

# What Matters Is Who Supports You: Diaspora and Foreign States as External Supporters and Militants' Adoption of Nonviolence

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## Supplemental Material/Online Appendix

### Descriptive statistics

In Table A1, I show the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis.

**Table A1 Descriptive statistics**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nonviolent tactics (DV)	1,447	0.054	0.226	0	1
Diaspora support	1,377	0.506	0.500	0	1
State support	1,412	0.596	0.491	0	1
INGO support	1,358	0.102	0.302	0	1
Group size	1,370	0.565	0.646	0	3
Group ethnic diversity	1,386	0.473	0.499	0	1
Repression at group	1,476	2.783	0.678	0	3
Group disunity	1,477	1.301	1.123	0	3
9/11	1,493	0.074	0.262	0	1
Cold War	1,493	0.299	0.458	0	1
Duration	1,493	10.705	10.245	1	59
Polity	1,273	-0.669	6.521	-10	10
Polity <sup>2</sup>	1,273	42.942	28.455	0	100
Time since last nonviolence	1,447	8.099	9.539	0	58

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## Bivariate statistics

### Diaspora support and State support

IV: Diaspora support	IV: State support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	328	350	678
Yes	219	423	642
Total	547	773	1,320

IV: Diaspora support	IV: State support			Total
	No	Yes	Missing	
No	328	350	3	681
Yes	219	423	54	696
Missing	24	68	24	116
Total	571	841	81	1,493

### Nonviolent tactics and State support

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: State support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	507	791	1,298
Yes	38	36	74
Total	545	827	1,372

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: State support			Total
	No	Yes	Missing	
No	507	791	71	1,369
Yes	38	36	4	78
Missing	26	14	6	46
Total	571	841	81	1,493

### Nonviolent tactics and Diaspora support

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: Diaspora support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	650	613	1,263
Yes	14	61	75
Total	664	674	1,338

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: Diaspora support			Total
	No	Yes	Missing	
No	650	613	106	1,369
Yes	14	61	3	78
Missing	17	22	7	46
Total	681	696	116	1,493

Below I present the same tables but with alternative coding for the main IVs, see also Table A3.


DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: State support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	1,024	345	1,369
Yes	74	4	78
Total	1,098	349	1,447

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: Diaspora support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	1,189	180	1,369
Yes	49	29	78
Total	1,238	209	1,447

### Substantive effects

It is likely that militant groups consider the behavior of the state when making decisions about their tactics. Figure A1 shows the marginal change in the probability of militants adopting nonviolent tactics at several levels of state repression, and given the presence of external support from diaspora and foreign states. The assistance from external governments does not have an effect on the outcome of interest. Yet, militants are able to overcome considerable levels of state repression with the support from diaspora. At the most extreme level of state repression, support from diaspora increases the probability of a tactical change to nonviolence by 6 percent.

**Figure A1 Marginal change in the probability of adopting nonviolent tactics given different levels of state repression directed at the militant group (Table 1, Model 4)**



*Notes:* The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of militants' adopting nonviolence given the presence of diaspora, foreign state and INGO external support at different levels of repression. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

### Endogeneity concern

In Table A2, I model both the determinants of external support from diaspora and foreign states, and the predictors of militants' adoption of nonviolent tactics simultaneously. For each recursive bivariate probit model, the selection equation takes the support from an external actor as a dependent variable, while the outcome equation contains the adoption of nonviolent tactics as the response variable. Since I am estimating recursive bivariate probit models, it is possible to include the dependent variable from the selection equation in the outcome equation (Greene 2003). The null hypothesis for these models is that there is no correlation between the equations, i.e. they can be estimated separately. A statistically significant  $\rho$  (rho) estimate would be evidence against the null, i.e. the disturbances of the two equations are correlated and by extension, there could be basis for endogeneity concerns.

However, for the models that I estimate, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation, which allows me to proceed with the analysis and to alleviate concerns that the relationship between external supporters and shift in tactics is endogenous.

**Table A2 Recursive bivariate probit models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)
Diaspora support	0.689* (0.394)	0.909*** (0.297)
State support	-0.239 (0.194)	-0.474 (0.403)
INGO support	0.138 (0.259)	0.135 (0.255)
Group size	0.248* (0.149)	0.256* (0.151)
Group ethnic diversity	0.507 (0.319)	0.551* (0.311)
Repression at group	-0.313** (0.151)	-0.310** (0.140)
Group disunity	-0.167 (0.122)	-0.177 (0.122)
9/11	-0.834 (0.524)	-0.833 (0.521)
Cold War	0.204 (0.205)	0.205 (0.205)
Duration	0.077*** (0.018)	0.076*** (0.017)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.227*** (0.075)	-0.227*** (0.076)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Intercept	-1.540*** (0.441)	-1.505*** (0.419)
<u>Selection equation</u>	<u>Diaspora support</u>	<u>State support</u>
Group size	0.168 (0.177)	0.263 (0.167)
Group ethnic diversity	-0.520** (0.261)	0.011 (0.226)
Repression at group	0.142 (0.125)	0.172 (0.120)
Group disunity	0.205** (0.099)	0.081 (0.080)
Duration	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.030*** (0.011)
Intercept	-0.471 (0.443)	-0.183 (0.394)
ρ	0.136 (0.168)	0.144 (0.251)
Number of observations	1,102	1,102

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.

\*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

### Alternative empirical models

In Table A3, I show the results with alternative coding of the main explanatory variables. Namely, I recode the variables so that the variable “Diaspora support” captures exclusively support from diaspora. It takes a value of one if there is diaspora support, but no state support, and zero otherwise. The same coding is followed for the variable “State support”. It takes a value of one if there is state support, but no diaspora support, and zero otherwise. The results closely follow those in the main text. What is surprising is that the state support variable shows signs of statistical significance across the models. This suggests that there might be an overlap between support from diaspora and states that might take away the influence of state sponsors that have less ties to the rebels they are supporting. This triggers the question whether there is not a competition for influence from state and non-state actors and how this interplay affects conflict dynamics. These are interesting questions that can be addressed in future research.

**Table A3 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups’ adopting nonviolent tactics (alternative coding of main IVs)**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Diaspora support	1.012*** (0.318)	0.821* (0.426)	0.912*** (0.347)	0.795** (0.374)
State support	-1.492** (0.615)	-1.999*** (0.736)	-1.784*** (0.677)	-1.592** (0.650)
INGO support	0.731* (0.434)	0.899* (0.470)	0.740* (0.425)	0.862* (0.480)
Group size		0.260 (0.296)	0.367 (0.284)	0.476 (0.346)
Group ethnic diversity		0.428 (0.585)	1.272* (0.661)	1.511* (0.839)
Repression at group		-0.430* (0.244)	-0.468* (0.276)	-0.219 (0.335)
Group disunity		-0.268 (0.238)	-0.237 (0.240)	-0.344* (0.206)
9/11			-1.441** (0.562)	-1.337** (0.612)
Cold War			0.470 (0.454)	0.601 (0.396)
Duration			0.112*** (0.020)	0.114*** (0.040)

Polity				-0.023 (0.058)
Polity <sup>2</sup>				0.005 (0.006)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.607*** (0.128)	-0.555*** (0.195)	-0.533*** (0.170)	-0.474** (0.187)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.035*** (0.010)	0.030** (0.012)	0.024*** (0.009)	0.020** (0.009)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Intercept	-1.778*** (0.313)	-0.980 (0.669)	-2.439*** (0.808)	-3.599*** (1.061)
Number of observations	1,318	1,183	1,183	1,011

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

In Table A4, I address any concerns that the models might not be correctly specified since in Table 1 (main table) only the key independent variables are lagged by 1 year. The results do not change.

**Table A4 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (all independent variables lagged by 1 year)**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support	1.524*** (0.388)	1.479** (0.574)	2.061*** (0.565)	1.805*** (0.578)	1.922*** (0.680)
State support	-0.843*** (0.307)	-0.823*** (0.307)	-0.552* (0.301)	-0.512 (0.380)	-0.286 (0.760)
INGO support	0.468 (0.397)	0.439 (0.424)	-0.242 (0.515)	0.410 (0.440)	0.419 (0.447)
Group size		0.250 (0.303)	0.261 (0.317)	0.568* (0.324)	0.575* (0.314)
Group ethnic diversity		0.669 (0.542)	1.511*** (0.550)	1.715*** (0.628)	1.714*** (0.628)
Repression at group		0.175 (0.292)	0.093 (0.282)	0.731* (0.437)	0.725* (0.439)
Group disunity		-0.194 (0.218)	-0.154 (0.229)	-0.373* (0.200)	-0.377* (0.201)
9/11			-1.674* (0.936)	-1.450* (0.781)	-1.469* (0.799)
Cold War			0.084 (0.391)	0.721** (0.322)	0.723** (0.320)
Duration			0.135*** (0.026)	0.114*** (0.034)	0.114*** (0.034)
Polity				0.009 (0.040)	0.012 (0.040)
Polity <sup>2</sup>				0.016** (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)
Diaspora*State support					-0.561 (0.937)

Time since last nonviolence	-0.892*** (0.183)	-0.857*** (0.267)	-0.621*** (0.227)	-0.518** (0.211)	-0.519** (0.212)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.055*** (0.016)	0.051** (0.021)	0.027* (0.016)	0.019 (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Intercept	-1.480*** (0.293)	-2.393** (1.072)	-4.513*** (0.902)	-7.427*** (1.306)	-7.524*** (1.375)
Number of observations	1,100	992	992	850	850

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

In Table A5, I run the analysis without any time lags for the IVs. The results hold, but from a theoretical perspective it is more plausible that the support from a foreign benefactor might need ‘time’ to influence any potential tactical reconsiderations. I deem the lagging of the main IVs to be justified also on the basis of any concern for reverse causality. Table A5 shows that my findings hold even without any time lags.

**Table A5 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups’ adopting nonviolent tactics (no time lags)**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support	1.629*** (0.498)	1.487** (0.592)	2.218*** (0.632)	2.205*** (0.628)	2.288*** (0.779)
State support	-0.786** (0.320)	-0.832** (0.362)	-0.353 (0.322)	-0.206 (0.432)	-0.043 (0.904)
INGO support	0.491 (0.439)	0.752 (0.494)	0.300 (0.477)	0.496 (0.455)	0.498 (0.458)
Group size		0.330 (0.310)	0.343 (0.315)	0.530 (0.365)	0.528 (0.369)
Group ethnic diversity		0.416 (0.623)	1.432** (0.654)	1.624** (0.809)	1.620** (0.803)
Repression at group		-0.440* (0.250)	-0.557** (0.251)	-0.324 (0.349)	-0.326 (0.349)
Group disunity		-0.303 (0.250)	-0.355 (0.246)	-0.492** (0.232)	-0.492** (0.232)
9/11			-2.049*** (0.769)	-1.619** (0.663)	-1.640** (0.696)
Cold War			0.402 (0.418)	0.706* (0.374)	0.709* (0.374)
Duration			0.157*** (0.030)	0.126*** (0.041)	0.127*** (0.042)
Polity				0.020 (0.052)	0.021 (0.051)
Polity <sup>2</sup>				0.015** (0.007)	0.015** (0.006)



Diaspora*State support					-0.195 (0.871)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.571*** (0.134)	-0.516*** (0.196)	-0.476*** (0.161)	-0.381** (0.167)	-0.381** (0.167)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.032*** (0.011)	0.028** (0.012)	0.018** (0.009)	0.014* (0.008)	0.014* (0.008)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Intercept	-2.372*** (0.403)	-1.539 (0.943)	-3.788*** (0.884)	-5.344*** (1.039)	-5.415*** (1.129)
Number of observations	1,217	1,102	1,102	947	947

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

Table A6 presents models with additional controls. I include the variable GDP per capita (log) and Population (log) obtained from Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data. Physical repression is measured using the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2017), in particular reports from the US State Department; the values range from one to five and higher values indicate higher repression. Political repression captures violations of the political rights of citizens and it is taken from Freedom House (Freedom House 2016). The values range from one to seven and higher values indicate higher repression.

**Table A6 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (additional controls)**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Diaspora support	2.209*** (0.669)	3.300*** (0.990)	3.530*** (1.063)	2.533*** (0.639)
State support	-0.261 (0.409)	-0.594 (0.409)	-1.026** (0.485)	-1.132** (0.531)
INGO support	0.492 (0.440)	0.990** (0.409)	1.391** (0.562)	2.449*** (0.613)
Group size	0.553 (0.362)	0.874** (0.389)	0.750** (0.307)	1.218*** (0.434)
Group ethnic diversity	1.554** (0.789)	1.455 (0.901)	1.885** (0.864)	1.143 (0.887)
Repression at group	-0.295 (0.358)	-0.273 (0.456)	-0.256 (0.540)	-0.484 (0.523)
Group disunity	-0.459** (0.215)	-0.914*** (0.217)	-1.067*** (0.268)	-1.633*** (0.504)
9/11	-1.494*** (0.570)	-1.637*** (0.447)	-2.195*** (0.605)	-2.147*** (0.727)
Cold War	0.715* (0.374)	0.731 (0.516)	0.409 (0.621)	0.243 (0.505)
Duration	0.117***	0.108***	0.152***	0.129***

	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Polity	0.007	0.020	0.094	0.111
	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.093)
Polity <sup>2</sup>	0.015**	0.018*	0.024*	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.013)
GDP per capita (log)	0.160	0.625**	0.446	0.392
	(0.288)	(0.299)	(0.282)	(0.319)
Physical repression		0.148	0.266	0.249
		(0.231)	(0.281)	(0.324)
Political repression			0.379	0.474
			(0.302)	(0.333)
Population (log)				0.674**
				(0.323)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.364**	-0.236	-0.208	-0.136
	(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.177)	(0.206)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.013*	0.006	0.003	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-6.567**	-11.823***	-13.164***	-18.004***
	(3.000)	(3.075)	(3.834)	(5.742)
Number of observations	925	616	559	559

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

Table A7 presents the logit estimations of the models. Since Gompit (complementary log-log) models are not that popular in political science, I show that my results remain unchanged even if I estimate the models with a logit link.

**Table A7 Logit models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support <sub>t-1</sub>	1.611*** (0.458)	1.635*** (0.561)	2.234*** (0.511)	2.200*** (0.709)	2.492*** (0.925)
State support <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.958*** (0.370)	-0.866** (0.350)	-0.495 (0.428)	-0.259 (0.426)	0.268 (0.995)
INGO support <sub>t-1</sub>	0.495 (0.470)	0.929* (0.508)	0.404 (0.633)	0.435 (0.498)	0.443 (0.508)
Group size		0.402 (0.286)	0.521* (0.288)	0.784** (0.323)	0.788** (0.321)
Group ethnic diversity		0.473 (0.554)	1.352*** (0.435)	1.648** (0.731)	1.634** (0.718)
Repression at group		-0.764*** (0.225)	-0.868*** (0.217)	-0.700** (0.323)	-0.727** (0.330)
Group disunity		-0.501** (0.229)	-0.479** (0.199)	-0.558** (0.224)	-0.564** (0.229)
9/11			-1.637* (0.955)	-1.251 (0.809)	-1.284 (0.831)
Cold War			0.309 (0.445)	0.646 (0.454)	0.646 (0.445)
Duration			0.139***	0.100**	0.099**

			(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Polity				0.030	0.037
				(0.047)	(0.044)
Polity <sup>2</sup>				0.019**	0.021**
				(0.010)	(0.009)
Diaspora*State support <sub>t-1</sub>					-0.656
					(1.023)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.905***	-0.875***	-0.671***	-0.573***	-0.580***
	(0.196)	(0.265)	(0.149)	(0.210)	(0.213)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.055***	0.051***	0.031**	0.026**	0.027**
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.350***	0.300	-2.041**	-3.716***	-3.895***
	(0.329)	(0.744)	(0.812)	(1.012)	(1.034)
Number of observations	1,100	991	991	850	850

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

Table A8 presents the Rare events logit models (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2002). The model accounts for small sample bias in binary choice models where one of the categories in the outcome does not have many cases. Even with this specification, the results hold and there is evidence for the hypothesized relationships.

**Table A8 Rare events logit models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Diaspora support	1.660*** (0.533)	1.531** (0.632)	2.156*** (0.683)	2.090*** (0.703)
State support	-0.868** (0.343)	-0.903** (0.377)	-0.414 (0.358)	-0.229 (0.434)
INGO support	0.566 (0.492)	0.880 (0.537)	0.338 (0.526)	0.473 (0.532)
Group size		0.354 (0.314)	0.370 (0.315)	0.579 (0.388)
Group ethnic diversity		0.403 (0.643)	1.326** (0.675)	1.511* (0.822)
Repression at group		-0.562** (0.273)	-0.642** (0.287)	-0.414 (0.380)
Group disunity		-0.352 (0.249)	-0.354 (0.256)	-0.471* (0.255)
9/11			-1.911* (1.033)	-1.547* (0.858)
Cold War			0.421 (0.393)	0.746* (0.413)
Duration			0.160*** (0.035)	0.122** (0.048)
Polity				0.025 (0.051)
Polity <sup>2</sup>				0.016**

Time since last nonviolence	-0.565*** (0.143)	-0.477** (0.192)	-0.414** (0.168)	(0.008) -0.294 (0.179)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.031*** (0.011)	0.023* (0.012)	0.011 (0.009)	0.006 (0.008)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Intercept	-2.246*** (0.417)	-1.059 (1.006)	-3.323*** (0.931)	-4.821*** (1.182)
Number of observations	1,217	1,102	1,102	947

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. \*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

Table A9 shows the bootstrapped estimates for all models. By bootstrapping, I resample 1,000 times my original sample so as to be able to have a better understanding of the population I am trying to study (i.e. all militant groups). The results from the statistical analysis demonstrate that the results stay the same even if using the resampling technique such as bootstrap.

**Table A9 Bootstrapped complimentary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (1000 reps)**

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Diaspora support	2.218*** (0.619)	2.077*** (0.760)	2.288*** (0.754)
State support	-0.353 (0.368)	-0.654 (0.878)	-0.043 (0.792)
INGO support	0.300 (0.477)	0.297 (0.472)	0.498 (0.512)
Group size	0.343 (0.238)	0.352 (0.238)	0.528 (0.326)
Group ethnic diversity	1.432*** (0.507)	1.433*** (0.470)	1.620*** (0.603)
Repression at group	-0.557** (0.229)	-0.553** (0.236)	-0.326 (0.579)
Group disunity	-0.355** (0.174)	-0.355** (0.177)	-0.492* (0.252)
Cold War	0.402 (0.423)	0.403 (0.419)	0.709 (0.480)
9/11	-2.049** (0.918)	-1.998** (0.962)	-1.640* (0.910)
Duration	0.157*** (0.033)	0.154*** (0.034)	0.127*** (0.041)
Diaspora*State support <sub>t-1</sub>		0.371 (0.926)	-0.195 (0.867)
Polity			0.021 (0.039)
Polity <sup>2</sup>			0.015** (0.007)

Time since last nonviolence	-0.476*	-0.476*	-0.381*
	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.198)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>2</sup>	0.018	0.018	0.014
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.034)
Time since last nonviolence <sup>3</sup>	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.002)
Intercept	-3.788***	-3.788***	-5.415***
	(0.916)	(0.916)	(1.669)
Number of observations	1,102	1,102	947

*Notes:* The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.

\*\*\* p < .01, \*\* p < .05, \* p < .1

## Diagnostics

The models do not suffer from multicollinearity since the average variance inflation factor (as well as the individual values of the VIF for all variables) is well below the accepted 5 VIF as an indication of potential collinearity problem.

## Collinearity diagnostics (Table 1, Model 4)

(N=948)

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Diaspora support	1.22	0.8228
State support	1.14	0.8752
INGO support	1.18	0.8490
Repression at group	1.05	0.9480
Group size	1.17	0.8553
Group disunity	1.20	0.8329
Group ethnic diversity	1.17	0.8534
9/11	1.39	0.7218
Cold War	1.40	0.7145
Polity	1.11	0.8086
Polity <sup>2</sup>	1.20	0.8303
Time since last nonviolence	4.30	0.2327
Duration	5.01	0.1997
MEAN VIF	1.74	

I also perform the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. The insignificant test statistic suggests that the model fits the data quite well.

### **Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (Table A7, Model 4)**

N = 850

N of groups = 10


Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 (8) = 11.74

Prob. > chi2 = 0.1631

### **Predictive power**

To examine the predictive power of Model 4, Table A7, I employ receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves analysis. Given that the area under the ROC curve of Model 4, Table A7 is substantially bigger than .5 (this is the same as predicting a flip of a coin), this indicates satisfactory discrimination, i.e. the model performs well and the results are not due to random chance.

### **ROC curve analysis (Table A7, Model 4)**



## References

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