Layout Investigation of GUI Navigational Interactions
of Android Applications

by

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THESIS

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JAL
CONTRIBUTION OF AUTHORS

The content in the sections: 1.1 Overview of App GUI Framework and 1.2 Overview of GAP State Machine of Chapter 1 has been referenced from Dr. Mark Grechanik’s previously published work [1–8]. The section 1.1 Overview of App GUI Framework provides the basic framework of an application’s interface and provides a base for my thesis work. The section 1.2 Overview of GAP State Machine describes the representation of an application as a finite state machine and helps me to elaborate on what my thesis aims to achieve. Dr. Mark Grechanik has authorized me to reference and include the materials from his published work for my thesis.

The content in Chapter 2 that includes the sections: 2.1 Attack by exploiting Assistive Technologies and 2.2 SEAPHISH: Defense by deception has been referenced from Dr. Grechanik’s previous unpublished NSF proposal. Dr. Grechanik has authorized me to use all the materials from his NSF proposal for my thesis. The Chapter 2 on Motivation introduces Accessibility Services and how it is required by users with disabilities. The section 2.1 Attack by exploiting Assistive Technologies describes the attacker model and the section 2.2 SEAPHISH: Defense by deception describes a platform aimed towards protecting against such an attack.
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<tr>
<td>ACTEve</td>
<td>Automated Concolic Testing of Event-driven programs</td>
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<td>Android Package Kit</td>
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<td>App</td>
<td>Application</td>
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<td>AS</td>
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<td>A³E</td>
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<td>DbD</td>
<td>Defense by Deception</td>
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<td>Graphical User Interface-based APplication</td>
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<td>GATOR</td>
<td>proGram Analysis Toolkit fOr andRoid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUI</td>
<td>Graphical User Interface</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUID</td>
<td>Globally Unique Identifier</td>
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<td>MA²P</td>
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SUMMARY

Nowadays, Graphical User Interface (GUI)-based Applications (GAPs) are universal for personal and business needs. Hence, making GAPs accessible to users with disabilities is extremely important. Unfortunately, about 50 million people have disabilities in the United States itself and over 600 million worldwide [11–14]. Thus, users with disabilities should be protected from possible malware attacks.

SEAPHISH (SEcuring Accessibility using PHISHing) is a platform designed towards protecting against an attack by providing defense by deception. A simulation for SEAPHISH can help govern the circumstances when an attack against a specific application can be done with a high degree of probability. But performing effective simulations requires a fundamental understanding of the properties of GUI layouts of applications (apps) at large.

This work focuses on providing a framework that analyzes GUI layouts and their transitions using a large base of approximately three million Android apps. We discuss various state-of-the-art tools that use different strategies in traversing GUI layouts. Although each tool has its own unique features, we build our solution using the tools that best help in building a GUI model of an application and we run it on a small base of 200+ Android apps.

We hope the investigation done in this thesis enhances SEAPHISH with statistically significant real-world constraints thereby providing defense against malware and reducing the security vulnerabilities faced by users with disabilities.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The content in sections 1.1 Overview of App GUI Framework and 1.2 Overview of GAP State Machine has been referenced from Dr. Mark Grechanik’s previous published work: ”Grechanik, M., Mao, C. W., Baisal, A., Rosenblum, D., and Hossain, B. M. M.: Differencing graphical user interfaces. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security (QRS), pages 203–214, July 2018” [1] [8].

A mobile application (app) is a software program or a computer application written to operate on a mobile device. The mobile app market is the fastest growing sector in the mobile industry [15]. Mobile apps use multi-touch screens, have access to the location of the device and these apps differ from desktop apps which operate on computers and web applications that operate on web browsers instead of directly operating on a mobile device [16].

There are different operating systems and platforms like Android (Google), iOS (Apple), Windows (Microsoft), Blackberry (Research in Motion) that allow mobile devices to run apps and other software programs. Android and iOS are two of the major mobile operating systems that consume a collective 98.7% of the market share in the USA [17]. However, Android has a somewhat larger customer base which is mainly due to its compatibility with different manufacturers like HTC, Motorola, LG, Samsung etc whereas iOS only operates on Apple products. As reported in August 2019 [18], the Android operating system holds a 76.23% market share worldwide.
The mobile apps can be downloaded from an app store or app marketplace. Each of the mobile operating systems (like Android, iOS, Windows etc) has its own store for distributing and making apps available for downloads. For example, Google Play Store is the official app store for Android where users can search and download apps that are developed with the Android software development kit (SDK) and published through Google [19][21].

In this chapter, we look into basics of the GUI framework in section 1.1 Overview of App GUI Framework. We next look at how an app can be represented as a state machine in section 1.2 Overview of GAP State Machine. We then look into basics of Android GUI components in section 1.3 Overview of Android GUI components. We conclude this chapter by providing a high-level description of the problem that this thesis aims to solve along with our contributions.

1.1 Overview of App GUI Framework

A GUI framework consists of an extensible and reusable set of GUI objects with well-defined interfaces that can be specialized to produce and run custom applications [22]. Figure 1 shows a basic model of GUI frameworks [1].

![Figure 1: A model of GUI Frameworks from 1]
As shown in Figure 1, a GUI framework typically consists of four main components: GUI representation layer, GUI object library, GUI interface, and the accessibility layer with its generic interfaces. The GUI representation layer defines how the GUI objects are programmatically represented as data structures in computer memory. As an example, HTML web pages are represented using a document object model in web browsers while Windows defines proprietary data structures for GUIs and the events that they send and receive. The visualization/graphics engine interprets these data structures and visualizes them using some predefined settings for styles and layouts.

To allow users to interact with GUI objects, the underlying operating system or virtual machine provides queues for receiving user inputs from peripheral devices (e.g., mouse, keyboard or a touch screen) and translates these inputs into event data structures that are passed to the corresponding GUI objects using its interfaces. GUI object libraries contain implementations of GUI objects and expose their interfaces; these libraries are extensible and many third-party vendors offer implementations of sophisticated GUI objects for different GUI frameworks. In general, GUI frameworks, which are developed by different vendors, expose diverse interfaces.

1.2 Overview of GAP State Machine

Figure 2 presents a representation of a GAP as a state machine. In this figure, nodes are the tree representations of its GUIs and transitions are labeled with actions on certain GUI objects that trigger corresponding method calls within the GAP. Thus, the GAP starts with the main window consisting of a tree representation of the GUI objects and when an action is taken against a GUI object like Select, the state of the GAP changes leading to the next
node, which is another tree representation and so on. In event-based systems like Windows or Android, each GAP has a main window, which is associated with the event processing loop. Closing this window causes an app to exit by sending the corresponding event to the loop. The main window contains other GUI objects of the GAP. A GAP can be represented as a tree, where nodes are GUI objects and edges specify that children objects are contained inside their parents. The root of the tree is the main window, the nodes are container objects, and the leaves of the tree are basic objects \[2, 8, 25\].

Each GUI object is assigned a category (class) that describes its functionality. For example, in Windows, the basic class of all GUI objects is the class Windows. Some GUI objects serve
as containers for other objects, for example, dialog windows, while basic objects (e.g., buttons and edit boxes) cannot contain other objects and are designed to perform some basic functions. Thus, different GUI trees include their topologies and labels of their nodes [1].

1.3 Overview of Android GUI components

An Android app that consists of different user interface components is built using the basic objects: View and ViewGroup [9,26]. View is the base class for widgets, which are used to build interactive user interface elements like buttons, textboxes etc [27]. A ViewGroup can contain other views that can be referred to as children. Thus, the ViewGroup acts as the base class for other view containers and layouts [28]. It can be referred to as an object that holds other View or ViewGroup objects in order to express the layout of a user interface.

A set of subclasses of both View and ViewGroup class are defined in the Android framework that provides various input controls and different layout models like relative or linear layout. Figure 3 depicts a simple hierarchy of the View and ViewGroup objects.

There are two ways to declare the layout for an app, either by instantiating View objects in code and a tree can be built or by defining the layout in an XML file. For a view, the name of an XML element is the Android class it represents. So an XML element <TextView> generates a TextView widget in the user interface, and the XML element <LinearLayout> generates a LinearLayout ViewGroup. Figure 4 shows a simple vertical linear layout with a TextView and a button. On loading the resource layout in the app, each node of the layout is initialized by Android into a runtime object that can be used to query the state of the object or to define additional behaviors or to modify the layout [9].
Figure 3: A view hierarchy, which defines a UI layout from

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<LinearLayout xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
    android:layout_width="fill_parent"
    android:layout_height="fill_parent"
    android:orientation="vertical">
    <TextView android:id="@+id/textExample"
        android:layout_width="wrap_content"
        android:layout_height="wrap_content"
        android:text="Example of a TextView"/>
    <Button android:id="@+id/buttonExample"
        android:layout_width="wrap_content"
        android:layout_height="wrap_content"
        android:text="Example of a Button"/>
</LinearLayout>
```

Figure 4: Declaring XML layout for a textview and button
The fundamental building blocks of an Android app are the app components [29], each of which could be an entry point through which one could enter the app. There are four basic types of app components:

1. **Activity:**

   An Activity denotes a single screen with a user interface and it is the entry point through which a user can start interacting with the app. For example, the Messages app consists of multiple activities like one activity that displays list of messages, another activity that can compose a new message and another to edit a message. Each activity may be independent of the others but they function together to provide a cohesive user experience.

2. **Service:**

   A service is an entry point component that runs in the background without providing a user interface. It can perform long running processes or tasks for remote operations. An example of a service is the one in radio that allows a user to listen to music in the background although the screen maybe locked or another app may have been opened. An activity can initiate a service and let it run or bind to it so that it can interact with it [29].

3. **Broadcast Receivers:**

   Broadcast receivers are components that listen and react to events. These components use intent filters to select events of interest. An intent [30] is a messaging object used to request an action from another app component. An intent filter specifies the type of intents that can be accepted based on certain attributes of an intent like its action, data and category. Thus, an app can register for which broadcast events it would like to be
notified of. For example, an app may register to be notified of a broadcast event like the
screen has turned off or the battery is low.

4. **Content Providers:**

A content provider is a component that manages a shared collection of application data
that may exist in a file system, or in a SQLite database, or on any other persistent
storage location that the app can access. Thus, other apps that have appropriate access
permissions to the content provider can access, query or even modify the data. For
example, a content provider can manage the user’s contact information.

In our thesis of exploring GUI layouts, out of the four basic app components, we mainly
focus on Activities as only Activities consist of GUI screens and objects. The other three
components do not provide any user interface.

**Android Package Kit (APK)** is the package file format for the distribution and instal-
l-lation of Android apps. An APK file is built by first compiling a program for Android followed
by packaging all of its parts into one container file \[31\]. This APK file consists of program
code (that includes .dex files i.e. the Dalvik Executable files generated on compiling Android
programs), resources, assets, certificates and the manifest file. Resources consist of static con-
tent files that the code uses such as GUI layout declarations, user interface strings and other
instructions. Assets help with including raw data files like text, xml, fonts etc. for the app.
The certificates are required by Android for digitally signing the apk before the apk file is in-
stalled on a device or updated. The manifest file i.e. AndroidManifest.xml \[29\] file is where all
the required components, features and permissions for running an Android app are declared.
Similar to other file formats, APK files can have any name, provided that the file name ends with the extension ".apk".

**Apktool** is a tool for reverse engineering third party, binary, closed Android apps [32]. Using the decode option on Apktool, we can run the command "\texttt{apktool d sampleApk.apk}" where \texttt{d} represents decode option and \texttt{sampleApk.apk} represents any Android apk file. Running this command helps in extracting all the resource files for the app [33].

Thus, having looked into the basics of the Android framework, we provide here a high-level description of the problem and work done in this thesis. Accessing an app on a smartphone involves events like click, touch, scrolling etc. Accessibility technologies aid users with disabilities in accessing an app on a smartphone. However, such technologies are not fully secure. Chapter 2 describes a possible attack when Accessibility services are turned on. We use an idea stated by Dr. Grechanik in his awarded NSF proposal that Defense by Deception can be used to defend against malicious applications that users installed on their smartphones and gave sufficient permissions to access and manipulate smartphone services the same way that the users can. The defense works even if the user allowed the accessibility service permissions to the installed application. However, to further enhance this defense mechanism, we need to obtain properties of GUI layouts and their transitions from a large collection of Android apps.

In this thesis, we explore various state-of-the-art tools that use different strategies in traversing GUI layouts. We created a hybrid framework where the tool Backstage performs static analysis of the layouts to help build a GUI model of the app and for cases where Backstage is not successful, we propose to use AndroidRipper which performs dynamic analysis to gen-
erate the GUI models. Using these models, we investigate the layouts of Android apps by collecting statistics on various GUI elements and screens. This investigation enhances the defense mechanism with statistically significant real-world constraints thereby providing defense against malwares and reducing the security vulnerabilities faced by users with disabilities.
CHAPTER 2

MOTIVATION

The content throughout this chapter including the sections 2.1 *Attack by exploiting Assistive Technology* and 2.2 *SEAPHISH - Defense by deception* has been referenced from Dr. Mark Grechanik’s previous unpublished NSF proposal.

The Android framework provides the Accessibility Service (AS) feature that is extended from Android’s Service component [34]. This service enhances user interfaces in order to assist users with disabilities (UWD), or others who may for some reason find it difficult to fully interact with a device. In these cases, users may need additional or alternative feedback such as text-to-speech or haptic feedback i.e. the use of touch to communicate with users [35].

Since there are hundreds of disabilities that impair people in vision, movement, thinking, remembering, learning, communicating, and hearing, UWDs need assistance in using GAPs by enhancing their GUIs, [1,4,36,37] and Mobile-Assistive APplications (MA²Ps) are designed to provide these enhancement services. There are several hundred MA²Ps on the Google Play store that request permissions for Accessibility Service [38,39], and two such MA²Ps were downloaded by at least ten million people together and they have a rating of 4.3 out of 5 stars [40,41]. Although there are hundreds of GUI accessibility approaches [42–51], there is almost no research to provide security guarantees to UWDs [38,52].

It has been said by many distinguished people including Mahatma Gandhi, Hubert H. Humphrey, and Cardinal Roger Mahony, that the measure of a civilization is how it treats its
weakest members. It is a formidable challenge to achieve a measure in which no UWD feels different from other users when working with GAPs to accomplish everyday tasks \cite{53,59}. Since designing accessible GAPs for users with various types of disabilities is very challenging \cite{60,65} and legally required \cite{66,67}, a large MA\textsuperscript{2}P marketplace exists where there is no control over the quality of these applications. Of course, money-stealing applications have long existed \cite{68,69}, however, malware in MA\textsuperscript{2}Ps is particularly reprehensible as it uses weaknesses of assistive technologies to take advantage of UWDs to steal their financial and other private information.

The following Section 2.1 describes a possible attack against UWDs and Section 2.2 describes SEAPHISH (SEcuring Accessibility using PHISHing), a platform aimed towards protecting against such an attack by providing defense by deception.

### 2.1 Attack by exploiting Assistive Technology

Accessibility technologies are mandated by the law \cite{67} and a common accessibility architecture is designed for different platforms \cite{70,71} that can be used to form attacks on UWDs as it is shown in Figure 5. The workflow starts in the upper right corner where the developer of a MA\textsuperscript{2}P releases it to the app store, and it is eventually downloaded by a UWD to her/his smartphone. The MA\textsuperscript{2}P developer owns or controls a MA\textsuperscript{2}P server to which the MA\textsuperscript{2}P connects and transmits the data, e.g., to offload computationally expensive analyses from smartphones. However, sending the UWD’s data to the MA\textsuperscript{2}P server may lead to security violations. For example, a malicious MA\textsuperscript{2}P that reads a financial statement to a UWD may send this data out to an external server.
Accessibility technologies largely bypass permission-based models. A general problem with permission-based security models is that the users do not follow the least privilege principle when granting permissions, and even in the absence of disabilities users cannot make informed decisions about which permissions are really needed. UWDs routinely approve the accessibility permission requested by the MA²P, and it is given access to the accessibility Application Programming Interface (API). In general, operating systems do not properly enforce permissions [72–85]. As a result, GAPs obtain permissions that are unnecessary, and an investigation of 940 applications showed that one-third are over-privileged [73, 80, 86–89]. Moreover, studies showed that users often are not prepared to make informed privacy and security decisions to select from over 130 different permissions [87, 90–95], especially considering high complexity of GUIs [96]. A key component of the accessibility API calls is to simulate a user of the smartphone, so that programmers can mimic user interactions with GAP by accessing and controlling GUI objects programmatically from MA²Ps. This fundamental strength of assistive technologies
is also their fundamental security weakness, since it is very difficult to create general permissions that will not affect the usability of MA\textsuperscript{2}Ps when considering hundreds of different impairments of UWDs \[38\].

Moreover, developers find ways to bypass permission checks altogether \[97–100\]. Interestingly, many GAPs expose private data through GUI objects \[101, 102\]. An example of this is an edit box for a financial app that displays the user’s account balance. Studies with blind smartphone users show they are unaware of or not concerned about security threats \[103, 104\].

Using the workflow that is shown in Figure 5 we show how MA\textsuperscript{2}Ps can attack UWDs by stealing sensitive information, which could cause serious harm to the individual, organization or company owning it if this information is compromised through alteration, corruption, loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure \[105, 106\]. Recent investigation of the accessibility technologies uncovered a wide array of security exploits \[38\], however, here we focus on exploits that steal sensitive information from UWDs.

1. A MA\textsuperscript{2}P obtains the data from the GUI objects of some GAP, enhances this data for UWDs, and transmits it to the MA\textsuperscript{2}P server, thus releasing sensitive information in this data into the wild. Interestingly, the MA\textsuperscript{2}P may not be malicious, it may use the power of server offloading for additional processing of the data. In general, distinguishing clearly between malicious and unwanted behaviours is a very difficult problem \[107–110\]. Of course, the MA\textsuperscript{2}P that requests accessibility permissions may not even use the accessibility to provide assistive services, and it can masquerade as an assistive application to steal sensitive information.
2. MA$^2$P developers use the accessibility API calls to inject threads and register callback functions for different events produced by GUI objects of some GAP. For example, MA$^2$P called InputObserver utilizes these hooks to measure UWD’s usage statistics [111]. In general, such MA$^2$Ps may be viewed as a case of plagiarizing other smartphone apps [112] or a library modification threat [113]. Thus, an attacking MA$^2$P can avoid protection mechanisms that analyze it to determine if it tries to send sensitive data outside the smartphone [86]. Hacker tools like this have been used to attack desktop GAPs for a few years [114].

3. A MA$^2$P can compose others GAPs with access to smartphone on-board sensors to attack UWDs [115,116]. It is an instance of the documented attack where sensory malware can convey raw sensor data (e.g., video and audio) to a remote server [117]. For example, consider a MA$^2$P that reads a financial statement to a UWD and it spawns a third party background application on the same smartphone that uses API calls to access the microphone and the phone hardware to capture the voice that is read by the MA$^2$P and to send it to an external server or even an answering machine. We easily realized this attack using Capture, a display-centric text recorder with real-time access to foreground and background process windows that integrates with the accessibility layer [118]. Of course, attacking sensors on smartphone is not new – PlaceRaider builds rich, three dimensional models of indoor environments for remote burglars [119], but combining different GAPs under the guise of assistive technologies is a new type of attack. Currently, there is no unified approach to protect UWDs from these attacks using the accessibility
API calls while preserving usability, which is extremely important for UWDs [120]. A recent exploratory user study with visually impaired participants revealed serious security concerns that are still not solved [121], and it is not clear how many UWDs are victims of these attacks.

2.2 SEAPHISH - Defense by deception

The idea of using deception is not new to protect computer hardware and software against attack – its main idea is to make the attacker do a lot more work to carry out a successful attack. A well-known use of defense by deception (DbD) strategy is in honeypots [122], which are simulated computer environments where attackers are presented with realistic configurations of the computer systems into which they gained illegal access. To determine if they interact with a real computing environment the attacker must spend time and resources to investigate it, and while doing so it enables the defense mechanisms to detect the attacker and to take countermeasures. Similarly, other deception techniques, strategies, and algorithms are used to increase the probability that the attacker constructs beliefs that lead the attacker to take certain actions, which may require the attacker to invest time and resources. Of course, the beliefs that are instilled by the deception strategy lead the attacker to gamble on an easy large payoff with minimum invested effort. DbD strategy is widely used in military operations where sophisticated deception strategies are used, often with an extensive network of human participants to make military intelligence make wrong conclusions about the battlefield. Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to construct algorithmic DbD strategies to construct and deploy secure computer
systems, since deceptions are based on specific scenarios and making general DbD strategies work in concrete cases is very difficult.

This difficulty is partially explained by the element of surprise when deploying deception as a protective weapon. If the attacker knows about the deception, then, depending on the payoff the attacker may find a hole in the DbD strategy and use it to bypass the defense. Regarding honeypots, there are multiple ways for the attacker to determine if the computing environment is real \cite{123}. Of course, as attackers grow more sophisticated so do the defenders and the cat-and-mouse game evolves into finding and exploiting specific holes in the given DbD system before they are patched. A central element of this game is that vulnerabilities and patches in the DbD systems are specific to the system and cannot be applied to other DbD systems without significant modifications if at all.

More importantly, all existing DbD strategies and algorithms protect actual systems from attackers penetrating them – once the attacker managed to subvert the defenses, it is game over and the expensive shutdown and cleanup with damage assessment are in order. These DbD strategies are based on the model where the attacker’s goal is to obtain administrative or even read access to the protected system. However, this model is not a good fit for the reality where smartphone users download applications (i.e., mobile apps or simply apps) based on how they may address the needs of the users. Not only many smartphone users do not give serious thoughts about permissions requested by the downloaded app, but also they often gamble with making decisions about downloading and using apps that come from unverified sources. And once these apps are installed on the smartphone with approved permissions, they can perform
all actions that can be done by the authorized users of this smartphone. Hence, the existing DbD strategies cannot be applied to this situation.

The other nascent trend is that malicious apps can collaborate over the Internet to distribute computational work in analyzing the environments where DbD is applied. Just like cloud computing is used to parallelize computations by splitting them among millions of computer servers that run instances of the same application (i.e., the map/reduce model), malicious applications can use their installed instances to determine if the DbD strategy is applied. In the case of honeypots, the attacker may run an exploration canary application in many environments and each instance of this canary application will explore a part of the environment sharing the obtained information with other instances to decide if the environments share the same characteristics and thus may be honeypots. Hence, with minimal amount of work the attacker can use the Internet-level parallelism to subvert DbD by obtaining combined information that changes the belief of the attacker about the environment where the attacker plans to commit abuse.

**Accessibility Technologies:** Since we cannot access and manipulate GUI objects as pure programming objects (they only support user-level interactions), we use accessibility technologies as a universal mechanism that provides programming access to GUI objects [2,4,8,24,124–126].

Accessibility technologies provide different aids to disabled computer users [127]. Specific aids include screen readers for the visually impaired, visual indicators or captions for users with hearing loss, and software to compensate for motion disabilities. Most computing plat-
forms include accessibility technologies since electronic and information technology products and services are required to meet the *Electronic and Information Accessibility Standards* \[127\].

For example, *Microsoft Active Accessibility (MSAA)* technology is designed to improve the way accessibility aids work with applications running on Windows \[128\], and *Sun Microsystems Accessibility* technology assists disabled users who run software on top of *Java Virtual Machine (JVM)*. Accessibility technologies are incorporated into these and other computing platforms as well as libraries and applications in order to expose information about user interface objects.

Accessibility technologies provide a wealth of sophisticated services required to retrieve attributes of GUI objects, set and retrieve their values, and generate and intercept different events. Although MSAA is used for Windows, using a different accessibility technology will yield similar results. Even though there is no standard for accessibility *Application Programming Interface (API)* calls, different technologies offer similar API calls, suggesting a slow convergence towards a common programming standard for accessibility technologies.

The main idea of most implementations of accessibility technologies is that GUI objects expose a well-known interface that exports methods for accessing and manipulating the properties and the behavior of these objects \[5, 8, 24, 124, 126, 129, 130\]. For example, a Windows GUI object should implement the *IAccessible* interface in order to be accessed and controlled using the MSAA API calls. Programmers may write code to access and control GUI objects of GAPs as if these objects were standard programming objects.

Using accessibility technologies, programmers can also register callback functions for different events produced by GUI objects thereby obtaining timely information about states of the
GUI objects of the GAPs. For example, if a GUI object receives an incorrect input and the
GAP shows an error message dialog informing the user about the mistake, then a previously
registered callback can intercept this event signaling that the message dialog is being created,
dismiss it, and send an “illegal input” message to the Designer that controls the GAP [2–4].

The idea as stated by Prof. Grechanik in his awarded NSF proposal in the working of a
DbD strategy i.e. SEAPHISH platform is threefold: (1) A technique called defacing is employed
where phishing is used to generate a fake app that resembles the original app that needs to
be defended; (2) the original app is slightly modified to create additional uncertainty for the
attacker, and (3) the installed app is monitored to determine if it provides useful services that
are the reason for this app to be installed and how it uses resources.

Our assumptions are the following. First, the user downloads and installs an app that
provides some useful services and it is the reason for using this app. For example, the user may
be legally blind and s/he selects an assistive application that interprets and reads information
from some other banking app to the user. If the downloaded app does not provide the service
once it is installed, then it is removed and reported to the app store. Second, installed apps
can freely use their resources to provide services like many security approaches that create
sandbox environments around the installed apps. Consider our example with the assistive
app that may send financial data from the smartphone to some external server to process
this data and send back a WAV file to play to the user the transcribed financial data. This
essentially means that you cannot prevent an app from using any external services that it may
need as part of its functionality of providing assistance to the user. Thus, you cannot simply
prevent an attack based on seeing that an app is performing some sensitive operation like reading/writing data from external entities. Third assumption is that the goal of the malicious app is to access external financial or safekeeping institutions to steal information or financial resources. That is, cases are not covered where a malicious application captures sensitive and personal data, like naked pictures and posts them on the Internet or collects some sensor information about the user’s surroundings, e.g., recording and transmitting user’s conversation.

Next, defensive mechanisms “know” about the installed app and monitor its usage of resources. Finally, the installed app cannot analyze other applications and their environments including security certificates. The modified OS services would be used to enforce the latter assumption.

Consider how SEAPHISH works using the diagram that is shown in Figure 6. The malicious app, M, is installed on multiple smartphones where for brevity we show only two, N and K.
separated by the vertical dashed lines. The app is installed by the DbD SEAPHISH platform, D, whose goal is to evaluate the installed app and disable it if the app behaves suspiciously. A part of suspicious behavior is to overuse resources without providing services which are the reason for installing this app in the first place. Here, overusing resources could mean that the malicious app is utilizing memory and processing power for the purpose of performing an attack rather than providing any useful service. Of course, an attempt to log into the the financial institution, F with certain credentials known only to D and F is a sign of the malicious intent. If it happens, then the app M and all of its instances are disabled by D and reported to the app store.

The arrow between D and F depicts the collaboration between the DbD platform and the financial institution, F. It starts by F issuing a certain login and password that may look reasonable to an algorithm that attempts to analyze if it is machine or human-generated. For that, a collected database of passwords is used and the generated login/password pair does not match to any of the pairs that belong to F’s users, and at the same time, this generated pair is statistically within the various ranges of login/password pairs from the database of passwords (e.g., the length of the password and the diagrams and trigrams are within the acceptable ranges). Besides D and F no entity knows about this generated login/password pair; any attempt to use it to log into a user’s account with this pair will result in a lockdown of the account and disabling all of the instances of M installed on all smartphones.

Moreover, M does not have to connect to F directly to perform malicious operations – it can operate through multiple connected various proxies or external entities, E. Consider a situation
where the stolen login and password are converted into text and M dials an external number and uses a voice narrator to leave a message on an answering machine that contains the login and the password. Then a different E will retrieve this message, convert it into text and will send this text as an SMS to a phone of an attacker who will actually attempt to log into the F’s website. In SEAPHISH, no matter where the information comes from the end goal is the attack on the website.

The input to D is the list of all apps installed on the smartphone that must be protected, e.g., banking or general financial apps, house security control apps, or health record apps. The first step that D performs is to create a set of phishing apps for each of the protected app, T. That is, it uses the accessibility layer to mimic how users interact with the app, T, by performing various actions on its GUI object to collect the layouts of screens, data, and to construct the state machine graph where the nodes are the screens with GUI objects and their values and the edges designate transitions between these screens. The captured state machine is used to generate a phishing app, P, which is a key of the proposed DbD strategy. Of course, the resulting phishing app has the limitation of how deep D explores the real app, since creating a fake replica of the real app is an undecidable problem. This is a part of this DbD game where M is using its analysis to determine whether an app it interacts with is T or P. If M makes the type 1 error by mistaking T for P i.e. a false negative, then it will keep wasting its analysis resources until D exhausts work credit it gives to M and marks it as malicious. Conversely, if M makes the type 2 error by mistaking P for T i.e. a false positive, then it will capture the
fake login that D uses to log into F and attempts to use it whereby it will be detected by F and neutralized.

To confuse the malicious app that T is the actual victim app and not one of the Ps, the platform D modifies T by injecting new GUI objects into its GUI layouts and by changing the geometry and various properties of the existing GUIs. These modifications do not change the functionality of the app T, however, they increase the complexity of the analysis that M must perform. Since creating P by simply cloning T does not affect M that can perform an attack on the clone on T, generating P in conjunction with modifying T requires the cooperation of the underlying OS to ensure that its security mechanisms do not reject the generated Ps and the modified T. At the same time, the OS must have information about the protected apps, T and the new app, M, so that it can detect and prevent M from accessing the code and certificates for T and Ps. This is done by modifying the OS and ensuring that no permission given by the user can enable M to access these specific services unless of the following two events happen: the user goes into the OS with binary rewriting tools in the developers mode to enable M to access these services or M passes the trial period and it is given the permission to access these services as a trusted app. As a result, the only way for M to determine which app is T and which ones are P is to keep providing useful services for the smartphone user while exploring the GUI state machine to determine discrepancies with the version of T that the attackers who created M explored.

Thus, for the SEAPHISH platform to modify an app’s GUI layouts in order to deceive the malicious app, the platform should simulate conditions as seen in the real world apps. The
platform should know the ideal number of screens or activities seen in an app that should be simulated. Thus, for an app consisting of structured GUI objects, when entering data into a simulator for SEAPHISH, how would the platform know whether an app can have 10, 50 or 500 screens? For a screen, again what should be the number of GUI objects that could be present? Such questions can be answered with a statistical record maintained for GUI objects and their properties seen in Android apps. Without such statistical information, developing an effective simulation for SEAPHISH can be a very difficult problem.
CHAPTER 3

OUR CONTRIBUTION

As the best way to enhance SEAPHISH simulation is to obtain statistics on the properties of GUI layouts of apps at large, we investigate possible solutions in generating the GUI model of an app. Specifically, our contributions are as below:

1. We investigate various state-of-the-art tools that use different strategies in automatically traversing through the different states of an app. We use the available documentation for each of the shortlisted open source tools and test it on a couple of sample apk files to check the following:
   
   • Does the tool work successfully in generating an output?
   
   • Does the generated output help in obtaining a model of the app’s state machine? If not, what enhancements need to be done to the existing tool?

2. Once we have the tool that can generate the required models, we test it on a small collection of 200+ apk files.

3. We next design a framework that can automatically obtain the GUI details of a large collection of 3 million Android apps.

4. We statistically analyze the resulting models and obtain details on various GUI objects and screens.
3.1 Challenges

The main challenge in this work is exploring the existing tools and finding one which meets our criteria with little effort and cost. There are eighteen open source tools that we explore and discuss in Chapter 4. Although the literature provides relevant details of each tool, the project documentation on steps and requirements to run each tool is limited in many cases. Getting each tool to work and analyzing the outputs has certain time and effort associated with it.

In cases where the metadata for an apk file is available in XML files, we hope to save on the runtime expense by simply analyzing the XML metadata to construct the GUI model rather than run the app on an emulator or device. However, we would need to rely on the tool’s effectiveness in best handling the case where only the app’s default layout is declared which then gets modified unpredictably at runtime.

When using a tool which relies on dynamic analysis i.e. finding paths by running the app on an emulator or device, there could be the problem of combinatorial explosion which arises due to the possibility of multiple different paths across different GUI objects/screens. This may cause the tool to run for a significant amount of time in performing the analysis which may not even be near to completion.
CHAPTER 4

RELATED WORK

With the tremendous growth in usage of Android apps and Android being open source, there is a lot of focus towards testing Android apps efficiently so that they meet their functional requirements in a qualitative manner. Manual testing of an app can be a laborious task and it may not uncover all the defects in a timely and cost-effective manner. Instead, there is growing research towards developing tools that can perform automatic testing of an app. These tools follow different strategies and aim towards detecting different kinds of bugs in apps like detecting bugs that do not meet functional requirements or those that result in memory leak patterns or detecting energy inefficiencies or performance related bugs. One of the most expensive tasks in the area of software testing is generating test input. We explore different tools in this chapter that aid with the automatic testing of Android apps. We investigate whether these state-of-the-art tools can help us in determining the finite state machine of an app in an efficient way in terms of cost and effort.

4.1 Dynamic Analysis

This section covers various tools that perform dynamic analysis of Android apps that generate test inputs by mimicking user interactions or events like clicking a button, entering values in text fields etc. This set of tools are classified with regards to their exploration strategy and we check whether these could or could not be used for the purpose of our thesis.
1. Random Exploration Strategy or Fuzz Testing:

Fuzz testing is an approach used to automate the process of testing software by a program called a fuzzer, which generates a large amount of input data for the target program. This technique is used to detect unknown vulnerabilities [137]. The drawback with fuzz testing is that since inputs are tested randomly, code coverage is generally low. Consider, for example, a simple conditional statement: “if (a == 1357) then { ... }”. Here, ‘a’ is a randomly chosen 32-bit value. Now the ‘then’ branch is exercised only when the value for a is exactly 1357. Thus, it has only one in $2^{32}$ chances of being exercised [138,139].

The set of tools that fall in the Random Exploration/Fuzz testing category randomly generate GUI events. This strategy may be apt in stress testing as random exploration can continually trigger events till some manually specified timeout is reached. However, as the exploration is random, the tools may generate the same event multiple times and there may not be a clear indication that all possible events across the different GUI screens have been covered within the timeout duration.

(a) Monkey

The UI/Application Exerciser Monkey commonly called ‘monkey’ is a command-line tool provided by the Android integrated testing framework. This tool can be executed on an emulator instance or on a device by generating and sending a pseudo-random stream of user events like keystrokes, clicks to the system [140].

As monkey is included in the Android developer’s toolkit, installation effort is minimum. Based on the selected verbosity level, reports on the progress and events
generated by monkey can be obtained. However, the tool can only implement a random strategy while exploring the app. While running the tool for a particular Android app, the user needs to specify the number of events to be generated. Once this limit is reached by the tool, the exploration stops. Thus, the random strategy is not guaranteed to capture all details across all GUI screens for an app and hence we did not consider this tool for our thesis.

(b) **MonkeyRunner**

The monkeyrunner tool can control an emulator instance or device outside of Android code by programs written through an API. It assists functional testing by automatically running an entire script that tests the application. Thus, a program can be written in Python to install the app that needs to be tested, run the app and provide inputs in terms of keystrokes or touch events to the app. The tool allows one to capture and save a screenshot of the user interface. The monkeyrunner API can also be extended with user defined classes.

However, as the input should be provided via a program, GUI details of the app must be known in advance to running monkeyrunner on the app. Hence, this tool was not considered for automatically analyzing the GUI state model of apps.

(c) **Dynodroid**

The working of dynodroid tool relies on an observe-select-execute cycle wherein for the app’s current state, the tool first detects the relevant events. For this, the tool detects for the current screen, the GUI layout of objects along with the kind of input
expected by each GUI object. In the select stage, the tool selects one of the observed relevant events using one of three different strategies – Frequency, UniformRandom and BiasedRandom. The frequency strategy picks up the least frequently selected event from the set of possible relevant events. The UniformRandom strategy selects an event uniformly at random. The BiasedRandom strategy makes use of a context-sensitive model such that events which are applicable to more contexts would be selected more frequently. Finally, in the execute stage, the tool executes the selected event which may result in a new state after which it again repeats this cycle.

In comparison to Monkey, Dynodroid provides additional features like being able to compute relevant events, generate system as well as GUI events. However, while trying to download and work on the tool from the publicly available site [143, 144], we found that the Google drive links were outdated. Thus, we could not successfully install the tool and test it on sample apps.

2. Systematic Exploration Strategy

This set of tools systematically tests an app by executing it symbolically. Symbolic execution divides the complete set of inputs into different classes such that each class corresponds to a unique program behavior. To understand symbolic execution, consider the same example used earlier for fuzz testing i.e. consider a simple conditional statement: “if (a == 1357) then {…}”. Here, symbolic execution collects the constraints on inputs from conditional statements that it finds in the program. Thus, symbolic execution of the example conditional statement for input a = 0 produces the constraint a ≠ 1357. Once
this constraint is negated and solved, it will yield $a = 1357$, a new input that leads to new
program behavior that follows the 'then' branch of the conditional statement \[138,139\].

Thus, instead of using random techniques, it uses a systematic strategy to generate spe-
cific, non-redundant inputs. A drawback of this type of exploration is that it is considered
less scalable as the complete set of input classes required to cover all possible program
behaviors is essentially infinite leading to the path explosion problem \[142\].

(a) **ACTEve**

ACTEve (Automated Concolic Testing of Event-driven programs) \[146\], is based on
concolic testing (also referred to as dynamic symbolic execution) and automatically
produces sequences of events in a systematic manner. It uses the concolic method
of execution to symbolically monitor events right from where they are produced up
to the point where they are handled and processed. Concolic testing \[147\] uses a
combination of symbolic and concrete execution to produce test inputs that can
explore all possible execution paths. Building on our previous example used for
fuzz testing and symbolic execution, consider an additional conditional statement as
below. Here $b$ is an integer variable.

```plaintext
if (a == 1357) then {
    if (a < b) then {
        ...
    }
}
```
We start with an arbitrary choice for the two variables ‘a’ and ‘b’. Now symbolic execution would solve the constraint and yield \( a = 1357 \) to reach the ‘then’ branch of the first conditional statement. Now, if \( b \) was chosen to be equal to 1, then the second conditional statement would fail as 1357 (a) is not less than 1 (b). Thus, the path conditions are \( a = 1357 \) and \( a \geq b \). The second condition is negated giving \( a < b \). Thus, in this case, concolic execution approach would involve looking for values of \( a \) and \( b \) such that \( a = 1357 \) and \( a < b \); for example, \( a = 1357, b = 1400 \). Hence, the input value of \( b = 1400 \) will satisfy the second conditional statement and the ‘then’ branch of the second conditional statement can be explored.

ACTEve instruments both the Android framework and the input app under test and tries to assuage the path explosion problem by handling program executions in a way that helps with pruning redundant event sequences.

Although the tool is publicly available [148], we did not find relevant information on the steps required for setting up and testing the tool on sample apps. Due to unavailability of proper documentation, we did not explore this tool further.

(b) Sapienz

Sapienz [149] is a multi-objective, search-based automated software testing tool for Android apps. Sapienz combines the random, systematic and search-based exploration strategies. Sapienz makes use of motif patterns, a set of patterns of low level events which are good indicators of achieving high coverage based on the current screen’s GUI information. A primary focus of Sapienz is to analyze and optimize
length of test sequences, while at the same time, maximize program coverage and fault detection.

However, the GitHub page of the online Sapienz prototype \[150\] mentions that the prototype is out-of-date and no longer supported.

(c) **EHBDroid**

EHBDroid (Event Handler Based) \[151\] is an automated, open source testing tool for Android apps based on the Soot framework \[152\].

“Soot is used to analyze, instrument, optimize and visualize Java and Android applications” \[153\]. Soot builds a control flow graph that represents the intra procedural data flow analysis. In this graph, the nodes depict the program statements and an edge between two nodes A and B indicates the flow of control from the statement depicted by node A to the statement depicted by node B \[153\]\[155\].

We will later see another tool GATOR that is described in Section 4.2 Static Analysis that is also based on the Soot framework.

Now, EHBDroid does not produce events from the GUI but instead directly triggers callbacks of event handlers, unlike other traditional GUI testing methods. This helps EHBDroid simulate a larger set of events that are otherwise not easy to produce by conventional GUI-testing methods.

EHBDroid consists of two basic components: 1) an **Instrumentor** that instruments the input app. Here, a relevant sequence of callback invocations in each activity is collected by analyzing various unique event registration patterns found in XML
resource files along with the app’s program code 2) a testing **Explorer** that tests the target app. As a list of analyzed activities is tracked, the Explorer detects if the present activity’s exploration is completed. On encountering any unexplored activity, the Explorer will automatically analyze the current activity else it returns back to explore the currently top of the stack activity [156]. This process continues until exploration of all activities in the activity stack is complete.

**EHBDroid** is publicly available [157]. However, although we were able to instrument a sample app after setting up and running the tool; further steps of signing and installing the app led to multiple exceptions and we were unable to resolve the errors.

3. **Model-based Exploration Strategy**

This set of tools focus on automated GUI testing of Android apps by building a model that abstracts the app’s behavior. Using the model, the testing tool then derives tests in order to validate an app’s functionality. The built models often represent finite state machines where activities denote the states and events denote the transitions. This set of tools dynamically build a model till all possible events that can be generated by all explored states of an app have been analyzed.

However, producing a complete set of tests based on an abstract model of the app can get overwhelming. Depending on the number of screens, GUI objects and possible transitions between the objects, the problem of path explosion can make it quite difficult to obtain and execute all possible tests.
(a) **SwiftHand**

SwiftHand [158] makes use of machine learning to learn and build a model of an app while testing the app and uses the built model to generate test input sequences which automatically analyze unexplored states of the app. Based on the execution results, the tool then refines the model. One of the important features of SwiftHand is to optimize the exploration strategy by minimizing the need to restart the app under test. This feature is considered important as traditional exploration techniques often restart an app by removing and installing it again in order to explore all states reachable from the starting state. However, restarting an app is considered a time consuming task rather than just executing a sequence of inputs on an app. Another focus of this tool is to realize code coverage rapidly by learning and analyzing the built abstract GUI model of the app. This is achieved by relying on the principle that instead of following a computationally expensive approach towards building a precise model of the app, an approximate model of the app can be assumed to suffice in guiding the generation of test inputs.

We followed the steps provided on the publicly available site [159] for building the tool, however, we were not successful in getting it to work on a couple of sample APK files. Hence, we did not explore the tool further.

(b) **PUMA**

PUMA [160] is Programmable UI-Automation Framework for Dynamic App Analysis. It includes a basic random exploration strategy like Monkey and exposes an
event driven programming abstraction. Thus, the basic framework can be enhanced to support any dynamic analysis on Android apps. The exploration strategy in PUMA can be modified by implementing compact event handlers that separate the logic between analysis and exploration. The tool is publicly available [161] but this has been tested only on Ubuntu machine (12.04), Android (4.3). As the tool is compatible only with a specific release of the Android framework, we did not explore this tool further.

(c) Stoat

Stoat (STOchastic model App Tester) [162] is an automated testing tool that tests whether an app meets its desired functionality by triggering different user and system events. Stoat works in two stages: First, the GUI layouts of the target app are expressed as a stochastic model which is a finite state machine with edges linked with probabilities for test generation. Specifically, Stoat builds the stochastic model by exploring different behaviors using a dynamic analysis strategy that is extended by a weighted GUI exploration strategy and static analysis. Second, in an iterative manner, Stoat mutates the built stochastic model producing tests from the model mutants. By perturbing the probabilities of edges, Stoat can produce unique tests to detect deep bugs that would otherwise not usually be detected.

The tool is publicly available [163] where the implementation has been tested with Android 4.4, running on Ubuntu 14.04. However, this version only supports testing ant projects. Hence, we did not explore this tool further.
(d) A³E

The A³E (Automatic Android App Explorer) toolset provides automated GUI testing of Android apps by modeling an app in the context of a Static Activity Transition Graph that depicts transitional relations between activities. For example, a directional edge from activity 1 to activity 2 indicates a possible transition from activity 1 to activity 2.

Using the Static Activity Transition Graph, A³E can implement two kinds of exploration strategies. 1) **Targeted Exploration** focuses on a fast, direct strategy of traversing between activities, including those activities that are less likely to be normally explored. It can detect activities that are triggered from other apps or services without requiring user interaction. 2) **Depth-First Exploration** uses a systematic way of mimicking user behavior by navigating from one screen to the next. The traversed screens are pushed into a stack so that the screen at the top of the stack is popped if a return event to a previous screen is triggered.

Only the depth-first implementation of the tool is publicly available and not the targeted version. As per the GitHub page of the depth-first version, it is tested under Ruby 2.0 and Android 4.4.2. Since this version of A³E seemed to require major efforts in setup and as it is compatible only with specific versions of Android, we did not explore this tool further.
DroidBot \[168\] is a lightweight, UI-guided test input generator that produces inputs using a state transition model built during runtime along with combining user-defined testing algorithms and methods. The generated model is essentially a directed graph where each node denotes a state of the app that includes the GUI details and each edge between two nodes denotes the input event that triggers the transition along with its methods and log details. The default exploration strategy used for producing the test inputs is depth-first. Droidbot also provides a set of high-level APIs that allow customized scripts and algorithms that enhance the event generation modules to be included thereby making Droidbot an extremely extensible tool.

We were able to run the publicly available tool \[169\] on sample APK files. First, we installed an APK file in an emulator using the command `adb install sampleApk.apk` where sampleApk.apk is an Android apk file. Next, we ran the droidbot tool command `droidbot -a sampleApk.apk -o output_dir` where -a is the argument for file path to the apk file and -o is the argument for the directory of output. The command allowed the tool to start the app on the emulator from the Main activity. However, we were not able to get the tool to automatically provide inputs to the text fields on the main screen, without which the app could not proceed to the next screen. Now for our thesis work of analyzing up to 3 million apk files, we needed a tool that could automatically provide inputs when needed, so that the different activities in the app could be automatically explored. Thus, if we were to...
use droidbot for our thesis work, we would need to investigate and maybe write customized scripts such that when the tool detects an input field on the current screen, it would need to generate the inputs.

(f) AndroidRipper

Android GUI Ripper \cite{170,171} automatically explores an Android app by exercising its GUI in both systematic exploration strategies (Depth First and Breadth First) and Random strategies.

The AndroidRipper tool uses a GUI crawling based approach to dynamically construct a model of the input app from an initial state. On exploring a new state, a list of events that can be triggered from the current state is tracked and the events are systematically invoked. When no new states can be detected during the exploration, the tool restarts the process from the initial state. Thus, AndroidRipper is mainly based on ripping feature which uses the crawler to simulate real user interactions to automatically and systematically traverse the app’s screens, build a GUI model, produce and run test cases based on the model as new events are found \cite{172,174}. Figure 7 depicts the iterative algorithm used by the GUI crawler in building the model \cite{10}.

We were able to configure and set up the environment as needed to run the latest version \cite{175} of AndroidRipper on input APK files. The tool automatically traverses through the screens in the app and generates model of the GUI in xml format. As no manual intervention was needed to run this tool on an app, we selected this tool
Figure 7: The Crawling Algorithm from [10] for performing dynamic analysis of the app to help generate the GUI state machine.

Chapter 5 provides more details on the output produced by AndroidRipper.
4.2 **Static Analysis**

In the previous section 4.1, we explored various tools that perform dynamic analysis of an Android app. However, such an analysis would require running the app on an emulator or Android device which can be a substantially expensive operation and it may be the case that even after spending a significant amount of time, the analysis may not obtain high coverage [131]. As Android development guidelines suggest that separating the design of the GUI layout in XML files from the code that implements its functionality is best practice [176], we explore another set of tools that perform static analysis of Android apps such that without running the app, these tools are able to reconstruct the GUI state machine by simply analyzing the XML metadata, thus saving the runtime expense.

1. **Flowdroid**

Apps may accidentally leak sensitive data or malicious apps may exploit permissions granted by the user to deliberately copy sensitive data. Flowdroid [177] focuses on spotting such data leaks by performing a static taint analysis of Android apps.

Taint analysis involves providing possible malicious data flows to malware detection tools or human specialists who can further inspect whether a leak in fact corresponds to a policy violation. This analysis method detects possible leaks by monitoring sensitive "tainted" flow of data initiated from a source (for example, an API method that returns a message containing financial information) and tracks it till it reaches a sink (for example, a method that writes this message to an external server).
"A precise model of Android’s lifecycle allows the analysis to properly handle callbacks invoked by the Android framework, while context, flow, field and object-sensitivity allows the analysis to reduce the number of false alarms." However, Flowdroid handles lifecycle/callback events and customized GUI objects only for a single activity. Hence, we did not further consider Flowdroid as our thesis involves apps which may be composed of multiple activities and efficiently traversing through multiple activities in generating the GUI model was an important requirement of our thesis.

2. GATOR

Gator (proGram Analysis Toolkit fOr andRoid) was first publicly available in Feb 2014 and since then there have been total 15 versions released with changes related to including new features, performance enhancements, optimizations, bug fixes as well as support to run as a Docker container. Gator takes as input an APK file and runs analysis on top of the Soot program analysis framework. We saw a short description of the Soot framework earlier while describing the tool EHBDroid in Section 4.1 Dynamic Analysis.

In Gator, the first component focused on modeling the static flow of object references in a program. This considered the possible data and control flow based on the GUI objects and the various interactions between them by the corresponding event handlers. Thus views, activities and listeners are abstracted and a constraint graph depicting the structural relationships consisting of views corresponding to activities and listeners and hierarchical structure of parent-child view relationships is developed.
The next component of Gator built on previous work, focuses on a program representation that helps with carrying out graph reachability by navigating context relevant interprocedural control flow paths detecting program statements that could invoke callbacks along with paths that do not include such statements. Here, callbacks are of two types: Lifecycle callbacks and GUI event handler callbacks.

**Lifecycle callbacks:** The Activity instances in the app shift through various phases in their lifecycle depending on how the user navigates through an app \[179\]. The Activity class offers six main callbacks: `onCreate()`, `onStart()`, `onResume()`, `onPause()`, `onStop()`, and `onDestroy()` which lets an activity understand when there is some change in the state such as when the system creates, stops or resumes the activity or destroys a process where an activity exists.

**GUI event handler callbacks:** These are associated with various user interactions. For example, when an object like button is clicked, the `onclick()` method is called on the object \[180\]. Such event handlers function different actions that lead to various transitions in the app logic like terminating an activity or returning to a preceding activity.

Subsequent work led to building a window transition graph (WTG) that denotes potential sequences of GUI windows with their corresponding callbacks and events \[181\]. This work focuses on modeling a window stack to monitor the active windows at present, updates to the stack with effects of callbacks.
Further work led towards detecting energy defects [182], exposing resource leak defects [183] and a responsiveness profiling strategy that expresses response times as a function of the size of a possibly expensive resource [184].

We ran version 3.8 (released in September 2019) [185] of Gator on a sample APK file as a docker container which did not require any manual setup. We just had to build the docker image and run the container which provided us with information on the WTG namely, the stack of active windows and changes to the stack. However, we were not able to extract the GUI model of the app in a format like XML or JSON that we desired. Hence, we did not consider this tool.

3. Backstage

Backstage [186][187] is an open source automated static analysis framework designed with the aim of finding irregularities between the expected behavior of a GUI object on a screen versus the actual behavior implemented by the GUI object. For example, an app ‘BMI Calculator’ that calculates Body Mass Index (BMI) has a screen with two text fields which accept height and weight parameters as input and has a button ‘Calculate BMI’. Now, based on the GUI objects on this screen, the user would expect that after entering the height and weight details, clicking the ‘Calculate BMI’ button should only return the calculated BMI value. However, if the button has additional functionality that also sends the user’s location to an external service, then such a behavior needs to be detected as irregular and reported. This may be deliberately done by those who want to attack the security and privacy of users or also maybe unintentionally done by developers who
provide additional functionality that is inconsistent with the expected behavior of the GUI objects that users see on screen. Backstage aims at finding such anomalies in apps. The functionality of the tool as implemented [188] consists of 2 stages: 1) GUI Analysis Phase 2) Detecting outliers phase.

**Stage 1) GUI Analysis Phase:** In this phase, Backstage first analyzes behavior of the app by investigating the GUI objects specified in the app’s xml layout files together with the corresponding code. Next, the tool constructs a control flow model by using the event handlers corresponding to the lifecycle and interactions of the GUI objects. Lastly, the code associated with the callback functions is analyzed to determine the content of GUI objects. Backstage can obtain the text of GUI objects in multiple ways like through the Android:text attribute specified in XML files, through “@string/” prefix that can be used to reference the app’s resources or simply the direct string that will be displayed, through styles.xml file where the label of a GUI object may change based on the style, through code (example method View: setText(text) defines the text for GUI objects) or through the text defined in icons or alternative text, which is specified in the android:contentDescription attribute of the GUI object.

**Stage 2) Detecting outliers phase:** Backstage uses the callbacks from stage 1 as potential entry points and builds a call graph via Rapid Type Analysis algorithm (RTA) that restricts the over-approximation in the analysis through determining potentially instantiated classes [186,189]. Using methods reachable from the callbacks, Backstage tries to determine which sensitive API calls [190] can be invoked. Here sensitive API calls are
those calls that can perform operations like accessing user’s location or which can carry out operations like sending messages to external services etc.

We ran backstage on sample apk files. The output of stage 1 of the tool provided the GUI model of the app in XML format depicting the hierarchy of the GUI objects and information on the different XML layout files could be extracted. We did not run the second stage of the tool as we did not need to detect any outliers corresponding to the GUI objects. On analyzing the output files obtained from stage 1, we could see that this tool could provide us the required information in the most cost-effective way. Chapter 5 provides more details on the output produced by Backstage.

4.3 Hybrid Analysis

This section consists of a set of tools that perform both static and dynamic analysis of an app’s GUI and we investigate if any of these tools could be used in our thesis.

1. Orbit

Orbit [191] uses a grey-box approach that combines static and dynamic analysis for Android apps. In the first stage, on performing a static analysis of the app’s code, the tool extracts a group of actions that can be invoked by each GUI object. In the second stage, dynamic analysis based on a crawler reverse engineers the built model by systematically invoking the actions on the running app. However, since this tool is not publicly available, we did not explore it further.
2. **MonkeyLab**

MonkeyLab follows a record-mine-generate-validate approach. "This framework relies on recording app usages that yield execution (event) traces, mining those event traces and generating execution scenarios using statistical language modeling, static and dynamic analyses, and validating the resulting scenarios using an interactive execution of the app on a real device" [192]. Thus, the analysis provided by this tool depends on first recording usages of an app. As our thesis involves analyzing up to 3 million apps without having any usage details of the apps, we did not consider this tool.

3. **Amoga**

Amoga (Automated MOdel Generator for Android apps) [193] uses a hybrid strategy of first using a static analyzer that constructs the WTG of an app using Gator. In this stage, the apk file is decompiled to obtain the bytecode and then a control flow analysis is performed. In the second stage, a crawler built on top of the Robotium framework [194] invokes the events detected from the static analysis stage, in a sequence at runtime to transition between different states of the app. As we could not find this tool online, we did not explore this further.
CHAPTER 5

SOLUTION

Of all the tools that we reviewed in chapter 4, we found two tools - Backstage and AndroidRipper, that were useful in helping us extract a model of the app’s GUI in XML format. Backstage uses static analysis while AndroidRipper uses dynamic analysis. Using these two tools, we design and propose a hybrid framework in section 5.1 and then we describe the outputs obtained on running the tools, Backstage and AndroidRipper in sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.

5.1 Proposed Framework

Figure 8 depicts the proposed framework for analyzing GUI layouts of input APK files using the tools Backstage and Android GUI Ripper.

1. As input, we have a large dataset of about 3 million APK files, each having filename as a 16 bytes Globally Unique IDentifier (GUID). We form a list of the APK file names from this collection and parallelize processing of these files further in the pipeline.

2. We build a resource manager component that computes the available memory and processing power in order to tune the level of parallelism across many Virtual Machines (VMs). Various metrics that are collected are average CPU utilization, memory utilization or disk utilization. The resource manager balances the workload among the virtual machines which can be scaled in or scaled out depending on the computed metrics. Here,
workload refers to processing of each input apk file in the pipeline. The resource manager component is required to achieve a balanced resource utilization and to optimize overall performance by proper use of available resources.

3. For each input apk file, we need to run the decode option of apktool command to extract the XML resource and layout files. Using these files as input, we next run Backstage to perform static analysis and generate the GUI model of the app.

4. Apk files for which Backstage fails to extract a model are flagged for further processing. Again, based on computed memory and processing power metrics by the resource manager,
the Android GUI Ripper can be made to run on these flagged APK files in parallel. This phase would include running the app on the emulator to dynamically extract model of the app.

5. We log errors generated in step 4 in log files and remove the corresponding apk files from the input collection.

6. Apk files for which either Backstage or Android GUI Ripper provides GUI models in xml files are stored and marked as done and removed from the input collection to avoid any further processing.

7. From the xml files extracted in stage 6, we run our statistics script to extract different statistical results like number of clickable objects, scrollable elements, input fields, screens/activities and layout files. We calculate various metrics like mean, median, mode, standard deviation, variance, proportion, range, skew, rank etc. for the GUI objects extracted from the apps.

Thus, our framework focuses on developing a solution that supports fault tolerance, scalability and optimized performance.

5.2 **Static Analysis - Backstage**

We found Backstage to be the most relevant for our thesis as it uses static analysis to extract a model of the app’s GUI in XML format, thereby eliminating the run time expense. We downloaded the source code from GitHub [188] and built the Maven [195] project to produce a jar file. We used a sample apk file ‘com.zola.bmi.apk’ which is the BMI calculator Android
app. This app takes input via two text fields which represent weight and height and on the click of a button ‘CALCULATE BMI’, it displays a message with the BMI value. Figure 9 shows the entry screen of the app.

We first run the apktool command with decode option on the file ‘com.zola.bmi.apk’ to extract the XML layout and resource files as shown in Figure 10. The res folder further

Figure 10: Files extracted on decoding input apk file using apktool command
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>abc_action_bar_title_item</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_action_bar_up_content</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_action_menu_item_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_action_menu_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_action_mode_bar</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_action_mode_close_item_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_activity_chooser_view</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_activity_chooser_view_list_item</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_alert_dialog_button_bar_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_alert_dialog_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_alert_dialog_title_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_cascading_menu_item_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_dialog_title_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_expanded_menu_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_list_menu_item_checkbox</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_list_menu_item_icon</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_list_menu_item_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_list_menu_item_radio</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_popup_menu_header_item_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_popup_menu_item_layout</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_screen_content_include</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_screen_simple</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_screen_simple_overlay_action_mode</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_screen_toolbar</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_search_dropdown_item_icons_2line</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_search_view</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_select_dialog_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abc_tooltip</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activity_btrimain</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fragment_btrimain</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notification_action</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notification_action_tombstone</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notification_template_custom_big</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notification_template_icon_group</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notification_template_part_chronometer</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notification_template_part_time</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>select_dialog_item_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>select_dialog_multichoice_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>select_dialog_singlechoice_material</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support_simple_spinner_dropdown_item</td>
<td>XML Document</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: XML Layout files extracted from input apk file
contains different files and folders and in this, the layout folder contains multiple xml resource files as shown in [Figure 11].

The backstage command is next run as below [196]:

```
java -Xmx40g -Xss5m -cp target/Backstage-5.1-SNAPSHOT-jar-with-dependencies.jar
st.cs.uni.saarland.de.testApps.TestApp -apk output/com.zola.bmi.apk
-androidJar libs/android.jar -apkToolOutput output/com.zola.bmi
-rAnalysis -uiTimeoutValue 30 -uiTimeoutUnit SECONDS -rTimeoutValue 30 -rTimeoutUnit
SECONDS -maxDepthMethodLevel 15 -numThreads 24 -rLimitByPackageName
```

- **-apk *.apk** refers to location of .apk file

- **-apkToolOutput * ** refers to the output folder containing app GUI models extracted by Backstage

- **-rAnalysis** indicates running UI analysis

- **-uiTimeoutValue, -uiTimeoutUnit, -rTimeoutValue, -rTimeoutUnit** indicates running UI analysis with timeout duration for entrypoint class

- **-maxDepthMethodLevel** indicates number of hierarchy levels that should be searched around the id element

- **-numThreads** indicates number of threads for running the analysis

- **-rLimitByPackageName** limits the analysis to classes based on the package name. For example, to analyze the Yelp app, classes belonging to only the com.yelp package would
be considered. This is done to eliminate the third party libraries that are often included in apk files.

On running the Backstage command, in the output folder, file ‘appSerialized.txt’ which represents the GUI model of the app is generated. Figure 12 shows a tree view of the main XML tags present in the appSerialized.txt file. Details of one GUI element – ’Calculate BMI’ button is shown in Figure 13.

The important tags that can be seen in file 'appSerialized.txt' are:

- `<activities>` tag as seen in Figure 14 lists out names and labels of the activity
- `<kindOfUiElement>` as seen in Figure 13 indicates the type of UI element like Button, TextView etc
Figure 13: Part of the GUI model for element 'Calculate BMI' button

- `<uiElementsOfApp>` as seen in Figure 15 consists of parent-child relationship details for the ID of the GUI elements referred to by `<int>` along with any `<styles>` defined.

`xmlLayoutFiles.txt` is another file extracted by Backstage tool which provides IDs of GUI objects seen in each resource layout file for the app. Figure 16 shows a part of the xmlLayoutFiles.txt file.
Figure 14: Details of activities tag in appSerialized.txt file

Figure 15: Details for one entry in uiElementsOfApp tag in appSerialized.txt file
Figure 16: Ids of GUI elements for each resource layout file seen in xmlLayoutFiles.txt file
We ran Backstage on a small sample of 213 Android apk files. These files were picked randomly across almost 3 million apk files such that these 213 files covered a range of apk file sizes. The 3 million apk files were obtained from the repo at the University of Luxemborg who obtained these apps from the Google app store. From this collection of 3 million apps, first a sample of 1,774 apk files was randomly obtained. This set of 1,774 apk files were of varying sizes from 14 KB - 279 MB. Since we wanted a sample that covered this wide range of apk file sizes, we randomly obtained files of sizes that were in ranges like 14 KB-459 KB, 5 MB-15 MB, 39 MB-50 MB, 51 MB-87 MB and 100 MB-279 MB such that:

- 100 apk files were of size in the range of 14 KB-459 KB
- 49 apk files were of size in the range of 5 MB-15 MB
- 25 apk files were of size in the range 39 MB-50 MB
- 35 apk files were of size in the range 51 MB-87 MB
- 4 apk files were of size in the range 100 MB-279 MB

The last category has only 4 apk files and that is because the sample of 1,774 files that was randomly obtained also had only 4 Apk files. Here, the sizes refer to the size of the APK files. We only considered the Apk file size for selecting the small sample of files for testing Backstage. This was done so that we have a sample that is representative of the large collection of 3 million Apk files that we have to finally analyze. No other features of the apps were considered while selecting the sample.
Using the sample of 213 apk files, we built the pipeline in Scala with the below steps:

1. A list of APK files is created from the collection of files in the input folder.

2. Using Scala’s .par operator for parallel processing of the list of APK files, a script consisting of below steps is run for each apk file:

   (a) Running the Apktool command to extract the resource and layout files of an app.

   (b) Running the Backstage command to perform static analysis

   (c) If backstage analysis is successful, mark the Apk file as done.

   (d) Errors or Success messages are appropriately logged for further reference. In case of an error with processing of any file, the program does not stop execution but rather continues with processing of the other APK files.

Table I provides summary of results seen on processing Backstage command. We see that out of 213 apk files, Backstage produces results for 134 apk files as highlighted in the last row of Table I. This accounts for about 63% of the input apps in this sample. Among the errors, we see about 32 apps fail with error ”Non english language detected. Aborting”, 44 apps fail with error ”App has less than 70% of XML Layouts” and 3 apps fail with general Java Runtime Exceptions.
Thus, of the 213 apk files, we see that there are two major reasons why Backstage did not produce GUI app models:

- **Error 1: Non english language detected. Aborting**

  This is a restriction placed by Backstage in its implementation that it removes apps from consideration for which less than 70% of the resources are in the English language. This is done because Backstage tries to identify anomalies in the expected behavior of GUI objects by reading the content of labels of GUI elements. The content is needed so that Backstage can further analyze what the expected behavior should be. For example, a button with text ‘Login’ will indicate that the user wants to only login and not provide any additional sensitive information like the user’s financial details. For this analysis, Backstage works on apps with interfaces written in the English language. As the apk files have been downloaded by crawling the internet with no restrictions placed on the language, we have apps in our datastore that could belong to non-English language.
• **Error 2: App has less than 70% of XML Layouts**

This is a second restriction placed by Backstage in its implementation to remove apps which have almost little to no GUI. It determines this based on calculating the value: (number of layout files / number of activities) <70%. “The intuition behind this heuristic is that there is usually one layout file for each activity. When this is not the case, it means that the activity does not have a UI that can be analyzed using Backstage (i.e. there are no labels with text, buttons, etc.). This heuristic, in essence led to ignoring all apps listed in the GAMES, ANDROID_WEAR, COMICS, and APP_WIDGET categories.”

5.3 **Dynamic Analysis - AndroidRipper**

As a workaround towards dealing with apps which could not be statically analyzed by Backstage, we propose to perform dynamic analysis using the AndroidRipper tool. We show below a couple of apps that worked using AndroidRipper that had earlier failed via Backstage.

Figure 17: Part of the GUI model generated by AndroidRipper tool for an app that failed with Backstage due to error ‘Non english language detected. Aborting’

To run AndroidRipper, we downloaded the latest release of the source code which contains the AndroidRipper.jar file. We first run this tool on an APK file which failed while running Backstage with the error ‘Non english language detected. Aborting’.
We run the tool using the command:

```
"java -jar AndroidRipper.jar sample.apk default.properties"
```

where,

- **Sample.apk** is sample apk file
- **Default.properties** provides configuration values like the target device, exploration strategy

Figure 17 shows a part of the GUI model generated on one of the runs of the tool on the apk file which failed with Backstage due to non-English characters. As seen in the Figure 17, the highlighted parts in black show the non-English characters.

Figure 18: Part of the GUI model generated by AndroidRipper tool for an app that failed with Backstage due to error ‘App has less than 70% of XML Layouts’

Next, we ran the tool AndroidRipper on another apk file which failed on running with Backstage with error ‘**App has less than 70% of XML Layouts**’. Figure 18 shows part of the model extracted by the tool for one of the runs.

Thus, we see that Backstage and AndroidRipper together can help us extract the GUI model of an app.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we explored existing tools available for testing Android apps that help in navigating through the screens of an app. There are mainly two types of analysis – Static and Dynamic that employ different strategies in testing an app. Of all the tools, we used Backstage that performs static analysis of the GUI layouts to help build a model of the app. We tested this on base set of 200+ Android apps. The apps for which Backstage did not produce an output model failed majorly for reasons like non-English language and apps having less than 70% of XML layouts. For such apps, we propose to use AndroidRipper which automatically performs dynamic analysis and helps in building the model. Thus, using state-of-the-art tools, we provide a framework that analyzes GUI elements, screens and their transitions across an Android app. Using these GUI models, we investigate the layouts of Android apps by collecting statistics on various GUI elements and screens.

The statistics collected in this work on existing Android apps will further help in effective simulation of SEAPHISH to determine the circumstances under which an attack against a specific app can be performed with a high degree of probability. Using phishing, i.e. a method of deception to deceive a malicious app from leaking sensitive data or from performing unauthorized activities can help defend against malware and reduce the security vulnerabilities faced by users with disabilities.
APPENDIX

I have been working as a Graduate Research Assistant on this thesis under the guidance of Dr. Mark Grechanik. The content in the sections: Overview of App GUI Framework and Overview of GAP State Machine of Chapter 1 has been referenced from Dr. Mark Grechanik’s previously published work [1–8] for which Dr. Grechanik has authorized me to use the content in my thesis. The content in Chapter 2 that includes the sections: Attack by exploiting Assistive Technologies and SEAPHISH: Defense by deception has been referenced from Dr. Grechanik’s previous unpublished NSF proposal. Dr. Grechanik has authorized me to use all the materials from his unpublished NSF proposal for my thesis. The Chapter 4: Related Work consisting of the sections: 4.1 Dynamic Analysis, 4.2 Static Analysis and 4.3 Hybrid Analysis is written using content from a variety of research papers that helped in this thesis work.

The text in all sections (1.1, 1.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3) have been included in this thesis as per the below copyright policies:

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