

Impact of admission screening for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* on the length of stay in an emergency department.

AUTHOR(S)

Peadar Gilligan, Michael Quirke, Stephen Winder, Hilary Humphreys

CITATION

Gilligan, Peadar; Quirke, Michael; Winder, Stephen; Humphreys, Hilary (2010): Impact of admission screening for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* on the length of stay in an emergency department.. figshare. Journal contribution. <https://hdl.handle.net/10779/rcsi.10768778.v1>

HANDLE

[10779/rcsi.10768778.v1](https://hdl.handle.net/10779/rcsi.10768778.v1)

LICENCE

CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

This work is made available under the above open licence by RCSI and has been printed from <https://repository.rcsi.com>. For more information please contact repository@rcsi.com

URL

https://repository.rcsi.com/articles/Impact_of_admission_screening_for_methicillin-resistant_Staphylococcus_aureus_on_the_length_of_stay_in_an_emergency_department_/10768778/1

1

2 **The impact of admission screening for meticillin-resistant**
3 ***Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) on the length-of-stay in an**
4 **emergency department**

5

6 ¹P Gilligan, ¹M Quirke, ²S Winder, ^{3,4}H Humphreys.

7

8

9 ¹Emergency Department and ²Information Technology Department, Beaumont

10 Hospital, Dublin, ³Department of Microbiology, Beaumont Hospital, Dublin,

11 ⁴Department of Clinical Microbiology, Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, Dublin

12

13 **Address for correspondence**

14 Dr Peadar Gilligan
15 Consultant in Emergency Medicine
16 Emergency Department
17 Beaumont Hospital
18 Beaumont Road
19 Dublin 9
20 Ireland
21

22 **Funding source** This work was not supported by an external research grant or
23 funding from a commercial or other source.

24

25 **Conflict of interest** HH has received research funding from Pfizer, Steris
26 Corporation, 3M, Inov8 Science and Cepheid in the last
27 three years. He has also received lecture or consultancy
28 fees from 3M, Novartis and Astellas.

Deleted: GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals

29

30

31 **Running title** *MRSA and Emergency Department length-of-stay*

1 **Abstract**

2 Preventing and controlling meticillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA)
3 includes early detection and isolation. In the emergency department (ED), such
4 measures have to be balanced with the requirement to treat patients urgently and
5 transfer quickly to an acute hospital bed. We assessed the contribution that previous
6 | MRSA risk group identification and selective [rescreening of those patients who were](#)
7 | [previously documented in the research hospital as being MRSA positive](#) made to a
8 | patient's stay in a busy, overcrowded ED. Patients with a previous diagnosis of
9 | MRSA colonisation were flagged automatically as a "risk group" (RG) patient on
10 | their arrival in the ED and were compared with those non-risk group (NRG), i.e. not
11 | previously [proven in the research hospital to be infected or](#) colonised with MRSA.
12 | Over an 18 month period, there were 16,456 admissions via the ED of which 985
13 | (6%) were RG patients. The expected median times to be admitted following a request
14 | for a ward bed for NRG and RG patients were 10.4 hours and 12.9 hours,
15 | respectively. Female sex, older age (over 65 years old) and RG status all
16 | independently predicted a statistically significant longer stay in the ED following a
17 | request for a hospital bed. [We consider that](#) national and local policies for MRSA
18 | need to balance the welfare of patients in the ED with the need to comply with best
19 | practice, when there are inadequate ED and in-patient isolation facilities. Patients with
20 | MRSA requiring emergency admission must have a bed to go to.

21 **Key words:** Emergency department, MRSA, surveillance, isolation, boarders

22

1 **Introduction**

2 Healthcare-associated infection affects 5-10% of patients in an acute hospital, many
3 of these infections are device-related and meticillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*
4 (MRSA) accounts for approximately 16% of all infections.^{1,2} General infection
5 prevention and control measures, such as the use of standard precautions, as well as
6 specific measures for MRSA are justified as the outcome from MRSA infections is
7 less favourable compared with other infections. A meta-analysis comparing
8 bloodstream infection due to MRSA and methicillin-susceptible *S. aureus* showed a
9 significant increase in mortality associated with MRSA bloodstream infection.³

10

11 Preventing and controlling MRSA requires a multi-faceted approach that includes
12 early detection and isolation, a common feature of many national guidelines.⁴ In the
13 UK and elsewhere, there is a move towards the introduction of universal screening,
14 i.e. the taking of swabs from all patients irrespective of risk, and this has provoked
15 some discussion on its merits.⁵

16

17 In the emergency department (ED), infection prevention and control measures have to
18 be balanced with the requirement to treat patients urgently and to transfer patients
19 requiring admission as quickly as possible to acute hospital beds. Furthermore, in
20 North America and elsewhere, the phenomenon of community-acquired MRSA is
21 being seen, particularly in EDs, in patient's without known risk factors for healthcare-
22 associated MRSA.⁶ We have documented that anything that prolongs the patient's ED
23 stay may adversely affect patient welfare and compound overcrowding.⁷ Most
24 national and local guidelines on the prevention and control of MRSA largely focus on
25 in-patients but their implementation have implications for the ED. Prolonging a

1 patient's stay in the ED will further compound overcrowding, which is a recognised
2 contributor to spread of hospital acquired infection.⁸

3

4 We assessed the contribution that previous MRSA risk group identification and
5 selective [rescreening of these patients made to their stay](#) in a busy, overcrowded ED.

6

7

1 **Materials and Methods**

2 *Institution and patients*

3 The study was conducted in the ED of an urban academic teaching hospital with an
4 annual census of approximately 46,000 patient visits, an admission rate of
5 approximately 23% and an average occupancy with patients awaiting admission
6 (boarders) of 105%. The observational study was approved by the chair of the
7 institution's ethics committee. From the first of November 2006 to the 30th of April
8 2008, data were gathered in the ED's Oracle database on all patient attendances that
9 resulted in admission. This Oracle database was interrogated using the Diver Solution
10 programme which is a data warehousing solution that facilitates the gathering of data
11 from different databases.

12
13 Selective screening, involved the taking of swabs from nose, groin and wounds (if
14 present) from patients at the time of their re-attendance to the ED where there was a
15 previous positive swab for MRSA in the research hospital. The prior diagnosis of
16 MRSA colonisation or infection in the research hospital automatically gave rise to the
17 patients being flagged as a "risk group" (RG) patient on the ED information
18 technology system. For the purposes of this study the term "risk group" is applied
19 only to those diagnosed with MRSA in the hospital laboratory on a previous
20 admission. All such risk group patients were screened for evidence of ongoing MRSA
21 colonisation. Previous MRSA carriers were declared clear on the basis of three
22 negative swab results but even those cleared of infection remained as RG on return to
23 the hospital.

Deleted: H

24

25

1

2 Patients with a previous diagnosis of MRSA colonisation [and / or infection, whether](#)
3 [or not they had negative screens subsequently](#), were flagged automatically as a “risk
4 group” (RG) patient on their arrival in the ED using the Oracle database. Those
5 patients with a prior diagnosis of MRSA colonisation were compared with those
6 without it with respect to age, sex, triage category, total ED processing time and time
7 from a bed on a ward being requested until the patient was admitted. Triage is the
8 systematic prioritisation of patients. The Manchester Triage System uses a series of
9 criteria to decide what level of priority a patient should have on the basis of their
10 presentation. The National Triage scale from the United Kingdom is used in many
11 EDs and is a five point scale from immediate (red), very urgent (orange), urgent
12 (yellow), standard (green) to non-urgent (blue).⁹

13

14 The results from all patients screened for MRSA by the hospital’s diagnostic
15 laboratory were entered on the laboratory information system and this informs the
16 hospital’s inpatient system at 6 am on the morning following MRSA results being
17 available. The hospital’s inpatient system informed in turn the Oracle database, and if
18 the patient subsequently re-attended the ED, that patient was automatically flagged as
19 a RG patient and selectively screened for evidence of ongoing MRSA colonization.
20 Previously MRSA positive or RG patients were screened with swabs from the nose,
21 groin and broken areas of skin, and swabs were cultured on MRSA Select
22 Chromogenic Agar (Bio-Rad Life Science group, France). Patients positive for
23 MRSA were decolonised according to guidelines, and this was commenced in the ED
24 and continued on hospital wards after admission.¹⁰

25

1 The ED is open plan with fourteen cubicles and two side rooms. Clinically stable
2 patients with a prior history of MRSA were isolated, where possible in these rooms,
3 pending the availability of other isolation facilities in the hospital. However, these
4 side rooms do not have separate toilet facilities or an ante room, and frequently the
5 number of patients requiring isolation for MRSA and for other indications exceeds the
6 capacity of the two rooms. Other patients in the department wait on trolleys or chairs,
7 usually in close proximity to other patients in the open plan area.

8

9 *Statistical analysis*

10 Cox proportional hazards methods were used to evaluate relative probabilities of
11 being admitted for RG patients versus non-RG patients (NRG) who acted as controls.
12 The interval time to event analysis determines whether a patient category has an
13 increased or decreased chance of admittance at a particular time point and the result is
14 defined by a hazard ratio.

15

16 A multi-factorial model was used to examine if risk group identification was
17 independently significant in the presence of confounding variables such as age and
18 sex. In addition the model was stratified into triage categories. Stata (version10,
19 College Station, Texas) was used to analyse the data and a p value less than 0.05 was
20 deemed to be significant.

1 **Results**

2 Over the 18 month period of the study there were 16,456 admissions via the
3 ED. Of these, 985 (6%) had a prior diagnosis of MRSA colonisation, i.e. were RG
4 patients. Amongst the NRG patients, 48.4% were female compared with 45.2% of RG
5 patients. The Manchester triage category for those who were triaged in RG and NRG
6 patients are compared in Table 1. [Over the time frame of the study 161 of the 16,456](#)
7 [subsequently admitted patients did not undergo triage and are not represented in table](#)
8 [1.](#)
9

10 The total time from arrival in the ED to admission to a ward bed was a median of 20.3
11 hours. For NRG and RG patients it was a median of 19.9 hours, [IQR 10.5 – 29.8
12 hours] and 22.6 hours [IQR 12.2 – 33.4 hours], respectively.
13

14 The expected median time to be admitted following a request for a ward bed was 10.5
15 hours; NRG patients waited a median of 10.4 hours [IQR 3.1 – 20.6 hours] compared
16 to 12.9 hours [IQR 4.3 – 26.6 hours] for RG patients. The results of the Cox model
17 revealed that older age ([>65 years old](#)) and female sex were statistically significant
18 factors influencing the time spent in the ED from arrival to a bed request but MRSA
19 colonisation was not (Table 2). However, female sex, older age and RG status all
20 independently predicted a longer stay in the ED following a request for a hospital bed,
21 i.e. RG status did not impact on the ED's and the on-call team's processing of patients
22 but did influence the time taken to allocate a ward bed. (Table 2).
23
24

1 Discussion

2 Risk factors associated with healthcare-associated MRSA infection include advanced
 3 age, male gender, previous hospitalisation, nursing home care, length of
 4 hospitalisation, a stay in intensive care, chronic medical illness, prior antibiotic use,
 5 presence of indwelling devices, asymptomatic colonisation with MRSA and exposure
 6 to an infected or colonised patient.¹¹ In this study we applied the term risk group (RG)
 7 only to those with a prior diagnosis of MRSA colonisation or infection in our hospital
 8 laboratory. All such patients were electronically flagged as RG on their return to the
 9 ED. The flagging of patients with a prior diagnosis of MRSA and selective
 10 rescreening of this group in this study was associated with a prolonged ED stay.

Deleted: H

11
 12 In the United States it is estimated that the rate of MRSA colonisation in the
 13 community is about 2% of the population.¹² Gopal *et al* found that 6.7% of screened
 14 adult emergency admissions to their UK based hospital were colonised with MRSA.⁸
 15 It is estimated that a non-isolated MRSA carrier will infect 0.14 patients per day in the
 16 absence of decolonisation.¹³ Consequently, the early identification of colonized/
 17 infected patients and the prompt implementation of contact precautions are important
 18 in preventing MRSA transmission in hospitals.^{8,14-17}

19
 20 With regards to the limitations of our research the RG status of a patient is not
 21 validated but is assumed to reflect all patients with a previous positive result for
 22 MRSA colonisation in our hospital. The study required the analysis of a real time
 23 computer database which is dependent upon the medical and nursing staff putting in
 24 data in a time sensitive manner. We have no reason to believe that any failure to do so
 25 would have been more prevalent in either those with or without MRSA.

1
2 Overcrowding in EDs is a distressing and potentially dangerous phenomenon in many
3 health systems. In our hospital, the elderly, those with prior colonisation with MRSA
4 and women wait longest for an acute hospital bed when they require emergency
5 admission. [The research hospital has insufficient acute beds to provide for emergency](#)
6 [admissions and this is further compounded by the fact that many patients in the](#)
7 [hospital experience delayed discharges owing to lack of nursing home beds or step](#)
8 [down facilities in the catchment area.](#) The reason for the delay for females may be due
9 to the fact that our hospital does not usually house males and females in the same bay
10 of a ward and as more males are admitted as emergencies, finding a “female bed” can
11 be problematic. The expected time for admission from time of arrival in the ED was a
12 median of 22.6 hours for RG patients compared to 19.9 hours for NRG patients. The
13 additional 2.7 hours for those requiring selective screening and in an individual
14 patient sick enough to require hospital admission on an already unacceptably long
15 wait for a hospital bed is of concern and further compounds overcrowding in our ED.
16 Paradoxically, the implementation of screening to identify patients early who require
17 isolation or cohorting in hospital impacts negatively on the provision of emergency
18 care. Overcrowding in EDs has already been shown to increase ambulance diversions
19 to other units, delay treatments, increase waiting times and walk outs and lead to
20 longer lengths of hospital stay as well as increasing patient morbidity and mortality.⁷
21
22 The early identification and recognition of patients with potentially transmissible
23 diseases and their early isolation is desirable and appropriate as illustrated by the
24 SARS epidemic earlier this decade. However, it is neither desirable nor appropriate
25 that such patients have more prolonged stays in the most overcrowded part of an acute

1 hospital i.e. the ED. Vichard *et al* argue that “sepsis containment units” where patients
2 with MRSA can be isolated helps to prevent cross contamination,¹⁸ but the ED can
3 not be expected to house patients for prolonged periods in the absence of isolation
4 rooms or cohort facilities on wards.

5
6 Dantas *et al* noted that prolonged stay in the ED posed a risk for colonization and the
7 transmission of multidrug-resistant bacteria and for contracting HCAI, all associated
8 with increased mortality.¹⁹ Cunningham *et al* documented that overcrowding and the
9 rapid turnover of patients in acute hospital settings contributes to cross-infection with
10 MRSA and they argue that adequate acute capacity would help to address this.²⁰ Borg
11 has described the correlation between workload indices and increased HCAI.²¹

12
13 The results of the study reported here show that the selective screening of patients
14 with a prior diagnosis of MRSA colonisation prolongs their ED stay and increases the
15 workload of already busy ED nursing staff, potentially increasing MRSA
16 transmission. Reducing overcrowding in neonatal intensive care units has been shown
17 to be effective in controlling endemic MRSA spread²² and it is plausible that reducing
18 ED overcrowding would have a similar positive effect.

19
20 The delay in being admitted to a ward bed from the ED in this study has been shown
21 to be partly related to selective screening for MRSA. Being over 65 years old, being
22 female or having MRSA should not mean that the patient will have a longer wait in
23 the ED when they require acute admission. Being able to clarify the patients MRSA
24 status sooner would probably help to facilitate earlier transfer to a bed. PCR testing
25 for MRSA may be of benefit in this regard. Hospital ward staff are reluctant to accept

1 patients from our ED with MRSA without there being an isolation room available
 2 because of the risk of cross-infection. Clearly, leaving patients for prolonged periods
 3 in the ED which is the most overcrowded part of any acute hospital is not appropriate.
 4 Acute hospitals must accept that factors contributing to the spread of infection are
 5 important on in-patient wards and in the ED. Having identified the problem the
 6 research hospital has now allocated areas within each ward that allow for the setting
 7 up of cohorts of patients with MRSA, if no single rooms are available. Another
 8 alternative suggestion is to not selectively screen patients during the ED component of
 9 their hospital stay if in so doing ward placement is made more difficult and to allow
 10 patients to be screened on the wards.

Deleted: ontaminating the ward and other patients.

Deleted: cannot behave as though the f

Deleted: that increase

Deleted: only

Deleted: the

Deleted: do not equally apply in the

11
 12 Harbarth *et al* investigated the use of a universal rapid MRSA admission screening in
 13 a surgical department and although they did not demonstrate a reduction in
 14 nosocomial MRSA, they acknowledge that others have recommended universal
 15 admission screening as a means to control MRSA.²³⁻²⁵ Robiecsek *et al* in their study
 16 of universal admission MRSA surveillance with isolation and decolonization of
 17 patients who tested positive for MRSA, found that this was associated with a greater
 18 than 50% reduction in healthcare-associated MRSA bloodstream, respiratory, urinary
 19 tract and surgical site infections during admission and for up to 30 days after
 20 discharge.²⁶

Deleted: wound

21
 22 The early isolation of patients with MRSA is the standard in most centres but
 23 adequate facilities must be available both on hospital wards and in EDs. We have
 24 shown that selective screening of patients with a prior diagnosis of MRSA
 25 colonisation in our hospital prolongs the wait for an acute hospital bed and

1 compounds ED overcrowding. National and local policies for MRSA control need to
2 address this by balancing the welfare of patients in the ED with the need to comply
3 with best practice when there are inadequate ED and in-patient isolation facilities.
4 Patients with MRSA requiring emergency admission to hospital must have a bed to go
5 to.
6
7 *We are grateful to all the staff in the ED and the infection prevention and control team.*

1 References

- 2 1. Smyth ETM, McIlvenny G, Enstone JE, *et al.* Four country healthcare associated
3 infection prevalence survey 2006: overview of the results. *J Hosp Infect* 2008;
4 **69**: 230-248.
- 5 2. Humphreys H, Newcombe RG, Enstone J, *et al.* Four country healthcare
6 associated infection prevalence survey 2006: risk factor analysis. *J Hosp Infect*
7 2008; **69**: 249-257.
- 8 3. Cosgrove SE, Sakoulas G, Perencevich EN, Schwaber MJ, Karchmer AW,
9 Carmeli Y. Comparison of mortality associated with methicillin-resistant and
10 methicillin-susceptible *Staphylococcus aureus* bacteremia: A meta-analysis. *Clin*
11 *Infect Dis* 2003; **36**: 53-9.
- 12 4. Humphreys H. National guidelines for the control and prevention of methicillin-
13 resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* –what do they tell us? *Clin Microbiol Infect*
14 2007; **13**: 846-853.
- 15 5. Dancer SJ. Considering the introduction of universal MRSA screening. *J Hosp*
16 *Infect* 2008; **69**: 315-320.
- 17 6. Moran GJ, Krishnadasan A, Gorwitz RJ, *et al.* Methicillin-resistant *S. aureus*
18 infections among patients in the Emergency Department. *N Engl J Med* 2006;
19 **355**: 666-74.
- 20 7. Gilligan P, Winder S, Singh I, Gupta V, Kelly P, Hegarty D. The boarders in the
21 Emergency Department (BED) Study. *Emerg Med J* 2008; **25**: 265-269.
- 22 8. Gopal Rao G, Michalczk P, Nayeem N, Walker G, Wigmore L. Prevalence and
23 Risk factors for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in adult emergency
24 admissions – a case for screening all patients? *J Hosp Infect* 2007;**66**:15-21.
- 25 9. Kevin Mackway-Jones on behalf of the Manchester Triage Group. Emergency
26 Triage, Manchester Triage Group. *BMJ Publishing Group* 1997, London. ISBN 0-
27 7279-1126-0.
- 28 10. Coia JE, Duckworth GJ, Edwards DI, *et al.* Guidelines for the control and
29 prevention of meticillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) in healthcare
30 facilities. *J Hosp Infect* 2006;**63**5:S1-S44.
- 31 11. Haddadin AS. Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in the Intensive Care
32 Unit. *Posatgrad Med J* 2002;**78**:385-92.
- 33 12. Kuehnert MJ, Kruszon- Moran D, Hill HA, *et al.* Prevalence of *Staphylococcus*
34 *aureus* nasal colonisation in the United States, 2001-2002. *J Infect Dis*
35 2006;**193**:172-179.
- 36 13. Jernigan JA, Titus MG, Groschel DH, Getchell-White S, Farr BM. Effectiveness
37 of contact isolation during a hospital outbreak of methicillin-resistant
38 *Staphylococcus aureus*. *Am J Epidemiol.* 1996;**143**:496-504.
- 39 14. Muto CA, Jernigan JA, Ostrowsky BE, *et al.* SHEA guideline for preventing
40 nosocomial transmission of multidrug resistant strains of *Staphylococcus aureus*
41 and enterococcus. *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2003;**24**:3622-386.
- 42 15. Department of Health. Screening for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*
43 (MRSA) colonization – A strategy for NHS Trusts: Summary of best practice.
44 England: Department of Health; November 2006.
- 45 16. Davis KA, Stewart JJ, Crouch HK, Florez CE, Hospenthal DR. Methicillin-
46 resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) nares colonization at hospital admission
47 and its effects on subsequent MRSA infection. *Clin Infect Dis* 2004; **39**:776-82.
- 48 17. Wallin TR, Hern HG, Frazee BW. Community-associated methicillin-resistant
49 *Staphylococcus aureus*. *Emerg Med Clin North Am.* 2008;**26**:431-55.

18. Vichard P, Talan D, Jeunet L. The importance of isolating septic patients in an autonomous unit in orthopaedic surgery and traumatology. *Bull Acad Natl Med* 2003;**187**:905-18.
19. Dantas SRPE, Moretti-Branchini ML. Impact of antibiotic-resistant pathogens colonizing the respiratory secretions of patients in an extended-care area of the Emergency Department. *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2003;**24**:351-355.
20. Cunningham JB, Kernahan WG, Sowney R. Bed occupancy and turnover interval as determinant factors in MRSA infections in acute settings in Northern Ireland: 1 April 2001 to 31 March 2003. *J Hosp Infect* 2005;**61**:189-193.
21. Borg MA. Bed occupancy and overcrowding as determinant factors in the incidence of MRSA infections within general ward settings. *J Hosp Infect* 2003;**54**:316-318.
22. Haley RW, Cushion NB, Tenover FC, et al. Eradication of endemic methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* infection from a neonatal intensive care unit. *J Infect Dis* 1995;**171**:614-624.
23. Harbarth S, Fankhauser C, Schrenzel J, et al. Universal screening for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* at hospital admission and nosocomial infection in surgical patients. *JAMA*. 2008;**299**:1149-1157.
24. Weber SG, Huang SS, Oriola S, et al. Legislative mandates for use of active surveillance cultures to screen for methicillin resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* and vancomycin-resistant enterococci: position statement from the joint SHEA and APIC Task Force. *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2007;**28**:249-260.
25. Diekma DJ, Edmond MB. Look before you leap: active surveillance for multidrug-resistant organisms. *Clin Infect Dis* 2007;**44**:1101-1107.
26. Robiecsek A, Beaumont JL, Paule SM, et al. Universal Surveillance for methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* in 3 affiliated Hospitals. *Ann Intern Med* 2008;**148**:409-418.

ED-MRSA Screening(3)

27-8-09

1 **Table 1.** Triage categories of admitted patients from the ED with and without MRSA.

2

<i>Category</i>	<i>Immediate</i>	<i>Very urgent</i>	<i>Urgent</i>	<i>Standard</i>	<i>Non-urgent</i>
	<i>(Red)</i>	<i>(Orange)</i>	<i>(Yellow)</i>	<i>(Green)</i>	<i>(Blue)</i>
NRG	171	5936	8864	322	25
(%)	(1.1)	(38.8)	(57.9)	(2.1)	(.2)
RG	18	459	489	10	1
(%)	(1.8)	(47)	(50.1)	(1)	(.1)

3 NRG = Non-risk Group (not previously MRSA positive),

4 RG = Risk Group (previously MRSA positive).

5

1 **Table 2.** Cox model of variables associated with prolonged ED stay from time of
 2 arrival to time of hospital admission.

3
 4
 5

Variable	Hazard ratio from time of arrival to bed request [95% CI]		Hazard ratio from bed request to admission [95% CI]	
RG	0.946	[0.887 - 1.010]*	0.874	[0.819 - 0.933]**
Age > 65 years	0.891	[0.863 - 0.919]**	0.780	[0.756 - 0.805]**
Female Sex	0.902	[0.875 - 0.930]**	0.883	[0.857 - 0.911]**

6
 7 RG, Risk group, i.e. previously MRSA positive
 8 *p = 0.094
 9 ** p <0.001

10
 11
 12
 13