

## **Pre-proof, pre-copyedit version:**

Douglas Robinson  
*Priming Translation*  
ORCID 0000-0002-3222-6122

Introduction: Prime Time

Abstract: Introducing the three Interpreters and the ways they prime translation.

In “Shared Representations and the Translation Process” Moritz Schaeffer and Michael Carl (2015) pose the question of what the source and target texts share *during the act of translating*, and to that end mobilize the distinction de Groot (1997: 30) draws between “vertical” translation, where “the source text is parsed and abstracted into more or less language[-]specific concepts or even non-linguistic concepts and then re-expressed in the target language” (Schaeffer and Carl 2015: 22), and “horizontal” translation, where “items in the two languages are linked via shared representations,” so that a given syntactic structure, say, will activate “a cognitive representation which it shares with the target text” (23). As their title suggests, they find it more cognitively useful and accurate to work on the horizontal plane, where, they say, transference mostly operates through “shared *memory* representations” (24; emphasis added) from the formal-linguistics realms of morphology, syntax, and semantics, and therefore can be empirically tested through priming experiments in those specific linguistic realms.

In this book I pick up the methodological rationale for priming research in translation at this point, and, while agreeing with Schaeffer and Carl in principle—

Our view is that priming forms the basis for the horizontal method: the influence of a previously processed item or structure on a subsequently processed item or structure forms the basis for horizontal translation. This is in line with Pickering and Ferreira (2008: 447, italics in the original) who argue that priming “reflects the operation of an *implicit learning mechanism*,” i.e., that repeated exposure to primes creates long-lasting memories. So rather than learning about translational equivalents, implicit mechanisms during repeated exposure to source and target texts establishes shared representations in the translator’s long[-]term memory. (26)

—I also expand the scope of experience within which “repeated exposure to primes creates long-lasting memories” quite drastically. At the very least, one would think linguistic pragmatics might offer another realm in which “repeated exposure to primes creates long-lasting memories”—how else do we learn to manage social interactions by the time we reach majority?

The social priming of levels of politeness, for example, is absolutely essential for schoolchildren in talking to teachers and other adults—and surely, as Hatim and Mason (1990) began insisting quite a while ago, of great importance in translating as well. As I have suggested (Robinson 2003, 2006a), most linguistic pragmatics remains quite formalistic—as I put it, “constative”—with a focus on abstract structure rather than the interactive performance of social identities and other realities, and that persistent formalism would seem to lend itself quite nicely to the kind of cognitivist priming studies Schaeffer and Carl envision. But doesn’t the acquisition of social competence require “repeated exposure to primes” of a more performative nature as well? Don’t we learn to interact effectively with others by being primed *in action*, in actual social situations where the stakes are high—where ridicule and embarrassment all too easily flagellate the learner for the tiniest mistake?

And speaking of ridicule and embarrassment: aren’t affective states the most powerful primes of all, or at least the highly charged vehicles in which primes ride? This is the realm in which I have situated my own cognitivist studies of translation since *The Translator’s Turn* (1991), of course, under the rubric of “the somatics of translation.” And more recently I have begun to expand somatic theory into the “ideological” or “ideosomatic” realm of icosis, exploring how socioaffective normativities prime adherence to ideological orthodoxies.<sup>1</sup>

But to be precise, I have not explored the performativity, somatics, and icosis of translation in the explicit terms of primes. The priming of translators’ decisions has been implicit in all of my cognitivist work since *The Translator’s Turn*; in this book I make it explicit.

Note, however, several things that this book is *not*. Fabio Alves (2019: xi), in his Foreword to García (2019), distinguishes between the kind of 4EA cognitive science explored in this book and the neurocognitive science tracked by García:

Recently, however, a new trend has emerged in cognitive translation and interpreting studies, advocating in favor of 4EA cognition, namely, a view which considers human cognition, and indirectly the act of translating and interpreting, to be embedded, extended, embodied, enacted, and affective (Muñoz Martín 2017; Risku 2017). When confronted with the present volume, it is then only natural that readers versed in mainstream approaches within 4EA cognition would ask: why should translation and interpreting studies be concerned with neurocognition at all? To that remark one could add an even stronger question: why is it important to locate translation in the brain when cognitive translation and interpreting studies seem to be moving away from a strict experimental paradigm towards a view of cognition which is situated and relies on contextual factors surrounding cognitive aspects related to the act of translating and interpreting?

On the one hand, this is not a study of neurocognition. In García’s terms, my approach is “non-neural.” I am indeed interested in “a view of cognition which is situated and relies on contextual factors surrounding cognitive aspects related to the act of translating and interpreting.” My

research is emphatically “within 4EA cognition.” On the other hand, however, that inclination does not make this book purely humanistic—purely opposed to “a strict experimental paradigm.” Priming studies are experimental research that is psychocognitive rather than neurocognitive in focus. Rather than studying neural pathways, they use priming to mobilize situated, contextual, attitudinal, and behavioral observations for empirical research into the psychology of cognition.

The book is also not an empirical research *report* (though it contains some empirical research *reports*); rather, it builds on other researchers’ empirical studies to develop priming tests as a blueprint for further empirical research. Specifically, I draw on cognitive psychologist Michael S. Gazzaniga’s intriguing “Interpreter Theory” to suggest cognitive, affective, and collective priming tests for the psychology of monolingual and translingual discourse. Gazzaniga was lucky enough in the early 1960s, as the Ph.D. student of Roger Sperry at Caltech, to get involved with the study of split-brain patients. In one experiment, two decades in, he and his Ph.D. student Joseph LeDoux—now one of the world’s leading affective neuroscientists—showed a split-brain patient’s right hemisphere the instruction to stand, and the patient stood. But because the left hemisphere’s speech centers had no access to instructions given to the right hemisphere alone, the patient had no idea why he had stood up. So Gazzaniga asked him why he had stood up, and he said that he needed to stretch.

That, Gazzaniga realized, was a confabulation. The left brain, without access to the full story, had invented a story that seemed to impose a plausible explanation on the standing. And from that Gazzaniga began to theorize the existence of a Left-Brain Interpreter whose task it was to explain the world based on the evidence available to it—and, even when no evidence was available, to invent explanations, *primed* by past memories of, say, standing to stretch stiff muscles.

Gazzaniga doesn’t mention priming: that’s my confabulation, if you like. I argue here that the speculative path Gazzaniga sketches out for the cognitive neuroscience of language, based on the positing of a Left-Brain Interpreter (LBI), leads (confabulatorily?) to the possibility of a Right-Brain Interpreter (RBI) as well, which interprets the world affectively, conatively, and kinesthetically, through visual and auditory inputs; and, further, once the LBI and RBI in a single head have entered into heteroglot interaction with the LBIs and RBIs in other heads, to the possibility of a Collective Full-Brain Interpreter (CFBI) as well.

To put that in emergentist terms: the RBI emerges evolutionarily out of primate tool use and gesture; the LBI emerges out of the RBI through the mirror-neuron systems in and near right-hemisphere Broca; and the CFBI emerges out of RBI-to-RBI and LBI-to-LBI communication with others in and through the stabilization of social interaction. Each emergence is ongoing and vulnerable to disruption. Each LBI, responding to one or more RBIs from “below” and one or more CFBIs from “above,” will confabulate in unpredictable ways. Each CFBI will consolidate “conflict management” in situated and therefore volatile ways. And so on.

By way of starting us off, let’s consider a paragraph from a source text that I translated recently, from Mia Kankimäki’s feminist memoir *Naiset joita ajattelen öisin* (2018), which I translated for Simon & Schuster as *The Women I Think About at Night* (Robinson 2020b):

Koko talven tarvon siinä suossa päivästä toiseen, mutta en edelleenkään tiedä, miten tämä kirja pitäisi kirjoittaa. Olen niin turhautunut, että tekee mieli kirkua. Koetan ajatella sitä, mitä kuvataiteilijaystäväni Jyrki sanoi – että tämä työvaihe, niin sanottu *paskan linkoaminen*, kuuluu asiaan, ja että koko ammatissa on kyse vain siitä, miten tämän vaiheen kestää. Minä en selvästikään kestä. Ja koska olen ajanut itseni vapaaehtoisesti täydelliseen sosiaaliseen tyhjiöön, makaan iltaisin yksin television ääressä itseinhon vallassa. Tuntuu melkein siltä kuin olisin masentunut. Mutta miten helvetissä voisin olla masentunut, minähän olen *keskellä tätä perkeleen unelmien elämää!* (376; emphasis added, the first corresponding to [X] in the translation below, the second corresponding to [Y])

Let me first translate that as affect-freely as I can—not literally, just with an effort to keep affective value judgments to a bare minimum—but with two brief passages left untranslated for discussion, [X] and [Y]:

All winter I trudge in that swamp from one day to the next, but I still don't know how this book should be written. I am so frustrated that I want to scream. I try to think about what my painter friend Jyrki said—that this work phase, the so-called [X], belongs to the thing, and that everything in the profession is about how you withstand this phase. Clearly I'm not withstanding it. And because I have voluntarily driven myself into a total social vacuum, I lie in front of the television evenings in the sway of self-loathing. It feels almost as if I were depressed. But how the hell could I be depressed, after all I'm [Y]!

Now clearly there are affect-markings there: “trudge,” “frustrated,” “scream,” “self-loathing,” “depressed,” “the hell.” This is a paragraph about not being happy with the writing. The question, though, is how that unhappiness should be shaded. Is it real self-loathing? Is the paragraph's affective bass note bitter, or something else? Is it possible that the author is deliberately exaggerating her frustration, her inclination to scream? Depending on which way I lean, obviously, the translation will look very different: grim, bleak, desperate if I lean toward “real self-loathing,” mock-histrionic, meta-exaggerated, perhaps even playful, light-hearted, if I assume that she's pretending things are worse than they actually are. How do I decide?

I can *reason* my way to a decision, without any kind of research or other corroboration from the outside world. This would be the LBI at work: “That book that Mia can't write,” I can tell myself, “is the one I'm translating. She finished it, and published it, and her agent sold translation rights to it to Simon & Schuster, and the editor at S&S hired me, so how bad can things be? Maybe she was actually this miserable at this specific stage of the writing, but surely she wasn't still feeling that way as she prepared the manuscript for publication. Surely at that latter stage, if she felt the self-loathing in this passage was too bleak she would have lightened things up a bit, and I should translate that.”

But the LBI, working alone, could easily be wrong. If I'm *just* reasoning, without checking with the RBI or anything outside my head, I'm confabulating. I'm making things up, like the split-brain patient explaining that he stood up to stretch his muscles. What if Mia is still today, two or three years after the writing of that paragraph, clinically depressed? What if later, after my sportive translation of this paragraph has been published, I find out that, like Yukio Mishima, the poor tormented soul committed suicide before the book was published? To prevent that, I can *feel* my way to a decision, again without any kind of research or other corroboration from the outside world. This would be the RBI at work: dark-night-of-the-writer's-soul passages like this one, my RBI reminds me, have occurred before in the book, and they've typically alternated with forays out into the world, to Africa, to Japan, to writers' residences in Italy and Germany, which, as my vague affective memories prime my thinking unconsciously, typically move from timid and self-blaming isolation to new friendships and joyful adventures that give Mia no time to write but fill her with a love of life. I can *feel*, even if I can't quite articulate that feeling to myself, that I shouldn't let my translation of this paragraph get sucked into its ostensible despair.

But notwithstanding the feeling-based hermeneutics that Friedrich Schleiermacher learned from Johann Gottfried von Herder—"feel your way into everything," including the research that the LBI reminds you to do<sup>2</sup>—the RBI too can be wrong. What if my RBI has misread the book? What if Mia hates my translation, says it's a travesty of her memoir? Well, I can *ask* her about it. I can interact with her throughout the translation process, over email, in red- and green-highlighted queries and discussions in the text. I can even meet with her in Helsinki over a cup of tea, get to know her face to face. By the time this paragraph apparently full of despair comes along, 85% of the translation is behind us, and we've had four or five lengthy email discussions for every ten pages I've translated. We have not only met for a couple of hours over tea, but spent another hour and a half across the table from her agent. That's a lot of interaction. The part of my mental apparatus that channels that relationship into the translation in the latter half of the book, therefore, would be the CFBI, a *Collective* Full-Brain Interpreter in which author and translator partly merge. It seems fair to say that she's exaggerating that dark night of the soul: "we" know that with a reasonably high degree of certainty. It's "fiction," as she said of another passage over tea. That doesn't necessarily mean she made the whole thing up; probably something like what she describes in the paragraph did happen. But she almost certainly heightened the despair for dramatic effect.

Now think of those guidance systems as *primes*, ways of priming the translation process: the LBI as a purely cognitive prime, the RBI as a purely affective (or perhaps affective-becoming-conative) prime, and the CFBI as a social prime. The difference between this case and most studies of monolingual, bilingual, or translingual priming, of course, is that the three guidance systems I've outlined are pragmatic guides to an actual translation. True, the assumption behind priming studies is that a controlled experimental situation is set up to *mimic* the actual guidance linguistic primes give speakers or translators; but in order that such experiments might yield verifiable empirical data about that guidance, they are specifically

designed to work on subjects as unconsciously as possible. Indeed, what “working unconsciously” means is that the priming effect is *mysterious*. Even the LBI, though it verbalizes everything, is a mystery—one that had to wait for Michael S. Gazzaniga to ask a split-brain patient about it to be revealed. Gazzaniga’s point is that we all have an LBI; because in neurotypicals it has access to everything the right hemisphere “knows” affectively, its confabulatory impulses are subdued, so subdued that we typically don’t notice them. Or rather, we notice them in very small children and people who are drunk, and perhaps in people with whom we have strong ideological disagreements—people who seem to be living on a different planet, because their reality is organized so differently—but not in ourselves. And not even Michael S. Gazzaniga noticed the RBI or the CFBI.

And indeed, as I hinted earlier, maybe Gazzaniga would say that my LBI is confabulating those two. If he did say that, he could be quite right, and I’d be the last to know. But let’s look at some evidence. How might we simulate the priming effects of the RBI and the CFBI in a controlled experiment?

Look back at the Finnish paragraph above—at the spot at the end that I’ve marked [Y]. A literal translation of the five words elided there would be “in the middle of this devil’s dreams’ life.” “The devil” there is *perkele*—one of the strongest swear words in the Finnish language. Lutherans from Germany to Finland taboo the devil’s various names (*saatana* “Satan” is another strong one in Finnish). In fact one generic Finnish term for swearing is *ärrä-päitä*, literally “r-heads,” because the r in *perkele* is rolled and often teased out for emphasis: *perrrkele*. In a sense it is the emblematic Finnish swear word. Traditionally, as you might expect, Finnish women have not been allowed to use it. That’s changed now—especially younger women use it all the time—but some of the old taboo lingers. And Mia is not only in her forties, but is rather shy and timid in person—not someone you’d expect to use a word like *perkele*. She also told me over tea that readers of her first book were first surprisingly irate at her potty-mouth in writing, and then even more surprised to find her so shy and timid in person when she showed up for a reading or a signing.

So how might we prime the translation of that phrase, “minähän olen keskellä tätä perkeleen unelmien elämää!”, in a controlled experiment? Note that this would no longer be a semantic or syntactic prime: it would be an *affective* prime. It would, in the terms I’m developing here, be an RBI prime. The trick would be to test which RBI primes would push the translator-subjects more in the direction of the bitter and the bleak and which would push them more toward the playfully meta.

Most likely, I suggest, the primes that would tend to produce bleak anger in the translation would involve strong English swearing: “Goddammit!” or “Jesus Fuck!” This would be especially true if one used an audio prime, with a middle-aged man swearing in a bleakly angry tone of voice, rather than just the written words. A photograph of the face of that bleakly angry middle-aged man could also be used—shown to the right brain, as in Gazzaniga’s experiment with split-brain patients, even though a neurotypical translator-subject would be able

to access both hemispheres of her or his brain, producing a less puzzling response than Gazzaniga and Joseph LeDoux faced.

And by contrast the primes that would tend to produce playful meta-theatricality in the translation would involve a different register of swearing, with strong words but a more humorous context and tone: say, “O.M. Fucking G.!” This would again be especially true with an audio prime, this one recorded by a playfully dressed woman with a whimsical sense of humor in her voice, or a photographic or other visual prime with something playfully warped in it.

If these aren’t evidence of the priming effect of an RBI, what is?

Now take it one step further. The gap marked [X] in my flat-affect translation would read literally “centrifuging of the shit” or “spin-drying of the shit.” The idea is that you put the shit-covered core of the thing—the book, in this case—in a metaphorical centrifuge or spin-dryer and spin it until all the shit flies off and the core remains in the center, pure and pristine. The main reason this seems like a good example to me is that I’d never seen or heard this phrase before, and had to guess at it, based on the verb *lingota*, which can also mean “to sling.” “Slinging the shit” seemed to me to work pretty well, though I wasn’t sure it was what the author meant. I really needed a prime!

Since this is a highly kinesthetic metaphor, in fact, I suggest that we would also need to simulate it experimentally with a highly kinesthetic prime: a photograph or video of an Olympic athlete midway through the windup for the hammer throw, for example. A video of a centrifuge might work as well—or of a dryer in the spin cycle, especially one that does a lot of bouncing around. (Kent 2009 might call this a “chronotopic” prime.) The idea would be to get the translator-subject to *feel the spin with her/his whole body*.

You might want to say that a whole-body experience is not the bailiwick of the RBI, which is trapped up there in the right brain; but that’s the wrong way to think about it. When your body moves, other people experience it visually; when you *feel* your own body moving, by contrast—not kinesis but kin-*esthesia*, the *feeling* of movement—the feeling (called proprioception) is managed in the primary somatosensory cortex on the opposite side of the brain: right hemisphere for movement on the left side of the body, left hemisphere for movement on the right side. This means that most split-brain patients would be able to access kinesthetic/proprioceptive sense-data (thalamocortical projections) in the dominant hemisphere but not the nondominant one. Since the central nervous system (CNS) integrates proprioception with visual and vestibular data, a split-brain patient might be able to *feel, see, and report* her right arm moving but only be able to report *seeing* her left arm moving. S/he might be able to feel it, but would not be able to report the feeling. While obviously not confined to the right cerebral hemisphere only, however, the fact that proprioception guides and primes without the LBI’s help might justify using the concept of the RBI loosely to describe its guidance.

What about the Collective Full-Brain Interpreter or CFBI, then? For that, let’s look at my translation of the paragraph:

All winter I slog through that swamp day after day, still without clue number one of how I should be writing this book. I'm so frustrated I could scream. I try to focus on what my painter friend Jyrki said—that this stage of the work, what is called *slinging the shit*, is an unavoidable part of the process, and the key to the whole profession is how you get through it. I'm obviously not getting through it. And because I've voluntarily isolated myself in a total social vacuum, I lie there evenings watching TV in a state of advanced self-loathing. It's almost as if I'm depressed. But how the hell could I be depressed? I'm living the fucking *dream*! (Robinson 2020b: 339)

The leading edge of the CFBI, as I began to suggest earlier, is social accommodation: I sent this translation to Mia and she responded, and I responded to her responses, and we kept going back and forth until we reached a mutually satisfactory solution. To my translation of [X], “slinging the shit,” she wrote the description of the centrifugal spinning that I used above, but added “mutta tämä ehkä ok?” (“but maybe this is ok?”). I wasn't entirely satisfied with “slinging the shit,” but couldn't think of anything better, so I described my sense of the phrase and said I was inclined to stick with it, and she agreed. To my translation of [Y], on the other hand, she wrote “Ai että kun on ihanasti käännetty tämä, naurattaa enemmän kuin alkuperäinen” (“How wonderfully translated this is, makes me laugh more than the original”).

So I had initially guessed that she was going for playful exaggeration, and with “laugh more than the original” she confirmed that: her original Finnish phrase made her laugh, but my translation made her laugh harder. Does her approval make the translation “right,” or “good”? Not necessarily. What it means, at least for the purpose of this illustration, is that the CFBI that I've built out of my interactions with her gave me reliable guidance. I was guessing not just that *she* was going for playful exaggeration, but that *we* were. In the terms I developed in *Feeling Extended* (Robinson 2013a), there is an authorial/translatorial persona that is probably intracranial but *feels* intercranial—like Mia and I have been swapping qualia across the ether, and that one morning across the tea table as well. In other words, it may technically be lodged inside my skull (it's a *full-brain* interpreter) but it feels like both of us (it's *collective*).

And yet another step: what would the editor at Simon & Schuster say? Would she accept “slinging the shit” and “living the fucking *dream*”? She did. She only made one tiny edit in that paragraph: she changed “still without clue number one of how I should be writing this book” to “still without a clue of how I should be writing this book.” Why? “A clue” is more *common* than “clue number one.” It's a common idiom, a commonplace. It has been shaped by the hundreds of millions. The editor's CFBI told her that the more ordinary usage suited the context better than mine did—mine presumably seeming over the top to her.

How did I feel about that? Since I hadn't interacted with her much, I hadn't had a chance to build a joint editorial/translatorial persona with her in my own head; but I too am part of the hundreds of millions American speakers using the phrase “I still don't have a clue.” And I recognized that, while “clue number one” is arguably livelier than “a clue,” it's also more



vulnerable to accusations of cuteness or preciousity. I decided the editor was smart to play it safe—especially because she toned my phrasings down sparingly. She mostly liked them.

The fact that she didn't balk at [X] "shit" and [Y] "fucking," too, says something about the ideological forces working in the background, channeled into both the editor's decision-making through her CFBI and into mine through my CFBI. They are taboo words that would not have been allowed into a Simon & Schuster book in the late fifties, when I was little. Presumably the editor has a much clearer sense than I do of how far she can let an author or a translator push the envelope with words that once were and still sort of are taboo in a Simon & Schuster book.

## The Structure of the Book

Martin Heidegger famously wrote that "Die Sprache spricht" (1950/1986: 16): language speaks. In the terms I'm developing here, that might be translated "The LBI speaks." Later Heidegger adds that "Der Mensch spricht, insofern er der Sprache entspricht" (33). Alfred Hofstadter translated as "Man speaks in that he responds to language" (1971: 210), but I suggest that for our purposes here it might be translated "Humans speak insofar as they are primed by the LBI."

But of course my shift to the plural there—"humans" and "they are"—is undeniably primed by my profeminist CFBI, which takes *der Mensch* to be somewhat more inclusive, even in Heidegger, than Alfred Hofstadter was willing to make it in 1971; and the priming or "speaking" of that CFBI is signaled to me by the tiny shudder I feel as I read "*Man* speaks in that *he* responds," which is to say that the "speaking" of the profeminist CFBI in me primes my RBI to send me a somatic signal designed to prime the translating job that my LBI undertakes. Heidegger's formula might be expanded, therefore, along these lines:

The LBI speaks, and humans speak insofar as they are primed by the LBI. But the LBI that primes their speaking is itself primed by the RBI, which in turn is primed by the CFBI. Human utterances of all sorts, and more broadly all human communicative and cognitive acts, are primed by an oversaturated heteroglot channel of mental interpreters.

In very broad strokes, at the level of the three Parts, that is the book's structure: Part I on the LBI, Part II on the RBI, Part III on the CFBI. Because the LBI is in almost every way the most obvious of the three, even the most insistent, and so has received the most attention from Gazzaniga and other cognitive neuroscientists, I have the least to say about it. Part I consists of only one chapter, on the LBI priming of monolingual speech and the LBI priming of translation (and translation studies). "Humans speak insofar as they are primed by the LBI." This account also introduces Gazzaniga's Interpreter Theory and attempts to provide a back-story to the existing translational priming studies, which tend to begin with formal linguistic features (morphology, syntax, and semantics) and end with translator decisions. The reigning assumption in those studies seems to be that translation is all about language, and language is all about formal features, and those formal features have no sociocultural history. They are simply stable

ontological objects that can be described scientifically. Martin Heidegger's famous post-Romantic attempt to retrieve "language" from the prison of scientific objectivity and infuse it with agency takes one step past those earlier priming studies, but a fairly cautious one; this book, and Part I/Chapter 1 in particular, seeks to push us several more steps in the same direction. The chapter offers two sets of recommendations for "priming translation," one based on the notion that "overtranslation" or "amplification" in translation might be a kind of LBI-primed confabulation, the other on normative translation (studies) as primed by the LBI.

Part II on the RBI is the longest in the book, with four chapters—Chapter 2 introducing the RBI, Chapter 3 exploring its evolutionary origins and function, Chapter 4 reviewing the empirical research into autism spectrum disorders as emerging out of a breakdown of the RBI, and Chapter 5 comparing the RBI-based semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce and the RBI-based semiology of Ferdinand de Saussure. The focus on affective priming in this part displays both a strong convergence with and a strong divergence from Séverine Hubscher-Davidson's *Translation and Emotion* (2017). Both are obvious from her introductory description of the book's aim as "to demonstrate the implications of emotionality for translation work and to explore the relevance and influence of emotions in translation by focusing on specific emotion traits" (2): influence would be RBI priming, but the RBI as I theorize it primes not only through emotions but through other affects<sup>3</sup> (hopes and fears, belief and doubt, approval and disapproval, etc.), conations (motivations, inclinations, etc.), and kinesthetic orientations. I track Hubscher-Davidson's (2013, 2017) review of trait emotional intelligence research in language learning and translation in the second section of Chapter 2 (pp. 00-00).

The "priming translation" sections in the chapters of Part II include priming recommendations based on:

- (Chapter 2) Carol Maier's (2006) discussion of the translator as *theôros*
- (Chapter 3, first) the affective body language involved in speaking another language and (second) the double-binds of translation
- (Chapter 4) the differences between affect-rich and affect-poor translations of Finland's greatest novel
- (Chapter 5, first) multimodal translations of *Inside Out* and (second) translating as performing indirect/periperformative speech acts, with a focus on Annie Brisset's 1991 account of Michel Garneau's 1978 Québécois translation of *Macbeth*

Part III on the CFBI consists of two chapters: Chapter 6 on Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia, with a section on "Heteroglot CFBI Anchors and Primes for Cognitive Translation Research," and Chapter 7 on the "sharing" of a normativizing Interpreter with other people, including a discussion of priming and what Daniel Kahneman (2013) calls "the associative machine" as themselves made possible by the CFBI, with a final "priming translation" section working with "high-money" and "high-love" primes.

We end, finally, with a Conclusion linking the birth of these various Interpreters out of habit to the two different directions in which one might read the book: from the Interpreter Theory to priming research or from priming research to the Interpreter Theory.

Another aspect of the book's structure is that each section is labeled either in italics as an "*Empirical Research Review*," "*Theory*," or "*Anecdote*," or in bold as "**Ideas for Research**." For the most part the contents of the sections identified with italicized labels construct the general cognitive-scientific orientation to the Interpreter Theory in its three instantiations (LBI, RBI, CFBI), and the contents of the sections identified with bolded labels tie the cognitive science that precedes them to translation research, first to general research that links translation to the cognitive-science research in previous sections, then to recommendations for mobilizing the preceding for empirical priming research into translation.

Thinking of the book in this latter way made me consider titling it "Priming Translation: A Guide to Research." For reasons that I spell out in the final section of Chapter 7 and the Conclusion, however, I decided against that. This book can be used as a guide to research, but I didn't want that pragmatic instrumentalization of its contents to overpower the bigger 4EA-cogsci picture mapped out by the expanded Interpreter Theory. Both the big picture and the narrower focus on priming studies of translation are important—and ideally each should inform the other.

## References

- Alves, Fabio. 2019. "Foreword." In García 2019: xi-xiii.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1934-35/1981. "Discourse in the Novel." Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. In Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, 259-422. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Brisset, Annie. 1991. "Translation and Social Discourse: Shakespear, A Playwright After Québec's Heart." In Mildred L. Larson, ed., *Translation: Theory and Practice, Tension and Interdependence*, 120-38. American Translators Association Scholarly Monograph Series V. Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
- de Groot, Annette M.B. 1997. "The Cognitive Study of Translation and Interpretation: Three Approaches." In Joseph H. Danks, Gregory M. Shreve, Stephen B. Fountain, and Michael McBeath, eds., *Cognitive Processes in Translation and Interpreting*, 25-56. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Duke, James, and Jack Forstman, trans. 1977. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*. Translation of Schleiermacher 1959. Atlanta, GA: Scholars.
- Forster, Michael N. 2002a. "Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher." In Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Online at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schleiermacher/>. Accessed February 16, 2013.
- Forster, Michael N. 2002b. "Herder's Philosophy of Language, Interpretation, and Translation: Three Fundamental Principles." *The Review of Metaphysics* 56.2 (December): 323-56.

- Forster, Michael N., ed. and trans. 2002c. *Herder: Philosophical Writings*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Forster, Michael N. 2005. "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics: Some Problems and Solutions." *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* 13.1 (Spring): 100-22.
- Forster, Michael N. nd. "Hermeneutics." Online at <http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/forster/HERM.pdf>. Accessed October 16, 2019.
- García, Adolfo M. 2019. *The Neurocognition of Translation and Interpreting*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Garneau, Michel, trans. 1978. William Shakespeare, *Macbeth: traduit en quebecois par Michel Garneau*. Montréal, QB: Vlb Éditeur.
- Hatim, Basil, and Ian Mason. 1990. *Discourse and the Translator*. London, UK: Longman.
- Heidegger, Martin. 1950/1986. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Pfullingen, Germany: Neske.
- Henderson, John. 1987. *Personality and the Linguist*. Bradford, UK: Bradford University Press.
- Herder, Johann Gottfried. 1774/1967. *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*. Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Hofstadter, Alfred, trans. 1971. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translation of Heidegger 1950/1986. New York: HarperCollins.
- Hubscher-Davidson, Séverine. 2013. "Emotional Intelligence and Translation Studies: A New Bridge." *Meta* 58.2: 324-46.
- Hubscher-Davidson, Séverine. 2017. *Translation and Emotion: A Psychological Perspective*. London, UK, and New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kahneman, Daniel. 2013. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. London, UK: Penguin.
- Kankimäki, Mia. 2018. *Naiset joita ajattelen öisin* ["Women I Think About at Night"]. Helsinki, Finland: Otava.
- Kent, Stephanie Jo. 2009. "Novelizing Simultaneous Interpretation: Timespace positioning and real life chronotopic calibration." Online at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269167677>. Accessed October 6, 2019.
- Maier, Carol. 2006. "The Translator as Theorêt: Thoughts on Cogitation, Figuration, and Current Creative Writing." In Theo Hermans, ed., *Translating Others*, 163-80. Manchester, UK: St. Jerome.
- Robinson, Douglas. 1991. *The Translator's Turn*. Baltimore, MD, and London, UK: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2003. *Performative Linguistics: Speaking and Translating as Doing Things with Words*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2006a. *Introducing Performative Pragmatics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2008. *Estrangement and the Somatics of Literature: Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht*. Baltimore, MD, and London, UK: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Robinson, Douglas. 2013a. *Displacement and the Somatics of Postcolonial Culture*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2013b. *Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2013c. *Schleiermacher's Icoses: Social Ecologies of the Different Methods of Translating*. Bucharest: Zeta Books.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2016a. *The Deep Ecology of Rhetoric in Mencius and Aristotle*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2016b. *Semiotranslating Peirce*. Tartu Semiotics Library 17. Tartu, Estonia: University of Tartu Press.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2017a. *Aleksis Kivi and/as World Literature*. Leiden, Netherlands, and Boston, MA: Brill.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2017c. *Critical Translation Studies*. London, UK, and Singapore: Routledge.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2017d. *Translationality: Essays in the Translational-Medical Humanities*. London, UK, and Singapore: Routledge.
- Robinson, Douglas. 2019. *Transgender, Translation, Translingual Address*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Robinson, Douglas, trans. 2020b. Mia Kankimäki, *the Women I Think About at Night*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Schaeffer, Moritz, and Michael Carl. 2015. "Shared Representations and the Translation Process: A Recursive Model." In Maureen Ehrensberger-Dow, Birgitta Englund Dimitrova, Séverine Hubscher-Davidson, and Ulf Norberg, eds., *Describing Cognitive Processes in Translation: Acts and Events*, 21-42. Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1959. *Hermeneutik, nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Heinz Kimmerle*. Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Winter.

## Notes

---

<sup>1</sup> For the development of my somatic theory, see Robinson (1991, 2008, and 2013a). Ictic theory began to emerge as an extension of somatic theory in early drafts (from about 2009) of what eventually became Robinson (2016a); see also Robinson (2013b, 2013c, 2016b, 2017a, 2017c, 2017d, and 2019).

<sup>2</sup> For the actual quotation about "feeling your way into everything," see Herder (1774/1967: 37, Forster 2002c: 292 in English); for Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, see Schleiermacher (1959, Duke and Forstman 1977 in English); for further discussion, see Forster (nd, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) and Robinson (2013c: 28-29).

---

<sup>3</sup> Hubscher-Davidson (2017: 12) uses the terms *affect*, *emotion*, and *feeling* synonymously; in other work I use the neo-Jamesian affective-neuroscience distinction between *emotion* as a body state and *feeling* as a cognitive mapping of that state, but here use *affect* very broadly to cover right-brain arousals that *affect* (elicit and shape) action. Pragmatically our terminological usages in this realm are ultimately congruent: “The following chapters,” Hubscher-Davidson writes, “combine research from the study of long-term *affect* with short-term fluctuations in emotion in order to obtain a more integrated view of translators’ emotional processes” (13). The main difference there is that I am less determined “to obtain a *more integrated view* of translators’ emotional processes”: this FOCUS monograph employs a hit-or-miss shotgun approach.