

Online Appendix: How public discourse affects attitudes towards Freedom of Movement and Schengen

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Appendix A: vignettes, key items, and data collection

1.1 Treatment on perception of border controls

'As part of the Schengen Agreement, there are no border controls within countries in the Schengen area. [COUNTRY] is/is not a member of the Schengen area.'

- Vignette 1.1 (negative security and crime framing): 'Studies show that the absence of border controls within the Schengen area coincides with higher level of crime rates and terrorist threats in the Schengen area.'
- Vignette 1.2 (negative cultural framing): 'Studies show that the absence of border controls within the Schengen area has resulted in immigration from people within the Schengen area who often do not share the local values and are unwilling to integrate into the local community.'
- No vignette: Control group with no vignette treatment

1.2 Measurement of attitude towards border controls

- Countries in Schengen area: 'Are you for or against the absence of border controls within the Schengen area?' (0) strongly against - (10) strongly for
- Countries outside the Schengen area: 'Are you for or against the border controls within your country and the Schengen area?' (0) strongly against - (10) strongly for

2.1 Treatment on perception of Freedom of Movement for workers

'European law grants citizens from all EU member states the right to work and do business anywhere in the EU.'

- Vignette 2.1 (negative welfare state frame): 'Studies show that foreign workers from other EU countries living in [COUNTRY] are more dependent on welfare support and impose higher costs on the welfare system than [COUNTRY] citizens.'
- Vignette 2.2 (negative wage effect): 'Studies show that foreign workers from other EU countries living in [COUNTRY] increase the competition in the labour market, which leads to lower wages and higher unemployment for [Country] workers.'

- Vignette 2.3 (positive welfare state frame): 'Studies show that foreign workers from other EU countries living in [COUNTRY] are less dependent on welfare support and impose fewer costs on the welfare system than [COUNTRY] citizens.'
- Vignette 2.4 (positive wage effect): 'Studies show that foreign workers from other EU countries living in [COUNTRY] do not decrease wages or increase unemployment levels for [COUNTRY] workers. Instead they help fill positions for which there are too few [COUNTRY] workers.'

2.2 Measurement of attitude towards Freedom of Movement for workers

- 'Are you for or against the free movement of workers within the EU?' (0) strongly against - (10) strongly for

3. Main control variables

- education: 'What is your highest degree of education?' 'none'; 'secondary education'; 'highschool degree'; 'university degree'; 'other'
- employment status: 'Which of the following categories best describes your employment status?' 'Employed, working 30 or more hours per week'; 'Employed, working 1 to 29 hours per week'; 'Not employed, currently looking for work'; 'Not employed, currently NOT looking for work'; 'Retired'; 'In school, university or practical training'; 'Disabled, not able to work'; 'Entrepreneur / Employer'; 'Self-employed / Freelancer'; 'None of the above'
- migration background: 'How did you or your family get to [COUNTRY]?' 'I moved here'; 'One or both of my parents moved here before I was born'; 'My grandparents moved here'; 'My family has been here for a longer time'; 'None of the above'
- political identification: 'If you had to choose one of the below, which option best describes your political views on a left-right scale?' 'extreme left'; 'left'; 'center left'; 'center right'; 'right'; 'extreme right'
- self-identification: 'Which of the following best describes how you see yourself? I see myself as...' 'European only'; '[COUNTRY MEMBER] and European'; '[COUNTRY MEMBER] only'

The data has been collected from 10,827 Europeans by Dalia Research. It is based on a sample of users of 30,000 apps and mobile phone websites, which cover the major content categories, in early to mid-December 2017. In order to ensure population-representativeness (Eurostat census for the working-age population) the sample is reweighted by age, education and gender. To avoid self-selection on topics respondents are randomly selected to join the survey. These invitations do not contain information about the specific content of the survey. The whole sample is representative for the EU working-age population. National samples are representative for the populations of the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom). There is little difference to other nationally representative surveys in terms of demographic characteristics (De Vries and Hoffmann, 2015). So far several other studies have used this panel for data collection (De Vries, 2018; De Vries and Hoffmann, 2016; Walter, 2017).

If not indicated differently in subsequent sections, the analyses are based on the census-weighted sample. The survey design makes use of quota sampling, based on age, education, gender stratum. For each country the age-gender-education cell is filled much as possible. Each country is sampled proportionally

to its population in the EU and the six largest countries are oversampled in order to ensure population-representativeness on a national level (cf. Figure 1). Afterwards post-stratification weights correct for any over or under-sampling relative to the EU-working population census. This allows to create a representative sample of the EU as a whole and representative subsamples for the six largest member states, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Applying the weights ensures that each respondent in the entire sample is representative of their country-age-gender-education cell.

Commonly vignette experiments (cf. Bechtel et al., 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Mutz, 2011) estimate the effect of the treatment by comparing means of groups to which survey participants are randomly assigned. In both experiments the group sizes¹ were balanced. Randomisation took place on a country level in order to make sure that an unbiased comparison within experimental groups in member states is possible. To increase the robustness of the results a repeated measures design was used which also provides data on the attitudinal change within subjects. In both experiments the dependent variables (attitude towards Schengen; attitude towards Freedom of Movement) were therefore measured twice per survey respondent - before and after the treatments. The wordings of the measurement items were identical at both points in the experiments. This was possible due to the structure of the omnibus survey. For the Schengen experiment 28 and for the Freedom of Movement experiment 12 thematically unrelated items from other survey clients were inserted between the pre-treatment and the post-treatment measurement. After answering the measurement item for a first time and responding to the unrelated items the treatment groups were presented with vignettes and subsequently asked a second time about their attitudes towards Schengen. The control group directly answered the attitude item without exposure to a vignette which allows me to reject a potential repetition bias (.99 significance level). This implies that attitudes are stable over the course of the survey and not biased by the other clients' items or the second measurement. Also the means of the different groups do not significantly differ in their support prior to treatment.

To be able to compare attitudes towards the actual status-quo and not an uncertain hypothetical scenario, which could for example consist of Ireland joining the Schengen area or Italy leaving it, the wording prior to the actual question has been adapted to the country in which the respondents answered the survey. This ensures that the respondents were actually aware of the current border regime with their EU neighbours. In order to strengthen this awareness further, respondents were all exposed to a map of the Schengen area and received a brief explanation of the main implications of Schengen membership and the Freedom of Movement. The scales of the dependent variables run from 0 (strongly against) to 10 (strongly in favour). To increase external validity and comparability with existing research, respondents' collective identity has been measured by the commonly used 'Moreno' question, differentiating between exclusively national, mixed national-European, and exclusively European self-identification.

¹Number of respondents per group in Schengen experiment: control group 3'623, security treatment 3'596 culture treatment 3'608; number of respondents per group in Freedom of Movement experiment: negative social system 2'631, positive social system 2'654, negative job market 2'762, positive job market 2'780







Figure 1: Number of completed surveys in each member state (unweighted)




(a) Number of completed surveys by age group



(b) Number of completed surveys by gender



(c) Number of completed surveys by self-identification



(d) Number of completed surveys by migration background

Figure 2: Number of completed surveys by age group, gender, self-identification and migration background

Appendix B: summary statistics and geographical distribution

Table 1: Summary statistics for the dependent variables

	n	mean	st. dv.	min	max
Inside Schengen pre-treatment support	8,696	5.489	3.214	0	10
Inside Schengen post-treatment support	8,696	5.160	3.226	0	10
Outside Schengen pre-treatment support	2,131	5.779	3.148	0	10
Outside Schengen post-treatment support	2,131	5.889	3.085	0	10
EU total pre-treatment free movement	10,827	6.691	2.690	0	10
EU total post-treatment free movement	10,827	6.352	2.723	0	10




Figure 3: Support before treatment (representative of the populations DE, ES, FR, IT, PL, and UK)




Figure 4: Support after treatment (representative of the populations DE, ES, FR, IT, PL, and UK)

Appendix C: Between-Group Effects

Table 2: Tukey HSD Test Output: Post-Treatment Support amongst Schengen Insiders

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	-0.22	-0.42	-0.03	0.02
2	vignette_1	security-control	-0.32	-0.52	-0.13	0.00
3	vignette_1	security-culture	-0.10	-0.30	0.10	0.46

Table 3: Tukey HSD Test Output: Post-Treatment Support for Schengen Outsiders with Accession Status

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	0.67	-0.07	1.41	0.08
2	vignette_1	security-control	0.94	0.20	1.68	0.01
3	vignette_1	security-culture	0.27	-0.48	1.02	0.68

Table 4: Tukey HSD Test Output: Post-Treatment Support for Schengen Outsiders in Ireland and the UK

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	0.02	-0.42	0.45	1.00
2	vignette_1	security-control	-0.06	-0.48	0.37	0.95
3	vignette_1	security-culture	-0.07	-0.50	0.36	0.92

Table 5: Tukey HSD Test Output: Post-Treatment Support for Freedom of Movement

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_2	vignette_2_1-vignette_2_4	-0.30	-0.49	-0.11	0.00
2	vignette_2	vignette_2_2-vignette_2_4	-0.41	-0.60	-0.23	0.00
3	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_4	-0.08	-0.27	0.11	0.69
4	vignette_2	vignette_2_2-vignette_2_1	-0.11	-0.30	0.08	0.44
5	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_1	0.22	0.03	0.41	0.02
6	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_2	0.33	0.14	0.52	0.00

Appendix D: Within-Subject Effects

Table 6: Tukey HSD Test Output: Treatment Effect amongst Schengen Insiders

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	-0.19	-0.35	-0.02	0.02
2	vignette_1	security-control	-0.25	-0.41	-0.08	0.00
3	vignette_1	security-culture	-0.06	-0.22	0.11	0.68

Table 7: Tukey HSD Test Output: Treatment Effect for Schengen Outsiders with Accession Status

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	0.60	-0.07	1.28	0.09
2	vignette_1	security-control	0.83	0.15	1.51	0.01
3	vignette_1	security-culture	0.22	-0.47	0.91	0.73

Table 8: Tukey HSD Test Output: Treatment Effect for Schengen Outsiders in Ireland and the UK

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	-0.01	-0.39	0.37	1.00
2	vignette_1	security-control	0.02	-0.35	0.39	0.99
3	vignette_1	security-culture	0.03	-0.35	0.40	0.99

Table 9: Tukey HSD Test Output: Treatment Effect for Freedom of Movement

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_2	vignette_2_1-vignette_2_4	-0.27	-0.41	-0.13	0.00
2	vignette_2	vignette_2_2-vignette_2_4	-0.34	-0.48	-0.20	0.00
3	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_4	-0.03	-0.17	0.11	0.96
4	vignette_2	vignette_2_2-vignette_2_1	-0.07	-0.21	0.07	0.60
5	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_1	0.24	0.10	0.39	0.00
6	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_2	0.31	0.17	0.45	0.00

Appendix E: manipulation checks and controls for order bias




Figure 5: Results of manipulation checks

Table 10: Tukey HSD Test Output: Pre-Treatment Support amongst Schengen Insiders

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	-0.04	-0.23	0.16	0.90
2	vignette_1	security-control	-0.08	-0.27	0.12	0.63
3	vignette_1	security-culture	-0.04	-0.24	0.15	0.88

Table 11: Tukey HSD Test Output: Pre-Treatment Support amongst Schengen Outsiders

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	0.04	-0.35	0.43	0.97
2	vignette_1	security-control	-0.01	-0.40	0.37	1.00
3	vignette_1	security-culture	-0.05	-0.44	0.33	0.94


Table 12: Tukey HSD Test Output: Support for Freedom of Movement prior to treatment

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_2	vignette_2_1-vignette_2_4	-0.03	-0.22	0.16	0.97
2	vignette_2	vignette_2_2-vignette_2_4	-0.07	-0.26	0.11	0.75
3	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_4	-0.05	-0.24	0.13	0.89
4	vignette_2	vignette_2_2-vignette_2_1	-0.04	-0.23	0.15	0.94
5	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_1	-0.02	-0.21	0.17	0.99
6	vignette_2	vignette_2_3-vignette_2_2	0.02	-0.17	0.21	0.99

Table 13: Tukey HSD Test Output: Pre-Treatment Support for Freedom of Movement conditional on Vignette 1 (Schengen) Treatment

	term	comparison	estimate	conf.low	conf.high	adj.p.value
1	vignette_1	culture-control	0.02	-0.12	0.17	0.93
2	vignette_1	security-control	0.01	-0.14	0.15	1.00
3	vignette_1	security-culture	-0.02	-0.17	0.13	0.96


Appendix F: regression output




(a) Marginal effect of the interaction between political orientation and border regime vignettes

(b) Marginal effect of the interaction between migration background and labour migration regime vignettes


Figure 6: Marginal effects of the interaction political orientation and vignette exposure



(a) Coefficient plot for regression treatment effect size on vignette type (inside Schengen)



(b) Coefficient plot for regression treatment effect size on vignette type (outside Schengen)



(c) Coefficient plot for regression treatment effect size on vignette type (freedom of movement)

Figure 7: Coefficient plots for multi-level regression models (country-level random intercepts)

Table 14: Model Output for Border Regime Vignettes

	Schengen insiders: within-subject treatment effect					Schengen outsiders: within-subject treatment effect				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
culture vignette	-0.187*** (0.071)	0.123 (0.290)	-0.177 (0.263)	-0.155 (0.108)	0.441 (0.298)	0.271* (0.144)	0.615 (0.529)	-0.515 (0.394)	0.124 (0.231)	0.484 (0.481)
security vignette	-0.246*** (0.071)	-0.481* (0.287)	-0.206 (0.251)	0.005 (0.107)	0.472 (0.301)	0.341** (0.141)	0.618 (0.515)	-0.474 (0.389)	0.208 (0.225)	0.562 (0.486)
excl. national ident.		-0.232 (0.230)					0.162 (0.391)			
mixed identity		-0.124 (0.218)					0.026 (0.387)			
culture vign.*excl. national ident.		-0.206 (0.320)					-0.375 (0.573)			
security vign.*excl. national ident.		0.268 (0.316)					-0.420 (0.558)			
culture vign.*mixed ident.		-0.384 (0.303)					-0.365 (0.566)			
security vign.*mixed ident.		0.245 (0.300)					-0.193 (0.553)			
income 0.5k-1k			-0.222 (0.241)					-1.042*** (0.386)		
income 1k-2k			-0.131 (0.212)					-0.620* (0.374)		
income 2k-3k			-0.047 (0.222)					-0.545 (0.418)		
income 3k-4k			0.245 (0.235)					-0.251 (0.451)		
income 4k-6k			0.050 (0.243)					-0.376 (0.511)		
income 6k-10k			-0.149 (0.304)					-0.210 (0.523)		
income 10k and more			-0.038 (0.284)					-0.321 (0.487)		
undisclosed income			-0.028 (0.225)					-0.642* (0.375)		
culture vign.*income 0.5k-1k			-0.059 (0.344)					1.562*** (0.551)		
security vign.*income 0.5k-1k			0.047 (0.336)					1.347** (0.541)		
culture vign.*income 1k-2k			0.175 (0.303)					0.850 (0.522)		
security vign.*income 1k-2k			-0.069 (0.294)					0.804 (0.535)		
culture vign.*income 2k-3k			0.117 (0.317)					0.961* (0.574)		
security vign.*income 2k-3k			0.068 (0.306)					0.765 (0.561)		
culture vign.*income 3k-4k			-0.315 (0.338)					-0.066 (0.634)		
security vign.*income 3k-4k			-0.261 (0.328)					0.927 (0.599)		
culture vign.*income 4k-6k			-0.165 (0.354)					0.912 (0.687)		
security vign.*income 4k-6k			0.113 (0.346)					0.440 (0.710)		
culture vign.*income 6k-10k			0.140 (0.435)					1.204 (0.773)		
security vign.*income 6k-10k			-0.032 (0.408)					0.622 (0.755)		
culture vign.*income 10k and more			-0.295 (0.428)					0.044 (0.691)		
security vign.*income 10k and more			0.255 (0.426)					0.327 (0.680)		
culture vign.*undiscl. income			-0.038 (0.324)					1.045** (0.518)		
security vign.*undiscl. income			-0.175 (0.315)					1.199** (0.506)		
no education				-0.154 (0.292)					0.365 (0.789)	
secondary education				-0.024 (0.127)					0.214 (0.290)	
university graduate				0.204 (0.127)					-0.216 (0.228)	
other education				0.449* (0.263)					0.972* (0.531)	
culture vign.*no education				0.673* (0.393)					-0.806 (0.974)	
security vign.*no education				0.371 (0.414)					-0.141 (0.407)	
culture vign.*secondary education				0.080 (0.179)					0.431 (0.413)	
security vign.*secondary education				-0.484** (0.180)					-0.315 (0.412)	
culture vign.*university graduate				-0.247 (0.180)					0.284 (0.330)	
security vign.*university graduate				-0.519** (0.178)					0.652** (0.323)	
culture vign.*other education				-0.399 (0.370)					-0.578 (0.713)	
security vign.*other education				-0.585 (0.387)					-1.156* (0.675)	
long-term stay					0.291 (0.223)					0.108 (0.366)
3rd gen. migrant					0.058 (0.314)					0.116 (0.577)
2nd gen. migrant					0.622** (0.282)					0.607 (0.485)
culture vign.*long-term stay					-0.632** (0.308)					-0.161 (0.507)
security vign.*long-term stay					-0.760** (0.311)					-0.169 (0.511)
culture vign.*3rd gen. migrant					-0.884** (0.441)					-0.456 (0.831)
security vign.*3rd gen. migrant					-0.413 (0.442)					-1.212 (0.899)
culture vign.*2nd gen. migrant					-0.900** (0.397)					-0.797 (0.699)
security vign.*2nd gen. migrant					-1.012*** (0.392)					-0.564 (0.710)
Constant	-0.230*** (0.068)	-0.082 (0.213)	-0.185 (0.186)	-0.289*** (0.088)	-0.518** (0.220)	-0.005 (0.123)	-0.083 (0.366)	0.532* (0.300)	-0.0003 (0.177)	-0.144 (0.355)
N	8696	8696	8696	8696	8696	2131	2131	2131	2131	2131
Log Likelihood	-21801.210	-21797.180	-21792.080	-21786.490	-21792.120	-5131.740	-5130.844	-5119.948	-5122.377	-5128.913
AIC	43612.410	43616.350	43642.160	43606.970	43612.240	10273.480	10283.690	10297.900	10278.750	10285.830
BIC	43647.770	43694.130	43847.210	43727.170	43711.230	10301.800	10346.000	10462.160	10375.050	10365.130

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 15: Model Output for Labour Market Regime Vignettes

	Within-Subject Treatment Effect				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
positive social system vignette	-0.032 (0.056)	0.420** (0.214)	0.313* (0.185)	-0.051 (0.085)	-0.553** (0.225)
negative job market vignette	-0.349*** (0.056)	-0.091 (0.213)	-0.139 (0.183)	-0.440*** (0.084)	-0.395* (0.215)
negative social system vignette	-0.273*** (0.056)	0.023 (0.223)	-0.077 (0.189)	-0.376*** (0.084)	-0.692*** (0.220)
excl. national ident.		-0.041 (0.164)			
mixed identity		0.058 (0.157)			
pos. social system*excl. national ident.		-0.064*** (0.236)			
neg. job market*excl. national ident.		-0.367 (0.235)			
neg. social system*excl. national ident.		-0.147 (0.245)			
pos. social system*mixed ident.		-0.400* (0.226)			
neg. job market*mixed ident.		-0.238 (0.224)			
neg. social system*mixed ident.		-0.400* (0.235)			
income 1k-2k			0.139 (0.156)		
income 10k and more			0.211 (0.222)		
income 2k-3k			0.237 (0.169)		
income 3k-4k			0.340* (0.178)		
income 4k-6k			0.147 (0.197)		
income 0.5k-1k			0.092 (0.175)		
income 6k-10k			0.103 (0.227)		
undisclosed income			0.247 (0.166)		
pos. social system*income 1k-2k			-0.321 (0.220)		
neg. job market*income 1k-2k			-0.452** (0.219)		
neg. social system*income 1k-2k			-0.216 (0.226)		
pos. social system*income 10k and more			-0.252 (0.322)		
neg. job market*income 10k and more			-0.127 (0.317)		
neg. social system*income 10k and more			0.177 (0.320)		
pos. social system*income 2k-3k			-0.416* (0.235)		
neg. job market*income 2k-3k			-0.180 (0.232)		
neg. social system*income 2k-3k			-0.218 (0.238)		
pos. social system*income 3k-4k			-0.596** (0.253)		
neg. job market*income 3k-4k			-0.379 (0.250)		
neg. social system*income 3k-4k			-0.536** (0.252)		
pos. social system*income 4k-6k			-0.111 (0.270)		
neg. job market*income 4k-6k			-0.065 (0.268)		
neg. social system*income 4k-6k			-0.402 (0.279)		
pos. social system*income 0.5k-1k			-0.285 (0.251)		
neg. job market*income 0.5k-1k			-0.318 (0.247)		
neg. social system*income 0.5k-1k			-0.006 (0.251)		
pos. social system*income 6k-10k			-0.208 (0.324)		
neg. job market*income 6k-10k			0.052 (0.314)		
neg. social system*income 6k-10k			0.123 (0.320)		
pos. social system*undiscl. income			-0.603** (0.238)		
neg. job market*undiscl. income			-0.046 (0.232)		
neg. social system*undiscl. income			-0.280 (0.238)		
no education				-0.223 (0.226)	
university graduate				-0.221 (0.217)	
secondary education				-0.102 (0.102)	
other education				-0.045 (0.097)	
pos. social system*no education				-0.153 (0.334)	
neg. job market*no education				0.201 (0.321)	
neg. social system*no education				0.427 (0.313)	
pos. social system*university graduate				-0.118 (0.297)	
neg. job market*university graduate				0.538* (0.291)	
neg. social system*university graduate				0.586* (0.302)	
pos. social system*secondary education				0.073 (0.146)	
neg. job market*secondary education				0.083 (0.143)	
neg. social system*secondary education				0.227 (0.144)	
pos. social system*other education				0.051 (0.139)	
neg. job market*other education				0.170 (0.138)	
neg. social system*other education				0.055 (0.141)	
long-term stay					-0.688*** (0.207)
3rd gen. migrant					-0.409*** (0.157)
2nd gen. migrant					-0.767*** (0.230)
pos. social system*long-term stay					0.802*** (0.302)
neg. job market*long-term stay					0.377 (0.292)
neg. social system*long-term stay					0.807*** (0.301)
pos. social system*3rd gen. migrant					0.520** (0.232)
neg. job market*3rd gen. migrant					-0.007 (0.224)
neg. social system*3rd gen. migrant					0.406* (0.229)
pos. social system*2nd gen. migrant					0.693*** (0.345)
neg. job market*2nd gen. migrant					0.457 (0.326)
neg. social system*2nd gen. migrant					0.596* (0.341)
Constant	-0.185*** (0.052)	-0.207 (0.152)	-0.357*** (0.136)	-0.135** (0.067)	0.284* (0.154)
N	10827	10827	10827	10827	10827
Log Likelihood	-24350.440	-24329.870	-24326.910	-24342.070	-24336.440
AIC	48712.880	48687.740	48729.810	48728.150	48708.880
BIC	48756.620	48789.800	49006.820	48888.520	48840.100

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table 16: Model Output for Interaction of Treatment and Political Orientation

	Δ Support for Schengen		Δ Support for Freedom of Movement	
	Model 1		Model 2	
culture vignette	-0.420			
	(0.344)			
security vignette	-0.461			
	(0.346)			
neg job market vignette			-0.468*	
			(0.280)	
neg. social system vignette			0.004	
			(0.277)	
pos. job market vignette			-0.064	
			(0.273)	
center left	0.138		0.368*	
	(0.256)		(0.213)	
center right	0.045		0.350*	
	(0.254)		(0.211)	
extreme left	0.064		0.598*	
	(0.379)		(0.316)	
left	-0.022		0.541**	
	(0.274)		(0.228)	
right	-0.064		0.361	
	(0.280)		(0.231)	
culture vign.*center left	0.056			
	(0.366)			
security vign.*center left	0.106			
	(0.368)			
culture vign.*center right	0.202			
	(0.364)			
security vign.*center right	0.262			
	(0.365)			
culture vign.*extreme left	0.604			
	(0.549)			
security vign.*extreme left	0.815			
	(0.542)			
culture vign.*left	0.296			
	(0.393)			
security vign.*left	0.140			
	(0.393)			
culture vign.*right	0.367			
	(0.397)			
security vign.*right	0.034			
	(0.401)			
neg job market*center left			0.152	
			(0.297)	
neg. social system*center left			-0.151	
			(0.294)	
pos. job market*center left			0.137	
			(0.291)	
neg job market*center right			0.167	
			(0.294)	
neg. social system*center right			-0.241	
			(0.292)	
pos. job market*center right			0.126	
			(0.288)	
neg job market*extreme left			0.030	
			(0.428)	
neg. social system*extreme left			0.526	
			(0.455)	
pos. job market*extreme left			0.368	
			(0.430)	
neg job market*left			-0.036	
			(0.318)	
neg. social system*left			-0.251	
			(0.318)	
pos. job market*left			0.040	
			(0.312)	
neg job market*right			0.258	
			(0.324)	
neg. social system*right			-0.546*	
			(0.320)	
pos. job market*right			-0.066	
			(0.317)	
Constant	-0.246		-0.590***	
	(0.243)		(0.203)	
N	8696		10827	
Log Likelihood	-20886.740		-23107.910	
AIC	41813.490		46267.810	
BIC	41954.900		46457.350	

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

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