

**ONLINE APPENDIX**

**Table A1. Models with the Alternative Sanction Success Variable\***

\*The Sanctions Success variable is coded one if the outcome is total compliance by the target or a negotiated settlement between the target and sender.

	Model 1	Model 2
<u>Sanction Success Equation</u>		
Veto	0.923** (0.402)	1.375** (0.553)
Institutions	0.513** (0.207)	0.506*** (0.168)
Sanction Costs	0.104 (0.116)	0.101 (0.117)
Trade Dependence	0.438 (0.908)	0.526 (0.889)
Target GDP per Capita	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.014)
Major Issue	-0.159 (0.156)	-0.174 (0.158)
Threat	-0.146 (0.131)	-0.114 (0.130)
Imposition Year	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)
Democracy		-0.104 (0.222)
Military Regime		-0.268 (0.253)
Personalist Regime		0.465** (0.199)
<u>Sanction Imposition Equation</u>		
Democracy	0.041 (0.100)	0.042 (0.100)
Capability Ratio (Target/Sender)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Total Trade	-0.177 (0.154)	-0.194 (0.149)
Trade Dependence	-0.084 (0.630)	0.000 (0.625)
Target GDP per Capita	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)
Post-Cold War	-0.063 (0.094)	-0.045 (0.093)
N (total)	932	932
N (censored)	498	498
Log-pseudo Likelihood	-912.9161	-908.6782

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A2. Probit Models Estimated without the Selection (Sanction Imposition) Equation**

Outcome Variable: Sanction Success

	Model 3	Model 4
Veto	1.186*** (0.406)	1.824*** (0.595)
Institutions	0.584*** (0.170)	0.541*** (0.174)
Sanction Costs	0.152 (0.121)	0.123 (0.124)
Trade Dependence	-0.273 (1.285)	-0.322 (1.319)
Target GDP per Capita	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.021** (0.010)
Major Issue	0.320* (0.175)	0.297* (0.181)
Threat	-0.074 (0.150)	-0.052 (0.154)
Imposition Year	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)
Democracy		-0.281 (0.261)
Military Regime		-0.383 (0.320)
Personalist Regime		0.441** (0.212)
N	461	446

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$