

Online Appendix for “The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset: Origins, Durability, and Death”

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The following pages display additional robustness checks referenced in the text. The codebook on the dataset is a separate file.

- **Table A1** adjusts the main models predicting autocratic regime breakdown (Table 3) with additional controls. These alternative models are separated with horizontal dashed lines, with further controls omitted for space. The sample, other control variables, and dependent variables are the same as in Table 3. The first set of models adds a full range of region fixed effects. The second adds a civil liberties measure used by Brownlee (2009) (recoded from Freedom House 2016). The third adds a measure of civil liberties from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016). As seen, results for *Ruling Party*, *Any Parties*, and the regime types are unchanged. *Civil Liberties* are positive for instability in the third set of models.
- **Table A2** adjusts the main models predicting autocratic regime breakdown (Table 3) using different combinations of the party and regime type variables. These different combinations are separated with horizontal dashed lines, with controls omitted for space. The sample, control variables, and dependent variables are the same as in Table 3. The first four sets of models in Table A2 test the main party variables by themselves, *i.e.*, *Ruling Party* without *Any Parties* or the regime type categories. The next set of models in Table A1 test *Ruling Party* and *Any Parties* without the GWF or AOW regime types. The next set reverse this and include only the regime type variables. The third includes all variables in Table 3 plus interactions between *Ruling Party* and military regimes (for both GWF and AOW) and personalist regimes (for GWF).

The results replicate the strong stabilizing effect of *Ruling Party*, whereas having *Any Parties* is destabilizing once *Ruling Party* is controlled for. Party-based and single-party

regimes are highly stabilizing when no other party variables or regime types are included, but this difference disappears when further variables are controlled for. Military and personalist regimes are more unstable than the reference category (monarchies and other), whereas party-based and single-party regimes are not significantly different. The final model type includes interactions, allowing the effect of *Ruling Party* to vary by regime type. Due to high multicollinearity, fewer of the results are significant. However, the model allows for several regime combinations to be compared, as shown in Figure A1.

- **Figure A1** displays the likelihood of irregular turnover for several regimes, based on their combination of regime type and ruling party. The estimates are taken from Model 1 with the interactions (the third model type) in Table A1. Predicted probabilities were calculated using Stata's `prvalue` function.

In order, the following regime combinations are compared (all using GWF regime types): (1) Party-based regime, (2) Military with a ruling party, (3) Personalist with a ruling party, (4) Monarchies/other with a ruling party, (5) Military with no parties, (6) Personalist with no parties, and (7) Monarchies/other with no parties. The results show that there is no significant or substantive difference between party-based regimes and other regime types with ruling parties. Military regimes without any parties are the most unstable. The most stable are monarchies with a ruling party.

- **Table A3** adjusts the models predicting autocratic breakdown and democratization from party characteristics (Table 4) using a different version of the dependent variables. For Table 4, when parties retained control after democratization or a country change, these were considered censored and removed from the sample. In Table A3, these are included in the transitions. As seen, the results are virtually identical.

Table A1: Models Predicting Autocratic Breakdown

		GWF Data			AOW Data		
		Irregular Turnover	Coup	Regime Failure	Irregular Turnover	Coup	Regime Failure
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
All Region FE	<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.617** (-2.86)	-0.704** (-2.76)	-0.438 (-1.67)	-0.978*** (-4.99)	-1.001*** (-4.24)	-0.788** (-3.17)
	<i>GWF: Party-Based</i>	-0.197 (-0.59)	-0.046 (-0.12)	-0.356 (-0.88)			
	<i>GWF: Military</i>	1.063*** (3.42)	0.926* (2.43)	0.686 (1.69)			
	<i>GWF: Personalist</i>	0.638* (2.07)	0.623 (1.60)	0.630 (1.61)			
	<i>AOW: Single-Party</i>				0.584 (1.49)	0.692 (1.51)	1.011* (1.97)
	<i>AOW: Multiparty</i>				0.931* (2.46)	0.618 (1.37)	0.651 (1.26)
	<i>AOW: Military</i>				1.124*** (3.55)	1.098** (2.92)	0.794 (1.74)
	<i>Any Parties</i>	0.574** (2.59)	0.589* (2.21)	1.025** (3.27)	0.545* (2.35)	0.659* (2.37)	1.397*** (3.64)
FH Civil Liberties Added	<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.809** (-2.94)	-0.931** (-2.78)	-0.234 (-0.66)	-0.938*** (-3.82)	-0.841** (-2.75)	-0.568 (-1.90)
	<i>GWF: Party-Based</i>	-0.041 (-0.10)	0.810 (1.31)	-0.753 (-1.41)			
	<i>GWF: Military</i>	1.282** (3.14)	1.731** (2.82)	0.231 (0.43)			
	<i>GWF: Personalist</i>	0.562 (1.40)	1.095 (1.77)	0.176 (0.34)			
	<i>AOW: Single-Party</i>				0.365 (0.72)	0.891 (1.20)	0.667 (0.94)
	<i>AOW: Multiparty</i>				0.876 (1.76)	0.966 (1.36)	-0.145 (-0.20)
	<i>AOW: Military</i>				1.171** (2.72)	1.513* (2.31)	0.624 (0.94)
	<i>Any Parties</i>	0.580* (2.07)	0.520 (1.48)	0.857* (2.11)	0.513 (1.82)	0.474 (1.34)	1.296** (2.70)
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	0.105 (0.40)	0.312 (1.00)	0.136 (0.41)	0.233 (1.00)	0.493 (1.75)	0.143 (0.48)	
V-Dem Civil Liberties Added	<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.640** (-2.93)	-0.633* (-2.48)	-0.416 (-1.57)	-0.945*** (-4.89)	-0.870*** (-3.72)	-0.616* (-2.55)
	<i>GWF: Party-Based</i>	-0.004 (-0.01)	0.133 (0.35)	-0.183 (-0.45)			
	<i>GWF: Military</i>	1.361*** (4.62)	1.220*** (3.50)	0.935* (2.32)			
	<i>GWF: Personalist</i>	0.908** (3.07)	0.946** (2.63)	0.936* (2.39)			
	<i>AOW: Single-Party</i>				0.607 (1.65)	0.773 (1.75)	0.922 (1.86)
	<i>AOW: Multiparty</i>				0.899* (2.49)	0.471 (1.08)	0.368 (0.74)
	<i>AOW: Military</i>				1.312*** (4.31)	1.300*** (3.55)	0.788 (1.75)
	<i>Any Parties</i>	0.629** (2.86)	0.533* (2.01)	1.002** (3.22)	0.579* (2.55)	0.592* (2.16)	1.245*** (3.29)
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	1.037* (2.29)	1.700** (3.17)	1.440* (2.57)	0.698 (1.56)	1.578** (3.05)	1.666*** (3.35)	

Notes: The table displays several tests of autocratic breakdown from the presence of a ruling party, any parties, and party-based regimes. Several additional control variables are considered, with the model types separated by horizontal lines and further controls omitted for space. The models are logits predicting irregular turnover, coups, and regime failure. Models 1-3 use the Geddes et al. (2014) regime classification and definition of autocratic failure; Models 4-6 instead use Magaloni et al. (2013). 18 total logits are summarized. The sample covers 1946–2009. *t* statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses.

Table A2: Models Predicting Autocratic Breakdown

		GWF Data			AOW Data		
		Irregular Turnover	Coup	Regime Failure	Irregular Turnover	Coup	Regime Failure
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ruling Party Only	<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.743*** (-4.70)	-0.745*** (-3.95)	-0.348 (-1.75)	-0.684*** (-4.56)	-0.712*** (-3.99)	-0.090 (-0.46)
Any Parties Only	<i>Any Parties</i>	-0.027 (-0.14)	-0.032 (-0.14)	0.500 (1.72)	0.001 (0.01)	0.015 (0.07)	0.976** (3.00)
Party-Based Only	<i>GWF: Party-Based</i>	-1.028*** (-6.07)	-0.922*** (-4.66)	-0.979*** (-4.50)			
Single-Party Only	<i>AOW: Single-Party</i>				-0.726*** (-4.03)	-0.466* (-2.34)	0.215 (1.14)
No Regime Types	<i>Ruling Party</i>	-1.051*** (-5.76)	-0.985*** (-4.49)	-0.751*** (-3.40)	-1.015*** (-5.70)	-0.985*** (-4.63)	-0.574* (-2.53)
	<i>Any Parties</i>	0.689** (3.15)	0.636* (2.41)	1.031** (3.29)	0.716** (3.28)	0.701** (2.66)	1.404*** (3.86)
Regime Types Only	<i>GWF: Party-Based</i>	-0.274 (-1.00)	-0.257 (-0.80)	-0.359 (-1.07)			
	<i>GWF: Military</i>	1.304*** (4.71)	1.076*** (3.35)	0.833* (2.27)			
	<i>GWF: Personalist</i>	0.718** (2.68)	0.648* (2.05)	0.771* (2.28)			
	<i>AOW: Single-Party</i>				0.055 (0.18)	0.135 (0.39)	0.865* (2.20)
	<i>AOW: Multiparty</i>				0.598* (2.02)	0.208 (0.59)	0.590 (1.42)
	<i>AOW: Military</i>				1.038*** (3.89)	0.891** (2.85)	0.802* (2.09)
With Interactions	<i>Ruling Party</i>	-0.912 (-1.42)	-0.042 (-0.07)	-0.604 (-0.80)	-0.981** (-3.04)	-1.019* (-2.55)	-0.404 (-0.99)
	<i>GWF: Party-Based</i>	0.142 (-0.15)	-0.469 (0.30)	-0.164 (-0.64)			
	<i>GWF: Military</i>	1.326*** (4.40)	1.293*** (3.63)	0.857* (2.06)			
	<i>GWF: Personalist</i>	0.629 (1.88)	0.910* (2.30)	0.717 (1.64)			
	<i>AOW: Single-Party</i>				0.550 (1.22)	0.733 (1.32)	0.503 (0.84)
	<i>AOW: Multiparty</i>				0.945* (2.28)	0.627 (1.23)	0.248 (0.44)
	<i>AOW: Military</i>				1.252*** (4.14)	1.172*** (3.29)	0.754 (1.73)
	<i>Military × Ruling Party</i>	-0.005 (-0.01)	-1.027 (-1.46)	-0.034 (-0.04)	-0.005 (-0.01)	0.077 (0.16)	-0.531 (-1.04)
	<i>Personalist × Ruling Party</i>	0.474 (0.69)	-0.667 (-1.00)	0.242 (0.29)			
	<i>Any Parties</i>	0.674** (3.12)	0.617* (2.36)	1.057*** (3.43)	0.604** (2.59)	0.641* (2.26)	1.370*** (3.54)

Notes: The table displays several tests of autocratic breakdown from the presence of a ruling party, any parties, and party-based regimes. Compared to the main paper, different combinations of these are included, as well as interactions, with the model types separated by horizontal lines and the controls omitted for space. The models are logits predicting irregular turnover, coups, and regime failure. Models 1-3 use the Geddes et al. (2014) regime classification and definition of autocratic failure; Models 4-6 instead use Magaloni et al. (2013). 36 total logits are summarized. The sample covers 1946–2009. *t* statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. **p* < 0.05, ***p* < 0.01, ****p* < 0.001

Estimated Instability in Autocratic Types




Fig. A1: The figure shows estimated probabilities of irregular turnover from different regime and party combinations, estimated from the variation with interactions of Model 1 in Table A2.

Table A3: Models Predicting Autocratic Breakdown and Democratization from Ruling Party Characteristics

	Auth. Trans.	Dem. Trans.	Auth. Trans.	Dem. Trans.	Auth. Trans.	Dem. Trans.
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
<i>Origin: Dictator/Military</i>	-0.183 (-0.85)	-0.108 (-0.25)				
<i>Origin: Communist</i>	-1.750** (-2.95)	-1.249* (-2.07)				
<i>Origin: Independence</i>	-0.278 (-0.67)	-1.185 (-1.76)				
<i>Origin: Revolution</i>	-0.733* (-2.14)	-0.359 (-0.62)				
<i>Power: Dictator/Military</i>			-0.229 (-1.10)	0.656 (1.88)		
<i>Power: Foreign/Commun.</i>			-1.315* (-2.14)	0.794 (1.17)		
<i>Power: Coup</i>			-0.233 (-0.41)	4.085*** (3.76)		
<i>Power: Revolution</i>			-1.573*** (-3.83)	-0.015 (-0.03)		
<i>Power: Election</i>					0.471* (2.48)	-0.681 (-1.95)
<i>Party Tenure</i>	-0.024** (-2.69)	0.025* (2.39)	-0.023** (-2.72)	0.029* (2.41)	-0.025** (-2.86)	0.026* (2.38)
<i>Party Marxist</i>	-0.555 (-1.82)	0.381 (0.95)	-0.567 (-1.87)	-0.044 (-0.11)	-0.965** (-3.27)	-0.266 (-0.92)
<i>Party Rule from Indep.</i>	-0.345 (-0.94)	-0.686 (-1.49)	-0.474 (-1.72)	-0.873* (-2.03)	-0.627* (-2.42)	-0.861* (-2.16)
Other controls?	Y		Y		Y	
N	3,631		3,631		3,631	
Countries	119		119		119	
Pseudo R ²	0.087		0.095		0.082	

Notes: The table displays multinomial logits predicting the party's loss of power, either to a new autocratic regime or democratization. The main predictors are the party's founding origins and how it gained power. The models are identical to those in Table 4, except that it counts parties continuing in power as cases of autocratic failure or democratization. The sample is all autocracies with ruling parties from 1940–2015. *t* statistics (based on robust standard errors) are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$