Online Appendix

This Appendix includes robustness checks of analyses using data on EMB de facto performance from the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index.

Robustness checks using Perceptions of Electoral Integrity data.

Table 2A. Formal institutional independence and de facto EMB independence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
EMB fully independent	-0.172		
	(0.472)		
EMB within government	0.421		
	(0.514)		
Oversight EMB by:			
Head of government or executive		-0.062	
		(0.278)	
Legislature		-0.118	
		(0.227)	
Judiciary / electoral court		-0.432	
		(0.301)	
Civil service		0.292	
		(0.482)	
Civil society		-0.258	
		(0.297)	
Political parties		-0.556	
		(0.370)	
Oversight EMB multiple actors?[a]			
Oversight by 1			-0.321
			(0.278)
Oversight by 2			-0.075
			(0.315)
Oversight by 3-5			**-1.109**
			(0.365)
Constant	3.557***	3.805***	3.816***
	(0.454)	(0.186)	(0.219)
N	66	66	66
R-squared	0.069	0.153	0.145

OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. Dependent variable is EMB impartiality as measured by the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (Norris et al. 2018). a. No oversight or missing is the reference category.

Table 3A. Personnel independence and de facto EMB independence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Who appoints EMB?							
Legislature	-0.370 (0.266)						
President or executive	**-0.632* (0.269)**						
Independent panel or body	-0.585 (0.499)						
EMB members	**-0.867** (0.315)**						
Courts	-0.161 (0.366)						
Political parties	**-0.992+ (0.564)**						
Appointment by multiple		**-0.375+ (0.225)**					
Appointment professional?			0.076 (0.241)				
Terms chair/members (1-5)[a]				**-0.181** (0.064)**			
Protection arbitrary					-0.115 (0.243)		
Who removes EMB?							
Head of						-0.188 (0.267)	
Legislature						-0.420 (0.283)	
Judiciary / electoral court						0.104 (0.362)	
Civil service						1.222 (0.953)	
Civil society						-0.166 (0.689)	
Political parties						-0.018 (1.196)	
Chair/member party							**-0.725** (0.214)**
Constant	4.099** (0.222)	3.954** (0.282)	3.472** (0.194)	4.033** (0.210)	3.598** (0.199)	3.669** (0.204)	3.939** (0.162)
N	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
R-squared	0.166	0.042	0.002	0.112	0.004	0.082	0.152

OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. Dependent variable is EMB impartiality as measured by the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (Norris et al. 2018). a. Terms of chairs vary from permanent, to limited term, renewable without limit, to limited term, renewable up to 5 times, to limited term, renewable 1-4 times, to limited term, not renewable.

Table 4A. Financial independence and de facto EMB independence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Who approves EMB budget?			
Head of government or executive	-0.264		
	(0.264)		
Legislature	0.082		
	(0.255)		
Judiciary / electoral court	1.299		
	(0.914)		
Civil service	**1.136+**		
	(0.657)		
Civil society	-0.125		
	(0.657)		
Political parties	1.500		
	(0.934)		
Budget approved by multiple actors? (0-3)		0.159	
		(0.195)	
Sources of EMB funding?			
National government			-0.077
			(0.145)
Regional and local government			0.064
			(0.230)
Civil society organizations (NGOs)			-0.212
			(0.333)
Private donors (philanthropists)			-0.352
			(0.358)
Private donors (business corporations)			0.385
			(0.421)
International organizations			**-0.536***
			(0.208)
Foreign government(s)			-0.076
			(0.237)
Constant	3.493***	3.350***	3.857***
	(0.248)	(0.239)	(0.245)
N	66	66	66
R-squared	0.142	0.010	0.188

OLS regression. Dependent variable is EMB impartiality as measured by the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (Norris et al. 2018).

Table 5A. Functional independence and de facto EMB independence

	Model 1	Model 2
EMB has power to:		
Call elections	0.017	
	(0.258)	
Order a recount of results	-0.096	
	(0.302)	
Order re-polling in particular polling stations	-0.184	
	(0.332)	
Completely annul an election	-0.405	
	(0.293)	
Count of powers (0-4)		-0.184*
		(0.074)
Constant	3.858***	3.875***
	(0.190)	(0.180)
N	66	66
R-squared	0.103	0.088

OLS regression. Dependent variable is EMB impartiality as measured by the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (Norris et al. 2018).

Table 6A. De jure independence, de facto independence and election integrity

	EMB autonomy (VDem)	EMB autonomy (VDem)	Election integrity (VDem)	Election integrity (VDem)
EMB de facto independence			**7.716***	**5.207***
			(1.112)	**(1.184)**
Institutional independence				
EMB within government	0.453	0.170	-0.803	-1.922
	(0.467)	(0.417)	(5.072)	(4.501)
Oversight EMB by political parties	-0.461	**-0.732***	2.858	-0.602
	(0.377)	**(0.337)**	(4.037)	(3.943)
Oversight EMB by multiple actors? (0-3)	-0.072	0.078	-1.124	0.021
	(0.140)	(0.128)	(1.517)	(1.385)
Personnel independence				
Who appoints EMB Chair?				
President or executive	-0.181	0.144	-0.218	3.021
	(0.245)	(0.227)	(2.632)	(2.412)
EMB members	-0.277	-0.185	0.657	0.286
	(0.271)	(0.230)	(2.805)	(2.447)
Appointment by multiple actors? (0-4)	-0.238	-0.163	0.789	0.433
	(0.219)	(0.187)	(2.275)	(2.010)
Terms chair (1-5)[b]	**-0.115+**	0.000	-0.754	0.386
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.694)	(0.704)
Chair allowed party membership?	-0.355	0.110	**-7.891****	-3.479
	(0.246)	(0.233)	**(2.641)**	(2.496)
Financial independence				
Sources of EMB funding?				
International organizations	**-0.419***	0.313	**-3.485+**	2.387
	(0.177)	(0.201)	**(1.924)**	(2.176)
Functional independence				
Count of powers (0-4)	0.019	-0.109	-0.162	-0.877
	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.836)	(0.799)
Control variables[c]				
EMB capacity		**0.668***		**4.731***
		(0.162)		**(1.987)**
Economic development		0.277		**4.534***
		(0.173)		**(1.855)**
Constant	4.424***	2.388***	57.010***	36.825***
	(0.501)	(0.637)	(5.604)	(6.782)
N	66	63	63	63
R-squared	0.410	0.657	0.740	0.828

OLS regression. Dependent variable is EMB impartiality as measured by the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (Norris et al. 2018). a. The number of actors involved in oversight of the EMB was recoded to vary from no oversight or missing, to oversight by 1 actor, oversight by 2 actors, and oversight by 3 to 5 actors. b. Terms of chairs vary from permanent, to limited term, renewable without limit, to limited term, renewable up to 5 times, to limited term, renewable 1-4 times, to limited term, not renewable. c. Models with controls also included regional dummies.