What do you think about positive discrimination in higher education?

What do you think about reinstating the Hungarian Autonomous Region in the Covasna-Harghita area?
Do you think it would be a threat to the regional identity of Transylvania, and of Romania in general?

Do you feel that this is an utopic project or at a certain moment, this could be real again?

Do you think that there is a conflict between Romanians and Hungarians? Or between Romanians and Romanies? Do you think that there is a case there or....

After the Revolution, the inter-ethnic conflicts of March 1990 in Tg. Mures, and the most recent ones, between Romanians and Romanies from Hadarem (Mures county) or Mihal Kogalniceanu (Constanta county) raised contradictory comments. Who do you think is responsible for what happened?

How do you explain what happened?

Do you think that the political power at that time can be blamed for what happened?

To what extent can Romanies be blamed for the conflict and violences at that time? To what extent Romanians can be blamed. .?

Do you think Hungarians are more blameworthy than Romanians for what happened?

Do you think that Romanians' behaviour was just a response to a provocation?

Why do you think there was so much violence?

What do you think most Romanians' attitudes are to Hungarians (Romanies...)? Positive or negative?

Do you think that Romanians (or people) are prejudiced against Hungarians (Romanies) ...or not really?

Do you think there is (much) discrimination against Hungarians (Romanies)...?

What are the causes of such discrimination?

If you were to describe the Romanies, how would you depict them?

Do you think that the rights of (ethnic and national minorities) should be extended?

Do you think that the ones they have restrict the affirmation of their identity?

Do you think that ethnic minorities enjoy the same rights as the majority?
Do you feel that the (nationalist) policies of Vadim Tudor (and Gheorghe Funar) towards Hungarians and other ethnic groups are the fairest ones?

How do you see Romanian society without such nationalist movements?

Do you think that most Romanians could be described as nationalists?

What is your image about the economic and social position (status) of ethnic minorities?

What do you think about the Hungarians’ Status Law? What do you think about the Hungarians’ ID?

Do you think that it touches upon our national identity?

To what extent and how are you aware of the presence of ethnic minorities in the economic and social field?

What do you think about learning from the Hungarian culture? or from the Romanies culture?

If Romania were a family, what place would every nationality have in it?
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