

Online appendix

for the article ‘Explaining Governmental Preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform’

Table of contents

Table A1. Operationalization	2
Table A2. Summary statistics	5
Table A3. 1 Missing Values by Country	6
Table A3. 2 Missing Values by Issue	7
Figure 1. Average governmental preferences across groups of issues	8
Table A4: Correlation matrix	9
Table A5. Coding of groups of reform issues	10
Tables A6-A8. Robustness checks	17

Table A1. Operationalization

Variable	Measurement	Source	Year
Issue position	A country's position on a given issue. We depart from the assumption that the position data captured in our dataset represents intrinsic preferences and we therefore use the terms preference and position synonymously. The original data covers positions on 47 issues on each of the 28 EU members. We select 41 of these issues that can be represented on a scale from 0 to 100 such that lower scores represent stronger preferences for national sovereignty. Higher scores represent preferences for increased prerogatives for European institutions, including treaty changes.	EMU position	Yearly
GDP per capita (log)	Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (real) (Eur)	Eurostat. (2017). Real GDP per capita, growth rate and totals [tsdec100]. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tsdec100 .	Yearly
Budget deficit	Budget deficit as a share of GDP (per cent)	Eurostat. (2017). General government deficit/surplus [tec00127]. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00127	Yearly
Financial sector liabilities	Total financial sector liabilities non-consolidated in 100 units of a national currency as share of GDP (per cent)	Eurostat. (2017). Total financial sector liabilities, by sub-sectors, non-consolidated - % of GDP [tipsfs11]. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tipsfs11	Yearly
Euro area member	Member of the Euro Area (0=no, 1=yes)	Eurostat. (2016). Glossary: Euro area enlargements. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Euro_area_enlargements http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en	Yearly
Trade balance	Trade balance (Mill Eur), Divided by 100,	Eurostat. (2017). Trade balance in million ECU/EURO [tet00002]. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tet00002	Yearly
TARGET balance	Divided by 100, see Whelan (2017).	Retrieved from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pol	Yearly

TARGET surplus	Dummy that equals 1 for countries scoring positively on the target balance variable and 0 if otherwise.	icy_and_exchange_rates/target_balances/html/index.en.html	Yearly
Interest rate over German bonds	Long-term interest rate spread over German bonds (per cent) (value at 01. July)	European Commission DG Regio Datawarehouse C3.	Yearly
Unemployment	Unemployment rates in per cent	Eurostat. (2017). Unemployment rate [tesem129]. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tesem120 .	Yearly
Government expenditure	Government expenditure	Eurostat. 2018. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00023	2007 (before the global financial crisis, relatively constant 2000-2007)
EU trust	Percentage of citizens that answered "Tend to trust" on the question "For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? - European Union". Weighted using poststratification weights.	Eurobarometer 71.3 (Jun-Jul 2009), Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010), Eurobarometer 75.3 (May 2011), Eurobarometer 77.3 (May 2012), Eurobarometer 79.3 (May 2013), Eurobarometer 82.3 (November 2014), Eurobarometer 83.3 (May 2015). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4971 Data file Version 4.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11756	Yearly
Euro support	Question wording: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A European [economic and] monetary union with one single currency, the euro" For / Against Measues % for, weighted using poststratification weights.	EB71.3 (June-July 2009), EB73.4 (May 2010), EB75.3 (May 2011), EB77.3 (May 2012), EB81.2 (March 2014), EB83.1 (Feb/March 2015)	Yearly
EMU reform support	Public support for EU-level reforms. See appendix table 4 for a detailed description of the measurement.	Various Eurobarometer datasets. See appendix table 4.	Coded using the Eurobarometer preceding EU-level decisions on a specific reform issue. See appendix table 4.
Parliamentary power index	Measurement	Source: Thomas Winzen	2012.
Left-right government ideology	Left-right position of government (time-invariant unweighted mean values of information from party expert surveys on a 0 to 10 scale).	Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2016. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version.	Yearly

Multiple cabinets in one year:
cabinet with most days in office.
Missings due to no party affiliation.

Eurosceptic parties	Vote share of Eurosceptic parties more generally by using data from the European Parliamentary Elections. We coded the vote share for 'hard' Eurosceptic parties only (cf. Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008) and are listed in de Vries (2018: 134-136).	http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/election_types/ep_elections/	2009
Eurosceptic parties (change)	Change in vote share of Eurosceptic parties from 2004 to 2009. For some Eastern European countries, there were no elections in 2004 but in 2007, so that we calculated the percentage change from 2007 to 2009. We coded the vote share for 'hard' Eurosceptic parties only (cf. Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008) and are listed in de Vries (2018: 134-136).	http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/election_types/ep_elections/	Change 2004-2009 or 2007-2009

Table A2. Summary statistics

Variable	Min.	Mean	Max.	Std. dev.	N
Preferences	0	52.05	100	47.26	792
GDP per capita (log)	8.56	10.00	11.30	0.60	792
Budget deficit	-32.10	-3.80	1.60	3.54	792
Financial sector liabilities	0.94	14.17	266.20	38.90	792
Euro area	0.00	0.68	1.00	0.47	792
Trade balance	-1731.00	13.69	2519.00	564.80	792
TARGET balance	-3314.00	65.31	6692.00	1719.00	541
TARGET surplus	0.00	0.36	1.00	0.48	541
Interest rate over German bonds	-1.38	2.56	24.58	3.39	761
Unemployment	4.60	10.11	27.50	4.95	792
Government expenditure	34.00	42.62	52.20	5.25	792
EU trust	13.60	43.69	74.40	12.60	792
Euro support	0.15	0.61	0.89	0.19	791
EMU reform support	0.060	0.610	0.960	0.240	611
Parliamentary power index	0.330	1.700	2.670	0.620	781
Left-right government ideology	1.050	5.670	8.440	1.520	773
Eurosceptic parties	0.00	5.81	22.48	6.68	792
Eurosceptic parties (change)	-14.78	0.32	14.77	6.39	792

Table A3: Missing Values

Table A3.1: Missing Values by Country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Missing observations (out of 40)</i>
<i>AUT</i>	6
<i>BEL</i>	7
<i>BGR</i>	20
<i>CYP</i>	12
<i>CZE</i>	11
<i>DEU</i>	2
<i>DNK</i>	17
<i>ESP</i>	5
<i>EST</i>	9
<i>FIN</i>	5
<i>FRA</i>	3
<i>GBR</i>	8
<i>GRC</i>	17
<i>HRV</i>	29
<i>HUN</i>	21
<i>IRL</i>	13
<i>ITA</i>	6
<i>LTU</i>	20
<i>LUX</i>	8
<i>LVA</i>	17
<i>MLT</i>	14
<i>NLD</i>	6
<i>POL</i>	12
<i>PRT</i>	9
<i>ROU</i>	19
<i>SVK</i>	11
<i>SVN</i>	12
<i>SWE</i>	9

Table A3.2: Missing Values by Issue

Issues	Missing Observations (out of 28)
EU cap on bank bonuses: legal v. shareholder-approved	11
Capital buffers: centralization vs. flexibility	7
Scope of the SSM: all banks vs. some banks	5
Double majority for EBA's decisions	5
SSM deadlines: speed versus quality	10
SRM: decision-making powers	2
SRF build-up and mutualization	4
SRF fiscal backstop	10
The idea of a mutualization of Eurozone debt	6
Preparedness to issue loan guarantees	7
IMF involvement	13
Enhancement of the EFSF's effective capacity	10
Allowing the EFSF to use additional instruments	17
Changing EU treaties	0
Size of ESM	7
Support instruments of ESM/EFSF	11
Financing of the ESM	10
Role of supranational institutions in the ESM	9
Adoption of the fiscal compact	0
Fiscal compact adopted by Treaty change	7
The role of the ECJ in fiscal compact	0
The role of the EC in fiscal compact	9
The participation of non-euro members at the Euro Summit	17
The purpose of the fiscal compact	16
Tax policy coordination	6
Incorporation to EU Treaties	20
Initial willingness to support Greece (Bailout I)	1
The First Greek Program: ad hoc vs. systematic	20
The IMF involvement in the First Greek Program	5
Short-term ambitions for the fiscal union	1
Potential redistribution within the fiscal union	3
Political accountability	2
Social policy integration	1
Suspension of Council voting rights for SGP non-compliant member government	6
Withholding EU Funds to deficit countries	1
The blocking of SGP sanctions by reversed qualified majority	5
Redemption fund in two-pack	8
Pre-approving Budgets by the Commission	0

Figure 1 provides information regarding governmental preferences in TARGET surplus countries compared to TARGET deficit countries across groups of issues. On average, deficit countries have been more supportive of power delegation to the EU regarding the banking union, fiscal transfers and EU financial governance. Surplus countries have been stronger proponents of increased European prerogatives regarding austerity and institutional change of the EU.




Figure 1: Average governmental preferences across groups of issues across TARGET Surplus (1) and TARGET Deficit (0) Countries

Table A4. Correlation matrix

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. Preferences	1.00								
2. GDP per capita (log)	0.03	1.00							
3. Budget deficit	-0.12	0.30	1.00						
4. Financial sector liabilities	0.12	0.59	0.29	1.00					
5. Trade balance	-0.16	0.19	0.27	-0.06	1.00				
6. TARGET balance	-0.13	0.28	0.45	0.12	0.80	1.00			
7. TARGET surplus	-0.15	0.45	0.45	0.34	0.48	0.60	1.00		
8. Interest rate over German bonds	0.09	-0.39	-0.45	-0.14	-0.20	-0.31	-0.36	1.00	
9. Unemployment	0.15	-0.47	-0.56	-0.24	-0.31	-0.54	-0.41	0.63	1.00
10. Government expenditure	0.06	0.17	0.07	-0.30	-0.20	-0.03	-0.12	-0.01	-0.23
11. EU trust	-0.10	0.05	0.18	0.21	-0.07	0.07	0.14	-0.43	-0.52
12. Euro support	-0.07	0.24	0.02	0.24	0.03	0.10	0.22	-0.07	-0.28
13. EMU reform support	0.00	-0.15	0.10	-0.03	-0.01	-0.07	-0.08	0.09	0.20
14. Parliamentary power index	-0.28	-0.21	0.21	-0.35	0.36	0.34	0.34	-0.28	-0.32
15. Left-right ideology in government	-0.00	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.15	0.02	0.11	0.06	0.2
16. Eurosceptic parties	-0.14	0.18	0.08	-0.21	-0.07	-0.06	0.25	-0.08	-0.22
17. Eurosceptic parties (change)	-0.14	-0.03	0.10	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.26	-0.05	-0.00
	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	
10. Government expenditure	1.00								
11. EU trust	-0.11	1.00							
12. Euro support	-0.10	0.55	1.00						
13. EMU reform support	-0.08	-0.29	-0.20	1.00					
14. Parliamentary power index	-0.00	0.26	0.31	-0.03	1.00				
15. Left-right ideology in government	-0.06	-0.24	-0.14	0.05	-0.07	1.00			
16. Eurosceptic parties	0.42	0.01	0.09	-0.10	0.36	-0.05	1.000		
17. Eurosceptic parties (change)	-0.11	-0.08	-0.08	-0.00	0.54	-0.06	0.36	1.00	

Notes: $N = 317$.

Table A5. Coding of groups of reform issues

Issue ID	Issue Code	Year Adopted	Package name	Group label	Variable label	EB	Question wording
1	BU1	2013	EU cap on bank bonuses: legal v. shareholder-approved	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned
2	BU2	2013	Capital buffers: centralization vs. flexibility	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned
3	BU3	2013	Scope of the SSM: all banks vs. some banks	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned
4	BU4	2013	Double majority for EBA's decisions	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned
5	BU5	2013	Not included in the analysis				
6	BU6	2013	SSM deadlines: speed versus quality	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned
7	BU7	2014	SRM: decision-making powers	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned

8	BU8	2014	SRF build-up and mutualization	Fiscal Transfers	"% Totally agree and tend to agree that setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis."	2012 (77.2)	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on this topic. Setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly... Would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis. 1 Totally agree/Tend to agree/Tend to disagree/Totally disagree
9	BU9	2014	SRF backstop	Banking Union	"% Mentioned that EU should strengthen the regulation of financial markets as a crisis measure"	2010 (73.4)	Which two of the following measures should the European Union prioritise in order to help people overcome the effects of the financial and economic crisis? Strengthen the regulation of financial markets. Mentioned/Not mentioned
10	EB1	2011	The idea of a mutualization of Eurozone debt	Fiscal Transfers	"% Totally agree and tend to agree that setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis." 2011 (76.1)		Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on this topic. Setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly... Would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis. 1 Totally agree/Tend to agree/Tend to disagree/Totally disagree
11	EFSF1	2010	Preparedness to issue loan guarantees	Fiscal Transfers	"% Totally agree and tend to agree that setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis." 2011 (76.1)		
12	EFSF2	2010	IMF involvement	Austerity	"%Mentioned IMF as most capable actor"	2009 (72.4)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
13	EFSF3	2010	Enhancement of the EFSF's effective capacity	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2009 (72.4)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
14	EFSF4	2011	Allowing the EFSF to use additional instruments	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2010 (73.4)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
15	ESM1	2012	Changing treaties	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2011 (76.3)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union

16	ESM2	2012	Size of ESM	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2011 (76.3)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
17	ESM3	2012	Conditionality				
18	ESM4	2012	Not included in the analysis				
19	ESM5	2012	Support instruments of ESM/EFSF	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2011 (76.3)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
20	ESM6	2012	Financing of the ESM	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2011 (76.3)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
21	ESM7	2012	Role of supranational institutions in the ESM	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective
22	FC1	2012	Adoption of the fiscal compact	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective
23	FC2	2012	Fiscal compact adopted by Treaty change	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective
24	FC3	2012	Not included in the analysis				
25	FC4	2012	The role of the ECJ in fiscal compact	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of

26	FC5	2012	The role of the EC in fiscal compact	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective
27	FC6	2012	The participation of non-euro members at the Euro Summit	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2010 (73.4)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
28	FC7	2012	The purpose of the fiscal compact	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective
29	FC8	2012	Tax policy coordination	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Strongly and fairly in favor of the EU introducing a tax on financial transactions."	2012 (77.2)	The European Parliament has recently endorsed the introduction of a tax on financial transactions at a global level, or at least in the EU at first. This tax would be very low: less than 0,1% on each financial transaction. It would not apply to the general public, but only to transactions between financial players (banks, hedge funds, etc.). Introducing a tax on financial transactions in the EU at first, if international agreement is not reached. Totally in favour/Fairly in favour/Fairly opposed/Totally opposed
30	FC9	2012	Incorporation to EU Treaties	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2011 (76.3)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective

31	FTT	2016	Financial transaction tax	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Strongly and fairly in favor of the EU introducing a tax on financial transactions."	2015 (84.3)	Thinking about reforming global financial markets, please tell me whether you are in favour or opposed to the following measures to be taken by the EU. The introduction of a tax on financial transactions. Strongly in favour/Fairly in favour/Fairly opposed/Strongly opposed
32	G1	2010	Initial willingness to support Greece (Bailout I)	Austerity	"%Totally or tend to agree: Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now"	2010 (73.4)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now
33	G2	2010	The First Greek Program: ad hoc vs. systematic	Austerity	"%Totally or tend to agree: Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now"	2010 (73.4)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now
34	G3	2010	The IMF involvement in the First Greek Program	Austerity	"%Mentioned IMF as most capable actor"	2009 (72.4)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
35	G4	2012	Not included in the analysis				
36	PR1	2015	Short-term ambitions for the fiscal union	Future Policies	% Totally agree or tend to agree that the EU has sufficient power and tools to defend economic interests	2015 (83.3)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. The EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy.
37	PR2	2015	Potential redistribution within the fiscal union	Future Policies	% Totally agree or tend to agree that the EU has sufficient power and tools to defend economic interests	2015 (83.3)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. The EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy.
38	PR3	2015	Political accountability	Future Policies	% Totally agree or tend to agree that the EU has sufficient power and tools to defend economic interests	2015 (83.3)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. The EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy.
39	PR4	2015	Social policy integration	Future Policies	% Totally agree or tend to agree that the EU has sufficient power and tools to defend economic interests	2015 (83.3)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. The EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy.
40	SP1	2011	Suspension of Council voting rights for SGP	Austerity	"%Totally or tend to agree: Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR	2010 (73.4)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally

			non-compliant member government		COUNTRY) are not a priority for now"		disagree. Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now
41	SP2	2011	Withholding EU Funds to deficit countries	Austerity	"%Totally or tend to agree: Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now"	2010 (73.4)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now
42	SP3	2011	The blocking of SGP sanctions by reversed qualified majority	Austerity	"%Totally or tend to agree: Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now"	2010 (73.4)	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. Measures to reduce the public deficit and debt in (OUR COUNTRY) are not a priority for now
43	SP5	2011	Not included in the analysis				
44	SP6	2011	Not included in the analysis				
45	TP1	2013	Redemption fund in two-pack	Fiscal Transfers		2012 (77.2)	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on this topic. Setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly... Would allow to reduce the cost of the crisis. 1 Totally agree/Tend to agree/Tend to disagree/Totally disagree
46	TP2	2013	Pre-approving Budgets by the Commission	Institutional Change of the EU	"% Very and fairly effective: A stronger coordination of economic policy among all EU Member States"	2012 (78.1)	A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States Very effective/Fairly effective/Not very effective/Not at all effective

47	TP3	2013	Independent macro-economic forecasts	EU Financial governance (integration)	"%Mentioned that the EU is most capable actor dealing with the crisis effectively."	2012 (78.1)	In your opinion, which of these actors is capable of dealing the most effectively with the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis? The European Union
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Notes: We coded Eurobarometer measures for the year preceding the adoption of the reform issues where possible, otherwise we used the temporally closest available Eurobarometer

Table A6. Multi-level models of government preferences without unemployment

	1.	2.	3.	4
Budget Deficit	-1.65*	-1.06		-1.85***
	(0.64)	(0.55)		(0.56)
Financial Sector Liabilities	0.25**	0.215**		0.17***
	(0.081)	(0.074)		(0.05)
Eurozone member				-9.67
				(10.17)
Trade Balance	-0.00	-0.01		-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)
Spread over German Bonds	-0.09	-0.179		-1.15
	(0.74)	(0.79)		(0.81)
Public Sector Size	1.22	0.58		1.54**
	(0.74)	(0.68)		(0.51)
Log GDP/capita	-7.168	-2.59		-10.02**
	(5.35)	(5.92)		(3.65)
TARGET Balance	-0.00	-0.00*		
	(0.00)	(0.00)		
Target Surplus		-11.47		
		(8.39)		
TARGET Surplus * TARGET Balance		0.02***		
		(0.01)		
Public Trust in the EU			-0.07	-0.36
			(0.31)	(0.44)
Public Support for the Euro			21.57	42.73*
			(14.41)	(21.77)
Public Support for EMU Reform			-6.65	-5.31
			(4.64)	(4.85)
Parliamentary Power Index			-17.18*	-12.22**
			(7.63)	(3.86)
Left/Right Govt Ideology			-0.97	-1.29
			(1.42)	(1.39)
Eurosceptic Party			-0.49	-0.86
			(0.33)	(0.57)
Constant	65.29	48.22	83.79**	112.88
	(37.22)	(41.05)	(29.78)	(60.19)
<hr/>				
Constant Level 2				
	5.00***	6.78***	0.00	0.00
	(2.31)	(2.70)	(0.00)	(0.73)
<hr/>				
Constant Level 1				
	46.03***	45.18***	45.19***	44.42***
	(1.43)	(1.81)	(1.82)	(2.34)
<hr/>				
<i>N</i>	499	499	565	542
<i>BIC</i>	5272.92	5256.55	5947.73	5688.37
Log likelihood	-2620.93	-2612.74	-2954.87	-2825.30

Notes: Unstandardized coefficients with robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Linear random-intercept models using maximum likelihood estimation. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A7. Multi-level models of government preferences with year fixed effects

	1	2	3	4
Budget Deficit	-0.69 (0.42)	-0.42 (0.32)		-0.58 (0.65)
Financial Sector Exposure	0.29** (0.08)	0.23** (0.07)		0.23*** (0.05)
Eurozone member	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)		-15.53 (11.12)
Trade Balance	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.00)
Spread on German bonds	-1.14 (0.98)	-0.44 (1.26)		-2.04* (0.92)
Unemployment	2.02** (0.70)	0.98 (0.96)		1.99** (0.60)
Public Sector Size	1.85* (0.87)	0.92 (0.98)		1.94*** (0.45)
2011	-11.04*** (3.04)	-14.77*** (3.19)	-13.75*** (3.53)	-6.34 (4.17)
2012	-5.01 (4.75)	-11.50 (6.71)	-21.31*** (3.50)	-19.08*** (3.88)
2013	-32.94** (10.87)	-32.82** (10.41)	-29.20*** (7.93)	-28.18*** (7.05)
2014	-18.40* (7.89)	-16.69* (7.11)	-28.27*** (6.92)	-23.35*** (6.00)
2015	-14.52*** (0.64)	-14.03*** (0.80)	-23.05*** (4.58)	-15.70*** (3.78)
Log GDP/capita	-6.55 (5.93)	-1.67 (6.47)		-9.12* (3.79)
TARGET Balance/100	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)		
TARGET Surplus		-12.12 (7.80)		
TARGET Surplus * TARGET Balance		0.01* (0.00)		
Public Trust in the EU			-0.31 (0.31)	-0.61 (0.42)
Public Support for the Euro			21.77 (13.29)	46.47* (21.05)
Public Support for EMU Reform			10.66 (6.28)	5.01 (5.80)
Parliamentary Power Index			-15.32* (6.87)	-9.31** (3.54)
Left/Right Govt Ideology			-1.55 (1.75)	-3.16 (1.69)
Eurosceptic Party			-0.53 (0.32)	-0.78 (0.602)
Constant	29.52 (46.12)	32.69 (47.08)	104.33** (34.78)	101.30* (43.17)
Constant Level 2	8.60*** (5.07)	8.25*** (5.15)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant Level 1	44.81*** (1.42)	44.40*** (1.75)	44.72*** (2.07)	43.57*** (2.43)
<i>N</i>	499	499	565	542
<i>BIC</i>	5250.42	5240.83	5935.70	5667.42
Log likelihood	-2609.67	-2604.88	-2948.84	-2814.82

Notes: Unstandardized coefficients with robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Linear random-intercept models using maximum likelihood estimation. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A8. Multi-level logit models of governmental preferences

	1.	2.	3.	4	5
Budget Deficit	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)		-0.05 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)
Financial Sector Liabilities/100	0.02*** (0.00)			0.01* (0.00)	0.02* (0.01)
Eurozone Member	0.0 (.)	0.0 (.)		-0.18 (0.26)	0.00 (.)
Trade Balance	0.00 (0.00)			0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Spread over German bonds	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)		-0.08* (0.03)	-0.10 (0.05)
Unemployment	0.09** (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)		0.11*** (0.03)	0.10 (0.07)
Public Sector Size	0.09** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)		0.08*** (0.02)	0.11* (0.04)
Log GDP/capita	-0.46 (0.38)	0.68* (0.27)			-0.65 (0.54)
TARGET Balance/100	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)			0.00 (0.00)
TARGET Surplus		-0.60* (0.29)			-0.51 (0.41)
TARGET balance*TARGET surplus		0.01* (0.00)			0.00 (.)
Public Trust in the EU			-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Public Support for the Euro			0.52 (0.53)		
Public Support for EMU Reform			-0.07 (0.58)	0.02 (0.66)	-0.02 (0.84)
Parliamentary Power Index			-0.78*** (0.17)	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.47 (0.27)
Left/Right Govt Ideology			-0.04 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)
Eurosceptic Party			-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Constant	0.01 (3.30)	-7.38* (2.92)	1.66* (0.76)	-3.30* (1.59)	2.10 (5.51)
Constant Level 1	0.10 (0.09)	0.12 (0.11)	0.07 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	0.14 (0.15)
<i>N</i>	499	499	565	542	381
<i>N (group-level)</i>	6	6	6	6	6
<i>BIC</i>	708.17	720.56	786.86	769.63	558.48

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. . Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.