

IPD-Dataset and Description¹

Supplemental file of the Manuscript 'Intra-Party Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Explaining Change and Stability from 1989 until 2011'

The IPD-dataset used in this article is extensively described in von dem Berge et al. (2013). This contribution presents an integrated approach to measuring the level of intra-party democracy through deductive and standardized content analysis of party statutes. The most important reason for using party statutes to analyze IPD is that they are the only available data source when trying to investigate changes in IPD-levels in CEE from 1989 onwards (for further reasons see von dem Berge et al. 2013: 2f.).

The level of intra-party democracy ranges from -1 (lowest level of intra-party democracy) to $+1$ (highest level of intra-party democracy) and can be calculated for any statute of any political party. Following the two identified main criteria of intra-party democracy – ‘inclusiveness’² and ‘decentralization’³ – three main categories of intra-party democracy are theoretically derived: members’ rights, organizational structure, and decision-making. On the basis of theoretical considerations further sub-categories and individual items are deduced from these main categories and put together into a comprehensive coding scheme. Precise coding instructions for the individual items of the coding scheme can be found in von dem Berge et al. (2013).

In total, the index consists of 92 *items* structured within different (*sub-*)*categories* which are organized within the three *main categories* presented above (see Figure 2.1 and Table 1. in von dem Berge et al. 2013). In the process of quantification, each answer (YES, NO and NS⁴) to each question is attributed the value $+1$, 0 or -1 (the questions/answers are the individual items of the index). The rationale behind this quantification is that all answers which have – from a theoretical perspective – negative implications for IPD with regard to its two distinct aspects (i.e. inclusiveness or decentralization) are attributed the value -1 , regardless whether the answer is YES, NO or NS. According to the same logic all answers

¹ The content presented in this Appendix is taken from von dem Berge et al. (2013).

² ‘Inclusiveness’ is defined as follows: “Under the most exclusive rules, key decisions are controlled by a single leader or a small group of leaders, and others have no binding role in the process. In the most inclusive parties, all party members, or even all party supporters, are given the opportunity to decide on important issues, such as the choice of party leader or the selection of party candidates [or on important policy issues]“ (Scarrow 2005: 6).

³ ‘Decentralization’ can be best described by defining ‘centralization’: “Centralization describes the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or decision body. In a highly centralized party, a national executive meets frequently and has the authority to make decisions that are accepted at all levels of the party. In especially decentralized parties, the national party committee probably meets much less often and tends to be focused more on coordination and communication than on providing definitive guidance to the party“ (Scarrow 2005: 6).

⁴ NS = not specified (in the statute).

which have positive implications for IPD are attributed the value +1, regardless whether the answer is YES, NO or NS. The value 0 is allocated to an answer when no specific effects on IPD can be identified. The table below gives a concrete example for the category ‘programmatic issues’.

Table: Example for the category ‘programmatic issues’ (criterion ‘inclusiveness’).

| Item | Coding Rules | Quantification |
|---|--|---------------------------------|
| May individual party members vote upon the manifesto? | Code YES if individual party members have a vote on defining the party manifesto (e.g. through intraparty referenda). Code NO if individual members have no direct influence upon the content of the manifesto. Code NS if there is no information that enables you to deduce whether individual members have or do not have an influence on defining the party manifesto. | Yes = 1 No = 0 NS = 0 |
| May the party congress vote upon the manifesto? | Code YES if the party congress has a vote upon the party manifesto (e.g. if the congress is either drafting OR voting on the party programme). Code NO if the congress has no direct influence upon the content of the manifesto. Code NS if there is not enough information that would enable you to deduce whether the congress has or does not have an influence on defining the party manifesto. | Yes = 1 No = 0 NS = 0 |
| May the party executive vote upon the manifesto? | Code YES if the party executive has a vote upon the party manifesto (e.g. if the party executive is either drafting OR voting on the party programme). Code NO if the party executive has no direct influence upon the content of the manifesto. Code NS if there is not enough information that would enable you to deduce whether the party executive has or does not have an influence on defining the party manifesto. | Yes = -1 No = 0 NS = 0 |
| May the party president vote upon the manifesto? | Code YES if it is <i>specified</i> that the party president votes or otherwise decides upon the manifesto of the party. Otherwise code NO. | Yes = -1 No = 0 NS = n.a. |

The overall results of the inter-coder reliability tests show a substantial degree of agreement between the coders (there were two coders in each country under study). Krippendorff’s Alpha shows a value higher than 0.67 which indicates an acceptable level of agreement for ca. 68 % of all variables; Fleiss’ Kappa reaches a value higher than 0.6 which indicates a substantial degree of agreement for ca. 78 % of the variables; Holsti shows a value higher than 0.8 which indicates a good degree of agreement for ca. 77 % of all variables (the exact results for each item are reported in Appendix C in von dem Berge et al. 2013). We can conclude that the results of the reliability tests are satisfying because the data was collected in a rather ‘difficult’ environment. Statutes from CEE parties are partly extremely difficult to code because they are not clearly structured and therefore hard to code (this holds especially for the period shortly after the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc during the 1990s). Against this background, the results of the reliability tests can be considered as very satisfactory. They show that the coding scheme works well, also in a rather ‘unfriendly’ coding environment.

The basic approach towards measuring IPD-levels of political parties in a single encompassing measure can be understood in terms of a 'formative' logic of index construction. The overall measure of IPD is constructed such that the items it combines meet the theoretically specified concept (see e.g. Coltman et al. 2008). As formative measurement models do not allow for factor analysis (e.g. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001: 271), the weighted average of all items is used to calculate the overall IPD-value for each party statute. To a certain extent this approach can be compared with prevalent approaches towards measuring democracy at the nation-state level as a multifaceted concept.