

**Marginalization or Legitimation?  
Mainstream Party Positioning on Immigration and  
Support for Radical Right Parties**

Ian Down and Kyung Joon Han, *University of Tennessee, Knoxville*

**Online Appendix**

Table A1: List of radical right parties

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Country	Radical right party
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium	Front National
Belgium	Flemish Interest
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance
Denmark	Danish People's Party
France	National Front
Germany	The Republicans
Germany	National Democratic Party
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally
Italy	National Alliance
Italy	Northern League
The Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List
The Netherlands	Party of Freedom
Sweden	Sweden Democrats
The United Kingdom	Independence Party
The United Kingdom	British National Party

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## Heckman Selection Model

The results of the selection model (Table A2, overleaf) show that right leaning and less educated individuals are likely to indicate immigration-related issues are the most important problem. Regarding country/year-level variables, high unemployment rates discourage people from indicating immigration as the major problem because deteriorating economic conditions raise their concerns on economic issues more than other issues such as immigration. The negativity of public opinion on immigration and electoral success of radical right parties in the past election, the adoption of a restrictive immigration policy by a mainstream party, and position proximity between mainstream parties and a radical right party actually decrease the likelihood that people indicate immigration-related issues as the most important problem. These results may seem to conflict with expectations, but the grievance model of right violence suggests that the success of radical right parties or their policies (e.g., the adoption of a restrictive immigration policy by other political parties or by the government) may actually reduce their supporters' antagonism towards immigrants because they think their voice is being heard (e.g., Koopmans 1996).<sup>1</sup>

The results in the response model, in which voting radical right is the dependent variable, generates similar results to those in Table 1. First, there is a statistically significant interactive effect of position proximity (between mainstream parties and radical right in model 1 and between mainstream left and radical right in model 2) and issue competence. The calculation of conditional coefficients and standard errors shows that the proximity variable is statistically significant only amongst those people that *do not* recognize radical right issue competence. Second, the interaction terms of mainstream party position and issue competence (mainstream

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<sup>1</sup> We do not explicitly suggest here whether the decrease in the overall salience level of immigration (among all the voters) is induced mostly by the reduction of the salience level among radical right supporters or the same causal mechanism described above works both among radical right supporters and other voters.

parties' positions in model 3 and mainstream left position in model 4) are also statistically significant. Again calculation of conditional coefficients and standard errors show that the adoption of a more restrictive immigration position by mainstream parties (or by a mainstream left party) increases the likelihood an individual will vote for a radical right party, only among people who *do not* recognize the issue competence of the radical right.

Most importantly, in no model is the *rho* statistically significant. This indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, that selection into the second stage (i.e. whether people indicate immigration-related issues as the most important problem) is a random process. As such, the data do not call for the use of a Heckman selection model.

Table A2: Heckman selection model

Model	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	SM	RM	SM	RM	SM	RM	SM	RM
Dependent variable	MIP	Voting	MIP	Voting	MIP	Voting	MIP	Voting
<b>Independent variables</b>								
Issue competence		1.23** (0.62)		2.28** (1.01)		2.11 (1.72)		0.86 (1.84)
Position proximity (RR and MP)	-0.28** (0.12)	-0.71 (0.79)						
Issue competence x Position proximity (MP)		-0.32* (0.19)						
Position proximity (RR and MR)			-0.22*** (0.03)	0.14 (0.32)				
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR)				-0.04 (0.07)				
Position proximity (RR and ML)			-0.29*** (0.05)	0.56*** (0.14)				
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML)				-0.25** (0.12)				
Mainstream position					-0.55*** (0.15)	-0.61 (0.85)		
Issue competence x Mainstream position						-0.38* (0.21)		
Mainstream right position							-0.35*** (0.04)	0.13 (0.40)
Issue competence x Mainstream right position								-0.08 (0.09)
Mainstream left position							-0.27*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.15)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position								-0.24* (0.13)
Radical right position					-0.01 (0.07)	-0.36 (0.33)	0.05 (0.10)	0.02 (0.39)
Issue competence x Radical right position						-0.08 (0.17)		0.15 (0.21)
<b>Individual-level controls</b>								
Female	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.08)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Education	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.11*** (0.03)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.09*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.10*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.06)
Left/right ideology	0.07*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.05)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)
Social status	0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)
<b>Country/year-level controls</b>								
Unemployment rate	-0.15*** (0.03)	0.25** (0.10)	-0.15*** (0.04)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.20*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.09)	-0.33*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.10)
Migrants	-0.02 (0.02)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.11* (0.06)
Unemployment rate x Migrants	-0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Effective number of political parties	0.07** (0.03)	0.04 (0.07)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.10 (0.10)	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)
Radical right party vote share	-0.03*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)

Public opinion on immigration	-0.38*** (0.04)	0.51*** (0.13)	-0.43*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.09)	-0.49*** (0.05)	0.65*** (0.16)	-0.56*** (0.04)	0.63*** (0.10)
Constant	2.13*** (0.65)	-0.32 (2.22)	5.71*** (0.70)	1.05 (4.17)	3.69*** (0.87)	4.08 (7.53)	7.30*** (1.15)	-5.94 (8.88)
<b>Rho</b>		-0.96		-0.97		-0.96		-0.98
LR test of independent equations (rho=0)								
Prob>Chi-square		0.2920		0.2116		0.2775		0.1420
<b>-2 x Log likelihood</b>		4,904.5		4,838.1		4,888.6		4,794.7
<b>Number of observations</b>		13,626	631	13,626	631	13,626	631	13,626

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. SM: Selection model; RM: Response model. MIP denotes the most important problem. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, ML does mainstream left parties, and MP does mainstream parties.

## **Robustness checks**

First, we should also control for individuals' stances on immigration. However, because the EES 2004 does not have an immigration question, we simply perform a robustness check using only EES 2009, adding a variable of individual's position on immigration ("Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [Britain]") but excluding other country/year-level control variables due to the degrees of freedom problem. The results, reported in Table A3, indicate no significant difference with the main results.

Second, van Spanje and Weber (*forthcoming*) and van Spanje and de Graaf (2018) show that the political exclusion of radical right parties by mainstream parties has an electoral effect on radical right parties and implies that the effect of position proximity and issue competence may have different impacts between radical right parties that are politically excluded ('pariah') and those that are not. We cannot fully incorporate this in our analysis because adding a variable on political exclusion decreases the degree of freedom and prevents us from obtaining a result. Thus, we interacted our main independent variables with the political exclusion variable and removed all other country/year-level variables except for the, consistently significant, radical right vote share. The results, reported in Table A4, indicate that significant differences between excluded radical right parties and others are found only in some models. Though more robust analyses with more data observations will be needed in the future, either direction of the exclusion effect is reasonably expected: the position proximity effect might be larger among excluded parties because there is a greater scope for enhancing legitimacy and credibility, but it might also be smaller because they are so far beyond the bounds of acceptability.

Third, multilevel modeling is not the only useful model for the analysis of clustered data, and there are certain trade-offs between multilevel modeling and other alternative methods such as modeling with clustered standard errors (e.g., see Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007).

Accordingly, we also use a logistic model with clustered standard errors as a robustness check and report the results in Table A5.

Fourth, because people who had voted for a radical right party might have only subsequently formulated the perception of issue competence, we also perform a robustness check in which the dependent variable is the respondents' intention to vote for a radical right party in the future. The results are reported in Table A6 and are not significantly different.

Finally, we can also re-phrase our research question in the following way: how does the positioning of a mainstream party affect voters' support for a radical right party relative the mainstream party? To examine this question, two alternative variables of voting for radical right parties are constructed: one has a zero value that indicates voting for a mainstream right party and the other has a zero value that indicates voting for a mainstream left party. Then, models in Table A7 examine how the positioning of mainstream right parties affects voting for radical right parties relative to voting for mainstream right parties (models 1 and 3) and how the positioning of mainstream left parties determines voting for radical right parties relative to voting for mainstream left parties (models 2 and 4). The results, particularly those on mainstream left parties, are consistent with original ones.

Table A3: Controlling for individuals' position on immigration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
Issue competence	9.35*** (3.47)	10.58*** (3.39)	12.90 (14.28)	44.82** (18.24)
Position proximity (RR and MP)	5.03** (2.50)			
Issue competence x Position proximity (MP)	-3.32** (1.56)			
Position proximity (RR and MR)		-0.12 (0.24)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR)		-1.36** (0.60)		
Position proximity (RR and ML)		2.28*** (0.74)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML)		-2.10*** (0.77)		
Mainstream position			4.82* (2.57)	
Issue competence x Mainstream position			-3.31** (1.59)	
Mainstream right position				4.80*** (1.42)
Issue competence x Mainstream right position				-5.29*** (1.50)
Mainstream left position				2.42*** (0.73)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position				-1.91** (0.80)
Radical right position			-0.35 (1.18)	-1.03 (0.85)
Issue competence x Radical right position			-0.44 (1.56)	0.93 (1.47)
<b>Individual-level controls</b>				
Female	-0.18 (0.44)	-0.19 (0.41)	-0.18 (0.44)	-0.21 (0.42)
Age	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Education	0.11 (0.36)	0.12 (0.33)	0.14 (0.36)	0.21 (0.34)
Left/right ideology	0.27*** (0.10)	0.24** (0.10)	0.28*** (0.10)	0.28*** (0.10)
Social status	0.04 (0.24)	0.19 (0.22)	0.03 (0.24)	0.08 (0.23)
Immigration position	1.87*** (0.60)	1.84*** (0.54)	1.85*** (0.59)	2.20*** (0.61)
Constant	-25.55*** (6.86)	-8.86*** (3.12)	-29.31 (27.57)	-44.84*** (16.96)
Variance components	1.21*** (0.52)	0.00 (1.07)	1.32*** (0.54)	0.00 (0.34)
<b>-2 x Log likelihood</b>				
<b>Number of observations (individuals)</b>	334	334	334	334
<b>Number of country/years</b>	9	9	9	9

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, ML does mainstream left parties, and MP does mainstream parties.



Table A4: Political exclusion and voting for radical right parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Independent variables</i>						
Issue competence	9.47*** (2.12)	20.13 (15.28)	9.87*** (3.26)	8.54*** (1.86)	14.99* (8.36)	6.66*** (2.16)
Political exclusion	9.28* (4.89)	-11.29 (13.21)	5.50 (15.35)	2.57 (2.08)	-6.40 (7.66)	0.30 (4.39)
Issue competence x Political exclusion	-5.72** (2.88)	32.39* (17.29)	-0.06 (9.34)	-4.67* (2.66)	12.32 (9.74)	5.83 (7.37)
Position proximity (RR and MP)	5.43*** (1.59)					
Issue competence x Position proximity (MP)	-3.07*** (0.93)					
Position proximity (MP) x Political exclusion	-7.02** (3.12)					
Issue competence x Position proximity (MP) x Political exclusion	5.12** (2.27)					
Position proximity (RR and MR)		1.02 (1.13)				
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR)		-1.55 (1.57)				
Position proximity (MR) x Political exclusion		1.00 (1.26)				
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR) x Political exclusion		-2.83 (1.72)				
Position proximity (RR and ML)			2.02* (1.15)			
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML)			-1.32** (0.57)			
Position proximity (ML) x Political exclusion			-1.44 (3.42)			
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML) x Political exclusion			0.09 (2.15)			
Mainstream party position				2.13*** (0.70)		
Issue competence x Mainstream party position				-2.90*** (0.88)		
Mainstream party position x Political exclusion				-1.53 (1.17)		
Issue competence x Mainstream party position x Political exclusion				5.04** (2.32)		
Mainstream right position					1.04 (0.84)	
Issue competence x Mainstream right position					-1.55 (1.29)	
Mainstream right position x Political exclusion					0.79 (1.04)	
Issue competence x Mainstream right position x Political exclusion					-1.54 (1.44)	
Mainstream left position						0.40 (0.44)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position						-0.85** (0.42)
Mainstream left position x Political exclusion						-0.28 (1.01)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position x Political exclusion						-1.08 (1.81)

<b>Individual-level controls</b>						
Female	0.12 (0.32)	0.04 (0.32)	0.07 (0.32)	0.11 (0.32)	0.03 (0.31)	0.05 (0.32)
Age	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Education	-0.29 (0.25)	-0.22 (0.26)	-0.24 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.25)	-0.28 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.27)
Left/right ideology	0.38*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.08)
Social status	0.28 (0.18)	0.27 (0.18)	0.25 (0.18)	0.28 (0.18)	0.30 (0.18)	0.26 (0.18)
<b>Country/year-level controls</b>						
Radical right party vote share	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.09 (0.06)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.11** (0.05)
Constant	-20.26*** (4.08)	-16.95 (11.72)	-18.86*** (6.42)	-10.09*** (2.07)	-13.39** (6.15)	-7.39*** (2.38)
Variance components	0.00 (0.22)	0.57* (0.31)	0.66** (0.32)	0.00 (0.24)	0.50 (0.31)	0.60 (0.31)
<b>-2 x Log likelihood</b>	288.3	295.1	293.5	288.9	299.5	293.8
<b>Number of observations (individuals)</b>	631	631	631	634	634	634
<b>Number of country/years</b>	17	17	17	18	18	18

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, ML does mainstream left parties, and MP does mainstream parties.

Table A5: Logistic regression with clustered standard errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
Issue competence	6.49*** (1.72)	6.77* (3.83)	6.60*** (1.97)	12.52** (5.06)
Position proximity (RR and MP)	3.27** (1.53)			
Issue competence x Position proximity (MP)	-1.76** (0.83)			
Position proximity (RR and MR)		0.13 (0.57)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR)		-0.41 (0.46)		
Position proximity (RR and ML)		1.63*** (0.51)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML)		-1.26*** (0.35)		
Mainstream position			3.90** (1.74)	
Issue competence x Mainstream position			-2.07** (0.93)	
Mainstream right position				0.29 (0.75)
Issue competence x Mainstream right position				-0.63 (0.59)
Mainstream left position				1.74*** (0.47)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position				-1.40*** (0.47)
Radical right position			-1.19 (1.45)	1.01 (1.89)
Issue competence x Radical right position			0.08 (1.02)	1.38 (1.15)
<b>Individual-level controls</b>				
Female	0.05 (0.33)	0.03 (0.36)	0.04 (0.34)	0.04 (0.37)
Age	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Education	-0.19 (0.27)	-0.09 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.28)	-0.10 (0.29)
Left/right ideology	0.37*** (0.10)	0.36*** (0.09)	0.37*** (0.10)	0.37*** (0.09)
Social status	0.30 (0.17)	0.30 (0.16)	0.29 (0.17)	0.27 (0.17)
<b>Country/year-level controls</b>				
Unemployment rate	0.60* (0.32)	0.43 (0.33)	0.36 (0.31)	0.70* (0.37)
Migrants	0.31 (0.22)	0.22 (0.24)	0.27 (0.20)	0.26 (0.24)
Unemployment rate x Migrants	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Effective number of political parties	0.35 (0.29)	0.19* (0.10)	0.53 (0.34)	0.17 (0.11)
Radical right party vote share	0.11*** (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)

Public opinion on immigration	1.00*	0.42	1.09*	0.79**
	(0.59)	(0.35)	(0.61)	(0.37)
Constant	-25.12***	-9.88	-24.71***	-11.67
	(9.54)	(8.58)	(9.05)	(10.74)
<i>-2 x Log likelihood</i>	286.1	280.8	284.4	278.2
<i>Number of observations</i>	631	631	631	631

*Note:* Clustered standard errors (by country/years) in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, ML does mainstream left parties, and MP does mainstream parties.

Table A6: Vote intention in the future

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
Issue competence	8.97*** (2.12)	10.90*** (3.96)	6.83*** (1.76)	10.79** (4.64)
Position proximity (RR and MP)	3.92** (1.70)			
Issue competence x Position proximity (MP)	-2.73*** (1.01)			
Position proximity (RR and MR)		-0.01 (0.30)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR)		-0.86* (0.46)		
Position proximity (RR and ML)		1.83** (0.71)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML)		-0.95* (0.51)		
Mainstream position			4.49** (1.90)	
Issue competence x Mainstream position			-3.28*** (1.13)	
Mainstream right position				-0.04 (0.87)
Issue competence x Mainstream right position				-0.65 (0.56)
Mainstream left position				1.39** (0.70)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position				-1.18** (0.56)
Radical right position			0.26 (0.78)	3.42 (2.31)
Issue competence x Radical right position			1.96** (0.90)	2.39** (1.20)
<b>Individual-level controls</b>				
Female	-0.36 (0.32)	-0.38 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.32)	-0.36 (0.32)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	0.03 (0.25)	0.04 (0.24)	-0.00 (0.25)	0.01 (0.25)
Left/right ideology	0.33*** (0.07)	0.32*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)
Social status	-0.17 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.17)
<b>Country/year-level controls</b>				
Unemployment rate	-0.17 (0.40)	-0.10 (0.40)	-0.11 (0.43)	0.23 (0.46)
Migrants	0.22 (0.21)	0.30 (0.27)	0.22 (0.23)	0.18 (0.30)
Unemployment rate x Migrants	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Effective number of political parties	1.26** (0.52)	1.21** (0.50)	1.28** (0.53)	0.71 (0.53)
Radical right party vote share	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.09)
Public opinion on immigration	0.10 (0.64)	-0.77 (0.48)	0.12 (0.74)	-0.31 (0.53)

Constant	-20.92**	-6.01	-19.00*	-2.91
	(9.40)	(7.18)	(9.86)	(11.44)
Variance components	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.22)
<i>-2 x Log likelihood</i>	297.9	299.3	294.4	295.6
<i>Number of observations (individuals)</i>	569	569	569	569
<i>Number of country/years</i>	16	16	16	16

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, ML does mainstream left parties, and MP does mainstream parties.

Table A7: Alternative dependent variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Independent variables</b>				
Issue competence	5.29** (2.09)	3.59*** (0.67)	9.81** (4.01)	8.58*** (2.99)
Position proximity (RR and MR)	0.36 (0.35)			
Issue competence x Position proximity (MR)	-0.36 (0.39)			
Position proximity (RR and ML)		1.50** (0.75)		
Issue competence x Position proximity (ML)		-2.09*** (0.71)		
Mainstream right position			0.67 (0.45)	
Issue competence x Mainstream right position			-0.73 (0.50)	
Mainstream left position				1.78** (0.81)
Issue competence x Mainstream left position				-2.03*** (0.73)
Radical right position			-1.03 (1.39)	2.11 (2.84)
Issue competence x Radical right position			-0.68 (0.87)	2.69 (1.76)
<b>Individual-level controls</b>				
Female	0.02 (0.38)	0.85 (0.55)	0.02 (0.38)	0.93* (0.56)
Age	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)
Education	-0.37 (0.31)	-0.18 (0.42)	-0.35 (0.32)	-0.18 (0.43)
Left/right ideology	0.18* (0.10)	0.78*** (0.14)	0.21** (0.10)	0.78*** (0.15)
Social status	0.32 (0.23)	0.46 (0.28)	0.29 (0.23)	0.48 (0.29)
<b>Country/year-level controls</b>				
Unemployment rate	0.26 (0.32)	-0.16 (0.60)	0.21 (0.43)	-0.41 (0.64)
Migrants	0.21 (0.24)	-0.54 (0.39)	0.20 (0.25)	-0.60 (0.40)
Unemployment rate x Migrants	0.01 (0.03)	0.12** (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	0.15** (0.06)
Effective number of political parties	0.11 (0.15)	-0.32* (0.18)	0.16 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.23)
Radical right party vote share	0.09* (0.05)	0.34*** (0.10)	0.11** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.10)
Public opinion on immigration	-0.05 (0.33)	0.27 (0.57)	0.08 (0.39)	0.25 (0.57)
Constant	-9.89** (4.27)	-9.23 (6.63)	-14.61** (6.64)	-12.13 (8.43)
Variance components	0.00 (0.23)	0.00 (0.31)	0.00 (0.24)	0.00 (0.29)
<b>-2 x Log likelihood</b>	211.8	121.8	209.5	120.7
<b>Number of observations (individuals)</b>	345	253	345	253
<b>Number of country/years</b>	16	16	16	16

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, and ML does mainstream left parties.

Table A8: Party position and perception of issue competence

	(1)	(2)
<b><i>Independent variables</i></b>		
Position proximity (RR and MR)	0.64 (0.59)	
Position proximity (RR and ML)	-0.27 (1.00)	
Mainstream right position		0.85 (0.80)
Mainstream left position		-0.28 (1.02)
Radical right position		0.18 (1.89)
<b><i>Individual-level controls</i></b>		
Female	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.24)
Age	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Education	-0.22 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.19)
Left/right ideology	0.35*** (0.05)	0.35*** (0.05)
Social status	-0.35** (0.14)	-0.35** (0.14)
<b><i>Country/year-level controls</i></b>		
Unemployment rate	2.19** (0.93)	2.48** (1.18)
Migrants	1.35** (0.65)	1.49** (0.75)
Unemployment rate x Migrants	-0.20** (0.10)	-0.23* (0.12)
Effective number of political parties	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Radical right party vote share	0.11 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)
Public opinion on immigration	2.08** (1.00)	2.32* (1.20)
Constant	-33.60** (15.33)	-39.48 (26.98)
Variance components	1.71*** (0.48)	1.69*** (0.48)
<b><i>-2 x Log likelihood</i></b>		
	471.6	471.5
<b><i>Number of observations (individuals)</i></b>	764	764
<b><i>Number of country/years</i></b>	17	17

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. RR indicates radical right parties, MR does mainstream right parties, and ML does mainstream left parties. The dependent variable is a binary variable that shows whether a survey respondent indicated a radical right party as the best party to deal with immigration-related issues.



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