TECHNOLOGY AND TOPOLOGY: RETHINKING THE SPACE OF EXISTENCE

by

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This work is dedicated to my mother, Susan Ellen Parsons, and to my grandfather, James Miller Spears II. Your friendship and guidance held open a place for me to be. I am only me because of you, and these thoughts, along with all my others, grow out of that place that we built together.

They are for you as much as for me.
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ABSTRACT

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For living things, being spatial means being in some place. Beyond mere geometric containment, this being in place reveals a relational and active spatiality that arises through one’s bodily interaction with an environment. However, for human beings this engagement occurs primarily through the medium of technology, broadly construed as the production and use of artifacts. Working at the intersection of philosophy of technology and phenomenology, my project accounts for this technologically mediated spatiality. In particular, I develop extant arguments that technology is best understood as an extension and externalization of our bodies and minds into the environment. I argue that this technological extendedness generates a topological spatiality that is a key feature of human existence. Put differently, I show that we are more than bodies in space; rather, we are spatial via our relation to technology.
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A SPATIALITY THAT IS TECHNICALLY PLACIAL

How is a human being spatial? The following project provides an answer to this, and related questions by pursuing an account of space that is indexed to human existence. This indexical space, however, is not merely focused on the simple fact that a human exists. More specifically, the following account does not concern itself with the space of the merely extant human body. Thus, what follows is not a geometric analysis of the body and its capacity for movement.

Instead, I am concerned with existence in an active sense. To exist is to be busy existing. Thus, any account of space that is indexed to this active existence requires a reinterpretation of space in an active sense as spatiality or being spatial. I understand human spatiality as the way that embodied human beings move through, engage, and understand their environment, understood in the literal sense of a surrounding world. Humans take up a position in the world through their embodied being. Yet, this positionality is more than merely occupying an interval in objective space. Instead, it constitutes a situatedness or embeddedness within a world that is filled with relations, actions, possibilities, and significance. The account of human spatiality that is presented below will explain human spatiality through the structures of this situatedness, the affects that is has on existing, and the history of its development.

I will pursue what I see as an underdeveloped avenue for explaining this phenomenon: the relation between human beings and technology. I believe that this relation holds the key to understanding how one is spatial, because technology is central to the phenomenon of human environmental engagement. I understand technology in a broad sense, including individual artifacts and tools, their ensembles, and the knowledge and techniques required for their production and use. Thus, technology refers to the combination of technical objects, technical practice, and
technical knowledge. In this sense, technology mediates the way that human beings engage their environment. Rather than interacting with a nakedly natural world, human beings utilize tools, techniques, and skills of all sorts to navigate their environment. Further, many human environments are wholly or mostly technological, as is the case for those of us who live in cities, towns, and the like. If human spatiality concerns environmental engagement, and if this engagement is mediated by technology, then human spatiality also concerns this technological medium.

Moreover, this production and use of technology are unique to human beings. While some animals, such as beavers and birds, exhibit rudimentary forms of technicity, human beings stand out through the extent to which they depend on technology, and the extent to which their technological industry has developed. When looking towards most other living beings, even the birds and beavers who build nests and dams, one finds that they primarily engage their environment through the biological body, with only the occasional appearance of a supplemental, material instrument. Human beings, on the other hand, are always accompanied by some form of artifice. Whether we look to the vast ensembles of technology that mediate environmental engagement in major cities, or if we look to the scaled-down mediation of other tools and techniques that are found elsewhere, the medium of technology remains.

This technological medium is more than an extant set of objects that stands between humans and the world. As I argue below, technology is more than a merely present object because it constitutes an extension and externalization of human bodies, minds, and capacities. We can see this in the case of everyday technologies: hammers are prosthetic forearms and fists, writing externalizes our memory and thought into a material trace, and binoculars extend our vision. There are many other examples of this phenomenon, some of which will be pursued below.
I argue below that this extension and externalization ought to be interpreted *spatially*. Technology extends embodied human beings out into their environment. The relations that obtain between this embodied being and these technological extensions constitutes a region that I identify as the *place* of existence. Humans make a place for themselves through technological use and production, and their unique mode of occupying and engaging this place through the medium of technology is what it means for them to be spatial. Put differently, human spatiality is a matter of human being-in-place.¹

The ensuing account of technologically mediated spatiality *qua* being-in-place pulls from a diverse set of resources. It takes its departure from, and remains grounded in a phenomenological analysis. However, I also incorporate ontological, paleontological, evolutionary, and cognitive accounts in the course of my arguments concerning spatiality and the human-technology relation. I think that this diversity of resources is important, and that it provides a necessary supplement to what phenomenology is able to provide on its own. I think of this modified form of phenomenology as constituting what I refer to as “Phenomenology+.”² This method does not seek to create its own new mode of philosophical investigation, but rather, it attempts to provide a better fleshed out image of a given phenomenon by looking at it from different perspectives.

The name that I have chosen for this method begins with phenomenology because that is where my own thinking begins. I believe that phenomenology is important as a way to orient ourselves to the basic and immediate features of a given topic. However, as anyone familiar with this method knows, phenomenology moves rather quickly from what is closest experientially to the conceptual heights of abstract analysis. It is here that I find it compatible with and greatly improved by these other modes of thought.
The following project is divided into six chapters, including this introduction and an epilogue. Chapter two begins with Martin Heidegger’s account of human existence as being-in-the-world. Heidegger argues that existence is a matter of the engagement that one has with equipment, objects, and others in a world. *World*, instead of being identical to the earth or the collection of existent things, is the significance-laden *wherein* of human life. This idea of an interactive existence, which includes the subtly spatial concept of the *wherein* of existence presents an appealing starting point for my own investigation.

However, Heidegger ultimately retreats from his focus on an interactive engagement with the world, arguing instead that temporality is the true meaning and foundation of existence. This creates a tension between the relational and ultimately spatial concept (*wherein*) of world, and its temporal foundation. To motivate the problems associated with this tension, I present Immanuel Kant’s argument that the possibility of time as ordered succession (past, present, future) depends on external, i.e., spatial relatedness. In general, this argument demonstrates the necessary belonging together of time (determined succession) and space (externality and external relatedness).

Due to the differences between Kant’s and Heidegger’s accounts of existence, this argument cannot be directly applied to Heidegger. Instead, I mount my own argument against Heidegger, which follows the Kantian blueprint. Kant’s argument focuses on the way that time *stands out* from its unity in the determinations of past, present, and future. Heidegger presents an analogue to this idea of temporality standing out from itself with his concept of the temporal *ecstases*. The ecstases are temporality’s three structural moments, and they are Heidegger’s reinterpretation of past, present, and future, thought outside of time *qua* succession. Applying this modified argument to Heidegger’s view of temporality, I show that Heidegger’s foundational
temporality requires an equally foundational spatiality, if the ecstases of temporality are to stand out from one another.

This chapter takes several steps towards the account of human spatiality that I am after. First, and perhaps most importantly, this chapter motivates the need for a renewed investigation of spatiality. Heidegger stands out as a particularly influential instantiation of a tendency that runs through much of post-Kantian, European philosophy. This is the tendency to elevate time to a foundational status, while also making a corresponding reduction in the importance of space, which comes to be seen as derivative or otherwise secondary. By pointing out the importance of space for Kant’s own account, while also showing this core issue with Heidegger’s account, I am able to level some of the inequality that has arisen between space and time. Additionally, the interactive and relational view of existence that Heidegger begins with, along with his concept of world provides my account with a good set of resources from which I can move forward in explaining the phenomenon of human spatiality.

Chapter three begins with a discussion of three general features of human spatiality that were gleaned from chapter two’s analysis. Chapter two showed that human spatiality means (at least) 1) being somewhere, 2) being related to other things that share that somewhere, and 3) being embodied, which is required for one’s taking up a position amongst entities in that somewhere. To account for these general features, I turn away from the generality of space, and I turn instead towards the specificity of the concept of place as it is developed by Edward S. Casey. Following Casey, I show how discussions of space become overly abstract for a proper understanding of human spatiality, and further, how they reduce human spatiality to being at a position or site.

Through a comparison of space and place, I show how place is better suited to the present investigation. In particular, this comparison of space and place shows how place better captures
the idea of being somewhere, and the mode of relation between the human being and those objects in that somewhere. That is, I show how place accounts for one’s situatedness or embeddedness in an environment, instead of focusing on merely being at a position in space.

From here, I turn towards the role of the body in human implacement. Again, following Casey, I show how the body contributes five organizational dyads—here-there, near-far, left-right, ahead-behind, up-down—to the structure of being-in-place. With this analysis, I am able to show how being-in-place properly accounts for the three general features of human spatiality that were found in chapter two.

Chapter three concludes by offering a critique of the weakest part of Casey’s account. Casey offers a lot of information concerning place, and the structures that obtain within place. However, his discussion of the bounds of place is lacking. Casey argues that one makes their way in and out of places through the body, and that the outer boundary of place is “landscape.” I argue that this idea of landscape presents three distinct problems. First, it is overly naturalistic and does not properly account for built or urban places. Second, it is overly ambiguous, and third, it risks turning place into a geographic locale instead of a structure of existence. Using some of Casey’s own examples, I argue instead that the outer boundary of one’s implacement is the extent and limits of their involvements. If places are more than extant locales, then they must be made or generated, and I argue that one makes a place for themselves through their involvement or engagement therein. That is, I show that places depend on the activities and projects that one undertakes through existing.

Chapter four provides an analysis of this idea of involvements in place. I begin by arguing that this idea of involvement or engagement in place is necessitated by the idea of existence as active. After these initial discussions, I move on to show that this activity primarily takes the form
of technics. Technics is “technical practice as a whole, as system or result,” and this realm of human activity is often relegated to a secondary status. It is argued that technics is parasitic upon some more basic human activity. Against this view I argue that technics is both a primary human activity in general, and, more specifically, that it is the activity through which human beings engage their environment and make a place for themselves.

The final section of this chapter accounts for the way that technics contributes a structure to being-in-place that is more complex than the five bodily dyads that were discussed in chapter three. I also argue that this structure is topological. I present two readings of topology: 1) as the order or logic (logos) of place (topos), and 2) as the mathematical discipline that bears the same name. Topology, as a mathematical discipline, analyzes finite, relational, and continuously transforming spatial manifolds, and it does so without resorting to the perspective of geometry. This presents the conceptual resources necessary to account for the view of place as articulated according to technological engagement. Moreover, since this topological structure owes to the influence of technics, I show how the logic of place, topo-logy, relies on the logic of technics, techno-logy.

The final chapter provides an answer to what I see as the last remaining question of this project: what is the relation between the human being and place? Answering this question requires interpreting the “in” of being-in-place. What does it mean to say that one is in place? Given that humans make a place for themselves through the mediation of technology and the activity of technics, I turn to an analysis of the human-technology relation to answer this question. I argue that this relation is one of extension and externalization; human beings are extended and externalized through the technology that mediates their engagement with their environment.
To show that technology extends human beings, I begin by analyzing Elisabeth Ströker’s claim that humans surpass their corporeity through the use of implements. This claim of Ströker’s is particularly intriguing because she makes it in the context of human being-in-place. However, Ströker demonstrates an ambivalence concerning the meaning of this claim. Thus, to elaborate on Ströker’s assertion, I provide a categorization of four different ways that humanity is extended through technology. These are extensions of the body, extensions of perception, extensions of thought, and extensions of abilities. These concepts come from several, seemingly disparate perspectives, including philosophy of mind, phenomenology, paleontology, and embryology.

The final section of this chapter presents my own reading of technological extension as *exteriorization*. I do this through a reading of Bernard Stiegler’s claim that technological extension is prosthetic. Stiegler argues that technology has become a human prosthesis through a “process of exteriorization.” This process, that begins with the earliest tool-using hominids and ends with modern humans, results in a “spatialization” and “temporalization” of human existence. I show how this dual process makes room for place. That is, I show how being-in-place emerges as the result of this spatialization and temporalization through technics.

Further, I argue that this exteriorization answers the question of the relation between the human and place. Places are spatial and temporal extensions of one’s bodily being, and thus, one is not in place in the usual way that we conceive of insideness. Instead, one is in place insofar as they are outside of themselves technologically. Through this process of technological exteriorization human beings transform “an initially aimless and endless scene into a place of concerted action, thereby constituting a dense placescape that, in close collaboration with our active bodies, guides us into orientation.”
In the epilogue, I offer one final bit of analysis. This analysis does not specify my account of being-in-place any further, but rather, it provides an elucidation of the relation between my view and Heidegger’s temporality. My discussion of the spatialization and temporalization of place brings this project back to the idea of temporality, and I develop my ideas in accordance with Heidegger’s to establish the concept of place-time. I show how place and temporality are intertwined because of the spatialization and temporalization of technological exteriorization, and I develop an understanding of Heidegger’s *ecstases* as placio-temporal, rather than simply temporal. With this I am able to close the transcendental circle with which I began.
CHAPTER 2. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF TEMPORALITY AND THE SPATIAL SUPPLEMENT

2.1 Introduction

At least since Kant, time and temporality have been privileged in discussions of being in general, and human existence in particular. This prominence comes to a head in the early period of Martin Heidegger’s career, where Heidegger argues that temporality is both the horizon for any understanding of being, and the nature of human being itself. To be is to be temporal, and this temporality founds our grasp of what it means to be.

Yet, despite this temporal focus, Heidegger’s account makes a striking case for importance of the relational, situated, and technological features of what it means to be human. And he does this all while relegating spatiality to a purely secondary status! It is because of the tension that exists between this set of views that I take Heidegger as my starting point for this project. By providing focused readings of Heidegger, I can make three important moves for the account of human spatiality that I am attempting to build. First, Heidegger’s discussion of world makes clear that a relational situation is a primary feature of existing. This relational situation provides the beginnings of an account of existential spatiality, which is my present goal. Heidegger wants to avoid resorting to accounts of human individuals as contained entities, standing over and against the world. Instead, he presents a view that makes our relatedness and embeddedness within a world primary.

Second, Heidegger argues that one’s relatedness to what he calls “equipment,” is the primary relation of engagement that human beings have with their world. This sense of equipment is not identical to what I understand by technology, but with this move, Heidegger puts technology, and artifice in general at the front and center of his account of human relatedness within a world.
Finally, Heidegger ultimately comes to argue that temporality is the foundation of this relational, embedded, situated, and technological existence. He says that temporality is the ontological *a priori*, in the sense that it is what makes the activity of existing possible. This temporality amounts to a temporal self-understanding that opens one up to the world. However, this retreat towards such a self-understanding betrays the original emphasis placed on relatedness within a world. Exposing this tension and pointing towards a possible solution will be the goal of this chapter.

I will begin with a summary of human existence as being-in-the-world and care, as these concepts are presented in *Being and Time*. These concepts are meant to capture the structures that describe what it means to be a human being, and with them we find Heidegger’s emphasis on relatedness and situatedness that I described above. With these concepts in view, I will show how Heidegger argues that these activities of existing ultimately depend on a pre-thematic, temporal self-understanding that he calls temporality. Heidegger argues that temporality, as the unity of three structural moments, or *ecstases*, provides human being with a fundamental openness from which the activities and engagements of existence proceed. The three structural ecstases of temporality are 1) having-been as personal and communal past, 2) making-present as the appearance of objects and others, and 3) projection towards various goals and projects.

Having presented this summary view of Heidegger’s account, I will turn to Immanuel Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism,” from his *Critique of Pure Reason* to mount an argument against Heidegger. This argument will show how Heidegger’s arguments concern temporality necessitate an equally foundational spatiality. The central problem turns out to be the way that Heidegger’s ecstases stand out from each other. Kant’s “Refutation” argues that time can only stand out from its unity, in the determinations of past, present, and future, if there is simultaneously a relation to semi-permanent, external objects in space. Put more simply, Kant shows that time needs space. I
will provide an analogous argument that follows Kant’s basic strategy. That is, I will show that Heidegger’s temporal ecstases cannot stand out from their unity in their activity of temporalizing if there is not a foundational, and properly existential account of spatiality.

2.2 Existence as Activity: Being-in-the-World and Care

Heidegger sets out to explain what it means to be in the mode of entities such as ourselves. This is what he means when he explains that his account of human existence is an elaboration of the “sum” of Descartes’ “cogito sum.” Elaborating on this sum requires a “phenomenological Interpretation of personality,” and the primary object of such an interpretation is “the unity of living through which is immediately experienced in and with our Experiences.” These descriptions that Heidegger provides offer a lot in terms of the type of investigation that he’s undertaking. This investigation’s method is phenomenology, and it will pursue existence in an active sense. Understanding existence will require more than explaining what a human being is qua extant thing or substance. Instead, this investigation is after the meaning of human existence as being busy being human.

Additionally, this investigation cannot resort to explaining existence as relying on some entity that lies behind the “unity of living through” that is described above. Human being is “not a Thing merely thought of behind and outside what is immediately Experienced’. The person is no Thinglike and substantial Being. Nor can the Being of a person be entirely absorbed in being a subject of rational acts which follow certain laws.” The investigation cannot begin from the postulation of a substance or transcendental subject that lies behind the acts and experiences that make up one’s existence. Rather, it must begin from an investigation of the concrete performance of a life lived.
With these clarifications, it also becomes clearer why phenomenology is the proper method for this type of undertaking. Phenomenology provides descriptions of existence as it is lived, and it makes inferences from these experiences to the structures and conditions that make it possible. Only by proceeding in this way will we be able to avoid the thinglike and substantial interpretations of existence that are found throughout the history of western metaphysics.

To adequately treat the existence that is his object, Heidegger offers his concept of being-in-the-world, which is a complex structure that captures the to be of existence. It is the “fundamental constitution of Dasein,” where “Dasein” captures the entity that we are. Human existence is being-in-the-world, and being-in-the-world is an assemblage of interrelating structures, each of which plays a foundational role in living a human life. The structures that make up being-in-the-world are conditions of the possibility of existing in the mode of human being, and Heidegger calls each condition an “existentiale.” These existentialia resemble Kant’s categories; however, they are not foundational concepts that are required for the proper functioning of our mind’s rational machinery. Rather, these existentialia are conditions of existing that lie prior to rational judgment in the first place, and in this way, at least according to Heidegger, they lie prior to the categories of the understanding.

These structures include spatiality, understanding, disposedness in a mood, language, reference, signs, truth, the world, the worldliness of the world, among others, which all determine the way that one is in the world; an insideness which is markedly different than water’s being inside a cup. A full description of each existentiale is beyond the scope of this project. However, a consideration of one’s current situatedness can help illuminate the basic thrust of this idea of existentialia. Consider yourself as you are reading this sentence. In reading this sentence you are, i.e., you exist, and there are several different angles from which one can investigate such existing.
One could isolate your body, and investigate its location on the earth, or its relative position with respect to other objects. One could instead focus on the physiology behind sight that allows us to see the words which we then decode and interpret. However, each of these perspectives is an abstraction, i.e., each of these perspectives isolates one aspect of existing at the expense of others. How can we avoid slicing up existence, and instead look towards that existing itself?

This proves to be a difficult task! It requires that we retune our investigative sight. Instead of trying to slice up the problem into smaller pieces, we must try to catch a glimpse of what it is like to be the type of thing that is reading this essay, prior to the reflective moment of thinking about being the thing reading this essay. That is, one must reflect upon their non-reflective consciousness of existing, and they must do so without adding in any preconceptions concerning that existing itself! Phew!

What do we find prior to abstraction and reflection upon the unity of living through our experiences and acts in a world? The first thing that we find is that anytime human being is, it is disclosed to itself along with the world. This is the “formal concept of existence.” The basic form of human being “is a being which is related understandingly in its being toward that being.” That is, our particular form of existing requires that we pre-thematically understand this existence as in a world. Such a pre-thematic understanding becomes a horizon upon which actions, thoughts, etc., can be understood. This dis-closure that Heidegger speaks of is meant in the dual sense of making something known, and as openness, or better, the opening up of something. To have your existence in a world disclosed to you means that you are open to this existence, and the possible modes in which it can relate and interact with that world.

But what is this world that we pre-thematically grasp by comporting ourselves towards it in various ways? Above I listed some of the existentialia that make up the being-in portion of
being-in-the-world, but the world is itself an existentiale and requires an explanation. The world does not refer to the collection of all objects on earth, nor the earth itself. Heidegger explains that “world” typically has four different meanings. It can mean 1) “the totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world. 2) “the being of those beings named in 1.”, 3) the “in which” of one’s existing, and 4) the “worldliness” of the world.²⁷ Heidegger explains that he is interested in all of these senses of world, although the third meaning is the one that he means when he uses the term “world.”²⁸ The reason that he remains interested in the other three is because the fourth meaning, (the worldliness of the world) explains the third meaning (the in which of existing). Moreover, only through an understanding of the second meaning (the being of intraworldly entities) that emerges from an investigation of the first meaning (intraworldly entities themselves) can we arrive at the worldliness of the world.

These intraworldly entities that must be investigated tend to be in the mode of handy equipment or, more simply, useful things.²⁹ That is, most entities are encountered as things that are handy for some task, in order to accomplish some goal, for the sake of furthering our own projects of existing. This does not mean that we consciously categorize things as handy whenever we encounter them. Rather, this is how things present themselves to us, and it is the basic way that we understand objects. The object lies at hand, we grasp it, and we begin to use it for various purposes.

This handiness can be modified in different ways depending on the way that one engages the world. Whenever something breaks, or if the piece of equipment proves to not be useful, then that thing is made “unavailable,” or merely “present.”³⁰ It becomes a thing that is merely there, an extant thing, as opposed to something that we put to use for some end. Or it becomes something obstinate, in the way, or something to be removed. There are other possible modifications that lie
between handiness and mere presence. However, handiness and presence are the two central designations that Heidegger identifies, and the original mode of presentation is handiness.

What does such handiness tell us about the world? The world is that in which one encounters such entities, but this does not mean that the world is some concrete location on the surface of the earth. Nor is it the general placeholder for being-located in general. That in which one encounters entities is “that in terms of which things at hand are at hand for us.” More than being a physical location, the world is the structure that allows for the appearance of objects as handy. What is required for such a structure?

Heidegger says that in moments of unavailability, unhandiness, or obstinacy one can glimpse part of the structure of world. What makes something unavailable, unhandy, or something similar is that it no longer fits within the structure of the task at hand. In general, for something to be understood as handy, one must have a grasp of the relevance of this object to the other projects and relationships that one is currently engaging in, or that one hopes to engage in, etc. There is a system of references between tasks, objects, and ourselves, from which entities acquire their status as handy, present, or some combination of the two.

We engage our world in order to accomplish tasks for the sake of some goal. Such doing is our occupation in a fundamental sense, and from out of this occupation of existing, entities present themselves as handy. That intraworldly entities are grasped in this way is a result of what Heidegger identifies as the having-to-be that is characteristic of existence. Our existence is such that we must be. We cannot simply be in terms of inert matter. Rather, we comport ourselves towards the world in terms of possible ways to be, and at each moment we must choose some possibilities at the expense of others. As existing, human beings are “occupied in [their] own being with [their] ability to be.”
The most basic way in which we pursue this having-to-be is through everyday tasks, which are structured according to some “in-order-to.” In projecting towards possibilities, objects are encountered in terms of their readiness to aid in some activity that we do in order to bring about some end. This in-order-to structure of our comportment towards beings, combined with the readiness to or presence at hand of intraworldly entities, makes up what Heidegger calls the “functionality” of our being-in-the-world. “The specific structure of equipment is constituted by a contexture of the what-for, in order to,” and “every entity that we uncover as equipment has with it a specific functionality, Bewandtnis [an in-order-to-ness, a way of being functionally deployed].” This functionality contexture is an a priori structure from which entities within the world can appear, and thus be understood as what they are. This contexture is the human environment, the umwelt, or more literally the around-world that surrounds us. “Existing in an environment, we dwell in such an intelligible functionality whole.”

Consider the simple act of coming upon a pen that you will use to write a grocery list. This pen presents itself as handy, i.e., it can be used in order to write the list. This appearance of the pen as handy relies on your familiarity with grocery stores, transportation, writing, reading, capitalism, social cues and norms, among other things. The pen and paper are handy in this situation because of one’s antecedent relations of understanding, projects, and relevance or functionality (Bewandtnis). This context, which includes each of these relations, makes up what Heidegger calls “significance [Bedeutsamkeit].” Heidegger explains that “the whole of these relations, everything that belongs to the structure of the totality with which the Dasein can in any way give itself something to be understood, to signify to itself its ability to be, we call significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. This is the structure of what we call world in the strictly ontological sense.”
This totality of relations, which structures one’s world, is not identical to the objects that one engages at any particular moment. To think of it this way would be to misunderstand the priority of the world. The world, as this system of relations, is what makes possible the appearance of various objects which belong to the sum referenced above. Heidegger explains that this totality is “the prius, within which specific beings, as beings of this or that character, are as they are and exhibit themselves correspondingly.”

Thus, the world is the wherein of existence qua referential relations of understanding and relevance understood as significance. Thus, to be in a world means being within the totality of relations of significance that adhere between my own existence, and those things I concern myself with. From out of the horizon of this totality, individual things and ensembles of things present themselves to me as something that can be put towards the project that guides my current activity.

However, Heidegger does not stop here. He insists that we dig deeper into this relational and active existing. Yet, this request should be puzzling. If being-in-the-world is the description of existing then what lies below that? How can Heidegger get underneath being-in-the-world, which would seem to answer the question of existence? Ultimately, the meaning of being-in-the-world has not been made clear. There is another phenomenon that explains the meaning of being-in-the-world. It is a unifying phenomenon, that brings being-in-the-world more clearly into view, and this is Heidegger’s notion of care (Sorge). “We have found the fundamental constitution of the being in question, being-in-the-world, whose essential structures are centered on disclosedness. The totality of this structural whole revealed itself as care. The being of Dasein is contained in care.”

I take care to be Heidegger’s attempt at replacing the usual concept of intentionality. Heidegger is dissatisfied with two phenomenological positions, which he thinks Being and Time
corrects. First, there can be no positing of a transcendental subject or otherwise substantial entity that lies behind existence, as we have discussed above. Second, Heidegger takes issue with the typical interpretation of consciousness as intentional, i.e., that consciousness is always of some object that it is directed towards. This view maintains a strict separation between subject and object, and Heidegger attempts to remove such a sharp contrast by arguing that one is in the midst of the world, caring for it, and only because of such an interactive living through our relations to various things can I make the move of abstraction to conceive of this relation in inappropriate ways, such as the subject-object distinction. Thus, to say that one is intentionally directed towards a world only covers over the fact that I am in the midst of a world in the mode of care.

There is a further difficulty in understanding care because of its everyday usage. Care is an ontological structure, and thus, it does not refer to the individual instances where I find myself caring for someone or something. These are possible comportments of my being, which is reliant upon the ontological structure of care as the meaning of human being. Care *qua* ontological structure can be broken down into three structural moments: existentiality, facticity, falling prey.

Existentiality refers to the projection of our own existence onto projects and tasks that we take up in the world. Facticity refers to the quality of existence where, at each moment, we find that we are already in a world that is not of our own making. Only from out of this world that I do not control (facticity) can I project towards possible comportments of my being (existentiality). Finally, there is falling prey, which captures one’s absorption in the present undertakings and dealings that one has in the world.

Heidegger provides a more concise way of putting this when he explains that our being as care means being “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which
we encounter (within-the-world).” To be is to be in a world that is not of our making, alongside entities that we concern ourselves with, directed towards possible ways to be.

2.3 Being-in-the-World and Care as Ecstatic Temporality

Care explains being-in-the-world, but care points beyond itself. There is another phenomenon that serves as the “ontological meaning” of care. “Meaning” takes on a special connotation here, and Heidegger elaborates on what he intends with this term. He explains

“meaning is that in which the intelligibility of something keeps itself, without coming into view explicitly and thematically itself. Meaning signifies that upon which the primary project is projected, that in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as what it is. Projecting discloses possibilities, that is, it discloses what makes something possible.”

Thus, the meaning of care will be that phenomenon that allows care to be properly understood. It will be that which discloses the possibility of care qua totality of the structures of being-in-the-world. So, when Heidegger asks about the meaning of care, as the being of Dasein, he is asking “What makes possible the being of Dasein, and thus its factical existence?”

The ontological meaning of care, or that which makes human existence possible is temporality. From an investigation of Dasein, the type of entity that we are, we found that being-in-the-world was the basic constitution of our existence. This formal constitution was eventually explained by care, as the unity of facticity, existentiality, and falling prey. Now, care reveals itself as temporality. It is because of this that Heidegger makes claims such as “time is Dasein.” Yet, Heidegger does not mean time as we typically understand it. To flesh out Heidegger’s understanding of temporality as the ground of existence, I must first make clear how each of the structural moments of care represents a temporal dimension, and further, how these temporal dimensions, as a unified phenomenon, can be understood as temporality.
2.3.1 The Three Ecstases of Temporality

As we saw above, existing is a matter of the relations that ground us in a world. These relations obtain between our own being, that of others, that of handy entities, and world itself. These relations are understood along the lines of the activities in which each of us constantly engage, where each activity can be understood as a possible way to be. As I move throughout the world, I engage in projects that direct my being this way and that. I make decisions to be one way rather than another, to do this rather than that, etc. Through this directedness towards possibilities we are “ahead of ourselves,” which is our existentiality.

Heidegger is not suggesting that I have somehow left my body, and that I am now at a location that is different from my body. Rather, he means that we are always running ahead of the present moment as we reach out for possible ways to be. As I type these words on the page I am not enclosed by the actuality of any one word that appears, nor does the present moment of me typing that one world encapsulate my being. Instead, I find myself out ahead of each word, searching for the next, and working through the various possibilities as they present themselves. I choose some words over others, and I open new paths while closing others.

“The Dasein understands [projects] itself by way of its own most peculiar capacity to be, of which it is expectant.” Humans exist insofar as they are expectant of possibilities of being. Losing this sense of running ahead of ourselves means losing existence itself. Being ahead of oneself in this way is the existential concept of the future. All human beings are necessarily futural in their being ahead of themselves, projecting (understanding) the various possibilities of their being. Thus, we see that existentiality is truly an account of a dimension of temporality, namely the future.

This futurity reveals another dimension of this fundamental temporality. Human beings are the type of entity that is “in such a way that it has in each instance already been the being that it
is.” This should appear trivial at first glance. To be able to run ahead of myself towards possible ways to be, it must be the case that I am already situated in a world from which I run towards these possibilities. I must already find myself in the world, having done this or that, in order to run towards new possibilities of being. This, for Heidegger, means that any futural projection requires a past situatedness, and vice-versa. Without both movements together, human existence dissolves into objective presence. This being what one has already been is the existential dimension of the past *qua* “having-been,” and it explains the temporal foundation of facticity.

This is an important point, as the past is often thought of as something bygone, or something which is only retained through memory. I imagine that Heidegger would allow that memory becomes a primary point of access to past events, but the *past* as a structural moment of temporality *qua* foundation of existence is something more. He explains that “in every sense and in every case everything we have been is an essential determination of our existence.” This is not a causally determined view of existence, where each past event, choice, etc., has led directly to the present moment where I now choose something new. Rather, this suggests that the past is something that each of us belong to. The past is a dimension of our being, and it is not something that has past, nor is it something merely extant. “That which we *are* as having been has not gone by, passed away, in the sense in which we say that we could shuffle off our past like a garment.” Were the past to be merely bygone we would be utterly different sorts of things. Moreover, only when we are no longer, i.e., when we have died, do we stop having-been. As long as we are, “everything we have been is an essential determination of our existence.”

This having-been does not only refer to our own personal past, to which we belong. Having-been also includes tradition, and the cultural history to which we are indebted. The traditions to which I belong, and which play a role in my identity are not bygone facts that I only sometimes
put to use through conscious recollection. I belong to certain traditions, and they make up an essential dimension of what it means to be the type of thing that I am. Tradition and personal history make up the past as having-been, and this having-been is anytime that we are.

Thus we have two parts of our temporality in view, and we can see how they relate to the care structure. The future is our understanding projection towards possible ways to be, which is the temporal meaning of being ahead of ourselves. The past is our having-been, which explains facticity as being already within a world. Notice also that each of these temporal dimensions weaves into the other. I project into the future from out of my embeddedness in the past, and only because of my ability to project and choose possible ways to be do I have a past to which I belong; only because of my projecting towards possibilities is this past mine. This leaves one other temporal dimension, namely the present.

The existential present is not to be confused with a now-moment, which exists as part of a continuous temporal stream of succession. This common-sense grasp of the present, as well as its resultant interpretation of the other two temporal moments, is not to be confused with Heidegger’s temporality. When interpreting time according to our common sense understanding of it, that is, when we interpret it as succession, the present is thought of as a self-contained now, belonging to an infinite temporal series of past, future, and present nows. This type of interpretation makes the present now the primary temporal phenomena, and it defines the past and future in contradistinction to it; the past becomes what is no-longer-now and the future is not-yet-now.

Instead of a present qua now, Heidegger understands the present as “enpresenting,” [Gegenwärtigen] or making-present. The existential present is our engagement with the world, others, and things. It is the way we dwell in the world, wherein things, others, possibilities, etc., are made present or fade into absence. In projecting towards possibilities, and thereby bringing
along our having-been, we comport ourselves towards the others and things that we find around us. These entities present themselves to us, and they support the various possibilities of our being. The dwelling together with those objects of concern, which we concern ourselves with because of our futural projection and past having-been, is the present *qua* making-present. This is the ontological meaning of our falling prey.

This existential interpretation of the present can take several forms. It may be understood as a falling prey whereby the things made-present are not really noticed, and our past and future remain concealed from us. Heidegger explains that we “are most frequently lost in this present and it appears as though future and past as bygoneness or, more precisely, the past as having-been-ness, were blacked out, as though the Dasein were at every moment always leaping into the present.”58 The present can also be modified so that we are alongside these things and others in a more original way which opens up the future and past to our view. However, for our purposes, the mode in which the present is experienced is not as important as the phenomenon of the present itself.

Finally, notice again that, for Heidegger, each temporal dimension is woven into the others. There is no projection without already being in a world, alongside entities of our concern. Yet, there is no having-been in this sense if we are not projecting towards new possibilities of engagement with the world as it presents itself. And there is no presentation of a world for our concern without possibilities of being, founded on our past situatedness. Thus, “This unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been is what we call *temporality*…*Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.*”59

The three structural moments of temporality are “ecstases.”60 Heidegger prefers this term “ecstasis” instead of “dimension.” This is because he believes that temporality is ecstatic in a
twofold sense. First, temporality is a unitary phenomenon from out of which three temporal moments or dimensions stand out. To be ecstatic literally means to stand or step out from, and each temporal moment is ecstatic from its unity. Or rather, they are unified in their ecstasy.

This is a tricky thought that Heidegger attempts to work out. Past, present, and future all imply one another, they are intimately interwoven, yet they differ or stand out from each other. Some have suggested that such temporality must be grasped as a “differential structure,” which I think begins to move in the right direction. The ecstases must be thought together, but their togetherness does not imply a oneness or unified being like that of an entity. There is not some more originary or unified version of time. There is no temporal Pangaea that serves as the ground for the ecstases to differentiate themselves. Rather, the standing out of each ecstasis is the original movement. The unity and the differentiation belong together, and each ecstasis, in its standing out, is unified with the others. For Heidegger, this brings out the active sense of temporality. Time is not some thing, some extant now. Instead, it is the temporalizing of our existence.

This is the first sense in which temporality “is outside itself.” However, remember that human existence is identified with this ecstatic temporality. If temporality is ecstatic, and human existence is such temporality, then human existence is ecstatic. The ecstatic nature of human existence is part of Heidegger’s attempt to displace accounts of existence that focus on extant substances or subjects, whether these lie behind existence, or are imminent to it. Such a subject or substance is located only in the present. By being here and now, the substance or subject exists. This is a temporal interpretation of existence, albeit one that is overly restrictive. This interpretation focuses on the present, and it only gives a negative status to the past and future. According to this line of thinking, the past and future are considered to be no-longer-now and not-yet-now, respectively.
For Heidegger, past and future, as projection and having-been, are essential determinations of what it means to be. This requires that human existence is not merely in the present. Time is not simply a container that marks human being as now. Rather, human being is the result of our projection, having-been, and making-present. Humans are not extant subjects, closed off from the past and future. Human existence is outside of itself, out in the world, alongside entities, ahead of itself running towards possibilities, and rooted in having-been. Human existence is ecstatic. Thus, human being is outside of the merely present moment. When Heidegger says that temporality is “the εκστατικον pure and simple,” and that “Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself,” he is explaining that existence is ecstatic as well. Existence is standing outside of oneself temporally, and because of “its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of Dasein’s being.”

It is also worth noting that temporality’s ecstatic character “has nothing to do with ecstatic states of mind and the like,” and is instead related to each ecstases’ “carrying-away.” Ecstasy literally means a “removal to” or a “being outside,” and the temporal ecstases have this character of being “carried away to.” As Heidegger explains, “Time is not carried away merely on occasion in a supplementary and accidental way; rather, future is carried away intrinsically as toward-it is ecstatic.” Each ecstasis has such a carrying away. In being projected out towards possibilities we are as “coming-toward-oneself.” In the past lies a “going-back-to” ourselves, and in the present there is a “staying-with, dwelling-with” ourselves and those entities which surround us.

These modes of being-carried-away are what Heidegger calls a “remotion.” In being carried-away we are held open to the world by means of the temporal “stretching” that occurs. The ecstasy of temporal existence removes one from the position of closure within a present now, and it stretches existence to reach into the past and future. This stretching is not merely a two-way
stretching that reaches back to the past and forward to the future, as though the past and future were merely designations on a typical timeline. Such stretching cannot be understood along the lines of our everyday grasp of temporal directedness. Rather, “each ecstasis, as removal to…, has at the same time within itself and belonging to it a pre-delineation of the formal structure of the whereto of the removal. We call this whither of the ecstasis the horizon or, more precisely, the horizontal schema of the ecstasis.” The directedness of each ecstasis is determined by its corresponding horizon.

“Horizon” is an important concept for Heidegger. Horizon typically refers to a boundary or limit, as in the horizon line of our vision. However, Heidegger encourages us to think this sense of boundary in a positive, rather than negative sense. Horizons are not merely the outer boundary of something, but they are also that from which something unfolds. The visual horizon is not only the limit of the distance my eyesight can travel, but it is also the boundary from which that which is visible unfolds. In this way, the horizon delimits the visible as such, so that that which is within my view can become accessible. To see how time is horizonal in this sense, I will provide an explanation of one of the three horizonal schemata. I will focus on the horizonal schema of the present, which Heidegger dubs “praesens.” Grasping one of these schemata will be sufficient, since I am more interested in the results of this ecstatic-horizontal picture of time, rather than a recapitulation of all of its specifics.

2.3.2 Praesens and Horizontal Time: Stretching Open and Going Beyond

To see the function of praesens we have to look to the part of the care structure that corresponds with the present. This is the being-alongside objects of concern, which deals with the everyday interaction and engagement with handy things or equipment in the world qua totality of significance relations. The world, as the totality of significance relations, is the condition for the
appearance of entities as handy or extant. However, *praesens*, as the horizon of the present, reveals that temporality grounds the structure of the world. How does temporality, in the mode of making-present (ecstasis) and *praesens* (horizontal schemata), i.e., the ecstatic-horizontal present, serve as a condition for the account of world presented above?

To begin, consider handiness and extantness, the two primary modes in which humans encounter objects. Is there anything that lies behind these two modes of being? Heidegger argues that, ultimately these are variations of the same basic phenomenon. They are the modes in which entities within the world show themselves to us as variations of “presence and absence.” To capture this, Heidegger uses the Latin term “*praesens,*” which means presence or existing. For Heidegger, *praesens* indicates both presence and absence, taken together. This is opposed to the usual understanding of presence as the presence of something present, which excludes absence. Instead, *praesens* speaks to the reliance of each of these on each other. In the coming to presence of something, there is a necessary withdrawal or absence that accompanies it, and likewise, when something retreats into absence there is something else that is made present.

*Praesens*, as this play of presence and absence, is the horizon upon which making-present, or as it is referred to in the *Basic Problems*, enpresenting carries us away. “That which lies beyond the ecstasis as such, due to the character of removal and as determined by that character, or more precisely, that which determines the *whither of the “beyond itself”* as such in general, is *praesens as horizon.*” Thus, Heidegger explains that *praesens* and making-present together constitute the present.

“As removal to... the [ecstasis of the] present is a being-open for *entities confronting us*, which are thus understood antecedently upon *praesens*. Everything that is encountered in the enpresenting is understood as a presencing entity—that is, it is understood upon presence—on the basis of the horizon, *praesens*, already removed in the ecstasis. If Handiness and unavailability signify something like presence and absence—*praesens* modified and modifiable thus and so—the being
of the beings encountered within the world is projected praeensially, which means, fundamentally, Temporally.”

The images that Heidegger uses here are crucial to the conceptual work in this paragraph. To understand any entity we must grasp it as handy (available or present) or extant (unavailable, absent). Such an understanding requires that the entity show itself from out of some context or world. Yet, the rising up of any entity as handy or extant requires the ecstasis of the present, which is enpresenting or making-present. That is, any object can only reveal itself to us if it is made-present. Such a making present requires that we are carried away towards the object. The image here is that we leave the enclosure of our own being to meet the object. Such is the transcendence of the phenomenologists. Yet, Heidegger offers a twofold explanation, meant to elaborate on such transcendence. First, the transcendence itself has a temporal basis, namely, ecstatic temporality qua what pushes us outside, or that which carries us through such transcendence. Second, transcendence does not stop at the object. We are not carried away to the object only. We are instead carried past the object, towards the horizon of praesens, and only by coming back from our remotion to the horizon do we grasp the object as handy or extant, that is, as present or absent. To be carried away by making-present is to be carried to the horizon, from which we find the vantage to see the object revealed in its presence or absence, i.e., in “praesens modified and modifiable thus and so.” By cashing out his view in this way Heidegger has emphasized an openness, created between our current situatedness, and the remotion to the horizon. Instead of time as something which encases us in a series of nows, time becomes that which opens us to being. On such a picture, making-present and praesens, an ecstasis with its horizontal schema are the conditions that allows for there to be any encountering of entities within the ecstasis of the present.

The expanse created between enpresenting and praesens, between the ecstatic carrying away of each temporal dimension and its corresponding horizon, creates an opening, a clearing
within which entities can be encountered. There is an open space(!) within which we find ourselves that is constituted by the ecstatic nature of the present. Without such openness we would lack the dis-closive ability that lets us understand being. Thus, according to Heidegger, temporality is the basis for our encountering entities at all, and thereby, it lies at the basis of our ability to take anything as something.

This account of the present and \textit{praesens} should not be interpreted as Heidegger reducing the being of any object to mere presence. Nor does he mean to suggest that any of this being-carried-away is the literal remotion to a different place. Instead, Heidegger is attempting to show that temporality constitutes an original openness, and this openness is the foundation of our access to being. We are constantly related to objects, and we are able to understand them in this relation. This is the basic mode of our access to what Heidegger calls being. This is evident in our encountering of beings of all sorts. Yet, for this to be the case, there is series of more and more fundamental concepts, which must be understood antecedently, i.e., \textit{a priori}. Extant or handy things only appear to us as such because of an antecedent understanding of functionality, which requires the significance that structures the world. However, this world, and thereby significance and functionality and encountering beings in general, is not possible unless we are open to these things in some fundamental way. This openness must be such that we do not merely stand separated and over-against the world and objects, but rather that we are there along with them, and open to their ability to unveil or conceal themselves. We are stretched out, between birth and death and between that which is made present and \textit{praesens}. We occupy the in-between which constitutes a clearing for things to be illuminated. By existing as a unity of past, present, and future, we are beyond a static thinking substance that only exists in the now, and because of that we are meshed
with the world instead of standing-over-against it. This temporal openness, which has its limits at
the various horizontal schemata, allows us to understand things ‘as’ what they are.

Two related questions now arise concerning this account of temporality. First, why are we
to think that temporality lies as the sole ground of our being? Heidegger’s account began with a
focus on our concrete engagement within a world of significance. It has now come to the point
where ecstatic-horizontal temporality is the true and sole condition for our openness to being, and
for our factual existence in general. By founding everything on time, Heidegger has argued that
everything else is secondary and subsequent. Now, we know that such subsequence cannot be
understood in the usual sense of succession. This would refer us back to traditional conceptions of
time, which Heidegger thinks are secondary to existential temporality itself. However, this issue
of subsequence is an interesting one. Does temporal openness truly precede our relatedness within
a world? Surely it is at least reasonable that such temporal openness makes possible our
understanding of entities, yet does it precede our engagement and relatedness within a world?
Another way of putting it is, how are we to account for things like the body, sensation, and concrete
situatedness if our existence is founded on a temporal openness? An investigation of these issues
will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

2.4 Kant’s Refutation of Idealism and the Mutual Dependence of Space and Time

With Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world, care, and temporality all in view, the key
question to be raised is this: is temporality a sufficient ground upon which these other structures
can rest? I submit that it is not. I do not believe that this account of Heideggerian temporality fails
because temporality does not play an important role in existence. I believe that temporality does
serve as a horizon upon which human beings understand the world, and I would not begin this
project with Heidegger if I did not think that he had something important to offer an investigation
into human existence. The problem is with his identifying temporality as the place where this account of existence bottoms out. By making temporality the ground of existence *qua* that which explains and makes possible the other structures of existence, Heidegger runs into a problem that is best described with some help from Immanuel Kant.

It may seem strange to look back to Kant at this point, but I believe there are several reasons why this is an important and valid detour back to the 18th century. First, Kant’s influence on Heidegger is apparent, particularly on this early period of his work. Kant is the second most referenced philosopher in *Being and Time*, after Aristotle.79 Heidegger’s *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*80 is a companion piece to *Being and Time*, and it is meant to provide some of what was promised in the unfinished second half of *Being and Time*.81 Additionally, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, which also offers some of what was promised for the second half of *Being and Time*, focuses on Kant more than any other philosopher, even though it provides several historical analyses. Moreover, the transcendental style of argumentation employed by Heidegger is clearly an ancestor of Kant’s own style of argumentation, even if Heidegger attempts to modify this mode of argument into a more hermeneutical version.

In the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger says of reading Kant that

“my attention was drawn to the chapter on Schematism, and I glimpsed therein a connection between the problem of Categories, that is, the problem of Being in traditional Metaphysics and the phenomenon of time. In this way the manner of questioning from *Being and Time* came into play as an anticipation of my attempted interpretation of Kant. Kant’s text became a refuge, as a I sought in Kant an advocate for the question of Being which I posed.”82

It is from his reading of Kant that Heidegger begins to draw his connection between Being and time, and it is Kant who Heidegger sees as a companion in his quest to understand the question of Being. Below, I will also look to Kant as a refuge, as I return to the *Critique of Pure Reason* to find an advocate for my critique of Heidegger’s thinking about time.
The first step towards seeing the problem of Heidegger’s account requires that we look more closely at the ecstases of time. By classifying the structural moments of temporality in terms of ecstases, Heidegger is providing an active interpretation of temporality. What I mean by this is that temporality is not an entity, thing, substance, or the like. In fact, temporality, strictly speaking is not. The language of Being is reserved for entities, and since temporality is not an entity it does not exist in the mode of entities. Rather than being an entity, temporality is the active condition of the appearance or presence of being to entities such as ourselves; it is the horizon for any understanding of being whatsoever. More simply, because of ecstatic temporality, human existence is able to understand, interact with, and be related to entities within the world in manifold ways. To capture this idea Heidegger says that temporality temporalizes, i.e., temporality only is in the activity of the standing out of the ecstases, through which human being is opened to being. Thus, Heidegger uses the idea of temporalization instead of talking about some sort of being of time.

Additionally, since time is not a being, the unity of the three ecstases cannot be any sort of Urgrund or otherwise prior unity that splits into the various ecstases. Their unity comes not from their being one entity that splits into three. Instead, it comes from their equal originality. Each ecstasis is interwoven in our existence, and thus, “all genetic or genealogical accounts must cease.” Instead, we must think the ecstases as an assemblage of active conditions that is more than the sum of its parts. In fact, it does not even make sense to speak of a sum here since the ecstases are not entities that admit of a quantitative analysis.

Although temporality is not an entity, it is only ever associated with an entity, namely human beings, or anything else that might fall under Heidegger’s concept of Dasein. Insofar as temporality is not an entity, it’s occurrence as a structure of making possible, i.e., temporality’s
temporalization, requires a concretely existing Dasein. Without the various human relations within the world, there would be no temporalization of temporality that makes them possible. Finite human existence and finite temporality belong together; the condition only exists in its union with the conditioned. 89

Kant is similar to Heidegger in that he accords a foundational role for time in the organization of our experience and understanding of the world. However, in the second edition of the First Critique, in particular in the “Refutation of Idealism,” Kant modifies his account of time. Specifically, the first edition of the First Critique maintains time’s priority over space. In the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” Kant asserts that time is the more basic form of intuition.

“Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori condition merely to outer intuitions. But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner intuition, and thus of time” 91

Time is the form of all appearances in general, while space only applies to outer intuitions. Put in more Heideggerian terms, time qua succession is the horizon upon which all appearances whatsoever become intelligible. This relegates space to a secondary role which still relies on time.

The Refutation changes this temporal priority by arguing for the mutual dependence of space and time. While it is still the case that time applies to a greater quantity of appearances, Kant argues that that time cannot be determined, i.e., that individual moments cannot stand out from the succession of time unless there is a spatial relatedness between a subject’s position and that of objects outside of them. This new argument for time’s reliance on space restructures the priority that time had in the first edition of the First Critique.

The “Refutation of Idealism” is one of the most interesting sections in the B edition of the First critique. It is the only entirely new section added to the B edition, and the claims that are
made in this short section have a significant impact on understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism. The purpose of this short section is to refute the “problematic idealism” of Descartes. Problematic idealism is the claim that the existence of external objects is doubtful at best. This is contrasted with Berkeley’s “dogmatic idealism,” which claims that external objects are impossible. Kant has already responded to Berkeley in the “Transcendental Aesthetic.”

The arguments from the “Refutation,” revolve around the relation between inner and outer sense, and their respective forms of time and space. The thesis that Kant sets out to prove in this section is that “the mere, but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.” This “empirically determined consciousness of my own existence” is one’s self-consciousness as determined in time. Time qua succession is the form of inner sense for Kant, i.e., my conscious experience of the world is ordered by temporal succession. This succession is why causes come before effects, events happen in a particular order, I perceive things one after another, etc. However, such a successive ordering can only become intelligible if the relations between experiential content can be determined. One must be able to determine their representations as coming before, after, and now i.e., according to past, present, and future. Without the ability to determine the relations between these successive representations, we would be trapped in a now-moment that bears no connection to the past that it comes out of, or the future that it is running towards. This would make knowledge of causal relations, change, movement, etc., impossible. Time’s intelligibility requires that these successive representations 1) stand out from one another, and 2) are dateable in relation to one another.

This issue of time-determinations appears earlier in the first critique, particularly in the “First Analogy,” where Kant argues that the persistence of substance is required to make time-determinations. Kant pushes this further in the “Refutation” by explaining that “the perception of
this persistent thing is possible only through a *thing* outside me, and not through the mere *representation* of a thing outside me.” The added condition here is that the persistent thing cannot be any mere representation within me. For Kant, all representations have only momentary existence. The contents of our consciousness, i.e., our representations, are part of a temporal stream of succession that is constantly moving past the present now. Thus, representations alone are not enough to determine the temporal order, and time, as nothing but succession, does not meet the persistence condition. Therefore, only by reference to something external to us can we determine the order of our experience.

Moreover, this external thing requires space as the form of outer sense, i.e., as the formal condition upon which any outer object can be grasped. Thus, the determinate temporal ordering of our experience owes to our spatial relatedness to semi-permanent objects. Only given our situatedness in a system of external relations can one determine the internal relations between the contents of our mind according to past, present, and future.

Following Georges Dicker, Kant’s argument can be reconstructed as follows:

1. I am conscious of my own existence in time, i.e., I am aware that I have experiences occurring in a temporal order.
2. I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if there is some persistent element by reference to which I can determine their temporal order.
3. No conscious state of my own can be such a reference.
4. Time itself cannot be the reference.
5. If 2, 3, and 4, then I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I can perceive persisting objects in space outside me, by reference to which I can determine such a temporal order.

6. Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experience.\textsuperscript{99}

This relatively short section\textsuperscript{100} is saying a lot! Kant proposes that at least three things\textsuperscript{101} are required for our temporally ordered cognition of the world. First, it must be the case that the rational subject takes up a position \textit{within} space, or perhaps better, within nature understood spatially. For the subject to be related to “a thing outside” in space, it must be the case that the subject is also found within that space. If the subject were to take up a position outside of space, from which it forges it’s relation to objects, then that relatedness would not be able to be understood spatially. If one did try to grasp such a relation spatially, it would require a new spatiality, space\textsubscript{1}, that would explain the relation between these different spaces. However, we know from what Kant says in this section that the relation must be spatial, and thus, the subject must be within the same space as these external objects.\textsuperscript{102}

Second, Kant asserts that it is spatial relatedness, and not merely space itself, that is crucial for time-determinations. Space itself, as a form of intuition, is required for the intelligibility of these relations, but it is the relatedness in space that suffices for applying time-determinations to the contents of one’s consciousness. Third, Kant seems to be providing an indirect argument for embodiment. While he does not make this explicit, embodiment seems to me to be the best candidate to explain the two other features, namely the position that one has within the spatial system, and the relatedness of the subject to those external objects. There may be other candidates for this, although embodiment seems to be the best for explaining the situation of human being, as
one possible version of rational beings. Thus, Kant argues that a subject’s ability to have a
temporally ordered, rational cognition of the world requires a relatedness, in space, to external
objects, at a position different from the subject, and, indirectly, embodiment.

With this move, Kant levels the initial inequality between space and time. For time to
stand out from the undifferentiated unity of succession, it must be the case that we are situated
among persistent objects, external to us, and to which we are related. Thus, we are determined
from without and within, or the interiority of temporality requires the exteriority of spatiality. Only
through the interaction of this mutual determination is there a rationally ordered experience
capable of yielding determinate knowledge. How can this be applied to Heidegger’s account of
temporality?

2.5 Space as Supplement: Finding the Necessary Companion to Temporality

For Kant, time is the “a priori formal condition of all appearances in general,” and for
Heidegger, temporality is the ontological a priori in general. By comparing of these two
positions, one can see the way that Heidegger radicalizes the function of time in Kant’s account.
Heidegger explains that “a priori means that which makes beings as beings possible in what and
how they are.” The above reconstruction of Heidegger’s arguments makes clear that this role is
reserved for ecstatic-horizontal temporality. He continues, “The possibility of comportment
towards beings demands a precursory understanding of being, and the possibility of the
understanding of being demands in its turn a precursory projection upon time… Temporality, due
to its horizontal-ecstatic nature, makes possible at once the understanding of being and
comportment towards beings.” Temporality’s temporalization, as the ecstatic activity of a
projective future, having-been, and making-present opens human beings to the world and
establishes their existence as care. It is through temporality that we are related to Being and beings,
both in terms of the relation of understanding, and in our relatedness in general, grasped through the Heideggerian notion of comportment. Because comportment requires understanding, and because understanding is reliant upon temporality, it is temporality that makes possible our comportment towards the world.

Kant says that we need time as a formal condition of any rational cognition, i.e., time is necessary for our ability to understand any appearance of an entity since those appearances must necessarily be successive in a particular order. Heidegger is making the stronger claim that it is only because human being is as ecstatic ‐ horizonal temporality that one can engage with the world at all. Without the openness provided by temporality, humanity would be closed off from the relatedness that we enjoy with entities.

It is here that Heidegger encounters a problem, because of the fact that while Heidegger radicalizes Kant’s thinking about time, he does not do the same with his thought concerning time’s companion, space. Remember that temporality is not an entity. It is only its temporalization. Temporality’s temporalization is the ecstatic activity of making one’s existence possible. This making possible requires the ecstatic movement of projecting upon possible ways to be, belonging to a cultural and personal past, and being alongside those entities which are present to us. Yet, each of these ecstatic movements requires more than temporality alone.

To belong to the cultural and personal past means to have already been situated within a world that is not of our own making. Only by through my existence in and relatedness to a factical world can I belong to tradition and my own past. To be alongside entities that are made present means being there with them, in a determinate relation that can simultaneously be illuminated through a projection upon the temporal horizon. Only through some original being ‐ with ‐ entities can I project past them and understand them on the basis of praesens. It is not temporality that
situates me within this world among entities, even though temporality does make this situatedness understandable. Further, projection towards possible modes of being appears as the ecstasis that is the most purely temporal. However, its reliance on this prior situatedness is seen through the reliance of this ecstasis on the other two. Only from out of my current situation can I run ahead towards possible ways to be, and only because of my already being my having-been can I be situated and projective in these ways.\textsuperscript{106}

For temporality to temporalize, there must be concretely existing human persons, a past to belong to, others and entities to be made present, and possibilities that can be projected upon. For temporality to condition the world as intelligible for us, there must be an equally foundational relation to that which is conditioned. This relation between condition and conditioned\textsuperscript{107} need not happen \textit{earlier} than temporality’s temporalization, i.e., this argument does not resort back to time \textit{qua} succession. However, this relation must be \textit{a priori} in the sense discussed above. Thus, temporality’s \textit{a priority} requires the priority of a situatedness in the midst of the world. The ontological structure of temporality requires an ontic situatedness amongst entities, and this situatedness, while it may seem trivial, must be grasped as occurring at the same foundational level as temporality.

This mirrors the core of Kant’s argument. Kant showed that time cannot stand out from its unity—and therefore make our temporally ordered consciousness determinate—without reference to something external and persistent. One must have already taken up a position within the world for time to play its role of making-possible. Only from such a foundational situatedness amidst entities, i.e., only because of our \textit{place in space}, and the relations that obtain between our being and that of other entities in space, can time function to make this situatedness graspable and illuminated for one’s conscious experience.
Heidegger’s temporality cannot temporalize, i.e., it cannot stand out in its original movement, without the existential-phenomenological equivalent of such an external, spatial relation. That temporality conditions our comportment towards entities means that temporality allows for the intelligibility of entities. However, this relation of intelligibility is not the first relation that one has towards entities. It might be the case that my foundational situatedness and the making-intelligible of temporality happen at the same time as my relation of intelligibility, but that does not mean that this foundational situatedness does not achieve a priority that is equal to that of temporality. One must have a foundational and antecedent situatedness in the midst entities that reveal themselves for temporality to have anything to project upon its horizon. There is a mutual dependence at play, and had Heidegger radicalized this part of Kant’s account of time, perhaps he would have caught this issue.

Moreover, following Kant’s argument, this situatedness will be the existential-phenomenological equivalent of a foundational spatiality. Situatedness, particularly in the case of an embodied existence such as our own, is grasped and explained through the terminology, metaphors, and concepts of space. Additionally, the idea of taking up a position amidst other entities is already to invoke some sense of space as the rubric through which the relation between these two positions can be understood. Thus, we find Heidegger’s temporality requiring spatiality, as Kant’s time needed it’s space. Temporality cannot stand out from its unity without a concretely existing Dasein that has taken up its position in the midst of non-Dasein entities within a world.

Additionally, such a positionality amidst entities will require one of the major phenomena that Heidegger does not treat in Being and Time, namely the body. Heidegger admits that corporeality “contains a problematic of its own not to be discussed here,” but this omission has serious consequences for his account. Not only does it ignore a major feature of one’s being, but
it leads to his postulation of temporality as the primary condition for existence, ignoring that this
existence must find itself concretely situated *qua* embodied, within a world. It is also important to
notice that Heidegger’s comments concerning corporeality come in his section concerning the
spatiality of Dasein! Right at the point where he puts himself in a position to begin elaborating on
the importance of concrete situatedness *qua* Dasein’s spatiality he ignores the entire problematic
of the body. He discusses the structure of spatiality\(^{110}\) without noticing the role that it plays in
existence. The result of all of this is that Heidegger finds himself in need of an account of a
foundational, embodied situatedness within the world that is illuminated by temporal openness.
Heidegger must make reciprocal the relation between concrete, embodied being and the
temporality that he speaks of. Only through this reciprocity, as an existential-phenomenological
equivalent of Kant’s move from the Refutation, can temporality make-possible in the ways that
he’s argued.

This argument can be elaborated as follows, resembling the Kantian argument presented
above:

1) I exist *qua* Being-in-the-world and care.

2) Temporality is the *a priori* condition upon which my existence depends.

3) Temporality is not an entity. It is only the activity of temporalizing.

4) Temporality’s temporalizing requires a concretely existing entity, situated within a world,
who’s existence is temporalized (e.g. a world must be made present, a personal
history/attachment to a cultural tradition must have been, possibilities must be projected).
Put differently, finite original temporality requires finite concrete beings related to
ontologically distinct entities, by reference to which original temporality can temporalize.

5) Given 3), temporality does not fulfil this condition of a concretely existing entity.
6) If 2-5, then temporality can only temporalize if a concretely existing entity is situated within a world that is opened to it through temporality.\textsuperscript{111}

7) Therefore, temporality requires an equally foundational, concrete situatedness of the entity whose existence is temporalized.

The point that I am making here might seem trivial to some. To clarify, I do not think that Heidegger ignores concrete situatedness altogether. However, I do think that Heidegger misses the importance of this situatedness, and, as I have argued above, I think that he takes the priority of temporality too far. By saying that temporality grounds all relatedness to the world, he asks too much of temporality. He puts it in a position, like Kant’s time from the A edition of the First Critique, where temporality must stand out from itself without that which allows it to stand out.\textsuperscript{112}

Heidegger refers to entities such as ourselves as “the clearing,”\textsuperscript{113} which is meant to invoke the image of a clearing in the forest. Temporal entities are like an open space in the forest where things can come to light, that is, become understandable as what they are. However, what might come to light and the forest itself must bear a prior relation to the clearing for the clearing to be what it is. Simone de Beauvoir puts this point nicely when she explains that “according to Heidegger himself, there is no interiority for men; his subjectivity is revealed only through an engagement in the objective world. There is choice only through an action that bites onto things…it is realized only in the creation of concrete links.”\textsuperscript{114} Temporality cannot stand alone at the ground, because it can never condition that which it is not antecedently related to. Heidegger requires an equally foundational and properly existential-phenomenological account of these concrete links that bite onto things, and that allows for temporality’s ecstasy.

In the chapters that follow I will provide an account of the concrete links that allow for this ecstatic existence. I will follow the trail that has been discovered through this critique of Heidegger,
beginning with an investigation of situatedness itself. This investigation of situatedness will lead
to the concept of place. From place, I will find my way to an explicit discussion of the human-
technology relation, and it is this relation that I will identify as the key component to explaining
existence as ecstatic ek-sistence.\textsuperscript{115}
CHAPTER 3.  PLACE: WHERE EXISTENCE OCCURS

3.1  Introduction

By reading Kant’s “Refutation” back into the Heideggerian picture of human existence two things became clear: 1) that the fate of time is tied to that of space, or, rather, that existence has a temporal and spatial grounding, and 2) that Heidegger’s account of existence requires a spatial supplement that includes an account of embodiment. This does not mean that investigations into temporality and time are all for naught. Nor does it signify that space and time have merely reversed roles, with one being primary over the other. The “Refutation” points towards the necessity of a renewed investigation into space as a supplement to the work that has been done on time. This new work needs to take space seriously as an essential component of human existence.\textsuperscript{116}

In this chapter, I will argue that the best way forward for an account of human situatedness in space is through the idea of being-in-place. I will begin by drawing out a general sense of being-in-place by elaborating on the Kantian insights from the last chapter. In particular, I will argue that Kant’s claims concerning the role of space bring out a general sense of being somewhere, and I will demonstrate that two features, embodiment and relatedness, are entailed by such a being somewhere. After drawing out these general features, which were merely hinted at in the first chapter, I will argue that these point away from the generality of space, as it is traditionally understood, and instead, that they point towards the concept of place, particularly as it is developed by Edward S. Casey. Casey’s account of place replaces the abstractness of space with a concept that is better equipped to properly explain existence in its lived, particular, and dynamic features. I will argue that my reading of Casey’s concept of place accounts for the aspects of existence that I am after more adequately than discussions of objective, infinite, or indefinite space.\textsuperscript{117}
After providing a description of place in general, and after demonstrating the differences between space and place, I will turn to the role of embodiment in being-in-place. As was seen in the last chapter, Heidegger’s concept of world marks great progress in understanding human situatedness and relatedness, but his refusal to treat the body is a driving force in the shortcomings of his account. Following Casey and Elisabeth Ströker, I will show how the body contributes organizational structures to place, and how places are opened for us through our embodied being.

With this summary discussion of place completed, I will move on to critique Casey for his discussion of the boundaries of place. One of the trickiest problems for modern place theorists is the way that they differentiate place as an ontological structure of existence from place as a standalone, geographic phenomena, i.e., place theorists must be careful to separate the ontological from the geographic. I argue that Casey does not do enough to avoid this ambiguity and tension. In particular, I show how this problem comes from Casey’s claim that “landscape” marks the outer boundaries of place. I will show how landscape remains both overly ambiguous and overly geographic, and therefore, that it fails to fulfil its role as the outer boundary of place as concerns our implacement. I will argue instead that the bounds of place qua structure of existence, i.e., the bounds of our implacement lie with the limits of our projects and involvements.

With this sense of projects and involvements we will see hints of Heidegger’s world coming back into play. I conclude this chapter by arguing that these involvements not only reveal handy entities, as Heidegger claims, but further that they are sustained through technics, i.e., the techniques, technologies, and knowledge that are characteristic of human activity. Thus, I will show how place refers us to the human-technology relation, and how we must understand this relation further if we wish to better grasp our implacement.
3.2 Even the Nowhere Man is Somewhere, Man

As I pointed out in the last chapter, Kant’s arguments in the “Refutation” bring out three essential features of the spatial relatedness that is necessary for temporal differentiation: 1) taking up a position amidst other entities, 2) a relatedness to these entities, and 3), indirectly, the embodiment required to take up such a position. Yet, how are we to interpret these three features? Kant has his own interpretation of these matters, based on his view of space, which we will see below. However, rather than committing myself to any particular view of space, I want to avoid diving too quickly into conceptions of space. Instead, I will begin by interpreting these three features in a general way, divorced from any prejudices or preconceived notions about space, allowing these interpretations to move the investigation forward.

Beginning with the first point, what is entailed by taking up a position amidst other entities? Taking up a position requires that one have a location to which they belong. Additionally, such a location must be large or open enough to allow the other entities, those that one is in the midst of, to have their own position within this location. Kant agrees with this minimal requirement. In the 1768 essay “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space,” Kant explains that “[i]n the case of any extended thing, the position of its parts relative to each other can be adequately known by reference to the thing itself. The region, however, in which this order of parts is oriented, refers to the space outside the thing.” The “position” that Kant refers to here has the same requirement of being locatable somewhere. “The thing itself” is not the noumenal thing in itself, but is instead the extended thing, which in this case is an existing person, where one can determine their location in a region, i.e., in space. This region names the larger system of positions.

The most general way to cash out this region of locations is through the idea of being-somewhere. Taking up a position at a location implies that this location is a somewhere that
encompasses both one’s own existence, and the existence of those other entities. To take up a position amidst entities is to be somewhere with those entities. Kant would again appear to agree with this proposition. In his “Inaugural Dissertation,” Kant claims that “Whatever is, is somewhere and somewhen.” Thus, we can say that the concrete situatedness, characteristic of existence, is always an existing somewhere.

This is an important, yet often overlooked feature of what it means to be. If one was truly no-where, i.e., if an entity had an absence of being-somewhere, then it would not be. Think of those times that the expression “nowhere” is used. It is most often employed in the sense of “nowhere to be found.” Here the expression does not imply that one is truly nowhere, but rather, that one has lost something. Whatever was lost is certainly somewhere, it is just that that somewhere is beyond the current state of one’s knowledge. In this way, nowhere implies “not knowing where,” rather than a strict “nowhere.”

To further illustrate this sense of being-somewhere, consider my current situation. I am sitting with my computer in front of me, typing words onto the screen. Beethoven is filling my ears, and the sound of the swirling wind outside catches my attention every few minutes. My computer rests on my desk, which is populated by various objects (pens, paperclips, toys, etc.). Beyond my immediate line of sight lies the rest of my apartment. There are rooms, marked off by the walls, and there is furniture and things which fill these rooms. I can expand this situation even further to include those things outside of my apartment and throughout the town. Regardless of the scale with which I look at my situatedness, and regardless of the particular walls or things that I find in my current situation, I find that I am always situated in this way. While the features of my situatedness change throughout my various comings and goings, I am never in a non-related
situation. Further, I am never in a non-situated relation. Being somewhere with other entities is an invariant feature of existence, and it is captured by the simple idea of being-somewhere.

This idea of being-somewhere provides a sufficiently general interpretation of the first essential feature listed above. The second feature, a relatedness to entities, has already come out of the above discussion of being-somewhere. Being-somewhere captures our being in the midst of entities, and this being-in-the-midst-of entails a relation between my own being and those other entities. The simple description of my being at my desk revealed that these other entities are not things that I am closed off from. To be in the midst of entities is to be with them. Thus, being-somewhere is really a being-somewhere-with entities.126

The remaining feature is embodiment. In my being-somewhere-with entities, I take these entities as outside of me. This sense of outside means that I grasp these other entities as external to me, especially in terms of being external to my position. As was seen in the last chapter, with Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world, it might not be the case that these other entities are outside of my existence, but I still grasp them under the rubric of externality. Why is this? What boundary leads to the judgment that entities that I am being-somewhere-with are grasped as external? The answer to these questions is embodiment.127

To take up a position somewhere, amidst entities, or rather, to have a “local presence,”128 requires a sensible body. This sensible body determines one’s location in that somewhere, and it further differentiates one’s location from those other entities that are grasped as out there. Our existence is embodied, and this embodiment makes it routine to apply the determination “external” to those entities that we deal with, and to which we are related.

Even if we were to imagine some sort of disembodied being, if that being takes up a position amidst other entities, then it has some sort of body. I am thinking here of the common folk
conceptions of ghosts or spirits. These ghosts do not have physical bodies, but they appear with some sort of ethereal body that marks their position amidst others. These ethereal bodies are usually invisible, transparent, or translucent, but they are bodies nonetheless. Kant notes this when he explains that immaterial things have only a “virtual” presence, as opposed to the local presence of corporeal entities. To be truly disembodied is no longer to have any presence, virtual or otherwise that marks one’s position amidst entities. Moreover, this lack of position would include a lack of being somewhere, which, as I have argued above, implies a lack of existence altogether. Anytime we think the positionality of an existing thing we think it as embodied, either virtually (immaterial) or locally (material/sensible).

Consider again the example of my situation. I am currently sitting at my desk typing words into my computer to generate sentences for the sake of completing my dissertation. The computer, the desk, and the items around me all stand in relation to me, yet they are experienced as outside of me. Throughout my day I will experience many similar situations, all of which contain manifold objects experienced as external. I can get up to refill my water, which will lead me into my kitchen, or I can practice putting for my upcoming disc golf tournament. I am constantly transitioning between these various everyday experiences, and I do so in a fairly seamless fashion. However, in such transitioning and movement my relation to objects remains under the rubric of externality. I move between situations, but the objects are left behind, unless, through the abilities of the body, I carry them with me. The constant externality of objects in our being somewhere is the result of our embodiment. Additionally, all of my interactions with these other entities are facilitated by my embodiment. I walk to these objects, I grasp and use them, etc.

This last item, embodiment, begins the biggest departure from the Heideggerian account that we saw in the last chapter. As I have already indicated, Heidegger will continue to pop up in
this quest to understand the concrete situatedness that lies at the foundation of existence. However, Heidegger’s choice to ignore the phenomenon of embodiment presents serious problems for the viability of his account. As I mentioned in the introduction to the present chapter, my own account of our concrete situatedness will have to walk itself back to include embodiment, before it can turn back around and move forward.

Piecing together the three essential components that were gleaned from Kant’s argument as applied to Heidegger reveals the phenomenon of an embodied-being-somewhere-with. This hyphenated term captures the basics of our concrete situatedness. To exist is to be embodied, to be somewhere, and to be amidst entities. In the following section I argue that this phenomenon can more simply be captured by the idea of being-in-place.

In general terms, whenever we think of our embodied-being-somewhere-with, we think of it in terms of place. Anytime we invoke a sense of “where,” we make recourse to an understanding of place. Place is everywhere in our experience, or better, it picks out each and every where. However, many, including Kant, have argued for the reduction of this sense of place to an account of space. In the following section I will make a case for why we should think of our embodied-being-somewhere-with in terms of place, as opposed to typical conceptions of space. I will provide a summary of typical views of space, arguing that they reduce one’s situatedness to a mere site or geometric point. I will argue that place avoids such a reduction, and that it is therefore better suited for the current investigation.

3.3 Space and Place

The distinction and debate between space and place has a long history, and for the most part, space has received much more attention. However, philosophers have recently paid more attention to place as a philosophically significant concept. This is especially true of Edward S. Casey,
who has produced several books and articles analyzing this concept. For Casey, “[t]o be at all – to exist in any way – is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some kind of place. Place is as requisite as the air we breathe, the ground on which we stand, the bodies we have…Nothing we do is unplaced.” How should this ubiquitous phenomenon be understood? How is it distinct from space?

To begin homing in on a sense of place, again consider my current situation. While at my desk I am directed towards my computer, which would appear to indicate a one to one sort of relation with this object that takes up most of my attention. However, on closer inspection we can see that my relatedness in this particular somewhere goes well beyond my working with my computer. I often reach out and interact with my glass of water that is to my left without skipping a beat. The stack of pens that lies at my side is certainly not the focal point of my experience, but my awareness of, and relation to them is such that they afford me various possibilities at any moment. Whether for twirling to satisfy my desire for fidgeting, or for taking notes, or for whatever else they may be needed. The stack of books next to me is something else that I am aware of in the background. The names that line the spines of the book are in the background of my awareness as those figures which I must engage in the passages that follow. I am even related to things beyond the scope of my desk and visual field. I am related to the chicken that is defrosting in the other room, and the clothes that are in the dryer. And so on and so forth.

When considering this trivial example of being-in-place it becomes clear that there are many different lines of relation that obtain in place. Places are that somewhere that I find myself, or at which I might find myself. Between my embodied being and those entities I am somewhere-with lies many different types of relations. I see some things, while using others. I close this line of relation to open these three others. I experience the relational situation which makes up the
somewhere of my existence as a combination of bodily relatedness and awareness. This relational context, in its specificity as this context, is the place in which I find myself.\textsuperscript{133}

How is this type of relational context different from space? Why not continue in a spatial register? The everyday way that place is used as a concept is indicative of one of the simplest distinctions between space and place. Embodied-being-somewhere-with points towards being in a particular somewhere that is differentiated from other somewheres. I am in my apartment, and thus, I am not at school. I am in Lafayette, IN and not Butler, PA, and so on and so forth. Place carries a concreteness and sense of differentiation that is not required by space.\textsuperscript{134} Space names either the entire system of locations, or the void within which locations are found. Space is always beyond the particular locations within it. Place names these locations.\textsuperscript{135}

In this investigation’s search for an understanding of concrete human situatedness, this specificity of place is beneficial. Space, as a concept is more general, and thus, it cannot capture many of the fine-grained details of one’s situatedness that is characteristic of existence. This is indicative of the debate concerning the difference between space and place, which comes to a head during the Modern Period. During this period, two leading conceptions of space emerge, both of which reduce place to a secondary and derivative role. These competing views are the absolutist view, held by thinkers such as Isaac Newton and Samuel Clarke, and the relativist view, held by thinkers such as John Locke and G.W. Leibniz.

The absolutists held that space was an empty and infinite void, within which sensible bodies find their locations, and the various spatial relations that obtain between these locations.\textsuperscript{136} This absolute and infinite void is that through which everything moves, it contains everything, but it remains separate from those things. Put differently, there is an infinite space that contains the finite matter that is distributed throughout it. On this view, “space has a pure dimensionality
independent of the concrete corporeal dimensionality of matter.” This pure dimensionality turns out to be its “measurability.” Think of an infinite space that stands separate from yet contains all things. If one can think of any part of this space, then that part would be such as to constitute a determinate interval. That interval is determinate because it admits of measure. This feature of pure space’s measurability “implies the sheer homogeneity of space, its strict regularity as isometric and isotropic (i.e., its homogeneity of measurement and direction, respectively).”

On this view, place, or the being-somewhere that is discussed above, is reduced to being at a portion of the infinite, homogenous void. Newton explains that “place is a part of space which a body takes up.” Thus, being-in-place simply means occupying this part of infinite space, and not another part. This is to reduce concrete situatedness to mere being at a mathematical point. Moreover, such being at a point is understood in only superficial, or overly abstract ways. Chapter one presented one possible view of human relatedness as forming a functionality contexture out of the totality of significance relations qua world. The absolutist conception of space cannot allow for an interpretation of relations that comes close to this type of analysis. Instead, it levels down an understanding of relations as involvements, and replaces it with distances, lines, angles, and other geometric or otherwise mathematical considerations. This may yield quite a bit for geometric investigations, but it explains very little concerning the role of concrete situatedness in existence.

The relativist view holds that space is an infinite or indefinite nexus of relative positions, where each position is determined by its relation to the entire system of locations. Casey explains that “if it is true that space is determined entirely by relations, then what matters most is not the size or shape of space, its capacity or volume, but the exact positions of the items related to each other in a given spatial nexus.” On this view of space as the entire system of relative positions, place is reduced, again, to just these positions. Thus, even when space is considered on the relativist
view, place is levelled down to a point, or “simple location.”\textsuperscript{143} Casey explains that “simple location entails the reduction of place to position—to a pinpointed spot in a massive matrix of relations.”\textsuperscript{144} Regardless of whether this matrix of relations names space itself, as it does for the relativists, or if it refers to “the expansion of space to an infinite universe that makes this matrix possible,”\textsuperscript{145} as it does for the absolutists, one’s being somewhere is abstracted and levelled-down to the point where there is not much left for an account of concrete relatedness.

The result of both of these conceptions is a view of our situatedness that, at best, describes the spatial existence of any body whatsoever. The determinations that can be made of these generalized bodies amount to calculations of distance, angles, lines, and other geometric properties. Place here becomes a merely calculable portion of space, and to make “place calculable is to transform it into site.”\textsuperscript{146} Casey employs “site” to refer to the levelled down conceptions of place, reduced to a mere portion of or position in space. Once place, that sense of being-somewhere, is reduced to site, one loses the situatedness that we are after. Casey explains that “site does not situate. Space on the modernist conception ends by failing to locate things or events in any sense other than that of pinpointing positions on a planiform geometric or cartographic grid. Place, on the other hand, situates, and it does so richly and diversely. It locates things in regions whose most complete expression is neither geometric nor cartographic.”\textsuperscript{147}

More than a mere site within a larger spatial system, places are those concrete, qualified, particular, densely populated, and historical somewheres within which one might find themselves. Place is closer to a Proustian locale that floods our mind with memories, than it is to the infinite space that so terrified Blaise Pascal. “[E]ngulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces I do not know and that do not know me, I am frightened and astonished.”\textsuperscript{148} Place takes this frightening space that swallows everything, and it replaces it with something familiar. Instead of an immense,
abstract, and empty space, place is that “settled spot where bodies come to reside when they have been thrown together…in the same region.” Place is the lived situation within which we find the interaction, dealings, and dwelling of our embodied existence. Implacement names the relation between this type of place, and our being.

Consider again the example of me at my desk. I find myself at the desk within the spare bedroom that serves as my office. I find a certain fullness in this place. The walls, floor, ceiling, and placement of objects limit and form my possibilities. This fullness also provides me with many relations to that which I find here. I primarily relate to things in this place in one of two ways: use or observation. We encountered this point in the last chapter with Heidegger’s account of the handy and extant. I look at some things while I utilize others for the task that I am carrying out in this place. In both cases my relation to things is one structured by my involvement with them.

As we saw above, these views of space reduce such involvements to calculable spatial relations, therefore depriving them of their character as a lived involvement. It reduces place to site as “the levelled-down, emptied out planiform residuum of place deprived of its actual and virtual ‘powers’.” These “powers” that Casey is referring to are the intricate relations and structures that arise through a consideration of place that is not reduced to space.

More specifically, as we saw above, space requires a homogeneity that is at once isometric and isotropic. Each place that we find ourselves in is differentiated and structured in asymmetrical and idiosyncratic ways. Each place differs from the next, and even if one were to try to focus on the space within this place it would present a heterogenous and differentiated space. What one would find is a particular spatial formation, dependent upon the particularity of this place. Each place that I occupy has its own texture, made up of the other entities found there, as well as the opportunities that are afforded by that place. Likewise, the directions and measurements
of these places would lack homogeneity as well, failing to meet the isotropic and isometric requirements of space. Thus, we can conclude that our concrete situatedness lacks homogeneity, and thus, if we want to grasp it from the perspective of existence, we must turn away from space, and back towards place.

To turn away from space and towards place begins by focusing on that which grounds our implacement, namely the body. As we saw above, the body is how we find our way into and out of places, and as we shall see below, the body contributes quite a bit more to what a place is. Places open up through our embodied engagement therein, and understanding the relation between our embodied being and place, i.e., embodied implacement, will reveal more about the sense of place that I am after.

3.4 Place and Body

“Far from my body being for me merely a fragment of space, there would be for me no such thing as space if I did not have a body.” Merleau-Ponty’s remark holds equally well for our implacement. To be in place requires embodiment. Our bodies do not merely take up a given interval in purely metric space, but rather, through our bodies we find ourselves in place. In this section I will present the key placial structures that arise through this place-body relation. In particular, I will present a reading of Casey’s arguments that the body produces five organizational dyads, here-there, near-far, ahead-behind, up-down, and left-right. These dyads, and more generally the place-body relation, sustains, structures, and opens up places as places to be.

As we saw above, one of the easiest to recognize aspects of our implacement is that to be embodied is to occupy some here. The most general response that can be given to the question “where are you,” is simply, “here.” To be in place is to occupy a particular here, delimited by its relation to the theres of objects and other places. This here-there structure is the most basic way
that our bodies contribute to our being-in-place, as well as the way that we understand places. I am here in my living room, and not in my kitchen. I am here in Lafayette, IN and not in Paris, FR, etc. Notice, however, that this here does not merely refer to the simple location or site that one occupies in space. To be here in a placial sense is to find oneself in a densely qualified somewhere, engaged in various activities therein. The placial here is a dynamic location that does not submit to the purely mathematical analysis of site. In the same way, the ther of the here-there relation must be understood as more than a simple location in space. They are the ther of new or old places, of tools, and of others. They are destinations, points of interest, or somewheres to be avoided.

This here-there relation creates what Casey refers to as a “tensional arc.” He explains that there is a tension that exists between here and there, which manifests itself in different ways. “For instance, we become aware of our failure to understand another person “from her point of view,” which is to say, from the standpoint of her own somatocentric here.” This is a much more noticeable tension between here and there, where the there appears in strict contradistinction to my current here. Other times, however, “[d]uring moments of minimal tension, the here seems to be continuous with the there.” This is particularly true since one is always here, absolutely. No matter what place I am in, I am here, and in my proceeding unaffected between places, or towards various ther there is seamless transition from here, to there, which, consequently becomes here.

This tensional arc begins to structure places by organizing various pathways, relations, and possibilities. One is offered different possibilities in particular directions. Movement and action within or between places always moves between here and there, transforming both along the way, while maintaining the tensional arc of here-there throughout. By offering different pathways in
different directions, here-there cuts through the density of a particular place. Whether virtual or actual, here-there present lines of possibility to be pursued. Places are full of possibilities because they are full of these webs of relations, opened between our embodied existence in place.

Additionally, here-there must be understood as a totality of relations, and not merely as a one-to-one relation. This may be obvious at this point, but the one to one relatedness of here-there is too easily levelled down to a mere geometric line in space, rather than a pathway of possibility in place. By taking these relations in a given place as a totality, we can avoid this potential pitfall. Additionally, this requires understanding the tensional arc of here-there as more of a web or network of arcs, each related to and mutually informing the others. The tension that is opened up between my bodily here and the there of my computer is reliant on many other here-there relations (to the desk, room, my relation to my university, my relation to my dissertation, etc.). Thus, here-there does not merely name the relation between two points, but rather, it captures the tensional pathways that begin to open places for us.

Elisabeth Ströker elaborates helpfully on the here-there relation when she describes this relation as contributing to “the extent and the limitations”\(^{160}\) of place. Ströker explains that

> “the extent of each region is relative to a project and to the possibilities of activity to be realized in it. Regions as such are not first established and opened but rather arise with what is encountered in them. What is encountered determines the extent and the limitations of regions, including their further articulation and the eventual possibility of ‘nesting’ of domains.”\(^{161}\)

Ströker’s use of region and domain instead of place notwithstanding, here she points towards the fact that the extent and limitations of place are malleable boundaries that accord to the projects I engage in place. In finding my way into place, I engage various activities therein. These activities require the activation of certain here-there relations, while other must remain potential or closed off altogether. The terminus of these activated here-there relations specify the extent of the place.
that one currently belongs to. Thus, through the tensional network of activated here-there relations, place is enlivened and opened. Thus, un-encountered places have no tensional arc with which to hold them open. There is no extent or limitation to a place without a lived bodily here interacting with it, because there is no relatedness (here-there; tensional arc) that allows for such determinations to be made.

The extent and limitations that here-there contribute to place serves as a sort of horizon, in the positive sense in which Heidegger employs these terms. Only from the extent and limitations of a place does that place begin to take hold. They are not the point at which a place stops, but they are the horizon from which that place unfolds. Here-there bears much of the weight of such unfolding through the “referential relationship[s] to the acting subject.” This furthers the point that places are not just locations on the globe, in space, on a map, etc. Place is the name for the concrete situatedness of existence. Thus, were there no existing persons, there would be places qua geographic or geometric locations, but there would not be places qua structure of existence. As stated above, places are not first established and opened, only to subsequently find relations and encounters within them. Places open up through the encounters that are structured via the here-there relation.

We can recognize, with this sense of our bodily here, that we are no longer discussing the strictly biological body, nor the body as extant thing. That which delimits one’s bodily here is the boundaries of their lived body. It is not about the line created by the skin, which separates the internal organs from the rest of the world. One’s here is not determined by the extent of their spatial extension. It is now a matter of what a body can do, as opposed to questions of size. Recognizing the lived body as that which defines our bodily here brings us to the next pair of terms that Casey details: near and far. This dyad is secondary to here-there, in that it specifies a further level of
detail concerning here and there. Where here and there provide an absolute pair of contrasting
terms, near and far provide a more concrete pair that is attuned to our disposition, activity, and
possibilities. Near and far segment that field opened by here-there into definite regions. This
segmentation results in two spheres, a near sphere and far sphere, which share a malleable
boundary.

The near sphere fills out the concept of our bodily here as more than existing at a point. Casey
explains that our bodily here “means not just that I am literally here, at some precise spot
in space—as if the ‘here’ were only a pure point, interchangeable in principle with any other
point.”\textsuperscript{165} Instead, my here extends to that which is near. “It extends into my near sphere and
beyond, into the far-sphere.”\textsuperscript{166} As opposed to a mere point, our near sphere is an open field,
extending around our bodies, and its limits are provided by the reach of our bodily possibilities,
regardless of whether they are actual or potential. “To be near at all is to be reachable by definite,
enactable doings.”\textsuperscript{167} This corresponds to Ströker’s point about the extent and limitations of place
that was discussed above. Places are delimited according to the projects and abilities that are
undertaken in place. That which my body, either on its own or through technological supplement,
is able to carry out defines the reach of my near sphere.\textsuperscript{168}

My current implacement finds a near sphere full of things within my reach. My computer,
coffee cup, cell phone, and other objects on my desk are all near in terms of my reach. Additionally,
this nearness is not restricted to actual reach, i.e., the near sphere is not determined through exact
measurements of distance. The various objects which populate my apartment are not reachable at
this exact moment, but through a small movement they become available. Thus, they also belong
to my near sphere. Further, something like the grocery store in my neighborhood is even further
out of my immediate reach, but it certainly is still near to me. The exact boundary of our near
sphere is often changing, and it is dependent upon our involvements in place. As I sit here writing these words, what is near is experienced as that which is within my actual reach. However, if I change my task to the need to refill my coffee reserves, then the store is considered near, in comparison to a coffee shop in Seattle, WA.169

Thus, we see that reach and availability contribute to determining the limits of our near sphere, which can be restricted or expanded depending on the scope of our current dealings in place. The far side of this directional dyad is conversely, not that which is distant as such, but rather, that which is \textit{out of reach}, and \textit{unavailable}.170 Because it remains related to reach and availability, the far sphere is likewise attuned to our embodied activity as well as our disposition. If I am feeling crushed under the pressure of a writing deadline, then the store, which has often appeared to me as near, may now present itself as far.

Casey explains that, together, these directional dyads grant “primal depth” to our being-in-place.171 “To move near to something is to move into its depth; to move far from it is to leave its depth and to join another. Either way, depth makes the near and far possible as distinguishable but inseparable parameters.”172 Casey’s use “parameter” is intended in terms of the Greek root \textit{parametrein}, which means to measure out.173 Measuring out in this way is an opening up and a spanning of that which the parameters are parameters for. Thus, it is very different than “measuring in,” such as measuring in inches or miles. It is not by reference to some other means of measurement, nor by means of calculable distances that a place acquires its parameters. Rather, a spanning and opening up of a delimited area through these parameters allows places to take their shape. Our reach measures out our implacement by spanning the near sphere and delimiting it in distinction to the far. Primal depth illuminates the range of possible action for the place we find
ourselves in. The near-far parameters of place indicate a more thorough opening up of the field that begins to be constituted by our here-there relations.

This primal depth produces what Casey understands, via Whitehead, as “non-simple location.” Non-simple’ is meant to indicate that our location is not that of a static point on a grid, but, rather, that it is a lived body in place. Our non-simple location is the being-within-a-field generated by our here-there, near-far relations, which includes the various possibilities of being that undertake within this field. The density and smallness of the point of simple location is transformed into the parametric spannedness of being here, in the near sphere. This parametric spannedness offers place as a field of possible action, as opposed to an empty container or static point-nexus.

There are three additional dyads that further differentiate places, contributing to their structure and organization. Casey describes these dyads as dimensional, instead of directional. They are the dyads of left-right, up-down, and ahead-behind. The dimensional dyads arise when considering the body as the center or pivot of our non-simple locatedness in place. They arise around the body, engulfing it in their pairs. The three dimensional pairs bifurcate places into regions beyond just near and far, which contribute to our ability to navigate within and between places. These dimensional pairs make it easier to get a foothold in place, and move between various possible actions. The possibilities offered to me in place are presented as either ahead, behind, left, right, up or down. The dimensional dyads allow us to organize the manifold here-there relations into distinct regions of possibility.

Our being-in-place would be quite different without these bifurcating pairs. Without a sense of right and left, I would be unable to grasp and manipulate things with my hands, nor would I be able to successfully navigate past objects which appear to the left or right of my body.
Moreover, right and left do not merely define sets of points that occur on either side of my body. They mark regions within my near sphere, and possible directions out of it, which have their own sort of depth *qua* section of the near sphere’s primal depth. The dimensional dyads segment the primal depth of our near sphere, thus creating further regions, which are sensitive to the position and activity of our bodies.

Up and down provide the spatial level\(^{178}\) that allows our embodied existence to pursue its goals through our upright posture. The spatial level, organized around our body’s center of balance, provides us with the possibility of balance and upright walking, but it also allows for an understanding of vertical organization within place. We sense the limits of a room above us, and we understand stacks of objects through their up-down relations. Ahead and behind add a further bifurcation according to the asymmetrical\(^{179}\) division of where our bodies are facing and where our backs are directed. The direction we are facing is crucial for our perceptual awareness because of the organization of sense organs on our faces,\(^{180}\) which results in an asymmetry in this pair. In fact, each of these pairs are asymmetric in ways that differentiate them from a strictly volumetric interpretation. One’s handedness determines the level of asymmetry between left and right, and ahead maintains priority over behind. Up and down comes the closest to being symmetrical, yet, as Casey explains, up receives greater attention and focus, which skews even this dyad.

> “Given the two-way directionality of this dimension, the motion of ‘up’ is stressed more than that of ‘down,’ as we see in expressions such as ‘upright posture,’ ‘standing up,’ ‘coming up to him,’ etc. ‘Down’ tends to denote deficient or degraded situations, e.g., ‘feeling down,’ ‘getting down on him,’ ‘down times.’ It is as if the downward draw of physical gravity gives rise to a compensatory emphasis on the upward motions of the human body.”\(^{181}\)

This asymmetry reveals that the dimensional dyads are structuring pairs, based on our lived bodies, not metric determinations of triaxial extension. The dimensional dyads also further the sense in which places and bodies are intertwined. Our bodies are a sort of proto-place, and from out of the
lines of our bodily organization come the organizational lines which are drawn through our near sphere, places, and regions.\footnote{182} It is as though our bodies extend beyond themselves, and merge into the place we come to occupy.

Through the interaction of our bodies and place we find a \textit{lived} place that is activated by the lived body.\footnote{183} Our bodies hold us \textit{here}, in place, related to various there\textemdash that forge a network of possible and actual relations and pathways. The abilities of my embodied being specify the depth of near and far that measure out the parameters of one’s bodily here. The asymmetrical dyads of our bodies organization extend beyond the proto-place of the body, to the place we find ourselves Through the body, places are activated into places to be, and here we find possibilities, pathways, and modes of orientation that make use of the differentiations made possible by this lived body. Through the bifurcations of the body, regions of places are illuminated in various ways.

However, at this point, there is a tension between the direction that I am pushing the investigation, and Casey’s interpretation. This tension arises when considering questions of the bounds of place. We have already seen Elisabeth Ströker suggest that the extent and limitations of place are specified by what one can do in place, i.e., by the near sphere, and those here-there relations that obtain within those bounds. Casey offers a different answer, which leads him to begin confusing place as a structure of existence, and place as a global location. Making this tension clear, and finding a possible resolution will take up the last section of this chapter.

3.5 The Bounds of Place: Landscape, Involvement, and a Departure from Casey

Place is that “settled spot” where our embodied existence is situated, amidst others, entities, and our surroundings. Such a place is parametrically spanned by the near sphere, held open through the tensional arc of here-there relations. This spanned area is further differentiated according to the axes of the body’s organization, i.e., the dimensional dyads.\footnote{184} However, it is not yet clear how
one should think about the bounds of being-in-place. I am always in place, but where does that place end? What marks the bounds of my implacement?

Before moving forward, I must note that we have run up against a difficulty in the way that place is discussed. Casey argues that places are multiple and particular in a way that marks them as distinct from space. Places are the somewhere of existence, and that somewhere is always differentiated by what is found there, especially the possibilities that are afforded by that somewhere. While I am always in place, that place is always different. In thinking through this particularity, it is easy to begin reducing places to locations. However, this reduces places to geographic entities, or, worse, they become mere sites in space. What I am after is an account of place as an ontological structure, and therefore, in determining the bounds of place, we cannot refer to the geographic boundaries of particular locations. While these boundaries do mark off places *qua* locations, they do not necessarily mark the boundaries of place as the embodied-being-somewhere-with that began this chapter. We must find a way to understand such being-somewhere between the extremes of abstract space and specific, existing locations. It is with this latter sense of place that we must pursue the question concerning the bounds of place.

Casey attempts to walk this line between geographic locations and ontological situatedness when he posits “landscape”\(^{185}\) as the outer boundary of place. According to Casey, landscape offers a way of differentiating and particularizing one place from another, while also maintaining a seemingly appropriate level of generality. Casey explains that

> “Body and landscape present themselves as coeval epicenters around which particular places pivot and radiate. They are, at the very least, the bounds of places. In my embodied being I am *just at* a place as its inner boundary; a surrounding landscape, on the other hand, is *just beyond* that place as its outer boundary. Between the two boundaries—and very much as a function of their differential interplay—implacement occurs.”
This sounds like an appealing answer to the question concerning the bounds of place, but what exactly does Casey mean by landscape in this context?

Casey explains further that a “landscape seems to exceed the usual parameters of place by continuing without apparent end; nothing contains it, while it contains everything, including discrete places, in its environing embrace.” This explanation begins to equivocate. Above, landscape is described as the outer bounds of a given place. Yet, with this elaboration, it seems that landscape contains or bounds several places at once, and therefore it does not necessarily differentiate places that occur within the same landscape. Can this ambiguity be resolved?

These remarks concerning landscape come after an analysis of navigation and orientation in place. Casey discusses different navigational techniques, and his reference to landscape seems to refer to the visual landscape that one sees as a sort of placial horizon. This would imply that between the visual horizon and my embodied being, place unfolds as the context, the somewhere of my being. Casey seems to endorse this visual interpretation of landscape when he explains that it “signifies not just a literal stretch of land-in-view, but, by extension, any coherent vista.” This maintains a visual sense of landscape, which is one candidate for eliminating the ambiguity discussed above. This visual interpretation can be especially appealing for certain types of places. My current situation finds me in the mountains of western Washington. The dramatic landscape that I see around me in the form of the Cascade Mountains delimits my place in a strong sense by providing physical boundaries that block my possible actions. These mountains also block my sight, or rather, they create a coherent vista that serves as a clear boundary, allowing my perception of this place to be bounded in the sense that I can only see so far. A similar perception might occur on a small island. This place has an outer boundary that is established by the surrounding landscape, or perhaps by the blending of the landscape and seascape.
Casey continues this perceptual interpretation of landscape, but he expands it to try to include more than just vision. He explains that “there is landscape wherever there is a felt difference unrecuperable by the usual designators of place.” On this account, the bounds of place are felt, perceived, or more generally, they are experienced between my body and the perceivable landscape that both environs a region of places, and that differentiates itself from those places. Yet, how can landscape be the boundary of place, when a given landscape can contain a multitude of places? If landscape is the outer boundary of some place, then we risk losing the scalar quality of places that was discussed above. North Bend, WA is a place with a distinct landscape, but what of the multitude of places within this larger region? They all share a landscape yet are not the same place.

Moreover, this type of dramatically clear boundary is not available for many types of places. My old home in Lafayette, IN has little to offer in terms of a landscape boundary. It belongs to the heartlands of America, where one often finds a seemingly endless expanse of flat ground. In these types of places one’s eyesight can travel as far as physically possible without meeting any determinate boundary other than the horizon line. Here it is not clear what differentiates one place from another as the landscape does not offer the “felt difference unrecuperable by the usual designators of place.”

My hometown of Butler, PA offers another type of example, situated between these two extremes. Western Pennsylvania is an area that is filled with rolling hills. These hills are not as dramatic as mountains, and they offer more differentiation than flat ground, but they still do not clearly differentiate the place that I find myself. If I sit in my mother’s home, trying to determine the bounds of my im placement, the hills around me offer very little. Which hill or set of hills marks the boundary of my current place? The elevation differences present me with a feeling of difference,
but it is not clear how this difference bounds a given place. Do I need to feel the difference between rolling hills and flat land? Or the difference between one set of hills versus another? If I am at the top of one of these hills, then what part of the landscape that I see provides the boundaries to my place? Unfortunately, Casey does not provide clear answers these questions.

Landscape might also refer to the landforms that are found within a particular region, instead of simply the experienced difference of a visual boundary. However, this sense of landscape refers to something in place. We would need to be able to determine the limits of a particular landform in place before this could provide a succinct boundary. Adding further ambiguity to this discussion of landscape, Casey confirms this reading of landscape as well! Later in *Getting Back into Place*, after he has described landscape in terms of vistas, he describes landscape as something that is distinct from geography. Casey explains that geography focuses on the “perceptual space”\(^\text{191}\) of place. Such perceptual space is understood as the space that is grasped by standing back, observing, and thinking about space from a removed, or what some might call an objective position. Instead of this perceptual, or observational perspective, landscape focuses on the “sensory space,” that arises from “sensing the landscape close up.”\(^\text{192}\) This also seems to connect to the idea of the “felt difference” of landscape that Casey references in the line quoted above. Landscape in this new sense refers to the terrain of a given area as it is actually lived, as opposed to the more sterile observation and description of locales.\(^\text{193}\) This makes it so that landscape is both the coherent vista of a given place, as well as the landforms that one experiences as they move through place. This seems to imply that landscape provides both the texture of a given place, and its visual boundary. However, neither of these meanings clearly differentiate this place that I find myself from other places that I might go.
One last thing to note is that this view suffers from an overly *natural* interpretation of place. Casey sees this, and advocates that his readers “must suspend any dogmatic naturalism in approaching place through body and landscape.” However, using a term that applies best to natural places, such as landscape, leads us down this road in the first place. Here in my office, or from the middle of Times Square, it becomes even more difficult to determine the landscape that marks the outer boundaries of my being-in-place. Is it the walls of the room? Of the house? Of the property? Of the town? Here again we see that landscape does not offer what is required. It is ambiguous, and it does not apply to built places as well as it does to natural places. Further, if it refers to a visual boundary, then landscape does more as a boundary of place *qua* geographic location as opposed to the ontological somewhere of existence, and if it refers to the landform that constitutes the texture of a place, then it does not fulfil its role as outer boundary. So where do we go from here?

We can begin to see the way forward in understanding the bounds of place if we look to the example of navigation and orientation that precedes Casey’s claim that body and landscape are the coeval epicenters of place. Casey’s discussion of navigation and orientation focuses on the Puluwatans of the Caroline Islands in Micronesia, who have been able to successfully navigate the Pacific Ocean for centuries. Puluwatans use orienting marks such as ocean currents, flotsam, ocean swells, sea spray, and stars, among other things. The Puluwatans can pick out stars that are located over a reference island. They feel the roll and pitch of their vessel over the waves to determine distances between themselves and the unseen land in the distance. They will
even taste the ocean water to test temperature and salinity which provides them a sense of currents and wind direction. They have learned to use seemingly invisible seamarks, as opposed to the landmarks that we typically use to orient ourselves.

This example presents a particularly interesting case, not only because of how impressive these navigational techniques are, but also because it presents a case of implacement on the ocean. The ocean is clearly different than built places, and it is even distinct from many other sorts of natural places. Additionally, the open ocean is seemingly empty compared to the places that are experienced by the majority of people in their day to day lives. Instead, it is filled with “barely perceptible seamarks.” One may also catch a glimpse of the stars, various clouds, or perhaps a distant landmass, but, for the most part, this presents a unique mode of implacement.

The ocean _qua_ place is also devoid of the type of felt difference that landscape is supposed to offer in experiencing the bounds of place. What is it about the Puluwatan’s seafaring adventure on this barren waterscape that constitutes implacement? Additionally, what is the boundary of their sea-place that they occupy while navigating? Is it a visual marker like the horizon line? Is it the edges of their boat? Is it the entire ocean? The world? Where can we mark the placial boundary, even if we allow this boundary to be malleable?

First, this example makes it abundantly clear that landscape does little to define the outer boundary of place. There is no distinguishing landscape in the distance, other than the horizon line. The horizon line marks off the limits of sight, but it is a rather arbitrary boundary for determining one’s ocean implacement. There is plenty of landscape _qua_ landform, or rather seaform in place for the Puluwatans to contend with, but as was pointed out above, this contributes to 1) the texture of the place they find themselves, as well as 2) the Puluwatan’s ability to get around. This does not, however, provide an outer boundary.
To find the boundary of the Puluwatan’s ocean implacement, let us turn away from landscape, and instead turn towards the other feature that Casey identifies as an epicenter of place, namely the bodily here. The Puluwatans implacement on the open ocean, like my own implacement here in my office, begins with the body. Through their bodies, the Puluwatan navigators occupy a here that engages many connections to the various entities with which they are involved: each other, their boat, the stars, seamarks, the taste of the water, and the other navigational tools and techniques that are described above. With this we find a set of theres that are within reach, which are organized according to the dimensional pairs. There is also another set of theres, which are out of reach, and which might be brought into the near sphere through some action. Each set of here-there relations is further specified according to the dimensional pairs, and it is with this relatedness that the Puluwatans ocean implacement occurs. If these relations could be traced out and determined, then perhaps they will provide a clue for the outer boundary of this implacement. However, we will also have to determine which here-there relations to trace. It will not be enough to trace every possible here-there relation since that will start a slide back towards space. Instead, we must focus on the here-there relations that obtain within the near sphere, as these are the relations that are in the same place as the Puluwatans themselves. The other relations, those that are in the realm of the far, are out there, somewhere else, and require concerted action to be brought into place with one’s here.

Casey gives credence to this return to the directional dyads in *Fate of Place*. While discussing Husserl, Casey posits that “[t]he importance of the near sphere is not just that it fills the gap between body and place—I am in place in the near sphere for the most part…” Being-in-place is a being here, within the near sphere, as that parametrically spanned area, held open by the
tensional arc of here-there, delimited by my reach. This parametric spannedness between here and there that cashes out the near sphere can be understood in terms of one’s involvements in place.

This brings us back to Ströker’s point above concerning the extent and limitations of place. The here-there relations that have been activated through my involvement in place span the near sphere and measure it out. If we are to do away with the usual geometric or geographic modes of determining the bounds of implacement, and if we are to think this implacement in terms of a concretely situated existence, then we are left with the non-metric lines of involvement that obtain between oneself and objects in the course of actions or possibilities that one engages. These here-there relations are pathways of virtual activity that have been seized upon. Once one seizes upon this virtual pathway it is activated through one’s involvement with it in place.

The limits of these pathways may measure out a near sphere that is quite small or that is quite large qua metric distances, but the metric determination of this area is unimportant. The web of involvements produced by our dealings in place holds open the near sphere as that wherein we are engaged. The limits of this near sphere specify the limits of our implacement by tracing the extent and limitations of our involvements, while also being sensitive to the objects and texture of the current context of implacement. Thus, we find that the near sphere, in its function of tracing out the extent and limitations of our involvements, defines the limits of implacement. Ströker’s idea releases us from the ambiguity of landscape. Our involvements run between one’s embodied here and the theres of objects, which gives shape and a limit to one’s implacement.

This is how the near sphere captures our implacement “for the most part.” It specifies the shape and limits of this place. The particular context and texture of that implacement is determined by what is found therein, and the possibilities of involvement are determined according to the particularity of this context and texture. Combining these, or rather filling in the content of the
near sphere brings implacement more clearly into view. Additionally, the way the near sphere is held open allows for newly activated pathways to be exploited as well as the possibility of carrying our near sphere to a new location, with different possible relations. Therefore, the near sphere must be thought in addition to these other factors, and only in combination is implacement determined.

This example of Puluwatan navigation not only serves to show how our involvements determine the shape and limit of our current implacement, but further, it reveals that one is not merely involved with extant things in place. The Puluwatan’s are not involved with the bare ocean, stars, etc., *qua* extant things. They are not related to merely present objects in a homogenous space container. Nor do the Puluwatans simply lay their involvements over a geographic or purely spatial world. Rather, they are involved with the currents, the placement of the stars above them and above various “reference islands,” the taste of the water, the jet spray that indicates the *terra firma* which lies beyond eyesight, and the other navigational marks, tools, and techniques that they have made for themselves. The lines of their activated here-there relations form the primary engagement that the Puluwatan’s have with their environment. The extant, geometric, or purely spatial world is an abstraction that comes only subsequently for the Puluwatan navigator. The primary place that they engage is their near sphere, which is inconceivably large when considering metric distances. Yet, it is completely within the navigators reach when considering these relations as involvements.

If we could trace the lines of involvement, generated by the projects of the Puluwatan’s we would see a web of relations that generated a field. This field would adhere throughout the project, while constantly shifting in shape. The Puluwatan sea place is this field, made up of navigational marks with which the navigators are involved, and that point the way towards that new place where they are headed.
Within this field we do not find empty space, a series of relative points, or a geographic locale, but instead we find space for acting, or rather, a place of action, replete with a sphere of reach, segmented along our somatocentric axis, full of here-there lines of relation between our bodies and things. The activated here-there relations *qua* involvements we undertake in place are what truly move us away from objective space and into something that better captures the richness of our lived and embodied being-in-place. To view place without our projects and involvement is to begin to slip into a view of place *qua* geographic location or abstract space. By trying to specify the bounds of place outside of these involvements, Casey risks slipping into these sorts of discussions. At the very least, he seems to present an outer boundary of place that is indexed to places *qua* locations, while identifying the inner boundary through our own embodied implacement. I will attempt to push his account in a different direction by avoiding this type of ambiguity.

Moreover, this discussion of involvements, and the example of the Puluwatans has also shown that the distinction between the handy and the extant is still in play. Objects with which we are involved are first and foremost handy things, and only secondarily are they merely present. Moreover, it is these objects *qua* handy bits of equipment, along with our involvement with them, that trace out the extent of our being-in-place. We can see in the case of the Puluwatans that the stars and seamarks are not merely present objects, but they are *navigational tools* that they have made for themselves. They are involved with these seamarks as their *equipment for navigating*. This idea goes against Casey’s claim that the Puluwatans have not made use “of compasses or other navigational instruments.” The Puluwatans certainly do have instruments in that they have transformed natural objects into equipment for navigating. In the way that they encounter the sea and transform aspects of this sea place into equipment they *make a place for themselves*.204
With the return of the handy and extant comes the return of Heidegger’s concept of world, albeit in a limited capacity. Heidegger’s world is the referential context of significance, from out of which one understands their involvement with entities. I do not wish to refute the existence of such a referential context, but rather to point out that this functionality contexture exists within place, and in relation to other places. Put differently, the world is sustained within the field that is opened up through our embodied implacement. This is due to the fact that world, in Heidegger’s sense, is a phenomenon of intelligibility. World makes possible the understanding of one’s involvements. However, these involvements are first and foremost placial relations. They are the activated lines that run between here and there, forged between my body and the various theres of objects, which create the tensional arc that makes room for action within place. These relations depend on the context and specificity of place, in addition to depending on the particular reach and abilities of the person. If the features and objects found within place contribute to the texture of that place, world adds more depth to this texture by imbuing it with differing degrees of know-how, depending on the extent of the references at play.

For example, if I were to try to engage in the methods of Puluwatan navigation, the functionality contexture of this activity would be rather bare, providing me with only a few rudimentary references that would result in a poor attempt at navigating. Whereas for the Puluwatan’s, their implacement contains a much richer texture, full of a great number of referential relations that help them to grasp what they are doing, and that also help them to succeed at doing it. This functionality contexture specifies the way that one understands involvements in place, and the adequacy with which they have the know how to be involved therein, but the involvements themselves are primarily placial. Thus, world supervenes upon place, and place remains that wherein one is involved.
These involvements, tracing here-there and the limits of the near sphere, organized according to the dimensional dyads, open a parametrically spanned area that is place *qua* ontological structure. Between my own body, and the things with which I carry out my dealings, there are non-metric lines of involvement that are sustained by the various possibilities that I engage in the particular, settled spot that is my current place. I am involved with objects, things, and features in various determinate ways, and these involvements are the primary way in which we should understand the here-there pathways that have been activated within our near sphere. Thus, it is through these activated lines of involvement that we are rooted and limited in place.

Yi-Fu Tuan, in his famous work concerning place, explains that “[w]hen space feels thoroughly familiar to us, it has become place.”²⁰⁶ Casey, making a similar point, says that places are *made* “by transmuting an initially aimless and endless scene into a place of concerted action, thereby constituting a dense placescape that, in close collaboration with our active bodies, guides us into orientation.”²⁰⁷ Places are made through one’s projects and involvements. With this activity of existing, one is able to find themselves within a world that is familiar, and that has aims and ends which specify places to act. These projects and involvements, in turn, depend upon the techniques, practices, equipment, and handy objects that human existence employs in pursuit of these various ends. Yet, these things that human beings are reliant upon to turn an “aimless and endless scene into a place” are all technological in nature. Put more simply, if involvements trace out the bounds and shape of place, and if these involvements depend upon techniques and technologies, then it is through *technics*²⁰⁸ that, in Casey and Tuan’s sense, places are made.

In the next chapter I will focus on developing the details of our involvements with handy things in place by pursuing a more in-depth analysis of technics. In particular, I will focus on two things. First, I will provide arguments concerning the primacy of technics as *the* placial activity. I
will show that technics is the primary way in which one makes places, in the sense discussed above. As the primary place-making activity, technics also contributes to the structure and shape of places. On this issue of the structure of place, I will return to Elisabeth Ströker in the next chapter. Ströker argues that technics provides a topological structure to place. I will explain this topological structure and show how it adds more depth to the understanding of place and its structure.
CHAPTER 4.  MAKING A PLACE FOR OURSELVES: TECHNICS AND THE SHAPE OF PLACE

4.1 Introduction

In chapter three I argued that the spatial supplement that is required for our account of existence is best explained as being-in-place. Being-in-place explains one’s situatedness among entities in a way that is attuned to human existence in particular. It captures what we might call the spatiality[^209] of one’s situatedness, while also accounting for that situatedness itself. Further, it does all of this without slipping into discussions of pure space. As I argued in the last chapter, the concept of space is ill-suited for the present investigation because it reduces one’s situatedness to being at a position or site. This idea of a position or site forces the account to become too generalized, therefore replacing our focus on human existence with an abstract investigation of existent bodies in general.

However, Casey’s account of being-in-place cannot be taken over in an unaltered form. The example of Puluwatan navigation brought two things into focus. First, that to be situated in place is to be engaged or involved with what is found therein. The specific place and mode of engagement can be determined differently, but the implanation and engagement itself are invariant. This involvement specifies the shape, extent, and limitations of one’s current implanation. Moreover, it is through this engagement that we *make* a place for ourselves.[^210] At the end of chapter two I suggested that this engagement in place is primarily technological, i.e., I claimed that the primary form of activity through which one engages a given place is *technics*.

Technics means “technical practice as a whole, as system or result.”[^211] Thus, technics names tools and implements, the techniques required for their creation and use, as well as the ensembles of tools and their human operators. Technics picks out the entirety of what we might
call the technological realm, regardless of whether we are discussing the active engagement of the
Puluwatan’s utilizing various techniques to transform the ocean into an ensemble of navigational
tools and information, or simpler cases such as when I use a pen and paper to write my grocery
list. Technics and its role in both the structure of place, and the activity of place-making\textsuperscript{212} will be
the focus of this chapter.

The following chapter is divided into three sections. The first of these sections investigates
the connection between existence and activity in general. The second section is devoted to an
investigation of the primacy of technics. As indicated above, technics is often viewed as an
accessory or add on to some more basic human nature. Against this view, I argue that technics is
primary, as the activity of human existence in place, and as the activity through which places are
made. The final section focuses on the structure of place as articulated through technics. This
section includes a return to Ströker, and I present a reading of her arguments that technological
placiality is structured according to a topological model. That is, following Ströker’s lead, I show
how technics leads to topology.

\textbf{4.2 Active Existence and Place}

That existence is active has already been established in both of the previous chapters.
However, it will be worthwhile to revisit these arguments briefly, because seeing why existence is
active will point towards the reason why this activity is primarily technics. This will require
revisiting the idea that existence consists in having-to-be (Heidegger), and the reasons why simple
location is an inadequate descriptor for existence (Casey).

In chapter one, I argued alongside Heidegger that our existence, i.e. the human \textit{to be}, ought
to be interpreted in the sense of having-to-be. There I explained that “we cannot simply \textit{be} in terms
of inert matter. Rather, we comport ourselves towards the world in terms of possible ways to be,
and at each moment we must choose some possibilities at the expense of others.” Existence, particularly in its temporal dimension, requires a constant state of projecting towards possible ways to be, in relation to those possibilities that were chosen in the past and that contribute to one’s having-been. Existence presents itself as a constant series of projective actions, where one seizes upon or stumbles into possible comportments of the existence that is their own, and that they are concerned with in relation to themselves.

This interpretation of existence is offered in contradistinction to the idea of an extant or merely present existence that only subsequently becomes active. We saw in chapter one that existence qua extantness is a derivative form of existing that belongs to intraworldly entities when these entities are modified out of their more originary handiness. Human existence is altogether different from such extantness and handiness, particularly since one “does not simply occur among other beings.” Instead, “the essential definition of this being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a what that specifies its material content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each instance it has to be its being as its own.” Human existence is such that “the essence of this being lies in its to be.” Heidegger adds an important footnote to this sentence, which states “that it ‘has’ to be; definition!” The definition of the “to be” of humanity is that it has to be!

As long as one is they are not yet finished with the project of existing. Whenever we think of the situatedness, spatiality, or what we now call the being-in-place of existing, it requires an interpretation that captures this activity. This is precisely why Casey argues so strongly against interpretations of space that reduce being-in-place to being simply located at a site or position. At best, simple location explains the situation of an object in general, merely present at some point, determined, in its relations to other non-descript objects via an external metric. This never comes
close to capturing the fundamental and invariant situatedness of an active existence. To be is to have to be, and this having to be outstrips the typical interpretations of simple location.

Being-in-place is offered as an alternative to such interpretations. Being-in-place captures the dynamic situation that one finds themselves in, opened up through the tensional arc of here-there relations, within one’s near sphere, bifurcated according to the three-dimensional pairs.

One certainly can use simple location as a rubric for doing other sorts of investigations (geometric, cartographic, etc.), but it is inadequate for attempts at understand existing. Existence is always existing, in the active sense of a having to be, situated in a place that opens through and is sensitive to that activity. The French philosopher Raymond Ruyer puts this point nicely in his discussion of life in general. He explains that “[a] living being is never ‘fully assembled’…it incessantly forms itself.” Existence is the project of incessant formation. At each level of existence—molecular, cellular, organ, organism, consciousness—we find only activity, because to be truly inactive is to not be.

However, the idea of existence in general qua activity is not enough. It is not enough to understand the existence of any living thing whatsoever. Instead, we must try to pinpoint a specifically human activity. Further, this specifically human activity must explain the incessant formation of being-in-place. What activity implaces human beings, and articulates the structure of that place? If existence is activity, and that existence is always situated in place, then there must be an activity connected to that implacement. As I have indicated above, I believe that the specifically human activity that gives rise to our being-in-place is technics. In the section below, I will argue for the primacy of technics. I will begin by revisiting the example of Puluwatan navigation that I discussed in the last chapter. I will do this to reiterate the connection between implacement, involvements, and the techniques and tools that sustain these involvements.
However, I also want to avoid begging the question, and thus, I need to entertain Casey’s claim that this navigation is non-technological. To do this, I will step back from the specifics of Casey and the example of the Puluwatans in order to look to whether or not we can find or conceive of a case of a natural, that is, non-technological human that is differentiated from and more essential than the technological human. As I will show, there is no non-technological human, as technics is wrapped up in the origin and activity of the human. After working through the problem of origin and formation of the human, I will return to Heidegger’s understanding of the primacy of handiness. After grasping the primacy of technics from the standpoint of the human origin and formation we will be able to look at Heidegger’s arguments with soft eyes.  

4.3 Technics and the Making of Place

The Tuan and Casey quotes that I provided at the end the last chapter provide a clue for determining the activity that makes a place for humans to be. These thinkers pointed towards the fact that the place making activity will need to instill places with familiarity, and this will be accomplished by establishing various aims and ends that will orient us in place. Whatever activity transforms open spaces into concentrated places of action that are filled with possibilities will be the activity that gives rise to place.

At this point, it will be helpful to return to Casey and his example of Puluwatan navigation that we saw in chapter two. The Puluwatans find themselves implaced on the open ocean. The extent and limitations of their implacement are the non-metrically determined lines of involvement that obtain between them and the various navigational techniques that they use. Through the use of these techniques, the Puluwatans are able to orient themselves, thereby making the open ocean into a place to be.
What if I was to attempt this type of navigation? First, I would become lost rather quickly while at sea. This would lead to a lack of familiarity with the ocean place within which I find myself. However, this would not rid my existence of place. Rather, the extent and limitations of my implacement would be reduced to a scale that frightens me. The Puluwatans imbue the ocean with familiarity through their skill, whereas the ocean would seem utterly out of reach for me as an unskilled navigator. I might be able to find familiarity within the boat, or with my own body, but this shrinking of my skilled reach would be a disconcerting experience. The important thing to note here is that this frightening shrinkage of my reach and the actions available to me would not be a loss of place, but rather a shrinking of place to the point where the scope of familiarity and involvement leaves us with little or nothing to pursue.

In both cases it is the skill, techniques, and implements that transform places and allow us to orient ourselves. The particular level of skill that one has for a given place determines how far their reach can extend, but the extent and limitations of place are a separate issue from the formation of that place itself. Here we return to the idea of involvements, except that we can see that these involvements rely on the techniques and tools that one has at their disposal. Put differently, it is technics that allows one to make places familiar and navigable.

Casey saw the Puluwatan’s as a case of natural, i.e., non-technological engagement in place. This is a distinction that is quite common in the way we usually conceive of technology. Because humans produce technology, it must be secondary to whatever properly human cause brings about the effect of technology. Despite this reading offered by Casey, we can now see the role of technics in Puluwatan navigation. They transformed seemingly natural objects (stars, waves, etc.), via particular techniques and “operational sequence[s]”\(^{221}\) into implements for navigating the open ocean. The Puluwatans were not without technical mediation. Rather, it was scaled down to a level
where the tools and techniques could hide from view. Casey misses this almost hidden trace of technics, thereby claiming that the Puluwatan’s are similar to Rousseau’s first man, untouched by the blemish of technology.²²²

However, even though Casey is mistaken about the role of technics in this particular example, this does not rule out the possibility of there being some more basic activity that founds technics. Perhaps it is intelligence, or some other human feature that is more basic or more natural than our technological engagement with an environment. Put differently, is it still the case that technics is parasitic upon some more basic human nature? Or is technics part of that nature itself, to the point where we cannot look at the Puluwatans, or any humans, as non-technological? I have already shown my hand concerning the answer that I prefer for these questions, but I will move on to show how technics cannot be accessory to a more natural human essence.

4.3.1 Technics: Essential or Accessory?

The question of the primacy of technics becomes a question of its place in the essence or nature of human being. Is technics a product of or accessory to the essential human being? Or is technics part of that essential being? Is the origin of technics delayed such that the human proper must emerge first? Or do they arrive together, in a single stroke.²²³

To claim that technics is secondary is to claim that it relies on some other human feature for its performance. The argument goes that human beings possess some fundamental characteristic or are able to engage in some fundamental activity, we can call it X, and X is the driving cause behind the effect of technics. This places technics in a secondary role.

Moreover, this position argues that there are humans prior to technicity. If this is the case, then this position should be able to provide some sort of image of what this pre-technological human, and they should be able to point to instances where this entity exists or has existed.
Additionally, this position also needs to specify what it is about this entity that makes them *human* prior to technology. Can these requirements be met?

Providing an image of the pre-technological human becomes difficult, because the current instantiations of the human form that we find around the world are all engaged in technics in one way or another. The same is true of the historical record. One place that we do find such an image is mythology. For example, the biblical story of Adam and Eve presents a view of this type of person. In the Garden of Eden, where everything is provided for them, Adam and Eve have no need for tools or instruments. Everything that they might need is there at hand, and thus, they have no need for handy instruments that help in the collection and production of food and resources. There is no need for mediation since they are immediately in relation to anything that they might desire. They do not require any techniques or tools, and they can simply grasp at the world, which produces what they desire. Only after being cast out of Eden do Adam and Eve have to learn to extend their powers through technological means. Technics becomes part of how they are able to grapple with the difficulties of their new, *fallen* existence.

Another version of this image comes from the Greek myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus. As the story goes, the titan Epimetheus was charged with doling out different qualities to the various animals on earth. Some animals received thick hides, others sharp teeth and claws, etc. However, when it came time to provide human beings with a quality, Epimetheus realized that he had run out of qualities to give. Epimetheus’ brother, Prometheus decides that he will make up for his brother’s blunder by stealing fire from the Olympic gods and giving it to humans. This fire is a symbol of technics in general, and thus, technics becomes the primary way that the human animals can contend with their environment. On this telling, technology becomes
a necessary supplement for an animal (humans) that is without the types of abilities afforded to other animals.

Rousseau’s *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* presents yet another image of this pre-technological human. Rousseau believes that the first human is “as I see him today: walking on two feet, using his hands as we use ours, directing his gaze over all of nature, and measuring with his eyes the vast expanse of the heavens.” Rousseau, like the mythological imaginings of the pre-technical humans, sees a naked person that looks and acts as we do today, with the exception being that they are without artifice of any kind. They possess natural relations to the world, and thus they do not need the mediation of artifice to help them reach their goals. With a human body and intelligence alone, they are able to make their way through the world.

Rousseau says further that “It is therefore no great misfortune…that they are naked, that they have no dwelling, and that they lack all those useful things we take to be so necessary.” Why is this “no great misfortune?” What about these entities establishes their humanity and equips them to deal with the world outside of the realm of technical production? Ultimately, Rousseau believes that speech, intelligence, and, most importantly, freedom mark this non-technological person as properly human. As Rousseau continues his story throughout Part One of this *Discourse*, we see a human that talks, that has moral sensibilities, and that can think rationally as a human being can, all while being without any artifice to aid in these endeavors. Only subsequently does this being fall into technics, and, additionally, into inequality.

Each version of this myth is consistent in claiming that technics is something that comes later, and that constitutes a change in the human. For Rousseau and the Christian myth, technology only comes after something has gone wrong, and it is wrapped up in a fall from the natural (without artifice), and therefore original position. In both cases, humanity emerges, intelligent and upright,
and then proceeds to “fall into technics.” The Greek myth is somewhat different in that it presents technology as a *supplement* that solves a particular problem. Instead of constituting a negative, the Greeks see technology as an *addition* to our being. However, this addition comes after the prior establishment of the human proper. In each of these images, the human begins with three features: an upright, bipedal body, speech, and intelligence. Technology is seen as coming out of these more originary features, either as a fall or as a supplement.

These images are fictions, but they are meant to capture something factual about the human-technology relation. The claim is that what is properly human is the embodied form of an upright being, possessing intelligence and speech. Any other human activities come later, as a sort of second origin, a fall or supplement to the originary person. However, are we to believe these fictions? Or, to put it more charitably, do these fictions correspond to the facts? What facts can one appeal to in order to test the validity of these fictions?

André Leroi-Gourhan and Bernard Stiegler argue that one must pursue the available empirical information concerning human development *alongside* this type of speculation concerning our origin. They believe that these empirical facts must be interpreted and gauged with this sort of transcendental analysis that is offered by Rousseau, Plato, Christian theology, and others. Moreover, as Stiegler insists, while this type of transcendental analysis may want to ignore some of the empirical facts of human development, it may not contradict them. Therefore, it is important that we look to these facts to see whether or not the transcendental image of the pre-technological human can be accepted. Is there any reason to believe that there have been intelligent, upright, speaking beings that lacked technicity?

André Leroi-Gourhan is a 20th century French paleontologist who is interested in the same issues that are on the table here. In particular, in his work *Gesture and Speech*, Leroi-Gourhan sets
out to determine the “criteria of humanity.” These criteria would be that which explains the emergence or origin of the specifically human species. Thus, his investigation is intimately tied to the questions we are posing here.

Leroi-Gourhan sought to establish the criteria of humanity outside of what he identifies as the “cerebralist” bias in such accounts. Cerebralist theories claim that “By imitating animals and by reasoning, the “natural man,” endowed with all the present human attributes but starting from scratch in terms of technical equipment, gradually invents everything within the technical and social order that will lead him to the present-day world.” Rousseau’s first man, Adam and Eve, and even the Greek image fall into this type of interpretation. On this type of view, the brain, and specifically the intelligence that comes with a larger, more developed brain, become the driving force in human development, and technics constitutes either a supplement or fall from this position as a natural human.

As noted above, such a view presents two origins. First, there is the inauguration of the naked but intelligent human, and then, only secondarily, is there the beginning of technological development. Leroi-Gourhan sees a distinct problem with this view of two origins, and the problem stems from two sources: the development of the human skeleton, and the discovery of the Zinjanthropian in Kenya in 1959. Prior to this discovery, it was assumed that human evolution proceeded from the development of the brain towards the development of speech and then technics. However, the Zinjanthropian was a large hominid “with a very small brain” and it was accompanied by “stone implements.” This two-million-year-old human ancestor presents a case of a bipedal, small brained, but technically capable being. With this, Leroi-Gourhan argues that “the human did not begin with the brain, but with the feet.”


What Leroi-Gourhan shows, through an analysis of skeletal, tool, and symbolic development, as it can be gleaned from the archaeological record, is that “the first and most important criterion [for humanity] is erect posture.” Once early hominids began to stand upright, they began to interact with their environment in new and interesting ways. In particular, this upright position leads to a series of liberations. Hands were liberated from the duties of locomotion, and our mouths were liberated from the duties of prehension. These liberations constitute a new development in the anterior field, where these newly de-specialized organs are able to be put towards new uses. The anterior field is the primary field with which vertebrates engage their environment. This field appears in the earliest vertebrates, such as the ostracoderm fish of the Paleozoic era, and it is divided into “two complimentary areas, one governed by actions of the head and the other by those of the forelimb, or, more precisely, by actions of the facial organs and of the extremity of the forelimb, respectively.”

However, this particular formation of the anterior field, where there is a short mouth that need not grasp, and hands which primarily grasp and need not be used to move, constitutes a significant development in animal morphology. A freed hand is able to manipulate in new ways, and the freed mouth is able to communicate in a similarly distinct way.

Moreover, Leroi-Gourhan shows that this posture is a driving force in the development of conditions that allow for a larger brain. Leroi-Gourhan explains that “[t]he postural development of monkeys had the consequence of partially freeing the back of the skull from mechanical stresses by transferring the entire apparatus for the absorption of mandibular stresses to the facial bloc.” By freeing the back of the skull in this way, there is a gradual shift in the proportions of the face and the braincase. “The face had begun to shrink and to be overthrust by an increasingly dominant braincase,” and “it is as though the brain had come gradually to occupy the anterior territories
as these became free from the mechanical stresses of the face." The consequence of this is that upright posture frees the skull in such a way to have potential room for a larger brain, while also freeing the hands for the potential of making, and the mouth for the potential of speaking.

The French philosopher, Bernard Stiegler, in one of his discussions of Leroi-Gourhan, explains that “[t]he hand will necessarily call for tools, movable organs; the tools of the hand will necessarily call for the language of the face. The brain obviously plays a role, but it is no longer directive: it is but a partial element of a total apparatus, even if the evolution of the apparatus tends toward the deployment of the cerebral cortex.” What we find in the analysis of these empirical facts concerning human development is that the large brain, and the developed intelligence that comes with it, are secondary to 1) erect posture, and 2) the capabilities of speech and technics that fall out of this bodily organization.

Thus, technics, speech, and a larger brain are all developments that fall out of erect posture. Additionally, what Leroi-Gourhan shows in his analysis is that these three features are all set in motion at once, through the achievement of erect posture, and it is not the case that one of them is the driving force behind the others. Thus, technology “does not supplement something, does not replace what would have been there before it and would have been lost: it is added.” It does not make up for a deficiency, nor does it constitutes a fall. The emergence of technics creates something new by addition, and that something new is humanity.

The problem with the mythical image presented by Rousseau, Plato, and others, is that it fails to recognize the importance of technics in human development. When these other thinkers speak of a human being that looks just like us, they do not realize that it is precisely this look that necessitates the technicity that they have excluded from original humanity. Rousseau’s claim that the natural man uses “his hands as we use ours” contradicts the facts of human development. Hands
are not merely for grasping, but rather, for using. The liberation of the hands necessitates the making and using of implements that Rousseau excludes from his image of early humanity. What Leroi-Gourhan, and Stiegler’s analysis shows is that Rousseau’s early man can only be an image, a fiction that runs counter to the facts. Michael Lewis puts it nicely when he says, “Rousseau’s mistake is to begin from man as he now stands, and to treat him as if he had always stood and walked upright, but without using his newly liberated hands for the manipulation of tools.”

The hand is not merely for grasping; it is de-specialized and therefore repurposed to the ends of making. With this move, Rousseau and the others have presented a fiction that contradicts the facts.

There is, in fact, no human being that is prior to technicity.

Leroi-Gourhan’s account, “furnish[es] a theory of anthropogenesis corresponding point by point…to a technogenesis.” The origin of the human is also the origin of technics. They both come along together, in a “single stroke.” Once the human form has developed there is already the emergence of the “technical tendency,” or technics as the activity through which early humans create concrete “technical facts,” qua implements. Because technicity precedes large brains and a robust intelligence, Leroi-Gourhan speaks instead of a general tendency to interact with the environment in such a way that implements are a “secretion” of human bodies. Prior to the abilities of intricate planning and designing practices, human beings were still able to make tools. Such tools are “secretions” that are exuded by these early humans that have obtained a form that necessitates such a tendency in environmental interactions.

This beginning of technics is also the beginning of “the pursuit of life by means other than life.” If individual organisms and species are understood as modes of existence pursuing their continued existence, i.e., the incessant formation discussed above, then we can explain this pursuit
in the case of human beings as technics. The “means other than life,” refer to the organized material, those externalized organs, that allow the human beings to pursue their goals.258

What is particularly interesting in this case is that this technical tendency cuts through the “exterior milieu”259 of both early and contemporary humans. This exterior milieu is “everything materially surrounding the human,”260 and what is particularly interesting about the emergence of technics is that it becomes the primary way through which human beings interact with their material environment. Put differently, technics becomes the primary way that human beings engage their environment qua situation in which they find themselves. Leroi-Gourhan points out that “the human group assimilates its milieu through a curtain of objects (tools or instruments). It burns its wood with the adze, consumes its meat with the arrow, the knife, the cauldron, and the spoon. Within this interposed membrane, it nourishes and protects itself, rests, and moves.”261 The products of human technical activity form a membrane that mediates their engagement with the harsh realities of their natural environment. Another way to put this is that the technical tendency cuts through the exterior milieu and transforms it.

In the same way that the addition of technics and erect posture bring about a new type of entity, the interactions of this entity with its environment present a new mode of being situated within that environment. Through the mediation of technicity, human beings are able to transform “an initially aimless and endless scene into a place of concerted action, thereby constituting a dense placescape that, in close collaboration with our active bodies, guides us into orientation.” Through technics, humans emerge and make a place for themselves in the world by establishing the curtain of objects with which we carry out our dealings. It is through technics that the world is turned into a hospitable place to be, and thus we see that being-in-place is articulated not according to the naked body’s engagement in an open world. Instead, it is
articulated through the dynamics of one’s engagement with the world through technical activity, through the techno-logic of our goal directed use of technology.\textsuperscript{262}

Our existence is such that it has been technical from the beginning. As the human form emerges, so does technics, even prior to technological development as a conscious and planned undertaking. The emergence of the human form (erect posture) leads to the development of human functioning (technics), and the combination of this form and functioning leads to the emergence of a new being, namely, humanity. Most interesting for our analysis is the way that Leroi-Gourhan and Stiegler reveal the importance of technics for environmental engagement. It is through the curtain of objects, utilized through various techniques that human beings engage their surroundings. That is, through the relation of one’s embodied being and technology, places are made and maintained. With this in mind, we can now return to Heidegger’s arguments concerning the primacy of handiness, and we can view these claims in a new light.

4.3.2 The Primacy of Handiness, The Primacy of Technics

In chapter one I showed that for Heidegger, entities are primarily encountered as handy. From out of the significance relations of the world, we grasp individual entities according to their handiness or \textit{zuhandenheit} and fit within a particular project that we engage. Moreover, this is not something that is added onto our more basic constitution. “We do not first need to put ourselves in the place of this way of being….Everyday Dasein always already \textit{is} in this way…”\textsuperscript{263} We encounter the world in terms of usability, which is delimited according to factors such as the concrete tools and “materials”\textsuperscript{264} that correspond to the task to be done.

Even natural objects are encountered through the lens of handiness. The sun is taken as an organizational tool that “provides the orientation for dividing up the ‘rooms’ and ‘arranging’ them according to their useful character.”\textsuperscript{265} Heidegger suggests that this is the primary way that natural
objects are encountered in our everyday lives. They are part of the “technium,” and only through a modification are they understood as something other than useful. Human engagement with an environment turns seemingly natural objects into tools and implements that contribute to our projects. That is, the environment is engaged, first and foremost, through technics.

Further, this mode of viewing the world does not arise out of nowhere, nor does it only owe to the pre-thematic temporal self-understanding that Heidegger identifies as temporality. Heidegger may agree that technics has a primacy in our everyday activities, but he reduces it to a secondary status, being founded on the fundamental temporality that grounds existence. However, with this move, Heidegger makes a pseudo-cerebralist turn in interpreting technics. For Heidegger to ground this mode of engagement in a temporal self-understanding is to place technics back within the cognitive realm, even if Heidegger wants to resist such language. Regardless of what terms Heidegger would agree to use, this move places technicity outside of the realm of our embodied interaction in place and into the interior realm of consciousness, thereby contradicting the anti-cerebralist arguments we have already seen. Certainly our cognitive and conscious abilities enhance our technical prowess, but they does not house technicity altogether. The cognitive arises alongside technics, not prior to it.

Heidegger’s later thought about technology mirrors this earlier analysis, even if it takes a more pessimistic tone. Consider Heidegger’s basic argument from his later essay “The Question Concerning Technology.” In this essay Heidegger argues that technology gathers the world into a particular image, and then presents this image as the way the world is. Any sufficiently influential technology has an essence that “is a way of revealing,” and as this mode of revealing technology proves to be “no mere means.” What Heidegger means with these claims is that technology is more than a simple instrument that is put to use for some goal. If a certain technology is integrated
far enough into human life, then that life is interpreted along the lines of the image that is presented according to the function of that technology.

Heidegger’s example of this phenomenon is thermodynamic technology. The disclosive essence of this technology is “Ge-stell” or “enframing.” Thermodynamic technology enframes the world in the image of a standing reserve of resources. This is because thermodynamic technology revolves around the production and use of resources, and by becoming influential to the extent that it has, it gathers everything under its disclosive umbrella. Heidegger is arguing that we view the world and the objects within it as a standing reserve of resources because our interactions with and reliance on thermodynamic technology literally determines the way that we think about, understand, and interact with the world.

Yet, it must be pointed out that only because our world is structured according to our interaction with technology that this interaction can determine the understanding that one has of that world. If technological engagement did not occupy this central place in existence, it would not have the power to affect my understanding of the world. This later analysis is in full agreement with what is found in Being and Time, except that instead of hammers, workshops, and stop lights we are considering hydroelectric dams and the technosphere of societies at large. The two accounts are not wholly distinct, but rather, “The Question” is a development of his earlier thinking about technics, albeit in a pessimistic and ludditic tone.

What this points to is that Heidegger has already accounted for the primary articulation of our existential situatedness in place as according to technics. The problem he runs into is that he has obscured the role of the body, and the emergence of the human being, and thus has incorrectly grounded this technicity solely within his temporality. This move reveals a Heideggerian analogue to cerebralist theories of technology. Technicity is primary as a mode of activity through which
we pursue our projects in the embodied-being-somewhere-with that is being-in-place, and it not merely a founded mode of action.

At this point it is worth pointing out that I am not arguing that we are always consciously manipulating some tool for the purpose of some task. However, even activities that appear to be non-technical are typically founded upon what Don Ihde refers to as the “background relations,” of a “technosphere.” When I go for a leisurely stroll I may not be directly using an implement, but I am wearing clothes, walking down a path that has been made for me, between locations that are established prior to my occupying them, etc. These background relations often go unnoticed, and they have an “atmospheric” quality to them. Yet, they are necessary for the type of existence that we enjoy. Even cases that do not include the direct manipulation of tools are still reliant upon the place we make for ourselves via technics.

Through technics, humanity transforms their milieu into a place. Through this activity there is the installation of a familiarity and structure that differentiates places from mere spaces. This technological place, the techno-place, contributes to and is not a product of what we are. Now that we have seen why this activity is so important for our understanding of being-in-place, I will move on to show how the structure of this activity, the techno-logic of technics, contributes to the structure or logic of place.

4.4 Technics to Topology

It is from the perspective of technics that we must understand our implacement. This was indicated through the interpretation of Puluwatan navigation that I offered at the end of the last chapter. However, pulling back from the phenomenological perspective to inquire after the emergence of technics in relation to the emergence of humanity has solidified this interpretation. The task that is now at hand is to determine how this primacy of technics effects the structure or
logic of being-in-place. What alterations must be made to Casey’s dyadic account as it has been presented so far? The final section of this chapter will answer these questions by turning back to Elisabeth Ströker’s account of being-in-place. Ströker offers a more developed account of the role of technics in the structure of place, which she refers to as the “space of action.” In this discussion, Ströker explains how the technologically determined place is structured “topologically,” according to the concepts of “zone” and “region.” Through an explanation of these three concepts I will be able to answer the questions discussed above, therefore completing the goals of this chapter.

4.4.1 Grasping Placial Structure Beyond the Bodily Dyads

Casey accounts for the structure of being-in-place according to five organizational dyads. These dyads each focus on the way that our lived bodies contribute structure to the place we find ourselves. The absolute here of my bodily implacement stands in a tensional relation to the various therers I find around me, further differentiated according to near and far. Within the near sphere, the axes of my body determine yet another level of differentiation.

Notice, however, that there is a distinct difference in how the body is emphasized between the directional and dimensional dyads. The directional dyads concern two things: the relations that obtain between my embodied being and other entities (here-there), and what my body can do in relation to these other entities (near-far). The tensional arc that exists between here and there provides various directions in which I can move. The near sphere is an open field, parametrically spanned by our potential reach, which delimits the range of possibilities that can be pursued between here and there. These two dyads have a distinctly more active sense than the others.

The dimensional dyads, instead of detailing the body as active and relational, focus on the form of the body itself. Because of the asymmetrical organization of the anterior field in relation
to the back of my body I grasp places according to what is ahead, which pales in comparison to
the opacity of behind. Because of my upright posture I grasp the vertical organization of a place
according to up and down and the spatial level of my body. Due to the division of my body into
distinct and incongruent sides, I grasp places in terms of left and right.

Given that the dimensional dyads do not focus on the relational and active body, they can
be put to the side for now, as we try to further our understanding of the role of technics in the
structuring being-in-place. To understand the articulation of place according to technics is to
elevate the human-technology relation to a position of primacy. This will require focusing on the
directional dyads, particularly in terms of the human-technology relation. If there is a synchronicity
between tools and our bodies, as demonstrated by my analysis of Leroi-Gourhan and Stiegler
above, then the relations between tools and bodies will be at the fore in the organization of our
implacement.

Thus, we need an account of the structure of being-in-place that incorporates both the lived
body and those technological artifacts with which we primarily engage, and this account must
show the importance of the interaction between our embodied being and technical reality.
Ströker’s account of place as the “space of action” provides such a focus.

4.4.2 Techno-logical, Topo-logical

Before analyzing Ströker’s views, I must first clear up some terminological ambiguity that
exists between the translation of Ströker’s work and the terminology that I have been using
throughout this project. First, the English translation of Ströker maintains a spatial vocabulary
when elaborating on what I would call her account of place. Ströker choses to describe such a
phenomenon as “der Aktionsraum.” Translating this as “space of action” is a fine translation,
however, raum does not necessarily invoke the technical sense of space that was discussed in
chapter two. *Raum* can be translated as space, but it can also mean “room” as in the room in a house, or it can mean “room” in the sense of “making room.” It can also, more generally, mean “area.” When it is used to refer to space, it is commonly used to refer to space *qua* available area, i.e., the space I have in my garage, or the space that I made for my guests by cleaning up.

Ströker understands this space of action in general terms, as the “*wherein*” of possible human activity. This wherein of human activity opens, according to Ströker, through one’s commerce or interaction with implements or technical objects, whether directly (direct manipulation) or indirectly (technosphere). Additionally, her “space of action” as the wherein of human activity is sufficiently similar to the idea of place as I have been developing it *qua* somewhere of existence.

The term “place” also makes an appearance in the translation of Ströker’s major work. In Ströker’s text, “place” translates “*Platz*.” “*Platz*” can be translated in several different ways, including “place,” “space,” or “room.” It can even be used to refer to a town square. However, Ströker uses “*Platz*” as a technical term to refer to the “locus” of a usable thing, discovered by our lived body.

To guard against misinterpreting my claims concerning Ströker’s account, I will replace these two translations of Ströker’s terminology. Instead of “space of action,” I will speak simply of “place” as it has been understood so far. In terms of Ströker’s own use of place, I will replace her use of this term with “zone.” Zone captures the same sense of a “locus of what is usable,” while avoiding the ambiguity that would arise were I to continue with two different meanings of place.

Ströker identifies the structure of being-in-place as opening up through the interaction of our bodies and usable objects. She argues that this place is articulated according to the zones of
usable things and the regions\textsuperscript{286} to which these zones belong. She claims that the place that is articulated according to zone and region is “topological.” It is these three ideas, “topological,” “zone,” and “region,” that must be elaborated if we are to understand Ströker’s addition to our account of placial structure.

**Zone**

As indicated above, zones are the locus of what is usable as it is discovered by our acting body.\textsuperscript{287} Such zones include the positive sense of something belonging somewhere for some task, being handy, or being efficient, as well as the privative forms of this belonging such as “not belonging there, lacking, being in the way.”\textsuperscript{288} These zones are revealed and delimited according to the task or work to be done. It might be tempting to think of zones as distinct points or simple locations in some placial coordinate system. On this construal, the “locus” would be merely the location of some item whenever we find it lying around. This is not what Ströker has in mind, however. Heidegger, who is foundational for Ströker’s own account, explains that handy equipment does “not simply have a place in space, objectively present somewhere, but as useful things [they] are essentially installed, put in their place, set up, and put in order.”\textsuperscript{289} These zones are the area\textsuperscript{290} to which something belongs according to its fittingness within the task at hand, and, additionally, its fittingness within the ensemble of implements to which it belongs.

Yet, even the use of “area” is a bit misleading, because I do not mean area in its usual geometric usage. Where something belongs can only be understood as a metric area in a limited sense. Surely there are exact points where I would prefer my things to be when I put them away, and there are tools that require precision to the point that we could measure the specific reach of their usability. However, understanding zones in this geometric sense levels down the active sense of this idea that Ströker intends. Any particular implement finds its zone in use, and this zone may
be measured at any given moment, but that measurement only holds for that moment, and not as part of an explanation of the active place opened up through use.

Consider, for example, the way that my office-place presents itself to me. I do not encounter this office-place by measuring the distances between objects, or by marking arbitrary areas around where they happen to be laying. Rather, this office-place is organized around these things as belonging to a particular zone of usability. The pen that I find is discovered in its usability or unusability for some task. It is discovered as useful, as in the way, or as something between these possibilities. Only secondarily do I think of this pen as merely there. Further, while writing, the pen can be within its zone at many different locations, where these locations are understood as points within some larger, objective space. However, here we see that neither our being-in-place, nor the placial status of the pen concern simple location. Rather, they concern our involvement. Places are structured according to our concern therein, which reveals things as in their particular zone. Additionally, notice that the location of the object does not change the zone, nor does it change the place itself. My being-in-place opens onto a scene of objects belonging to a particular zone, delimited by the task, and it is sustained by my engagement in that task, with those objects. My implacement is not a matter of the location of my body, nor of the objects I discover around me.

In the same way that these zones cannot be understood along the lines of simple location, the relation between them cannot be understood in terms of distance. The zones of each thing we find in place, revealed as being-in-its-zone or not-being-in-its-zone according to the task at hand, do not relate to other zones as points relate to other points on a grid. Were we to conceive of zones in this way we would be merely analyzing physical objects and their trajectories through space, and we would map these trajectories at different points to see how they overlapped. This, however,
tells us little about being-in-place. These zones, instead of needing to be understood according to
trajectories in space, are instead the interrelating areas of belonging, within which objects are
shown to be either fitting, indifferent, or oppositional to the task at hand. These zones add the
detail and depth necessary for these places to be more than a metrically delimited area. Moreover,
these zones deepen our current understanding of the here-there dyad. The theres that are found
within the near sphere are zones of the implements found therein.

Region

While the individual implements, objects, and technical ensembles are found in particular
zones, these objects and zones are never taken in isolation. Technical objects and zones always
point towards something beyond themselves. They always belong to, and are understood according
to a context, totality, or ensemble of implements, understood through our particular involvement
with them. Each object is not taken in isolation as a merely present thing that we secondarily
ascribe a use to. Things are primarily encountered as belonging within some greater context of
equipment, and this context or ensemble determines the “whence and whither” of the technical
individual. Thus, we can say that the region determines the zoning of any individual instrument.

Here we can see part of the payoff of my terminological choice to pursue “zone.” Much
like the zoning of properties according to a legal code, the zoning at issue here is about the
appropriateness of something occupying a particular area, according to some code or norm. The
key differences are that the particular area is understood according to one’s involvement and not
according to simple location (address), and the code is not the legal code, but the code, rationale,
logic, or norm that is dictated by a particular ensemble’s organization in tandem with our
projective use of that ensemble.
Returning for a moment to Casey, we are now in a better position to see the ways in which Ströker’s understanding of zones and their interrelation contributes to his view. Our being-in-place is the opening up of a parametrically spanned near sphere, articulated according to our projective involvement with the objects we find as being fitting, indifferent, or oppositional to some task. These objects, depending on their status, have a corresponding zone of appropriateness within which they are revealed, and these zones point beyond themselves as being determined by a system of references between zones. The reference relations that obtain between these zones corresponds in turn to the task we are engaged in.

With this in mind, consider being in a kitchen. The kitchen opens itself as a place that is articulated according to the zones of the many cooking utensils and other kitchen-related objects. Each object is understood, in turn, according to its belonging within the kitchen-region and its particular use for some task. The whisk, the spoon, the burner, the oven, etc. are all understood according to the whence and whither determined by our involvement, and the region that is opened up through this involvement.

This system of zones, as a meshwork of relations between instruments in place, constitutes a field of action, and this field is the region, specified by one’s particular involvement there. To consider another example, think of one’s home. By entering and involving yourself in your home, various regions open up, and they are articulated according to our involvement there. There are cooking-regions, relaxation-regions, working-regions, etc. Further, these regions are a scalar determination of places that scale up or down depending on our involvement there. One might consider their entire house as a region within the greater place of their town, insofar as our involvement stretches the limits of our implacement to the town as a whole, as we might find while running errands. However, this house may, in turn, reveal several regions within it, whenever our
involvement delimits our implacement to the house itself. Thus, as Ströker explains, zones are “not a punctiformal where, but a somewhere within the region,” and regions are zone-manifolds.

This Strökerian picture deepens our current understanding of the logic or structure of place, while also meeting the need for an account of place that grants primacy to our relation to technical objects and ensembles. Ströker presents a view of being-in-place as structured by zones and regions, and their interrelation, according to our involvement with implements, artefacts, and ensembles of things for some task. Zones elaborate on the theres of technical objects in relation to the activity of the lived body, and regions further specify and deepen our understanding of the organization of the near sphere. The place that opens up on this view is one that is not merely given, but rather, that is generated techno-logically, according to our particular mode of engagement qua technics. However, it is yet to be seen how this structure of our being-in-place, how this techno-logic of place is “topological.”

Topological

There is an immediate advantage to understanding the structure of place as “topological.” Any account of the structure of place falls under the purview of such a term given its literal meaning. “Topological” is composed of two Greek root words: topos and logos. Topos means place, and logos, among its many translations, means “logic” or “order.” To say that place is topological is to say that it’s structure follows the logic or order of place. Thus, to say that place is structured topologically is almost redundant. Of course placial structure accords to a logic, or rather the logic, of place itself. Clearly then, topological is a fitting choice to describe such a structure from a merely terminological perspective.

“Topos” can also mean surface, which provides another important image for our understanding of place as topological. Jeff Malpas, who writes on the topics of place and topology,
points out that a surface is “constituted in terms of the relatedness of the elements that make up that surface (much as elements in a landscape are determined through their relative location), rather than by anything that lies beneath or above that surface.” That is, the logic of a surface is the establishment of something through the interrelation of its elements, without any attempts to reduce it to the sum of its parts or the influences of that which lies outside and above it. This matches the description of the emergence of places through the relation of regions, zones, here-there, and near-far. Like a surface, place is constituted through the relatedness of the elements that make it up, without trying to reduce it to any one of these elements. Thus, even if *topos* means surface, it seems that topological is an accurate terminological choice.

Ströker does not make explicit reference to the Greek terms that constitute this term. Instead, she uses it in a way that is inspired by its two most common meanings. First, topology names the mathematical study of space-manifolds and the spatial properties that are maintained throughout various homeomorphic deformations. Topology also names the topographic study of a particular place, i.e., a detailed description of the arrangement and distribution of the parts and features of a given locale. How is Ströker’s account “topological” in this dual sense.

Beginning with this second sense of topology, it becomes clear that this sense of the word takes its departure from a basic understanding of place. As it is usually understood, place names a particular location, but as we know, Ströker’s account modifies this so that place is the wherein of possible human activity, as opposed to an extant location. Even though Ströker is not concerned with places *qua* locations, her account looks to describe the arrangement and distribution of the parts and features of place. However, instead of looking at this arrangement in terms of extant features or parts, Ströker focuses on the interrelation of implements, and the way that these implements are revealed according to zones and regions. Where topographers look to
specify the surface of the locations on earth, a philosophical topographer looks to specify the surface of one’s ontological situatedness.

Topography, like topology, is built out of the Greek root for place (topos). However, instead of an account or logic of place, we have a graphia, i.e., a writing or inscription. Topography is the inscription or writing of the topos. The way that the topos (place) inscribes itself in what is. Topographical studies then look to uncover such an inscription, and in the case of being-in-place, this inscription takes the form of the contour lines of zones and regions. It is an account of place and its logic or order according to the topographic distribution of the parts or features that make up the whole. Thus, by detailing placial topography, Ströker provides us with a topological account. Ströker’s account of placial structure provides us with a topography of the parts and features of place, both in terms of an explicit topographic study, and in the sense of an inscription of the topology.

The first sense of topology, the mathematical sense, is also related to Ströker’s account. Steven Connor nicely expands on the concerns of topologists when he explains that,

Topology may be defined as the study of the spatial properties of an object that remain invariant under homeomorphic deformations, which is to say, broadly, actions of stretching, squeezing, or folding, but not tearing or breaking. Topology is not concerned with exact measurement, which is the domain of geometry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean, but rather with spatial relations, such as continuity, neighborhood, insideness and outsideness, disjunction and connection […]. Thus a triangle is topologically equivalent to a circle, a cube is topologically equivalent to a sphere and, less intuitively, perhaps, a doughnut is equivalent to a teacup and a two-holed doughnut to a teapot. Because topology is concerned with what remains invariant as a result of transformation, it may be thought of as geometry plus time…²⁹⁹

Ströker, who is more phenomenologist than mathematician, sees place as needing to be understood from this perspective.³⁰⁰ Instead of looking at geometric relations in space, topology views
individual, finite spatial manifolds. Topologists are concerned with the surface of these manifolds, as articulated through an interrelation of elements, and the way that this surface can change without tearing. This is the perspective that must be brought to placial analyses.

**Place** is a finite manifold, generated through our activity, which deforms throughout the performance of this activity. Place is not a matter of simple location or geometric or geographic determinations. Instead, it concerns the properties of place-manifolds that remain invariant through deformations. These deformations are homeomorphic whenever the zones and regions are continuous throughout the activity. As the activity changes, the manifold can change as well, but if the change is dramatic enough, then the zones are regions are re-inscribed in a way that breaks continuity with the initial formation of the place. This break in continuity constitutes a tearing of the placial-manifold, and thus, would not be homeomorphic.

Viewing place topologically allows one to see place as a continuously deforming manifold. For our purposes, the place that one engages deforms in a similar pattern, constantly changing shape, size, and even breaking into new manifolds, while always tracing the shape of our technical engagement. Such a manifold is always with the existing person, even if the manifold changes given the specificity of a given place. Moreover, such a view allows us to show that what changes through various transformations and activities is not the implacement itself, but rather the organization and relation of regions and zones. Implacement does not disappear or change, but the regions and zones, as the topographic features of our implacement, can change while the topological place remains constant. Changes in regions and zones are like the stretching, squeezing, or folding that is studied by mathematical topologists. These are things which may de-form the topological manifold, yet it does not tear it open or make it something altogether different. For the mathematical topologist, the cup and the donut\(^{301}\) are the same manifold. This type of unintuitive
understanding of the possibilities of placial-formation and change needs to be brought to our grasp of human being-in-place.

To describe place as topological in this sense requires that one relinquish the usual, geometric, or geographic ways that we view places. This typical view sees a place as something standing there, waiting to be filled up, either with active beings or extant things. Consider the above example of the kitchen. We tend to think of the kitchen as a place, demarcated by walls, filled with objects, waiting for use by someone or other. This is a fine way to think of place qua location within some larger space, be it the house-space, town-space, world-space, etc. However, this does not capture the kitchen-place as a topological place-manifold. The kitchen-place that I am describing only is when someone is implaced there. By engaging the kitchen, various lines and counters, according to zones and regions, articulate a malleable manifold that is part of the engagement itself. Instead of merely serving as the scene or stage for activity, the kitchen-place is the shape and place of that activity.302

Thus we can see that Ströker’s account of place, as articulated according to zones and regions, is topological. Through our technical activity, a finite manifold is generated and continuously deformed. Although this manifold and its shape are not visible to us, we could imagine tracing out the lines of actual and virtual involvement to reveal an active manifold that does not contain our bodies and activity. Instead, this manifold would be generated through that interrelation of an active body and the objects and environment that that body engages. Our engagement creates a taught surface that gives shape to the places that we make for ourselves through the activity of existing. Place is the topological manifold that corresponds to the shape of our engagement.
This discussion also makes clear how Ströker’s topological account supplements Casey’s dyadic account. Casey’s dyads help with one’s understanding of the relations between regions and zones, and zones and regions better flesh out the nature of what is organized according to these dyads. With Ströker’s account we get an explanation of what is entailed by the near sphere and implace ment itself. Here we get a view that encompasses both place and our active body, with explicit reference to technics and technological artifacts. Ströker’s account lets us get a sense of our being-in-place that explains the role of our bodies, technics, and their interaction. The zones and regions that Ströker speaks of may be further differentiated according to up-down, left-right, front-back, but the **topology of our technical interaction** first articulates an area that is subsequently bifurcated along the lines of these other dyads.

Although place has come much more clearly into view, there is still a central question that I have yet to answer. How is one in place? Put differently, how are we to understand the relation between the embodied human and the place within which they exist? The insideness of being-in-place is clearly not anything like the usual sense of in *qua* containment. How then can we understand this fundamental relation? More importantly, where do we look to find such an answer?

It was shown above that the connection between the human and place is forged through the mediation of technology. The human-technology relation gives rise to human implace ment, and we saw above how this relation structures being-in-place topologically. However, the exact nature of the relation between human and technology is underdeveloped. In the fourth and final chapter of this project, I will pursue an account of the human-technology relation, and I will show how we this relation holds reveals the mode in which one is in place.
CHAPTER 5. IN OR OUT?: THE PLACE OF THE PERSON IN PLACE

5.1 Introduction

In chapter three, through an analysis of Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler, and Ströker, I argued that our being-in-place is the topologically structured situatedness of existence, arising through one’s technologically mediated engagement with their environment. However, this account has yet to specify the place of the human being within the topological techno-place. How is one in place? What is the relation between the person and place? Gaining a better understanding of this relation is the focus of the present chapter.

To accomplish this goal below, I develop an account of the human-technology relation, since this is the relation that gives rise to human implacement. I begin with a comparison of Heidegger and Ströker’s arguments concerning the human-technology relation in connection to place. After developing the difference between these two accounts, I argue that Ströker’s account is preferable, albeit incomplete. As I indicated in the last chapter, Ströker’s topological account of being-in-place is a development of Heidegger’s account of human spatiality from Being and Time. However, while their accounts are similar, I show that Heidegger maintains an untenable separation between the human and place. Heidegger argues that place is the space of handy equipment, i.e., a space of things, while human spatiality, or the way one is spatial, is something altogether different. That is, Heidegger bifurcates the human and place, and I argue that such a move runs counter to the analysis that I have provided in the previous three chapters. Ströker avoids making this same distinction. Instead, she maintains the unity of the person and place. She argues that the topological place that arises through one’s technological relatedness is precisely the way that one is spatial. 303
Ströker argues for this connection between person and place through an analysis of the connection between the person and technological instruments. In analyzing this connection, Ströker homes in on the idea that the human being surpasses itself through technological extension. However, she never fully develops this concept. The third section of this chapter provides a more robust account of technological extension.

Section four presents my own reading of technological extension as *exteriorization*. I argue that this concept answers the question of how one is *in* place. Specifically, I show that place is not a matter of insideness or containment at all. Rather than being contained within place, I argue that place is the exterior aspect of human existence. To accomplish this goal, I develop Bernard Stiegler’s arguments concerning technological emergence as a “process of exteriorization.” Stiegler argues that this process results in a “spatialization,” and “temporalization,” of human existence, and I show how this dual process exteriorizes the human being, and therefore makes *room for place*. Put differently, I show how technological exteriorization puts humanity in place.

5.2 Being-in-Place vs. Being and Place

As mentioned in the last chapter, Ströker’s topological account of the space of action is a development of Heidegger’s account of spatiality from *Being and Time*. The line of connection between these accounts is most clear in the use of “place” (*Platz*), which I refer to as “zone,” and “region” (*Gegend*). Ströker explains that her own use of place *qua* zone and region comes directly from Heidegger, they both define these terms in similar ways, and they both use these concepts to account for the articulation of places. This structure according to zones and regions reveals that both thinkers argue for an instrumental, that is, technological view of place.

Although their accounts share these features, they are certainly not identical. First, Ströker offers much more detail concerning the particulars of the space of action, while Heidegger moves
through this topic fairly quickly. This should not be surprising, as Ströker’s book is a treatise on space, while Heidegger’s is a treatise on temporality. Aside from the focus on space, Ströker’s willingness to seriously consider the role of the body provides her with much more to analyze compared to Heidegger’s account, which refuses to treat the body explicitly. Moreover, Heidegger does not label his account of spatiality as “topological,” although this is most likely due to the fact that Ströker is better versed in the mathematical disciplines that deal with space, particularly topology.

Yet, the most striking difference between Ströker and Heidegger’s accounts is the way that they each account for the relation between the person and place. For Heidegger, place, considered ontologically, is always a feature of one’s being-in-the-world. World specifies the “in which” of existence at the ontological level, which, at the ontic level can manifest in one’s situatedness within many different concrete places. These places have the character of the “aroundness of the surrounding world,” where “surrounding world” translates “Umwelt,” which could also be translated as environment. This environment or surrounding world is articulated according to zones and regions, in a way similar to Ströker’s space of action. However, this place that is articulated by zones and regions is designated by Heidegger as the “the spatiality of innerwordly things at hand.” The topological ensemble of technical objects concerns a spatiality that is not that of the person. The person is merely surrounded by such a spatiality, and the spatiality of the individual is something different. In the language of this current project, we can say that Heidegger maintains a distinction between place and the person, as well as the structure that belongs to each.

The implaced person’s mode of spatiality is what Heidegger calls directional de-distancing. This properly human spatiality concerns one’s engagement and use of the
topological ensemble of technical objects. Directional de-distancing is the way that one makes things available in various directions according to their concern, and the region this concern has revealed. Regions and zones offer the context within which our projects are pursued. As these zones and regions are opened up through our activity, zoned objects are drawn near, i.e. de-distanced, in their being made available for use. Yoko Arisaka explains that de-distancing captures “the way we exist as a process of spatial self-determination by ‘making things available’ to ourselves… When I walk from my desk area into the kitchen, I am not simply changing locations from point A to B in an arena-like space, but I am ‘taking in space’ as I move, continuously making the ‘farness’ of the kitchen ‘vanish,’ as the shifting spatial perspectives are opened up as I go along.” The same is true of those things of which I make use; I make the farness of the available implement vanish by using it for some project. By using this implement, which is only understood within a context of involvement and an ensemble of other implements, I engage the entirety of the surrounding world that presents itself to me as handy. On this picture, human spatiality concerns use, placial structure concerns a referential totality of handy equipment, and the combination of the two results in what is presented above.

This de-distancing is not, however, a purely neutral phenomenon occurring in an undifferentiated space. Equipmental space is always discovered with a particular orientation that directs one’s action in this way or that. This directionality is related to the directional organization of places that was encountered in chapter two. Places are articulated according to regions, which specify zones of equipment. These regions and zones offer a referential context within which the equipment can be grasped in different ways. Further, the organization of the zone or region specifies the directions within which one moves, between here and there, near and far, and one pursues these directions by de-distancing objects and other regions required for the current activity.
Arisaka explains that “regions determine where things belong, and our actions are coordinated in
directional ways accordingly.” Thus, de-distancing is always directional.

This directional de-distancing also has the effect of “making room.” Heidegger explains
that one is “by no means merely objectively present in the piece of space that its corporeal body
fills out. Existing, it has always already made room for a leeway. It determines its own location in
such a way that it comes back from the space made room for to a “place” that it has taken over.”
Making room does not mean that one literally clears out the clutter that may be lying around a
particular region. Making-room has nothing to do with moving the locations of objects. Rather,
one finds themselves directed towards particular regions, and through the activity of directional
de-distancing, one opens that region as a place for some specific task, i.e., as a place for action.
Heidegger explains that making room is “a way of discovering and presenting a possible
totality” of zones. To make room is to discover zones of utensils as within reach, and as either
suitable or unsuitable for the task at hand. It is to discover a place as a place to act. Thus, making-
room concerns one’s understanding grasp of a given place, rather than any physical activity on the
part of the actor.

An example may help to illustrate Heidegger’s point here. As I enter my kitchen to make
lunch, particular zones are illuminated according to my lunch-making focus. The refrigerator, the
cabinets with plates, the drawer with knives and forks, etc. are immediately drawn into a relation
with me as I take in this place. I take in the kitchen not by containing or capturing it, but by
grasping it as the place for my particular directedness (lunch-making).

As these zones and regions are illuminated according to my orientation, that which I seek
for lunch is de-distanced, along with the things I will use to make it. This movement of de-
distancing will occur in particular directions, according to the organization of the kitchen-region.
The plate, knife, bread, meat, cheese, mayonnaise, the chips in the pantry, the coffee maker that will be used after I eat are all de-distanced *qua* brought within reach. This activity makes-room within the kitchen so that there is *space to act*, in the sense of enough leeway to carry out the given project.

With directional de-distancing, making room, and the spatiality of innerwordly things at hand we have the core of Heidegger’s theory of space. He offers this theory as an attempt to explain the spatial aspects of existing, in a way that is similar to this project, Ströker, and Casey. Yet, one problem with this account stems from the fact that Heidegger moves through the topic of space rather quickly, and he never explicitly develops this account later in his career.

More important than his lack of further development concerning this theory of spatial organization and foundation, is the issue of how we are to understand the relation between these two spatialities. By bifurcating this account in two, instead of explicitly arguing for some sort of unity like being-spatial, or, as I have used, being-in-place, Heidegger presents us with an interpretative choice. Either his account describes two distinct spatialities, and thus, the Umwelt and its structure should be seen as distinct from Dasein and its structure. Or, more charitably, it might be the case that these are two reciprocal phenomena, which cannot be disassociated because of the fundamental unity of Dasein and world.

Arisaka argues for the later. She believes that these two spatialities are really just different “ways of describing the spatiality of a unified Being-in-the-world” that are “equiprimordial.” She continues, “[r]egions ‘refer’ to our activities, since they are established by our ways of being and our activities. Our activities, in turn, are defined in terms of regions. Only through the region can our de-severance and directionality be established. Our object of concern always appears in a certain context and place, in a certain direction.” On this reading, zones and regions are the
space that belongs to world, but since world and Dasein only exist in the unity of being-in-the-world, then these spatialities are equiprimordial, and therefore are not to be thought separately. The handy space of regions and zones and the self-determining space of directional de-distancing belong together.

The other reading presents Heidegger’s separation of these two spatialities as a symptom of a greater problem, which is that Heidegger slips into individualistic and subjectivist conceptions of existence. This reading is more consistent with the interpretation of Heidegger that I offered in chapter one. While the first half of *Being and Time* seems to present an interactive and relational view of existence, the second half shifts the focus onto the individual Dasein who is radically individualized in the realization of their own finitude. On this reading, the second half of *Being and Time* skews the equiprimordiality between Dasein and world to the point where world acquires a secondary status. Thus, one can view the separation of Dasein’s spatiality and the world’s spatiality as a preview of this eventual reversal.

I agree with Arisaka that these two spatialities can be read as equiprimordial. However, this requires that we provide Heidegger with an interpretive charity that, when compared with my arguments from chapter one, I am not sure he deserves. Moreover, if equipmental space belongs entirely to handy objects, then it is generated by their relation, not the relation of the person to the objects. In this way, it becomes an objective space, in the sense of a space of objects. If it is such an objective space, then the world’s structure takes on an existence of its own, which stands out there, apart from the individual’s existence. Such an external space would then only become handy upon its discovery by the individual. Yet, this view of external space already appears in *Being and Time* as “world-space,” which is supposed to be fundamentally secondary to the two spatialities at issues here. “World-space” is, according to Arisaka, “space conceived as an ‘arena’ or ‘container’
for objects.”

By maintaining a separation between the world’s spatiality and Dasein’s spatiality, Heidegger shows an uncharacteristic ambivalence concerning the relation between world-space and the spatiality of the world. The spatiality of innerworldly things begins to sound like the structure of the relation between handy objects *in* world-space, as opposed to the primary space that is generated through the unity of being-in-the-world.

Even if this handy space avoids the problems of extantness and being subsumed to world-space, it is not clear from the passages in *Being and Time* that this space stands on equal footing with the spatiality of Dasein. Heidegger moves quite quickly through the spatiality of innerwordly things, and even Arisaka admits that this space is merely handy, whereas directional de-distancing corresponds to an essential determination of existence *qua* existentiale. The key point to notice here is that Heidegger maintains a separation between spatialities while allowing these spatialities to be underdeveloped. Moreover, if we are to understand these spatialities as unified, it is not clear to me why Heidegger does not simply unify them in his account, as, we shall see below, Ströker does. I think that the more critical reading of these sections is the correct one, and that it points towards Heidegger’s tendency to devalue the unity of being-in-the-world in favor of focusing on the individual.

Putting aside the above criticisms of Heidegger, there are two further issues with his interpretation. First, his view of place *qua* equipmental space is only understood in terms of using technical objects. There is no discussion of the relation between the human and technical object other than to say that the person uses and understands these objects based on their concern for some task. This ignores other, more robust characterizations of this relation as having to do with more than instrumentality. Heidegger will eventually take up these further questions in “The Question Concerning Technology,” but he never returns to discuss their importance for an
understanding of human spatiality. Second, and related to the first, Heidegger’s refusal to treat the body, particularly in its role in establishing spatiality, leaves his account incomplete.

Ströker, in comparison to Heidegger, makes three key moves that differentiate her account from Heidegger’s. First, Ströker understands place as a feature of human existence, which arises out of one’s relation to technology. That is, she does not differentiate between a space of objects and a spatiality of the human being who uses them. She sees these as being part of the same structure, named the space of action. Thus, she avoids the ambiguity that is present in Heidegger’s account by providing a view of being-in-place as an explicit unity. Second, Ströker accounts for more than simple use concerning the human-technology relation. Finally, Ströker accords a foundational role for the body in her account. With these three moves, Ströker both avoids the problems that Heidegger encounters, while also opening up new doors for furthering our grasp of being-in-place. Seeing how Ströker develops Heidegger’s account in these ways will be the focus of the rest of this section.

For Ströker, the here-there relation is key to understanding how place **qua** the space of action arises through the interrelation of the lived body, regions, and zones. The human being occupies a zone that is similar yet differentiated from the zones of instruments. This differentiation occurs in the form of here-there, while still allowing that here and there are both zones. The human zone obtains its difference from its function as that from which place “unfolds.” It is a perspectival point of orientation, from which the zones of implements, as well as other regions, are marked as there. This perspectival feature of here marks it as qualitatively distinct from there in our grasp of place. However, while our bodily here is distinct from the theres of implements, it is related to them in a way that is similar to the relation between theres. Thus, here exists as one of the zones that structure place, albeit the most significant one.
This qualitative difference between here and there is crucial, according to Ströker, because it serves as the basis for the “non-homogeneity” of place. Place must be non-homogenous, because otherwise it would be unnavigable. Only because of this fundamental placial difference can one be directed and oriented within place. Additionally, without this perspectival determination of the felt difference between here and there, the space of action would dissolve into a coordinate system of homogenous points. If everything is a there, then everything stands in an equal and calculable relation.

This is similar to Kant’s argument concerning incongruent counterparts that was mentioned in chapter two. There we saw Kant argue that incongruent counterparts, such as the human hands, provide a spatial non-homogeneity that allows one to navigate through space. Were it the case that no such differentiation was made, then we would lose the reference point through which we understand directions, and no one would be able to get around in a guided manner. Ströker is arguing that handedness or the division of right and left is secondary for orientation, and that the here-there relation is primary. The difference between here and there, as well as the directions that this relation opens up serves as the primary way that we orient ourselves. Right and left further differentiate places by adding another determination to the directions that are offered by here-there. This makes a given region easier to navigate, but this is secondary to the original differentiation of here and there.

What is most interesting here is that Ströker does not differentiate the places that are divided into zoned regions from the spatiality of the person that acts in that place. By elaborating on the zonal structure of regions in terms of here and there, Ströker maintains that places arise through the interrelation of those modes of space that Heidegger separates. Thus, according to Ströker, being-in-place is the way that one is spatial instead of something belonging to objects or
being otherwise external to the human. For Ströker, the individual is not separated from place. It is only through the relation of the person’s here to the theres of objects that place unfolds. Put differently, Ströker highlights the unity of person and place, whereas Heidegger leaves it up to his commenters to defend the unity of these terms.

Through this discussion of here and there, Ströker also develops an understanding of the relation between human and instrument beyond mere use. This development comes during her discussion of what she calls the “ambivalence” concerning the zone of the person. Part of the reason that our bodily here can be construed as a zone, in a way similar to instruments, is that the body is a “thing among things.” However, the body is also distinct from things as the perspectival center of our being-in-place. Thus, the being of the body is doubled; it exists as a thing and as lived body. “[I]n the first respect it is a thing among things, in the second aspect it is irrevocably counter to all things. Thus there arises a continuous ambivalence of the subject’s situation—the ambivalence of being a physical body and yet being beyond the physical body.” Understanding such being beyond the physical body is key to seeing how she furthers our grasp of the human-technology relation.

Ströker explains that “The acting subject is his corporeity; he cannot choose to ‘have’ it or not. Yet he is not just a corporeity…the subject is a body only to the extent that he has it—and has it at his disposal in the framework of his projects…The subject, caught in the here, nevertheless surpasses his here. While moving himself in his here, he reaches the things there, in the world.” Ströker indicates two different senses of being beyond the body here. First, one is beyond the body by not being only a body. She is indicating that because I am a conscious being, I am more than a mere physical object. I may be located through my physical body, but my physical body is not
identical to me, or the “I” that is the subject of my judgments, experiences, etc. That “I” has the body at their disposal, as a sort of proto-instrument.

Second, Ströker’s discussion of “surpassing” one’s here towards a there implies that the transcendence of intentional consciousness is a mode of being-beyond the body. Not only does consciousness reveal a being that is in excess of the body, but the structure of intentional consciousness is precisely “a going beyond” given that “in being intentionally directed to an object, consciousness goes beyond itself.”\textsuperscript{342} Insofar as I am conscious of a world of theres, I am never fully contained within my here, shut off from the rest of the world. I transcend my here in my intentional apprehension of various theres around me. Put differently, my consciousness is never \textit{just} that consciousness. Because consciousness is always consciousness of something, consciousness always exceeds itself by also being its content. This is why “on the one hand he is \textit{oriented toward} a there, and on the other, he \textit{finds himself at} a there, ‘being exposed’.”\textsuperscript{343}

Ströker confirms this reading of such being-beyond when she says that this “turn of phrase can only be metaphorical, an image for my being able to orient myself toward the world, and this orientation is not spatial but intentional. The being beyond the body of the ego does not mean a spatial being outside of the lived body.”\textsuperscript{344} However, the sense of “spatial,” that Ströker refers to in the above quotation seems to run counter to the view of space that she is presenting in this section. To say that I am not spatially outside of my lived body is to revert to a geometric conception of space. It requires locating my perspectival consciousness as occurring at a point in a larger objective space, for the purpose of showing that this location is distinct from the location of some object that lies apart from my body. That is, this claim would require reference to a larger objective space or coordinate system through which the locations of objects are determined.
Such a claim would be more difficult to make from the perspective of topology, which Ströker herself has named as the key to understanding her space of action. Topology does not deal in points, locales, or the features of these things as they occur within some larger space. Instead, topology is concerned with finite manifolds, considered as a whole, and the spatial features that result from the activity and transformations of this manifold. Thus, to speak of the spatial sense of being-beyond as having only to do with locations needlessly restricts the discussion. There could still be a topological being-beyond that would be properly spatial, albeit not geometric. There will be more to say about this below, but for now I must turn my attention to the fact that in spite of these remarks Ströker lays out another, non-metaphorical way that one is beyond their body through their relation to technology.

Ströker introduces this other mode of being beyond the body through a discussion of the difference between human and animal involvements in place. She explains that humans, when “reduced to vital activity”\textsuperscript{345} appear to be the same as other animals. They react with “flight, defense, and protection, such as are also known in the kingdom of animals.”\textsuperscript{346} However, what truly characterizes the human being as distinct is their “knowledge of how, in principle, to transform these reactions through instruments. An implement serves not only to subjugate the resisting world, but also to surpass the subject’s corporeity, its limits and fragility.”\textsuperscript{347}

In addition to corresponding to Leroi-Gourhan’s analysis from the last chapter, this passage indicates a type of surpassing that is distinct from the intentional surpassing discussed above. Being beyond the body through one’s relation to technology causes one to surpass their corporeity altogether. One way that this happens is when an implement functions “as an extension of bodily members,” where the implement “incorporates the there into the here.”\textsuperscript{348} This does not extend our here in terms of the measurable distance of the surface of our bodies, but rather, it extends the
reach, capabilities, and involvement that one engages from their here. Additionally, while the here
does not change into a different simple location, one’s here and their bodily engagement is changed
nonetheless because of the change in ability.

An example is helpful here. Consider the simple act of getting a glass of water and drinking
it. While it may not be obvious, the glass is an extension of our bodies. Without the cup, the thirsty
person could still drink water, in a similar way, by cupping their hands, filling them with water,
and drinking out of that. The glass serves as an externalized hand, that is cupped in such a way as
to contain the water more usefully. Thus, the glass serves to extend the abilities of my hand.

This idea of technological extension is not developed any further by Ströker. However, this
is related to Ströker’s own discussion of the way that one has their body, as something that is at
their disposal. I have my body because it is at my disposal for various tasks. Insofar as I have my
body in this way, my body is a proto-instrument or proto-tool. It is the first piece of technology
that I engage. However, Ströker does not pursue this technological interpretation of corporeality.

However, this is an important point to note, because it shows that my relation to my body
is bound up with my relation to technology, and with technics. Moreover, it implies a further
relation between the body and place. My own body can be construed as a topological manifold,
structured according to zones and regions, which implies that places are extended versions of the
bodily proto-place that is our first domain of familiarity and involvement. Insofar as my body is
my first instrument, the structure of my relation to place radiates out from my original relation to
my own body.

This continuation of Ströker’s view also adds clarity to the here-there relation of zones that
was discussed above. Ströker claims that the “here of the lived body is the sole place that is not a
place of an instrument.” However, insofar as I have my body at my disposal, and insofar as I
exceed that body by not only being a body, the place of my lived body is precisely the place of an instrument. It is the first instrument to which I am related.

Ströker does seem to notice this general way of construing the relation between person and place when she explains that the body is “graspable only as a region.” However, she again says this in passing before moving on to other topics. But, pushing this idea further provides more information concerning both one’s being-in-place, and the relation between humans and technology. If one’s body is a proto-place and proto-instrument, then we must view it as made up of many different zones of instruments. These instruments, in the case of the body, are organs, which come together to form the bodily region. This whole region, much like other large technological ensembles, can be engaged for the sake of different tasks, and in this way, it is at one’s disposal. Moreover, this implies that whenever one uses some other bit of technology, whenever they incorporate this technology into their bodily being, they are drawing that zone into their bodily region. The instrument becomes another tool, related to the tool of the body, which thereby extends that which the body is able to do on its own.

On this view, technological objects are literally in-corporated in the sense that they are drawn into the body. Place becomes the extension of one’s bodily region according to the human-technology relation, which incorporates various therees into our bodily here, thereby stretching and transforming the topological manifold of the bodily proto-place region. This places the concept of being beyond the body in an entirely new light. Surpassing one’s corporeity through the use of instruments in place is truly a being beyond the body in a spatial, or better, placial manner through the in-corporation of technological objects that extends this body and bodily region.

The above analysis began as a comparison of Heidegger and Ströker’s view of technologically mediated spatiality qua structure and specifics of being-in-place. The first result
of this comparison was the importance of emphasizing the unity between human bodies and implements in the generation of place. From there, I began analyzing Ströker’s claims concerning the being beyond the body that results from instrumental use. This led to the conclusion that place is an extension of one’s own bodily region. Rather than being an objective locale, receptacle, or container, places are the topologically organized manifold of my extended body-region. My bodily here is transformed in its relation to theres. Here we see Ströker hitting on the important idea that technology is the placial extension or externalization of one’s bodily here. These concepts deserve further attention. The next section will provide a more detailed description of technological extension. This concept has received a great deal of treatment in the philosophy of technology and developing it further will help with the current grasp of place.

5.3 Being-Beyond: Surpassing as Extension

The above analysis of Ströker indicated one form of technological extension, which is the placial extension of one’s bodily here. Yet, this is only one possible mode of technological extension among others. “Extension,” has become an important concept for understanding the human-technology relation, and there are at least four types of technological extension that are typically discussed in the literature concerning the human-technology relation. These four modes include bodily extension, the extension of perception, the extension of one’s abilities, and the extension of one’s mind. In this section I will lay out a basic description of these four modes of technological extension. As we saw above, being-in-place involves technological extension, and by providing a more robust elucidation of this concept I will be able to further our current grasp of this phenomenon.
5.3.1 Bodily Extensions

Most simple implements, and many other more complex devices or practices, serve as extensions of our bodies. This is partially the result of the fact that our bodies are the first instrument with which we content. In an attempt to improve the abilities of this body-instrument, tools are devised which extend the body to be able to better accomplish certain goals. Consider a hammer. One can do the work of a hammer with their body alone. You simply make a fist, and use the leverage provided by your elbow to strike your target. However, this can become quite painful, which limits the work that can be done, and further, it does not provide the proper leverage for more difficult hammering projects. The hammer is produced as an externalized forearm and fist that extends one’s ability to pound something. By creating an external forearm and fist the body is extended to be able to accomplish more.

Another, more interesting example is cooking. Cooking is noteworthy because it challenges our intuitions about technological extension differently than the hammer example. This is because the hammer acts and looks like the part of the body that it extends and externalizes. With cooking, there is an extension and externalization of something that is typically considered to be inside the body, namely the digestive tract. Cooking extends the digestive tract by beginning the digestive process outside of the body. Pots are like externalized stomachs, where heat, spices, sauces, etc., combine together to begin the process that our bodies will eventually finish. By cooking we begin to digest our food before it ever passes their lips. Although cooking does not replicate the look of the organs it externalizes, in the way that the hammer does, it still constitutes an extension in the same way as the hammer.

In both cases we see two things. First, many techniques and tools are externalizations of organs, body parts, and bodily processes. Second, we see here that these techniques and technologies are put in circuit with our bodies to create a system of biological body and inorganic
tool that functions at one. This system exceeds the typical limits of our bodies, and it also enhances
the natural ability of that body’s interaction with the environment.

5.3.2 Perceptual Extensions

In addition to bodily extensions, the technical object can extend one’s perceptive abilities
by being incorporated into the perceptual apparatus. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s famous discussion
of the blind man’s stick is one instance of this. In a discussion of human spatiality and motility,
Merleau-Ponty remarks that “The blind man’s cane has ceased to be an object for him, it is no
longer perceived for itself; rather…it increases the scope and the radius of the act of touching and
has become analogous to a gaze.” The blind man’s stick is incorporated into his perceptual
apparatus, and the end of the stick becomes the end of his tactile gaze. He feels and experiences
the world through the end of this stick, and this stick can be properly understood as an extension
of his perception. The cane takes the intentional abilities of his tactile body, and it stretches them
through the stick towards its point. Here we can see that an implement truly serves to surpass one’s
corporeity by extending that corporeity further into the world.

Don Ihde provides another compelling example of this type of extension with his
discussion of the telephone. Whenever I answer a telephone call, I am not merely put into
relation with the phone as a there that relates to my bodily here. Nor do I intend the telephone
directly as an object. Instead, the phone becomes a long-distance amplification device that allows
me to have conversations that would be impossible with my usual, corporeal being. The phone is
incorporated into my embodied being, and although it does not become a part of my biological
body, it is brought into the fold of my lived body. During the experience of the conversation the
phone is a (mostly) transparent part of my perceptual apparatus. The intentional terminus of the
experience of this conversation is the voice as it comes through the receiver, which mimics the
intentional directedness of a conversation. It is only when the telephone breaks down, either through static, bad service, a dropped call, etc., that I intend the phone as technical object. Otherwise I simply engage the phone as a perceptual-extender so that I can carry on conversations with people at a distance.

Notice also that the telephone example brings clearly into focus that a calculation of spatial distance will not help us to understand this phenomenon. Rather, it reveals further that being-in-place, and the interactions therein, can be had across great distances, while being “near” placially. Each member of the telephone conversation is brought together, into each other’s near sphere, through the conversation. The telephone constitutes a realm of virtual connection between people, which can be actualized through its ability to help us surpass our corporeity. In this way, the telephone presents a rather dramatic example of how the boundaries of one’s place can be stretched.

Ihde also explains that this example of the telephone exhibits the “amplification-reduction” structure of technological extension. Instruments that extend our perception tend to amplify some aspect or aspects of that relation, while reducing others. For example, the telephone amplifies our voice and ability to hear from a distance. However, this comes at the cost of reducing one’s awareness of other aspects of their perceptual situation, such as body language. Ihde explains further that

“two effects may be noted: first, the amplification tends to stand out, to be dramatic, while the reduction tends to be overlooked, or may be forgotten, particularly when the technology is good, when its transparency is highly enhanced…but the point is that the more enhanced the transparency, the greater the contrast between the drama of amplification and the recessiveness of the reduction. The second effect is that the transformation also alters what may be called the ‘distance’ of the phenomenon being experienced. The instrument mediated entity is one which, in comparison with the flesh relations, appears with a different perspective…and this is part of the transformation process itself.”

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In terms of Ihde’s first point, consider the capabilities of video calling that are available today. Instead of only being able to hear someone’s voice through a telephone receiver, I can now have a face-to-face conversation with them, albeit through the impermeable membrane of a screen. Video calling enhances the transparency of the telephone by helping us to immerse ourselves in the conversation. In this way it gets closer to mimicking a conversation that occurs when two people are in the same room. Video calling has enhanced the drama of the amplification, while the reduction recedes more and more.

Ihde’s second point is an interesting one, and it relates directly to our investigation into place. The distance of the phenomenon, in this case a conversation, is altered through technological extension. Somehow the phone conversation is farther away from a face to face discussion. The “distance” that he speaks of is a removal from “in the flesh” experiences. However, by what measure would we determine such an intentional distance? Is this distance anything more than a metaphor? To think of the differences between flesh relations and instrument mediated relations in terms of distance is to think of their relation in terms of points lying in space. However, the distance here is not a mere neutral, spatial distance. Ihde, as I read him, is describing a vertical, hierarchical type of distance. What I take Ihde to be hinting at is that the telephone interaction is somehow less natural, or more removed from one’s nature in some way. The non-technological experience that requires only the naked body is taken as the starting point. It is the natural, more basic type of experience. The technologically mediated experience is somehow distant from this more basic experience.

However, such a hierarchy would be difficult to maintain, as it would mean reverting to the views of Rousseau and others who view the bare body as more natural than the technologically extended body. As was shown in the last chapter, this is an untenable position. Therefore, we
cannot think of the relation between these types of activities in terms of distance in the way that Ihde does above. If we instead think this comparison—between a flesh relation and an instrument mediated one—placially, then we see that both instances have the other person drawn into our near sphere, implaced with us. Surely they admit of differences in the quality\textsuperscript{359} and type of sensations, but difference does not necessarily imply distance.

Additionally, focusing on the supposed distance between these types of experiences loses sight of the fact that the amplification-reduction structure is present in every mode of engagement with our world. There is no mode of human activity that does not amplify some aspect of the experience, while reducing others. This is a basic form of all types of experience and perceptual awareness. Therefore, not only is distance an inappropriate rubric for understanding the difference between naked perception and instrument mediation, it is also a point that can be made about all modes of human activity. If there is any sense of an altered “distance” in the case of the phone call, it is simply that the telephone or video call extends one beyond the rather small limits of their corporeality, i.e., it admits of corporeal surpassing.

5.3.3 Ability Extensions

In addition to extending perception and the body, technology extends the abilities and powers of which one is capable. This mode of extension has considerable overlap with extensions of the body. However, the extensions present here do not typically take the form of a particular body part, organ, or system that is being extended. Instead, these extensions focus on the abilities of the acting person, and the way that the tool or technique extends those abilities.

The lever serves as a simple example of this type of extension. Human beings generally have the ability to move things. Through our bodies, strength can be exerted on a particular object in order to lift it from point A to point B. However, many things are incapable of being moved
through the body alone. The lever directly extends one’s ability to move an object. It provides one with leverage that would not be possible with the body alone.

There are other, more complex versions of these types of capacity extenders. The automobile is an incredibly complex extension of our general capacity for movement. The human body has a capacity for movement, and this movement is possible only up to certain speeds. Automobiles extend the movement and speed capabilities of the person beyond what is possible by the body alone. Things like houses and irrigation ditches also fall into this category. The house extends our ability of protection, while the irrigation ditches take over the work of water gathering. These technologies extend our abilities in such a way that we can set them in motion and more or less forget about them.

5.3.4 Extensions of the Mind

In addition to these extensions of bodily power and capabilities, there are also extensions of cognitive powers and abilities, or, more simply, extensions of the mind. These extensions occur whenever some technical object becomes part of one’s mental activity. This can occur in several ways, but the most common example of this is memory technologies. Memory is a distinctive and important part of our cognitive apparatus, and it has been greatly supplemented through technological means. Writing, photography, audio recordings, and other forms of material memory make it so that we do not have to use up cognitive resources on storing things internally.

Andy Clark and David Chalmers provide an important example of this type of extension in their now famous paper “The Extended Mind.” Clark and Chalmers provide an example by comparison, where they ask us to imagine two people, Otto and Inga. Inga, using an internal map of the city, stored within her mind, navigates to a museum that she wishes to visit. Otto, who suffers from memory loss, is unable to navigate in the same way. Because of this, Otto supplements
his abilities of spatial reasoning through the use of a notebook. Otto is intimately familiar with the notebook, and he is able to use it seamlessly, in a way that appears the same as Inga’s internal navigation.

This use of the notebook is an example of what Clark and Chalmers call the extended mind. The notebook is incorporated into the cognitive apparatus of the person in such a way that it is indistinguishable, at least functionally, from the internal components of that system such as they appear in another person. In this way, technology extends thought beyond the typical boundaries of the “skin and skull,” thus showing that “it ain’t all in the head.”

Another way to think of the extension of thought is through the act of writing. Instead of merely using something that is written to guide your action, one can also use writing as a form of externalized thinking. I think that the most common form of this extension of thought is working out a math problem on a piece of paper. Whenever I sketch through various attempts on the page, and whenever I ultimately reach the correct conclusion, I am not merely reproducing something as it appears in my mind. It is not that I picture the problem, and then write it down so that I do not have to hold the picture in my mind. The thinking occurs quite literally on the page, and I would be otherwise unable to solve the problem if it were not for the visual and material extension of my cognitive ability.

Writing, such as I am engaged in now to produce these sentences, is another form of this type of mental extension. In spite of the fact that some of my thoughts, ideas, connections, etc., are contained within my internal cognitive apparatus, it is not the case that these are the only or even the primary components of my thinking, which results in the written work. Surely I could develop arguments, examples, etc., outside of the context of writing. But this particular
accomplishment of thought has incorporated several external components such as notes *qua* externalized memory and writing *qua* externalized thinking.

At least two things arise from these examples of extending our thought. First, I am not sure that Inga does not incorporate external memories into her navigational experience as well, and because of this, it becomes difficult to grasp what purely internal navigation would be like. If “internal” refers to some sort of representation of a map or list of directions, then internal navigation would seem replicate something that required an external mind, namely, reading from a list or following a map. This would seem to further breakdown the difference between these types of cognition by showing that both operate in similar, or at least analogous ways.

I believe that Clark and Chalmers’s recognize this, and that this is why they focus on the act of remembering as something that requires internal and external components. But these examples should be pushed further, particularly as concerns an image of internal navigation. As I think through the example, it seems that Inga would require external components to navigate to the museum as well. She needs to see *that* building, as a visual cue which reminds her to turn right. Or if a particular tree or fire hydrant were moved, it might be the case that she would become lost due to the lack of a key landmark. Landmarks, visual cues, and the like are already externalized memory storehouses. Thus, even Inga’s thought and memory is “extended,” at least in part.

This also shows the significance of considering this example from the perspective of techno-placiality. These landmarks and visual cues can easily be incorporated into Inga’s bodily here because they are already a constitutive part of her placial manifold. Her implacement is already in relation to these memory technologies as she moves through the city, and it is not as though her navigation is possible merely from within the internal realm of the mind. Her implacement is such that she’s already engaging these zones of landmarks for the purpose of
getting around the city-region. Put differently, Inga is able to navigate because of the interaction of her mental abilities, and her implaced surroundings. These surroundings are familiar to her in that upon seeing certain objects, she is reminded to do this or that as she makes her way to the museum. It is only through the combination of mind and place that she makes her way around, and place, as the external part of this mental circuit, seems to me to be necessary.

Moreover, there is a subtle indication, particularly in the example between Otto and Inga, that the non-technologically mediated thought is somehow more basic than that which is mediated. Otto is made to have a cognitive malfunction to pump our intuitions towards the idea that the notebook is an equal participant in the cognitive assemblage. What if Otto had a perfectly fine memory. What if he just preferred to use the notebook? Would that be any less of a part of the cognitive assemblage? This choice on the part of the authors seems to point towards either a preference for unmediated cognition, or the realization that many readers will have this type of bias. Either way, we should avoid considering the mediated and unmediated activities as completely distinct and distant.

We encountered this same tendency in Ihde’s description of the amplification-reduction structure. Instead of recognizing that all experiences have this structure, Ihde uses it to explain technological mediation only. This makes it seem like we have lost something whenever we extend a particular form of perception through technological means. However, as I argued above, all experiences amplify and reduce, and it is incorrect to say that this is primarily a feature of technological modification. The significant thing to note here is not that these thinkers posit a difference between technologically mediated experience and those that are not. It is rather that there is an implied priority given to the unmediated experiences.
However, as we saw in the last chapter, technological mediation is a primary feature of existence. There we saw that technics is the primary way in which one contends with their environment. Bringing this conclusion to bear on the example of Inga reveals that her navigation is not the result of mental processes that are only subsequently laid over top of her placial surroundings. Rather, it is Inga’s technicity that transforms the city into navigational tools. Her landmarks, her memory, and her general ability to navigate all combine to result in the successful navigation.

Thus, we can see from the above that human beings surpass their corporeity in several different ways. Through intentional consciousness, the having of one’s body, and the four modes of technological extension, human beings are beyond their bodies in important and interesting ways. However, the significance of such extension must be brought to bear more directly on the present account of being-in-place. In the next section I will show how these different modes of technological extension are part of a long process of exteriorization, through which, human beings and technology have intertwined, and thereby formed each other. The following will tie together the above discussion of extension, the arguments for the primacy of technics that were seen in chapter three, and the basic idea of being-in-place that has been developed out of my readings of Casey, Ströker, and Heidegger.

5.4 Extension, Exteriorization, Epiphylogensis: The Spatialization and Temporalization of Technical Emergence

In the last chapter I established the primacy of technics as the activity through which one engages their world. Through readings of Casey, Ströker, and Heidegger I was able to show that this technical engagement of the world structures our being-in-place according to zones and regions, reach, and directionality. That is, one’s being-in-place is the result of the human-technology
relates. Further, my reading of Ströker pointed the way towards the concept of extension. Technology extends human existence, where one surpasses their corporeality in at least four different ways, through the incorporation of instruments. This reading of Ströker, together with the examples presented above, make clear that the human-technology relation is one of extension, and thus, this extension is central to grasping being-in-place.

However, we must be careful in interpreting this technological extension. Insofar as technics is truly primary, we cannot view technological extension as a mere accessory to some more basic human being. Technological extension does not mean that one is taken out of their being and moved into the world. In the last chapter, Stiegler and Leroi-Gourhan exhibited that to be human is to be technological. If being technological means being extended, then humanity is always already extended. While technology does extend one’s body, mind, perception, and abilities in the present moment through technological usage, these are only instantiations of a core determination of our being.

How can we think extendedness as this type of core determination? What does it mean that technics, and therefore technological extension, has been there from the start? Stiegler will again prove to be helpful in explaining this point. Stiegler provides the resources required to account for such an essential extension through his interpretation of technological objects as prosthetic. Stiegler argues that all of technics constitutes a realm of prosthesis, and further, that the prosthetic relation between technics and human beings constitutes both a spatialization and temporalization. Interpreting these claims in the direction of place will be the focus of this last section.

Stiegler, as we saw in the last chapter, is indebted to Leroi-Gourhan’s evolutionary account of the human-technology relation. Stiegler finds inspiration in Leroi-Gourhan, and he looks to
build upon the foundation of his paleontological predecessor. In particular, Stiegler sets out to show how the human being and technicity emerge together, as the result of a “process of exteriorization.” Leroi-Gourhan was able to show that technological extension is not a single event. Rather, it is the culmination of a process through which early hominids surpass their biological being through artificial means, i.e., through the process of hominid evolution. The Zinjanthropian was a pre-human hominid, with a small brain and stone implements. Here we see one stage in the process of exteriorization. The first tools, the first technological extensions, occur with early hominids. By the time the human being proper emerges on the scene, technicity is not as simple as it was with the Zinjanthropians. Technicity has evolved alongside the hominids, and by the time homo sapiens appear, technology of all sorts has been incorporated into the being of this new entity. That is, the properly human entity is already extended technologically went it arrives on the scene. It appears as an exteriorized entity.

It should be noted here at the start that Stiegler sometimes betrays this interpretation of exteriorization by saying that “[e]verything is there in a single stroke.” This would seem to go against his claim that such exteriorization is a process. Even if erect posture necessitates technical ability, that ability needs to be developed and integrated into the early hominid’s existence, not to mention the fact that further morphological, cognitive, and technical developments need to take place to realize the strong sense of exteriorization that Stiegler has in mind. This idea of exteriorization arriving in a single stroke is tied to Stiegler’s claim, discussed in chapter three, that there is no second origin for humanity. It is not the case that humanity arrives on the scene, and then technicity follows. Rather, they come together. However, there are other options available to Stiegler such that he could maintain the claim of a single origin, while also allowing that this origin is the result of a process.
Christopher Johnson, speaking of this inconsistency in Stiegler, suggests that “the technical metaphor of bricolage would in fact provide a more effective means of conceptualizing these processes than Stiegler’s more abstract notion of differentiation.” This metaphor of bricolage allows one to view exteriorization as an achievement or result, gained through the evolutionary developments that arise out of the constant re-use of the old to form the new, i.e., bricolage.

Johnson continues

“Leroi-Gourhan himself would doubtless agree with Stiegler that there is no second origin, but at the same time would argue that there are emergent properties at the stage of Neanderthal and Homo sapiens which set these species apart from pervious human forms. ‘Emergent’ in this context does not mean ex nihilo—it is less the case of an evolutionary jump than a continuation of the process of stratification described above—evolution as the constant building upon the old in order to make the new—reaching definitive critical mass with Homo sapiens.”

The achievement of the human form, together with its technological extendedness, requires the long evolutionary trajectory of emergent properties that are then repurposed into something new, and so on and so forth until the point at which the human emerges. Thus, when Stiegler speaks of the process of exteriorization, we cannot allow him to retreat from this towards the interpretation of this as an event that happens in a single stroke.

With this correction in mind, we can return to Stiegler’s thought concerning the process of exteriorization. This process corresponds to the same evolutionary timeline that Leroi-Gourhan identifies, which occurs between the Zinjanthropian and the Neanthropians, or other anatomically modern humans. This process took place over the course of more than a million years. This marks the passage from the first technical anthropoids, to beings that are significantly more anatomically similar to current human beings. Over the course of those million years there is a significant development in the types of tools that are produced, and the techniques used to produce them.
The earliest tools, such as those used by the Zinjanthropians, are called “choppers.” These are made “by means of a single movement, that of simple percussion, the same gesture as would serve to split a bone, crack a nut, or bludgeon an animal.” This early stage of technological development represents a very simple operational sequence, and this particular operational sequence was able to be repeated. The repeatability of the chopper constituted a stereotype that could be reproduced by other early hominids. This reproducibility is important for these early tools since, as secretions of the body, these first tools were external organs that were exuded by the basic activity of the pre-human hominids. As external organs they are bound to follow the same logic as internal organs, i.e., “[t]hey must exhibit constantly recurring forms, their nature must be fixed.”

Familiarity with the chopper and its operational sequence eventually leads to more developed operational sequences that produce more specialized tools. Leroi-Gourhan explains that these early techniques were “eventually supplemented by a second series of movements whereby the piece of stone intended to become a tool was struck in a direction no longer perpendicular but tangential to its main axis.” This leads to the evolution of the chopper into what is known as the biface and hand axe.

By the time of the Neolithic era, operational sequences had become advanced to point where stone tools were attached to wooden handles to increase leverage, in addition to producing advanced techniques such as stone grinding, domestication of animals, and other agricultural techniques. The movements that it takes to produce different tools were split into separate industries, which were subsequently combined, and the amount of planning that it takes to turn these advancements into a stereotype corresponds to the increased size of the brain, which had developed alongside this technical evolution.
The key point to see here is that through the evolutionary history of early hominids, leading to homo sapiens, there is a parallel evolution of techniques and technologies. As the hominid develops, so do its tools, and the history of each of these evolutionary trajectories is the history of the intertwining of hominid and tool. This intertwining with technology reaches a point where the organic body of the human and the artificial body of technology cannot be neatly separated. By the time homo sapiens appears on the scene, technicity has been ingrained into the hominids being for over million years. But, since the human-technology relation is one of extension, this presents a view of the human being as emerging through a process of exteriorization.

This process of exteriorization explains Stiegler’s claim that technicity is “the pursuit of life by means other than life.” Evolution proceeds as a development and reorganization of organic materials into new and different forms. However, in the development of technics, life begins to pursue its continuation through the organization of inorganic objects, i.e., through the development of technology as externalized, inorganic organs. Therefore, technology is not an artificial substitute for some more basic human nature. Technology is part of the natural, i.e., evolutionary, morphological, and cognitive development of the human being.

Some may object that this type of inorganic organization is found in other animals as well. After all, beavers build dams, birds build nests, and even spiders seem to indicate a form of technicity with their web weaving. However, Raymond Ruyer, analyzing Leroi-Gourhan, provides an important rubric for interpreting these facts, which differentiates human technicity from the types of animal technicity discussed above. For Ruyer, one of the key consequences of Leroi-Gourhan’s work is the view that technology requires an evolutionary and biological analysis. Ruyer explains that “[a]fter a meticulous study of techniques, Leroi-Gourhan sought to bring biology and technology closer together. Technical intention and creation extend the instinctive
movement by which the living being strives to ‘make contact’.” This has already been made clear in several places above, particularly in our discussion of the exterior milieu, which is where human beings “make contact” through the mediation of technology.

Daniel W. Smith, discussing Ruyer, explains further that “[w]hat seems to be specific to the human species, by contrast, is that its externalized organs become detachable, removable, separated from the body, to the point where they enter their own evolutionary history.” The first point to note here is that we must be careful with this sense of “detachable” that Smith employs. These externalized organs are detached from the body such that they take on their own evolutionary history, but they are not, therefore, outside of the essential determinations of the being whose body is at issue. Smith is not arguing that humans and technology are utterly distinct, but rather, that human technicity takes on an evolutionary trajectory that is intertwined with, yet distinct from that of the human’s organic body.

Thus, life pursuing life through inorganic means bifurcates human evolution into two poles, each of which intertwines into the other like a double helix. One can see that “the human organism has been sculpted over thousands of years by an extremely slow-moving evolution, but these organisms in turn have produced externalized artifacts that connect together to create a new technological body, which is evolving at a faster and increasingly accelerated pace.” This detachability differentiates human technicity from the beaver dams and bird nests that have not, or at least not yet inaugurated their own evolutionary trajectory that constitutes an externalized body.

Smith continues his analysis by succinctly pointing to the way that Ruyer pushes Leroi-Gourhan’s ideas further than Leroi-Gourhan takes his own work. This new direction that Ruyer sees for conceptual development comes out of an analysis of an amoeba. An amoeba is able to digest food, react to an environment, self-direct, and adapt, among other activities, all without the
specialized organs of more developed living entities. The amoeba has no digestive tract, it lacks sense organs or a nervous system, but even without these biological means it is able to perform these tasks. With this analysis, Ruyer begins developing Leroi-Gourhan’s thesis further. Smith explains that,

“[i]n so-called higher animals, “functions” like digestion and thought become localized in specific organs such as the stomach and the brain, but clearly—as the example of the amoeba shows—the functions do not require the specialized organs. Ruyer drew the obvious conclusion: *bodily organs are themselves technical artifacts*; they are specialized ‘tools’ that have been fabricated by the organism over the course of evolution.”

Thus, playing on this developmental scale from amoeba, to spider, to beaver, to human, Ruyer identifies three modes of technicity: “Organic formation, instinctive external circuit, and intelligent external circuit.”

Human technicity falls into the third group, where the organic body develops to a point where it can make a detachable technological body through which it interacts with its environment, i.e., through which it “makes contact” with the world. Therefore, “with the advent of exteriorization, the body of the living individual is no longer only a body: it can only function with its tools.” The body is only a *human* body if it is exteriorized. The despecialized hand calls for tools, and not merely for an unmediated grasping of the “natural” world.

The above analysis has been necessary to get to the point where I can introduce, with its full force, Stiegler’s concept of technics *qua* prosthetics. Stiegler explains that “[p]rostheticity, here a consequence of the freedom of the hand, is a putting-outside-the-self.” With the freed hand, early hominids begin a process of putting themselves out into the world. What starts as very simple externalized organs, eventually builds up an entire built world that is an extended and external aspect of the technical human beings themselves i.e., the “technological body” that Smith describes.
This ensemble of human extensions makes up the realm of the prosthetic. Stiegler asks us to think prosthesis literally in this context. “Prosthesis” is developed out of two Greek terms, transliterated as pros and tithemi. Pros means before, in front of, or in addition to. Tithemi means to place. Pros-thesis, in the literal sense, means to place before, in front of, or in addition to oneself. Being fundamentally technological in the prosthetic sense means having being placed in front of… and in addition to…oneself. This prosthetic movement is then a fitting image for human evolutionary development. Early hominids create organs that are in excess of or in addition to their biological being. After a million years of development and reliance on these prosthetic additions, the human being proper emerges as a new mode of existing. This new type of being, developed out of the bricolage of hominid evolution, exceeds the purely biological hominid. It surpasses it, towards a being that is both biological and artificial. The properly human entity takes up a position outside or before itself, in the mode of technological extension, and thus, the human being is always already outside of itself. That is, prosthetic technicity requires taking up a position in front of, or outside of oneself, exteriorization.

This interpretation of prosthesis replaces typical understandings of technology as a mere supplement to the human body, and instead interprets it as the movement of human evolution. This brings the current investigation to what is perhaps the most important sentence in all of Technics and Time, I. Stiegler explains that “[b]y pros-thesis, we understand 1) set in front, or spatialization (de-severance [é-loignement]); 2) set in advance, already there (past) and anticipation (foresight), that is, temporalization.” Prosthesis as being-set-in-front is already made clear by the above discussion. However, in what way is this prosthetic movement a spatialization? In what way is it a temporalization? Understanding each part of this line is absolutely crucial for unlocking the proper understanding of the human-technology relation in terms of place.
5.4.1 Prosthetic Technicity as Spatialization

I will interpret these two points in the order in which Stiegler presents them. How is the prosthetic movement of technological exteriorization a spatialization? First, with the prosthetic movement of exteriorization, embodied human existence is put into relation with a technological object. This technical object is out there, but it is nevertheless still bound, existentially, to the bodily being of the person. This should begin to sound familiar, as this mode of spatialization has already been encountered above, except that it was not spoken of as a process of spatialization. Rather, I provided a discussion of the result of this process. This spatialization that Stiegler speaks of is the establishment of the technological here-there relation.

Although non-technological entities surely experience something analogous to the here-there relation, that to which they are related is another entity, distinct from and foreign to them. Each there for the non-technological entity is something that is entirely outside of what they are. However, the technological there forges a new relation due to the fact that while the technological object may be numerically distinct from my body, it does not exist outside of what I am; it does not lie outside of my existence. The experience of this there, i.e., spatialization, must be different than the forms that came before it. This new mode of relatedness changes the nature of the relation itself. Moreover, given, as we have seen, that this relation plays a foundational role in structuring one’s situatedness and environmental engagement, these will also reflect the novelty of this relation, as has been shown above.

At this point it should begin to become clear how Stiegler and Ströker offer similar interpretations, albeit from distinct vantages. Ströker explains that the human here-there relation obtains primarily between one’s bodily here and those technological theres that serve to push one beyond their corporeity. This surpassing is not merely a momentary achievement, but rather, it is an inherited feature of human existence, borne out of a million-year process of exteriorization. By
taking up a position outside of ourselves, human existence is brought into relation with the technological thereś that are extended bits of human existence, and thus humans exceed, surpass, and are extended beyond their bodily here.

This brings about an expansive spatiality, or, in the terminology that I have employed above, an expansive *placiality*. This placiality is expansive both in terms of the eventual reach of technological extension, which today is quite extensive, and in terms of the way that human existence expands to generate its own being-in-place, separate from the objective global space of earth. This expansion clears out or *makes room* for the externalized entity. That is, technological humanity *makes a place* for itself through this prosthetic movement. This place making gives rise to a placiality where the entity is not simply in space, related to points foreign to them. Rather, they are *spatialized*, in an active sense. One can imagine a placial manifold extending out of the body, to meet the externalized organs found throughout their environment. The shape of this manifold may change continuously, stretching, shrinking, and even ripping apart. But the manifold is there, as the being-spatial of these technological entities. This manifold is imbued with familiarity to the point where it is no longer a mere space, but rather, it acquires the designation of place. In this way, the technological entities find themselves not in space, but *in place*, residing within a spatialized region that is the exterior or external aspect of what they are. Through this spatialization, human beings find their way into place.

In this way, Stiegler provides an evolutionary account of the emergence of placial surpassing. The process of exteriorization through technological development puts us outside of ourselves and spatializes us in such a way that we become implaced. One surpasses their corporeity towards the thereś of implements, because of this long process. Additionally, as we saw above,
that places are the extensions of one’s bodily proto-place can now be viewed in light of this idea of a process of exteriorization or extension.

Moreover, it is important to see that Stiegler references the Heideggerian term for human spatiality in the above quote. As was noted above, de-severance is the initial translation of Entfernung, which is discussed above as de-distancing. Joan Stambaugh, in her more recent translation of Being and Time, uses the latter expression, while the earlier English translation, by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, uses the latter. Stiegler sees that the de-distancing of our relation to handy equipment amounts to more than the spatiality of technological usage. Such bringing near is an expansion of oneself, and results from a long process. It consists in more than spatiality; it is spatialization, a becoming and subsequently being-spatial through the exteriorization of technology. Taking this idea even further, the above analysis shows that being spatial is better grasped as being-in-place.

This reveals a direct line of development, running from Heidegger, through Ströker, to Stiegler, and eventually to this project. Heidegger begins this line of thinking with his claims concerning the importance of handy equipment for the organization of human spatiality, which Ströker develops further in her account. Stiegler sees the importance of this spatial interpretation and deepens it by showing how the prosthetic exteriorization of the intertwining of human beings and technology leads to a spatialization that I have shown to be topologically structured placiality. Therefore, in the pros-thetic movement of exteriorization, the human being finds themselves in place in the way we have been discussing it. One is in place in so far as this process of exteriorization has made room for the topological techno-place to which one belongs, and which answers the question of their situatedness.
This is why Stiegler continues in the line following the quotation above by saying “The prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the constitution of this body *qua* ‘human’.”387 As Ströker explained, the human body is only more than a mere thing if one exceeds it. One must be beyond their body—in the relation to technology—for this body to be the lived body of human existence, and this particular mode of lived body is always situated *qua* in place. What Ströker does not realize is how profound her statement is, not just for an understanding of being-in-place, but for an understanding of human being in general. The constitution of the human body results from the prosthetic exteriorization that puts one outside of themselves and generates a topological place that is the spatiality of that exteriorized, prosthetic being.

5.4.2 Prosthetic Technicity as Temporalization

The above analysis greatly enriches our understanding of place, its emergence, and its significance for human existence in general. Further, all of that was accomplished just by interpreting the first half of the important Stiegler line quoted above! What about the second half of that quotation? What about Stiegler’s claims that this spatialization is a temporalization? How are we to think both of these movements, particularly since this project has been focused on place as the answer to the situatedness of human existence?

The answer to these questions begins with Stiegler’s concept of epiphylogenetic memory, or “epiphylogenesis.”388 When Stiegler explains that the process of exteriorization, which spatializes, also temporalizes, he is pointing towards the intertwining, not only of technology and the human body, but also of place and temporality. Exteriorization results in the formation of place, through the specific here-there relation that obtains between humans and technology, and which is further specified according to reach, the dimensional dyads, and other structural features that have been noted above. But it also brings about the organization of a new form of memory. This might
sound strange at first, considering the way that memory is typically understood. A memory is typically thought of as a psychological representation of an event. However, much like how Ruyer challenges us to think technicity outside of our typical understanding, Stiegler pushes us to think memory in a broader sense.

To grasp this new, technological form of memory we must first get a grip on the types of memory that are found prior to this new organization. Stiegler explains that there are two types of memory that occur prior to the achievement of exteriorization.389 First, there is genetic memory, which is the memory of the species. Rather than the retention of individual experiences, this memory is the collection of particular traits and abilities that have been coded into genes through the long process of evolution. They are memories of functions and bodily formations that have succeeded, i.e., been selected, in the development of the species. In this way, they are memories, not in the individual sense, but rather, as the collection of the past of the species, inherited, non-cognitively, through reproduction. This genetic memory is the impersonal storage and potential recollection of traits. Each expression of genes is like a recollection that occurs at a level well below the conscious recollection of an event.

There is also memory in the typical sense, which Stiegler calls “specific memory,”390 or “epigenetic” memory. This is not to be confused with the cellular memory of the same name. This epigenetic memory is individual memory qua psychological representation of individual experiences. It is the “memory of the central nervous system.”391 It is epigenetic because it is in addition to or outside of (epi) the genetic memory mentioned above. Before the emergence of technology, there are only these two forms of memory.

Now consider a tool. That tool might be a modern device such as a computer or smartphone, or it might be one of the earliest tools we know of, such as the flaked stone chopper that is
used for scraping or other basic tasks. Regardless of the type of tool that is imagined, what all tools have in common is that they are the product of a particular “operational sequence [chaine opératoire],” as was shown above. Each artifact results from a particular sequence of gestures. I have to strike the stone this way or that in order to produce the chopper. I must combine the silicon parts of my computer in this way or that to produce the same type of product. Each tool is the result of these gestures.

Leroi-Gourhan explains that “[t]echniques involve both gestures and tools, sequentially organized by means of a ‘syntax’ that imparts both fixity and flexibility to the series of operations involved.” Each tool bears the trace of this syntax, and thus, it is able to reveal the fixity and flexibility of both its creation and possible uses. Through this preservation of the operational sequence, the tool constitutes a memory; the tool is an artificial preservation of the individual experience of tool creation. Thus, “Exteriorization…qua the gesture, is also an Erinnerung.” Erinnerung is the term for a memory, and Stiegler uses the German expression to evoke Heideggerian connotations, since Heidegger uses this and related terms when discussing the ecstasis of the past. Bracketing these Heideggerian connotations for now, it is enough to see that each product of technical activity, particularly each type of artifact, the stereotype that was discussed above, serves as a memory for others to tap into. This new formation of memory has profound effects.

Stiegler explains further that

“The stereotype is as much the result as the condition of its production, both the support of the memory of operational sequences that produces it, conserving the trace of past epigenetic events that accumulate as lessons of experience, and the result of the transmission of these operational sequences by the very existence of the product as an archetype. Such is epiphylogenesis.”
With no prosthetic exteriorization, each individual’s epigenetic memory is lost with their death. However, the prosthetic preservation of operational sequences that occurs through technological production results in the preservation of individual memories that can be accessed by individuals other than the ones who first had the experience. This brings about a new relation to the past, a new temporalization, through a new relation to memory *qua* artificial, exterior storage of epigenetic experience. Put into the register of Clark and Chalmers, epiphylogenetic memory constitutes the first stages of an extended mind.

Moreover, it is not as though technology, particularly contemporary technology, is *only* the trace of operational sequences. As technology has developed, there continues to be more and more advanced forms of preserving individual experience. Film, writing, and photography all preserve the syntax that lead to their creation, but they also preserve the more intimate features of these individual memories such as feelings, individuals, and entire narratives or reproductions of events. After all, the tools of pre-human hominids are only the simplest version of exteriorized memory.

Stiegler’s argument concerning this new form of memory is that the phylogenetic differentiation of our species relies on the process of exteriorization that gives rise to a new form of memory. In this new form of memory, epigenetic experience is preserved, and through this preservation there arises an entirely new relation to and engagement with the environment. Put differently, there arises a new temporalization and spatialization.

Stiegler and Leroi-Gourhan both point to the exteriorization of the tool as a major cause of the subsequent cognitive and social development of hominids. This new relatedness and mode of engagement develops over several millennia, and through the intertwining of the hominid and the artificial, human beings emerge. Thus, technology constitutes an epigenetic memory with
phylogenetic effects, i.e., it is an epiphylogenetic memory, and this epiphylogenetic memory is the temporalization that corresponds to the spatialization of human implacement.

The human is only human through the process of exteriorization, and this process, which spatializes us into the techno-placial entities, also puts us in relation to individual experiences that I inherit without having lived them. The tool begins a connection to a past that I have not lived, but that is nevertheless mine.

“Epiphylogenesis, a recapitulating, dynamic, and morphogenetic (phylogenetic) accumulation of individual experience (epi), designates the appearance of a new relation between the organism and its environment, which is also a new state of matter. If the individual is organic organized matter, then its relation to its environment (to matter in general, organic or inorganic), when it is a question of a who, is mediated by the organized but inorganic matter of the organon, the tool with its instructive role (its role qua instrument), the what. It is in this sense that the what invents the who just as much as it is invented by it.”

The human invents the tool and the tool invents the human. Neither is without the other, and their mutual relatedness must be grasped not as a linear movement outward, but as an oscillation between two poles. This oscillation spatializes by opening up a place to be human, and it temporalizes by forging a new connection to the past. By preserving epigenetic memory in the material trace of the tool, one is connected not only to the externalized being of their own handiwork, but also to the collective externalized being of technical entities in general. In our contemporary situation this has resulted in a digital and global connectedness. In the case of early hominids the range of extension may have been more limited, but it was nevertheless present. Exteriorization makes room for place and forges a connection to the past that results in a new relation to one’s milieu, spatialization, in a way that is fully imbued with a new memory or inheritance, temporalization.

The past, in the existential sense, is the already-there in terms of this epiphylogenetic memory. To have a past that extends beyond my individual experience, i.e. to be historical, there
must be a relation to this epiphylogenetic vector of technology. Otherwise I could never inherit a past that I did not live. Without the epiphylogenetic vector of technology there would only be the genetic preservation of the traits of the species, and the very temporary preservation of specific memory, which is lost when the individual dies. However, it must be noted that Stiegler does not only reference the past in terms of this technological temporalization. There is also a reference to the future as anticipation. How is this epiphylogenetic memory also the emergence of anticipation?

Consider this line from the quote above: “The stereotype is as much the result as the condition of its production.” The “stereotype” here refers to the general form of a particular implement that one might want to create. To produce an artifact, one must anticipate the form and use of that artifact itself. After all, to make a boat, the boat-maker has to know what a boat is! This means that the technical gesture, no matter how simple, reveals the anticipation of a product or stereotype.

However, we have to be careful here. It is easy to think of this anticipation as a creative intelligence. On this view, the early hominids would have to, through their creative genius, come up with the design and possible usage of a particular tool, and then reproduce this tool based on the cognitive model they had in mind. This view establishes an intellectual interior from which the material artifact emerges. Surely we can say that this type of creative intelligence is present in modern tool production, but to say that the first tools were created in this way would be to fall back upon cerebralist interpretations of technological emergence. This introduces “a notion of spirituality: a second origin.” As we saw above, tool and intelligence are developed together, and they mutual influence each other. Thus, the first tools present a paradox. They present the image of an anticipation that is nonetheless not the same as creative intelligence. How can we think this anticipation in the right way?
Thinking through this anticipation requires our earlier analysis of the development of tools. First were the choppers of the Zinjanthropians. Their making presupposes two pebbles, of which one serves as a hammer while the other receives the blows. This mode of manufacture is so simple, that, as we saw, it is a mere “secretion” of early hominids. Thus, “it is logical that the standards of natural organs should be applied to such artificial organs: They must exhibit constantly recurring forms, their nature must be fixed.” The secretion of tools begins as an exteriorization that follows the rules and logic of natural organs, rather than a creative expression. This is further evidenced by the “countless millennia” through which this stereotype persisted, which “disproves,” the idea that this is the result of creative intelligence.

Thus, in the secretion of the first tools, early hominids create a stereotype that marks the beginning of epiphylogenetic memory. Moreover, the secretion of the earliest tools brings about anticipation as “the realization of a possibility that is not determined by a biological program.” Although the creation of tools adheres to the speed and structure of biological development, it is nonetheless a non-biological creation. It is not a matter of genetic expression that tools emerge, but rather, it is the realization of a new possibility, that corresponds to a new program. Even before tool creation is influenced by creative intelligence, the establishment of the epiphylogenetic vector in flaked stone emancipates the early hominid from a strictly genetic program, and thus is the first instance of anticipation in this technical sense.

The flaked stone chopper exists for close to a million years, being reproduced without a development in the stereotype. This indicates a very basic anticipation that occurs at the speed of biological development. However, through the re-creation of the simple flaked stone, early hominids anticipate a result, i.e., realize a possibility that they projected onto, and they do so through the material trace of an operational sequence. Moreover, once a further development
takes place, i.e., whenever the chopper is developed into the biface, which is a more complicated stereotype, requiring multiple gestures, we see the development, anticipation, and preservation of a new stereotype. The biface is developed again, which produces further developments, and at this point technical evolution begins to speed up. As tools and hominids are woven closer together, anticipation begins to look more like creative intelligence as we know it today. Stiegler’s central point concerning this development of an artificial program is that we cannot think anticipation as we experience it today. Rather, the tool changes intelligence, which changes the tool, and so on and so forth in such a way as to lead to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in.

Therefore, there is a relation to possibility in the strong, existential sense, i.e., to a range of possible ways to comport one’s biological being in non-biological ways, and a relation to a past of sedimented, individual experiences that are inherited. Put differently, this intertwining of humans and technology temporalizes by forging a new futurity qua anticipation and a new past qua epiphylogenetic memory.

Through the process of technological exteriorization, biological and artificial development are forged together, and this intertwining of the hominid and tool results in the emergence of the human, as the implaced being, exteriorized, and thereby related to a future that it anticipates and a past that it inherits without having lived it. Contemporary humans are able to anticipate in vastly improved ways, through the intelligence that we have as a result of the initial process of exteriorization that leads to the emergence of this anticipation. Moreover, the epiphylogenetic memory of the tool does not fade out of existence. Instead, it continues to collect, creating a sediment of individual experiences to which humanity is related. This sedimentation is evidenced in the million-year-old tools that we are now discussing through the use of computers, books, print-technology, and the internet! The result of these processes is a being that is outside of itself. The
exteriorized human finds themselves implaced in the present moment through the topological techno-place. The spatialization of the human being is the emergence of this placiality. However, this place is imbued with a sedimented, material past, and the temporal projection towards an anticipated future.

5.5 Conclusion

Places in the ontological sense are not intervals of objective space, nor are they mere locales on the earth. They are the spatialized and temporalized extensions of humanity that are forged through the prosthetic movement of technology. Technology extends the zones and regions of the body, and it organizes a field of possible activity according to this structure. This spatialization makes room for places as a place to act, and as an open region within which embodied existence carries out its projects. This prosthetic movement also exteriorizes memory, and it temporalizes this field of activity in a way that opens up possibilities, in addition to maintaining a connection to the past. The sedimentation of these temporal movements adds a depth and content to places as more than an open space of possible activity.

It is in this way that places are the spatialized and temporalized exterior aspect of existence. Thus, we cannot think of the insideness of being-in-place through our usual grasp of this concept. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that human beings are placial, rather than merely being in place. Human existence occurs with and through this exterior field that is established with the “curtain of objects” qua prostheses, which mediates humanity’s environmental engagement. Through the creation of this curtain, and the way that it intertwines with human existence, lines of involvement emerge that obtain between one’s body and the limits of one’s involvement, thereby transforming a milieu into a place. Insofar as one is externalized through this spatial and temporal
field of technological exteriorization, they are in place. Thus, being-in-place means being outside of oneself, i.e., placial being is *ecstatic* being.

The above analysis brings this project to a close by answering the question of how one is in place. One is *in* place insofar as they are outside of themselves through technological exteriorization.

In the ensuing epilogue, I will not develop the details of this account further. Instead, I will focus on the connection between this account of placial ecstasis, and Heidegger’s account of temporal ecstasy that began this project. I will show how being-in-place and Heidegger’s temporality are compatible through the unified notion of place-time. Specifically, I argue that Heidegger’s ecstases are each placial *and* temporal, which provides a fitting conclusion, and a closing of the transcendental circle with which I began.
CHAPTER 6.  EPILOGUE: PLACE-TIME AND THE ECSTASY OF PROSTHESIS

“It seems a region holds what comes forward to meet us; but we also said of the horizon that out of the view which it encircles, the appearance of objects comes to meet us. If now we comprehend the horizon through the region, we take the region itself as that which comes to meet us.” — Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking.*

The above account of being-in-place offers two primary perspectives on this phenomenon. There is the current perspective, which explains what it means to be implaced. This perspective accounts for the structures and significance of human situatedness as a feature of what it means to be. There is also the backwards looking perspective, which accounts for the emergence of place, and which solidifies my technological interpretation of being-in-place.

This backwards looking perspective also saw a reemergence of the concept of temporalization. This concept appeared in chapter one, as the activity through which temporality founds existence. Heidegger argues that the temporalization of temporality makes existence possible, as the ontological *a priori,* upon which being-in-the-world and care are founded. This temporalization is temporality’s activity of making possible by the standing out of its three structural moments. According to Heidegger, existence is possible through the differential unity of projection, having-been, and making-present.

The end of chapter two showed that this temporalization is impossible without an equally foundational spatiality *qua* being-somewhere-with-entities. Chapter three argued that this being-somewhere-with must be interpreted as being-in-place. The remaining portions of this project served as an elaboration of the concept of being-in-place, and the way that it arises through the human-technology relation.
Yet, in chapter five above, temporalization reappears in my discussion of the emergence of technics. Technics spatializes and temporalizes existence. Through technics, existence is spatialized into the placial region qua technological extension of one’s body region. Additionally, this spatialized place acquires a temporal depth through the temporalization of epiphylogenesis. Technicity allows for an anticipation of possibilities and for an inheritance of a past that one has not lived. This temporalization further differentiates place from pure space by opening up the existential past and future, towards which the implaced being is stretched.

However, what does it mean that places are temporalized? What is the connection between being-in-place and the temporalization that occurs through technical emergence? These final questions, which bring us back to Heidegger, deserve brief attention in the closing of this project. Thus, this epilogue is devoted to explaining how place and time are woven together, and the way that place-time, as a unified phenomenon, constitutes the ecstasy of existence.

The above reading of Stiegler argues that the emergence of technicity results in at least two of Heidegger’s ecstases, namely having-been and projection. The process of exteriorization establishes the ability to anticipate possibilities beyond the biological program, which clears the way for a futural projection into an open field of possible ways to be. This process also establishes epiphylogenetic memory, which allows one to inherit a past that they have not lived, i.e., epiphylogenetic memory gives rise to the historical dimension of having-been. If this temporalization arises with the spatialization of place, how are we to think these movements together? How can we think place and time as intertwining structures? To do so requires that I show how Heidegger’s ecstases exist in a reciprocal relation with being-in-place.

I will begin with the ecstatic of the present, or, what Heidegger refers to as making-present. In one’s engagement with entities qua “entangled being-together-with,” the temporalization of
making-present reflects these entities upon a temporal horizon, which brings them into view as present or absent. By projecting upon the horizon of *praesens*, entities appear, or better, they *present* themselves. The ecstasy that occurs in the present is the being carried away towards those entities that are made present, and the temporality of this ecstasis comes from its connection to presence, which, according to Heidegger, grounds our more typical grasp of the temporal present *qua now*. This is also why Heidegger uses the language of “being alongside” or being “entangled” with these entities.⁴¹¹ One’s being is out there with those entities, involved with them, and one is not simply a contained consciousness that stands over and against the world. The present consists in the ecstatic movement of making these things present.

The first thing to notice here is that making-present focuses on one’s relation to entities. However, we already know from the arguments of chapter one, that this relatedness to entities cannot result from temporality alone. Chapter one demonstrated that to make entities present through a temporal horizon, or for any temporalization of temporality in general, one must concurrently be somewhere with entities. These entities cannot be made present prior to being-somewhere-*qua* relational situatedness amongst those entities.

Additionally, making-present, as a projection upon the horizon of *praesens*, is a phenomenon of intelligibility. The temporalization of this ecstasis makes entities that we are entangled with intelligible *as* present or absent. However, following Kant’s insight, the entanglement with entities and their intelligibility as present or absent must be concurrent. In Heideggerian terms, I can only be carried past those entities towards the horizon of *praesens*, if I am *somewhere* with them already.

The temporal ecstasis of making-present, as a phenomenon of intelligibility, is unable to create the relational situatedness that grounds one’s entanglement with entities. It deepens the
phenomenon of this situatedness through a depth of understanding, but because it is only the activity of temporalization, it is unable to forge the situation itself. This relational situatedness is only supplied by one’s being somewhere with entities. What is the phenomenon of such being-somewhere-with? It has already been demonstrated that this is being-in-place. Therefore, the relational situation that is required for the ecstatic-horizontal activity of making-present is being-in-place.

If temporality’s temporalization were to occur prior to the placial relation of being somewhere with entities, then this temporalization would have nothing to temporalize! It would be an empty functioning *qua* activity of conditioning, which would lack the content of that which it is meant to condition. Instead, the temporalization of making-present takes the placial relations that exist between one’s body, places, and things in place, and it temporalizes these relations through the horizon of presence and absence. Making-present adds a temporal depth to those relations. Only if these occur together is there a temporalization of temporality.

Making-present also entails the ecstatic movement of having-been. Having-been temporalizes as the ecstasy of being one’s past. One is always outside of any merely present self in their belonging to both a personal and cultural past, i.e., their belonging to a history. Not only do I retain my past actions, identities, and other aspects of my personal past, regardless of my awareness of them, but I also belong to the cultural, geographic, and familial histories, among others, that forge my identity. These histories are always more than a mere list of successive events that are bygone. This history *is*, and it is part of the existent person regardless of the way that one comports themselves towards it. Heidegger points towards this as an ontological condition of existing, which I do not wish to dispute. However, what Heidegger ignores is the history of how
this idea of historical being came to be. Stiegler fills in this gap by directing us towards the technological origin and maintenance of such having-been.

What is most interesting with this ecstasis is not that I am my own, personal past. Instead, it is the importance of tradition and a cultural past. Having-been is more expansive than one’s own individual life, and this expansiveness is indicative of one of the greatest strengths of Being and Time. Heidegger excels at exposing the referential relations that govern different aspects of existence. Tools are only understood from out of an expansive web of referential relations, and thus cannot be taken in isolation. Individual people cannot be taken in isolation either, because one’s own having-been is connected to a much broader web of history that constitutes part of what it means for them to be. One is the expansive web to which they belong, whether one chooses to contend with it, or not.

Heidegger admits that forgetting this inheritance of tradition is more basic than remembering it in an authentic way. However, that there is a possibility of remembering it authentically is key. Inheriting a tradition must include the possibility of confronting this dimension of having-been. Put differently, one must belong to a past that they have not lived, but which, nevertheless, can be remembered as one’s own.

Yet, we have already seen what leads to this possibility: technics. This is why Stiegler claims that “[e]xteriorization…qua the gesture, is also an Erinnerung.” An Erinnerung is a memory, and this term harkens back to Heidegger’s usage of erinnern as to remember or to recall. Only through a memory that preserves the past of individuals, and which can subsequently be inherited by others, can one be open to the historical past qua having-been. Further, this memory must be preserved so that it can accumulate, resulting in traditions and cultures. Thus, having-been requires a form of memory that can accumulate, and which can become accessible
and inheritable by those who subsequently belong to these traditions and cultures. This describes
the process of epiphylogenetic memory.

The earliest forms of having-been are the preservation of operational sequences in simple
tools. Prior to this epiphylogenetic memory, individual experiences were lost with the death of the
individuals that had them. However, by preserving the experience of crafting in a material medium,
the tool allows individuals to tap into an experience that was not their own. Through an
engagement with the tool or stereotype that was produced by another, an individual could inherit
a past that comes to be theirs, without their having lived it. This is an important change from the
original two forms of memory: genetic memory, which is inherited without notice, and individual
memory, which is noticed but not inherited. These tools become a memory, an Erinnerung, which
opens up the possibility of being one’s having-been in a strong sense.

Think of all the different ways that epiphylogenetic memory opens up our having-been. It
allows for an investigation into the modes of industry that existed in the communities of pre-human
hominids, it opens up a link to cultures throughout human history, and it even preserves the thread
of the history of philosophy, to which these words, soon to be an epiphylogenetic memory of their
own, contribute. Without technicity, the past is preserved in our genetics, but it becomes
inaccessible. Through technicity, the past is opened as the ecstatic dimension of having-been.

In the preservation of epigenetic experience in the tool, humanity is exteriorized in a way
that is simultaneously placial and temporal. Rather than merely being a temporal phenomenon that
grounds the way we understand and move through the world, our having-been is rooted in both
technicity, and the implacement that arises from it. As memory and preservation of the past, this
is a squarely temporal phenomena, but as material and technological, it is a matter of the here-
there relations that exists between human beings and their technological extensions.
If human beings did not exist as being-in-place, they would not be exteriorized through technology. Without this exteriorization, there would be no accessible preservation of the past, nor would there be any accumulation of this past in the form of an epiphylogenetic sedimentation. From my current implacement I am afforded the possibility of remembering my own having-been, and it is this possibility that makes this temporalization possible. Thus, having-been is housed in place, and provides this implacement with a temporal depth. I come to the texts, tools, and other material traces of epigenetic experience in place, and I am able to tap into a past that I inherit through these material means.

Moreover, the mode of having-been that is proper to me as an individual is a matter of the places that I find myself throughout my life. The place that I am born into, the places that I call home, and the places that I will go all provide gateways to my own peculiar having-been. Additionally, as anyone who has read Marcel Proust\textsuperscript{416} or who has returned to their hometown after being away knows, places are access points to the past. Because places are part of what one is, they are gateways into having-been. Places are storehouses of our having-been, and it is from out of my implacement that I can be this ecstatic temporalization. Only through the placial relations of technological exteriorization is this having-been accessible to me, and therefore part of my existence.

Making-present and having-been are not merely subsumed to place, however. They are concurrent with it, arising through the same process of technological exteriorization, and coming to be together in a way that is placial and temporal. Place must be temporalized \textit{and} spatialized to be more than pure space, but temporality must be implanted to avoid being an empty functioning without content. What about the last ecstasis of projection? Does this mode of ecstasy exist as placio-temporal? Does it bear the same reciprocal relation to our implacement?
Projection is the ecstatic movement of running ahead of oneself in the anticipation of possible modes of being. Here one is outside of their merely present self by being their future in this anticipation. This projection requires that one always exceeds themselves by not being only that which they currently are, or that which they have been. However, there are two things that must be noted with regards to projection. First, as my reading of Stiegler argues above, it is through the process of technological exteriorization that the early hominids are released from the biological program of possibility. Through the development of technics, these hominids acquire a new, artificial programmatic.

This does not mean that capricious freedom is acquired through technicity. Rather, Stiegler’s claim is that through the anticipation of a result in the making of technological objects, one comes to be related to a realm of possibility that exceeds what was previously available. Through technicity, one can be more than the non-technical being, i.e., they are in excess, in terms of possibilities. Put differently, one could say that technicity opens the realm of *existence*, as an expansion of the realm of life. Humans come to acquire a new range of possible ways to *be*, each of which must be chosen at the expense of others. Instead of existence as having to survive, existence becomes a matter having to choose how to be, and this is made possible through the inauguration of technological differentiation.

In the early stages of this anticipation, hominids project upon the limited number of stereotypes that are available for creation. This type of anticipation is fitting for these entities’ general capacity of thinking and cognition. However, as the body, brain, and tool develop together, new possibilities are anticipated and realized, to the point where now there is an indefinite number of virtual possibilities to be seized upon at any moment. Technicity, which arises because of the liberation of the hands from the ground, now liberates one’s projective capacities.
The key thing to note here, for our purposes, is that this anticipation arises through technological mediation as the mode through which humans “make contact” with their environment. By engaging the spatialized region that is place, human beings find a field of possibility. From within the open region of place, as the extended region of one’s own bodily being, one can run ahead of themselves towards that which they will come to be. It is from places that one runs ahead of themselves, and it is to places that they return. Moreover, the possibilities that are available for projection at any given moment are dependent upon the place that one finds themselves. The direction in which one can run ahead of themselves is determined by the directional dyads of here-there and near-far. I can only project upon what is in reach, over there, and in relation to my embodied being-in-place. Again, projection is not caprice. The artificial programmatic still has limits, which are inscribed by one’s implacement.

However, this is not to say that possibility is reduced to place. Rather, place and possibility, spatialization and temporalization, both rely on the emergence of technicity. They develop together, and where place provides a grounding and content to the temporalization of projection, projection provides a depth to place. Projection needs places, and places need projection. At the ontological level, these determinations are reciprocal. Thus, Heidegger’s ecstasis of the future is truly placio-temporal. Projection is determined in part by the places we find ourselves, and it arises through the development of possibility through technological invention. It is surely still temporal, in that the running ahead and seizing upon possibilities is properly futural, but this futurity is rooted in and made possible by technicity and being-in-place.

What this analysis is meant to show is that being-in-place provides the situatedness required for temporalization. Making-present, having-been, and projection each exist in a reciprocal relation with the implacement of existence. Through one’s bodily entanglement with
entities, making-present has a content that can be made intelligible. Through the lines of here-there relatedness in place, having-been becomes accessible as a past that I can remember beyond passive inheritance. I run ahead towards modes of being from the place that I find myself. Places are temporalized through these ecstatic movements, and the ecstasy of temporality acquires a temporalizeable content that is provided by the technologically extended region of place.

Additionally, it is because this region is a technological exteriorization of one’s being that these temporalizations can occur as Heidegger has described. I am only ecstatically alongside objects of my concern because they are exteriorized aspects of my own existence. Having-been can only temporalize through the sedimentation of epiphylogenetic memory, itself the result of placial exteriorization. Anticipation of possible ways to be requires the opening up of an artificial programmatic that exceeds mere biological continuation, i.e., it requires that humans exceed themselves technologically. Thus, we can say that there is a fourth ecstatic, where one is outside of themselves placially. The ecstasy of temporalization requires the concurrence of the ecstasy of placialization. Place and time come together as a fourfold ecstasy, that accounts for the deficiencies of the tripartite ecstatic temporality that was encountered in the first chapter.

Therefore, technological exteriorization spatializes and temporalizes existence. Temporality is not merely the horizon that surrounds and stands outside of the placial region. This region clears out a space to be, wherein the horizon provides the light of possible illumination, and the depth of a meaningful existence. Both emerge from the development of our species, and more specifically the emergence of technicity. Through this intertwining of region and horizon the ecstasy of ek-sistence is established. This ecstasy is a fourfold, differential structure, that does not tell the story of a linear line of development. Rather, the ecstases form a differential assemblage, between which there is a movement of oscillation that is non-linear and productive of a new
organization of being. Through the reciprocal determination of these oscillating movements between making-present, an inherited material past, a techno-placial situatedness, and an anticipation of possible ways to be there is existence as being open to the world. This fourfold structure is what I call *place-time*. With it we find a foundation of existence that is interactive, temporal, and placial.
Chapter One

I present a reading of this concept that is based on Edward S. Casey’s work. Casey provides me with a foundation from which I can build my own account, which clearly differs from Casey on the importance and role of technology. See Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Towards a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

I was tempted to use Don Ihde’s term “postphenomnology,” but I do not think that it is quite right for my purposes. I do not simply wish to create a new mode of philosophical investigation that grows out of and changes phenomenology as a method. Rather, I believe that phenomenology should be utilized alongside these other sources to provide a fuller picture of various phenomena. See Don Ihde, Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking Lectures (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2009).

Heidegger explains that the world is “that ‘in which’ a factical Dasein ‘lives’ as Dasein.” That in which one lives, is that wherein one finds themselves, hence my use of this idea of the wherein of existence. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 65. See also SZ 86, 80, 194. All references to Being and Time refer to the German pagination. Other references to this text will simply be written as “SZ, page number,” to indicate that it corresponds to the Sein und Zeit pagination, and unless otherwise noted, these references refer to the Stambaugh translation.

Casey, Getting back into Place, 29.


Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, 146.

Stiegler, 17.

Casey, Getting back into Place, 29.

Chapter Two

Kant, Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche all demonstrate a preference for the temporal over the spatial, and each of these five thinkers plays a formative role in Heidegger’s thinking. This is not to mention thinkers such as Bergson, Hegel, and others, to whom Heidegger is indebted, and who share his temporal focus.

This period spans approximately 1919-1935. This is the period before the supposed ‘turn’ or ‘kehre’ of Heidegger’s career.

SZ, 1 and 19. These pages provide clear statements of this claim.

I use this term strictly to mean of or pertaining to existence. While it is impossible to use this term without harkening back to the historical period and cultural movement that bears this name, I will use it sparingly in this technical sense.

“Equipment” is a usual translation of Heidegger’s usage of “Zeug,” although Stambaugh prefers to “useful thing.” See SZ, 68.
Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B274-B279. From here forward, I will refer to this section simply as the “Refutation,” with a capital “R.” Additionally, following common practice, all references to this work will use the marginal pagination, written as A#/B#. A and B refer to either the first (A) or second (B) edition of the first critique.

Existence is the term that Heidegger uses for the type of being exhibited by humans. For Heidegger, every entity *is* in some way or other. Some things are extant, others are handy, and other things exist. Human beings belong to those things which exist. Existence will have a very close relationship to experience in the phenomenological sense. See especially SZ, 12, where Heidegger explains “We shall call the very being to which Dasein can relate in one way or another, and somehow always does relate, *existence.*”

I use this phrase not only to capture what I think Heidegger is after, but also to expose Heidegger’s indebtedness to Aristotle. I learned this particular turn of phrase from Prof. Patricia Curd in a Purdue University seminar on Aristotle. I have also come to understand this further through conversations with one of Curd’s students, Dr. Alex Gillham. This phrase is a way to understand Aristotle’s grasp of what a soul does, i.e., the way it informs substances. For Aristotle, beings are substances in and of themselves, that is, they are beings with being. This being is informed by the type of soul an entity has, which corresponds to the type of entity something is. Thus, plants have planty souls, and horses have horsey souls, etc. To have such a soul means that you are busy performing the activity that corresponds to your type of soul. So plants are busy being planty, horses are busy being horsey, and humans are busy being humanly. Heidegger’s sense of existence is similar, in that he does not want to describe the mere presence or look of a human being. Rather, he wants to describe the structures that make possible our own type of being busy being human. See further Aristotle, *On the Soul* trans. W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume 1*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 641-692.

For Heidegger’s arguments concerning the difference between his and Kant’s projects, see especially SZ, §13, §43, and the Introduction.


36 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 164. *Bewandtnis* is translated either as functionality (*Basic Problems*) or relevance (*SZ, Stambaugh*) or involvement (*SZ, Macquarrie and Robinson*), but in each case they refer to the same phenomenon.

37 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 164.

38 *SZ*, 85.


40 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 164.

41 *SZ*, 249.

42 *SZ*, 231.

43 *SZ*, 249.

44 *SZ* 323.

45 *SZ* 324.

46 Factual is a term that I will use a couple of times throughout this chapter. This is a translation of the German term *faktisch*, which can be translated simply as “in fact” or “as a matter of fact.” It also bears important connections to the notion of “facticity.” Facticity refers to the “that-it-is and has to be” (*SZ*, 135) of Dasein’s existence. I will typically refer to factual existence which refers to an actual, concretely existing human person.

47 *SZ*, 325.


49 I think that being-in-the-world and care have a lot to offer, and do not wish to be rid of them. It is the development of these ideas towards the single ground of time that I see as the problem.

50 *SZ*, 191.


52 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 265.


54 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 265.


58 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* 266.

59 *SZ*, 326

60 *SZ*, 329.


63 *SZ*, 329. Original Emphasis

64 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 267.

65 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 267


68 *BP*, 266.


70 In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger uses this idea of stretching to refer to the ordinary understanding of time, and the way in which we conceive of the ‘now’ as being
stretched, or possessing a certain dimensionality (248-249). However, I think the same idea applies to his account of temporality. Instead of being contained in a particular moment, human being is stretched along from birth until death. Our being acquires a spannedness that opens us up to the world in a way that is different from that of a merely extant substance. Were we to only exist in the now as an extant subject we would be closed off from ourselves and the things we find around us. Instead, and via our temporal being, we are literally disclosed (care) to ourselves, which allows for the dis-closure of the world, entities, being, etc. This metaphorical understanding of stretching and openness can aid in figuring out what Heidegger is up to here.

71 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 302.
72 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 305.
73 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 305.
74 This is how Being itself is traditionally understood.
75 This is a major Heideggerian theme, and one that I will not be able to treat in full. But in general, Heidegger’s point here is that any experience of presence, whether of an object, feeling, or anything else, requires a corresponding absence or withdrawal. To see a particular thing we must mute or conceal its surroundings, to choose something we must forego something else, etc. Heidegger’s point is that pure presence never truly shows itself to us, and to think so has proved disastrous for philosophy. This is also related to Heidegger’s emphasis on the ontological difference between being and beings. To focus only on beings is to allow an absence or oblivion of being, which is something that we ought to have fought more stridently against throughout the history of philosophy, according to Heidegger.

76 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 306.
77 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 306.
78 More on this will appear below, as well as in the subsequent chapters, but Heidegger’s reliance on spatial language and metaphor should already be apparent to anyone who has done sufficient work on his thought. The language of the ecstases is very much a language of coming out into the exterior realm, i.e., into space, or more simply, it is language that focuses on a change in location or a movement between places (remotion, carrying away). Moreover, the openness to being that Heidegger is so focuses on is described as a clearing in the forest, itself a particular space or place. While Heidegger writes much about time, he does so through the language and imagery of space.

79 A perusal of the glossary shows that Aristotle has 56 entries, while Kant has 45. See Heidegger, Being and Time, 480 and 482.
80 Martin Heidegger, Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). Following common usage, I will refer to this work simply as the Kantbuch.
81 Heidegger explains in the introduction to Being and Time that the second part of this work is supposed to continue his destructive reading of the history of metaphysics. This will occur with a reading of “Kant’s doctrine of the schematism and of time, as preliminary stage of a problem of temporality,” SZ, 40. This never appears in Being and Time, and instead it is dealt with in the Kantbuch.
82 Kantbuch, xvii.
83 SZ, 329.
84 If it were possible to use being language to describe time we could say that temporality is in its standing out from itself. Temporality is what it does in that it makes possible the various
understanding comportments that human beings take towards the world. For ease of understanding, I will employ some being language to discuss temporality, but this note and the above description must be kept in mind.

85 “The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive factors has often been disregarded in ontology on account of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from a simple ’primordial ground’[Urgrund].” SZ, 131. On the one hand, temporality is not a simple ground because it is the unity of the three ecstatics. Temporality is not a substantial ground that lies underneath the functioning of the ecstatics. However, on the other hand, Heidegger does seem to reduce existence to a single ground, even if it is not a simple ground.

86 That the unity of time is not an Urgrund, and that instead it is the equal originality of the ecstatics comes from Krell, Ecstasy, Castastrophe, 24-25.

87 I understand Dasein as at least humanity. I do not know what other entities might qualify as Dasein, but I believe that this concept should be such that it allows for the possibility of non-human Daseins.

88 “Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and makes possible the constitution of the structure of care.” SZ 331. This is temporality in its temporalizing, but since care is the being of Dasein, we only find this in the case of a concretely existing Dasein.

89 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B274-B279.

90 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A34/B50. My emphasis

91 Norman Kemp Smith believes that this section is so significant that “Had Kant made all the necessary alterations which these new positions involve, he would, as we shall find, have had entirely to recast the chapters on Schematism and on the Principles of Understanding.” See further Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1918), 298-321.

92 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B274.

93 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B274.

94 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B274. Specifically, Kant says that “the ground for this idealism, however, has been undercut by us in the Transcendental Aesthetic.”. This section runs A19/B33-A49/B73, with the sections on space running A22/B37-A30/B45.

95 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B275.

96 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A182/B224-A189/B232. See especially A188/B231 through the end of the section.

97 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B275.


99 Four pages, counting by the marginal page numbers from the German edition.

100 These three things are required for the intermediate conclusion that is found at 5.

101 Kant scholars are still left with the metaphysical problem of how to interpret Kant’s claims that these objects are “outside” and not merely representations of some outsideness. However, I am not concerned with the coherence of Kant’s system, and thus, I leave these sorts of issues to the side. Instead, I’m merely interested in the thrust of this argument concerning the relation between time and space. Kant sees that only from an embeddedness within a spatially organized world can my representations receive a temporal order. I will try to show below that something similar is at issue in Heidegger’s account of temporality.

102 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 324.
Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 324.


One must be careful here with the mode of time that is at play in these discussions. I do not mean that situatedness happens first, in terms of our everyday understanding of time, and then, as an effect, temporality temporalizes. Rather, my point is that the temporalization must bear a reciprocal relation to our factical, concrete existence.

I consider this to be a major hermeneutic circle that Heidegger leaves open.

This is as far as I wish to push the claim at this point in the project. I am not yet arguing for any conception of what this situatedness will look like, since that takes up the next 3 chapters worth of material.

A full discussion of Heidegger’s concept of spatiality appears in Chapter Four of this project.

To put this in non-Heideggerian terms, one could say that my temporal self-understanding can only make my experience intelligible if it is accompanied by a foundational, non-temporal relatedness.

When we look to those sections that dive further into the structure of one’s situatedness within the world, especially the sections on spatiality (SZ, 101-113 and 367-369) we see Heidegger insisting that this relatedness is only possible because of temporality. However, as early as 1936 Heidegger begins to speak not of temporality, but of Time-Space (*Zeit-Raum*). He joins these two together, and insists on their belonging together. This move, again similar to Kant’s, levels the prior relation that he set up between these two phenomena. However, I do not wish to follow Heidegger into his later thought. The following chapters will be dedicated to finding an account of this foundational situatedness that is compatible with the insights gleaned from *Being and Time*. Rather than making my own *kehre* towards the later Heideggerian thought, I will set out on my own path of thinking that tries to elaborate on this blind spot in the tradition of Heideggerian-influenced existential-phenomenology. Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 2012. See especially 204, 245-246, 293-306


Heidegger’s footnote on SZ, 133 is particularly illuminating on this term. “Dasein exists, and it alone. Thus existence is standing out, into and enduring, the openness of the there: Ek-sistence.”

Chapter Three

There are two things to note at this point. First of all, I am certainly not the first to latch onto the idea that space is formative of what we are (Merleau-Ponty, Casey, Ströker, Yi-Fu Tuan, Malpas, others). Second, however much space has been emphasized by these other thinkers I stand apart in two aspects. The first is that I take the *Refutation* to be the main point in Kant that pushes a way forward for spatial exploration. Second, not enough work is being done to tie our spatiality to technology. Something that Heidegger realizes, but never thinks through.

The phenomenal richness of place also allows for a proper fleshing out of the lived aspects of our constant relatedness to external things, which would be much more difficult were we to stick with traditional conceptions of space.

Casey, *Getting back into Place*, 29
This is Casey’s term for our being-in-place. Casey, *Getting Back Into Place*, x.

There are many different possible views on space, and I do not want to commit to any of these views too quickly. If the idea or thought of space should remain at this point, it is only in a general, pre-thematic sense where space might be simply the rubric under which we understand the relations between corporeal entities. In this way it’s more *spatiality* than space proper. I will dive more fully into these matters below.

I intend position and location to have a subtle difference here. Position refers to the place or spot that one currently belongs, and location refers to something larger, something like a region, that contains one’s position along with other entities positions, and even virtual positions that are not occupied.


This is particularly true for corporeal entities, but even incorporeal entities are ‘somewhere’. Ideas have some place (mind), fictional entities are somewhere (within a story; in an imaginative place), etc. While I’m mostly concerned with our embodied being, I think this is a general insight for all entities. For something to truly be nowhere is for that something not to be.

In thinking through the uses of “nowhere,” I could not help but think of The Beatles song “Nowhere Man.” This song describes someone without a perspectival view of the world, and without a directedness in his life (“Doesn’t have a point of view, knows not where he’s going to). The Beatles compare this person to the everyday person, but in this way they slip into the sense that even this nowhere man is somewhere. It is just that he lacks the perspective and life-trajectory that most of us seek in our lives. If he was truly nowhere, he would not be, as I’ve indicated above. The Beatles, “Nowhere Man,” December 1965, *Rubber Soul*, Parlophone.

This should have the ring of Heidegger’s descriptions of being-in-the-world, and I think that that is a good thing. However, this relatedness and situation is being granted a more foundational role in existence, and, as we will see below, there are two features in particular, embodiment and the human-technology relation, that Heidegger has either left out or not sufficiently treated.

I prefer to talk of embodied being because using phrases like “our body” could seem indicate a mind/body dualism. I do not want to slide into such dualisms and so I will use terms such as embodiment and embodied existence where possible. Sometimes locutions that indicate possession of the body are unavoidable, but their use should not signify an undercover dualism at work here.


Kant, “Inaugural Dissertation,” in *Theoretical Philosophy*, 410. Here Kant entertains the position or presence of beings such as God or Angels. He explains that their presence would be merely virtual, and then goes on to argue that trying to think God in terms of predicates that apply to our finite being only leads to illusions of reasoning.

Grasping places us a such a network of relations already begins the movement beyond Casey’s account of place. Casey’s account views places as that which sustains our relatedness, whereas, as I will argue below, my view of place is constituted by such a relatedness. Further, this helps to avoid potential problems with the Kantian picture. Kant’s concern was with the perception of something permanent, and thus the requirement could be construed as being about a one-to-one relation in space. However, this sort of one to one relation does little to open us onto the importance of our being somewhere. Place opens our being somewhere onto a relational totality, and each particular relation arises from out of this totality.

However, this is not to say that place is the same as these particular locations. Rather, it is to point out that while we are always implaced, place itself changes based on the concrete details of that implacement.

This is not, however, the same as saying that places are only locations. Treating place as simple location, as we will see, would be to reduce place to space. I will attempt, with Casey’s help, to tease these apart.

The following is a summary of Casey’s description of this view. Casey, Fate of Place, 137-150.

Casey, Fate of Place, ix.

Casey, Fate of Place, 137. Here Casey is explaining the view of Gassendi, which precedes Newton and Clarke’s conception of absolute space.

Casey, Fate of Place, 139-140.

Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. A. Motte, ed. F. Cajori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 6, quoted in Casey, Fate of Place, 143.


Casey, Fate of Place, 182.

Casey, Fate of Place, 138. This term comes from Whitehead, but Casey alters it slightly to fit his own discussion of the relation between position, point, and place in Modern conceptions of space. See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 72.

Casey, Fate of Place, 138.

Casey, Fate of Place, 201.

Casey, Fate of Place, 201.


Casey, Getting Back into Place, 352.
attuned space, although I read this attuned space as somewhat secondary to these others, at least in terms of experience. See further Ströker, *Investigations in Philosophy of Space*, X-X.

151 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 362.

152 Descartes stands out here since he “retains a remarkably Aristotelian conception of ‘external place’ as ‘the surface immediately surrounding what is in the place’.” Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 357. Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy,” in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1*, 471-474. This view accounts for space as extension, but it would not necessarily be homogenous and isometric.


154 Casey actually lays out five different interpretations of our “here,” which can be found at Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 52-54. These are 1) the here in part of being localized within our bodies, 2) the here of our body proper, 3) the here of our by-body, which indicates the moving and acting body that carries it’s here along with it, 4) the regional here of our existence within a particular region that allows for movement between places, and finally 5) our interpersonal here which is the combination of our bodily here in relation to that of other people. Casey refers to the fifth with the expression (t)here to indicate the duality of our interpersonal here. For our purposes, the focus will be on 2), which, as I understand it, includes both 3 and 4 within it. As far as I can tell, our bodily here is always already the here of our by-body, that also carries with it the here that can move between regions.

155 Here we can see the scalar quality that places exhibit. I can move from the exact location of my body, to the room I am in, to the address, to the town, to the country, etc. The place one finds themselves always exhibits this sort of scalar quality. While it will not be pursued further here, the scalar nature of places and their relation to, and nesting within, one another is worthwhile. Also, on this issue of nesting, see Ströker, 52-57.

156 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 51.

157 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 55.

158 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 55.

159 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 55.

160 Ströker, 55.

161 Ströker, 55. Region and space both here must be interpreted according to place as I have been discussing it.

162 Ströker, 56.

163 See further Ströker, 55. Here Ströker is detailing “regions,” but it seems to me that these regions for action are the same as places described by Casey and me. The one major difference seems to be that regions are perhaps smaller than various places, although as I have noted above, place itself has scalar limits and so it certainly does not exclude this notion of regions.

164 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 48.

165 Casey, *Fate of Place*, 225.

166 Casey, *Fate of Place*, 225.

167 Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 60.

168 As I argue in subsequent chapters, I believe that the near sphere and bodily here amount to the same thing. The idea of the near sphere just adds some further limitations to the possible extension of the bodily here, by reigning it in according to possible activity. Additionally, this
points to the non-simple, i.e. active, nature of our bodily here, as well as pointing towards the 
fact that the biological body is deemphasized, while still included.

Much like the near and far spheres, place itself has a sort of scalar quality that expands or 
restricts depending on our particular directedness towards that place. In my running errands 
around town, the entire town becomes a sort of place that I inhabit, whereas my research and 
writing restricts my implacement and near sphere to my apartment, and perhaps even just my 
study.

This is not exactly what Casey has in mind with his characterization of the far sphere. He 
chooses to characterize the far through a notion of “range” as opposed to the “reach” that 
makes up the near sphere. While Casey’s discussion of range is quite interesting, 
understanding the far sphere simply as ‘out of reach’ is sufficient for my purposes. The far 
seems to me as that which is at the limit, and beyond, of our near sphere. Further, this 
characterization of the far sphere as out of reach highlights an important aspect of the far. Its 
importance in our implacement pales in comparison to that of the near sphere. The far sphere 
is understood in and through its distinction from the near, and for the most part we can ignore 
it. It mostly appears as the shadowy reverse side of the near.

Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 65. What is “primal” about this depth is that it lies prior to any 
sort of measured depth that we would find through ‘measuring in’. The depth of near and far 
lies “under” (Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, X and 66) the objectified depth of metric 
dimensions in that it is more original to our experience.

The subtle difference between three-dimensional space and the three-dimensional dyads is 
quite important. Three-dimensional space is an important abstract notion, but by focusing 
instead on the bifurcated pairs of terms that articulate our possibilities in place, we find pairs 
of terms that offer choices and orienting features to our lived bodies. This important 
distinction is pursued below in the discussion of volume.

In 1768, Kant published “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of 
Directions in Space,” which argues for this same role of the body in providing differentiation 
of space into particular regions related through various directions. This essay is important 
because it marks a split between Kant and the Leibnizian sense of space, and it is also 
prescient of later phenomenological accounts of being in space. See, Casey, *Fate of Place*, 
203-210 for a discussion of this in the context of place.

This term, while discussed by Casey, comes from Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Casey, *Getting 
Back into Place*, 80. Merleau-Ponty, 259.

Front and back are not the only pairs that are asymmetrical. For example, we tend to favor 
right, ahead, and up. Each of these terms from the dimensional dyads are more important for 
us, creating an asymmetry in the dimensional field.

We also tend to understand things to be done and possibilities to be grasped as out ahead of 
ourselves, while areas of retreat, regression, or repulsion are often pursued behind us. The 
organization of sense organs as facing ahead also marks the behind-region more vulnerable 
than others.

Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 81.
Also, considering the dimensional dyads as unfolding volume in this way brings us into two familiar problems, each of which we have been attempting to avoid. First, this would fall prey to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. To posit metric volume as the primary result of these dimensional dyads would be to mistake an abstract notion for a concrete aspect of our being-in-place. We rarely encounter places in terms of volumetric calculation or understanding. The dimensional dyads present regions of place as bifurcated and organized in asymmetrical and concrete ways. Second, reducing the richness of the dimensional dyads to height, breadth, and depth loses the dyadic nature of these pairs that open up the dimensional field through their bifurcations. Height, breadth, and depth lack the differentiation of the dyads, and instead of an opening up of a bifurcated and organized field within which we can pivot and move, we would be at a simple location in space understood in terms of objects qua res extensa and space qua extension.  

Casey, *Fate of Place*, 226.  
Were our bodies to be organized along different axes, say radially, I have no doubt that places would be grasped differently.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 29.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 25.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 203.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 24.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 30. Casey says that places, bodies, and landscapes are all things that are experienced “where experience stays true to its etymological origin of ‘trying out,’ ‘making a trial out of.’’” I tend to agree with him that these things have malleable boundaries, but as I will show below, I think that we can push this issue further and provide a better explanation of how to understand the bounds of implanation.  
I should add, that with this quote Casey has referred to something that he himself has not provided. These “usual designators of place,” are not offered by Casey. Additionally, appealing to such usual designators, which I take to be the common ways that we talk about place, makes the reduction to ontic locales that I warned against above.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 252.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 252.  
I take Casey’s key distinction to be between observing a place by standing apart from it, and sensing a place as taking part in it.  
Casey, Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 30.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 26-29.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 27.  
We cannot begin to think of here-there as the lines that lie between two points in abstract space. As we will see below, here-there mark lines of involvement, which are imbued with more than geometric determinations.  
Casey, *Fate of Place*, 219. Original emphasis.  
Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, 27.  
See further, Ströker, 48-82, particularly 52-56. In this chapter Ströker lays out her view of space of action, making use of a notion of “region” that comes very close to the sense of place that I am venturing here.  
The significance and involvement that we find in any given place has many influences. These involvements may be determined individually, culturally, or in some other way. However, I
am not as interested in what lies behind these involvements. Rather, what is important to notice, is that to be in place is to be involved in a somewhere, and to be involved is to find significance in that which you find while implaced.

SZ, 101-113, Ströker, 48-82, and Casey, 1-40. These three thinkers agree that our primary space or place centers on the concepts of dwelling, action, possibilities, and the ready-to-hand. I believe that the last of these terms, the ready-to-hand or handy bits of equipment that mark our involvements, have not been properly investigated in terms of our implacement and they will be the focus of the next chapter.

Casey, 25-26. Here Casey provides a related discussion of Eskimo hunters making landmarks for themselves in the Tundra. This is the same as with the Puluwatan’s, and it is what orients and anchors them in place. To be in place is to be involved, and whenever we’re presented with a geographical location that appears to lack objects which could sustain involvements, we simply make equipment out of that which is presented to us.

As I read Casey, being-in-place is an attempt to rethink Heidegger’s world in a way that reasserts the importance of the body, physical objects, concrete situatedness, and relatedness in general. Thus, I think that these are compatible, as I explain above, and that the issue is simply that world is subsumed under place, and not the other way around.

Chapter Four

Although something like “placiality” would probably fit better here, I use spatiality simply to refer to the structure, shape, and dynamics of one’s bodily engagement in place. Rather than referring to “space” itself, spatiality refers us to the way that one is in an open area, which, although typically interpreted as space, has shown itself to place.

It is important to note that this “making a place” for ourselves may take various different forms. It need not be strictly a clearing out of some area through work that takes on a domineering sense. Rather, it could be the deficient mode of simply making a place for ourselves to do nothing. This idea of place-making, as well as its importance for the present account will be discussed in full in the next chapter.

Stiegler, 30 fn 1.

An issue related to that of place making is the sense of familiarity that accompanies us throughout our implacement. Even when we are lost somewhere, say in a forest, we try to recapture some sense of familiarity through technics. We make marks, and fashion devices, or, as the sun goes down, we make a shelter. In these moments of being lost be resort to technical activity to supply the familiarity that we enjoy in places where others have cultivated this familiarity for us. This is a testament to our species greatest skill, i.e., technics, which allows us to be implaced wherever we may find ourselves. We are utterly unlike fish out of water, even when we might feel most lost or not at home.

Cf. page 7 above.

The *Wire*, “Soft Eyes,” episode 39, originally aired September 17, 2006. I learned this expression from season four, episode two of the HBO show *The Wire*. One of the characters, Kima Greggs, who is a detective, tells her partner that he looks quite hungover after a night of drinking. Her partner, Bunk Moreland replies that he likes to investigate murder scenes after a night of drinking because it gives him “soft eyes.” He says “you know what you need at a crime scene…soft eyes. You got soft eyes you can see the whole thing. You got hard eyes, you stare at the same tree, missing the forest.” My hope is that by looking outside of Casey and Heidegger, I will be able to soften our eyes moving forward.

André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, trans. Anna Bostock Berger (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), 230. Stiegler, 177. André Leroi-Gourhan utilizes this term [*chaine opératoire*] to discuss the various techniques that yield particular tools. Each technical act requires not only one technique, but several that are strung together in a particular order. “Operational sequence,” picks out this string of techniques performed in a particular sequence.


Rousseau, 19.

Rousseau, 19.

Rousseau, 23.

Rousseau, 25.

Stiegler, 96. Stiegler argues that even with Plato and this discussion of the myth there is a fall into technics. As I point out in the next sentence, I think that the Greek myth is somewhat different, while still presenting this story of dual origins.


Stiegler, 112. “Rousseau may well decide to ignore the facts; he may not, however, totally contradict them.”

Leroi-Gourhan, 18-21.

Leroi-Gourhan, 10.

Leroi-Gourhan, 10.

Stiegler, 117.

Leroi-Gourhan, 18.

Leroi-Gourhan, 18.

Stiegler, 145.

Leroi-Gourhan, 18.


See especially Leroi-Gourhan, 30-36.

Leroi-Gourhan, 28.

Leroi-Gourhan, 31.

Leroi-Gourhan, 67.

Leroi-Gourhan 71.

Leroi-Gourhan, 72.
Stiegler, 145. Stiegler rights this as thought the progression is erect posture-technics-speech. I would argue that speech and technics exist as two branches that both arise from erect posture.

This is not to say that increased brain size does not affect technological production and development. Surely it does. However, this does mean that the brain is not the cause that leads to technics as effect. They are both effects of skeletal development.

Stiegler, 152.


Stiegler, 112. “Rousseau may well decide to ignore the facts; he may not, however, totally contradict them.

Stiegler, 45. Full Quote: “furnish[es] a theory of anthropogenesis corresponding point by point, as we shall see, in its paleoanthropological dimension, to a technogenesis.”


Stiegler, 43. Leroi-Gourhan, interestingly, goes on to speculate that this tendency cuts through “ethnic milieus,” and splits “into an indefinite diversity of facts,” according to Stiegler (44). These diverse facts make up the ethnic differences that obtain within our species. This would be an interesting hypothesis to pursue.

Leroi-Gourhan, 91. See also 97, 98, 106.

Leroi-Gourhan, 91. See 90-91.

Stiegler, 17.

As Stiegler explains, through the aid of the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus (cite), the human beings does not have the same type of organs as other animals. I do not mean by this that we do not have lungs and hearts and livers like animals do. Rather, I mean the organs that are the tools of survival for various animals. Where other predators are faster and stronger, and other herbivores are better at seeking out food sources through smell or other senses, human beings have a despecialized organ in the case of the hands. This despecialized organ allows for the formation of other, more specialized organs, outside of the body. This is why Prometheus had to steal fire from the gods. His forgetful brother did not leave any specialized skills or organs (natural technologies) for human beings, and thus Prometheus brought us technics so that we could survive.

Stiegler, 55-63.


As I will try to show below, this does not necessitate a domineering view of being-in-place. It’s not that humans must dominate a place through advanced technology in order to make a place for themselves. The Puluwatans remind us that being-in-place needn’t be domineering to be familiar and made. Making a place is not identical to building a place. Instead, it is through technical activity in general that we find our ways into place, and navigate or orient ourselves therein.

SZ, 67.

SZ, 70.

SZ, 103-104


I read this later essay as a development of Heidegger’s understanding of world from *Being and Time*. World is the network of significance relations that serves as the horizon for understanding entities as equipment for this or that task. However, certain types of equipment (technologies) become so prevalent that they feed back into those significance relations and they frame them in a particular way. This leads one to view not only equipment, but other types of entities under the rubric of the dominant technology.


Ihde, 14.

Ihde, 13.

We saw some of Ströker’s account in chapter two, and I will present a fuller picture of her view here. She is a phenomenological thinker, and her work on the space of human existence is a must-read for anyone interested in the importance of spatiality and space in general. Ströker provides an account of the grounding of mathematical space in the various spaces of existence. She argues for three spaces, the “space of action,” which is primary, “attuned space,” which is the space of affectivity, and the “space of intuition,” which is the space of action modified to observation instead of directed action.

Ströker, 48-82.

Ströker, 52-57.

This incongruency is a reference to Kant’s discussion of incongruent counterparts, discussed above.

“Both fossil remains and tool finds strongly suggest that tools and skeletons evolved synchronously.” Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, 97.

Either directly, or in terms of the technosphere.

Elisabeth Ströker, *Philosophische Untersuchungen zum Raum* (Frankfort: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965), 54.

Ströker, 48.

This should remind readers of Casey’s discussion of the near sphere, a discussion that owes much to Ströker. Both thinkers conceive of this area to which one belongs as that which opens up according to our activity—virtual and actual—understood either simply as activity or rather by reach.


Ströker, 52.

Ströker, 52.

Ströker, 52.

Ströker, 52. The idea that our placiality is articulated according to place and region is also found in Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §22-24. Ströker makes clear that this use is coming from Heidegger when she says of her account “these delimitations agree with Heidegger.” 52. These connections will be elaborated on in the next chapter.

Ströker, 52.
Heidegger, 100.

Even area is not quite right in this context, although we are running up against the limits of our language. Part of my goal with this rethinking of place is to provide a view of a concept that can replace space in terms of human existence. Yet our language, and our thinking, are so thoroughly dominated by spatial terms and understandings that it becomes difficult to try to forge something new on this matter. Thus, when I say “area” I do not mean a calculable set of metric dimensions that yield a metrically determined spatial manifold. I rather mean range of appropriate belonging that delimits an object in terms of its use within a task.

This tripartite division of ways that things are revealed is somewhat preliminary and will not be pursued here.

SZ, 135. Heidegger uses these terms in reference to Dasein, but they work just is well in this discussion of instruments.

Yoko Arisaka, “Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in Being and Time,” Philosophy Today, Spring 1996, 40. I am indebted to Yoko Arisaka and her paper for making clear exactly how region functions in this context. Sometimes, both Ströker and Heidegger refer to regions as though they are the leeway or neighborhood of zones, but Arisaka makes a strong case that the region is the entire field that has been delimited according to a specific task.

Ströker, 54.

Ströker, 55. By saying that a region is a zone manifold I do not mean that regions are reducible to the sum of the zones that make them up. Regions are a type of multiplicity or assemblage that outstrips the mere sum of its parts.

I mean techno-logical here in the quite literal sense of a logic of techné that is the determining force behind this placial formation.

Jeff Malpas uses topological in this sense, particularly in his discussion of Heidegger. He intends this terms as the order, structure, logic, and articulation of place. While I hope to have this meaning resonate in my usage of the word, I want to expand on this meaning, thereby giving it another technical sense, which will be elaborated below. See further Jeff Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006).


Steven Connor, “Topologies: Michel Serres and the Shapes of Thought,” http://www.stevenconnor.com/topologies/. Additionally, with this “geometry plus time,” claim we should hear the connection of a fundamental spatiality and temporality, i.e. being-in-place as the supplement to Heidegger’s temporality.

Ströker goes even further in her claims about the connection between topology and being-in-place. She speculates that topology itself comes out of the active being-in-place that she describes as the “space of action.” Ströker, 57.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4iHjt2Ovgq.

Topology sometimes is referred to as the study of the shape of place. See Jeffrey R. Weeks, The Shape of Space (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2002).

Chapter Five

As I indicated some in the last chapter, I do not think that Ströker or Heidegger’s usage of spatial language ties them to the modern accounts of space that were seen in chapter two. Both of these thinkers are attempting to articulate something different, something phenomenological, which explains the phenomenon of one’s being situated within a world.
Thus, when they speak of spatiality, or what I call being-spatial, I see a parallel to being-in-place. The difference being that they are without the placial language that has been developed by thinkers like Casey, and that has been used in this project. As has been shown in the case of Ströker, and as will be shown below with Heidegger, the spatiality that they discuss is utterly distinct from typical accounts of space, or being within space. See Casey, *Fate of Place*, 243-284.

304 We have to keep in mind that this space of action is functionally the same as place.

305 SZ, 101-113.

306 Ströker, 52. She explains that these terms “agree with Heidegger,” and she frames her argument as a development of his basic thought concerning space as revealed through technical action. For Heidegger’s introduction of these terms, see SZ, 102-103. Heidegger also understands the space of our interaction with technical objects as articulated according to place and region. Further, he also understands this “space” in a way that makes better sense under the rubric of “place.”

307 Heidegger defines a zone as “the place of this useful thing for…in terms of a totality of the interconnected places of the context of useful things at hand in the surrounding world.” SZ, 102. The first instance of the ellipsis is Heidegger’s own usage. The second indicates the trailing off of the quoted sentence.) Heidegger goes on to say that these zones are “already oriented toward a region and within that region. Something akin to a region must already be discovered if there is to be any possibility of referring and finding the places of a totality of useful things available to circumspection.” SZ, 102. These definitions correspond almost exactly to Ströker’s understanding of these terms, as was made clear in the last chapter.

308 See further, Casey, *Fate of Place*, 244.

309 The sections on spatiality run for what is ultimately less than 12 pages. Heidegger returns to the topic of spatiality later in *Being and Time*, SZ 367, but this is only to explain how Dasein’s spatiality has a temporal foundation, and this section is only 3 pages long (SZ 367-369)

310 Yoko Arisaka claims, I think correctly, that Heidegger assumes temporality’s priority over spatiality, rather than providing convincing arguments to this effect. Arisaka believes that this assumption may come from Kant, Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, or perhaps some combination of the four. See further, Arisaka, 36.


312 As I noted in the last chapter concerning Ströker, Heidegger’s use of place corresponds more to zone. However, the spatiality that he speaks of is related to a concept that is quite similar to place, as I will attempt to show.

313 SZ, 65.

314 SZ, 101. This is part of the section heading for Heidegger’s analysis of space. “C. The Aroundness (Umhafte) of the Surrounding World (Umwelt) and the Spatiality of Dasein.”

315 SZ, 102.

316 SZ, 104f.

317 Arisaka, 37-38.

318 Arisaka, 37.

319 Arisaka, 28.
“In the literal sense, Dasein takes space in.” Heidegger here means that instead of merely being within space as a simple position, space is something that is grasped or contained by the experiencing individual. By putting it this way, Heidegger flips our usual sense of space on its head. Instead of being in space, it is something that I take in. Further, such “taking in” corresponds to the sense “taking in” a beautiful landscape. When I take in the landscape I am not trying to contain or capture it, but rather, I am letting it be the beautiful environment/umwelt/around-world that it is, while also finding my own place within it in terms of my hopes and projects therein.

Arisaka points out that Heidegger does not offer much more than this to develop his view of space in other writings from this period. This comes, most likely, from the derivative status that he accords to space. Arisaka, 43, fn6.

As I have pointed out above, Heidegger does come back to the topic of space, especially in Contributions, and one could argue that it reappears in the seminar in Le Thor. However, he never tries to develop the account that he offers in Being and Time. The only later work that bears some resemblance to this account of space is Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 143-159. This essay does not offer an explicit elaboration of the theory of space from Being and Time, but I think there are some connections here, especially in the way that Heidegger describes a bridge’s ability to coordinate a region. See especially Heidegger’s discussion of the bridge from Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” 150-155.

Arisaka, 38.

“de-severance” is the older translation of Ent-fernung. I have used the newer translation of de-distancing, as I think it reads more naturally.

I think that this comes out most clearly in anticipatory resoluteness, the discussions of authenticity, and being-towards-death. With the turn towards these concepts, Heidegger makes a move towards a focus on the individual that decides, rather than the inherently relational and contextual account of existing that he focuses on in Division I of Being and Time. See SZ, 260-301.

David Rothenberg provides his own classification of the different modes of technological extension, which provided a guide to my own, four-part classification. Rothenberg argues that we should think of technological extension through three dichotomies, “Action or Thought,” “Means or Construction,” and “Driven or Embodied.” The first dichotomy is fairly easy to grasp. This is the difference between the ways that we physically relate to the world, and the way that we perceptually or cognitively relate to the world. The second dichotomy differentiates between “immediate means for realizing physical or mental intention by extending the forces of the body and mind” and “self-contained systems.” The last dichotomy refers to extensions that are driven by a human guide in contrast to extensions that function “independently of the initial actions that created them.” I do not use Rothenberg’s classification, because I prefer the simplicity of my four-part division. Rothenberg is helpful for thinking about extension, but his classification is more fine-grained than is required for the present account. David Rothenberg, Hand’s End: Technology and the Limits of Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 44-45. See also Rothenberg, 28-53.

I saw “typically” here, because I am not convinced that the digestive tract is truly “inside” the body. One could argue, instead, that the body is wrapped or folded around the digestive tract, which problematizes our typical view of insideness. Regardless, diving too far into this issue is beyond the current scope.

It is difficult to discuss the differences between “flesh relations” and technological ones, particularly given the transparency of technology offered today. We might say that facetime or skype are different than a face-to-face conversation, but it becomes harder and harder to account for the core of this difference. We may try to specify that the difference is one of being located in the same space. However, if we are thinking placially, then each member has been gathered into the other’s near sphere in such a way that it’s hard to see how “distance” is the proper way to differentiate what Ihde is calling “flesh relations” versus technologically mediated ones.

I do not mean “quality” in a sense of better or worse, such as we might discuss the quality of meat. Rather, I mean “quality” in terms of the feel and what-it-is-like of these activities.
Stiegler, 152.


Stiegler uses the term “Neanthropian” instead of Neanderthal or anatomically modern human. This usage comes from Leroi-Gourhan, who uses the same term. See further, Stiegler, 141.

Zinjanthropus lived during the Pleistocene era, which occurred between 2.4-1.4 million years ago. The Zinjanthropian that Stiegler and Leroi-Gourhan discuss is dated to about 1.75 million years ago (https://www.britannica.com/animal/Paranthropus-boisei). Neanthropians date to about 30,000 BC while Neanderthals date to around 50,000 BC. Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, 121.

Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, 92. See also figure 46, which appears on page 93, and which details the early progression from choppers to a rudimentary biface.

Leroi-Gourhan, 91.

We encountered this phrase in the last chapter. Leroi-Gourhan argues, I think correctly, that these earliest tools were not the result of forethought, but rather, they were produced by basic movements, and lacked the technical foresight that produces tools today.

Leroi-Gourhan, 95. See also figure 47 on 96.

Ruyer, 20-21. “make contact,” is a quote from Leroi-Gourhan’s *Milieu et Technique*, 409. This phrase refers to the way that technology mediates the human interaction with their exterior milieu.


Smith, 122..

Smith, 120.

Smith, 122.

Ruyer, 33.

Stiegler, 148.

Stiegler, 146.


Stiegler, 152. My emphasis.

I have been hesitant to use this term throughout this project because of the connotations of the loosely organized school of thought referred to as Existentialism. I am here using this term in a technical sense, to mean strictly “of or pertaining to existence.”

Heidegger and Jeff Malpas would both disagree with this claim. For each of them, technology constitutes a fallenness that removes one from the familiarity of their home. However, as I have attempted to show above, these types of “fallen” accounts of the human-technology relation are reliant upon cerebralist interpretations that I have argued against throughout this project. Moreover, each of these thinkers appeals to a pastoral view of human being that they view as somehow outside of technicity. Even Heidegger had his hut, papers, and pens in the Black Forest, and Malpas is likewise indebted to the techno-sphere within which he writes about the homelessness of technology. Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology*, 309.
388 Stiegler, 135.
389 Stiegler, 177. For a full treatment of the issue of memory, see Stiegler, 134-179.
390 Stiegler, 177.
391 Stiegler, 177.
393 Leroi-Gourhan, 114.
394 Stiegler, 153.
395 SZ, 339. Heidegger uses “erinnern” in his discussion of remembering or recalling one’s having-been in an authentic way. One must remember their having-been in a particular way in order to open up the authentic temporalization of this ecstasis.
396 Stiegler, 177.
397 This explains Stiegler’s claim that epiphylogenetic memory “determines the relation to the milieu.” Stiegler, 177.
398 Stiegler, 177.
399 Stiegler, 141, 155.
400 Even though I am unsure of just how often design and invention works out this way.
401 Stiegler, 151.
402 Leroi-Gourhan, 92.
403 Leroi-Gourhan, 92.
404 Leroi-Gourhan, 91.
405 Leroi-Gourhan, 91.
406 Leroi-Gourhan, 92.
407 Stiegler, 151.

**Epilogue**

409 These temporal aspects of place are helpful, but unnecessary to understanding what place is. As I attempt to show below, existence is both temporal and placial, and one can understand these two determinations of existence as intertwined. However, this project is concerned solely with the placial aspects of existence, and thus, this elaboration of time’s role in place offers a quick view on an issue and concept that would require a second project.
410 SZ, 328.
411 SZ, 192. Macquarrie and Robinson express care as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world.)” Stambaugh renders this phrase as “being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerwordly beings encountered).” Stambaugh also adds that one is “entangled” with these entities, whereas Macquarrie and Robinson maintain the sense of being alongside. In both cases, the translators are trying to capture that Heidegger sees our being as “out there,” amongst entities. It is not merely contained within some cabinet of consciousness, but is rather out there in the world. This connotation acquires an added depth when considered from the perspective of being-in-place and technological exteriorization.
412 For Heidegger’s full discussion of this aspect of having-been, see §§74-75 of *Being and Time*, SZ 382-392.
“Just as expectation is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is possible only on the basis of forgetting, and not the other way around.” Emphasis original.

Stiegler, 153.


Heidegger connects existence and projection throughout *Being and Time*. I believe that part of the reason for this connection is Heidegger is showing how projection towards possibilities, i.e. having to choose how to be, is indicative of the type of entities that we are. Instead of just being, we must choose to be, and thus move beyond the typical life of other organisms.
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- Introduction to Existentialism
  - Spring 2017
- Ethics
  - Spring 2018, Summer 2016, Spring 2015, Fall 2014, Spring 2014

**Graduate Assistant**
- Religions of the East
  - Fall 2013
- Ethics
  - Spring 2013
- Introduction to Philosophy
  - Fall 2012

Invited Lectures
2019 “Go Go Gadget Humanity: Inspector Gadget and the Human-Technology Relation” at Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, as part of the Student Government Association/Philosophy Club Invited Lecturer Series

Academic Presentations
2018 “Ecstasy and Time’s Necessary Companion: A Refutation of Heidegger’s Temporocentrism” at the Indiana Philosophical Association Fall Meeting, Indiana University
2017  “Technology and Topology: Rethinking Space as Instrumental” at the Purdue University Graduate Student Symposium

“Technological Topologies: The Techno-Space of Existence” at the 42\textsuperscript{nd} Annual 
\textit{Collegium Phaenomenologicum, Nature of Spaces, Spaces of Nature}, in Citta di Castello Italy

2014  “A Further Question Concerning Technology: The Essence of Writing.” as part of the panel: “Phenomenology at the Edge of Disciplines” at the 1\textsuperscript{st} annual Pittsburgh Continental Philosophy Network conference “Approaching the Liminal” at Duquesne University

\textbf{Honors & Awards}

2018  Nominee for the Midwestern Association of Graduate Schools Excellence in Teaching Award
Nominee for the 2018 Purdue Graduate School Excellence in Teaching Award

2017  Purdue University Teaching Academy Graduate Teaching Award
Participant in the 42\textsuperscript{nd} Annual \textit{Collegium Phaenomenologicum, Nature of Spaces, Spaces of Nature”}

2010-Present  Member of Phi Kappa Phi national honors society

\textbf{Grants}


2018  Purdue University College of Liberal Arts PROMISE Research Travel Award for presentation of “Ecstasy and Time’s Necessary Companion: A Refutation of Heidegger’s Temporocentrism” the Indiana Philosophical Association Fall Meeting: $750
Purdue University College of Liberal Arts PROMISE Research Travel Award for presentation of “Technological Topologies: The Techno-Space of Existence” and Participation at the 42nd Annual *Collegium Phaenomenologicum*: $1,500

PUF (Partner University Fund) Grant to attend the *Choses en Soi/Things in Themselves* conference, L’École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France: $2,500

**Conference Moderation and Paper Commentary**

2018  
Commenter on Sean Murphy’s “Schopenhauer’s Causal Account of Acting for a Reason,” at the Indiana Philosophical Association Fall Meeting, Indiana University

Moderator of “Feminist Philosophies” panel at the *Inclusive Philosophies* Conference, Purdue University

2017  
Moderator of “Sex and Gender” panel at the *Inclusive Philosophies* Conference, Purdue University

2016  
Moderator of “Déssubjectiver l’Empirisme” panel at the *Choses en Soi/Things in Themselves* conference, L’École Normale Supérieure

**Departmental Service**

2016-2017  
Graduate Student Liaison to the Undergraduate Philosophy Society

2016-2017  
Graduate Student Mentor, Purdue Philosophy Department Diversity and Inclusion Initiative

2014-2015  
Graduate Assistant, Purdue Philosophy Department Diversity and Inclusion Initiative

2014-2015  
Graduate Representative, Purdue Philosophy Department
**Professional Membership**

2018  American Philosophic Association

2009-Present  Phi Sigma Tau Philosophy Honorary

**Graduate Coursework (Purdue University)**

**Philosophy Coursework**

Seminar in Continental Philosophy: Philosophy of Technology (audit), Daniel Smith

Studies in Philosophy of Mind: Evolution and Externalism (audit), Daniel Kelly and Daniel Smith

Seminar in Continental Philosophy: *Being and Time*, Calvin Schrag

Seminar in Philosophy: Henri Bergson, Daniel Smith

Studies in Greek Philosophy: Aristotle (audit), Patricia Curd

Phenomenology, Jacqueline Mariña

Pro-Seminar in Philosophy: Philosophy of Technology, Daniel Smith

Seminar in Ethics: Kant’s Ethics, Patrick Kain

Existentialism, William McBride

Seminar in Philosophy: Philosophy of Psychology, Daniel Smith and Daniel R. Kelly

Philosophy of Kant, Jacqueline Mariña

Symbolic Logic (Metalogic), Dolph E. Ulrich

Philosophy of Social Science, Leonard Harris

Special Topics Ancient Philosophy: Plato, Patricia Curd and Daniel H. Frank

**Other Coursework**

Dissertation Seminar, Daniel Kelly

German for Reading Knowledge 1, Jeffrey Turco

German for Reading Knowledge 2, Marc Rathmann
References

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