

Appendix: data description¹

We have gathered information on populist parties in European Economic Area (EEA) countries (i.e. EU-28 plus EFTA-3), as coded by various scholarly overviews (Moffitt 2016, Stanley 2017, Rupnik 2016, van Kessel 2015). There were no populist parties reported in Malta, Cyprus, and Portugal, bringing the country total to 28. The parties were selected for having obtained parliamentary representation in at least one election during the two decades of focus of the study (1999-2018): this gives us an n=66.

For each party (after mentioning if it is still a going concern in 2018) we list the span of years in which it was represented in parliament, its best electoral result in a general election, in terms both of vote share and party rank, and its participation in government, on an ordinal scale with 0=opposition, 1=external support, 2=participation, and 3=leadership of government (parlgov.org data).

We then select for each party one leadership figure (with the exception of one Icelandic party that was governed by a directoire). The choice of such a personality obviously involves an element of discretionality on the part of the observer: in a few rare cases the same politician may have led two different parties (e.g. Joerg Haider), in a few others the politician selected was not the formal leader of the national party (e.g. Christoph Blocher); we are convinced, however, that in the overwhelming majority of cases the chosen politician uncontroversially represents the most important actor within the party in the period of focus of the study. Of these 65 cases, we

¹ See replication material for full dataset.

list whether the politician founded the party, when the leadership occurred and how long it lasted, and whether it is still ongoing.

Furthermore, we identify a subset of cases where the politician in question had resources of notoriety/visibility outside of political life: this yields a group of 23 leaders with outsider (pre-political) credentials, or roughly a third of the total; the origin of such social capital is generically identified.

Next, we describe party ideology. We present the party's L-R index (from 1 for extreme Left-wing parties to 10 for extreme Right-wing parties) reported in parlgov.org; as an alternative, we present the latest RiLe index for the party from the Manifesto Project (which assumes a negative value for Left, positive for Right). Further evidence on ideological orientation is derived by other data in the Manifesto Project, namely Euroscepticism (*Manifesto Project EU: negative [per 110]*), anti-corruption animus (*Manifesto Project Political corruption [per 304]*), anti-finance animus (*Manifesto Project Foreign financial influence [per 103.2]*), and anti-immigrant animus (*Manifesto Project Immigration: negative [per 601.2]*). All these indices measure the extent to which such topics recur in the party's electoral manifesto for a given election, and for each party the data refer to the latest election for which the Manifesto Project has data on them.

As a measure of party organization, we have a dummy variable reflecting whether the party is a new party in the time-frame of the study, according to the criteria set forth by Emanuele and Chiaramonte.

As a measure of the institutional 'temperature' in the country, we use the index of anti-establishment attitudes present in the DEREX database, itself developed on the basis of the European Social Survey. For each party, the data-point immediately preceding the accession of

the leader is chosen; failing that, the data point immediately preceding the obtaining of parliamentary representation; as a residual rule, the earliest data point within the period in which the party sat in parliament. For the same year, we also present three indicators of trust (in political parties, the national parliament, and the national government) drawn from the Eurobarometer survey data for that country. Furthermore, to present a more diachronic picture of Eurobarometer data, we show the value of the net satisfaction with democracy at four time points (1973, when Eurobarometer surveys began, 1999, the beginning of our period of study, 2004, the date of the Eastern EU Enlargement, and 2010, as a conventional post-global-financial-crisis year).

In terms of the national media system, we report a classification based on Hallin & Mancini (2004), as expanded by Castro Herrero et al. (2017) to Central and Eastern Europe: six different typologies (A through F) of media systems are identified, based on characteristics of market concentration, lowbrow-highbrow balance of readership, and so forth.

Finally, party system innovation is measured, following Emanuele & Chiaramonte (2016) data, in two ways: *Cumulative party system innovation in the last election held in each country* and *Variation in the cumulative party system innovation since 2010*.