

Online Appendix for: The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism

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A Descriptive Statistics and Information about the Data

Table A.1: Surveys used in the left-right self-placement analysis

SURVEY	Survey Years	Frequency	Percent
WVS/EVS†	1981-2008	202,478	11.33
ESS /European Social Survey	2014-2015	35,298	1.97
EB /Eurobarometer	1970-2006	1,070,622	59.89
LB /Latinobarometer	2000-2010	202,394	11.32
EES /European Election Study	1989-2014	173,025	9.68
CEEB/Central and E. Europe Barometer	1990-1997	103,706	5.8
Total		1,787,523	100

†WVS: World Values Survey; EVS: European Values Survey.

Table A.2: Surveys used in the left-right self-placement analysis

	Left-wing	Neutral	Right-wing	Total
Argentina	0	0	18,568	18,568
Australia	0	4,697	0	4,697
Austria	0	43,515	0	43,515
Belgium	0	108,189	0	108,189
Brazil	0	0	17,059	17,059
Bulgaria	15,413	0	0	15,413
Belarus	4,107	0	0	4,107
Canada	0	7,079	0	7,079
Chile	0	0	17,853	17,853
Colombia	0	0	22,249	22,249
Czech Republic	19,895	0	0	19,895
Denmark	0	100,732	0	100,732
Dominican Republic	0	0	9,817	9,817
El Salvador	0	0	12,307	12,307
Estonia	17,195	0	0	17,195
Finland	0	48,083	0	48,083
France	0	109,760	0	109,760
Germany	0	1,001	0	1,001
Greece	0	0	84,554	84,554
Guatemala	0	0	11,997	11,997
Hungary	17,172	0	0	17,172
Ireland	0	98,467	0	98,467
Italy	0	113,176	0	113,176
Latvia	14,498	0	0	14,498
Lithuania	16,686	0	0	16,686
Netherlands	0	107,240	0	107,240
New Zealand	0	2,155	0	2,155
Norway	0	17,867	0	17,867
Peru	0	0	17,105	17,105
Poland	17,990	0	0	17,990
Portugal	0	0	73,929	73,929
Romania	15,212	0	0	15,212
Russian federation	16,567	0	0	16,567
Slovakia	14,315	0	0	14,315
Slovenia	14,923	0	0	14,923
Spain	0	0	97,056	97,056
Sweden	0	45,241	0	45,241
Switzerland	0	5,385	0	5,385
Ukraine	23,320	0	0	23,320
Great Britain	0	106,369	0	106,369
United States	0	10,757	0	10,757
Uruguay	0	0	10,400	10,400
Venezuela	0	0	18,000	18,000
Serbia	1,220	0	0	1,220
W Germany	0	107,257	0	107,257
E Germany	61,673	0	0	61,673
Bolivia	0	0	12,998	12,998
Ecuador	0	0	13,200	13,200
Honduras	0	0	11,007	11,007
Nicaragua	11,031	0	0	11,031
Panama	0	0	11,031	11,031
Paraguay	0	0	10,206	10,206
Total	281,217	1,036,970	469,336	1,787,523

Table A.3: Right-wing regime dates and ideological associations

	Regime start and and Year of Re- democratization	Type of Regime	Ideology A: Anti-communist P: Populist L: Left-wing N: Nationalist
Argentina	1976-1983	Military dictatorship	A
Brazil	1964-1985	Military dictatorship	A
Chile	1973-1989	Military dictatorship	A
Colombia	1953-1958	Military dictatorship	A/P
Dominican Republic	1966 - 1978	Civilian-military [†]	P/A
El Salvador [‡]	1979-1982	Military junta	A
Guatemala	1954-1985	Military dictatorship	A
Peru	1968-1980*	Military dictatorship	N/P
Uruguay	1973-1984	Civilian military regime	A
Venezuela	1948-1958	Military junta	A
Bolivia	1980-1982	Military regime	A/N
Ecuador	1972-1979	Military	P/N
Honduras	1972-1980	Military dictatorship	P/A
Nicaragua	1979- 1990	Sandinista junta	L
Panama	1968 -1990	Military dictatorship	P/A
Paraguay	1954 -1989	One-party military dictatorship	A
Greece	1967-1974	Military regime	A
Spain	1936-1978	One party Military dictatorship	A
Portugal	1926-1975	Civilian-military	A

[†]Balanguer was technically an elected president (elected 1966 and 1974) so not clear how authoritarian. According the V-Dem and Polity IV it was authoritarian so we have classified his tenure as an authoritarian regime although much milder than Trujillo's.

[‡]The regime end date is complicated by the civil war from 1982 to 1992 (see notes below on regime start and end dates).

* We ignore the arguable democratic back-sliding under Fujimori.

B Coding: regime start/end dates and ideology

Determining regime end point/re-democratization: We chose the year of the democratic election where the regime relinquished executive power. Occasionally, as in Brazil, the regime allowed some parliamentary elections first as part of the gradual democratization process, but the military ultimately retained executive power. Therefore, as the final end point of the regime, we chose the year where the military actually transferred all power to elected officials. The key test of the regime's end is whether the military accepts the results of the elections and transfers power.

Regime start point: In most cases the regime start point is unambiguous since it is marked by a coup against elected officials and the regime start point matches the coding done by [Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán \(2007\)](#). Transfers of power from one general to the next often occurred through coups. Where these coups were done on the basis of excuses such as the "ill health" of the incumbent and did not mark a significant change in policies, we assume regime continuity to be unbroken. However, in some cases, the regimes are punctuated by "semi-democratic" interludes or coups that indicated a more dramatic change of character in the regime. Bolivia is an example. In these cases, we test a few start points for

the regime. Both regime start and end points are also verified against general democracy indicators including Polity IV, V-Dem, and the regime classification done by [Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán \(2007\)](#). For example, Balaguer's regime (1966-1978) in the Dominican Republic was some form of electoral authoritarianism, but based on its low Polity and V-Dem scores, we classify it as the latest authoritarian regime. In determining regime end points, our focus is very much on who officially holds power (thus reflecting the symbolic nature of holding power) rather than on whether elections are fully free and fair and whether political repression or civil unrest has been fully ended. Therefore, there may be an occasional discrepancy between the levels of democracy given by the indicators and the date of the regime end/democratization chosen by us.

Ideology: Table A.3 summarizes the various elements making up the overall ideological orientation of the regime in order of dominance. Ideology is coded on a case basis by looking at following criteria. The source materials are secondary history sources as well as official statements issued by the regimes.

- The publicized excuse for the first coup, which overthrew democratically elected representatives. The main sources are statements issued by the military juntas after the coup as well as historic accounts of the military's objections to the democratic incumbent (i.e. policies). Main justifications include: restoring peace in a civil war/social unrest, and this was often linked to a Marxist/communist "insurgency"/guerrilla war (see below); countering left-wing policies of the democratically elected government i.e. re-nationalization; also both latter excuses are linked more generally to dealing with a "socialist threat" (i.e. in Brazil) and anti-communism.
- The presence of ongoing war against communist/left-wing guerrillas is used as an indicator of a right-wing anti-communist stance. The military often entered politics in the first place because of the guerrilla war. The military's focus on eradicating a "left-wing" threat provided an ideological orientation for the regime. Examples include Paraguay and Uruguay.
- The nature of the regime's policies particularly economic policies: for example, we examine to what extent the regimes aligned themselves with neoliberalism. Also, church-state relations are examined, as well as the presence of nationalism. Also, relations with the Soviet Union are used as an indicator of how far left a regime is in terms of its ideological associations. Some regimes like under Gen. Oswaldo Lopez in Honduras were more populist and had some more left-wing policies (particularly relating to modernization and expansion of education), however the willingness of a regime to align itself with the Soviet Union is an indication of just how committed the regime is to a left-wing image. In so far as a regime is officially and openly aligned against the Soviet Union, we classify it as right-wing. The Panama regime also displays a vaguer stance due to its strong populist-nationalist character. However, we do not consider populist nationalism, in itself, to be enough to fully classify a regime as left-wing. We also look at the targets of regime de-mobilization policies i.e. bans on communist and socialist parties (Chile, Spain).
- Ideologies of regimes' key policymakers and advisers for example neo-liberal economists, a.k.a. 'The Chicago Boys.'

- The ideologies of the coalition supporting the regime. An example includes the MNR/ “Revolutionary National Movement” in Bolivia which supported the regime; this was a middle-class conservative social movement that grew out of the Bolivarian Revolution.

B.1 Argentina (1976-1983)

Regime dates: Regime start: 1976 coup against Isabel Peron. Regime end: Defeat in Falklands War main cause of regime end; Last general, Bignone, relinquished power in elections on October 10 1983.

Ideology: Right-wing, neo-liberal, anti-privatization policies ; pretext for military coup was communist insurgency leading to “Dirty War” but also a strong ideas of defending "Western Christian civilization" (Pion-Berlin 1988); neo-liberalism was strong influence on the regime and was even featured in regime-sponsored public "education campaigns" (Fridman 2010).

B.2 Bolivia (1980-1982)

Regime dates: N.B. Two possible regimes starts. Regime start 1: 1964: military junta takes over lead by the vice-president; brief semi-democratic interlude (1978-1980); Regime start 2: then coup by Meza Tejada in 1980; Regime end: 1982 Military allows previously elected congress to nominate president.

Ideology: Right-wing, nationalist. Right-wing elements of the MNR/ Revolutionary National Movement (a middle-class conservative nationalist movement) were central to earlier military regime (1964-1978) and exerted continued intellectual influence; The successive military regimes shifted increasingly to the right culminating in the ultra-conservative Meza Tejada regime 1980-1982. The military regimes were increasingly viewed as "fascist" (Mayorga and Gorman 1978) and the Meza Tejada regime even deemed neo-nazi (German Nazi Klaus Barbie was given sanctuary and helped organize mercenaries)(Jerez and Müller 2015).

B.3 Brazil (1964-1985)

Regime dates: Regime start: 1964 coup against President Goulart. Regime end: Regime finally allowed presidential election in January 1985.

Ideology: Right-wing; prominent ideas include “New Professionalism” (preparation for counter-insurgency warfare) and the “Doctrine of National Security”; in Brazil, the government displayed a “heavy emphasis on anticommunism” (Skidmore 1990); the dictatorship started with coup against President Goulart (follower of Vargas who was a nationalist populist) on the pretext that he was leading Brazil towards socialism (Skidmore 1990).

B.4 Chile (1979-1989)

Regime dates: Regime start: coup against President Allende. Regime end: 1989 presidential elections.

Ideology: Right-wing; strongly neo-liberal (‘Chicago Boy’ economists played important role); anti-communism as justification for coup (coup against Allende who was an open Marxist), bans on socialist and communist parties; In Chile, Pinochet’s junta “declared itself opposed

to Marxism” Kurtz (1999); intellectual influence of Jaime Guzman (helped draft Pinochet’s constitution and speeches and developed gremialismo (mix of Catholic social teaching and neo-liberalism)); national holidays commemorating coup and book burning show ideologization.

B.5 Colombia (1953-1958)

Regime dates: Regime start: 1953 peaceful coup by General Rojas against democratically elected President Gomez. Regime end: May 4 1958 elections for the first National Front (compromise system between main parties) president.

Ideology: Right-wing; main excuse for military coups was controlling civil unrest “la Violencia,” which was basically a civil war between the Conservative and Liberal parties. General Rojas’s policies included extensive public works (a populist element) and giving women the right to vote, but ideology not very clear.

B.6 Dominican Republic (1966-1978)

Regime dates: Regime start: election of Balaguer in 1966. Regime end: electoral defeat of Balaguer in 1978 (at first military intervened to stop vote count but under international pressure election completed).

Ideology: Earlier Trujillo regime was strong ideological influence. Political orientation of Trujillo’s regime: represented a mix of nationalist and Catholic values with an emphasis on order (Hartlyn 1998) and also it was highly personalistic (capital city renamed Trujillo City, as well as a mountain), had political party El Partido Dominicano and the re-organized military as Guardia Nacional as basis of power; Trujillo declared himself “Number one anti-communist”, during WWII aligned with Axis powers; 1963 military coup aimed against leftist President Bosch and supported by upper classes and Catholics; Balaguer was a close supporter of Trujillo and was quite authoritarian but was elected as right-wing Christian democrat (created party Partido Reformista Social Cristiano), he continued Trujillo’s tradition of high visibility infrastructure projects (a populist element) (Betances 2005).

B.7 Ecuador (1972-1979)

Regime dates: Regime start 1: popularly elected president Velasco seized power in 1970 (autogolpe) and held it with some military support; Regime start 2: 1972 coup by new military junta led by General Lara; Lara removed by coup. Regime end: second round of presidential elections April 1979 and 1st round Jul 1978, so picked the second round as the end of the regime.

Ideology: Right-wing, nationalist: General Lara maintained government control of oil, “oil nationalism” Brogan (1984).

B.8 El Salvador (1979-1982)

Regime dates: Regime start: coup in 1979. Regime end: In May 2 1982 President Magana chosen by elected Congress. N.B: civil war from 1981-1992 so some ambiguity about regime’s

hold on country. The 1979-1982 regime was preceded by a string of military regimes since 1945.

Ideology: Centre right-wing. The Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno (a civilian-military dictatorship) established through a coup in 1979 and was largely engaged in waging a civil war against the left-wing Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) [Alvarez \(2010\)](#). The military-civilian regime was supported by the United States to avoid “abandoning it to the communists” and despite the terrible human rights record the regime was seen as the last bulwark against a communist takeover ([LeoGrande 1998](#), 157). The end of the Cold War was central to the end of the civil war in El Salvador ([Kalyvas and Balcells 2010](#)), thus highlighting the ideological aspect of the civil war.

B.9 Greece (1967-1974)

Regime dates: Regime start: coup in 1967. Regime end: November 1974 general election.

Ideology: Right-wing: Papadopoulos’s (main junta leader) “Creed” (regime manifesto) stated anti-communism as key aim ([Anastasakis 1992](#)); communist party as well as other left-wing parties outlawed, support for traditional Greco-Christian culture.

B.10 Guatemala (1954-1985)

Regime dates: Regime start: CIA-orchestrated coup led by Gen Armas in 1954. Regime end: Due to international pressure General Mejía Victores allowed return to democracy in Guatemala. On 1 July 1984 an election was held for representatives to a Constituent Assembly to draft a democratic constitution. On 30 May 1985, the Constituent Assembly finished drafting a new constitution, which took effect immediately. General elections were scheduled, and civilian candidate Vinicio Cerezo was elected as president 1985. We chose the year of the presidential election as the regime end. N.B. 1954 Armas regime was CIA sponsored so not clear how functional. Since Armas’s death in 1957 there were elections but military interfered, then several semi-elected authoritarian presidents followed (including Gen. Ydígoras Fuentes Col. Peralta Azurdia 1963-1966 Col. Arana Osorio 1970-1974, Gen. Laugerud García 1974-1976, Gen. Lucas Garcia 1977-1982). Next, two military leaders who seized power through coups (Rios Montt (coup 1982) and Majija Victores (1983)). There was a civil war 1960 to 1996 so regime’s hold on the country questionable.

Ideology: Right-wing: started by CIA-sponsored coup against democratically elected President Arbenz who was viewed as a communist threat after he started nationalizing land (including that of United Fruit Company) ([Streeter 2000](#)); Gen. Castillo Armas was vague ideologically except for an anti-communist stance voiced in manifesto; the string of military rulers from 1963 were aligned with the Partido Institucional Democrática a center-right party (set up by Peralta Azurdia), often allied with the far-right National Liberation Movement (MLN) formed by Castillo Armas; however the long string of military dictators mainly leaves the military as the main source of continuity.

B.11 Honduras (1972-1980)

Regime dates: N.B: Two possible regimes starts. Regime start 1: 1963 coup led by Gen Oswaldo Lopez; brief period of civilian rule; Regime start 2: second coup by Oswaldo Lopez in 1972; 1975 coup ousted Lopez; then 1978 coup. Regime end: Constituent assembly popularly elected in April 1980.

Ideology: Before the first coup Oswaldo Lopez accused the President Villeda Morales of being soft on communism (Darnton 2014). In second dictatorship Oswaldo Lopez was more progressive; successors carried out various modernization programs; last junta just advocated a return to civilian rule; close co-operation with the United States and recipient of military aid.

B.12 Nicaragua (1979- 1990)

Regime dates: Regime start: July 1979 Sandinistas announce government led by Daniel Ortega. Regime end: Unclear. 1984 presidential election under the Sandinistas (won by Ortega) was considered free and fair by many observers; Polity IV however suggests democratization only occurred with 1990 election were coalition of all opposition parties (conservative and left-wing) won against Ortega.

Ideology: Sandinista junta was left-wing (Soares Jr 2006).

B.13 Panama (1968 -1990)

Regime dates: Regime start: coup by Gen. Torrijos Herrera in 1968; then Torrijos died, and Gen. Noriega took over in 1981. Regime end: US invasion in 1989. US supported the re-validation of 1989 presidential elections and President Endarra was inaugurated on December 29 1989. We chose in 1990 as the first year when new president was in charge.

Ideology: A bit vague; Torrijos was possibly socialist in sentiments, implemented policy of land reform, and he was himself dark-skinned and opposed to "white elites." Torrijos founded the party Partido Revolucionario Democrático, or PRD which was the regime party in 1978 (key ideas: included elements of nationalism, anti-colonialism, Latin American solidarity, cultural identity, and anti-imperialism, with an emphasis on international relations and reaching out to all provinces and social classes (Scribner 2003)), however regime manifesto stated repudiation of communism as first aim (Ropp 1982, 38); racial-class dynamics mixed race poor vs "white-tailed elites" Millett (1988), corporatist multiculturalism (Horton (2006), see also section on neo-indigenismo in Rivera Aguilar (2013)).

B.14 Paraguay (1954 -1989)

Regime dates: Regime start: General Stroessner made coup in 1954. Regime end: Stroessner overthrown in coup in 1989 by Rodriguez. Presidential elections held in May 1989 and won by Rodriguez on Colorado Party ticket (elections considered generally free), he then allowed a new constitution that limited presidential powers to go into effect in 1992 and then transferred power to new democratically elected president in 1993; 1989, 1992, and 1993 all plausible regime end dates.

Ideology: Right-wing: nationalist. Main ideological themes include order, progress, and anti-communism (Lambert 1997). The conservative right-wing political party provided one of the bases of power (Asociación Nacional Republicana – Partido Colorado, ANR-PC); Staunchly anti-communist: Communist party banned (Gillespie 1990), with assistance of the US, the regime conducted a counterinsurgency campaign against left-wing communist guerrillas (Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional, abbreviated FULNA, supported by Cuba).

B.15 Peru (1968-1980)

Regime dates: Regime start: coup 1968 by Gen. Velasco Alvarado. Regime end: May 1980 democracy restored through presidential elections. N.B.: Democratic freedoms suffered a relapse under Fujimori 1990-2000 but we ignore this in our analysis.

Ideology: Started as nationalist/populist regime and gradually becoming more right-wing. The Velasco regime was unique among Latin American regimes at the time in its lack of overarching and strong right-wing anti-communist ideology. Velasco had pro-poor policies, nationalization and land reform policies. The general ideology was known as Peruanismo Cant (2012). The regime displayed strong anti-Americanism (Philips 2013) and a policy of non-alignment towards Soviet Bloc; the regime pursued a “third-way” and did not want to be identified with either left or right; some would say it displayed an “unintelligible political message” (Cant 2012). In speeches, Velasco clearly characterised the regime as “military nationalist” to avoid the appearance of communist affiliation (Puente 2016). Velasco Alvarado was replaced by Morales Bermúdez in 1975 and the regime took a more conservative turn “with a clear anti-communist” position (Aguirre and Drinot 2017, 4).

B.16 Portugal (1926-1975)

Regime dates: Regime start: coup 1926 and Estado Novo founded in 1933 by Salazar. Regime end: Carnation Revolution in April 1974, followed by Portuguese Constituent Assembly election, 1975 was carried out in Portugal on 25 April 1975.

Ideology: Right-wing: corporatist and strongly pro-Catholic as well as nationalist (Payne 1996) and supportive of the idea of Portuguese imperialism (Cusack 2005). Early minor Fascist elements although Salazar was clear in his rejection of ‘pagan’ fascism (Payne 1996; Pinto and Rezola 2007, 315).

B.17 Spain (1936-1978)

Regime dates: Regime start: in 1936 Franco named caudillo or use end of civil war 1939. Regime end: The transition began shortly after Franco’s death on 20 November 1975, while its completion has been variously said to be marked by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the failure of an attempted coup on 23 February 1981, or the electoral victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) on 28 October 1982.

Ideology: Right-wing: Franco’s takeover was reaction to civil war which had strong ideological split between left and right. The regime was based on a Falangist, nationalist, Carlist coalition (Jensen 2002). The regime was pro-Catholic; with early Fascist elements; and a strong single party gave unifying theme to regime.

B.18 Uruguay (1973-1984)

Regime dates: Regime start: 1973 coup. Regime end: 1984 presidential elections.

Ideology: Right-wing: the military gained power by fighting the Tupamaros, a left-wing guerrilla movement; bans of left-wing parties. Regime generally nationalist, pro-order, and anti-Marxist (Achugar 2007).

B.19 Venezuela (1948-1958)

Regime dates: Regime start: 1948 coup. Regime end: 1958 presidential elections.

Ideology: Right-wing; started with coup against Accion Democratica party, which was center-left. Coup occurred after Venezuela's first democratic elections. AD party had overwhelming majority (73%) which scared upper-classes, large business owners and the Catholic Church (Neuhouser 1992).

C Repression and Indoctrination Measures

Repression:

Interval measure 0 (no repression) to 1 (full repression). The measure is an average of the z-score measures of the individual indicators over the duration of each authoritarian regime. The measure is a macro/aggregate/country-level measure that reflects the prior authoritarian regime characteristics, specifically the regime’s reputation. In other words, we are not looking at what individual people experienced in their impressionable years, for example, or total levels of repression experienced by individuals etc. Rather we are interested in overall levels of repression “generated” by the regime that can somehow shaped attitudes towards the regime. Of course not all respondents in the survey data analysed will have first-hand experience of the regime.

We have selected V-Dem Civil liberties index (`v2x_civlib`) to measure repression as it best captures overall state repression in both “hard” and “soft” forms ([Gerschewski 2013](#)). The V-Dem description of the index from the V-Dem codebook runs as follows: “Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.” Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: property rights for men/women (`v2clprptym`, `v2clprptyw`), from forced labor for men/women (`v2clslavem` `v2clslavef`), freedom of religion (`v2clrelig`), religious organization repression (`v2csrlgref`), freedom of foreign movement (`v2clfmov`), freedom of domestic movement for men/women (`v2cldmovm`, `v2cldmovw`), party ban (`v2psparban`), barriers to parties (`v2psbars`), opposition parties autonomy (`v2psoppaut`), CSO entry and exit (`v2cseeorgs`), CSO repression (`v2csreprss`), freedom from torture (`v2cltort`), and freedom from political killings (`v2clkill`.)” This index is then transformed to create an overall indicator of state repression for each regime. The transformation is done by taking a simple average level of state repression over the duration of each dictatorship. So we take the mean score of each of the indicators between the regime start and dates (see Appendix Table A.3).

Indoctrination:

Interval measure of indoctrination with values ranging from 0 (no indoctrination) to 4 (full indoctrination). The measure is an average of the z-score measures of the individual indicators over the duration of each authoritarian regime.

Definition of indoctrination: We define indoctrination as the deliberate, and sometimes coercive, inculcation of the subject population with the regime’s guiding idea through the monopolization of the political and social discourse and re-organization and subordination of social, media and educational structures in service of regime aims. This is our own original definition. Our definition is tailored to indoctrination by political regimes. Most extant definitions tend to be very much confined to the sphere of education particularly civic education (see [Snook 2010](#)). We deliberately include broader structures beyond the education system such as various mass membership organizations. Furthermore, we do not include the requirement of “uncritical” acceptance that is so common in definitions as we want to

distinguish the attempt to indoctrinate from its success. To measure indoctrination we have created an index using individual V-Dem indicators to capture the key elements/tools of indoctrination: (1) the presence of a clear ideology, (2) the monopolization of public discourse and exclusion of alternative views, (3) the control and exclusion of organization that could provide alternative views, and (4) the presence of regime-controlled institutions that have mass penetration into society such as mass membership organizations and a developed education system.

Key components of indoctrination and means of indoctrination.

- Firstly, there is a need for material for indoctrination, namely content. Content for indoctrination is reinforced by the presence of a clear ideology or message. We cannot directly measure this with V-Dem indicators. As an approximation we use the measure for reasoned justification (`v2dlreason`) Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions? We assume that more ideological regimes will make greater use of reasoned justifications for policies.
- Second, there is a need for tools/means for indoctrination. Our measures will focus on the means for indoctrination. We are most interested in measuring the means/opportunity for indoctrination rather than its success. In this sense we thinking about indoctrination as a true treatment which may or may not succeed. In other words, we are not defining the treatment through its effect. The two key elements that characterize the means of indoctrination are a monopolization of the public discourse and, secondly, institutions with a mass reach and mobilization capacity that can “educate” the public.
 1. Monopolization of political discourse: only one “worldview” allowed. Ability to prevent alternative views/information.
- General censorship of population: no freedom of thought and expression
 - freedom of discussion for men/women (`v2cldiscm,v2cldiscw`)
- Control of media, censorship
 - Print/broadcast censorship effort (`v2mecenefm`) → reverse
 - Harassment of journalists (`v2meharjrn`), media self-censorship (`v2meslfcen`)
 - Media bias (`v2mebias`), print/broadcast media critical (`v2mecrit`), and print/broadcast media perspectives (`v2merange`).
 - Inverse of Media access (C) (`v2meaccess`) "Question: Approximately what percentage (%) of the population has access to any print or broadcast media that are sometimes critical of the national government?"
- Control and exclusion of organizations that could offer alternative world views. This is part of the process of monopolizing the public discourse.
 - Control of academic sphere: Freedom of academic and cultural expression (`v2clacfree`).

- Control of political parties and opposition groups and civil society
- Party ban (C) (`v2psparban`) (Most authoritarian value: All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. Captures one party regimes, but it would seem all authoritarian regimes ban parties so not much within variation.
- CSO entry and exit (`v2cseeorgs`) "Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?"
- CSO structure (`v2csstruc`) "Question: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs."
- CSO participatory environment (`v2csprtcpt`) Zero value best captures regimes that are good at indoctrination: "0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary."

2. Ability to inculcate population (particularly the new generations) with regime's world view.

2.a Presence of regime controlled institutions with mass penetration of society i.e. broad-based mass membership.

- Mass-membership political parties:
- Party organizations (`v2psorgs`): "Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?" Measures number of personnel working for party – should capture level of party institutionalization.
- Party branches (`v2psprbrch`) "Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?"
- Size and social penetration by regime controlled civil society: trade unions, youth groups etc: no measure available.

2.b.Means of spreading and teaching regime ideology through mass education:

- Educational equality (`v2peedueq`)
- Promotion of mass literacy. Partially captured by education equality measure.

Some observations: The three variables (party ban, party branches and party organizations) capture interesting variation: for some regimes, particularly right-wing, they all move together, but for Portugal and communist regimes they diverge.

The aggregation technique used to create indoctrination measures involved creating five components that are then equally weighted.

The five components include: the monopolization of public discourse, a strong ideology, control of organization with competing world views, capacity for mass mobilization (mass organizations), and capacity for mass education. Each component is an average of indicators included in the component. The final measure of indoctrination is an average of the indicators for the five components thus giving equal weight to each. Thus, indoctrination with equally weighted measures of five components = (monopolization of discourse + strong ideology + control of competing organizations + mass organization + mass education)/5.

Each component is calculated as mean of the component indicators if more than one used:

- (A) Monopolization of public discourse = $(v2cldiscm + v2cldiscw + v2mecenefm + v2meharjrn + v2meslfcen + v2mebias + v2mecrit + v2merange + v2clacfree) / 9$
- (B) Control of competing organization = $(v2psparban + v2cseeorgs + v2csprtcpt) / 3$
- (C) Mass organization = $(v2psorgs \text{ (reversed)} + v2psprbrch \text{ (reverse)}) / 2$
- (D) Mass education = $v2peedueq \text{ (reversed)}$
- (E) Strong ideology = $v2dlreason \text{ (reversed)}$

Next the average is taken of all above components, thus giving each equal weight, $Indoctrination = (A + B + C + D + E) / 5$.

Finally, the resulting measure was recoded so as to form a scale running from 0 (no indoctrination) to 4 (full indoctrination).


Sensitivity Analysis

It is evident that the indoctrination scale was constructed deductively, without testing whether our assumptions about how the individual items that construct each subscale are linked to each other and without further testing how well the resulting subscales are linked together to form a unified scale. We try to test these assumptions and to see how results change when we relax some of the underlying assumptions behind our measurement strategy. We do this by using 1990 as the year of regime change for both left- and right-wing dictatorships. Using alternative years for right-wing dictatorships leaves all main results unchanged.

Our analysis follows the two-stage logic used to form the scale. Thus, we start by inspecting how well the individual items can be put together to form a scale. In other words, we will examine the scalability of the individual items. Items are scalable when they are monotonically related to the rest of the scale. They do not need to be linearly correlated but they do need to be monotonically related to each other. This property is also known as the monotone homogeneity assumption (Jacoby 1991). We test this assumption separately for the two main subscales that consists of more than two items: *Monopolization of public*

Discourse (A) and *Control of Competing Organization* (B). To do so, we construct scales consisting of all items but one of them. We then explore the monotone homogeneity assumption by looking at the scatterplot between the scale missing one time and the omitted item. For example, starting with the monopolization scale, we look at the association between the scale except from the item `v2cldiscm` and this item. We do the same for all items in both scales (A) and (B).


Figure C.1: Checking the monotone homogeneity assumption with subscale A (Monopolization of public discourse).



Note: Each panel plots the values that correspond to the item shown in the horizontal axis and the average of all other items consisting of subscale A. A local linear regression curve (in blue) traces the scatterplot as a way to assess the monotone homogeneity assumption. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence intervals.

The results are displayed in Figure C.1. To avoid capitalizing on time dependencies that would inflate the correlation between all items (because values of the previous year predict very well the values of the next year), we aggregate the data, using the average value for each country. Thus, the dots shown in the scatterplot represent countries, not combinations between countries and years. As shown, in all instances the relationship between each item and the scale consisting of all other items (constructed by simply taking the average of the remaining items) is not only monotone but can be very easily approximated by a straight line. Albeit informal, this visualization provides ample evidence about the scalability of each item consisting of the monopolization scale.

Figure C.2: Checking the monotone homogeneity assumption with subscale B (Control of competing organization).



Note: Each panel plots the values that correspond to the item shown in the horizontal axis and the average of all other items consisting of subscale B. A local linear regression curve (in blue) traces the scatterplot as a way to assess the monotone homogeneity assumption. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence intervals.


Figure C.2 presents the results for scale (B): control of competing organization. The results are very similar. Once again, the correlation between the items consisting of the scale is quite high. The monotone homogeneity assumption seems to be comfortably satisfied.

We now proceed to the second stage. We ask whether the subscales are monotonically related to each other so as to justify their inclusion in one scale. Before we continue with this analysis it is important to emphasize in this second stage the monotone homogeneity assumption is not as crucial as in the first, because now the subscales are expected to capture different characteristics of indoctrination. In other words, we try to get into different facets of indoctrination that do not necessarily need to travel together. That said, since we do use them as items of an additive scale, we need to at least assess how much they relate to each other.

The results are shown in Figure C.3. The pattern is now much more ambiguous than in the previous stage. Indeed, not all facets of indoctrination appear to relate monotonically to each other. As a result, there is evidence for a non-monotone relationship in at least two occasions, namely scale A and scale B, both of which appear to be non-linearly related to the scales constructed of all remaining subscales.

As a way to address these non-linearities, we try to examine how sensitive our results

Figure C.3: Checking the monotone homogeneity assumption for each subscale consisting of the final indoctrination scale.



Note: Each panel plots the values that correspond to the scale shown in the horizontal axis and the average of all other subscales consisting of the indoctrination index. A local linear regression curve (in blue) traces the scatterplot as a way to assess the monotone homogeneity assumption. Shaded area indicates the 95% confidence intervals.

are when each of these scales is excluded from the indoctrination index. Although our main concern lies with Scale A and Scale B, we repeat the analysis for all scales. The main results that we are interested in are those shown in Table 1 of the main text, i.e. when indoctrination is used as predictor of left-right placement among left- and right-wing dictatorships.

The results are shown in Table C.1. The first part of the table presents the effect of indoctrination on LR placement in left-wing dictatorships whereas the second part presents the same effect for right-wing dictatorships. Each column is named after the subscale excluded in the construction of the indoctrination index. In both cases the results seem to remain robust to such the exclusion of each subscale. In all instances indoctrination, irrespective of which subscale is omitted, brings people more to the left in left-wing regimes and more to the right in right-wing regimes. The only exception is subscale D, mass education. Without this item, the indoctrination index appears to be negatively correlated with LR placement in right-wing dictatorships. This means that without subscale D, indoctrination in right-wing regimes makes people more left-wing. Although this results comes in contrast to our expectations, our overall assessment of the scale remains positive for two reasons. First, this is precisely the subscale that seems to correlate monotonically with the rest of the scale, thus pointing to its scalability in the final indoctrination index. Second, substantially, we believe that presence of mass education is a key component of an indoctrination strategy and should thus be included in the final index. School textbooks differ in many respects but share their function as a means through which states disseminate a national narrative, which in the case of dictatorships has an unequivocal ideological connotation. Third, our main argument in the paper is that indoctrination was mainly successful and thus particularly important in the case of communist regimes, not so much in right-wing dictatorships. For left-wing regimes, the results remain robust to the exclusion of this subscale from the resulting index.

Table C.1: The effect of indoctrination on ideological bias, excluding each time one subscale of the indoctrination index.

	Without Scale A	Without Scale B	Without Scale C	Without Scale D	Without Scale E
Left-wing Regimes					
Continuous LR	-1.575*** (0.257)	-1.542*** (0.251)	-1.492*** (0.243)	-3.098*** (0.505)	-2.339*** (0.381)
Binary LR	-0.333*** (0.054)	-0.326*** (0.053)	-0.316*** (0.051)	-0.655*** (0.106)	-0.495*** (0.080)
N	81202	81202	81202	81202	81202
Clusters	87	87	87	87	87
Right-wing Regimes					
Continuous LR	0.340* (0.176)	0.245 (0.150)	0.379** (0.145)	-1.044** (0.379)	0.397** (0.146)
Binary LR	0.082** (0.028)	0.063* (0.025)	0.084*** (0.023)	-0.128* (0.061)	0.083*** (0.023)
N	80264	80264	80264	80264	80264
Clusters	192	192	192	192	192

Notes: Each column presents the correlation between indoctrination and LR placement in left-wing and right-wing dictatorships (while controlling also for repression). Entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses.

D Additional Analyses

Table D.1: More detailed results for the estimates giving rise to Figure 3 of the main text.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.374*** (0.0878)	-0.401*** (0.101)	-0.387** (0.127)	-0.448** (0.135)
Left	-0.255* (0.113)	-0.00970 (0.182)	0.0123 (0.280)	0.217 (0.291)
Time Trend	0.00347 (0.00294)	0.00670* (0.00294)	0.00450 (0.00419)	0.00928 (0.00498)
Time Trend× Right	0.0105** (0.00401)	0.00937* (0.00390)	0.0118* (0.00478)	0.00914 (0.00515)
Time Trend× Left	0.0147* (0.00722)	0.00700 (0.00846)	0.00104 (0.0129)	-0.00967 (0.0134)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
<i>n</i>	1168471	947214	511444	471039
<i>n</i> of clusters	787	602	471	431

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. *c* is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.2: Replicating the results of Table 1, adding up to a fourth time polynomial in Equation 1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left	-0.015 (0.056)	0.072 (0.120)	0.094 (0.117)	0.064 (0.118)
Right	-0.240*** (0.067)	-0.247*** (.085)	-0.227** (.094)	-0.350*** (0.112)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>TimeTrend</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>TimeTrend</i> ²	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>TimeTrend</i> ³	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>TimeTrend</i> ⁴	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
<i>n</i>	1168471	947214	511444	471039
<i>n</i> of clusters	787	602	471	431

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. *c* is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.3: Replicating the results for the right, using $c = 1985$ as the starting point in established democracies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.148* (0.058)	-0.290*** (0.077)	-0.244* (0.101)	-0.416*** (0.113)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
<i>n</i>	1168471	947214	511444	471039
<i>n</i> of clusters	787	602	471	431

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. *c* is defined as 1985 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.4: Replicating the results for the right, using $c = 1980$ as the starting point in established democracies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.099*** (0.055)	-0.232*** (0.074)	-0.182** (0.097)	-0.331** (0.111)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
n	1168471	947214	511444	471039
n of clusters	787	602	471	431


Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1980 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.5: Replicating the results for the right, using $c = 1975$ as the starting point in established democracies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.051 (0.054)	-0.175** (0.073)	-0.121 (0.100)	-0.247** (.111)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
n	1168471	947214	511444	471039
n of clusters	787	602	471	431


Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1975 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure D.1: Replicating Figure 3 for right-wing dictatorships, using $c = 1975$ for established democracies.




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.2: Replicating Figure 3 for right-wing dictatorships, using $c = 1980$ for established democracies.




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.3: Replicating Figure 3 for right-wing dictatorships, using $c = 1985$ for established democracies.




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.4: Replicating Figure 3 dropping Italy, Germany and Austria from the group of established democracies.



Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.5: Replicating Figure 3, treating Italy, Germany and Austria as post-right-wing authoritarian regimes.



Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.


Table D.6: Replicating Main Analysis using the country×year as the unit of analysis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Right	-0.219*** (0.0648)	-0.183* (0.0830)	-0.262** (0.0943)
Left	-0.0783 (0.0576)	0.0994 (0.105)	0.0774 (0.107)
Survey	✓	✓	✓
Fixed Effects			
Pre-WWII		✓	✓
controls			
Post-Treatment			✓
controls			
<i>n</i>	787	602	542

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. *c* is defined as 1990 for established democracies, which are employed as the baseline category.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure D.6: Replicating Figure 3, by implementing the analysis at the country×year level.



Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Table D.7: Replicating the results using a binary outcome as the dependent variable (denoting as one right-wing respondents).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.0666*** (0.0119)	-0.0790*** (0.0145)	-0.0562** (0.0189)	-0.0594** (0.0223)
Left	-0.0377** (0.0122)	-0.0282 (0.0197)	-0.0443 (0.0227)	-0.0439 (0.0229)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
n	1168471	947214	511444	471039
n of clusters	787	602	471	431

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.8: Replicating the results for the right, using $c = 1985$ as the starting point in established democracies, binary outcome: Right 0/1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.052*** (0.0114)	-0.082*** (0.0142)	-0.060** (0.018)	-0.072*** (0.021)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
n	1168471	947214	511444	471039
n of clusters	787	602	471	431

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1985 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.9: Replicating the results for the right, using $c = 1980$ as the starting point in established democracies, binary outcome: Right 0/1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.073*** (0.014)	-0.052** (0.018)	-0.060** (0.021)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
n	1168471	947214	511444	471039
n of clusters	787	602	471	431


Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1980 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.10: Replicating the results for the right, using $c = 1975$ as the starting point in established democracies, binary outcome: Right 0/1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Right	-0.0360*** (0.0108)	-0.0644*** (0.0137)	-0.0433* (0.0176)	-0.0478* (0.0208)
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls		✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls			✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls				✓
n	1168471	947214	511444	471039
n of clusters	787	602	471	431


Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1975 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure D.7: Replicating Figure 3, by employing a binary LR outcome indicator, which denotes as one right-wing respondents.



Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.8: Replicating Figure 3, using a dummy variable for each time point, interacted with *Left* and *Right* regimes.



Note: A local linear regression smoother traces the point estimates for each survey-year. The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies. The shaded area denotes the 95% estimation-wise confidence intervals.

Table D.11: Using Costa Rica as a benchmark group for right-wing dictatorships: Average Treatment Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	c=1990		c=1985		c=1980		c=1975	
Right	-0.931*** (0.193)	-0.885*** (0.193)	-0.854*** (0.191)	-0.819*** (0.190)	-0.777*** (0.190)	-0.754*** (0.190)	-0.700*** (0.192)	-0.688*** (0.191)
<i>n</i>	220861	198891	220861	198891	220861	198891	220861	198891
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.12: Using Costa Rica as a benchmark group for right-wing dictatorships: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, conditioning on years since regime change.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	$c=1990$		$c=1985$		$c=1980$		$c=1975$	
Right	-2.731*** (0.711)	-2.721*** (0.686)	-3.243*** (0.908)	-3.259*** (0.876)	-3.755*** (1.105)	-3.796*** (1.067)	-4.267*** (1.304)	-4.334*** (1.259)
$Time_{t=c}$	-0.102* (0.0400)	-0.108** (0.0388)	-0.102* (0.0400)	-0.108** (0.0388)	-0.102* (0.0400)	-0.108** (0.0388)	-0.102* (0.0400)	-0.108** (0.0388)
$Time_t = c \times Right$	0.118** (0.0402)	0.121** (0.0389)	0.118** (0.0400)	0.121** (0.0388)	0.118** (0.0400)	0.121** (0.0388)	0.118** (0.0400)	0.121** (0.0388)
n	220861	198891	220861	198891	220861	198891	220861	198891
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level								
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure D.9: Using Costa Rica as a benchmark group for right-wing dictatorships.

Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Table D.13: One Country Out: Including only a linear trend and survey-fixed effects (Part I).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without
	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany
Right	-0.220*** (0.06)	-0.239*** (0.06)	-0.230*** (0.06)	-0.220*** (0.06)	-0.190** (0.06)	-0.174** (0.06)	-0.262*** (0.06)	-0.248*** (0.06)
Left	-0.046 (0.06)	-0.059 (0.06)	-0.051 (0.06)	-0.045 (0.06)	-0.021 (0.06)	0.001 (0.06)	-0.085 (0.06)	-0.079 (0.06)
n	1164847	1138388	1100332	1163553	1093923	1128483	1093675	1091957
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.14: One Country Out: Including only a linear trend and survey-fixed effects (Part II).

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Without Ireland	Without Italy	Without the Netherlands	Without New Zealand	Without Norway	Without Sweden	Without Switzerland	Without the U.S.
Right	-0.205** (0.06)	-0.225*** (0.06)	-0.219*** (0.06)	-0.216*** (0.06)	-0.218*** (0.06)	-0.223*** (0.06)	-0.225*** (0.06)	-0.207*** (0.06)
Left	-0.026 (0.06)	-0.062 (0.06)	-0.034 (0.06)	-0.043 (0.06)	-0.048 (0.06)	-0.051 (0.06)	-0.051 (0.06)	-0.035 (0.06)
n	1106720	1096422	1088878	1167154	1150446	1130256	1158523	1162210
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.15: One Country Out: Adding pre-WWII country characteristics (Part I).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without	Without
	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany
Right	-0.265*** (0.08)	-0.292*** (0.08)	-0.311*** (0.07)	-0.273*** (0.08)	-0.247*** (0.08)	-0.139 (0.09)	-0.330*** (0.08)	-0.266*** (0.08)
Left	0.077 (0.10)	0.036 (0.10)	0.051 (0.10)	0.069 (0.10)	0.043 (0.10)	0.229* (0.11)	-0.033 (0.10)	0.073 (0.10)
n	943590	917131	879075	942296	872666	907226	872418	943850
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls								

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.16: One Country Out: Adding pre-WWII country characteristics (Part II).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without Ireland	Without Italy	Without the Netherlands	Without New Zealand	Without Norway	Without Sweden	Without Switzerland	Without the U.S.
Right	-0.274*** (0.08)	-0.377*** (0.09)	-0.244** (0.08)	-0.263*** (0.08)	-0.269*** (0.08)	-0.262** (0.08)	-0.267*** (0.08)	-0.255** (0.08)
Left	0.095 (0.10)	-0.047 (0.11)	0.141 (0.10)	0.078 (0.10)	0.072 (0.10)	0.080 (0.10)	0.083 (0.10)	0.047 (0.10)
n	885463	875165	867621	945897	929189	908999	937266	940953
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.17: One Country Out: Adding individual-level controls (Part I).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without Australia	Without Austria	Without Belgium	Without Canada	Without Denmark	Without Finland	Without France	Without Germany
Right	-0.213* (0.10)	-0.250* (0.10)	-0.224* (0.10)	-0.223* (0.10)	-0.199 (0.10)	-0.094 (0.11)	-0.274** (0.10)	-0.215* (0.10)
Left	0.000 (0.12)	-0.052 (0.12)	-0.001 (0.12)	-0.009 (0.12)	-0.021 (0.12)	0.148 (0.13)	-0.083 (0.12)	-0.001 (0.12)
n	508792	502775	479998	508626	477836	496075	474642	508296
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.18: One Country Out: Adding individual-level controls (Part II).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without Ireland	Without Italy	Without the Netherlands	Without New Zealand	Without Norway	Without Sweden	Without Switzerland	Without the U.S.
Right	-0.231* (0.10)	-0.245* (0.12)	-0.226* (0.11)	-0.211* (0.10)	-0.229* (0.10)	-0.210* (0.10)	-0.209* (0.10)	-0.205 (0.10)
Left	-0.007 (0.13)	-0.020 (0.12)	0.002 (0.12)	0.002 (0.12)	-0.013 (0.12)	0.002 (0.12)	0.019 (0.12)	-0.013
<i>n</i>	485509	476059	475295	510221	499243	498646	501623	508412
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. *c* is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.19: One Country Out: Adding post-treatment economic indicators (Part I).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without Australia	Without Austria	Without Belgium	Without Canada	Without Denmark	Without Finland	Without France	Without Germany
Right	-0.322** (0.11)	-0.357** (0.11)	-0.346** (0.11)	-0.327** (0.11)	-0.339** (0.11)	-0.171 (0.12)	-0.442*** (0.12)	-0.323** (0.11)
Left	0.016 (0.12)	-0.037 (0.12)	0.015 (0.12)	0.010 (0.12)	-0.002 (0.12)	0.251* (0.12)	-0.093 (0.12)	0.014 (0.12)
n	468387	462370	442010	468221	440459	455670	438131	467891
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Post-Transition	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.20: One Country Out: Adding post-treatment economic indicators (Part II).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Without Ireland	Without Italy	Without Netherlands	Without New Zealand	Without Norway	Without Sweden	Without Switzerland	Without the U.S.
Right	-0.356** (0.11)	-0.377** (0.14)	-0.322** (0.12)	-0.320** (0.11)	-0.302** (0.11)	-0.314** (0.11)	-0.338** (0.11)	-0.313** (0.12)
Left	-0.020 (0.12)	-0.020 (0.13)	0.023 (0.12)	0.017 (0.12)	0.014 (0.12)	0.019 (0.12)	0.062 (0.11)	-0.002 (0.12)
<i>n</i>	465583	439103	438674	469816	458838	458241	461218	468007
Survey-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Post-Transition Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses. *c* is defined as 1990 for established democracies. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure D.10: One control-country out, Right: Model 1 (including only survey-fixed effects and a time trend).




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.11: One control-country out, Right: Model 2 (Adding Inter-war co-variates).




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.12: One control-country out, Right: Model 3 (Adding individual-level demographics).




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.13: One control-country out, Right: Model 4 (Adding Post-WWII economic indicators).




Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.14: One control-country out, Left: Model 1 (including only survey-fixed effects and a time trend).




Note: The red lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.15: One control-country out, Left: Model 2 (Adding Inter-war covariates).




Note: The red lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.16: One control-country out, Left: Model 3 (Adding individual-level demographics).




Note: The red lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.17: One control-country out, Left: Model 4 (Adding Post-WWII economic indicators).




Note: The red lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.18: The impact of Repression and Indoctrination in authoritarian regime on Left-Right placement along the process of party system consolidation.



Note: The red lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure D.19: A more flexible specification of the impact of repression and indoctrination on ideological placement: Fully-factorizing time since regime-end.



Note: A local linear regression smoother traces the point estimates for each survey-year. The blue (red) lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing (left-wing) dictatorships and established democracies. The shaded area denotes the 95% estimation-wise confidence intervals.


Table D.21: Assessing the robustness of the repression effects in right-wing regimes when controlling for prior support for the left.

	Binary Outcome: 0, 1: Right	Left-Right 0-10 scale
Repression	-1.010*** (0.0985)	-6.414*** (0.561)
Indoctrination	0.215*** (0.0389)	1.114*** (0.222)
Survey Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Time Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Pre-WWII controls	✓	✓
Additional Controls Pre-WWII	✓	✓
Left vote	✓	✓
<i>n</i>	213484	213484
<i>n</i> of clusters	151	151

Standard errors, clustered at the country-year level, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure D.20: Prior support for the left and intensity of repression and indoctrination during the authoritarian rule.



Note: The blue curve denote the local regression line (span=1), with the shaded area covering the accompanying 95% confidence intervals, whereas the dashed line represent the linear fit. The regression slope for the first panel (repression, right-wing regimes) is .1081643 with standard error .1021, whereas in the upper right panel the regression slope is -0.07 with standard error 0.09. The equivalent slopes for Indoctrination are 0.238 (std. error 0.469) and -0.688 (std. error 0.596) respectively.

E Party Placement Analysis

E.1 Data

Table E.1: Surveys used for Party placement analysis

Survey	Years	Frequency
CSES Modules 1-3 †	1996-2011	75725
CSES Module 4 ‡	2011-2016	26,271

†Heiko Giebler, Josephine Lichteblau, Antonia May, Reinhold Melcher, Aiko Wagner & Bernhard Wessels. CSES MODULE 1-3 Harmonized Trend File doi:10.7804/cses.trendfile.2016-05-31

‡CSES MODULE 4 doi:10.7804/cses.module4.2018-05-29

Table E.2: Party Placement: Respondents by country

	Country	Voters surveyed	Percent	Cum.
Left-wing	Albania	1,116	1.92	1.92
	Belarus	2,000	3.44	5.36
	Bulgaria	2,481	4.27	9.63
	Croatia	1,004	1.73	11.36
	Czech Republic	7,689	13.23	24.58
	Estonia	1,000	1.72	26.3
	Hungary	2,725	4.69	30.99
	Kyrgyzstan	2,000	3.44	34.43
	Latvia	3,045	5.24	39.67
	Lithuania	1,009	1.74	41.4
	Montenegro	967	1.66	43.07
	Poland	9,935	17.09	60.16
	Romania	7,886	13.57	73.72
	Russia	5,086	8.75	82.47
	Serbia	1,568	2.7	85.17
	Slovakia	2,353	4.05	89.22
Slovenia	5,119	8.81	98.03	
Ukraine	1,148	1.97	100	
	Total	58,131	100	
	Country	Voters surveyed	Percent	Cum.
Right-wing	Argentina	1,406	3.69	3.69
	Brazil	8,650	22.7	26.39
	Chile	3,573	9.38	35.76
	Greece	3,059	8.03	43.79
	Peru	7,394	19.4	63.19
	Portugal	8,222	21.58	84.77
	Spain	4,836	12.69	97.46
	Uruguay	968	2.54	100
	Total	38,108	100	

The party placement analysis is two level. The lowest unit of analysis is voter respondent assessment of each party. Thus the N in the lowest level of the party placement analysis is number of parties assessed multiplied by the number individual respondents assessing the party. Then voter party assessments are clustered by party. We also include fixed effects for individual voters.

E.2 Coding

Party Preference (Dependent Variable): Scale 0 "Dislike" to 10 "Like" ; measure at individual voter level.

Proximity-LR : $= | \text{PartyLR}_{\text{VoterPlacement}} - \text{LR}_{\text{selfplacement}} |$; Scale: 0 to 10; measured at individual voter level.

Same side: Values 0,1;

Coded 1 if $\text{partyLR}_{\text{expert}} > 5$ for each party A through H & $\text{LR}_{\text{self}} > 5$, otherwise 0; measured at individual voter level.

Right-wing Party: Values 0, 1

Coded 1 if $\text{PartyLR}_{\text{expert}} > 5$ for each party A through H, otherwise coded 0; measured at party level.

Opposite side: Values 0, 1

Coded 1 if $\text{PartyLR}_{\text{expert}} > 5$ for each party A through H & $\text{LR}_{\text{self}} < 5$, otherwise coded 0; measured at individual voter level.

Left-wing Party: Values 0, 1

Coded 1 if $\text{PartyLR}_{\text{expert}} < 5$ for each party A through H, otherwise coded 0; measured at party level.

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