


## **Supplementary Material**

Table A1. Probit regression model to estimate impact of relative list positions on party list elections

Probit regression model	
Relative list position	0.10*** (0.01)
Constant	-0.01 (0.05)
N	904
Log-likelihood	-431.07
Nagelkerke's R <sup>2</sup>	0.39

Note: Table entries are unstandardised coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; Candidates elected in the SMD tier excluded, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.


Figure A1. Predicted probabilities of party list election by relative list position



Note: Predicted probabilities of party list election by relative list position with 95% confidence intervals based on a bivariate probit model presented in Table A1.

In this appendix, we provide a number of additional empirical materials. In order to demonstrate that %FN is not highly truncated for candidates of immigrant-origin and, thus, not biasing the results of the interaction effect, *Figure A2* presents the distribution of %FN for candidates with and without immigrant origin separately in the form of histograms. Although candidates of immigrant-origin tend to run more often in constituencies with higher immigrant shares, the distribution for candidates of immigrant-origin is not worrisome in the sense of a highly skewed distribution.

Figure A2. Histograms of local shares of foreign nationals for candidates with and without immigrant-origin



Note: own calculation based on data described in text

In *table A2*, we replicate the main model (model 6 in table 2) with different censoring thresholds between -18 and -25 (models 1 to 7) and with no censoring (model 8) replicating the results of the main analysis.

Table A2. Tobit regression models with varying left-censoring thresholds of the relative list position

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Left-censoring at	-18	-19	-21	-22	-23	-24	-25	None
% FN <sup>a</sup>	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.11)
CIO	1.73+ (1.02)	1.80+ (1.09)	1.87+ (1.12)	1.89+ (1.14)	1.90 (1.16)	1.91 (1.19)	1.90 (1.20)	2.18+ (1.26)
CIO * % FN	0.21** (0.08)	0.21* (0.08)	0.21* (0.08)	0.21* (0.09)	0.21* (0.09)	0.21* (0.09)	0.21* (0.09)	0.16 (0.12)
District magnitude <sup>a</sup>	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
FDP <sup>b</sup>	-4.43+ (2.36)	-4.60+ (2.39)	-4.97* (2.48)	-5.12* (2.53)	-5.25* (2.56)	-5.40* (2.60)	-5.51* (2.63)	-6.62* (3.05)
Grüne <sup>b</sup>	-2.87+ (1.67)	-2.99+ (1.68)	-3.32+ (1.76)	-3.41+ (1.78)	-3.48+ (1.79)	-3.56* (1.81)	-3.61* (1.80)	-4.13* (1.94)
Linke <sup>b</sup>	0.63 (1.26)	0.59 (1.27)	0.45 (1.31)	0.41 (1.33)	0.38 (1.33)	0.33 (1.35)	0.30 (1.35)	-0.03 (1.46)
SPD <sup>b</sup>	1.25 (1.56)	1.20 (1.59)	1.07 (1.64)	1.00 (1.67)	0.95 (1.68)	0.89 (1.70)	0.86 (1.72)	0.42 (1.95)
Voter turnout (t-1) <sup>a</sup>	0.11 (0.07)	0.12+ (0.07)	0.14+ (0.07)	0.14+ (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)	0.16* (0.08)	0.22* (0.09)
Party vote share (t-1) <sup>a</sup>	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Female candidate	2.44*** (0.49)	2.45*** (0.48)	2.52*** (0.50)	2.58*** (0.52)	2.59*** (0.51)	2.66*** (0.54)	2.67*** (0.53)	3.01*** (0.65)
Tertiary education	1.68** (0.52)	1.72** (0.53)	1.78** (0.56)	1.77** (0.54)	1.85** (0.57)	1.87** (0.58)	1.84** (0.56)	1.78*** (0.48)
Age <sup>a</sup>	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	- (0.02)
C List incumbent <sup>c</sup>	11.3*** (2.26)	11.4*** (2.30)	11.6*** (2.37)	11.6*** (2.40)	11.7*** (2.42)	11.8*** (2.46)	11.8*** (2.48)	12.4*** (2.71)
C SMD incumbent <sup>c</sup>	5.03*** (1.28)	5.04*** (1.30)	5.00*** (1.34)	4.98*** (1.33)	4.98*** (1.30)	4.96*** (1.28)	4.96*** (1.28)	4.86*** (1.34)
Constant	10.5*** (1.17)	10.6*** (1.17)	10.6*** (1.17)	10.7*** (1.19)	10.7*** (1.18)	10.8*** (1.16)	10.8*** (1.16)	10.9*** (1.29)
Sigma	7.20*** (1.00)	7.30*** (1.02)	7.52*** (1.09)	7.63*** (1.11)	7.73*** (1.13)	7.82*** (1.15)	7.90*** (1.17)	8.83*** (1.38)
N	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121
Censored N	170	154	130	121	111	101	92	0
Log-likelihood	3397.68	3453.59	3545.00	3585.36	3624.79	3661.44	3695.73	4032.63
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.39

Note: Table entries are unstandardised coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on 16 multi-member districts in parentheses. <sup>a</sup> Variables are centered at their global mean; <sup>b</sup> “CDU/CSU” is the reference category; <sup>c</sup> “Not incumbent” is the reference category; + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

In *table A3*, we present further robustness checks.

- Since the variables CIO, %FN ( $r = 0.13$ ) and their interaction term are somewhat correlated with each other (0.45 and 0.28), *model 1* includes the main model without the interaction term, while *models 2* and *3* include either CIO or %FN. The results do not differ substantially from the models presented in the paper.
- *Model 4* presents the results of the main model when %FN is not centred, showing that the interaction turns out to be positive and significant, while the two constituent terms do not provide much explanatory power. Moreover, the insignificance of the CIO variable in model 4 shows that multicollinearity issues seem to become more problematic when %FN is not centred.
- In *model 5* of *table A3*, we address potential concerns regarding the manipulation of our dependent variable by estimating the main model as an OLS regression with the dependent variable being candidates' actual list positions (first position =1, second position=2, ...). Since higher values indicate positions further down the list, we would expect a negative coefficient for the interaction term and, indeed, this is what we find.
- *Model 6* addresses the concern that candidates' migration background may not be visible to voters. To tackle this concern, we generate a variable called *visible CIO*, that is, minority candidates who are visible based on their names or physical appearance. This shrinks the number of CIOs further ( $n=53$ ), which makes it more difficult to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in regression analysis. As seen in Model 6, the interaction effect between visible CIO and %FN remains positive, but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance ( $p=0.102$ ).
- *Model 7* replicates the main model, but only for parties of the left. The discussion of this model follows below Table A3.

Table A3. Additional regression models

	Model 1: Tobit	Model 2: Tobit	Model 3: Tobit	Model 4: Tobit	Model 5: OLS <sup>d</sup>	Model 6: Tobit	Model 7: Tobit
% FN <sup>a</sup>	-0.05 (0.08)		-0.04 (0.08)		0.09 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.10)
CIO	2.35* (0.95)	2.21** (0.76)		-0.09 (1.77)	-2.07 (1.30)		1.28 (1.35)
CIO * % FN					-0.24* (0.11)		0.24* (0.12)
Visible CIO						2.27* (0.96)	
Visible CIO * %FN						0.17 (0.10)	
%FN (not centered)				-0.07 (0.08)			
CIO * % FN (not centered)				0.21* (0.09)			
District magnitude <sup>a</sup>	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
FDP <sup>b</sup>	-4.68+ (2.42)	-4.66+ (2.41)	-4.78+ (2.46)	-4.76* (2.42)	4.96* (2.07)	-4.76+ (2.44)	
Grüne <sup>b</sup>	-2.99+ (1.70)	-2.97+ (1.70)	-2.93+ (1.70)	-3.13+ (1.70)	4.76** (1.37)	-3.13+ (1.73)	
Linke <sup>b</sup>	0.62 (1.26)	0.65 (1.24)	0.78 (1.19)	0.53 (1.26)	-0.51 (1.51)	0.55 (1.25)	3.74*** (1.09)
SPD <sup>b</sup>	1.21 (1.62)	1.25 (1.58)	1.25 (1.63)	1.14 (1.60)	4.54** (1.47)	1.14 (1.61)	3.81** (1.37)
Voter turnout (t-1) <sup>a</sup>	0.13+ (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.13+ (0.07)	0.13+ (0.07)	-0.21* (0.10)	0.13+ (0.07)	0.10 (0.06)
Party vote share (t-1) <sup>a</sup>	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	0.21* (0.08)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Female candidate	2.46*** (0.49)	2.42*** (0.48)	2.39*** (0.48)	2.49*** (0.49)	-3.01*** (0.63)	2.48*** (0.49)	2.70*** (0.74)
Tertiary education	1.81** (0.57)	1.77** (0.54)	1.76** (0.56)	1.79** (0.57)	-1.48** (0.48)	1.83** (0.58)	1.57* (0.62)
Age <sup>a</sup>	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
C List incumbent <sup>c</sup>	11.47*** (2.35)	11.44*** (2.34)	11.48*** (2.37)	11.46*** (2.34)	-12.2*** (2.78)	11.48*** (2.34)	10.42*** (1.96)
C SMD incumbent <sup>c</sup>	5.00*** (1.30)	4.99*** (1.31)	4.97*** (1.29)	5.06*** (1.32)	-6.50*** (1.46)	5.09*** (1.30)	0.33 (3.37)
Constant	-10.7*** (1.20)	-10.6*** (1.25)	-10.5*** (1.24)	-10.0*** (1.70)	17.7*** (1.22)	-10.6*** (1.20)	-12.6*** (1.84)
Sigma	7.41*** (1.05)	7.42*** (1.06)	7.44*** (1.06)	7.41*** (1.05)	-	7.41*** (1.06)	7.41*** (0.91)
N	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121	1121	630
Censored N	141	141	141	141	-	141	57
Log-likelihood	-3501.86	-3502.61	-3505.02	-3501.08	-4047.81	-3501.19	-2027.49
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup> / adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.55	0.40	0.35


Note: Table entries are unstandardised coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on 16 multi-member districts in parantheses. <sup>a</sup> Variables are centered at their global mean; <sup>b</sup> “CDU/CSU” is the reference category; <sup>c</sup> “Not incumbent” is the reference category; <sup>d</sup> the dependent variable is candidates’ actual list position; + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Existing literature suggests that in Germany and other Western democracies with significant immigration, right-wing parties contribute to migrants' descriptive representation less often than left-wing parties (e.g. Bloemraad, 2013: 664). Accordingly, we find that double candidates of immigrant-origin are *a priori* less likely to run for right-leaning parties:

- CSU/CDU n=7
- FDP n=8
- Grüne n=21
- Linke n=18
- SPD n=19.

*Figure A3* shows also that the distribution of the foreigner share is strongly left-skewed in the group of centre-right CIOs (CDU/CSU and FDP), while the picture is more balanced for left-wing CIOs. In other words, almost all CIOs running in a SMD with a high foreigner share are left-wing. This suggests that our results are driven by left-wing parties. However, these patterns do not thwart the overall relationship because immigrant-origin candidates are a lot less likely to run for centre-right parties and their distribution is strongly biased toward smaller foreigner shares. Model 7 in table A3 further supports this view by replicating the main model for left-wing parties only. As can be seen, the results are very similar.

Figure A3. Scatterplots of relative list positions and local foreigner shares by party



Note: own calculation based on data described in text