THREAT, MEMORY, AND FRAMING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH KOREA'S DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT, 1979-1987

by

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation research focuses on the development of South Korea's democracy movement from 1979 to 1987, a time that was marked by two waves of sustained protest: one of which was brutally repressed while the other led to a transition to democracy. This dissertation examines the cultural processes at work during the period between these two waves. This study builds a dataset drawing on archival data in the form of memoirs, diaries, leaflets and brochures, minutes, statements, and testimonies of activists and activist organizations as well as newspaper reports and government documents. Using the dataset, this study advances scholarship on contentious politics and democratization by revising and expanding three theoretical concepts: threat, memory work, and framing.

CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION

At the end of 1986, the Chun Doo Hwan regime in South Korea put oppositional leader Kim Dae Jung[1] under house arrest, the 39th time for him alone that year. A journalist visited him and asked: "When I visited you in 1974, you were under house arrest. … Have there been any significant changes in the past 12 years?" (Branfman 1987:162). Acknowledging that the state was still under a military dictatorship, Kim claimed that there was a major difference between 1974 and 1987. "The people were not strong enough in 1974 to challenge the military government. Now, they have more determination, are more experienced in fighting for democracy, and do not fear punishment. They are even willing to go to prison for their beliefs" (Branfman 1987:162).

Kim's words illustrate an important timeline in recent Korean history, one marked by two waves of sustained prodemocracy protest between 1979 and 1987. Adopting Tarrow's (1988:433) definition, the term "protest cycle" refers to the ups and downs of "the magnitude of conflict, its social and geographical diffusion, the forms of action employed, and the number and the types of SMOs involved." A comprehensive report on prodemocracy protest events in Korea in the 1980s shows that there were two cycles, or waves, in terms of the number of participants, organizations, issues, and protest events before and after the relative abeyance period (Taylor 1989) of 1981 through 1983 (Shin et al. 2007). One wave was brutally repressed, in the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, while the other succeeded in bringing in a transition to democracy (see Appendix A for a chronology of events during this period).

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[1] Kim Dae Jung was an opposition leader who challenged and almost unseated the dictator of the 1960s and 70s, Park Chung Hee, in a relatively free presidential election of 1971. A threat to the Chun Doo Hwan regime of the 1980s, he was sentenced to death in 1980 and was exiled in the United States from 1982 to 1985. Later he became President (1998-2003) and a Nobel Peace Laureate.

The quote from Kim also suggests that something changed for the Korean people between the years of 1979 and 1987. If his evaluation has some truth in it, how did the people change from lacking strength to having determination, experience, and courage that risks punishment? Also, granted that "people" are not necessarily a single entity but a stratified collection of individuals, what are the indications of the cultural shift among the public that allowed them to feel strong? This dissertation essentially attempts to explain those changes in the 1980s, between the two waves of protest. The broad research question of the dissertation is: What were the processes through which the democracy movement developed from 1979 to 1987?

In studying this time period of 1979-1987, I take a cultural approach to collective action to illustrate mechanisms at work that led to the development of the democracy movement. A focus on the construction of *threat*, *memory work*, and *frames* in the movement dynamics will allow me to answer my research question. Specifically, three empirical chapters of the dissertation address the following questions: 1) How did threat assessment change during the period between the waves, and how did these perceptions facilitate mobilization? 2) What are the cognitive, relational, and emotional mechanisms of recruitment processes under severe repression (1981-1984) and the role of memory work on the Gwangju Uprising in the process?; and 3) What were the frames for suggested political changes in 1985-1987 and how did they reflect a cultural shift among the public?

1.1 Significance

One of the main contributions of this project is to apply a sociological perspective to a topic that is often treated from the perspective of other disciplines. In particular, whereas disciplines such as Political Science understand the events during this period by focusing on changes in the state institutions and the final outcome of contention such as a regime change, I

use insights from the field of social movements to examine the development of popular contention and its role in social change.

The literature on democratization, primarily from Political Science, provides a wealth of transition theories. Many of their explanations are applicable to the South Korean case. Bueno and Smith (2009), for instance, showed that governments are more responsive to pressures from below when the country has no sources of unearned revenues such as natural resource rents or foreign aid. With little to no such revenues, the military regime of the 1980s gave in and accepted an electoral reform once the mass mobilization reached its peak in South Korea in June 1987. Lindberg (2009) and his colleagues present another noteworthy theory of transition: "a theory of elections as a mode of transition." He argues that as some authoritarian regimes adopt elections, each election becomes a subgame under a metagame of regime change. It is a subgame because a result could be "stretching, redefining, and changing the parameters of the costs and benefits of the metagame" (2009:318). It is Lindberg (2009:329)'s explanation that by changing the cost of repression and tolerance, elections may make democratization more likely if they help make repression more "expensive" or counterproductive. In February 1985, the general election of South Korea resulted in a hurriedly organized opposition party becoming a significant minority of the national legislature, which was a surprise for both the civil society and the government. It was also a significant signal, if not a game-changing moment, for the democracy movement. Repression became more costly for the government as activists gained access to more allies in the state.

A more canonical model of transition is presented by Przeworski (1991). Przeworski (1991) argues that an interaction between liberalizers within an authoritarian government and moderates within civil society is a necessary process. The rationale behind the "liberalizers"

negotiating with "mobilizers" is that liberalizers see the elites from the social movement as possible allies against regime hardliners after transition. This elite-centric explanation of transition, despite its considerable descriptive and explanatory merits, largely ignores the variation in mobilization. In broad strokes, the model tends to regard mobilization as a given condition or a variable with only two possible variations such as 1) moderates marginalize radicals; and 2) radicals dominate the mobilization. If scholars move our focus from an institutional change to mobilization, we are better positioned to see the variation that is much more nuanced.

Sharing my viewpoint, Adler and Webster (1995) revise Przeworski (1991)'s model to better explain democratic transition in the case of South Africa. They demonstrate the South African labor movement's role in the origin and development of the transition process which was not captured in the elite-centered first model. My approach to democratization is the most similar to Adler and Webster (1995) among the studies of democratization I discussed so far. However, my outcome variable in this project is not transition, but *mobilization that enabled the transition*. In specific, I study mechanisms that enabled emergence and sustainment of movement activities under repression. I argue that those mechanisms will eventually help explain what Della Porta (2014) calls "eventful democratization"—contentious and popular democratization from below.

Della Porta (2014) coined that term to describe a type of democratic transition that is contrasted with pact transition. Her work explicitly attempts to bridge the social movement studies and democratization studies and therefore gave me a model to emulate. By comparing episodes of protests for democracy in different countries in 1989 and 2011, she tried to describe mechanisms and conditions of "eventful democratization." Her study does not formally test those mechanisms, and her comparison remains largely descriptive rather than analytic. However, I'd

like to build upon her theorizing about democratization from below and my case best equips me to focus on cultural mechanisms.

This approach enables me to make contributions in understanding two aspects of democratization. First, as a more nuanced understanding of mobilization, scholars will better understand the democratization from below. I intentionally exclude the transition from my focus but concentrate on the mass mobilization (which is an essential element of democratization from below). Second, my project adds cultural elements to a structural theory of transition. For instance, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) very effectively demonstrate that democratization is about a power shift. However, they treat culture in a very limited fashion. In contrast, my project addresses cultural elements—such as threat assessment, memory work, and framing—more centrally. For instance, the third empirical part of my project describes how changes in frames show a power shift in the culture of a society—a shift in its values and beliefs which are translated into popular frames and claims.

This project is also expected to advance social movement scholarship by revising and expanding three theoretical concepts: threat, memory work, and framing. Using my empirical case, I revise the concept of threat and give it an adequate place in the political process model (McAdam [1982] 1999; Tilly 1978). Specifically, the revised definition recognizes the constructed nature of threat and therefore helps better explain its relationship with repression, risk, and mobilization. My study also deepens our understanding of the role of memory work for social movements under repression. Lastly, the study shows one way frames can illustrate a cultural process that links two macro-level changes of economic development and democratization.

1.2   The Case of South Korea

When a series of protests brought down the first administration of the Republic of Korea in April 1960, South Korea (Korea hereafter) was a very poor and authoritarian "third-world" country. In the next 32 years, Korea became a highly industrialized and democratically stable society. Scholarly attention, however, has been given disproportionately to the industrialization rather than the democratization process. Political economists in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology have adopted the notion of a developmental state to explain the process through which Korea transformed its society and economy (e.g., Amsden 1989). In fact, Korea is one of the best known cases of a developmental state (Johnson 1982, 1999). However, the dominance of the state-centered view among studies of the Korean society has been a source of relative paucity of studies on the contentious aspect of democratization in specific and Korean society in general (Shin 2003). Therefore, my dissertation project is well positioned to advance our understanding of contentious politics in Korea and its impact on Korean society, in addition to theoretical contributions to our understanding of dynamics of social movements in general.

To understand the nature of authoritarianism in Korea from 1948 to 1987, it is very important to note that political regimes may be understood as examples of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006) rather than simply as dictatorships. Under the influence of U.S. military rule (1945-1948) that had ended the Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), Korea instituted a democratic constitution as well as three branches of government (Cummings 2000). Therefore, the political system allowed elections, no matter how ill-managed they may have been. Yet, Presidents Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) often either disregarded the constitution or revised it as they saw fit (Sohn 1989). President Park in particular enforced a revised constitution that practically allowed him to be a permanent ruler in 1972. This

so-called "*yushin*[2]" system ended when he was shot and killed by the head of Korean CIA on October 26th, 1979. It was in this political context that the Chun Doo Hwan administration emerged through a *coup d'etat* within the military in December of 1979 and the brutal repression of the Gwangju Uprising in May of 1980. It should be noted that the beginning and the end of the regime largely overlap with my study period of 1979-1987.

By June of 1987, Chun's administration met a significant challenge from below. Chun's anointed successor and long-time collaborator, Noh Tae Woo, announced on June 29th, 1987, that he would accept an electoral reform of a direct presidential election. This announcement is widely regarded as the beginning of the institutionalization of democracy and as a victory of the people (Kim 2000). It finally allowed the people to define the nature of the regime. Since then, the institutionalization (e.g., Cotton 1989; Im 1989) and consolidation (e.g., Kim 2000; Kim 2008; Lee 1993) of democracy has become a growing subject of social science studies of Korea, particularly in the discipline of Political Science. However, their emphasis has mostly been on the changes in state institutions rather than the nature of contentious politics. Further, those relatively few studies that do apply social movement perspectives to the Korean case mostly focus either on particular segments of pro-democracy movements such as the labor movement (Chai 1996) and student activism (Ko 2008) or on the Gwangju Uprising of 1980 alone (Jung 2003; Kim 1999; Na 2001, 2003). Other notable studies include Lee's (2010) focus on the development of collaborations among the movement organizations with a particular emphasis on the transition period, and Choe and Kim's (2012) examination of political opportunities that promoted the success of the prodemocracy movement.

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[2] The literal meaning of this word is "renewal." A culturally more relevant meaning is "restoration" as in the Japanese Meiji Restoration of 1868.

Though these works are illustrative applications of some of the relevant concepts and dynamics to the Korean case, I argue that it is beneficial to focus not simply on the transition to democracy, but to take a broader view by examining the period marked by both waves of collective action between 1979 and 1987. In fact, an examination of this period stands to make a contribution to the field of social movements. How did the first wave decline quite rapidly and how did the second wave sustain its mobilization until the successful transition to democracy? What are the ways in which activists' assessment of the environment shaped their decisions and the development of each wave? And should these two waves be thought of as independent events or are there some connections between the two? Notably, did the memory of the repression in the first wave (i.e., the Gwangju Uprising) contribute to the development of the second wave?[3] If so, how?

1.3   Overview of the Dissertation

Throughout the following chapters, I illustrate how a democracy movement managed to emerge in 1987, despite the brutal repression of activists less than a decade earlier. In Chapter Two, I introduce my theoretical framework that builds on extant research on threat, collective memory, and framing. In Chapter Three, I describe my data and explain my methodological approaches. In the following three chapters, I report my findings. In Chapter Four, I show how a threat-oriented political assessment of activists enabled them not only to sustain their movement but also expand their coalitions. In Chapter Five, I focus on illustrating and explaining one particular cultural mechanism that radicalized the movement participants: memory work.

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[3] Though Cho (2003) partially addresses this question by examining legacies of the Gwangju Uprising for the transition to and consolidation of democracy, his evidence is rather indirect and limited. His ultimate interest in an institutional change also removes his focus from the social movement dynamics to institutional changes.

Without the memory work on the failed Gwangju Uprising of 1980, I argue that the 1987 movement may have not been that successful. In Chapter Six, I describe the frame competition in the mid-to-late 1980s as an indication of a cultural shift in the Korean society that was about to experience a democratic transition. In Chapter Seven, I conclude with a summary of findings and a discussion of the theoretical significance of those findings as well as my study's limitations and potential directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

My dissertation research draws on and contributes to the literature on social movements and political sociology, especially with respect to social movement emergence. In the following sections, I introduce and briefly review previous studies on such central concepts as threat, memory, and framing. Throughout this chapter I demonstrate how using these theoretical concepts illuminates different facets of my research questions as well as the contributions I aim to make to each set of literature.

2.1   Threat, Threat Assessment, and Movement Dynamics

2.1.1   Threat, opportunity, and repression

This project is primarily grounded in and contributes to the social movement literature. In particular, it makes a contribution toward the theoretical development of the concept of threat, which has been used to explain when and why social movements emerge. Building on previous research on the political process model (e.g., McAdam [1982] 1999; Tilly 1978) and threat (Almeida 2003, Einwohner 2003; Maher 2010; Reese *et al*. 2005), I distinguish threat from two other concepts with which it is often confused—opportunity and repression—and offer a revised definition. Further, a renewed conceptualization of threat, I argue, will enable me to tackle the puzzle of the effects of repression on mobilization as well as the first empirical research question: What are the ways in which activists' assessment of the environment shaped their decisions and the development of each wave?

In comparison with opportunity, the concept of threat has not received equal treatment although a social movement perspective on political processes initially directed our attention to

opportunities and threats together (McAdam [1982] 1999; Tilly 1978). Since the 1980s, the literature on the political process of social movements has focused more on opportunities rather than threats (Einwohner and Maher 2011). Political opportunity generally refers to an "opening" in the political system that provides room for collective action to occur (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Yet, it should also be noted that the concept has been operationalized in many ways (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). The various treatments of the concept and the labels of the approach, most notably political opportunity structure (POS), testify to its popularity among the social movement scholars.

While the concept of opportunity has been used extensively (e.g., Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999), its conceptual twin—threat—has not been treated distinctively. Indeed, there is a bit of confusion as to how separate the two concepts really are. As two concepts are intricately related, threat has been popularly understood as a lack of opportunities (e.g., Kadivar 2013; Rasler 1996). Complicating matters more, threat is also understood in terms of repression. Goldstone and Tilly (2001:183) define threat as "the cost that a social group will incur from protest or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action." Though their definition allows us to be inclusive of different types of threats, the first part of the definition can definitely be explained by repression. In other words, threat has been explained by already available concepts such as repression and opportunities. By doing so, is there any important social movement dynamic that scholars have been missing?

To answer that, students of social movements might want to direct our attention to a group of scholars that have treated threat differently in the recent decade or so. Almeida (2003:347) defines threat as "the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act accordingly." His definition is a major revision of

that of Goldstone and Tilly (2011): he distinguishes threat from costs incurred by repression. It is a theoretical advancement that enables us to see another set of motivation of activists which is particularly relevant for activists under repressive conditions.

Building on Almeida (2003) and others, I define threat as *the real or perceived consequences of inaction*. My treatment further improves current definitions in two ways. First, I add "real or perceived" to recognize the constructed nature of environmental assessments (e.g., Einwohner and Maher 2011; Kurzman 1996). Second, and more importantly, it enables us to expand the scope of actors, from activists or challengers alone to activists as well as the state actors and other claims-makers. Such an expansion is important because *all actors* in contentious politics are expected to engage in their own threat assessment upon which they can act. For instance, state actors actively survey the political environment to keep insurgents from becoming a greater threat (Goodwin 2001).

Lastly, though previous research on the role of threat in mobilization often focused on cases with extreme conditions (e.g., Einwohner and Maher 2011) or societies lacking a tradition of liberal democracy (e.g., Alimi 2007), recent research also illustrates the relevancy of the concept in mobilization and claims-making in the United States: mobilization in communities at risk (McAdam and Boudet 2012), reactive movements (van Dyke and Soule 2002), campaigns against welfare privatization (Reese et al. 2005), or state actors' decision on repression (Earl *et al.* 2003). My project uses the case of waves of collective action for democracy in Korea from 1979 to 1987 to illustrate and further elaborate on my treatment of threat.

2.1.2   Threat assessment and movement dynamics

An improved definition of threat can lead to a better understanding of movement dynamics in general, but it is especially helpful toward understanding the curious effects of

repression on mobilization. Previous research shows mixed findings about the relationship between state repression and mobilization. Researchers primarily adopting a rational choice perspective tend to argue that repression deters collective action or dissent (e.g., Lichbach 1987; Moore 2000). However, others find positive effects of state repression on collective action (e.g., Khawaja 1993; Olivier 1991). Still others find that when there are certain conditions repression leads to more collective action (Francisco 1995). This challenging task of explaining the exact relationship between repression and mobilization is partially addressed by an analysis and interpretation of an Iranian case of contentious politics (Rasler 1996). Rasler (1996) empirically shows how repression could discourage protest in the short term but encourage protest in the long term. Opp and Roehl (1990) also suggest that the negative effects of repression can be reversed, for instance, if repression is seen as illegitimate or if it increases incentives for participation in protest leads to micro-mobilization processes.

I suggest that a new conceptualization of threat may provide another way to look at the relationship of concern. Whether there is state repression or not, activists constantly assess opportunities and threats. It is well understood that the collective assessment of the prospects of successful insurgency, which are opportunities in the eyes of activists, is instrumental in mobilization. Extending this logic, I argue that the collective assessment of the necessity of insurgency, or threats in the eyes of activists, is also instrumental in mobilization. In other words, either opportunity or threat should be constructed by activists so that they can act on them.

Then, how would activists react to a changing environment when the state deploys its repressive measures? Whether they act upon opportunities or threats, repression increases the risks for activists (Tilly 1978), with risks being "anticipated dangers of engaging in a particular type of activity" (McAdam 1986:67). However, activists' response to risk may vary depending

on the primary construct of their assessment of the political environment. For instance, activists acting upon opportunities are expected to scale back their activism in response to growing repression and risks. Activists acting upon threats, on the other hand, may be quite immune to, if not stimulated by, state repression (e.g., Almeida 2003; Loveman 1998).

In summary, for both threat and opportunity, activists' construction of political environment is believed to have a positive relationship with mobilization. So does repression with risk. However, I suggest that the relationship between risk and mobilization is contingent upon the type of construction of political environment. Specifically, risks may attenuate the effect of opportunity on mobilization. In contrast, risks may not decrease the effect of threat on mobilization.

This is a tentative formalization of the suggested relationship between opportunity, threat, repression, and mobilization. This dissertation project does not plan to formally test these ideas, but is instead aimed at theory building. Thus, I aim to provide an initial illustration of the dynamics between stated factors: 1) activists' assessment of political environment, 2) state repression, and 3) mobilization. However, it should be noted that my view captures the time period *between* 1) the point when substantial organizational strength has been established so that initial mobilization can be launched (Almeida 2003; McAdam [1982] 1999); and 2) the point at which mass mobilization lowers risks substantially to the extent that people could join collective action with nominal or no risk, i.e., the point at which assurance (Karlins and Petersen 1993; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011) or aggregation (Kurzman 1996) has been achieved.

In addition, an empirical question that threat helps address is one of the research questions of this project: What are the ways in which activists' assessment of the environment shaped their decisions and the development of each wave? Also, did the threat assessment of

each wave differ from each other? If so, how? The concept of threat provides a theoretical

vantage point from which to understand activists' interpretations of the political environment and

their impacts on strategic choices and, therefore, movement development.

2.2   Subcultures of Memory and Movement Dynamics

2.2.1   Memory work for mobilization

The second part of my dissertation project resides in the intersection of the political

sociology literature on collective memory and the social movement literature on dynamics of

mobilization. Isaac (2008:50) defines collective memory as "the process by which people come

to recall, lay claim to, interpret, narrate and represent the past in a collectively agreed upon

fashion." While the collective memory literature is dominated by micro-level studies showing

variation in memory by age, time, and place (e.g., Griffin 2004; Griffin and Bollen 2009;

Pennebaker 1997; Schwartz and Schuman 2005), social movement scholars' concern with

collective memory most often results in macro-level studies, demonstrating the importance of

collective memory as a cultural resource that activists can appropriate for claims-making (Kubal

and Becerra 2014). More recently, however, some meso-level studies also have demonstrated a

more fruitful intersection of two areas by illustrating how collective memory can help construct

and maintain the collective identity of a group and thus support mobilization and a movement's

continuity (Benford 1996; Gongaware 2003, 2010, 2011).

It is not collective memory *per se* but the memory work that activists do that helps

mobilization. Memory work refers to the active work of commemorating an individual or event

through individualized or collective action such as rituals that use speeches, sites, and

celebrations. Memory work enables members of a society to recognize the past as relevant and

salient or pair the past with a current event (Jansen 2007; Schwartz 1996; Zelizer 1995). In other

words, agents of memory (Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002) construct and reconstruct the memory of the past. In the process, they can mobilize supporters and participants: memory work makes an impact on ways of meaning-making, without which troubling conditions cannot become grievances. However, memory constructions are also constrained by the extant cultural patterns (Zelizer 1995). Memory work processes may be particularly powerful and dramatic when state-sponsored memory and popular memory are diverging if not contradictory (e.g., Jansen 2007; Lev-Aladgem 2006). Some scholars refer to this type of memory work as subversive stories (Ewick and Silbey 1995) or counter-memory narratives (Velez-Velez 2010:412; Zerubavel 1995:11). A similar notion, which is a broader category, is counter-narratives (Steinmetz 1992). As one type of counter-narrative, counter-memory narratives try to subvert a memory that an authority—state or non-state—approves.

It is Polletta (1998) who most vividly illustrates the power of narrative in mobilization. She finds that student activists' narratives on sit-ins enabled them to normalize the risky form of activism during the early phase of the height of the Civil Rights Movement. Breaking from the bureaucratic planning and adult leadership, students constructed sit-ins as spontaneous acts and made the particular form of protest a norm rather than an exception. Without that process, she argues, sit-ins would have not become one of the best known protest tactics from the 1960s. However, a narrative is only one of many tools that agents of memory work can use.

More broadly, memory work helps explain how activists make use of the past while recognizing their constraints (Jansen 2007). Recognizing that there are different modes of memory work, Jansen (2007) demonstrates a variation in historical patterns of usages of collective memories. Those historical patterns, he argues, enable and constrain options for activists in later times, directing our attention to three criteria of the model: 1) salience: how well

it is remembered; 2) valence: a positive, negative, or neutral/ambivalent valence; and 3) ownership by protagonists, antagonists, or neither of them. These dimensions are what Zelizer (1995:230) calls "structures for meaning-making" that condition contemporary memory work. These dimensions, however, can also be revised by memory work of the current generation (Jansen 2007; Olick and Robbins 1998; Zelizer 1995).

This project attempts to investigate mechanisms of memory work within a network of activists committed to collective action for democracy particularly from 1980 to 1985 when the movement was relatively in abeyance (Shin et al. 2007). Specifically, it investigates ways in which information about the Gwangju Uprising, which marked the end of the first wave of pro-democracy protest, was transmitted during the rest of the period, and the particular meaning of that event that was constructed. Using Jansen (2007)'s notions, how did activists reconstruct the valence of the memory and own the narratives of the memory of the Gwangju Uprising? And, what are the ways in which the memory work shaped the mobilization process through 1987?

When addressing the above mentioned research questions, three types of mechanisms in eventful democratization (della Porta 2014) as well as three dimensions of collective identity (Gongaware 2011; Polletta and Jasper 2001) provide a set of themes that I will look for in the empirical case. All of these direct our attention to the same three aspects and mechanisms of mobilization: the cognitive, relational, and emotional. Combining the questions into one, I ask: What are the cognitive, relational, and emotional mechanisms of recruitment process under severe repression and the role of the memory work on the Gwangju Uprising in the process?

2.2.2   Making a subculture of memory

Social memories vary. Isaac (2008:50)'s definition of collective memory suggests that members of society remember the past "in a collectively agreed upon fashion." However,

empirical research shows that a memory is often fragmented (e.g., Straughn 2007; Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002). A basic premise of this research is also that memory is contested (Olick and Robbins 1998). Most notably, state agents and non-state agents may act very differently (Vinitzky-Seroussi 2002) when they commemorate a political and historical event.

The notion of contestation of collective memory directs attention to what are known as the "subcultures of memory" (Fine and McDonnell 2007:179). Studying the case of the "brown scare," which was a memory template for later interpretations and actions for state actors but was never cemented into firm cultural knowledge of the public, Fine and McDonnell (2007:182) demonstrate a simple but powerful dynamic regarding remembrance: "Remembrance differs in different subpopulations." They find a substantial difference between the memories of state actors and the public. Yet, it should be noted that they find it after substantial, if not all, memory work is completed. Then, why would a subculture of memory begin to emerge in the first place? This question gets particularly interesting when repressive cultures and state policies come into play on the dynamics of differential remembrance. Under repression, the transmission of information and collective remembrance of a political event can be risky activism by itself. Under repressive conditions, why would activists help build a subculture of memory of an uprising against the state?

A social psychology perspective partially answers this question (e.g., Pennebaker *et al.* 1997). A memory of a silenced event would encourage a subpopulation to build subcultures of memory. Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) suggest that people continue to think and even dream about an event when people actively avoid talking about it due to outside repressions such as that by authoritarian institutions. Under these circumstances, an empirical study on activists' memory work on the Gwangju Uprising provides a unique vantage point to investigate how activists

initiate changes in dominant culture. So I ask: What are the ways in which activists' memory work contributes to the making of a subculture of memory?

In sum, this part of the dissertation project investigates the cognitive, relational, and emotional mechanisms of recruitment and mobilization process under severe repression and the role of the memory work in the process. The investigation will also show how activists reconstructed the valence of the memory of the Gwangju Uprising and how they owned the narratives. Lastly, this dissertation illustrates how activists help build a subculture of memory.

2.3 Framing Political Change

2.3.1 Broadening a view on frames

This third empirical part of the dissertation builds on the literature on collective action frames and contributes to the understanding of a macro-level social change: democratization. I draw on this literature in order to better analyze the discussions and interpretations that activists, members of the public, and state actors had during the transition period of 1985 to 1987. Borrowing the notion from Goffman (1974), Snow et al. (1986:464) define frames as "schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large." To address the limitations in the Resource Mobilization approach to social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978), Snow and his colleagues direct social movement scholars' attention to the frame alignment processes in mobilization. Following their lead, scholars have demonstrated and illustrated the cultural aspects of activists' choices and behaviors, and conditions under which they act, all of which the structural perspective of Resource Mobilization Theory had failed to explain. In fact, Snow and his colleagues' seminal piece has been acknowledged to have started a "cultural turn" in the social movement literature (Benford and Snow 2000). However, previous research on frames has in

general focused more on the behaviors of activists than on large-scale political and cultural changes in society.

It should be noted, however, that the political environment is of critical importance to activists. Social movement scholars working in the framing tradition have been well aware of that. Notably, scholars recognize that for a certain frame to be effective, it should resonate among the target audience (Snow and Benford 1988). In other words, activists cannot choose any frame at all but instead strategically pick and choose from possible options after their evaluation of the cultural configuration of a particular issue. This requires of activists "a balancing act" in which they consider trade-offs of their frames (McVeigh et al. 2004). Still, interpretations of reality can definitely vary, resulting in frame variation (Snow et al. 2007). Empirical studies show how activists within movements disagree on the primary frame of their movement as in the women's suffrage movement (McCammon et al. 2004), women's jury movement (McCammon 2012), and the same-sex marriage campaign in Hawaii (Hull 2001), to list a few. Disputes on frames within movements, in turn, indirectly reflect the current state of political and cultural environment in wider society. In understanding competition among frames within movements, Kubal (1998)'s notion of "front region" is also relevant as it is of strategic concern of activists. "Front region" is where the social movement frames are presented in front of the public while in the back region many frames can be tested, experimented, and contested (Kubal 1998).

Though a focus on contestation among activists is a useful window to look into changes in society, the scope of framing research has hardly been broadened. I suggest that this could be one of the reasons why the framing research on agents of social change has, ironically, not been very successful in explaining social changes themselves. A collective emphasis on mobilization or activists allowed social movement scholars to have a narrow scope without paying much

attention to other types of claims-makers. To be fair, some scholars have expanded their scope significantly by studying the interaction between movements and the counter-movements in specific and the political environment in general (e.g., Adair, 1996; Dugan 2004; Kubal 1998). Adair (1996), for instance, illustrates how a counter-movement conditions the options of activists. Anti-nuclear activists, to be successful, had to frame their actions as an effort to protect homes, property, and businesses while distancing themselves from ideological critiques of the American society. Dugan's (2004) study of protest surrounding an anti-gay rights initiative in Cincinnati argues that the gay acceptance movement was not successful partially because activists failed to address frames of their opponents—the Christian Right. These studies are a step toward a better understanding of dynamics of social change.

Still, the scope of an empirical study on frames has not expanded to include the state claims-makers (for notable exceptions see Noakes 2000; Zuo and Benford 1995). In other words, social movement research has rarely treated the state as a claims-maker. This project, on the other hand, assumes that framing is relevant to both challengers and state actors as much as threat is relevant to both challengers and state actors. Though this could be empirically obvious only when either a surveillance branch of government (Noakes 2000) or an authoritarian government (Zuo and Benford 1995) is concerned, an empirical study of a society that is under a democratic transition will further illustrate and demonstrate the usage of frames for explaining social change. To be more specific, I argue that contested frames 1) within movement organizations and 2) between challengers and the state will show a process of conflictual interactions that captures a major political and cultural shift in the society. So, this project asks: What were the collective action frames for suggested political change in 1985-1987? What were the contested and tested frames within the activists' networks and what became the primary

frame? What were the counter-frames of the state and its most vocal supporters? How did two frames address each other?

2.3.2   Cultural process of a democratic transition

A cultural approach to democratic transition is expected to complement the current approaches to the topic. In particular reference to the relationship between capitalist development and democratization, a few major approaches emphasize class compromise (Neuhouser 1992), a transformation of the class structure (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), and modernization of a society (Almond and Powell 1966; Lerner 1958; Lipset 1960). Though Przeworski (1991)'s model captures the strategic interaction between state and oppositional elites, the models of democratic transition tend to be structural. This project does not refute the usefulness of these approaches but rather complements their findings with cultural understanding of a political change.

Modernization theory, in particular, assumes a linear relationship between development and democracy and is in need of a cultural explanation. It is a robust finding that economic development and democracy are positively correlated (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). It is also noteworthy that more recent revisions of modernization theory (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1994) attempt to embrace processual and cultural aspects of the relationship by acknowledging the role of education and changes in belief system with reference to democratization in East Asia. However, Lipset (1994) assumes that a democratic transition itself is a proof of a change in belief system. If a cultural change is not an outcome of democratic transition but a cause or a precondition, scholars need to explain the mechanisms and processes through which such a cultural shift contributes to the democratic transition.

By studying the emergence and evolution of different frames of political changes to be brought about, this project will demonstrate a cultural process of a transition to democracy. In

specific, I document what competing frames were presented and how those frames evolved from 1985 to 1987. Those frames may reflect not only changing perceptions of the movement participants but also cultural shifts in the general public as 1) the whole society knew a change in the regime was coming in early 1988; but 2) the members of the society were also not sure how different the regime would be. By examining competition among frames in the period, this project will provide a much needed illustration of a cultural mechanism of democratization.

To paraphrase, my project builds upon the assumption that primary frames of a successful movement are culturally resonant with a society's dominant values and beliefs. Cultural resonance of frames is their "congruence with society's values and principles" (Ferree 2003:307; Snow and Benford 1988). In the literature on frames and social movements, the notion of resonance has been often cited as a reason that determines a certain frame to be effective or ineffective for an episode of campaign or social movements (Benford and Snow 2000). However, resonance itself is not what I am specifically looking for. I rather assume that primary frames of successful movements are resonating with the society's values and beliefs. When certain frames dominate not only a movement organization but also the discourse of a society, they must be resonating with prominent cultural themes of the society at the time. This assumption is crucial component of my analytic approach.

In sum, I aim to better describe a cultural shift in a society about to transition to democracy. I argue that the shift is indirectly observable through the emergence, dominance, and decline of frames of a movement that is able to launch a mass mobilization before a transition to democracy. Those ups and downs of frames may reflect more than just changing perceptions of the movement participants. Successful frames are culturally resonating with a society. Therefore, the ups and downs of frames may reflect changes in values and beliefs of the society in its

broadest sense. It should also be noted that this project assumes that framing is relevant to both challengers and state actors as much as threat is relevant to both challengers and state actors. When state actors address certain frames of the movement, it also shows how prominent certain frames are and how threatening they are to state actors. Therefore, I document the ups and downs of frames among activist organizations, public discourse, and claims of state actors.

2.4   Summary

My dissertation explores the developmental mechanisms of a movement for democracy in society under repression. I use the South Korean case to illustrate the roles of political assessments in the mobilization, memory work in radicalization of the movement, and collective action frames as indications of a cultural shift. To better understand and situate this case, I draw on the literature on social movements and political sociology. In specific, I have reviewed the literature on threat, memory, and framing and theoretically framed my study with those concepts. In the following chapter, I describe my data and analytic approaches.

CHAPTER 3.   DATA AND METHODS

This is a qualitative study of mechanisms and processes in the development of the South Korean democracy movement. I used archival data to answer my research questions, drawing upon several extensive collections of primary historical documents along with secondary sources to triangulate my analysis and results (Berg and Lune 2008). In the following section, I first introduce the key sources of data and the process of data collection. Then, I describe my analytic approach, which can be summarized as a modified grounded theory method (Strauss 1987).

3.1   Data Sources and Collection Process

The first two empirical parts of the dissertation use very similar types of data: documents that activists and movement organizations produced. As I explain in more detail below, these data all came from archival sources. Still, I paid more attention to a specific type of data for each part. To be more specific, as I read through the data repeatedly, I found that organizational documents and materials were most relevant to the topic of threat assessment, so I found myself focusing mostly on those data in Chapter Four. However, both individual and organizational data contained information about memory work, so my analyses in Chapter Five draw on a broader array of data. For both parts, I used documents from the Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) Archives and the Gwangju City Archives. For the memory work part, I also used the 5.18 Memorial Foundation Archives as a source. For the most part, data from the KDF archives are a digital copy format while data from the other archives are in a hard copy format (often in a compilation of the copied material or typed from the original historical records). Refer to Table 3-1 for a summary of data types and sources.

For the third empirical part, presented in Chapter Six, I used not only movement organization documents but also media reports and government documents. To do so, I used online archives such as Naver News Library and Lexis-Nexis (accessed through Purdue Libraries) in addition to physical archives. Below, I discuss each data source and data collection process in detail.

Table 3.1 Summary of Data Types and Sources

Parts	Type of Data	Source of Data
Threat Assessment and Mobilization	*Organizational*: Statements, memos, leaflets, brochures, minutes, and correspondence *Individual*: diaries, memos, and letters	Archives such as the KDF Archives, the Gwangju City Archives Published materials
Memory Work and Recruitment Process	*Organizational*: Statements, memos, leaflets, brochures, minutes, and correspondence *Individual*: diaries, memos, and letters	Archives such as the KDF Archives, the 5.18 Memorial Foundation Archives and the Gwangju City Archives Published materials
Framing and a Cultural Shift	*Organizational*: statements, periodicals, leaflets, brochures, minutes, and correspondence Editorials, columns, and letters appearing in newspapers Government documents such as *The 1980s: Meeting a New Challenge*	Physical archives such as the KDF Archives, the Gwangju City Archives and online archives such as Naver News Library and Lexis-Nexis Published materials

The single most important source of data is the Korean Democracy Foundation (hereafter KDF). Founded by the Korea Democracy Foundation Act of 2001, the Foundation aims to commemorate the democracy movement in its broadest senses. The foundation's activities include, but are not limited to, 1) holding commemorating events; 2) educating the public; 3)

facilitating research; and 4) creating and maintaining an archive (KDF 2015a). Its archive attempts to "collect and preserve every form of historical data associated with Korea's democracy movement from the establishment of our government in 1948 to today" (Chang 2008b:21). However, it should be noted that the original data collection of the Foundation was limited by the availability of the primary materials. As they began collecting materials about 15 years after the democratization of 1987, the primary materials of my interest (1979-1987) that were not preserved by individuals, organizations, and other archives could have been lost, confiscated, forgotten, or destroyed. Nevertheless, the archive has been recognized as the most comprehensive and thorough source of social movement studies on Korea's democracy movement (e.g., Chang 2008a, 2008b; Chang and Vitale 2013). It is also the primary source of a Stanford Korea Democracy Report that presents an exhaustive descriptive statistics of protest and repression events from 1970 to 1992 (Shin et al. 2007).

From the KDF archive, which I visited on a daily basis in June of 2015 to build rapport with archivists, I was able to access various forms of first-hand accounts that individual activists and organizations produced. They include statements, testimonies, dairies, memoirs, minutes, leaflets and brochures that are digitized. To create a set of data that allows me to reach saturation points for each research question but still is manageable, I sampled the data theoretically and purposively. The theoretical sampling systematically reflected two primary variations in the data: 1) social groups; and 2) events. The Stanford Korea Democracy Report (2007) shows that, during the 1980 through 1987, two main social groups organized protest events: students/youth (48.41%) and laborers (23.65%). Christians, intellectuals, and general activists are also notable minor groups (Shin et al. 2007:18). I selected materials in a way that ensured diversity of the groups as well as the relative importance of each group. Also, I used the categorization of events

that the KDF archive already made available. In addition to the primary materials, the KDF

Sourcebook on Events (*minjuhwa undong kwallyŏn sagŏn sajŏn*) and the Sourcebook on

Organizations (*minjuhwa undong kwallyŏn tanch'e sajŏn*) allowed me to triangulate activists'

own accounts (Berg and Lune 2012; Chang 2008b).

In addition to the KDF archive, I complemented my dataset with data from three

additional archives. Previous research on Korea's democratization used the Democratic

Movement Data Base at Sungkonghoe University (Kim 2008). The next two archives are the

Gwangju City Archive and the May 18 Memorial Foundation Archive. They provided me with

records particularly related to activists' accounts of the Gwangju Uprising in the 1980s. I also

had a chance to visit relevant and historical sites in the city of Gwangju during a research trip in

the summer of 2015.

This study also drew on published materials. Some participants and witnesses in protest

events published their memoirs and/or reports before democratization (e.g., Lee [1985] 1999) or

after democratization (e.g., Park [1988] 2014; Scott-Stokes et al. 2000). Some college alumni

organizations also commemorated their students' activism by putting together testimonies. These

also provided me with first-hand accounts of activists and witnesses. However, as they relied

upon their memory of the time after substantial time had passed, I strove to conservatively

interpret them and used them to complement, rather than substitute, the records that were

produced in the time period of my interest.

For my analysis of the frames on political changes in 1985-1987, summarized in Chapter

Six, I also used online archives such as Naver News Library and Lexis-Nexis (accessed through

Purdue Libraries). They were particularly useful as they included views of non-activists.

Newspapers of the 1980s provided a wonderful vantage point as they were censored by the State

and often reflected the state's perspective rather than that of objective witnesses (Chang 2008b). I used various keywords such as "current situation," "political issues," and "constitutional amendment" that were particularly relevant during the time.

In addition to the Korean newspaper sources, I also made use of Lexis-Nexis to document claims-makings of state actors as well as supporters of Korea's democratization in the United States from 1985 to 1987. Korean state actors were active not only in Korea but also in the United States, partly because of the continued importance of the US in Korean politics (Kim 2000). Therefore, these data provided me with a unique vantage point from which to see the transnational aspect (Schock 1999) of claims-making for and against Korea's democratization. To find the articles, I used combinations of keywords such as "South Korea," "democracy," "protest," and "North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea."

In an effort to triangulate the primary documents—documents produced by activists, SMOs, and other claims-makers—I used secondary materials that archives or researchers have produced such as *Chronology of the Democracy Movement* (in Korean) and *Sourcebook of Events* (in Korean). I also talked to archivists (or equivalents) to better understand the archives— how they collected the data and how they see other archives. They include Jong-kwan Won (an archivist of the KDF Archives), Gye Shin Hong (the chief archivist of the KDF Archives), Yong Han Song (the general manager of Sungkonghoe University Archives), and Ho Moon Jung (the general manager of Gwangju City Archives).

3.2   Methods of Data Analysis

These data were analyzed using content analysis. While some approaches to content analysis employ counts of the number of times that words and phrases appear in textual data, my approach used a modified version of grounded theory. The grounded theory is an inductive

analytic strategy to qualitative data and its goal is toward the development of theory (Strauss 1987; Charmaz 2004). It is *grounded* theory because data are the only ground for all the analytic and abstract themes. Though it has "theory" in its name, it is more of a set of principles and guidelines to data collection, analysis, and theory building.

This methodological approach provides researchers with four guidelines for open coding. Following this method, I first, asked the data repeatedly a set of questions that helped basic categorizing of the data in terms of relevance. Second, I analyzed the data minutely so that nothing important was missed. Third, I wrote theoretical memos frequently so that I did not get lost in details and was able to move into an analytic level. Fourth, I did not assume the importance of traditionally regarded variables such as age, class, sex, and race because they also need to be grounded in the data (Strauss 1987:30-32).

I generally followed the principles of grounded theory methods but went into the data collection and analysis with a few relatively focused set of concepts and patterns to investigate, which departs somewhat from Strauss' approach. For instance, for my analysis of memory work, I was guided by previous research, and especially the themes of salience, valence, and ownership (Jansen 2007), which I expected to appear in the data (though I recognized that some of them might not always appear). Similarly for my analysis of recruitment and mobilization processes, I expected that the cognitive, relational, and emotional themes would appear in the data. Therefore, I looked for these themes, or "conceptual labels," in the data. However, I was still open to new patterns and themes emerging from the data. This coding method using a modified ground theory is sometimes called a "retroductive scheme" (Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011) because it uses both deductive and inductive codes.

In my reiterative reading of the dataset, I continued to put conceptual labels on the data. My approach was similar to what some grounded theorists call "focused coding" as it refers to "taking earlier codes that continually reappear in your initial coding and using these codes to sift through large amounts of data" (Charmaz 2004:508). Next, conceptual labels were categorized as larger themes while comparing patterns across individual accounts.

To make the whole coding process reliable (Stemler 2001), I articulated my self-instructions: criteria of judgment and the questions I asked myself when reading the data. As I had a few conceptual labels in mind, I first created several questions that asked if the data fit the labels before matching such themes with actual data. After reading several documents, I revised the details of the criteria and specific questions. Then, I applied those criteria and questions to re-read the documents. Then, as per a new theme emerging, I renewed the self-instructions.

3.3   Limitations of Data and Analytic Strategy

Some readers would argue I still need qualitative interview data for a complete understanding of the emergence of the democracy movement, and they have a point. Most of the movement participants are still alive and many likely would not mind telling their stories. Such interviews would definitely help make a richer set of findings. However, they would not come without their risks. Activists' memories could have been lost and modified due to two reasons. First, it has been a substantial time between now and the time period of interest. Second, due to the people's "victory," with the establishment of democracy in 1987, activists' participation in the movement has become mostly honorable and is often a politically beneficial story to tell. Still, I would have not been able to conduct this study without interviews had it not been for the rich and comprehensive data from the Korea Democracy Foundation archives.

As discussed earlier, the KDF and other archives allowed me to have access to tremendously rich archival data. They were produced by activists, activist organizations, reporters and other observers, police, state prosecutors, and other state officials. They had their own reasons and purposes to produce those documents. With the benefit of hindsight and triangulation in addition to a modified ground theory approach, I could still yield useful findings that help us better understand the mechanisms and processes of the development of the movement.

In sum, I used archival data and unobtrusive analytic strategies to examine human traces (Berg and Lune 2012). A modified grounded theory enabled me to read and interpret reliably and analytically the traces of activists and other claims-makers that they left behind with their own intentions and reasons in the 1980s. Despite aforementioned limitations, my data still yielded rich empirical findings. In the following chapters, I report my findings and present my interpretations.

CHAPTER 4.   THREAT, STATE REPRESSION AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION

My previous two chapters described the theoretical framework and methodological approaches of my dissertation. Chapters Four through Six report empirical findings and interpret those findings. In this chapter, I illustrate and explain the broad mechanisms of mobilization in the South Korean democracy movement in the 1980s. In particular, I focus on the activists' interpretation of the political environment and the impacts on their strategic choices, and therefore, movement development. In so doing, I emphasize the role of threat, the real or perceived consequences of inaction, in the political process of mobilization. I argue that the threat assessment allowed the strategic adaptation of the activists which then allowed a successful mobilization in the second wave of collective action in the 1980s. To do so, I use primary sources that activists created primarily in the 1980s but also secondary sources such as the Stanford Democracy Project Report (which was a result of collaboration with the Korea Democracy Foundation).

Figure 4.1 shows the number of protest and repression events from 1970 through 1992 (Shin et al. 2007). My focus, however, is on the years 1979-1987, from right before the May 1980 Gwangju Uprising to the establishment of democracy in June 1987. Looking just at those years, the number of protest events is lowest between 1981 and 1983, when the state repression was the highest. Yet, while this figure is a very useful indicator of movement activity, it could also give readers the impression that the movement peaked in the 1970s.

Figure 1   Number of Protest and Repression Events by Year

Source: Stanford Democracy Report (with the Korea Democracy Foundation)

Figure 4.1 Number of Protest and Repression Events

Figure 4. 2 reports another indicator of movement activity: the number of participants (Shin et al. 2007). This figure substantiates my suggestion that there were two waves of mobilization from the year 1980 through 1987. It clearly shows that the peak of the movement, in terms of participation, was in 1987. It also partly explains why previous research often focuses on the time period of 1985-87, during which protest events and participation were increasing. What this figure does not tell us is how the surge happened. My goal in this dissertation is to examine how activity in 1980-84 helped develop the later wave. Therefore, in this chapter, I show how activists built their movement step by step from 1984 through 1987 with the culmination of the mobilization in June of 1987, and how the activists' responses to the defeat of 1980 helps explain it.

Figure 2   Number of Individuals Participating in Protest Events by Year (1970-1992)

Source: Stanford Democracy Report (with the Korea Democracy Foundation)

Figure 4.2 Number of Individuals Participating in Protest Events by Year

4.1   A Defeat, Severe Repression, and Threat Construction

In the first section of this chapter, I describe how activists experienced a defeat in an earlier wave of mobilization. It provides not only a broader picture of the movement of the 1980s but also a necessary pretext for the changes in activism after the defeat.

4.1.1   A defeat of the activists

The sudden death of Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979 created a power vacuum in the Korean state. Taking advantage of this situation, a group of generals launched a military *coup d'etat* on December 12, 1979. By August of 1980, it became clear that South Korea had a new regime headed by a former general Chun. His rise to power was a bumpy one, however. In the months following the coup, by May of 1980, many student organizations in Seoul managed to issue statements calling for a democratic transition of the political system. They also managed to

launch a mass protest event at the center of the capital (in front of the Seoul train station) on May 15th. For the occasion, one group of participants from Seoul National University, the most elite school in the country, put together a "Memo to Fellow Citizens." In the memo, they called for the public's support for democratization. However, the sense of urgency and particularly severity is less clear than the one of Gwangju activists.

Two days after the protest event and statements, on May 17, 1980, the military announced martial law throughout the nation. The only protest event that followed the shock of the establishment of martial law was the Gwangju Uprising, which took place in a major regional city of Gwangju from May 18th through 27th. The uprising started as a peaceful protest resisting the martial law on May 18th, 1980. It escalated as the martial law troops assaulted demonstrators. As angry citizens joined the demonstrations, the troops responded with mass shooting on May 20th and 21st. Starting on May 21st, some citizens armed themselves and fought against the troops, and the troops retreated to suburban areas. On 27th, the military came back and suppressed the remaining resistance. The Gwangju Uprising, and subsequent memory work, is the focus of the next chapter and will be further elaborated.

After suppressing the uprising, Chun's way to the presidency was cleared. He could to a large extent succeed in imposing silence on the resistance to his presidency. In other words, the spring of 1980 was largely a defeat for the activists and a victory for the military regime. The martial law was in effect until January of 1981.

A former student activist in the mid-80s in Seoul, Back, recalled the mood and situation of the spring of 1980 when the hopes were high but soon dashed:

It was confusing and chaotic. Still, we were positive that things will fall into right places.

Looking back, we realize how naïve we were about the situation.

His overall evaluation gives us a birds-eye view of the time. At the same time, this quote captures the retrospective understanding that activists' assessment of the political situation in May of 1980 was off the mark. In other words, they did not know what they were up against. Instead, they were suffering from the internal conflict, disagreeing on whether they should focus on school issues or society-wide issues. For instance, he recalls that the majority view in his school was to move from school issues to social issues only incrementally.

After this defeat, activists were in shock. It was a lot to process. One of the things they had to process was that they were wrong about what they were up against. Activists in the capital city also realized that it was a regional city of Gwangju that made some difference. A student group that was active in Gwangju released their statement on the same day of May 15th. It was titled "Our Resolution for a Decisive Battle." It makes a good contrast to the statement released on the same day in the capital city of Seoul. Whereas the Seoul protesters were moderate and reasonable, those in Gwangju were more militant. In addition to the militant approach to activism, the Gwangju students' statement is very notable in that a self-evaluation of their activism is very critical as following:

> We celebrated small wins on campus and lost sight of a big picture—a battle for democratization of the state. In the meantime, remnants of the previous dictatorship are keeping the initiative of this battle.

Retrospectively, scholars know that their assessment of the political environment was the most accurate. A military junta was acting quite strategically and secretly and activists in the capital city were responding rather than being proactive. After their defeat, activists in other regions (e.g., the capital city of Seoul) had a chance to reflect upon all the events in the spring of 1980.

4.1.2   Threat and high levels of state repression

As Figures 1 and 2 show, the period between 1981 and 1983 was largely one of movement abeyance, or a time of relative lack of movement activities (Taylor 1989). Even after the martial law came to an end, the military regime did not let go of its firm grip on the civil society. In Figure 1, 1981-1983 is practically the only time where the number of repression events was higher than the number of protest events. According to the protest event sourcebook of the Korea Democracy Foundation, the national security agency reported 18 security-related events in the year of 1982 alone. A typical repression event was to charge and convict a group of students or citizens who were reading some books and/or discussing social and political issues. This kind of approach to the civil society made it hard to organize people.

Still, activists organized some protest events and their rationale for organizing started to change from the one of 1980. For instance, organizers of a protest event at Korea University in Seoul on October of 17th, 1980, recalled the time in a testimony:

From mid-September [of 1980], we discussed a lot about it and the point was that we need to let people know about Gwangju. It was the time that you got arrested for a handout [whether it is radical content or not]. We had this idea that Korea University should be doing something.

They were well aware of the risk they were taking. It did not matter whether the contents of a handout or something are radical or not. You could get arrested for having a document on a political matter. Still, the necessity of doing something, or their construction of threat, compelled them to organize an event. With a placard that called for the end of martial law, they launched a demonstration on campus. This protest event was notable enough to get reported to the US Department of State by the US ambassador to South Korea. Likewise, the KDF event data show that similar protest events happened on college campuses such as the Seoul National University

on March 19th and 25th, Seongkyunkwan University on March 31 and May 12, Joongang University on March 31, and Donguk University on May 7th, all in 1981. In terms of numbers of participants, they were small with typically a couple hundred students. They were mainly distributing handouts about the martial law and the massacre in Gwangju. They typically ended quickly, often resulting with some arrests. Still, they organized those events while the state repression was severe and therefore they had to take high risks of arrest.

4.2   Strategic Adaptation and New Environment

The second section of this chapter draws our attention to a result of different assessments of the political environment and the strategic adaptation of activists. The notion of strategic adaptation refers to activists' effort to revise their strategy in light of their evaluation of the political environment and to implement new tactics (McCammon 2012). While my focus is on activists' strategic adaptation, it should also be noted that activists faced some changes in their political environment in late 1983 and early 1984. The military regime took some liberal measures. They allowed expelled students and professors to come back to colleges and stopped regular deployment of police officers on campus. Previous research points to two factors behind these measures: 1) the regime was confident in terms of their performance, especially in terms of the economy; and 2) the regime wanted to show that they were not very "authoritarian," which was necessary because of a scheduled national assembly election in early 1985 (Sohn 1989). Activists working for democracy did not buy the state propaganda for sure. While they made use of this new opportunity, their response to this opportunity shows much more than that.

4.2.1   Learning from the defeat

In September 30 of 1983, the Youth Association for Democratic Movement was established (see Appendix A for the chronology). While this group used the word "youth" in their name, they were not in their teens but mostly in their twenties and some in their thirties. They were mostly college educated—often times from elite schools. This group played an important role in many ways for the South Korean democracy movement. In the second wave of mobilization, this group emerged as a mainstream but militant organization that is comparable to the Student Nonviolent Coordination Committee in the US Civil Rights Movement. In March 1984, they released a statement sharing their point of view.

> Like a climber fearlessly climbs by grabbing every possible edge and crack without thinking of falling, we should proactively make use of every chance however small it may seem. We should turn them into stepping stones for development of our movement.

> We need to strengthen our organizations in each sector [e.g., students, laborers] and prepare for the setbacks that will come for sure. When they come, the strength of organizations will be our shield.

First of all, these quotes demonstrate their courage to take high risks. Likening themselves to climbers, they committed themselves into difficult and challenging activism. Second, they also illustrate an implicit but clear realization that there is no compromise or peace with the current regime. In other statements and periodicals, they call the president a murderer. It was clear that they did not regard the government as legitimate at all. Third and last, they presented a strategy of building and strengthening organizations. In the second wave of

mobilization, this strategy was not only implemented but also contributed greatly to the mobilization.

They came to these realizations after reflection on the failure of the activism in 1980. In the inauguration statement titled "We cannot wait anymore, can we?", they write how they were ill-prepared for the spring of 1980 and call for militant activism. In other words, they perceived a grave threat which would be materialized if they did not act. Based on this construction of threat, they identified the lack of organizations and the mass participation in the movement as the key problem. "In the past three years, we reflected upon our failure," they write, "and the time calls for the youth to devote ourselves to organizing all the intellectuals, religious leaders, politicians, laborers, and farmers who care about the future of the country." In a nutshell, they demonstrated their strategic adaptation: they learned a lesson from the loss in an earlier wave and have a new tactic for the later wave.

Another notable point is that they write about the situation more in terms of necessity than in terms of opportunities. They were well-aware of opportunities of liberal measures that the government took. However, as shown in their understanding that the repression will come back, they did not have any wishful thinking of sustained opportunities but acted on the perceived necessities of activism or simply threat. This in part explains the high level of protest events in Figure 2. It is also worth noting the increasing level of repression events in Figure 2. In 1985, for instance, the government renewed their surveillance of the campus and responded to militant activism harshly.

4.2.2   Emergence of a genre of activist writing

These indications of strategic adaptation may be better understood when observers consider the role of an emergence of a new genre of activist writing: evaluation. I argue that

evaluation, as a genre of activist writing, emerged and became established in the 1980s and it helped the strategic adaptation of the movement. The aforementioned inaugural statement of the Youth Association incorporated "evaluation" into their statement. But, as a genre of writing, it became more widespread and regular.

Activist organizations produced many kinds of written documents. When they were primarily targeting the public, those documents typically came in the forms of statements or newsletters. Though those documents could also be occasionally self-reflective, they do not engage full-fledged evaluations characteristically. However, when they were primarily targeting their members, a section of evaluation became a staple in this time period. For instance, the writers would comment on a recent episode of protest or their activities in the past year or quarter. By the mid-1980s, movement organizations regularly produced evaluations of their activism.

Another indication that shows how it became an established practice is that evaluation became a part of the activists' regular writing. For instance, as they reported the development of an event, they included evaluation of it. As they wrote about prospects regarding near future, they evaluated their previous activism up to that point. In other words, evaluation became part of repertoire of activist writing.

Anybody can evaluate anything. But, when activists evaluate their activism systematically and regularly, it puts them in a position to engage in strategic adaptation more readily. The first step of strategic adaptation is to recognize signals. When engaging in evaluation regularly, it makes activists more prepared to recognize any and all notable changes in the political environment. More importantly, when evaluating their activism, activists would presumably be much more open to a revision of tactics when it seems necessary. It is not

coincidental that the genre of evaluation became an established practice for the movement when they became more strategic compared to their activism in 1980.

This practice of evaluation also directly helped implement the relatively new and revitalized tactic of coalition building. For instance, in the document they produced in the fall of 1986, the Youth Association comment in detail on different sections of movements such as labor, farmers, the poor, or women's organizations. The title of the document reads "Evaluation and Reflection on the National Democratic Movement of the 1980s." They deeply appreciated that they were all part of a movement serving the same purpose—democratization.

4.2.3   Work on coalitions and coalition building

Based on the strategic evaluation, activists working for democracy in South Korea built their coalitions. Still, it took substantial work. One way of doing this was to use their publications to inform their members about other organizations' activities. In other words, periodicals published by organizations did a lot of work on solidarity building. *The Road to Democratization* was a regular publication of the Youth Association. In the periodical, they regularly reported on the development of the movement on campus, in labor organizations, farmers, and religious groups. Likewise, *the Democratic Labor* which was a periodical of the Workers' Association always reported on the development of the democracy movement while they used most of their space for issues directly related to labor rights.

Occasionally, state repression gave activists momentum to expand their coalitions. In response to a case of police brutality against workers, organizations such as the Youth Association, the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR), and others organized a press conference to condemn police brutality on November 12th of 1984. When a taxi driver and union organizer set himself on fire on November of 30th, 1984, the NCDR,

religious groups, and the Council of People's Democratization Movement (CPDM) released a combined statement and also organized a commemoration for the activist. Likewise, when students carried out a militant protest and faced subsequent repression such as arrest and charge, other groups organized a petition or released a statement supporting the students. On a high-profile case such as arson at the Cultural Center in Busan in 1982 (described in more detail in Chapter Five), it is noteworthy that solidarity groups in the US also co-sponsored a statement. They included the New York Korea Action Committee, North American Coalition for Democracy in Korea, Committee for a New Korea Policy, Church Committee for Home Rule in Asia, and Korea Support Committee.

Thanks to this coalition work, many coalition organizations emerged in the years 1984 and 85. The three most notable are the Council of Movement for People and Democracy (CMPD: *minminhyup*), the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NCDR: *kukminhoeui*), and the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCMR: *mint'ongnyŏn*). In 1985, college students also succeeded in building a coalition organization of their own on April 19th: the National Association of University Student. But, most importantly, these coalitions were necessary developments of the strategic adaptation of the democracy movement.

4.2.4   The culmination of the second wave in 1986-87

In his New Year address on January 16th of 1986, the President Chun officially announced the postponement of the discussion on an amendment of the constitution. If amended, the constitution would require a direct election for a new president which was scheduled to happen in late 1987. In response to the announcement, activists spearheaded by the CMPD made an unprecedented decision: they decided to work with a main opposition party of Sinmin Party to

launch a nation-wide campaign. The campaign aimed to get 10 million people's signatures supporting the constitutional amendment. In a major city near the capital, Incheon, a mass demonstration happened for the campaign on May 3rd of 1986. It was a very successful campaign also in the sense that state agents frequently claimed that opposition party members should discuss such a matter in national assembly rather than in the streets.

The conflict around the constitutional amendment continued to dominate the discussion of political and protest organizations until the summer of 1987. The Chun administration came up with different options to negotiate with the opposition parties but it did not work out. On April 13th of 1987, President Chun announced again that he was not open to revise the constitution. It was the so-called "Defense of the Constitution" speech. Activist organizations responded by building a coalition of coalition organizations. Combining two already gigantic organizations (NCDR and PMCDR), activists established the National Movement Headquarters for Democratic Constitution (NMHDC: *kungmin undong ponbu*). This is the organization that launched the protest event of June 10th of 1987 which is now remembered as the June Democratization Movement.

4.3   Chapter Summary and Discussion

This chapter has attempted to describe the broad mechanisms of mobilization in the South Korean democracy movement in the 1980s. I focused on the activists' assessment of the political environment and its impacts on strategic choices and subsequent development of the movement. Activists in the spring of 1980 lacked militant approaches to the movement. The rise of Chun's administration and the failed uprising in Gwangju was a painful defeat for the activists. But, after the defeat, they started to interpret the political environment more in terms of the

necessity—an indicator of threat—and less in terms of opportunities. This kind of political assessment allowed activists adapt their strategy and build a strong movement in 1984-1987.

The construction of threat first allowed protest events during the height of state repression in 1981 through 1983. Fully appreciating the high risk they were taking, student activists distributed handouts and organized demonstrations because they felt they had to. As they understood the government headed by Chun as an ultimate threat, no matter how many civilian ministers he had in his cabinet or how many liberal measures they took, they relentlessly organized and worked on coalition building throughout the 1980s. When laborers got arrested, student activists got the word out to the public. When student activists got arrested, religious organizations organized petitions. Ultimately, the coalition got broader and bigger to the extent that it enabled the mass protest of June 1987 where not only activists but also middle-class citizens (characterized by suits and ties) participated in the protest events.

This strategic adaptation process of the South Korean democracy movement seems to suggest the critical role of evaluation in the process. McCammon (2012:4) suggested that there are four steps in strategic adaptation: 1) recognition of signals; 2) assessment and evaluation of activism in light of the information; 3) revision of tactics; and 4) implementation. With the unmistakable defeat, activists re-evaluated their approach and adopted a new approach: radical confrontation while broadening coalitions. In this process, the practice of evaluating their activism became a routine. It might be possible to theorize that, the level of strategic adaptation of a movement group is related to the extent to which the group incorporates the practice of evaluation into their repertoire of activism. As briefly discussed earlier, when activists evaluate their activism systematically and regularly, it puts them in a position to have strategic adaptation more readily. It makes activists more prepared to recognize any and all notable changes. Even

more importantly, when evaluating their activism, activists are much more open to revision of tactics when it seems necessary. There could be variation in the extent to which an organization incorporates the practice, especially when a significant portion of members do not find it a useful allocation of their time and efforts.

In Chapter Two, I theorized that while activists acting upon opportunities tend to scale back when the risk goes up, activists acting upon threats might not scale back their activism. This chapter's findings do not give us a definitive support for that claim. They do not solve the puzzle of the curious effect of repression. However, they do seem to suggest that the democracy movement's successful mobilization in the height of state repression was possible due to its threat construction. Connecting this phenomenon with the later wave of mobilization, we can theorize that societies that mobilize while under severe repression would be more likely to successfully mobilize down the road when there are more opportunities. In other words, protest events during the height of state repression would indicate the extent to which the activists would mobilize later when opportunities arise. This would indicate how well prepared activists are for the changes whether opportunities continue to rise or state repression resumes.

While this chapter elaborated on the coalition aspect of the movement's successful strategy, it has not elaborated on the radicalization aspect. In the next chapter, I describe a particular mechanism of radicalization in the South Korean democracy movement: memory work.

CHAPTER 5.   REMEMBERING GWANGJU: MEMORY WORK IN THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT, 1980-1987

The previous chapter illustrated the broad mechanisms of mobilization in the South Korean democracy movement in the 1980s. In this chapter, I focus on a particular mechanism of mobilization and radicalization of activists: memory work. Memory work refers to the active work of commemorating an individual or event through individualized or collective action using speeches, sites, and celebrations (Jensen 2007). It is one of the meaning-making mechanisms activists can use so that 1) they can help other members of society to recognize the past as relevant and salient; and 2) they can share their point of view. In this chapter I ask: How did democracy activists use the memory of the Gwangju Uprising between 1980 and 1987 to facilitate the democracy movement?

While I briefly described the uprising earlier in this dissertation, I will provide more detail here. The Gwangju Uprising was a 10-day episode of protest that took place in the southwestern city of Gwangju in May 1980, beginning on May 18. At the beginning of this period, during martial law, military troops assaulted peaceful demonstrators. When angry citizens joined the protest and their number reached about 40,000, the military responded with a mass shooting in broad daylight. In response to that, some citizens began to arm themselves to fight against the troops. The troops retreated to suburban areas for several days, but then came back with thirty tanks and crushed the remaining resistance. To deploy that many units, the military regime convinced, and to a certain extent fooled, the US commander (Wickham 1999). This is the source of a US complicity issue which turned out to be a beginning point of anti-Americanism in Korea. As for casualties, the best estimates available today suggest about five hundred civilians dead and over three thousand injured. Currently, the event is officially

recognized as a part of the democracy movement in Korea. The government started to recognize it as such as early as 1988, despite the conservative nature of the government at the time. Globally, it is often likened to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, or for some, the Paris Commune of 1871 (Shin and Hwang 2003).

Historical research on this empirical case has documented the significance of this failed uprising for the participants of the democracy movement (Shin and Hwang 2003). By 1986, the movement was successful enough to bring in many new participants, as shown in Figure 4. 2. They labeled the regime a military dictatorship when it allowed a major election in 1985 and did fairly a good job managing its economy. In other words, the regime was more of what political scientists call electoral authoritarianism rather than a sheer dictatorship. How did people radicalize like that? Opportunity alone in 1985 and 1986 does not explain it; historical research directs our attention to this uprising of Gwangju to help explain the radicalization process of the movement participants.

When addressing the research question, three types of mechanisms in eventful democratization (della Porta 2014) as well as three dimensions of collective identity (Gongaware 2011; Polletta and Jasper 2001) provide a set of mechanisms that can appear in successful mobilizations. They are cognitive, relational, and emotional mechanisms. In addition to that, this case of memory work allows us to delve into how memory work creates a powerful social force. To put it another way, when can memory work make a big impact, and through what kind of trajectories? Jansen (2007) argued that there are three criteria or dimensions of memory: 1) salience, or how well it is remembered; 2) valence, or whether it is remembered positively, negatively, or ambivalently; and 3) ownership, or whether it is owned by protagonists, antagonists, or neither. Using the empirical case of the South Korean democracy movement and

memory work, I am refining our understanding of memory work by illustrating process and mechanisms of memory work and its impact.

In the roughly seven-year-long period between the Gwangju Uprising and June 1987, the memory work evolved in three stages. My findings are reported in three sections chronologically. Each section begins with descriptions of the development of memory work and mobilization. Then, I analyze and discuss the status of memory at each stage and three ways the memory work helped mobilization. Specifically, I describe the changes in the memory of Gwangju in terms of salience, valence, and ownership in three phases and highlight a particular mobilizing mechanism that was most visible in each phase of memory work.

I use a variety of archival data or primary documents such as statements, memos, leaflets, brochures, minutes, personal and organizational correspondence, and published memoirs that activists and activist organizations produced from 1980 through 1987 that made reference to the uprising; they add up to about 1,200 pages of material. To triangulate them, I used secondary materials that archives or researchers have produced such as *Chronology of the Democracy Movement* report of the Korea Democracy Foundation as well as newspapers and government documents. For the analysis, I use content analysis, similar to the approach that I used in Chapter Four. My approach was partly a deductive process to the extent that I had a few themes in mind to look for and, also partly an inductive process to the extent that I was open to unanticipated "emergent" themes. In the archival data, people often make references to the event (or "May 18th") and memory work is a primary reason but not the only reason to do so. The references to the event without purposes of honoring, celebrating, or preserving the memory are not memory work but just referencing. The references, therefore, were not included in further analysis.

5.1   The First Phase (May 1980 – March 1982): Picking up from the Shock

The first phase of memory work covers the time period between the uprising and a militant protest event in March 1982. Given the repressive nature of this time period, during which martial law was in place for most of the time, it was largely a period of "imposed" silence. There were notable exceptions but it was hard to disseminate information about what some people referred to as the "Gwangju Incident." However, the later phases built on what had happened during this phase where activists picked up themselves from the shock of the repression of the Gwangju Uprising and, eventually, mobilized successfully for democracy.

5.1.1   The development of the first phase

During and in the wake of the Uprising, participants and observers tried to get the word out about the event—why and how it happened and how it was different from what the government told the public. According to the government, it was a riot—a communist-instigated rebellion at worst and an unpleasant incident at best. Foreign press got some footage and reports sent to their media. In response to this coverage, concerned citizens and expatriates in the United States and Germany made statements supporting the citizens of Gwangju and criticizing the brutal repression of the regime (both in English and Korean). However, unbiased reports were virtually unavailable in the domestic newspapers. The following short and poem-like leaflet from reporters of a regional newspaper, *Jeonnammaeil*, is quite telling about the circumstances in Gwangju in specific and South Korea in general.

To the owner of *Jeonnammaeil*,

We saw it.
We clearly saw that people were being dragged like dogs and dying.
But, we failed to put it in print.

Hence we are ashamed and laying down our pens.

1980. 5. 20

Reporters of *Jeonnammaeil*

Rather than relying on the media, therefore, observers of the event had to rely on leaflets, handouts, and statements that could be distributed in person. In May and June, there were more than 10 different documents that were distributed by individuals and groups such as professors of Jeonnam University, Gwangju citizens, people from Jeonnam province in Seoul, and Catholic priests of the Gwangju Archdiocese. However, there was no sign that shows the messages got across to the people in other regions. Instead, it seemed like silence filled the air. One of the observers of the Uprising and crackdown found the silence of the public unbearable. A college student, Kim Uigyi, circulated a leaflet denouncing the brutal nature of the regime and killed himself in Seoul three days after the Uprising. A week later, a laborer, Kim Jongtae, burned himself in protest of the repression, stating: "I'd throw my body and burn myself if just a few fellow compatriots find courage [to stand up against the regime]."

However, the state repression was high and those protests failed to build momentum. By March 1982, there were only two groups of people that consistently kept making references to the 1980 Uprising in a visible way: 1) those directly affected by the event, most notably families of the imprisoned in relation to the Uprising; and 2) priests from the Gwangju Archdiocese. The families wrote a number of letters to the regime, allies, and the general public so that those imprisoned would get a pardon. In other words, they were referring to the event for practical reasons, to earn an "amnesty." It was the second group that was engaging in memory work. As conscientious observers, priests organized masses in remembrance of the victims of the Uprising despite frequent bans on such assemblies from the regime. It was primarily for consolation of

those directly affected by the event in the region. In other words, it was less political than the ones in later stages of memory work.

In light of this general pattern, it is noteworthy that some college student activists organized protest events and, when they did so, often distributed information regarding the event in Gwangju. In October of 1981, activists from Seoul National University, who often led students' activism in South Korea, made a statement against the "Fascist" regime although they did not make an explicit reference to the "Gwangju Incident" at all. However, in October of 1980, students from Korea University organized a demonstration and one of four things they wrote on a placard was proper dealings with the massacre in Gwangju. Former student activists also recalled that they distributed handouts titled as "Chun Massacres Gwangju Citizens" in the wake of the event.

There is no reason to believe that these handouts, due to their limited reach, made a direct impact on the public in this phase because most of them were small. But, the first phase ended with a violent protest event in March 1982 that was inspired by those kinds of firsthand accounts of the Gwangju Uprising. One of the leaflets created by an observer, Kim Hyeonchang, inspired this protest event. Three theology college students led by Moon Bushik set fire to the US Cultural Center in the city of Busan on March 18, 1982, burning down the Center's first floor. A few others distributed leaflets accusing the military regime and the US of complicity in dealing with the Uprising (as described above). One college student who had been studying in the center was killed and three others were injured. In the final statement during his trial, Moon summarized his motivation: "I, a college student, would not be standing here [as a defendant] if we had not had the Gwangju Incident."

5.1.2   Memory work and mobilization

As introduced earlier, social movement scholars recognize three sets of mechanisms that appear in successful mobilizations: cognitive, emotional, and relational mechanisms. In this first phase of memory work and mobilization, the most notable mechanism is that of emotions. Memory work, or the active work of keeping the memory alive by giving oral testimonies and distributing written accounts, triggered a "moral shock" among activists (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). That shock motivated them to take extremely high risks associated with militant activism. In the final statement in his trial, the leader of the arson, Moon Bushik said: "Whenever I think of the Gwangju Incident, my blood runs the other way round. So I won't be recording all the detail that arouses my deepest concern." Here is what his collaborator thinks: "I participated in the arson to accuse the military government for the Gwangju citizens' sacrifice. People speak of martyr's spirit. I think a religious person demonstrates it when she stands against military government at the risk of her life." They knew what kinds of risks they were taking. Still, they did not mind them. More importantly, they attribute their motivation to the shock and anger in response to their learning of what happened in Gwangju.

Still, the memory of Gwangju would score poorly if I use the Jansen (2007)'s criteria of salience, valence, and ownership. It was not salient because of the "silence" imposed by the state. It was definitely not a total "silence" but, except for the small number of attempts to publicize the event, it seemed to be on track to be forgotten outside of the city of Gwangju itself. The memory was also negative in general. The state named it a riot (*pokdong*). "The incident (*satae*)" was the de-facto official and the most frequently used name. Even the activist who carried out a violent protest called it an incident. However, in the handouts, activists referred to the event with a different label: massacre (*haksal*). It is a distinctive label that is clearly different from the

state's label of incident. As they used this label, activists regarded the event as an example of state violence and repression. Still, that does not necessarily make a memory a positive one.

Lastly, it should be noted that, with exceptions of the directly affected ones and some religious leaders in the city of Gwangju, there were no groups that tried to own the memory. The government just labeled it as a riot and did not really mention it again. Student activists referred to it as a massacre and accused the military regime of wrongdoing but did not make attempts to get associated with the event more closely. But, this was about to change in the next phase.

5.2   The Second Phase (March 1982 – May 1985): Reinterpretation

In the second phase, I find that the memory work developed dramatically. Activists shifted to an ownership of the memory and presented a drastically different narrative of the event. In so doing, they provided an alternative narrative which could challenge the state-authorized narrative.

5.2.1   The development of the second phase

The burning of the US Cultural Center in March 1982 shook South Korea, and two people, the leader of the arson and the writer of an account on the event, were sentenced to death (though it was not because of the civilian casualties but because of a threat to national security). Though it may have been very unpopular and sensational among the public, the arson and subsequent trial gave other activists a chance to raise awareness of the unjust nature of the state's dealing with the Uprising as well as to promote solidarity actions among activists. Christian-affiliated organizations as well as the United Movement for Democracy & Unification in Korea made statements in support of the activists who were charged. In February of 1983, a Christian organization organized a public worship to petition an amnesty. It also drew the attention of

concerned citizens and representatives in the United States. An open letter to President Chun from the New York-based The Council for Democracy in Korea was signed by 24 congressional sponsors and other civic organizations.

The arson event in March 1982 also marks the beginning of the second phase because it led to new developments in memory work about Gwangju, both in terms of numbers and qualities. Statements from religious leaders became more political and more critical of the regime. In July of 1982, the Ministers' Conference was held and they released a statement in both Korean and English. They stated: "[The Chun administration], at its very beginning, brought about a terrible crime against God and man in Gwangju City." Compared to the earlier commemoration and consolation of those directly affected by the massacre, their statement in the summer of 1982 shows the change of their tone and purpose.

Student activists also made statements and condemned the massacre in Gwangju more frequently. However, it should be noted that in 1982 and 1983, the event was primarily remembered as a "massacre" or "incident." The term massacre (*haksal*) invokes an image of passive victims. The term incident (*satae*) means an unpleasant turmoil and was the most often used and quasi-official label of the event until 1987. It was only among activists in Gwangju who used a label of "uprising" as early as 1982 as in their statements such as "What Should We Learn from the Gwangju Uprising?" In comparison with the other two, the term uprising (*bonggi* or *hangjaeng*) gives more agency to the actors and invokes a more confrontational image.

Things changed with the establishment of the Youth Association for Democratic Movement in September 1983. This group both re-interpreted the 1980 event and embraced it. In fact, in a statement released on the fourth anniversary of the Uprising, the group placed the event in the lineage of popular movements in modern Korean history such as the 1894 Peasants

Uprising, the liberation movement against Japanese Imperialism and the April 19 "Revolution" of 1960. This is a significant move because it allowed the interpretation of the event to be a positive one. They also stated: "We should be reborn as sons and daughters of Gwangju with fighting spirit." They evidently tried to inherit legacies of an event that was called by the government as a riot (*pokdong*).

It is noteworthy that this group is the first documented group without direct ties to the city of Gwangju that used the label of People's Uprising (*minjung hangjaeng)* for the event. Before the democratic transition of 1987, the term uprising was only popular among the activists and activist organizations that had direct ties to the city of Gwangju or Jeonnam Province. The label "Gwangju Incident" was still the quasi-official and most often used label included in statements of most groups like "Human Rights Declaration of 1984" of Korean Protestant Church Association and "Dismissed Reporters of 1980 Speak Out." Even the Youth Association used the label of incident when they released more public-friendly statements.

In addition to the label "uprising," organizations that had direct ties to the city of Gwangju started to use another label in 1984: *Ueguh* or Righteous Action. In particular, organizations of or for the participants of the Uprising started to add that term to their organizational names. It should be noted the label was most popularly used to describe a violent protest of the liberation movement against Japanese Imperialism. Probably the best known example is An Jung-geun's assassination of Ito Hirobumi, four time Prime Minister of Japan, in October 1909 in protest of the colonization of Korean peninsula by Japan.

Given such variation between organizations in Gwangju and those in other regions, the Youth Association's reinterpretation was particularly noteworthy. Encouraged by this development, organizations in Gwangju started to engage in three distinct but related processes

of memory work in this phase. First, in November of 1984, the Jeonnam Youth Association was established. In a statement, they proclaimed: "We refuse any sympathy or regret associated with 'tragedy of Gwangju.' Instead, we urge contemporary youth that, on behalf of fallen souls for democratization, we reproduce the spirit of Gwangju nationwide." Second, in April of 1985, they self-labeled as "glorious inheritor of People's Uprising." Third, they launched a plan to build a memorial tower of the Gwangju Righteous Action, which was signed and supported by a number of organizations.

5.2.2   Memory work and mobilization

In this second phase of memory work and mobilization, significant changes occurred. In terms of mobilizing mechanisms, a cognitive mechanism is the most evident. Memory work radicalized movement participants in ways that they became completely disillusioned with the legitimacy of the state. Moon Bushik, who committed the arson in March 1982, stated: "Even the dictator Hitler did not massacre his own people."[4] His collaborator Kim Eunsook stated: "I learned about the detail of Gwangju Incident for the first time in some Christian group meeting in 1980. I thought it is the worst tragedy in 5,000 years long Korean history." As activists learned about the event from firsthand accounts, they understood the head of state or the general-turned President Chun as a murderer. They literally called him a murderer in statements. This radicalization is highly notable partly because of the government's attempts to picture the administration as a successful one with mostly technocrats in the cabinet. As noted before, the administration also did a decent job managing the economy of the country.

The memory of Gwangju went through significant changes as well. In terms of salience, the memory work on the Uprising revived how well the people remembered the event. Though

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[4] While historically inaccurate, this quote is still powerful, as it shows that the activist saw the Korean state as doing something even worse than what Hitler did.

the state gravely censored the media and suppressed distribution of the information regarding the event, militant protest such as the arson of 1982 and memory work made the event a little more salient than it was in the first phase. In May of 1984, students in seventeen colleges also organized demonstrations in commemoration of the event.

This revival cannot be explained without understanding the changes in terms of the ownership of the event. In particular, the Youth Association for Democratic Movement, among others, re-interpreted the event and embraced it. This really turned what could have been simply a regional event into a national one. Previously, there were no protagonists other than people in Gwangju who were quite intimately related to the event. The Youth Association claimed the ownership of the memory in a dramatically positive light. This attempt to own the memory made a difference in the valence of the memory. It was previously either negative or at best ambivalent. But, it developed into more positive memory at least among activists—notably, both in Gwangju and the ones outside of Gwangju. Still, one should not exaggerate how positively it was remembered in this phase. It was still an incident or massacre rather than an uprising for most people.

5.3   The Third Phase (May 1985 – June 1987): Contention

The third phase is distinctive from the second phase because of the full-blown contention between the state-authorized narrative and the popular narrative. A militant protest event and subsequent support from coalition organizations compelled a prominent state agent to repeat the state-authorized narrative. However, it prompted even more widespread memory work on the Uprising among activists working for democracy in South Korea.

5.3.1   The development of the third phase

Seventy-three organized college students launched another episode of militant protest targeting a US Cultural Center in May 1985. This time it was the one in Seoul, the nation's capital city. They dashed in the building on May 23 and stayed there for three full days until they walked out on May 26 under the condition of having access to a press conference. The leaders were imprisoned and prosecuted. In support of the students, however, movement organizations released statements calling for a truth commission on the Gwangju Incident. They included the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCMR) and the Council of Movement for People and Democracy (CMPD). The major opposition party, Sinmin Party, also stated that "the occupation of the Cultural Center happened because the government did not try to find the truth about the incident" and they "understand the students' heartfelt call for the truth."

The event and its aftermath prompted a state agent, Minister of Defense Yun, to deliver a "Government Report on Gwangju Incident" in front of the national assembly in June 1985. The report defined the incident as a riot and repeated a state-authorized narrative about the Uprising. However, the state could not stop movement organizations from labeling the event as a massacre (*haksal*), people's uprising (*minjung hangjaeng*), resistance for democracy (*minjuhwa hangjaeng*), and righteous action for democracy (*Ueguh.*) In fact, Protestant organizations that used to call the event an "incident" started to call it a People's Uprising in June 1985. It makes sense that they used to call it an incident because moderate groups tend to try not to contradict the government. However, as the full-fledged contention between the state-authorized narrative and that of the activists unfolded, moderate groups started to align with the radical interpretation of the event.

This contention seems to have helped the popular counter-narrative become richer. In August 1985, a Gwangju-based movement organization declared: "We should make it clear for

ourselves that we were not rioters but democracy fighters and rejoin the movement for democracy." In 1986, a farmers' organization made an association between their cause of farmers' welfare and the ideal of the Uprising. A regional college commemorated individual activists who died in the Uprising yet were not in leadership positions. On the sixth anniversary of the Uprising, an organization referred to the event as People's Revolution. In a commemoration speech, a committee for building a memorial tower to the victims also stated: "Dear souls! Rest in peace and protect us till the end."

Another example of memory work in May 1985 marked a qualitatively different phase of memory work on the Gwangju Uprising. Jeonnam Youth Association for Democratic Movement published a book on the Gwangju Uprising[5] that was immediately banned but still was circulated among underground activists. The author, Jae-eui Lee, was a young participant and survivor of the Uprising. In early 1985, now just married, he risked another arrest and put together a report on 10 days of the Uprising. In the author's preface to the English edition, he talks of the motivation: "We, the insurgents, struggled to end the isolation by spreading the word of the uprising to the rest of world. Who would know our truth, if we were all killed? How would history remember us?"

5.3.2 The memory work and mobilization

In this phase, a relational mechanism of mobilization was most notable. Relationally, memory work helped building collaboration and solidarity among activists working for democracy. Activists may have different perspectives, strategies, and tactics. However, when militant student activists were sentenced to death in 1982 or when they occupied the US Cultural

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[5] This book was later translated into English entitled *Gwangju diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age* in 1999. It was sponsored by the UCLA Center for Korean Studies and published as part of UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series.

Center in 1985, numerous movement and non-movement organizations issued statements and organized petitions to support them. In Gwangju, the issue of building a memorial tower also gave another impetus to build networks of movement organizations from 1985. In sum, throughout the 1980s, the Gwangju Uprising and memory work gave activists something to hold on to together and broaden the circle of sympathizers, even despite the repression. In May of 1985, students from 14 colleges in Seoul and 25 colleges in other regions organized protest events to call for truth and investigation of the event.

It is even more notable that radical and moderate activists aligned their interpretations of the event. Even moderate groups adopted "uprising" and avoided "incident" by June of 1985. After the state agents' clear repetition of their narrative, the label of "uprising" became more widespread.

The memory of Gwangju went through a quite dramatic trajectory of changes in terms of three criteria in this phase. It became more salient to the extent a prominent state agent had to address it in front of national assembly. In terms of valence, it was still ambivalent among the public as indicated by uses of different labels as massacre, incident, and uprising. However, it was very positive among activists as the convergence of the main label as uprising and emergence of new labels such as people's revolution and righteous action. In terms of ownership, the Youth Association's attempts to own the memory helped other groups follow the suit.

5.4   Chapter Summary and Discussion

This chapter has examined ways in which memory work on the Gwangju Uprising evolved and shaped mobilization for democracy in South Korea. Cognitively, memory work radicalized movement participants in ways that they became completely disillusioned with the legitimacy of the state. That disillusion allowed them to call President Chun a murderer.

Emotionally, memory work deeply motivated activists to take high risks of activism. Even after some were sentenced to death for the arson of 1982, activists continued to talk about the injustice of the dealings of the Uprising with little regard to their lives in their final statements. Relationally, memory work helped building collaboration and solidarity among activists working for democracy. It was a notable shift that organizations that had used to call the event as "incident" started to call it an "uprising" in late 1985, less than a month after the occupation of the US Cultural Center in Seoul.

Using Jansen (2007)'s model of memory work, I also documented how activists increased the salience, reconstructed the valence of the memory, and owned the narratives of the memory. Through militant protests inspired by the memory work, activists drew people's and state's attention to the memory. Through radical re-interpretations of the "riot and "massacre" narratives, activists reconstructed the valence of the memory from negative or passive to positive and active. The shift in labels activists use demonstrates the change of valence. These changes would have not happened if activists (in places other than Gwangju) had not owned the memory, exemplified by the Youth Association's statement in May 1984: "We should be reborn as sons and daughters of Gwangju with fighting spirit."

This case of memory work help us better understand the memory work as a social force, especially a powerful one as shown in this case. I suggest that ownership is a key among three criteria of memory. It is hard to imagine that the changes of salience and valence would have happened had it not been for the organizations like the Youth Association. They did not fear getting associated with an event that the government called a riot. More importantly, they were able to present a radically different interpretation of the event which enabled others to follow. Although this radical interpretation was available to residents of the regional city of Gwangju

before this group had it, it could have remained as a regional event had it not been adopted by groups based in the capital city of Seoul. In other words, they were radical enough to present an alternative narrative and they were mainstream enough to have authority among the public. Therefore, I argue that the ownership could be the most important factor among three criteria of salience, valence, and ownership.

On a more abstract level, for memory work to be impactful, it seems necessary that there is an inherent conflict between a narrative sponsored by state or authorities and an alternative narrative. Using a chemistry analogy, I am suggesting that the more pressure from the state there is, the more explosive a subculture of memory can be. Granted that there should be an alternative narrative that is supported by substantial groups, it could be the case that state repression ironically increases the impact of memory work on society through mobilization. Using the language of causal inference, I would theorize that state repression is a pre-condition, the existence of an alternative interpretation a necessary condition, and the moderate groups' alignment of interpretation with an alternative narrative is a sufficient condition for mobilization.

Memories of repression of protest are rather common among polities that have not been fully democratized. What do activists working for democracy do with those memories? The case of South Korea between 1980 and 1987 shows cognitive, emotional, and relational mechanisms of mobilization that have been partially shaped by memory work. Though there should be wide variations by countries, others might experience similar dynamics in the development of movement for democracy. It could be especially true if they have an event as dramatic as the Gwangju Uprising. One example is the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Eaglestone (1991) made extremely striking parallels between these two events. Scholars might want to observe a trajectory of memory work on the protests. All in all, I suggest that memory work could be

relevant to a wide variety of cases, especially in countries with a history of violent repression of

protests.

CHAPTER 6.   FRAMING POLITICAL CHANGE

The previous chapters showed the dynamics and mechanisms through which activists recruited, mobilized, and maintained their activism. This chapter, on the other hand, takes a broader view to include the interaction between the movement, the state, and the public. It draws on the literature on collective action frames and contributes to an understanding of a macro-level social change: democratization. It is a robust finding that economic development and democracy are positively correlated (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). However, studies often assume that a democratic transition itself is a proof of a change in belief system. If a cultural change is not an outcome of democratic transition but a cause or a precondition, scholars need to show the processes through which such a cultural shift happens before a democratic transition.

By focusing on frames that are expressions of beliefs and values, this chapter takes a cultural approach to democratic transition. Or, rather, it focuses on a society that launched mass movements for democracy and traces back the process through which the movement frames converged to two main prognostic frames, or frames that suggest a solution to a problem of concern (Benford and Snow 2000). Specifically, I document what competing frames were available and how major organizations' frames evolved from 1985 to 1987. But, the scope of this study also includes state claims-makers. While social movement research has seldom treated the state as a claims-maker, framing is relevant to both challengers and state actors as much as threat is relevant to both challengers and state actors. Both of them have goals and their goals are often presented in the form of prognostic frames or suggested forms of political changes. As an empirical study of a society that went through a democratic transition by pressure from a mass mobilization, this chapter will further illustrate and demonstrate the usage of frames for explaining social change.

In terms of the time scope, I focus on the time between 1985 and 1987, while I include 1980-1981 to a limited extent. In February 1985, the general election of South Korea resulted in a hurriedly organized opposition party becoming a significant minority of the national legislature. It was a surprise for both the civil society and the government. It was also a significant signal, if not a game-changing moment (Lindberg 2009), for the democracy movement. Repression became more costly for the government as activists gained access to more allies in the state. By June of 1987, the democracy movement launched a series of mass protests and converged with two main prognostic frames which were also slogans at protest events: 1) "down with the dictatorship" (*dokjaetado*); and 2) "reform the constitution" (*hoheoncheolpae*)—i.e., to accommodate electoral reform.

In this chapter, I illustrate how those two main frames emerged and became prominent in the democracy movement. For instance, the prognostic frame of the constitutional amendment became a primary frame of the democracy movement, indicated by a national campaign launched by an umbrella organization (the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification, or *mint'ongnyŏn*) by February 1986. In this wave of the movement, the frame first appeared in the "front region" (Kubal 1998) of student groups, or their publications targeting the public, in early October of 1985. However, a claim for revision of the constitution was available in the back region of the movement as early as 1980, though it never seemed to make into the front region. Then, in November 1985, it also appeared in the front region of labor organizations' discourse. Once it dominated the movement discourse, the frame was sure to be noticed by the state. In April 1987, then-President Chun gave a speech, "Defense of the Constitution," in an effort to head off a further discussion of a constitutional revision. For the movement, the speech only seemed to make it clear what the movement should be doing.

In this process, two things are particularly notable. First, the constitutional amendment frame made it to the front region of neither movement organizations nor the public arena until 1985. But, once it entered the front region of the movement, it swiftly became a primary frame of the coalitions. The 1986 campaign, led by opposition politicians as well as an umbrella movement organization, was very successful and the prognostic frame provided one of two most popular rallying words during the massive protest events of June 1987. At the same time, once the frame was available in the front region of the movement, labor movements that had focused on labor issues up until the early 1980s quite swiftly adopted the frame and joined the political campaign.

To better understand this process, I will first look at what goals and prognostic frames the state had. This section will not only provide the general backdrop of movement activities but will also how show state agents were influenced by normative ideas of development, democracy, and advancement. Then, I will describe how a major movement organization responded to frame competition among the movement participants. Lastly, I describe the role of labor activists.

6.1   State Agents' Claims and Development

As early as 1981, the secretariat of President Chun felt the need to publicize their approaches to national policies in English. In collaboration with a presidential spokesperson, the secretariat collected some of speeches of President Chun that he had delivered in 1980-1981 and published them in a book format. The title of the collection is *The 1980s: Meeting a New Challenge*. In those speeches, observers can see their understanding of social and political changes which, I argue, was heavily influenced by the idea of development. First I will report several excerpts from them. But, it was not just the most important state agent, the President, who was tapping into culturally resonant ideas such as political modernization and national

advancement. To show that, I will also draw from stage agents' claims that appeared in newspapers in South Korea and the United States. The second section also reports state agents' claims in 1985-1987, which show the normative influence of democracy.

6.1.1   Theme of development and democracy in President Chun's political agenda

In the aforementioned collection of speeches, President Chun's spokesperson wrote a preface. That preface gives us a broad overview of speeches and basic premises of their political agenda. In it, he declares that "the Korean people have successfully achieved the first goal of national development" by which he refers to industrialization. Defining that "the Republic of Korea has entered the second stage of national development," he states that the administration has deliberated on what they mean by that. He confirms that the new administration set the following as goals of the nation in the 1980s, by which they mean the second stage of national development: "a working democracy, a better life for all, justice in social relations and cultural enrichment." According to them, these are the challenges of the 1980s, and so goes the title of the volume. In the volume, he promises that the speeches "will serve as a reference for an understanding of Korean development in light of the philosophy and style of the President and above all the priority of national policies."

While the previous quotes provide a general overview of the political agenda of the administration, President Chun had more specifics. In an interview with TIME, he elaborated on this idea of second stage or "second takeoff":

This "second takeoff" means more than simply economic growth. It implies a substantial, well-balanced development of various sectors of national life. If refers, for example, to *social development*, structural improvement of industries in order to strengthen their

international competitiveness, and *modernization* of our lives not just materially, but also spiritually and culturally—in short, a material abundance as well as an improved quality of living.

What then should a new political *modus operandi* be like? In answering that question, I emphasize the need for politics to be *modernized* (Chun 1981: 47; emphasis added).

When he said political modernization, he had particular hopes in mind that legislators serve only one term. He claimed that many politicians were engaging in corruption and the promotion of violence and disturbance, which he deemed as going against political modernization. In other words, he was making use of the substantial level of the public's distrust of professional politicians to his advantage. Still, it is evident that he was actively incorporating the idea of modernization, development, and advancement. This theme is recurrent in the speech collection; for instance, he titles a speech for an occasion of a cultural event as "Artists, Writers, and Scholars—the Guiding Light of *National Development*" (my emphasis).

In fact, from the beginning of the regime, President Chun conceptualized and summarized the nature of the state that his administration strove to achieve. In his inaugural address delivered on September 1st of 1980, during the height of state repression, he drew from populist ideas but also revealed something much more ambitious than that:

This land belongs to the nation of people who preserved it with their blood and built with their toil. It is not the nation of the privileged few. Therefore, in the 1980s, we ought to shake off the residual ills of the past and construct *a genuinely democratic welfare state* (Chun 1981:5; my emphasis).

In addition to populist ideas that it is the nation of people, this remark shows the impact of the norm of democracy made on this administration. Retrospectively, it may sound ridiculous that a general-turned-president could claim himself as a leader of that transition. Still, the idea of democracy was normative enough for him to embrace it. Of course, readers can question how sincere the administration was or how deeply they believed in their own words when they crafted these speeches. Still, it is highly noticeable that the ideas of development and democracy were culturally dominant enough that the administration actively incorporated them into their political agenda and rhetoric.

6.1.2   Other state agents and contention in 1985-1987

State agents working for the Chun administration may not also have really believed in the values of democracy. However, they had to make more distance from characteristics of military regime or police state and claim that they were working toward democracy. This tendency was particularly strong for state agents working in the US. In a letter to the *New York Times*, the General Consul of Korea in New York wrote in February of 1985,

> Even though Korea may not be as democratic as the United States at this stage of its development, it is moving toward that goal. The Korean government and its people continue to work to improve the situation. … Why not let us continue our autonomous efforts? … It is very unfair to use such outmoded, far-fetched expressions as "military regime" or "police state" when the Korean cabinet is as civilian-dominated as its U.S. counterpart and when the Korean people have just held a free, open and vibrant national election.

While it is evident that he made this case to minimize the US influence on Korea, it is remarkable how much he emphasized the necessity and importance of democratic change.

As the contention with opposition politicians and the movement escalated in 1985 through 1987, state agents often tried to "divide and rule" moderates and radical activists. One way of doing that was to frame protest events as undemocratic:

> Protest is not a legitimate method in democracy where different interests and conflicts are mediated in the way that guarantees unity of the people. Protest is ultimately violent and undemocratic (Kyunghyang, May 13, 1985).

They also claimed to the public that President Chun was serious about the peaceful transfer of power as it promoted the political development of the country. These efforts of the state agents would be best interpreted in light of their absolute hostility to radical changes, and their simultaneous attempt to hand over power to Chun's longtime collaborator and another general-turned-politician, Noh. Still, they demonstrate how the state incorporated ideas of development and democracy into their claims.

6.2   Frames of the Movement

The second section of this chapter draws attention to a militant but mainstream organization, the Youth Association for Democratic Movement (the Youth Association *hereafter*). I will illustrate how the organization refused to adopt radical frames about political change but adopted more popular frames. To do so, I will first show what radical frames were available and why some claims-makers interpreted the situation in Korean society that way. Then, instead of those frames, I will show what prognostic frames the Youth Association adopted and with what considerations.

6.2.1   Radical prognostic frames

As illustrated in the beginning of this chapter, the success of opposition parties in the election of 1985 boosted the confidence of all the elements of the democracy movement as well as opposition politicians. But, some elements in particular took it as a chance to present radical claims. They diagnosed the primary problem of the Korean society and state as foreign influence and dominance, especially that of the US, as in the dependency theory of international political economy (Lee 1993). They prescribed that the movement's fight should be primarily against "foreign influences" and secondarily against the military regime. Their rationale was that the domestic tyrant is only secondary to the foundational problem of dependency to foreign powers and capital.

> The contradiction of Korean society is that the (US) imperialism dominates the politics, economy, and military of the Korean society. The landlords, domestic capitalists, and the bureaucrats align with the foreign power against its people. Therefore, the transformative movement should liberate the nation and establish people's democracy.

Another radical prognostic frame was one of national unification. This view might sound irrelevant. However, from the perspective of radical elements, this frame is an extension of national independence. In that perspective, the Korean peninsula, which was once dominated by Japanese imperialism, was still subjugated by the US imperialism and global capitalists.

These frames are radical in the sense they suggested more structural and fundamental changes in the Korean society. They are also radical in the sense that the public was less willing to align with this interpretation. For the Korean public in the 1980s, the integration of Korean economy in the global economy was already largely a success story. There may have been some sacrifices such as low wages for a large section of workers which was later alleviated around

1990. But, the subjugation of the Korean economy by the global economy was not largely commensurate with the Korean public's experience (Snow and Benford 1988).

6.2.2   The choice of the Youth Association

The choice the Youth Association made in the period between 1985 and 1987 is very indicative of a movement that is trying to widen the support from the public. As described in the previous chapter on memory work, the Youth Association was in no sense a moderate organization among movement elements, such as religion-based organizations. However, they chose to distance themselves from radical frames that fought against foreign influences or national unification. They were well aware of those frames and acknowledged some merits of those interpretations in their internal documents. However, in late 1986, they got wary of the wide circulation, among the movement participants, of the frame of the fight against the foreign countries (i.e., the US). The Youth Association argued that the frame would not help strategically as it could cause them to lose their focus on the most important struggles, which were for democracy and against the dictatorship.

Their diagnostic frame of dictatorship is evident in the following excerpt from a document they circulated among movement elements in late 1986.

Who knows what the military dictatorship would choose to do to stay in power? Whatever it is, we need to bring together all the democratic elements against the dictatorship and to crush that dictatorship.

Another important theme in this excerpt is that these activists strongly emphasized the need for coalition. Their emphasis was based on strategic evaluation that, without coalitions, the movement cannot succeed. They said:

We need to build coalitions and combined fault-lines against the dictatorship as widely as possible. … The dictator's schemes for staying in power will get clearer and clearer. Then, the public will see the essence of the problem and therefore will contribute to the expansion of the movement. But, this would not be an automatic process as the regime will certainly attempt to divide and rule. Who convinces the public? That is the question that determines who wins and who loses.

Retrospectively, observers can see how prudent the strategy was. This organization's decision to work alongside the public turned out to be instrumental to the successful mobilization of 1987. But, it should be noted that their frames, especially those for movement audiences, also had flavors of radical elements such as nation (*minjok*) and people (*minjung*) modifying the theme of democracy. More importantly, in their reflections in their documents, it is evident that there were well aware of all the radical claims. Yet, they were prudent enough to distance themselves from those claims in the front region of communication.

In sum, there were different interpretations of the primary problem of Korean society among movement participants. Some radical activists identified the subjugation of Korea by foreign powers and global capitalists as the primary problem. Accordingly, they prescribed a fight against the foreign powers as the most important goal of the movement. However, a mainstream (but not moderate) movement organization such as the Youth Association chose the diagnostic frame of dictatorship as their primary frame while building coalitions.

6.3   Labor Activists

In the last section of this chapter, I show how labor activists aligned their interpretation of problems and goals with the democracy movement. To do so, I draw on periodicals published by the Korean Association for Worker Welfare. This organization was established in 1984 and was

instrumental in a series of massive protest events in the summer of 1987 following the big win of the democracy movement in the June of 1987 (KDF 2009). Titled as Democratic Labor, their periodicals not only addressed labor issues but also gave updates on the democracy movement. They covered the general election of February 1985 and then the constitutional revision in 1986-1987. The goal of democracy may not have been more important than labor rights but they were more or less equally treated. In the inaugural issue of the *Democratic Labor*, the secretary general wrote:

> Democracy and rights of workers and farmers—we cannot receive them from somebody but should fight for and gain them.

In addition to its militant approach, what is noteworthy here is the parallel of labor rights and democracy. His opening statement is the closest to the organization's mission statement. He further reveals the goals of the organization.

> We are charged to represent the Korean labor movement and to overcome the limitations of the movement of 70s. We should build coalitions and a mass-oriented movement.

What he means by the "limitations of the movement of 70s" are the tendencies of labor unions and organizations that focus on their own issues within organizations and the dealings with its employers. Much like the democracy movement tried to move beyond the one in the 1970s, labor activists did their part. While their ultimate goals were ensuring labor rights such as the rights to organize and bargain, they show their understanding that those rights were not guaranteed by a military regime. As in December of 1986, their statement says: "Without a public-oriented political struggle, our movement cannot win."

6.4   Chapter Summary and Discussion

This chapter has attempted to help illustrate an aspect of a large scale political and cultural change—democratization and mass mobilization that made it possible. To do so, I focused on activists' and state agents' prognostic frames or claims about ideal political change to happen. First, I showed how the idea of development and democracy had a normative influence on the military regime's political agenda. The ideas were culturally dominant and ideal enough to be adopted by government claims. Then, in the period of 1985-1987 where political claims were highly contested, the state agents had to stick with those goals in principle or at least refrain from being directly against the said goals. In specific, they could attack radical elements of the movement but there were significant constraints in suppressing the opposition politicians and moderates of the movement.

Second, I showed how a militant but mainstream movement organization, the Youth Association, refused to adopt radical frames about political change but adopted more popular frames. They did this very strategically while building coalitions. In the back region of their discussion, they were well aware of radical frames and, to an extent, acknowledged some merits of such interpretations. However, they strongly advised against using those frames for the communication with the public and promoted popular frames of fight against the military dictatorship and constitutional amendment in the "front region" of the movement.

Third, I showed how labor activists aligned their interpretations with the democracy movement. A labor organization like the Korean Association for Worker Welfare had distinct goals of achieving labor rights which were not necessarily the same as the goals of the democracy movement. They ultimately came around and worked along with the movement as they thought they could not win those rights without the success of the democracy movement. In

their prognostic frames, observers see such an understanding that democracy and labor rights go hand in hand.

There are several points to discuss about the implications of these findings. First, what would be the rationale or explanation of the choice the Youth Association made? While activists of the group were not very hostile toward radical claims in the back region, they fiercely defended the popular frames in the front region. This might raise eyebrows of some observers. However, it seems that they did it out of necessity. By doing so, they could stay relevant with the public. It may sound too modest of a goal. But, it is important to remember that the campaign for constitutional amendment was organized by both a movement organization as well as the opposition party (Sinmin Party). Without the strategic choice, or a balancing act (to use the language of McVeigh et al. [2004]), they may have risked losing meaningful contacts with the larger population. Additionally, the frame of military dictatorship must have been much more commensurate to the people's experience than the frames of colonialism, the US imperialism, or dependency on foreigners.

Second, these findings may be interpreted as evidence of the impact of the master-frame of development on a society of developing countries. Spinning off of "economic development," the idea of development in other aspects of a society resonated among claims-makers in Korea—both state and non-state actors. This kind of situation allows a master frame, a frame aligned with established and widespread values, to be an effective tool (Snow and Benford 1992). As a master-frame, the idea of development or progress was culturally dominant across the board. Political development includes (but is not limited to) goals such as rule of law, the due process of election, and protection of civil rights. And, this frame is appealing to everyone—working class as well as middle class. In other words, it is easier to align frames with the larger audience. In

terms of frame alignment, activists did not have to extend or transform frames but they did bridge and amplify frames (Snow et al. 1986). In other words, the audience was more receptive to the message. In contrast, the frame of the "liberation" of the working class was much more challenging to make frame alignment possible, although it was popular among some highly devoted activists.

In addition to the illustrations of a possible role of a master-frame in developing and democratizing countries, these findings also show how contentious fault lines might form in societies of developing countries when they experience the possibility of democratic transition. The literature on democratic transition often referred to class compromise (Neuhouser 1992) or a transformation of the class structure (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Those processes require or assume a precondition of the working class becoming vocal claims-makers. Achieving the minimal organizational strength, those labor organizations may or may not align their goals with other elements in their society that primarily pursue the democratic transition. If they follow the track that happened in South Korea in the mid-80s, it could substantially contribute to the democratic transition. In other words, this case illustrates a possible route of broad-based coalitions across class lines in developing countries, aided by framing.

CHAPTER 7.   CONCLUSIONS

Today, South Korea has a vibrant civil society which is a backbone of its maturing democracy (UNDP 2002). In November 2016, following peaceful protests, President Park Gyun Hye was impeached for political corruption. These events reminded observers, in the peninsula and the world, of the strength of democracy in South Korea. This project has been in part an attempt to help explain the strength of the civil society which was initially developed along with the society-wide mobilizations in the 1980s. By describing and illustrating the mechanisms of the development of South Korea's democracy movement, this dissertation further establishes the link between a robust civil society and a working democracy.

Specifically, this dissertation addressed the following questions about the development of the democracy movement in South Korea: 1) How did activists' threat assessment change during the period between two waves of the movement in the 1980s, and how did these perceptions facilitate mobilization? 2) What are the cognitive, relational, and emotional mechanisms of recruitment processes under severe repression (1981-1984) and the role of memory work on the Gwangju Uprising in the process?; and 3) What were the frames for suggested political changes in 1985-1987 and how did they reflect a cultural shift among the public? All in all, this dissertation has attempted to explain the processes through which the democracy movement developed from 1979 to 1987, with an emphasis on the less understood period of 1981-1984.

In this final chapter, I will first summarize the major findings of this dissertation. Then, I will discuss their implications and significance. In doing so, I will emphasize the gaps in our understanding of non-Western countries and their political changes. I end by discussing the limitations of this dissertation and consider possibilities for future research.

7.1   Summary of Major Findings

I began my empirical analysis in Chapter Four. In that chapter, I investigated the ways in which activists' assessment of the political environment shaped their decisions and in turn the development of each wave of mobilization. I found that, in May of 1980, activists in the regional city of Gwangju had a clearer construction of threat than those in the capital city of Seoul. After the Gwangju Uprising, which was understood by activists as a defeat of citizens against the military regime, activists in the capital city started to have an understanding of what they were up against. This realization helped them to interpret their environment more in terms of threats than in terms of opportunities. I suggested that this understanding helped them to mobilize despite the severe repression of 1980 through 1983, although the protest events were not massive.

Since late 1983, activists' strategic adaptation became more visible in their episodes of mobilizations, and the construction of threat played a key role in that process. The notion of strategic adaptation refers to activists' effort to revise their strategy in light of their evaluation of the political environment and to implement new tactics (McCammon 2012). With the benefit of hindsight, the new strategy of the activists in the mid-1980s could be summed up as militant activism while broadening coalitions. Their militant activism was primarily reported in the Chapter Five and, in Chapter Four, I reported primarily on the work on coalitions. For instance, to help each other get informed and build solidarity, democracy activists reported on labor issues in their publications and labor organizations reported on democratization movement in their periodicals. Other examples of coalition work included a joint protest against police brutality and organizing petitions for student activists by multiple organizations. Building on this coalition work, umbrella organizations could emerge in 1984 and 1985 and further develop in 1986 and 1987.

I also suggested that the strategic adaptation would have not been possible without the emergence of a genre of activist writing—evaluation. Anybody can evaluate anything, but when activists do that in a regular and serious manner, the practice gives them a vantage point from which they are 1) more prepared to recognize any and all important signals in the political environment; and 2) more open to the revision of tactics. I suggest that scholars can further theorize that the level of strategic adaptation of a certain movement group could be related to the level of the practice of evaluation in that group. It is reasonable to expect variation in the extent to which different segments of a movement value the practice or to which different movements use the practice.

In Chapter Five, I focused on a particular cultural mechanism for radicalization of the movement: memory work on a failed uprising. Memory work refers to the active work of commemorating an individual or event through individualized or collective action using speeches, sites, and celebrations (Jansen 1997; Schwartz 1996; Zelizer 1995). Throughout the three-step process of the development of the memory work in the 1980s, this work contributed to mobilization in three ways. Emotionally, it helped movement participants take high risks. Given the severity of state repression, it took moral outrage to participate in activism and the memory helped that happen. Cognitively, it helped the activists to get completely disillusioned about the regime. It allowed student activists to call a sitting president, with a substantially well-performing economy, a murderer. Relationally, the memory work helped with the building and strengthening networks whose members aligned their interpretations of the event with that of radical organizations once the major contention with the state began. All in all, memory work on a failed uprising helped radicalize the movement participants.

To theorize on the process and mechanism of memory work's impact, I emphasized the role of ownership as a key factor among three criteria of memory: ownership, salience, and valence. The memory of the Gwangju Uprising went through a dramatic change between 1980 and 1987 in terms of salience (how well it is remembered), valence (whether it is positively, negatively, or ambivalently remembered), and ownership (whether it is owned by protagonists, antagonists, or by neither of them). However, if it were not for the efforts of owning the memory of organizations like the Youth Association, which was militant enough to present a radical claim and mainstream enough to be trustworthy among the movement organizations, it is hard to imagine that the whole process could have happened.

While Chapter Four and Five focused on the dynamics and mechanisms through which activist recruited, mobilized, and maintained activism, Chapter Six broadened the view to include the interaction between the movement, the state, and the public. To be more specific, I documented political goals of activists as well as state agents presented in the form of prognostic frames, particularly in 1985-1987. To begin with, the ideas of democracy, development, and the welfare state were normative enough that the administration actively embraced them into their political agenda and rhetoric. They also made conscious efforts, at least rhetorically, to distance themselves from the characteristics of the military regime or police state.

On the other hand, activist organizations did a balancing act between radical frames and popular frames. For instance, a militant but mainstream organization, the Youth Association, saw a merit in radical frames but distanced themselves from radical frames. This strategic choice allowed them to be relevant to wide-ranging coalitions and the public agenda, which turned out to be instrumental to successful mobilization in 1987. In the meantime, the labor activists aligned their interpretations of problems and goals with the democracy movement. They made a parallel

between labor rights and a democratic transition. To them, the political development was a necessary step toward a more just economic development.

Previous studies on the movement and the democratic transition of South Korea often emphasized the role of opportunity in the 1984-1987 period (e.g., Choe and Kim 2012). Across three empirical chapters, I explored the roles of threat, memory work, and frames in the process of mobilization. Overall, my research yields a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the democracy movement and how activists recovered from the repression in 1980, and how they created a viable movement from 1984 onward. In the next section, I discuss the implications of the overall findings for our understanding of social movements and democratization in non-Western societies.

7.2   Implications and Significance

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to apply a sociological perspective to a topic that is often treated from the perspective of other disciplines. In particular, whereas a discipline such as Political Science understands the events during this period by focusing on changes in the state institutions and the final outcome of contention such as a regime change, I used insights from the field of social movements to examine the development of popular contention and its role in social change.

Specifically, this dissertation investigated possible ways in which a previous wave of protest could contribute to subsequent waves of collective action. The first wave in 1980 in general and the failed uprising in specific was instrumental in the strategic adaptation and radicalization of the second wave of the movement for democracy. As they learned from the previous failure (strategic adaptation) and made the past event relevant (memory work), activists were able to radicalize while broadening their coalitions. Combined with a cultural shift,

movement and civic organizations could launch a massive mobilization in 1987, which enabled the democratic transition. It is now accepted by history that the mass mobilization not only enabled the democratic transition but also helped the consolidation of democracy down the road (Im 2000; Kim 1997).

As a case of democratization from below, my case study builds on della Porta (2014)'s efforts to bridge social movement studies and democratization studies. Though this is definitely not the kind of cross-national comparison that she suggests, this study helps by articulating several processes and mechanisms observers might be able to see in other cases of democratization. For instance, the level of state repression in authoritarian settings is typically high. In such environments, activists might grapple with the construction of threat as they did in South Korea. Failed uprisings are also prevalent in those settings and, therefore, memory work could be relevant to other cases as well.

Finally, this study allowed me to speculate on implications of the findings for foreign policies or more broadly the general understanding of political contention in authoritarian settings. Popular contention sometimes leads to the instability of a society. This instability is in and of itself never a good thing. But it might be a necessary part of a process toward democratization. However, some observers find it very difficult to tolerate. I am referring to a US general who was a commander of the Combined Forces Command from July 1979 to June 1982 and allowed military deployment to suppress the Gwangju Uprising (Wickham 1999). His mission was to protect "U.S. interest to maintain peace and stability in the region" (Wickham 1999:132). In my viewpoint, his constant emphasis on the U.S. commitment to South Korea's security gave a wrong signal of acquiescence, if not approval, to crack down on the popular contention. In his or many other "realist" observers' perspectives, contentious politics in more

authoritarian settings is something to be avoided. They seem to have all forgotten that historically democratization was achieved through series of popular uprisings, as in France, or a war against foreign country, as in the United States. Likewise, "late democratisers," or the polities who adopted democratic institutions in the post-WWII environment, seem to have "unstable" contention in the process of making them more substantially democratic. Many of episodes of contention do not end up in a success—democratization. However, observers in western societies may need to revise their expectations regarding the democratization process. Otherwise, scholars and observers might suffer a cultural bias against anything militant or contentious, especially something that happens in less developed countries. We might all want to recall a famous quote of Thomas Jefferson on democracy and liberty: "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants" (Jefferson 1955 [1787]).

7.3   Limitations and Considerations for Future Research

There are two major limitations of this study that I would like to acknowledge and discuss. First, although I was able to find relevant and rich pieces of evidence from the archival data, qualitative interview data would have been truly beneficial. Grappling with archival data for years, I now appreciate more that archival data tend to prioritize organizational needs in both the production as well as the preservation processes. Though activists did create personal records, they wrote things more for their organizations. In addition, in the preservation processes, it is only reasonable to assume that organization records were favored over personal records unless they were from leaders[6]. Qualitative interviews would have filled this gap. In addition, they would have enabled me to triangulate findings even more.

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[6] This is in part my speculation and was not substantiated by interviews with archivists. In fact, I did not have this speculation at the stage of data collection.

The other limitation is that this is not a comparative study. There still is a lot of room for improvement in our understanding of democratization process from below. Future research could explore the possibility of a comparative and analytic study building on my findings as well as others (e.g., Brancati 2016; della Porta 2014). Inclusion of the South Korea for the cases of comparison will particularly enable the analysis of the processes of strengthening civil society, which is helpful not only in the democratic transition period but also in the consolidation of democracy.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL AND PROTEST EVENTS, 1979-1987

Year	Date	Event
1979	10/26	Assassination of President Park
	12/12	*Coup d'etat*
1980	5/17	Establishment of martial law
	5/18-27	Gwangju Uprising
	7/4	Kim Dae Jung's arrest with the charge of plotting the "Gwangju Insurrection"
	8/27	Election of Chun by an electoral college
1981	1/28	Chun's State visit to the United States
1982	3/18	Arson at the U.S. Cultural Center in Busan
1983	9/30	Establishment of Youth Association for Democratic Movement
	11/12-14	Reagan's State visit to South Korea
1984	6/29	Establishment of the Council of People's Democratization Movement
	10/16	Establishment of the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification
1985	2/12	General Election
	3/29	Establishment of the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (*mint'ongnyŏn*)
	5/23-26	Occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul
	7/18	Arrest of Sammin Toowi students
	11/4	Sit-in at the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea
1986	2/12	Constitutional amendment campaign
	5/3	Demonstrations in Incheon
	9/20-10/5	Asian Games
	10/24	Sit-in protest at Keonkuk University
1987	1/14	Park Chong Chul's death by torture
	4/13	President Chun's "Defense of the Constitution" speech
	5/27	Establishment of the National Movement Headquarters for Democratic Constitution
	6/10	The June Democratization Movement
	6/29	Announcement of electoral reform

* Source: Appendix C of Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report (Shin et al 2007).

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 Dissertation Title: Threat, Memory, and Framing: The Development of South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1979-1987

2013   MS, Sociology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

2009   MA, Political Science, Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea

2007   BA, English Literature and Applied Linguistics, Kyung Hee University

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Social Movements and Political Sociology, International Political Economy, East Asia (Korea), Research Methods

PUBLICATIONS

Peer Reviewed Journal Articles

Park, Soon Seok, and Rachel L. Einwohner. 2019. "Becoming a Movement Society? Patterns in the Public Acceptance of Protest, 1985-2006." *Sociological Focus* (DOI: 10.1080/00380237.2019.1624233)

Park, Soon Seok, and Andrew Raridon. 2017. "Survivor: Spectators and Gladiators in the US Environmental Movement, 2000-2010." *Social Movement Studies* 16(6):721-734. (DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2017.1331121)

Park, Soon Seok. 2017. "Gendered Representation and Critical Mass: Women's Legislative Representation and Social Spending in 22 OECD Countries." *Sociological Perspectives* 60(6):1097-1114. (DOI: 10.1177/0731121417710458)

Book Chapters and Encyclopedia Entries

Subramaniam, Mangala, Christopher Bunka, and **Soon Seok Park**. 2013. "Desertification" in *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization,* edited by George Ritzer. Blackwell Publishing. (DOI:10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog604)

Translation (from English into Korean)
Park, Soon Seok. 2009. *Politics and Propaganda*, by Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press). Paju: Hanul (한울).

Other Publications
Park, Soon Seok. 2018. "Threat, Here and Elsewhere." Invited essay for *Mobilizing Ideas*, website of Center for the Study of Social Movements, University of Notre Dame (https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2018/07/27/threat-here-and-elsewhere/)

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Park, Soon Seok. "Memory Work on the Gwangju Uprising and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1980-1987." (*In preparation for submission, draft available*)

Park, Soon Seok. "Construction of Threat and Dynamics of South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1979-1987." (*In preparation for submission, draft available*)

Einwohner, Rachel and **Soon Seok Park**. "Swept Up or Swept Aside? Local Mobilization and National Threat."

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor
> Sociology, Purdue University:
> > Introduction to Statistics in Sociology
> > Introduction to Research Methods in Sociology
> > Social Problems (In-class and online)

PRESENTATIONS AT PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

2019   **Park, Soon Seok**. "Construction of Threat and Dynamics of South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1979-1987." Presented at the 3rd Mobilization Conference, San Diego, CA

   Park, Soon Seok. "Frame Competition, a Master Frame of Development, and the Movement for Democracy." Presented at the North Central Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Cincinnati, OH

2017   **Park, Soon Seok**. "Social Construction of Migrants in South Korea." Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, QC

2017 **Park, Soon Seok**. "Construction of Threat and Dynamics of South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1979-1987." Presented at the North Central Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Indianapolis, IN

2016 **Park, Soon Seok**. "Memory Work on the Kwangju Uprising and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1980-1987." Presented at the Social Science History Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL

    Park, Soon Seok, and Andrew Raridon. "Survivor: Spectators and Gladiators in the Environmental Movement, 2000-2010." Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA

2015 **Park, Soon Seok**. "Threat, Memory, and Framing: The Development of South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1979-1987." Presented at the Annual Meeting of Association of Korean Sociologists in America, Chicago, IL

    Park, Soon Seok. "Gendered Representation and Critical Mass: Female Legislative Representation and Social Spending in 22 OECD Countries." Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL

    Park, Soon Seok, and Rachel L. Einwohner. "Explaining the Acceptance of Protest." Presented at the ASA Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL

2014 **Park, Soon Seok**. "Public Attitudes toward Globalization: The Case of South Korea." Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA

INVITED TALKS AND OTHER PRESENTATIONS

2016 **Park, Soon Seok**. "Threat, Memory, and Framing: The Development of South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1979-1987." Presented at the Social Science Research Council Korean Studies Dissertation Workshop, Pacific Grove, CA

    Park, Soon Seok. "Remembering Kwangju: Memory Work in the South Korean Democracy Movement, 1980-1987." Presented at the 2016 Young Scholars Conference, Center for the Study of Social Movements at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN

2015 **Park, Soon Seok**. "A Few Steps in the Archival Data Collection Process: Visiting the Archives and Talking to Archivists." Presented at a Graduate Seminar on Qualitative Methods, Department of Sociology, Purdue University

    Park, Soon Seok. "Teaching Social Problems with a Constructivist Perspective." Presented at a Graduate Seminar on Teaching Sociology, Department of Sociology, Purdue University

SERVICE

Professional

2015 –   Reviewer for *Social Movement Studies, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, Sociological Focus*, and *The Sociological Quarterly*

University

2017 – 18   Sociology Senator to the Purdue Graduate Student Senate, Purdue University
2014 – 17   President, VP of Education, and VP of Public Relations, Toastmasters Club (Int'l organization for public speaking), Purdue University

Departmental

2015 – 16   Graduate Student Representative, Undergraduate Committee, Department of Sociology, Purdue University
2008   President, Student Council of Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University

Community

2009   Research Associate, Korea Human Rights Foundation, Seoul, Korea

HONORS, GRANTS, AND AWARDS

2018 – 19   Bilsland Dissertation Fellowship, Purdue University ($21,387)
2018   Outstanding Graduate Student Teaching Award, Department of Sociology
2016 – 18   PROMISE Awards, College of Liberal Arts, Purdue University ($2,502)
2017   Summer Research Training Grant, Purdue ($2,128)
2016 – 17   Purdue Research Foundation (PRF) Research Grant ($17,215)
2015   Summer Research Grant, Graduate School, Purdue University ($3,090)
2009   Award of Excellence in MA Thesis, Kyung Hee University (KHU)
2007 – 09   Full Scholarship, Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, KHU
2007   Dean's Prize (the second highest honor), College of Humanities, KHU