

The European refugee crisis, party competition, and voters' responses in Germany

Matthias Mader and Harald Schoen

Online Appendix

Table of content

A1: Question wording	2
A2: Additional information about Figure 1.....	5
A3: Additional descriptive statistics mentioned in the manuscript.....	6
Section 3	6
Endnotes 6 and 15	6
Endnote 9.....	7
A4: Additional regression analyses mentioned in	8
Endnote 13.....	8
Endnote 14.....	9
A5: Regression tables of results reported in	10
Figure 2	10
Figure 3	11
Figure 4	17
Figure 5	23
References in the Appendix	31

A1: Question wording

Unless indicated otherwise, all surveys analysed in the paper use the same question wording and response format. German question wording is reported in italics.

Attitudes towards immigration

Let's talk about immigration. Do you think laws on immigration of foreigners should be relaxed or made tougher? (1) relax immigration restrictions – (7) make immigration restrictions tougher

Jetzt geht es um Zuzugsmöglichkeiten für Ausländer. Sollten die Zuzugsmöglichkeiten für Ausländer erleichtert oder eingeschränkt werden? (1) Zuzug von Ausländern erleichtern – (7) Zuzug von Ausländern einschränken

In the 2015 Intermediate inquiry (“w5”), a 9-point response scale was used. In the Online Trackings, an 11-point response scale was used.

Perceived party position on immigration

Let's talk about the question whether laws on immigration of foreigners should be relaxed or made tougher. What do you think are the positions of the political parties on this issue? – [CDU / CSU / FDP / SPD / Bündnis 90/die Grünen / Die Linke / AfD]: (1) relax immigration restrictions – (7) make immigration restrictions tougher

Jetzt geht es um die Frage, ob Zuzugsmöglichkeiten für Ausländer erleichtert oder eingeschränkt werden sollten. Wie stehen Ihrer Meinung nach die folgenden Parteien dazu? – [CDU / CSU / FDP / SPD / Bündnis 90/die Grünen / Die Linke / AfD]: (1) Zuzug von Ausländern erleichtern – (7) Zuzug von Ausländern einschränken

In the 2013 Campaign panel survey (“w6“-“w10”), the perception of the joint position of the “CDU/CSU” was measured. In the Online Trackings, an 11-point response scale was used.

Attitudes towards welfare

Some people would like to see lower taxes even if that would imply some reductions in welfare state benefits; others would like to see more government spending on welfare state benefits even if that would entail higher taxes. How about you? What is your position concerning taxes and spending on welfare state benefits? (1) lower taxes and less government spending on welfare state benefits – (7) higher taxes and more government spending on welfare state benefits

Manche wollen weniger Steuern und Abgaben, auch wenn das weniger sozialstaatliche Leistungen bedeutet, andere wollen mehr sozialstaatliche Leistungen, auch wenn das mehr Steuern und Abgaben bedeutet. Wie ist Ihre Meinung zu diesem Thema? (1) weniger Steuern und weniger sozialstaatliche Leistungen – (7) mehr Steuern und mehr sozialstaatliche Leistungen

In the 2015 Intermediate inquiry (“w5”), a 9-point response scale was used. In the Online Trackings, an 11-point response scale was used.

Perceived party position on welfare

Some people would like to see lower taxes even if that would imply some reductions in welfare state benefits; others would like to see more government spending on welfare state benefits even if that would entail higher taxes. In your opinion, what are the positions of the political parties on this issue? – [CDU / CSU / FDP / SPD / Bündnis 90/die Grünen / Die Linke / AfD]: (1) lower taxes and less government spending on welfare state benefits – (7) higher taxes and more government spending on welfare state benefits

Manche wollen weniger Steuern und Abgaben, auch wenn das weniger sozialstaatliche Leistungen bedeutet, andere wollen mehr sozialstaatliche Leistungen, auch wenn das mehr Steuern und Abgaben bedeutet. Wie ist Ihre Meinung zu diesem Thema? – [CDU / CSU / FDP / SPD / Bündnis 90/die Grünen / Die Linke / AfD] (1) weniger Steuern und weniger sozialstaatliche Leistungen – (7) mehr Steuern und mehr sozialstaatliche Leistungen

In the 2013 Campaign panel survey (“w6”-“w10”), the perception of the joint position of the “CDU/CSU” was measured.

Vote choice

As you know, you have two votes to cast in the federal election: The first vote for a candidate of your district and the second vote for a party. Who will you vote for? Second vote: (1) CDU/CSU, (2) SPD, (3) Greens, (4) Left, (5) AfD, (6) FDP, (7) Another party, (8) None (will not vote) [In the survey, the screen with this question shows a ballot on which respondents can mark a box with the party they would vote for]

Bei der Bundestagswahl können Sie ja zwei Stimmen vergeben. Die Erststimme für einen Kandidaten aus Ihrem Wahlkreis und die Zweitstimme für eine Partei. Was werden Sie auf Ihrem Stimmzettel ankreuzen? Zweitstimme: (1) CDU/CSU, (2) SPD, (3) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (4) Die Linke, (5) AfD, (6) FDP, (7) Andere Partei, (8) Keine Partei (werde nicht wählen) [Bildschirmansicht zeigt Musterstimmzettel mit Erst- und Zweitstimme]

In wave 7 of the 2013 Campaign panel survey (“w4”) and wave 8 of the 2017 Campaign panel survey (“w10”), retrospective vote choice was measured.

Party identification

In the Federal Republic, many people lean towards a political party for an extended period of time although they vote for a different party now and then. How about you: Do you—generally speaking—lean towards a political party? And if so: Which party? (1) CDU (2) CSU, (3) FDP, (4) SPD, (5) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (6) Die Linke, (7) AfD, (8) Another party, (9) None

In Deutschland neigen viele Leute längere Zeit einer bestimmten politischen Partei zu, obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen Sie -

ganz allgemein gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu? Und wenn ja, welcher? (1) CDU (2) CSU, (3) FDP, (4) SPD, (5) Bündnis 90/die Grünen, (6) Die Linke, (7) AfD, (8) Andere Partei, (9) Keine Partei

In the 2017 Campaign panel survey, CDU/CSU was an additional response option. For the analyses in the main paper, the CDU and CSU categories were collapsed.

Party approval

Please state what you think in general about the political parties. – [CDU / CSU / AfD]: (-5) I think poorly of that party – (5) think highly of that party

Was halten Sie so ganz allgemein von den einzelnen politischen Parteien? – [CDU / CSU / AfD]: (-5) Halte überhaupt nichts von der Partei – (5) halte sehr viel von der Partei

Leader approval

Please state what you think about some of the leading politicians. – [Angela Merkel / Horst Seehofer / Frauke Petry]: (-5) Think nothing of that politician – (5) think highly of that politician

Bitte geben Sie nun an, was Sie von einigen führenden Politikern halten. – [Angela Merkel / Horst Seehofer / Frauke Petry]: (-5) Halte überhaupt nichts von dem Politiker – (5) halte sehr viel von dem Politiker

Most important problem

In your opinion, what is currently the most important political problem in Germany? Please specify only the most important one. [Response format: Text box displayed on screen]

Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach gegenwärtig das wichtigste politische Problem in Deutschland? Bitte nennen Sie nur das allerwichtigste Problem. [Antwortformat: Textfeld]

In your opinion, what is currently the second most important political problem in Germany? Please specify only the second most important problem. [Response format: Text box displayed on screen]

Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach gegenwärtig das zweitwichtigste politische Problem in Deutschland? Bitte nennen Sie nur das zweitwichtigste Problem. [Antwortformat: Textfeld]

A2: Additional information about Figure 1

Figure 1 draws on data from the GLES Online Trackings, which are cross-sectional online surveys. The sampling universe consists of all persons with German citizenship resident in the Federal Republic of Germany who were at the time members of the *forsa omninet* (which has ca. 75,000 active members). Active panel members had been recruited exclusively by phone, had filled out a basic questionnaire, and had attended to at least one survey within the last twelve months. Sampling was based on a primary defined ratio schedule (sex, age, education). The realized sample of each Tracking comprises about 1000 respondents. The field times of the surveys are documented in Table A2-1; for more information, see the corresponding reference.

Table A2-1: Online Trackings used in Figure 1

Survey	Field time	Reference
T19	2013, January	Rattinger et al. (2014a)
T20	2013, May	Rattinger et al. (2014b)
T21	2013, September	Rattinger et al. (2015a)
T22	2013, November	Rattinger et al. (2015b)
T23	2014, February	Rattinger et al. (2015c)
T24	2014, May	Rattinger et al. (2015d)
T25	2014, August	Rattinger et al. (2015e)
T26	2014, November	Rattinger et al. (2015f)
T27	2015, February	Roßteutscher et al. (2015)
T28	2015, June	Roßteutscher et al. (2016a)
T29	2015, September	Roßteutscher et al. (2016b)
T30	2015, December	Roßteutscher et al. (2016c)
T31	2016, February	Roßteutscher et al. (2016d)
T32	2016, June	Roßteutscher et al. (2016e)
T33	2016, August	Roßteutscher et al. (2016f)
T34	2016, December	Roßteutscher et al. (2017c)
T35	2017, March	Roßteutscher et al. (2017d)
T36	2017, June	Roßteutscher et al. (2017b)
T37	2017, September	Roßteutscher et al. (2017a)

All entries in Figure 1 are weighed with post-stratification weights calculated by GESIS.

The data on the most important problems are based on responses to open questions (see A1: Question wording). The GLES team coded these responses by hand into pre-defined categories. We used codes 3750-3755 to identify respondents who were concerned about immigration and codes 3800-3899 to identify those concerned about the labour market. A full documentation of the coding scheme can be found here:

<http://info1.gesis.org/dbksearch/download.asp?id=20312>.

Respondents who answered “don’t know” or who refused to answer are included in the reference category. This makes the measure a conservative one, as those refusing to answer are presumably in part concerned about immigration/refugees (or the labour market).

A3: Additional descriptive statistics mentioned in the manuscript

Section 3

The following table presents the evidence supporting our statement that “the stability of immigration and partisan attitudes did not vary between these groups.”


Table A3-1: Attitude stability in the 2013 campaign panel

	2017 respondents	2017 dropouts
Correlation between immigration attitudes, w1-w4	.79	.74
Correlation between Merkel attitudes, w1-w4	.85	.83
Correlation between Seehofer attitudes, w1-w4	.73	.72
Correlation between CDU attitudes, w1-w4	.83	.83
Correlation between SPD attitudes, w1-w4	.73	.71
Correlation between AfD attitudes, w1-w4	.61	.55
Percent stable CDU/CSU party ID	14%	15%
Percent stable SPD party ID	20%	17%
Percent stable CDU/CSU vote intention	18%	18%
Percent stable SPD party vote intention	19%	19%

Notes: w1 = First wave of the 2013 GLES panel; w4 = Seventh wave of the 2013 GLES panel. Respondents who participated in w1 and w4 but in none of the 2017 waves were coded as “2017 dropouts”; respondents who participated in w1 and w4 and at least one wave of the 2017 panel were coded as “2017 respondents”.

Endnotes 6 and 15


Figure A3-1: DK/RF responses to party position items



Notes: Weighed data from GLES Online Trackings T19-T36. Spikes are 95% confidence intervals.

Endnote 9

Figure A3-2: Mean absolute immigration policy distance in groups differing in prior immigration attitude




Notes: Reported are mean changes in absolute distance between w3 and w7 (-1 = distance decreased by 1 points, 1 = distance increased by 1 point) among respondents with different immigration attitudes (1 = relax immigration restrictions, 7 = toughen immigration restrictions).

A4: Additional regression analyses mentioned in ...

Endnote 13


The following figure includes the results from the left panel in Figure 5 in the paper and, in addition, results for moves towards the CDU/CSU and away from the AfD.

Figure A4-1: Effects of change in absolute distance to the CDU on change in vote choice and party identity



The following figure includes the results from the right panel in Figure 5 in the paper and, in addition, results for moves towards the CDU/CSU and away from the AfD.


Figure A4-2: Effects of prior immigration attitude on vote choice and party identity



Endnote 14

We estimated multinomial regressions in which the response behaviour to the differentiated party identification item (“CDU”, “CSU”, “CDU/CSU”) was regressed on the change in absolute distance to the CDU position (left panel in Figure A4-3) and prior immigration attitude (right panel in Figure A4-3).

Figure A4-3: Party identification after the crisis among prior CDU identifiers



Notes: Reported are AMEs and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial regressions. Effects on additional response options (FDP, SPD, Greens, Left, Other party) not shown. To compute change in the absolute distance to the CDU, w3 data was used.

A5: Regression tables of results reported in ...

The following tables report the regression results on which the figures in the main text are based.

Figure 2

Table: Regression results for change in attitudes towards immigration

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
PI CDU (w1)	-0.02 (0.01)			
PI CSU (w1)	0.03 (0.02)			
PI SPD (w1)	-0.00 (0.01)			
PI FDP (w1)	0.02 (0.02)			
PI Greens (w1)	0.00 (0.01)			
PI Left (w1)	-0.01 (0.01)			
PI AfD (w1)	0.04 (0.03)			
PI Others (w1)	0.03 (0.02)			
PI CDU (w4)		0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
PI CSU (w4)		0.04 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
PI SPD (w4)		-0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
PI FDP (w4)		0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
PI Greens (w4)		-0.04 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
PI Left (w4)		-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
PI AfD (w4)		-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)
PI Others (w4)		-0.08* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)
Constant	-0.01 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
R2	.0036	.007	.0065	.011
N	4120	2705	2180	1943

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference is 'No PI' category. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Figure 3

Table: Regression results for change in CDU approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration		
	w3-w7	w3-w8	w3-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	-0.24 ^{***}		
	(0.02)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	0.16 ^{***}		
	(0.02)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	-0.27 ^{***}		
	(0.04)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	0.18 ^{***}		
	(0.04)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		-0.20 ^{***}	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		0.10 ^{***}	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		-0.24 ^{***}	
		(0.05)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		0.13 [*]	
		(0.05)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			-0.31 ^{***}
			(0.03)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			0.18 ^{***}
			(0.03)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			-0.25 ^{***}
			(0.06)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			0.13 [*]
			(0.06)
Constant	0.02 ^{**}	0.03 ^{***}	0.02 ^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	.13	.085	.15
N	1407	1203	1182

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change in CSU approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration		
	w3-w7	w3-w8	w3-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	0.05*		
	(0.02)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.16***		
	(0.02)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	0.00		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.11*		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.04	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-0.14***	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w8)		0.04	
		(0.06)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w8)		-0.16**	
		(0.05)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			-0.02
			(0.03)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			-0.13***
			(0.03)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			-0.01
			(0.06)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-0.10
			(0.06)
Constant	0.03***	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	.064	.06	.072
N	1402	1193	1179

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$.

Table: Regression results for change in CSU approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration		
	w3-w7	w3-w8	w3-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	0.24*** (0.03)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.17*** (0.03)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	-0.00 (0.06)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	0.03 (0.06)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.20*** (0.04)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-0.12*** (0.03)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		-0.07 (0.07)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		0.08 (0.07)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			0.24*** (0.04)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			-0.14*** (0.04)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			-0.06 (0.08)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			0.09 (0.08)
Constant	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
R2	.04	.028	.039
N	1402	1193	1177

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$.

Table: Regression results for change in Merkel approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration		
	w3-w7	w3-w8	w3-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	-0.42 ^{***}		
	(0.03)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	0.28 ^{***}		
	(0.03)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	-0.43 ^{***}		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	0.35 ^{***}		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		-0.30 ^{***}	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		0.16 ^{***}	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		-0.34 ^{***}	
		(0.06)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		0.25 ^{***}	
		(0.06)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			-0.38 ^{***}
			(0.03)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			0.24 ^{***}
			(0.03)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			-0.27 ^{***}
			(0.06)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			0.15 [*]
			(0.06)
Constant	-0.01	0.03 ^{***}	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	.21	.13	.17
N	1405	1201	1181

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$.

Table: Regression results for change in Seehofer approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration		
	w3-w7	w3-w8	w3-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	0.15 ^{***}		
	(0.03)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.24 ^{***}		
	(0.02)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	-0.00		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.05		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.05	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-0.15 ^{***}	
		(0.03)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.03	
		(0.06)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-0.15 ^{**}	
		(0.06)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			0.05
			(0.03)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			-0.16 ^{***}
			(0.03)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			0.01
			(0.06)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			-0.09
			(0.06)
Constant	0.03 ^{***}	0.03 ^{***}	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	.075	.057	.054
N	1402	1198	1173

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change in Petry approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration		
	w3-w7	w3-w8	w3-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	0.40 ^{***}		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.37 ^{***}		
	(0.05)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	0.25 ^{**}		
	(0.09)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.20 [*]		
	(0.09)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.28 ^{***}	
		(0.05)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-0.27 ^{***}	
		(0.05)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w8)		0.43 ^{***}	
		(0.11)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w8)		-0.42 ^{***}	
		(0.11)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w9)			0.39 ^{***}
			(0.06)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w9)			-0.33 ^{***}
			(0.06)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			0.21
			(0.12)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-0.25 [*]
			(0.12)
Constant	-0.09 ^{***}	-0.09 ^{***}	-0.12 ^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	.11	.082	.091
N	826	711	696

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Figure 4

Table: Regression results for CDU approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.04 ^{***}			
	(0.01)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	0.01			
	(0.02)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.00			
	(0.01)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.02			
	(0.01)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		-0.10 ^{***}	-0.20 ^{***}	-0.21 ^{***}
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		-0.11 ^{***}		
		(0.02)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		0.06 ^{**}	0.10 ^{***}	0.12 ^{***}
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.03	0.06 [*]	
		(0.03)	(0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			-0.19 ^{***}	
			(0.02)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				-0.15 ^{***}
				(0.02)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				0.07 ^{**}
				(0.03)
Constant	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.06 ^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R2	.0048	.035	.078	.092
N	4084	1978	2154	1923

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for CSU approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.03*			
	(0.01)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	-0.01			
	(0.02)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.00			
	(0.01)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.02			
	(0.01)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		0.10***	0.13***	0.07***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		0.07**		
		(0.02)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		0.05	0.12***	0.11***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.04	0.04	
		(0.03)	(0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			0.07**	
			(0.02)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				0.05*
				(0.02)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				0.02
				(0.03)
Constant	0.00	-0.10***	-0.14***	-0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R2	.0027	.022	.022	.016
N	4057	1962	2144	1913

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for AfD approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.11 ^{***} (0.01)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	0.09 ^{***} (0.02)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.04 [*] (0.02)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.02 (0.02)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		0.12 ^{***} (0.02)	0.15 ^{***} (0.03)	0.10 ^{***} (0.03)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		0.12 ^{***} (0.03)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		0.07 [*] (0.03)	0.07 [*] (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			0.18 ^{***} (0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				0.10 ^{**} (0.03)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				-0.04 (0.04)
Constant	-0.04 ^{**} (0.02)	-0.16 ^{***} (0.03)	-0.22 ^{***} (0.03)	-0.20 ^{***} (0.03)
R2	.018	.021	.024	.014
N	4054	1904	2136	1914

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for Merkel approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.03 ^{**} (0.01)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	0.01 (0.02)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.01 (0.01)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.03 [*] (0.01)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		-0.28 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.48 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.32 ^{***} (0.02)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		-0.28 ^{***} (0.02)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		0.05 (0.03)	0.14 ^{***} (0.03)	0.13 ^{***} (0.03)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.04 (0.03)	0.07 [*] (0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			-0.42 ^{***} (0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				-0.28 ^{***} (0.03)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				0.05 (0.03)
Constant	-0.02 (0.01)	0.12 ^{***} (0.02)	0.19 ^{***} (0.02)	0.11 ^{***} (0.02)
R2	.0045	.13	.23	.15
N	4068	1979	2158	1924

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for Seehofer approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.02 (0.01)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	-0.00 (0.02)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.07*** (0.01)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.07*** (0.01)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		0.20*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		0.14*** (0.02)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		0.07** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			0.14*** (0.03)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				0.10*** (0.03)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				-0.01 (0.03)
Constant	0.02 (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.02)
R2	.01	.061	.069	.041
N	3980	1958	2129	1898

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for Petry approval

	Change in attitudes towards immigration			
	w1-w3	w3-w5	w3-w6	w3-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	-0.01 (0.02)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w3)	-0.02 (0.03)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	0.02 (0.02)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w3)	-0.00 (0.03)			
Immigration attitude (w3)		0.28*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.36*** (0.04)
Change in immigration attitude (w3-w5)		0.19*** (0.04)		
Welfare attitude (w3)		-0.05 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.13** (0.04)
Change in welfare attitude (w3-w6)		-0.00 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	
Change in immigration attitude (w3-w6)			0.34*** (0.04)	
Change in immigration attitude (w3-w10)				0.25*** (0.04)
Change in welfare attitude (w3-w10)				-0.13* (0.05)
Constant	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)
R2	.0018	.082	.19	.13
N	1427	902	1065	1005

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$.

Figure 5

Table: Regression results for change away from CDU/CDU vote choice

	Δ vote choice, away		
	w4-w7	w4-w8	w4-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	1.14 ^{**} (0.41)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.48 (0.42)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	1.29 (0.86)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.08 (0.86)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.44 (0.50)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-0.05 (0.48)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w8)		1.71 (0.90)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w8)		-1.01 (0.90)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			0.77 (0.54)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			0.26 (0.53)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			0.34 (1.13)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-0.10 (1.13)
Constant	-2.29 ^{***} (0.12)	-2.22 ^{***} (0.12)	-2.33 ^{***} (0.14)
McFadden's R2	.032	.013	.016
N	939	794	699

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change away from CDU/CDU party identification

	Δ ID, away		
	w4-w7	w4-w8	w4-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	1.17** (0.42)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.14 (0.43)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	1.64* (0.82)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.47 (0.83)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		0.93 (0.51)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		0.29 (0.51)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w8)		2.39* (0.97)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w8)		-1.59 (0.96)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			1.53** (0.52)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-0.54 (0.50)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			2.37* (1.19)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-1.02 (1.17)
Constant	-2.86*** (0.13)	-2.96*** (0.14)	-3.01*** (0.15)
McFadden's R2	.039	.037	.052
N	1385	1187	1167

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change towards AfD vote choice

	Δ vote choice, towards		
	w4-w7	w4-w8	w4-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	3.15 ^{***} (0.41)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-2.33 ^{***} (0.42)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	1.08 (0.86)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-0.93 (0.86)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		3.81 ^{***} (0.53)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-1.66 ^{***} (0.50)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w8)		1.57 (1.00)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w8)		-1.54 (1.00)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			3.59 ^{***} (0.54)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-1.30 ^{**} (0.49)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			1.63 (1.15)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-1.54 (1.16)
Constant	-2.52 ^{***} (0.14)	-2.85 ^{***} (0.18)	-2.57 ^{***} (0.17)
McFadden's R2	.12	.15	.13
N	939	794	699

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change towards AfD party identification

	Δ ID, towards		
	w4-w7	w4-w8	w4-w9
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	2.30 ^{***} (0.37)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-1.84 ^{***} (0.38)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w3-w7)	2.00 ^{**} (0.74)		
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w3-w7)	-2.54 ^{***} (0.76)		
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6-w8)		3.11 ^{***} (0.46)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6-w8)		-1.43 ^{**} (0.45)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w8)		2.30 [*] (0.94)	
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w8)		-2.20 [*] (0.93)	
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			2.84 ^{***} (0.47)
Δ absolute immigration distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-1.15 ^{**} (0.44)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CDU (w6- w9)			1.79 (1.09)
Δ absolute welfare distance to the CSU (w6- w9)			-2.26 [*] (1.07)
Constant	-2.74 ^{***} (0.12)	-3.13 ^{***} (0.16)	-3.00 ^{***} (0.15)
McFadden's R2	.094	.12	.09
N	1385	1187	1167

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change away from CDU/CSU vote choice

	w1-w4	Δ vote choice, away		
		w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.58 (0.34)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	0.25 (0.49)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-1.03* (0.41)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-1.07** (0.41)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		1.27** (0.41)	1.34** (0.42)	0.75 (0.43)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		1.19** (0.46)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		-1.13* (0.46)	-1.22** (0.44)	-2.04*** (0.45)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.11 (0.50)	-0.14 (0.47)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			1.77*** (0.49)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				0.63 (0.49)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				-0.01 (0.49)
Constant	-2.81*** (0.34)	-2.78*** (0.42)	-2.72*** (0.43)	-1.86*** (0.43)
McFadden's R2	.015	.034	.042	.05
N	2429	1309	1321	1170

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change away from CDU/CSU party identification

	Δ ID, away			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	0.70*			
	(0.33)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	-0.29			
	(0.46)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.09			
	(0.39)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.33			
	(0.40)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		1.66***	1.18**	1.24**
		(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		1.68***		
		(0.47)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		-0.82	-0.96*	-1.18**
		(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		0.33	0.25	
		(0.49)	(0.45)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			1.28**	
			(0.46)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				1.38**
				(0.47)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				0.26
				(0.45)
Constant	-3.83***	-3.70***	-3.18***	-3.09***
	(0.34)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.42)
McFadden's R2	.0064	.04	.028	.036
N	4077	1987	2167	1931

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001.

Table: Regression results for change towards AfD vote choice

	Δ vote choice, towards			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	1.92 ^{***} (0.47)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	1.17 (0.64)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-1.17 [*] (0.47)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	-0.45 (0.47)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		7.61 ^{***} (1.14)	6.08 ^{***} (0.62)	7.98 ^{***} (0.95)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		6.27 ^{***} (1.18)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		0.07 (0.47)	0.13 (0.38)	-0.22 (0.39)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.86 (0.53)	-0.96 [*] (0.42)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			5.72 ^{***} (0.69)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				6.98 ^{***} (1.01)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				-0.52 (0.46)
Constant	-4.12 ^{***} (0.46)	-9.16 ^{***} (1.13)	-6.99 ^{***} (0.62)	-8.78 ^{***} (0.93)
McFadden's R2	.042	.2	.2	.22
N	2429	1309	1321	1170

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$.

Table: Regression results for change towards AfD party identification

	Δ ID, towards			
	w1-w4	w4-w5	w4-w6	w4-w10
Immigration attitude (w1)	5.62 ^{***} (1.12)			
Change in immigration attitude (w1-w4)	6.29 ^{***} (1.29)			
Welfare attitude (w1)	-0.21 (0.61)			
Change in welfare attitude (w1-w4)	0.02 (0.60)			
Immigration attitude (w4)		5.78 ^{***} (0.85)	6.19 ^{***} (0.64)	6.79 ^{***} (0.87)
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w5)		4.57 ^{***} (0.88)		
Welfare attitude (w4)		-0.37 (0.47)	-0.12 (0.36)	-0.44 (0.40)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w6)		-0.51 (0.52)	-0.46 (0.40)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w6)			5.43 ^{***} (0.69)	
Change in immigration attitude (w4-w10)				5.43 ^{***} (0.93)
Change in welfare attitude (w4-w10)				-0.90 [*] (0.45)
Constant	-9.05 ^{***} (1.10)	-7.66 ^{***} (0.84)	-7.56 ^{***} (0.63)	-8.27 ^{***} (0.86)
McFadden's R2	.12	.14	.17	.17
N	4077	1987	2167	1931

Notes: Reported are logits with standard errors in parentheses. *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$.

References in the Appendix

- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2014a. Long-term Online Tracking, T19 (GLES), Version 2.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12034).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2014b. Long-term Online Tracking, T20 (GLES), Version 2.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.13016).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015a. Long-term Online Tracking, T21 (GLES), Version 3.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12231).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015b. Long-term Online Tracking, T22 (GLES), Version 3.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12232).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015c. Long-term Online Tracking, T23 (GLES), Version 2.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12421).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015d. Long-term Online Tracking, T24 (GLES), Version 1.2.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12279).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015e. Long-term Online Tracking, T25 (GLES), Version 2.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12811).
- Rattinger, Hans/Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015f. Long-term Online Tracking, T26 (GLES), Version 1.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12281).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Dietz, Melanie/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2017a. Longterm-Online-Tracking T37 (GLES), Version 1.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12917).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Dietz, Melanie/Scherer, Philipp. 2017b. Longterm-Online-Tracking, T36 (GLES), Version 1.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12872).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2015. Long-term Online Tracking, T27 (GLES), Version 1.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12282).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2016a. Long-term Online Tracking, T28 (GLES), Version 2.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12521).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2016b. Long-term Online Tracking, T29 (GLES), Version 1.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12522).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2016c. Long-term Online Tracking, T30 (GLES), Version 1.2.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12540).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2016d. Long-term Online Tracking, T31 (GLES), Version 1.1.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12655).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2016e. Long-term Online Tracking, T32 (GLES), Version 1.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12625).

- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2016f. Long-term Online Tracking, T33 (GLES), Version 1.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12675).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2017c. Long-term Online Tracking, T34 (GLES), Version 1.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12731).
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid/Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger/Schoen, Harald/Weßels, Bernhard/Wolf, Christof/Henckel, Simon/Bieber, Ina/Scherer, Philipp. 2017d. Longterm-Online-Tracking, T35 (GLES), Version 1.0.0 (doi:10.4232/1.12795).