

Chapter 13 Additional Material

Frank L. Howley and Berlin

On July 1, 1945, a U.S. Army Civil Affairs detachment of 37 officers, 175 men, and 50 vehicles entered the devastated city of Berlin. The group was the first American unit to enter the capital city, and at its head was Colonel Frank L. Howley, the director of the military government in the American sector of Berlin. He served in that capacity until 1949, along with being the American deputy commandant for the Allied Kommandatura, the governing body of the four victorious powers in the Second World War, until becoming commandant himself on December 1, 1947. As both director of the military government and commandant of the Kommandatura, Frank Howley played a crucial role in creating a close connection between Americans and Berliners. Most importantly, his staff's contingency preparations for the Berlin Blockade played an important role in the Airlift.

Born in Hampton, New Jersey, on February 4, 1903, Frank Leo Howley lived a fairly typical youth. He earned a Bachelor's in economics from New York University in 1925 and also studied French history at the Sorbonne. It was not until 1937, when he was 34 years old, that Howley joined the Army Reserve as a cavalry officer. After a motorcycle wreck in 1943, he was forced to choose between being discharged from the U.S. Army or entering into Civil Affairs, where he would make his name, which was by accident rather than design. He chose Civil Affairs and quickly became noted for his successes in administering to the French cities of Cherbourg and Paris. It was Howley's group of Civil Affairs officers who created the template for other military government detachments in the U.S. and British armies.

While Howley was probably the best candidate to tackle the problems of Berlin, he was

a controversial character. Direct, confrontational, and unapologetic, he aggravated his Soviet counterparts with a straight-talking style and refusal to participate in the time-consuming political rhetoric that Moscow preferred. His lightning rod personality made for little common ground between those who loved his directness and those who were exasperated by his lack of diplomacy. Soviet propaganda bestowed upon him a myriad of labels, ranging from “the American brute colonel” to “the Beast of Berlin”; Americans were more split on their opinion, calling him “a tough, wiry fighter for American interests and for Berlin” while others believed he was too self-involved, impatient, and a liability. Even before getting to Berlin, Howley had earned the reputation of being difficult to work with; yet those who knew him personally remarked his bark was worse than his bite.

Throughout his four years in Berlin, Howley led his men and women through the travails of rebuilding the destroyed American sector, all the while sparring with the Soviets on the Cold War’s tense frontier. He spent 2,000 hours in meetings with his Allied counterparts, and produced 1,200 agreements. Howley, by virtue of his long tenure in Berlin, provided continuity to the U.S. Army occupation. By the time he left Berlin, Howley had overseen free elections and the democratization of Berlin’s City Assembly; he played a large part in the founding of higher education in West Berlin, Freie Universität; and he had been an important leader on the ground during the Blockade and Airlift.

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Desperate Fighting at Kunu-Ri in North Korea, November 1950

On November 30, 1950, near the village of Kunu-Ri in North Korea, American soldiers in the 2nd Engineer Battalion found themselves under heavy attack from Communist Chinese troops. The engineers fought a desperate rear guard action so that their parent unit—the 2nd Infantry Division—could retreat southward and escape the five Chinese divisions, totaling 60,000 troops, that were pursuing them. This engagement came only days after the Chinese entered the Korean War to help destroy the South Korean and American forces. Until then, they fully expected to win the Korean War and reunite both halves of the nation as a noncommunist nation.

The hopelessly outnumbered 2nd Engineer Battalion stood its ground as long as its men could against wave after furious wave of Chinese infantry attacks. However, because communications broke down between the battalion and the division, the engineers did not know when it was time for them to evacuate. Instead, several thousand Chinese eventually overran the engineers' position. At the last moment, before his headquarters was attacked, the 2nd Engineer Battalion's commander Lieutenant Colonel Alarich Zacherle ordered the destruction of all his unit's equipment and the burning of the battalion's colors (a red flag with the 2nd's battle streamers). He wanted to deny the Chinese the use of equipment as well as to deny the unit's colors as a prize. After these acts were done, Lieutenant Colonel Zacherle then gave the order "every man for himself."

By December 1, 1950, all the battalion's officers were killed or captured, except for just one captain. Only 266 engineers of the battalion's original 977 men found their way through the freezing night to safety. Those other engineers not killed at Kunu-Ri were captured by the Chinese and then suffered as prisoners of war until repatriated in August 1953. Every year since 1950, on November 30, both the 2nd Engineer Battalion and the 2nd Infantry Division burn the battalion's colors in a ceremony to honor the memory of the fallen at Kunu-Ri.

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Development of Helicopters in Military Doctrine

The United States military's operational use of helicopters began as early as the Second World War when four Sikorsky YR-4Bs of the United States Army Air Force operated in the China- Burma-India theater in 1944. In the following decade, however, as technological developments made rotary-winged aircraft more capable and reliable, American military service branches explored their potential. For the U.S. Army, Major General James M. Gavin was one of the earliest influential proponents of a new air mobility concept of which helicopters would play a major part. Already known for his innovative spirit and visionary outlook while commanding the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II, his April 1954 Harper's magazine article signals the beginning of an embryonic debate. The aptly titled "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses" proposed that helicopters offered increased "momentum." Arguing that the nuclear age necessitated highly mobile forces dispersed over

vast terrain, Gavin suggested a combined armor and air cavalry. With an image of the European battlefield in mind, he asserted that “in ground combat the mobility differential we lack will be found in the air vehicle.”

The helicopter’s combat usefulness had become apparent during the Korean War (1950– 1953), where the rough terrain made overland travel time-intensive and dangerous. The United States Marine Corps (USMC), not the Army, was the first branch to successfully use helicopters in combat situations as became common practice in Vietnam. Throughout the war, Marines experimented with rotary-wing aircraft to supply and transport infantry, capably relocating entire battalions. The U.S. Army, however, took their own strides in operational use of helicopters during the conflict. Medical evacuation of wounded soldiers was made possible by the Bell H-13 Sioux, and the aircraft also proved useful for command and control missions, as well as logistical tasks. Impressed by the utility of helicopters during the Korean War, in August 1954 the Army took further steps to develop their own organic aviation capabilities, reactivating the once defunct Camp Rucker for use as the Army Aviation School. In October 1955, aviation found a permanent home there, re-designated Fort Rucker.

Helicopters also became part of strategic considerations in the larger Cold War. Mobility, the era’s buzz word in the military community, was the primary the focus when anticipating Soviet armor storming across the plains of Europe in the 1950s. A nuclear battlefield, widened by the range and lethality of those weapons, meant conventional ground transportation would likely be too slow and vulnerable. For that reason, Army planners believed helicopters necessary to quickly insert troops and supplies where needed. Realizing that nuclear weapons altered how armies would fight future wars, Army Chief of Staff Ridgway and his staff determined that helicopters would have to provide transportation, evacuation, supply, and communications—all roles the helicopter eventually filled in Vietnam.



A Sikorski HO3S-1 helicopter on board the USS Philippine Sea (CV-47) during operations off Korea, October 19, 1950. The crewman is backing off vacuum prior to starting the helicopter's engine.

Credit: Naval Heritage & History Command Photo: # 80-G-420949

The Army's desire to expand their aircraft inventory soon ran them afoul of the Air Force, however. The Air Force wished to protect their role as the dominant practitioners of flight in the U.S. military. Their main argument against the Army's expanded use of helicopters was that if it flew, it should belong to the Air Force. A series of disagreements through the late 1940s into the 1950s eventually formed mutual understandings of aviation roles and responsibilities between the two branches. In a bid to guarantee weakened Army Aviation, the Air Force attempted to usurp their usefulness by proposing their own assault helicopter squadrons. Air Force obstructions throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s did slow advances in Army air mobility, but Air Force staff members understood that they could not

effectively argue their usefulness as specialists in tactical aviation at the expense of their status as a strategic force. Ultimately, as a means to maintain their primary role in massive retaliation, plans for their own assault helicopter squadrons lost out to the high-technology appeal of strategic nuclear delivery. For the Army, the latter 1950s witnessed a focused attempt at establishing a singular program of tactical airlift of troops and supplies using helicopters. Air mobility plans became more ambitious in part due to the improving technology of aircraft. The Bell UH-1 Iroquois “Huey,” the most recognizable helicopter of the Vietnam War, began testing in 1956, not as a troop carrier but as a medical evacuation platform.

Ultimately, the 1950s and early 1960s set the stage for the U.S. military’s use of helicopters in the Vietnam War. Rotary-wing aircrafts’ first infant steps in World War II became full strides in Korea. The usefulness of helicopters and their potential in future wars meant that peacetime planners found themselves at odds with their service brethren over which branch earned the right to use the aircraft. Over the course of a quick 15 years, Army helicopter units justified their existence and evolved from a small contingent into a formidable force. Helicopters became not only the prime mover of U.S. men and material throughout Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, but an invaluable component of an entire strategy. Though explicitly intended for a European battlefield, wartime necessities meant air mobility would find its true test in very different terrain against a very different enemy.

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“ATOMS FOR PEACE” SPEECH

In the contexts of the 1950s and the early Cold War, President Dwight D. Eisenhower determined to solve “the fearful atomic dilemma” by finding some way by which “the miraculous inventiveness of man” would not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. In his “Atoms for Peace” speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower sought to solve this terrible problem by suggesting a means to transform the atom from a scourge into a benefit for mankind. Although not as well known as his warning about the “military industrial complex,” voiced later in his farewell radio and television address to the American people, President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech embodied his most important nuclear initiative as President. From it sprang a panoply of peaceful atomic programs. With it President Eisenhower placed the debate over the control of nuclear science and technology, which had largely been the province of government officials and contractors, squarely before the public. Indeed, the present public controversy over nuclear technology and its role in American society can be traced back to President Eisenhower’s determination that control of nuclear science was an issue for all Americans.

The Atoms for Peace speech reflected the President’s deep concern about “Atoms for

War.” The escalating nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, which included the development of thermonuclear bombs, brought President Eisenhower to the United Nations. Since Hiroshima the destructive power of nuclear weapons had increased dramatically. Nuclear weapons technology, thus far a product of American expertise, would also eventually enter the arsenals of the Soviet Union through the normal processes of technological development. President Eisenhower felt a moral imperative to warn the American people and the world of this new reality.

Rapid strides in nuclear weapons technology had begun at the end of World War II. In 1945 the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan had killed an estimated 106,000 people and had injured approximately 110,000 others. The larger of the two, the Nagasaki bomb, had released the explosive equivalent of 23,000 tons of TNT. In 1948 the United States had tested even larger atomic bombs in the Pacific, and by 1949 the Soviet Union had achieved its own nuclear capability with the detonation of a nuclear device. In response to the Soviet atomic bomb program, the United States had embarked upon a crash program to develop an even larger weapon, the hydrogen bomb, which promised explosive power in the range of millions of tons of TNT. The United States successfully detonated a hydrogen device in November 1952; just a few days before Eisenhower won the presidency. The awesome 10-megaton blast had destroyed the test island of Elugelab, creating an underwater crater 1,500 yards in diameter. With it the United States and the world entered the thermonuclear age. The text follows.

**Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations
General Assembly, 8 December 1953**

Madame President and Members of the General Assembly,

When Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to address the General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world. During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honour. That honour is mine today as I stand

here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly. Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, of the courage and of the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-being for all men.

Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so clearly etched in your Charter. Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes. I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates, and on mine, for a great many months: thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use.

That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's

existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know, I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic explosion.

Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions.

Atomic bombs are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World War. A single air group whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all the Second World War.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier

start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance.

First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That program will be accelerated and extended.

But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb doesn't permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.

Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defense capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor, for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste, all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes of the United States.

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed, the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us from generation to generation, and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery towards decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction?

Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the "great destroyers", but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending quest for peace and mankind's God-given

capacity to build.

It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom and in the confidence that the peoples of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life.

So my country's purpose is to help us to move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward towards peace and happiness and well-being.

In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience.

I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act.

I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world.

But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps - now.

The United States and its allies, the United Kingdom and France, have over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table.

On the record has long stood the request of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany.

On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian peace treaty.

On the same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea.

Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-Power meeting. Along with our allies, the United Kingdom and France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions previously put forward.

As you already know from our joint Bermuda communique, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity.

We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening international tension.

We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightly belongs to it.

We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.

On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples of the East and of the West - the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations.

Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of the USSR.

Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asia, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and to elevate their lot.

These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war, but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy peoples and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought and natural disaster.

These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent.

But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored.

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored -an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In its resolution of 28 November 1953 (resolution 715 (VIII)) this General Assembly

suggested: "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report...on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954.

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved", to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception.

The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes.

It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.

The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. The capability, already proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds the people and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.

I therefore make the following proposal.

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within

the scope of the "private conversations" I referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing - it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for the conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful

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