

# **Independent Assessment of International Support to the Whole Security Environment in Somalia Post-2021**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Somalia is forming a nation and building a state in a regional and international context that is characterised by uncertainty, change, conflict and competition. It needs to be recognised, in this context, that Somali agency is undermined by a number of exogenous factors and influences. At the same time, Somalia is struggling to recover from a legacy of state fragility and collapse. Somalia's statebuilding project has to overcome a complex set of challenges, including highly fragmented clan politics, low public trust in state institutions, endemic corruption and a jihadist terrorist insurgency.

Despite considerable progress in various areas, especially when measured against the complete absence of the state only 16 years ago, there is a gap of expectations between the investment the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and international partners made to achieve and maintain the current degree of stability, and the level of state authority achieved to date. This has resulted in a sense of disappointment among all stakeholders. Frustrations have been further exacerbated by slow progress on the transition towards Somali security forces (SSF) taking over security responsibility from AMISOM and the lack of significant offensive operations by AMISOM in recent years. A divergence between the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners' expectations and the reality of what AMISOM can deliver in the current context and configuration remains a source of grievances for all.

Despite manifest improvements, the Somali state is not yet in a position to take full responsibility for its own security. Somalia will thus continue to need international support to protect the state from Al Shabaab and other armed groups, and to help build state capacity until it is able to take full responsibility for its own security.

International support for Somalia is, however, likely to contract over the coming years and even in the more immediate term as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the global economic recession it has caused. Maintaining a sizeable international security operation in Somalia is not sustainable over the long run. Somalia thus has a relatively short window of opportunity over the next 5 years during which it should make maximum use of the international support available, before an international security operation is likely to be withdrawn, and before international support for capacity building may be significantly reduced.

International support for security and stabilisation in Somalia cannot be effective without a reliable partner. Somalia's political leaders need to closely collaborate and forge inclusive political agreements to develop and adopt clear and realistic statebuilding plans, including the finalization of the constitution so that there can be a well-defined legal and political foundation around which Somali federal and member state institutions, including security institutions, can be developed and supported. The degree to which Somalia can attract international security support, and the scope of that support, will depend on the extent to which there are a Somali leadership, vision and a clear pathway for making tangible progress with the Somali statebuilding project over the next 5 years.

The most immediate security and stability threat Somalia has to manage is the threat to the state and the Somali people posed by Al Shabaab and other armed and criminal groups. The threat from Al Shabaab has changed significantly over the last decade. Whilst Al Shabaab still poses an existential threat to the state, the nature of the threat has changed. It has morphed from being primarily a military threat to the state, its institutions and international partners, to be a terrorist, hybrid and asymmetric threat, including to other countries in the region and beyond. Currently, Al Shabaab operates more effectively as a terrorist and organised criminal organisation than it does as a military force.

The more enduring challenge is to address those political and governance factors that make it possible for Al Shabaab and other armed and criminal groups to prey on the Somali people. The first is the lack of a clear, stable and predictable political project. The second is weaknesses and gaps related to basic public administration and the provision of basic services, justice and law enforcement; and the inability of the state to protect its people. The third is the degree to which the already weak social contract is further undermined by prevalent corruption. Clan politics and the systematic discrimination of minorities further complicate the relationship between citizens and the state. The fourth is the degree to which the political elite is perceived to act in their personal or clan interests and, at times, under external influence. The fact that the government is dependent on foreign forces further strengthens this narrative. Addressing these political, security and governance challenges are key to reducing support for and countering Al Shabaab over the medium- to long-term.

International security support has been provided by AMISOM, with support from the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the European Union (EU) and international partners; Ethiopian, Kenyan, the United States and more recently Ugandan bilateral forces; a wide range of international partners including the EU, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States who are engaged in training, equipping and advising military units; and a large number of other international partners that contribute to the AMISOM and Somalia Security Forces (SSF) trust funds or who contribute in other ways to support Somalia's civilian stabilisation efforts, police or military capabilities.

Although there is broad recognition that military action cannot be the only solution, both the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners have been focussing their main effort on developing military capabilities. While military action against Al Shabaab can create temporary opportunities for stability, sustainable security and stability can only be realised by the provision of governance services, including public administration, law enforcement and justice. Sustainable security and stability will not be achieved unless these civilian stabilisation and governance dimensions receives the same degree of attention as the military dimension by the Federal Government, the Federal Member States and international partners.

To counter the hybrid Al Shabaab of today, the Somali state and international partners will have to shift their approach to security from a predominantly state-centric, military-heavy and territorial (clear-hold-build) counter insurgency concept to a more balanced approach that gives much more attention to people-centric, governance, preventing and countering violent extremism and organised crime dimensions of a comprehensive approach.

The capacity building provided by the various international partners needs to be more effectively coordinated with the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to ensure that it is in line with Somalia's long-term plans for the SSF, security sector reform initiatives as well as its short- to medium-term statebuilding, civilian stabilisation and

governance plans. The military, police and related civilian capabilities that are being developed through these programmes need to be appropriate for the security threats that Somalia will have to manage in the future, including the hybrid terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab. In addition, coordination among the partners remains key and should be further strengthened to ensure a coherent approach in supporting Somalia's security forces and institutions.

AMISOM has successfully achieved its core mandate of protecting the Somali state and international partners over the past 13 years and enabled the political and federal state-formation processes to take shape. However, it has become over-extended and it has not been able to make significant new gains in the last few years, with the exception of Operation Baadbaado in Lower Shabelle and, in particular, the capture of Janaale.

The independent assessment considered the full spectrum of possible options for an international security operation in Somalia beyond 2021, ranging from a United Nations (UN) stabilisation operation, a joint AU-UN operation, an ad hoc regional coalition and a reconfigured AMISOM. Having considered this spectrum of options, the independent assessment views a reconfigured AMISOM as the most viable option for providing an international security operation capable of protecting the Somalia state and international partners, disrupting Al Shabaab and other threats, and operating in support of the SSF.

Regardless of which option is ultimately chosen, the requirement is for an international security operation that can support Somalia's stability, protect the FGS and FMS against Al Shabaab and other threats, enable the SSF to progressively become the main operational component, and to support the SSF until it is able to take over full responsibility for Somalia's security. The design of an international security operation would need to take into account the changed threat environment, new operational roles (enabling support), a new mindset (SSF as the main operational element), as well as the need to better support the SSF to take over responsibility for its own security.

This implies that a post-2021 international operation should be adapted to serve as an exoskeleton that enables and enhances SSF operations. Supporting and enabling Somali National Army operations implies a range of combat support functions, including force projection; intelligence and counter-intelligence; preventing and countering IED; surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting; command and communications support; civil-military coordination; medical evacuation and combat logistics. Supporting and enabling the SSF and civilian stabilisation and governance functions will require relevant civilian and police planning and liaison functions, joint police operations, providing security escorts, specialised investigation expertise and community policing support.

Such an operation should be designed to temporarily overcome the operational challenges that undermine the ability of the Federal and Member State governments to deploy their own military, police and civilian stabilisation assets, so that their planning and support capabilities can be used to deploy and sustain the SSF and their civilian stabilisation counterparts and can be employed to support SSF operations and civilian stabilisation and governance initiatives.

The support an international security operation provides to the SSF should be reduced over time, in step with the capabilities and experience gained. A detailed transition plan will need to be developed, but in principle, this should be a phased process, where the SSF progressively assumes greater responsibility for security. In the initial phases, the Somali National Army will operate alongside or be embedded in the international operation, but progressively they should

become the main operational component until eventually they take over lead responsibility. The international operation's support should gradually be reduced over time.

Some of Somalia's immediate neighbours and the United States have deployed bilateral military forces in Somalia that are making valuable contributions to Somalia's security and stability. It would be important to continue to align the support of these bilateral forces with Somalia's own security vision and statebuilding goals and to proactively involve these forces in analysis, planning, coordination and assessment processes.

The capacity building provided by the various international partners has been primarily devoted to training and equipping military and police staff. Based on the hybrid terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab, more emphasis will in the future need to be devoted to developing capabilities such as preventing and countering IED, counter-terrorism intelligence and operations, preventing- and countering violent extremism programming, organised crime intelligence, investigations and operations, financial crime, community policing, comprehensive approach planning and planning and managing joint operations.

International partners need to significantly increase their investment in public administration, basic services, law enforcement, and justice, including assisting the relevant FGS and FMS institutions to employ, prepare, direct and sustain the civilian personnel required to carry out these functions.

In order to ensure that international security support is aligned behind a Somali-led stabilisation and statebuilding vision and plans, a joint fusion cell should be established that will ensure that the combined civilian, police and military effort is joined-up, comprehensive, coherent and synchronised. Such a coordination mechanism needs to ensure that the overall process benefits from joint intelligence and analysis, joint planning, operational coordination, joint performance assessment and close synchronisation with capacity building efforts.

A regional stability pact could serve as a high-level political and security forum, anchored in an annual Heads of State and Government summit, where a regional political and security framework that endorses and supports the Somali government's vision can be agreed, emerging problems addressed, and progress can be assessed. Regional consensus on the objectives of engagement can be produced and this could generate high-level political attention and focus on Somalia's strategic vision and its interlinkages with regional and broader international security drivers.

The independent assessment encourages the Somali government and all international partners to increase their efforts to ensure that the military, police and civilian capacities being developed and deployed are appropriately gendered and that the operations they undertake are gender sensitive and rights-based.

Ultimately, the two overarching strategic objectives that should guide international support to the whole security environment in Somalia are firstly to encourage and enable a functioning federal system, and secondly to enhance the capacity and support the operational effectiveness of federal and member state military, police, civilian stabilisation and related government functions, and their ability to collectively and cumulatively generate and maintain stability and build the Somali state.

The overarching principle that should guide international security support to Somalia is to transfer maximum security responsibility to the appropriate FGS and FMS authorities. However, any changes in the mandate, role and capacity of AMISOM, and any adaptations to international security support beyond 2021 need to ensure that the strategic gains made to date are protected and consolidated, and need to avoid increasing risk to the Somali people and state, and their international partners.

## INTRODUCTION

1. The Somali state has not been able to achieve full control over its territory since at least 1990. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2004-2012) and subsequently a Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established over the last decade and a half with the help of the international community, and in particular the protection of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
2. At great cost, AMISOM recovered the capital and other strategic population centres from Al Shabaab, and provided the security that has enabled the Somali people and federal and member state governments to start rebuilding the Somali state. AMISOM's sacrifices also enabled Somalia's international partners to re-engage and to establish a presence in the main urban centers of Somalia.
3. The FGS remains dependent on international support in almost all critical areas of governance, including support to build the capacity of the Somali Security Forces (SSF), which include the Somali Police Force (SPF) and the Somali National Army (SNA). Considerable progress has been made in various areas, especially when measured against the complete absence of the state before 2004. However, the discrepancy between the sacrifices AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and the SNA made to achieve and maintain the current degree of stability, the significant international support invested over the last decade and a half, and the level of self-sustainable state authority achieved to date, has resulted in a sense of disappointment and frustration among the Somali population, government, AMISOM and international partners.
4. The sense of frustration has increased over the years, but two recent developments, in particular, contributed to this disappointment. Firstly, Somalia was scheduled to elect a new Federal Parliament in 2020 and select a new President in 2021. This would have represented the third peaceful transfer of power since the establishment of the TFG, the second since the establishment of the FGS in 2012 and the first one-person-one-vote election since 1969. Instead, the electoral timetable has experienced delays, will once again take the form of an enhanced indirect electoral process based on the 4.5 clan formula. There was hope that the election would be a symbol of progress and another milestone in the consolidation of Somalia's statebuilding project, but instead the electoral process thus far has revealed how vulnerable the political process is in the absence of an agreed constitution as well as strong and independent judicial and other institutions through which the rule of law can be enforced. Secondly, according to the Somali Transition Plan, Somali security forces and institutions were supposed to take over lead responsibility for security from AMISOM in 2021. Notwithstanding progress in some areas, it is clear at this stage that the Somali security forces will not yet be in a position to take lead responsibility for security in 2021. The timelines that are foreseen for the drawdown and withdrawal of AMISOM, which has already started, will thus have to be reviewed and adjusted accordingly.
5. In this context, the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment, by 10 January 2021, and present options to the Security Council on international support to the whole security environment in Somalia post-2021, including the role of the UN, AU and international partners, and after consultations with the FGS,

AU and international partners on their respective views (Resolution 2520 of 29 May 2020), as well as options on United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia's (UNSOM) role in this regard (Resolution 2540 of 28 August 2020).

## **METHODOLOGY**

6. The Secretary-General appointed Lieutenant General Carlos Santos Cruz of Brazil to lead the independent assessment team. He has been supported by Dr. Annette Weber of Germany and Dr. Cedric de Coning of South Africa. The UN Secretariat provided facilitative support to the team's work. The independent assessment team has undertaken its work between late September and early December 2020.
7. The independent assessment team has analysed current and anticipated progress on the transition, the security situation on the ground, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other non-state armed opposition groups, Somali security capacities, and the availability of international resources and support. The team has considered the experience, achievements and challenges of the Somali security forces, AMISOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and other international partners to date.
8. The situation in Somalia and the region is highly dynamic. Whilst the independent assessment was undertaken from October to December 2020, there were several terrorist attacks in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia; the United States announced that it will withdraw most of its military personnel from Somalia; a conflict erupted in Ethiopia with implications for AMISOM and Ethiopia's bilateral forces in Somalia; Somalia severed diplomatic ties with Kenya, and election related tensions in Somalia started to increase. The mandate of the independent assessment - to present options to the Security Council on international support to the whole security environment in Somalia post-2021 – is focussed on the medium- to longer-term and therefore the independent assessment has focussed on identifying strategic principles and recommendations that are likely to remain broadly valid regardless of developments in the near future.
9. The assessment is based on an analysis of over 80 primary and secondary sources and a wide range of virtual meetings and interviews with approximately 100 key stakeholders, including representatives of the FGS, IGAD, AMISOM TCCs, UNSOM, UNSOS, UN Secretariat, Agencies, Funds and Programmes; the EU and other international partners, countries in the Horn of Africa and wider region including the Gulf, Security Council members, Somali civil society including women and youth, researchers and independent experts. The assessment team was unable to travel to Somalia and other locations due to constraints posed by the Covid-19 pandemic.
10. Regrettably, the AU Commission opted not to cooperate with the independent assessment, pursuant to the call of the AU Peace and Security Council, as per its Communique 949 of 24 September 2020, for the UN Security Council to agree on modalities for AU-UN co-leadership of the independent assessment. The AU Commission also instructed AMISOM not to cooperate with the independent assessment.

## **CONTEXT**

11. Somalia is forming a nation and building a state in a regional and international context that is characterised by uncertainty, change, conflict and competition. Seen in the context of significant regional and international pressure, influence and interference, Somalia and its people have shown remarkable resilience, ingenuity and creativity. With the heavy sacrifices made by AMISOM and the SSF, notable progress has been made over the last

decade. The next five years will be critical to consolidate the gains achieved and to use the opportunity the Somali leadership has now, to move the country beyond the tipping point and achieve self-sustainable statehood.

12. According to all the stakeholders interviewed, whilst Somali leadership and ownership are key, the Somali state is, for the time being, not yet able to take full responsibility for its own security. Somalia will thus need continued and sustained international security support, probably for at least another decade, to protect the state and to help build state capacity until it is able to take full responsibility for its own security.
13. However, politically and economically, international support for Somalia has already started to contract and this trend is likely to continue over the coming years, especially in the context of a post-Covid-19 global financial recession. Maintaining a sizeable international security force in Somalia is not sustainable. Somalia will thus probably have a relatively short window of opportunity during which it should make maximum use of the international support available, before an international security operation is likely to be withdrawn, and before international support for capacity building may be significantly reduced.

#### Causes of instability and insecurity

14. The most immediate security and stability threat Somalia has to manage is the threat to the state and the Somali people posed by Al Shabaab, which has evolved significantly over the last few years. Whilst Al Shabaab still poses an existential threat to the state, the nature of the threat has changed. It has morphed from being primarily a military threat to the survival of the Somali state, its institutions and international partners, to be a terrorist, hybrid and asymmetric threat to the security and stability of the region, and as a consequence, to international peace and security. In recent years up to ten thousand civilians have been killed by Al Shabaab, several hundred in neighbouring Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti. There is currently a court case underway in the United States, involving an Al Shabaab operative that planned a 9/11 style attack on a US city. A comprehensive Joint Threat Assessment, that was conducted by the FGS, UN and AU from October to December 2019, has found that Al Shabaab has increasingly avoided force-on-force combat and turned instead to terror attacks, including complex attacks that at times combine suicide and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices with ground assaults, both inside Somalia and in the region. Another serious threat posed by Al Shabaab is directed at undermining the Somali statebuilding project by carrying out attacks in government dominated areas, infiltrating Somali state institutions, including the security forces; by assassinating or otherwise exerting influence on Somali politicians, clan elders and officials. Al Shabaab also engages in a range of organised criminal activities, including in those areas under the nominal control of the Somali state, such as extortion. As documented in the recent report by the Panel of Experts, through these means Al Shabaab has been able to amass considerable income. At the same time, Al Shabaab is embedded in the Somali society, where it prescribes religious and social norms and provides basic administration, security and justice in the areas under its control. Currently, Al Shabaab thus operates more effectively as a terrorist and organised criminal organisation than it does as a military organisation.
15. The more enduring challenge is to address those political and governance factors that make it possible for Al Shabaab and other armed and criminal groups to prey on the Somali people. The first is the lack of a clear, stable and predictable political project. This includes the lack of clarity on whether Somalia is continuing to pursue federalism or whether some, at the highest levels in Somali politics, is now opting for a more centralist model. Without a shared political vision for Somalia's statebuilding project, anchored in a reviewed

constitution that provides the basis for an inclusive agreement on the federal state, the Somali political project lacks viability and legitimacy. The international community has invested a significant amount of blood and treasure over the last 20 years to support the Somali statebuilding project. It has facilitated the process that led to the formation of the transitional government, helped to install that government in Mogadishu, and is still supporting and protecting the FGS to this day. The degree to which this two-decade-long commitment is now being eroded and endangered is thus deeply disappointing and a cause of grave concern. The second is weaknesses and gaps related to basic public administration and the provision of basic services: justice and law enforcement; and the inability of the state to protect its people. The third is the degree to which the already weak social contract is further undermined by prevalent corruption. Clan politics and the systematic discrimination of minorities further complicate the relationship between citizens and the state. The fourth is the degree to which the political elite is perceived to be acting primarily in their own, own clan or foreign interests. The fact that the government is dependent on foreign forces for its survival further strengthens this narrative. Al Shabaab frames AMISOM and the bilateral forces in Somalia as ‘foreign Christian crusader forces’. Corruption, politicians that are perceived to be beholden to external influence and foreign occupation are widely seen as the most important reasons why Al Shabaab enjoys support among parts of the population. Al Shabaab also fills a governance vacuum in some areas, especially when it comes to justice and the provision of security. Addressing these political, security and governance challenges are thus key to defeating Al Shabaab over the medium- to long-term.

16. Overall, insecurity in Somalia emerges from a complex combination of interdependent internal and external drivers. Alongside insecurity, recurrent climate shocks have undermined community resilience and have been a major driver of displacement. In 2020, the triple threat of floods, COVID-19 and the worst Desert Locust upsurge Somalia has experienced in decades have compounded vulnerabilities. As a result, humanitarian needs in Somalia remain high and may further increase. The prevention and management of communal land and resource conflicts require conflict resolution mechanisms, which are currently provided by Al Shabaab and clan elders rather than state institutions. In the absence of fully functioning state and local structures, the clans remain the main social organisational element, which people rely on for services, including protection. However, the disenfranchisement of minority clans, and the marginalisation of women and youth from decision making processes, is an important driver of discontent that undermines social trust, peace and stability. Inclusive statebuilding and service provision therefore become a fundamental building block for both the legitimacy of the Somali state as well as the means to displace Al Shabaab and other armed groups.

#### Somali state and security capacity

17. In March 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have determined that Somalia has taken the necessary steps to begin receiving debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. When Somalia successfully reaches the HIPC Completion point in approximately 3 years, its external debt burden is expected to fall from about US\$5.2 billion to US\$557 million. Over this period Somalia will spend less revenue on servicing its debt and should have more revenue available to invest in governance, services and its own security forces.
18. As the HIPC process shows, considerable progress has been made over the last decade and a half and Somalia is now in a better position than it has ever been to consolidate its statebuilding project. However, as a result of the lack of clarity around the federal project,

uncertainty around the division of roles and responsibilities between the FGS and FMS, including on security, and lack of coherence in international support, the SSF has not been able to develop at the pace foreseen in the Somali transitional and related architectures and plans.

19. Continued uncertainty around whether the current administration is committed to the federal project undermines the development of Somali security forces, as a lack of clarity around the division of powers, roles and responsibility between the FGS and FMS makes it impossible to make predictable long-term plans regarding the training, deployment, location and sustainment of the security forces and civilian services. The plethora of poorly implemented security-related plans and the lack of clarity around security roles and responsibilities undermine the ability of the Somali state to muster a security capability that can protect itself or its citizens against Al Shabaab and other armed groups.
20. Although a significant number of soldiers has been, and continues to be trained, the FGS has, with a few exceptions, not been able to equip, deploy and sustain those trained according to the Somali transition and related plans. The SNA lacks unity of command because many of its units are associated with clan identities, officers are appointed and frequently changed based on clan or other political considerations and because the training of the SNA is undertaken by a number of international actors in an uncoordinated manner that undermines the overall cohesion of the SNA.
21. Considerable progress has been made with the biometric registration of all SNA personnel. However, a sizeable proportion of the estimated 19,000 to 24,000 strong SNA remains comprised of inactive personnel, including soldiers over retirement age, unfit for service, or dependents of soldiers that were killed or wounded in service. The progress that has been made to date with the passage in the parliament of the pensions and gratuity bill, is an important step towards the right-sizing of the Somali security forces and increasing fiscal space in the defence budget. Efforts should continue to ensure it is signed into law, affordability assessments are made and that financing mechanisms are in place.
22. Progress on police has been steady, although considerable challenges, especially political, remain towards the implementation of the New Policing Model. Although officially endorsed in 2016, residual resistance by the Somali leadership to the decentralised model still has to be overcome. The Somali Police Force is comprised of approximately 6,500 personnel, mostly hailing from one clan and concentrated in and around Mogadishu. However, many of the SPF personnel are not operational. The Darwish police forces do not perform classic community-oriented policing and investigation functions but should rather be seen as part of a wider militarised security capacity. Developing civilian policing capacities remains critical and efforts should be further enhanced, to ensure the establishment of a well-functioning federal and state police. In addition, to further strengthen basic police capacities, a focus should also be placed on developing the financial crime investigation capabilities of the police.

#### International security support

23. International security support has been provided by AMISOM, with support from UNSOS, the EU and international partners; Ethiopian, Kenyan, the United States and more recently Ugandan bilateral forces; a wide range of international partners including the European Union (EU), Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States who are engaged in training, equipping and advising military units and a large number of other international partners that contribute to the AMISOM and SSF trust funds or who contribute in other ways to support Somalia's civilian stabilisation efforts, police or military capabilities.

24. AMISOM has successfully achieved its core mandate of protecting the Somali state and international partners in Somalia over the past 13 years. With international support and together with other bilateral forces, AMISOM has successfully displaced Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and most of the major urban centres in southern and central Somalia. However, it is now over-extended and cannot make significant further gains without being relieved by the SSF from protecting those areas already liberated from Al Shabaab. The recent Operation Baadbaado in Lower Shabelle and, in particular, the capture of Janaale has shown how effective joint SNA and AMISOM operations can be when there are an agreed Somali-led plan and aligned international support.
25. UNSOM, in conjunction with international partners and AMISOM, provides support to the FGS and the FMS to accelerate the implementation of key security sector reforms, including a coherent National Security Architecture, delivery of the Somali-led Transition Plan, agreement on a federated justice and corrections model, and the establishment and strengthening of rule of law institutions. UNSOM is also mandated to support the FGS in coordinating international assistance to its security sector, including under the coordination framework provided by the Comprehensive Approach to Security and as agreed in the Security Pact adopted at the 2017 London Somalia Conference. UNSOS is a strategic enabler for AMISOM and SSF through the provision of non-lethal support.
26. Kenya and Ethiopia contribute troops bilaterally and through AMISOM, to protect and pursue their national security interests by degrading Al-Shabaab in Somalia and supporting the establishment of a stable Somalia. They also contribute to the overall Somali state-building project in a number of other ways, including by seconding experts and advisors into FGS and FMS ministries and agencies.
27. The US has been one of the most important providers of direct military support to Somalia. US contributions to the SSF Trust Fund have also been the mainstay of logistical support to the SSF. In addition to training Somali Danaab special forces units, its forces have also undertaken several operations alongside Danaab units against Al Shabaab in Somalia and it has used drone strikes to degrade Al Shabaab and to protect population centres and AMISOM operations. The US administration announced on 4 December 2020 that it will reposition the majority of its personnel and assets out of Somalia by early 2021, but it emphasised that this is a change in posture, not a change in policy of commitment, and that the US will retain the capability to conduct targeted counter terrorism operations in Somalia.
28. The EU is the largest financial contributor of international support to Somalia. In addition to supporting AMISOM with approximately €200 million euros per year, it also contributes to humanitarian assistance, civilian stabilisation, governance and peacebuilding, the training and capacity building of the SPF through its EUCAP mission, and the training and equipping of SNA units, and other support to SNA, via its EU Training Mission (EUTM). As a result of the UK leaving the EU, pressing needs elsewhere and changes to EU financing structures and decision-making due to take effect in 2021, it is anticipated that the EU's financial support for Somalia will continue to be under pressure and is most likely to gradually reduce over the coming years.
29. The independent assessment noted that apart from UNSOS, there were no women in the senior leadership of UNSOM, AMISOM, EUTM, EUCAPS and the other international partners. In the context of the UN Secretary-General's commitment to gender parity and global Women, Peace and Security norms, (UNSC Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions) this needs to be addressed.
30. There is a large number of international actors involved in the security and other sectors, and typically each actor tries to carve out a niche area with specific national counterpart institutions. This has resulted at times in duplication and competition, and has contributed

to the fragmentation of Somali institutions, including especially the SNA. Inadequate coordination among international partners undermines the overall capacity of the FGS, FMS and SSF to act coherently. Whilst there have been some improvements since the establishment of the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Strands in 2018, coordination and joint planning remains a major challenge.

#### Geopolitical dynamics and international partners

31. Somalia became an important space for geopolitical competition, influence and power projection in recent years. The main driving factors are its geo-political location and strategic ports, natural resources such as fish stocks, gas deposits and minerals, the threat to international trade-routes through the Bab el Mandeb and along the Somali coast due to piracy, and the risk of Al Shabaab to the region and jihadist mobility more generally. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are of strategic interest for several countries, including for China in the context of its One Belt One Road initiative, for India and especially for the Gulf countries. This increased interest in the maritime sphere around Somalia could lead to further insecurity, but it could also offer opportunities for the countries in the Horn of Africa, depending on how they position themselves.
32. Interference by external actors in Somali politics has undermined commitment to a common federal statebuilding project. However, the wider region is also a source of funding for training and equipping the SSF and investing in other aspects of statebuilding. Regional trade links and these additional sources of funding and partnerships for the Somali state should be integrated into any Somali strategy, especially since the regional links imply long-term strategic interest and thus more self-sustainable arrangements. The emergence of new alliances in the Horn of Africa, particularly between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia will have both security and political implications for Somalia and could also impact the role and influence of IGAD.

#### A militarised and territorial approach to security and stabilisation

33. Although there is broad recognition that military action cannot be the only solution the FGS and most international partners have primarily focussed on developing military capabilities. Whilst military action against Al Shabaab create temporary opportunities, sustainable security and stability can only be realised through civilian administration and services, security, law enforcement and justice. Gaining military control over territory has dislodged the formal Al Shabaab presence, but it has failed to disrupt their intimidation, extortion and influence over the people. This approach has thus not resulted in a significantly weakened Al Shabaab, nor has it resulted in a Somalia that is more secure and stable for its people.
34. As a result of this approach AMISOM and the SNA has been tied down for the last few years in a mostly static defensive posture to protect currently 77 Forward Operating Bases and population centres under the nominal control of the Somali state. The proposed solution, namely that Somalia, with international support, generates Somali security forces that can free-up AMISOM, so that AMISOM and the SNA can gain control over more territory, is unlikely to produce a different result from what has been achieved with this approach to date, unless it is combined with broader measures to sustain stability, improve governance and tackle the hybrid Al Shabaab threat.
35. The threat posed by Al Shabaab has changed significantly. Countering Al Shabaab through a theory of change that is mainly conceived around liberating territory from Al Shabaab via military means is likely to continue have low leverage on disrupting the capability of Al

Shabaab to survive and thrive as a terrorist and organised crime organisation and is thus unlikely to significantly improve stability and security in Somalia.

36. To counter the hybrid Al Shabaab of today, the Somali state and international partners will have to shift its theory of change from a predominantly state-centric, military-dominated and territorial (clear-hold-build) counter-insurgency approach to a more balanced approach that gives much more attention to a people-centred rights-based approach to governance that aims to strengthen rule of law and justice. The principal focus of Somali and international security operations should be to ensure effective and just rule of law and governance for the people of Somalia. The more the FGS and FMS succeed with this project the less space there will be for Al Shabaab. This will require significant additional investment in areas such as peacebuilding, community policing, preventing- and countering violent extremism, organised crime intelligence and investigation capabilities, and public administration, basic services, law enforcement and justice at state federal, member state and local government levels. It should also include measures to strengthen anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing, to ensure that an effective strategy is in place to disrupt Al Shabaab's finances.
37. This does not mean that there should be no focus on disrupting and degrading Al Shabaab and recovering strategic territory from the group, only that it should not be the primary theory of change. Strategic territory that still needs to be recovered includes, for instance, Lower and Middle Shabelle which are both critical for securing Mogadishu, and the main roads and strategic points in Middle Juba such as Buale, the official capital of Jubaland.

## **TOWARDS A STABLE AND SECURE SOMALIA**

38. A Somali-led strategic vision for the medium-term future (2021-2025), building on the Somali Transition Plan (as revised in 2020), the Security Pact (2017) and the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), as agreed at the Somali Partnership Forum (2019), with clear milestones will provide the FGS, FMS and related political stakeholders with a political framework and time-table around which they can address outstanding issues, including the finalization of the constitutional review process. This will help the FGS and FMS to develop further clarity around the division of roles and responsibilities, including those related to the security institutions. Having shared strategic stabilisation and statebuilding goals may help to motivate the FGS and FMS to address those outstanding issues needed to make progress with the development and operationalisation of the SSF and to organise the next cycle of elections.
39. Somalia's political leaders need to formulate a clear strategic vision for what the state wants to achieve over the next electoral cycle in Somalia's statebuilding project. Such a vision needs to be accompanied by a matching plan with well-defined benchmarks as well as a process to generate, monitor and sustain political will, capacities and resources, at least up to 2025. Such a vision needs to emerge from a Somali-led process, and a dialogue involving the regional and other international actors. In this regard, the 2020 update of the Somali Transition Plan is a welcome and commendable step in the right direction, but it still falls short of locating, what is essentially an operational concept, within a larger political strategic vision, nor does it amount to an actionable plan that can be operationalised without further elaboration. Clear benchmarks and a timeline to evaluate progress are critical elements, already endorsed in the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) but so far not acted upon.

40. One scenario, as an example of what such a vision could look like, could be to align all governance, stabilisation, statebuilding and security efforts behind a joint whole-of-government effort to successfully and safely conduct local and regional government elections in all the major population centres in line with the regional electoral timelines, followed by the first direct general election in 2025. Successfully organising the first one-person-one-vote general elections in 2025, preceded by local and regional elections, in all the major population centres under the control of the FGS and FMS, would be a significant milestone, signal substantive progress in the Somali statebuilding project, and build national confidence and pride in Somalia. It will also represent a significant defeat for Al Shabaab, as it would signal their inability to disrupt the federal statebuilding project and it will go some way to convincing the Somali population that the Somali state is a viable alternative to Al Shabaab.
41. Such a vision can also serve as a platform around which civil society, the business community and the diaspora can be engaged. Their support would be critical for the successful achievement of such a vision. Aligning the security plans to support such an electoral-driven political statebuilding strategy will also help ensure that focus shifts away from a short-term focus on defeating Al Shabaab towards a medium- and long-term vision for building the Somali political and civil governance capabilities that will be needed to make Al Shabaab irrelevant. This example is shared to stimulate reflections on how linking stabilisation and security goals to an election timetable may create the public interest and engagement, and the political energy necessary to address outstanding issues and stimulate FGS and FMS cooperation. However, increased election-related tensions and even violence are also a risk that needs to be factored into such a scenario.
42. Building a self-sustainable Somali state will require a sustained and coordinated whole-of-system approach that aligns and integrates a comprehensive international political, development and security support effort with a Somalia-led federal and member state agreed statebuilding vision and plan.

## **INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT TO SOMALIA BEYOND 2021**

43. The two overarching strategic objectives that should guide international security support to Somalia are firstly to encourage and enable a functioning federal system, and secondly to enhance the capacity and support the operational effectiveness of federal and member state military, police, civilian stabilisation and related government functions, and their ability to collectively and cumulatively generate and maintain security and stability and build the Somali state. The overarching principle that should guide international security support is to transfer the maximum possible security responsibility to the appropriate Somali federal and member state authorities.
44. International security support to Somalia beyond 2021 will be needed in two areas. Firstly, an international security operation will need to support Somalia's security and stability and protect the FGS and FMS as well as the international presence against Al Shabaab and other threats. Secondly, international partners are needed to help generate, deploy and sustain SSF and the civilian stabilisation and related governance capabilities needed to ensure basic security and stability. The more progress achieved with the latter the less will be needed of the former.
45. The UN, AU and other international partners should continue to provide the FGS and FMS with advice and support that can enable the development and continuous adaptation of Somali strategic plans, policies and operations, but they need to adapt the knowledge and expertise offered to ensure that their advice remains relevant for the changing threat

landscape and increase investment needed in peacebuilding and the civilian and governance dimensions of stabilisation.

### Stabilisation and governance

46. The centre of gravity for defeating Al Shabaab and for establishing a self-sustainable Somali state is effective governance, law enforcement and justice. The Somali government and their international partners need to significantly increase their investment in public administration, basic services, law enforcement, and justice. The core services that the FGS and FMS need to advance in each FMS are local and district administration, law enforcement, justice and basic services (water and sanitation, health and education). These need to be complemented by programmes aimed at peacebuilding, preventing and countering violent extremism, community violence reduction programmes, community policing and other initiatives that are specifically aimed at disrupting the ability of Al Shabaab to intimidate, extort and influence the Somali people living in the areas under Somali state control, while restoring trust in the state structures and rule of law. The relevant FGS and FMS institutions need to further develop the capacity to employ, prepare, direct and sustain the personnel required to carry out these functions.
47. Among the international partners, the UN should lead on coordinating as well as providing enabling advice and support, including via programming, for peacebuilding and civilian stabilisation, with international and national partners providing support in the domains where they have relevant expertise. An international security operation should protect and enable civilian stabilisation and related governance functions, and the operation should have appropriate civilian personnel to advise the mission leadership on its role and responsibilities, to participate in planning, assessment and related processes and to liaise with the relevant Somali agencies and other international partners. Other international partners should significantly increase their support to the relevant FGS and FMS agencies with capacity building, institutional support and enabling programmatic support.
48. The independent assessment took note that the Peacebuilding Fund will allocate 50% of its funding in the coming five years to programmes aimed at increasing the role of women in peacebuilding and encourage the Somali government and other international partners to increase their efforts to ensure that the civilian stabilisation and governance capacities being developed advance female representation in line with the Somali Women Charter.

### International security operation options

49. The independent assessment considered the full spectrum of possible options for an international security operation in Somalia beyond 2021, ranging from a UN stabilisation operation, a joint AU-UN operation, an ad hoc regional coalition and a reconfigured AMISOM. Regardless of which option is ultimately chosen, the requirement is for an international security operation that can guarantee Somalia's stability, protect the FGS and FMS as well as the international presence against Al Shabaab and other threats, enable the SSF to progressively become the main operational component, and to support the SSF until it is able to take over full responsibility for Somalia's security.
50. UN stabilisation operation: UN peacekeeping is a well-developed instrument with a 70-year track record. Some of its major advantages are that it can generate a sophisticated multidimensional civilian, police and military capability, which can also, under the right circumstances, be integrated with the UN's development programmes, agencies and funds. Under this option AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS can become one mission that is

integrated with the UN Country Team. This will significantly improve joint analysis and planning and ease coordination for the Somali authorities and international partners. An integrated UN stabilisation operation can provide a wide range of expertise and resources that could support the SSF and its civilian stabilisation counterparts. On the military side, it could consist of a strike force made up primarily of re-hatted AMISOM TCCs combined with enablers such as attack helicopters. The strike force could be complemented by other Police and Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs) that are employed to protect the major population centres and strategic infrastructure, including main supply routes. A further element could be engaged primarily in providing training to the SSF. A major advantage of a UN peacekeeping operation is that it would be funded by assessed contributions from UN member states, and this option would thus generate predictable and sustainable financing for the international security operation. This option would further improve command and control as well as strengthen strategic oversight. Some of the disadvantages of this option are the loss of an African and AU identity, its cost – both the transaction cost to set up a UN peace operation and ongoing costs, UN doctrinal guidance against using UN peacekeeping operations for enforcement and counter-terrorism operations, and Somali preferences. Given UN peacekeeping standards and standing operating procedures, and compared to similar missions elsewhere, it is estimated that a UN stabilisation operation of approximately the same size as AMISOM would require a budget of approximately USD 2 billion. This implies a doubling of the current combined cost of AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS. The Somali government has expressed a clear preference for a direct transition from AMISOM to the SSF. A transition from AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS to a new UN stabilisation operation would also require significant international effort that may distract attention from the focus on investing in developing, deploying and supporting Somali security and stability operations, in line with the aspirations of the Somali government.

51. Joint AU-UN operation: This option is attractive because it could bring together the comparative advantages of AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, and the UN country team, without such an operation losing its African and AU identity. It also opens up the possibility of enhancing AMISOM with additional P/TCCs that could bring in additional enabling capabilities such as engineering, combat logistics and additional aviation assets. A joint AU-UN operation could thus support the SSF with protecting the major population centres, key infrastructure and main supply routes, which would free up AMISOM's current TCCs to support the SSF to liberate new territory and disrupt Al Shabaab. A joint AU-UN operation would enhance joint analysis and planning and ease coordination for the Somali authorities and international partners. This option could also be financed through the UN assessed contribution system for UN peacekeeping operations and thus ensure predictable and sustainable financing for the international security force. The disadvantages are similar to the UN peacekeeping option in that UN doctrine and guidance clearly advise against using UN peacekeeping operations for counter-terrorism and enforcement operations. In addition, the cost of a joint AU-UN operation would be similar to a UN peacekeeping mission, requiring the allocation of significant additional resources than are currently committed for international security assistance in Somalia. It would also not be in line with the wishes of the Somali leadership for a direct transition from AMISOM to the SSF. The transaction costs of transitioning from AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS to a new joint operation would distract international attention from focussing on investing in Somali-led security and stabilisation capabilities and could risk delaying a transition of security responsibilities further.
52. Ad hoc regional coalition: Another option is an ad hoc regional coalition similar to the G5 Sahel Force or an African peace support operation undertaken under the auspices of IGAD,

or under the auspices of the Eastern African Standby Arrangement (EASF). Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya already have forces in the country, operating outside AMISOM, and a transition from AMISOM to such a regional force would result in a force perhaps almost twice the size of AMISOM. In order to work, the security force would need to be linked to a regional political and security framework and aligned closely with a shared political vision and strategy for the region, which would be one of its main advantages. Whilst AU or UN operations are by their nature temporary, a regional security force has the potential to be much more sustainable over the long-term. However, without the convening role and strategic direction of the AU, and given developments reflecting opposing visions by regional actors, it is difficult to see how such a regional security force can be constituted or sustained. Another important disadvantage of this option is that it lacks predictable and sustainable financing.

53. Reconfigured AMISOM: The most obvious option is a continuation of AMISOM, but in a reconfigured form, and with a new concept of operations that is adapted to the evolving threat and that is geared towards enabling the SSF to become the main operational component. Advantages include that most of AMISOM's TCCs have a long-term interest in a stable, secure and prosperous Somalia and region. AMISOM's TCCs also have a proven capability in counter terrorism and peace enforcement operations, including in urban areas and the AU has a Peace Support Operations Doctrine that enables a full spectrum of operations, including counter-terror and enforcement operations. AMISOM also has a proven track record of operating alongside and in support of the SSF. AMISOM has an unsatisfactory but functioning financing mechanism with UN core funding from the UN's assessed contribution budget for UN peacekeeping operations that is provided via UNSOS for logistical support, and additional support via the EU's Peace Facility for stipends. Disadvantages include challenges with command and control, negative perceptions of AMISOM among the Somali population, linked in part to the length of time the mission has already been in Somalia, current static posture and a funding gap for the AMISOM option that needs to be addressed.
54. Having considered this spectrum of options, the independent assessment views a reconfigured AMISOM as the most viable option for providing an international security operation capable of protecting the Somalia state and international partners, disrupting Al Shabaab and other threats, and operating in support of the SSF.
55. If the African Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council opt for the reconfigured AMISOM model, the independent assessment recommends that they consider transitioning from AMISOM to a new African support mission to Somalia. This will signal that AMISOM has successfully completed its primary mandate to help establish the Somali state and represent the start of a new phase in the AU's relationship with Somalia, during which the SSF assumes primary responsibility for its own security and the AU shifts into an enabling and supporting role.
56. In case the reconfigured AMISOM/African support mission to Somalia option is chosen, it would need a predictable financial arrangement. The continuation of the UN support package via UNSOS and additional support via the EU and other willing donors, and the AMISOM trust fund will be a minimum prerequisite. However, AMISOM is underfunded compared to similar-sized UN stabilisation operations and currently AMISOM troops receive only 70% of the stipends they would have received if they were deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. The fact that most AMISOM TCCs also contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations, where they face considerably less risk, further adds to a sense of unfairness. These unsatisfactory levels of funding and the uncertainty of this current arrangement undermine the morale and effectiveness of the mission. The optimal solution would be UN assessed contribution funding for a reconfigured AMISOM/African support

mission to Somalia, as per the proposal of the 2018 AU-UN Special Envoys on AMISOM Financing and as further elaborated in AU PSC communique (689 of 30 May 2017) and UN Security Council resolution (2378 of 20 September 2017).

57. The design of an international security operation would need to take into account the changing threat environment, new operational roles, new mindset as well as the need to better support the SSF to take over responsibility for its own security. An international security operation will need to retain the core capabilities necessary to protect the FGS and FMS, including the ability to disrupt Al Shabaab and other armed threats so that they are unable to threaten the survival of the Somalia state, but the posture and focus of the mission should shift to a supporting role that is geared towards enabling SSF operations.
58. This implies that a post-2021 international operation should be adapted to serve as an exoskeleton that enables and enhances SSF operations. Supporting and enabling SNA operations implies a range of combat support functions, including force projection, counter-IED; surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting; command and communications support; civil-military coordination, medical evacuation and combat logistics. Supporting and enabling the SPF and civilian stabilisation and governance functions will require relevant civilian and police planning and liaison functions, joint patrolling, providing security escorts, specialised investigation expertise and community policing support.
59. Such a new operation should be designed to temporarily overcome the operational challenges that currently undermines the ability of the FGS and FMS to deploy its own military, police and civilian stabilisation assets, so that its planning and support capabilities can be used to deploy and sustain the SSF and their civilian stabilisation counterparts and can be employed to support SSF operations. Currently, AMISOM's sectors do not conform to FMS boundaries. It is recommended that an international security operation that is reconfigured to support the Somali statebuilding project align its sub-national command and control arrangements with the political boundaries of the FMS.
60. After the relevant SSF units have completed their pre-deployment training and once they are deployed, the relevant international security operation and SSF units and their command structures will need to undertake joint exercises until they are confident that they can operate and manoeuvre together as one joint force. The international security operation will need to develop a training capacity that is aimed at preparing the units trained by other partners for joint operations with the international force.
61. The international security operation and the SSF should have female engagement teams and other such military, police and civilian capabilities and expertise that can assist the SNA and SPF to engage with and ensure that the rights and needs of Somali women and girls are taken into account and addressed.
62. The independent assessment noted that the number of civilian casualties attributed to actions by AMISOM and the Somali security forces has decreased over the last few years. The international security operation and other international partners need to continue to be guided by the UN's human rights and due diligence standards and related international law and guidance, and should continue to invest in training and preventative and other compliance measures. AMISOM's Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell should be adequately resourced and consideration should be given to transferring this function to the fusion cell (see below) and eventually to the appropriate Somali authority.
63. The support an international security operation provides to the SSF should be reduced over time, in step with the capabilities and experience gained by the SSF. A detailed handover, drawdown and withdrawal plan will need to be developed, but in principle this should be a phased process, where the SSF progressively assumes greater responsibility for security. In the initial phases, the SNA will operate alongside or be embedded in the international

operation but eventually they will take over lead responsibility and the international operation will progressively provide less support.

#### Threat appropriate capacity building

64. The capacity building provided by the various international partners, including especially the AU, EU, UN, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, needs to be closely coordinated with the FGS and FMS to ensure that it is in line with Somalia's long-term plans for the SSF, security sector reform initiatives as well as in the short- to medium-term the revised Somali Transition Plan. To that end, coordination among the partners remains key and should be further strengthened to ensure a coherent approach and mutual accountability in supporting Somalia's security forces and institutions.
65. The military, police and related civilian stabilisation capabilities that are being developed through these programmes need to be appropriate for the evolving security threats that Somalia will have to manage in the future. It is noted that these programmes are currently predominantly focussed on preparing basic infantry-style military and police capabilities.
66. Based on the hybrid terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab, significantly more emphasis will in the future need to be devoted to developing capabilities to prevent and counter IED, counter-terrorism intelligence and operations, preventing- and countering violent extremism programming, organised crime intelligence, investigations and operations, financial crime, transnational organised crime cooperation, community policing, countering and other extortion practices, comprehensive approach planning and planning and managing joint operations.
67. International partners need to significantly increase their investment in public administration, basic services, law enforcement, and justice, including assisting the relevant FGS and FMS institutions to employ, prepare, direct and sustain the civilian personnel required to carry out these functions.
68. International partners and the SSF should ensure that the military, police and civilian capacities generated are inclusive of all clans and minorities and efforts are made towards increasing female representation.
69. Whilst a number of soldiers and police officers are being trained, relatively few have been deployed. The FGS, FMS and international partners should jointly assess the challenges that are preventing more soldiers, police and civilian stabilisation personnel from being deployed. Such an assessment may lead to more support in the future being directed at developing logistical, medical evacuation and other support and enabling capabilities, as well as further investments in the institutional capabilities of the SNA and SPF and relevant civilian agencies to deploy, manage and support units and staff once deployed. In the meantime, the SSF and international partners should work closely with the international security operation to help deploy, sustain and support SNA, SPF and civilian stabilisation units and personnel.
70. Consideration should be given to developing a common doctrine for the SNA or at least some form of a common training curriculum that would ensure a greater degree of standardisation of procedures, techniques, tactics, equipment, weapons and ammunition across the different military and police units being trained.
71. The training and preparation of the SSF and related civilian agencies should be closely coordinated with the international security operation with whom they will be subsequently co-deployed and with whom they will undertake joint operations.
72. UNMAS improvised explosive device threat mitigation, supported by UNSOS, has proven critical to enable the SSF and AMISOM to prevent and counter the IED threat and should be further scaled up.

73. A more sustainable financing mechanism needs to be identified given the chronic underfunding of the Somali Security Forces Trust Fund to ensure the Somali forces receive the non-lethal support required through UNSOS.

#### Joint analysis, planning, operational coordination and performance fusion cell

74. In order to ensure that international security support is aligned behind a Somali-led stabilisation and statebuilding vision and FGS and FMS intent to implement such a vision, the SSF and relevant FGS and FMS ministries and institutions, the international security operation, bilateral forces, UNSOM, UNSOS and international partners need to establish a joint fusion cell that will ensure that their combined effort is joined-up, comprehensive, coherent and synchronised.
75. The joint fusion cell needs to consist of four elements: joint intelligence and analysis, joint planning, operational coordination and a joint performance assessment system. Existing UN systems that have been developed for UN peacekeeping operations, such as the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) and the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) and other similar international systems can be adapted for the Somali multi-actor environment.
76. Such a joint fusion cell needs to generate and sustain an iterative adaptive process aimed at developing specific SSF and civilian stabilisation and related governance capabilities, deploying and sustaining those capabilities alongside the international security operation, and supporting their operations, in repeated cycles that benefit from organisational learning and adaptation.
77. The joint fusion cell can be supported by a core of co-located civilian, police and military staff that represent the SSF and relevant Somali ministries and agencies, the international security operation, UNSOM, UNSOS, bilateral forces and international partners. Special efforts would need to be made to build and sustain trust among these stakeholders and the functions of the cell can be expanded over time as trust and security improves. Some of these capabilities need to be replicated at the FMS/Sector levels.
78. The joint fusion cell should be co-owned by the Somali government, the African Union and the UN, and can be facilitated and supported by UNSOM with funding allocated for this purpose in the UNSOM/UNSOS mandate and budget. The joint fusion cell can be overseen by a joint decision-making body like the steering committee foreseen in the 2020 Somali Transition Plan, that bring together all the key stakeholders involved in generating, deploying and sustaining the SSF and civilian stabilisation and related governance capacities.

#### Regional stabilisation pact

79. Somalia's immediate neighbours and the wider region have a long-term vested interest in Somalia's security. A regional stability pact could serve as a high-level political and security forum, anchored in an annual Heads of State and Government summit, where a regional political and security framework that endorses and supports the Somali government's vision can be agreed upon, emerging problems addressed, and progress can be assessed. This will generate high-level political attention and support for Somalia's strategic vision and link it with commitments to address related regional security drivers.
80. The regional stabilisation pact can initially be modelled along a more flexible format, not unlike the Friends of Sudan, with the aim of generating high-level international political support for enhanced partnership, coordination, transparency and mutual accountability. The process of establishing a regional stabilisation pact can help to foster regional

consensus on security arrangements in support of Somalia. It should build on existing coordination formats, including IGAD, the AMISOM TCC heads of state and government summits and the Somali Partnership Forum, but add new elements to ensure that all the relevant actors are represented. In addition to Somalia's neighbours, AMISOM TCCs and other IGAD member states, such a regional security pact will benefit from involving all other stakeholders, including countries from the Gulf, Turkey and the relevant western donor partners, as well as IGAD, the AU and the UN.

81. The stability pact needs to be Somalia centred and led. Annual meetings can be convened by the President of Somalia in partnership with one of the regional Heads of State or Government, on a rotational basis.

## **CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS**

82. Somalia has made considerable progress over the last decade, especially when measured against the complete absence of the state only 16 years ago. AMISOM and international partners played a key role in enabling the progress to date. Despite this progress, there is a gap of expectations between the investment AMISOM and international partners made to achieve and maintain the current degree of security and stability, and the level of state authority achieved to date. This has resulted in a sense of disappointment and frustration.
83. Despite the progress achieved thus far, the Somali state is not yet able to take full responsibility for its own security. Somalia will thus continue to need international support to protect the state from Al Shabaab and other armed groups, and to help build state capacity until it is able to take full responsibility for its own security.
84. However, international support for Somalia is likely to contract over the coming decade. Maintaining a sizeable international security operation in Somalia is not sustainable. Somalia thus has a relatively short window of opportunity during which it should make maximum use of the international support available.
85. The most immediate security and stability threat Somalia has to manage is the threat to the state and the Somali people posed by Al Shabaab and other armed groups. This threat has evolved significantly over the last few years. It has morphed from being primarily a military threat to the survival of the state, its institutions and international partners, to being a terrorist, hybrid and asymmetric threat.
86. In this context the independent assessment makes the following recommendations for the international security support to Somalia beyond 2021.
  - a. Support Somali leadership and strategic vision: Somalia's political leaders need to formulate a clear strategic vision for what the state wants to achieve over the next electoral cycle in Somalia's statebuilding project. Such a vision needs to be accompanied by a matching plan with well-defined benchmarks as well as a process to generate, monitor and sustain political will, capacities and resources. Such leadership and vision would give Somalia's regional and other international partners a clear project, with defined goals and timelines around which they can align their own plans, mobilise the necessary resources and develop the coordination mechanisms needed to ensure that international security support beyond 2021 is aligned behind Somali leadership and vision.
  - b. A shift in focus from controlling territory to protecting people through effective governance: Somali authorities and their international partners should consider shifting their approach to security and stability away from a pre-occupation with a territorial counter-insurgency (clear-hold-build) campaign where progress is

measured by liberating territory from Al Shabaab, to enabling stability through a balance of physical security and civilian governance, law enforcement and justice in those areas under the control of the state. The main effort should be directed at transforming the nominal control the FGS and FMS currently has over the major population centres into substantial and effective rule of law that ensures that the Somali state has the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and that Al Shabaab is denied the opportunity to threaten and extort people and commit acts of violence against them.

- c. Increased investment in stabilisation, governance and peacebuilding: The centre of gravity for defeating Al Shabaab and for establishing a self-sustainable Somali state is effective governance, law enforcement and justice. The FGS, FMS and their international partners thus need to significantly increase their investment in delivering public administration, basic services, law enforcement, and justice in the major population centres where most of Somalia's population is concentrated. These services need to be complemented by programmes aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, community violence reduction programmes, community policing and other initiatives that are specifically aimed at disrupting the ability of Al Shabaab to intimidate, extort and influence the Somali people living in the areas under Somali state control.
- d. A Reconfigured AMISOM to support SSF operations:  
The independent assessment considered the full spectrum of possible options for an international security operation in Somalia beyond 2021, ranging from a UN stabilisation operation, a joint AU-UN operation, an ad hoc regional coalition and a reconfigured AMISOM. Having considered this spectrum of options, the independent assessment views a reconfigured AMISOM as the most viable option for providing an international security operation capable of protecting the Somalia state and international partners, disrupting Al Shabaab and other threats, and operating in support of the SSF.
- e. Adapt capacity building to add focus on stabilisation, governance and a changing threat landscape: The capacity building provided by the various international partners has been primarily devoted to training and equipping military and police staff. Based on the hybrid terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab, more emphasis will in the future need to be devoted to developing capabilities such as counter IED, counter-terrorism intelligence and operations, preventing- and countering violent extremism programming, organised crime intelligence, investigations and operations, financial crime, cooperation, community policing, countering extortion practices, logistics, medical evacuation, comprehensive approach planning and planning and managing joint operations. International partners need to significantly increase their investment in public administration, basic services, law enforcement, and justice, including assisting the relevant FGS and FMS institutions to employ, prepare, direct and sustain the civilian personnel required to carry out these functions.
- f. Establish a Joint Fusion Cell to enhance coordination, integration and a comprehensive approach: In order to ensure that international security support is aligned behind Somali-led stabilisation and governance vision and plans, the SSF and relevant FGS and FMS ministries and civilian stabilisation and governance

institutions, the international security operation, bilateral forces, the UN and international partners should establish a joint fusion cell that will ensure that their combined effort is joined-up, comprehensive, coherent and synchronised. Such a cell needs to ensure that the overall process benefits from joint intelligence and analysis, joint planning, operational coordination, joint performance assessment and close synchronisation with capacity building efforts.

- g. Anchor international support at the highest political level in a Somali-led Regional Stability Pact: A regional stability pact could serve as a high-level political and security forum, anchored in an annual Heads of State and Government summit, where a regional political and security framework that endorses and supports the Somali government's vision can be agreed, emerging problems addressed, and progress can be assessed. A regional stability pact will generate high-level political support and attention on Somalia's strategic vision and its interlinkages with regional security drivers. It could foster a regional consensus on security support in Somalia.
87. The independent assessment encourages the Somali government and all international partners to increase their efforts to ensure that the military, police and civilian capacities being developed and deployed are appropriately gendered and that the operations they undertake are gender sensitive and rights-based.
88. The two overarching strategic objectives that should guide international security support to Somalia beyond 2021 are, firstly, to encourage and enable a functioning federal system, and secondly to enhance the capacity and support the operational effectiveness of federal and member state military, police, civilian stabilisation and related government functions, and their ability to collectively and cumulatively generate and maintain stability and build the Somali state.
89. The overarching principle that should guide international security support to Somalia is to transfer maximum responsibility for security and stability to the appropriate FGS and FMS authorities.
90. Any changes in the mandate, role and capacity of AMISOM, and any adaptations to international security support beyond 2021, however, need to ensure that the strategic gains made to date are protected and consolidated, and need to avoid increasing risk to the Somali people and state, and their regional and international partners.

## Annex 1: Summary of Findings and recommendations

<b>Independent Assessment of International Security Support to Somalia Post-2021 Summary of Findings and Recommendations</b>	
<b>Findings</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
The need for continued international support	
Despite considerable progress in various areas Somalia will need continued and sustained international security support over the coming years to protect the state and to help build state capacity until it is able to take full responsibility for its own security.	International security support to Somalia beyond 2021 will be needed in two areas. Firstly, an international security force will need to <u>guarantee Somalia's security and stability</u> and protect the FGS and FMS against Al Shabaab and other threats. Secondly, international partners are needed to help <u>generate, deploy, enable and sustain SSF and the civilian stabilisation and governance</u> capabilities needed to ensure basic security and stability.
Support a Somali-led strategic vision for the next decade	
<p>Continued uncertainty around whether the current administration is committed to the federal project undermines the development of Somali security forces, as a lack of clarity around the division of powers, roles and responsibility between the FGS and FMS makes it impossible to make predictable long-term plans regarding the training, deployment, location and sustainment of the security forces and civilian services.</p> <p>The plethora of poorly implemented security-related plans and the lack of clarity around security roles and responsibilities, undermine the ability of the Somali state to muster a security capability that can protect itself or its citizens against Al Shabaab and other armed groups.</p> <p>The next five years will be critical to consolidate the gains made, and to use the opportunity the Somali leadership has now, to move the country beyond the tipping point and achieve self-sustainable statehood.</p> <p>Building a self-sustainable Somali state will require a sustained and coordinated whole-of-system approach that aligns and integrates a comprehensive international political, development and security support effort with a Somalia-led federal and member state agreed statebuilding vision and plan.</p>	<p>Somalia's political leaders need to formulate a <u>clear strategic vision</u> for what the state wants to achieve over the next electoral cycle in Somalia's statebuilding project.</p> <p>Such a vision needs to be accompanied by a <u>matching plan</u> with well-defined benchmarks as well as a process to generate, monitor and sustain political will, capacities and resources, at least up to 2025.</p> <p>Clear <u>benchmarks</u> and a timeline to evaluate progress are critical elements, already endorsed in the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) but so far not acted upon.</p>
An evolving threat landscape	
<p>The most immediate security and stability threat Somalia has to manage is the threat to the state and the Somali people posed by Al Shabaab.</p> <p>Al Shabaab has evolved significantly over the last few years. Currently, Al Shabaab operates more effectively as a terrorist and organised criminal organisation than it does as a military organisation.</p>	<p>UNSOM and other international partners should continue to support the FGS and FMS with advice that can assist the development and continuous adaptation of Somali strategic plans and policies, but they need to <u>adapt their expertise to the changing threat landscape</u>.</p> <p>The military, police and related civilian stabilisation capabilities that are being developed for the SSF with international support need to be appropriate for the <u>evolving</u></p>

<p>However, international support to the SSF is currently predominantly focussed on preparing basic infantry-style military and police capabilities.</p>	<p><u>security threats</u> that Somalia will have to manage in the future.</p> <p>Based on the hybrid terrorist threat posed by Al Shabaab, significantly more emphasis will in the future need to be devoted to developing capabilities such as counter IED, counter-terrorism intelligence and operations, preventing- and countering violent extremism programming, organised crime intelligence, investigations and operations, financial crime, cooperation, community policing, countering extortion practices, civilian stabilisation practices, comprehensive approach planning and planning and managing joint operations.</p>
<p>Increased investment in stabilisation, governance and peacebuilding</p>	
<p>Although there is broad recognition that military action cannot be the only solution, the FGS and most international partners have primarily focussed on developing military capabilities. This approach has not resulted in a weakened Al Shabaab, nor has it resulted in greater security and stability.</p> <p>The threat posed by Al Shabaab has changed significantly. Countering Al Shabaab through a theory of change that is mainly conceived around liberating territory from Al Shabaab via military means is likely to have a low leverage on disrupting the capability of Al Shabaab to survive and thrive as a terrorist and organised crime organisation and is thus unlikely to significantly improve stability and security in Somalia.</p> <p>Corruption, politicians that are perceived to be acting primarily in their own, own clan or foreign interests, and foreign occupation are widely seen as the most important reasons why Al Shabaab enjoys popular support.</p> <p>Addressing these political, security and governance challenges are key to defeating Al Shabaab over the medium- to long-term. Inclusive statebuilding and service provision therefore become a fundamental building block for both the legitimacy of the Somali state as well as the means to displace Al Shabaab and other armed groups.</p>	<p>The centre of gravity for defeating Al Shabaab and for establishing a self-sustainable Somali state is <u>effective and just governance</u>.</p> <p>The Somali government and their international partners need to <u>significantly increase their investment in public administration, basic services, law enforcement, and justice</u>.</p> <p>There is a need for <u>increased capacity</u> in areas such as preventing and countering violent extremism, community violence reduction programmes, community policing and other initiatives that are specifically aimed at disrupting the ability of Al Shabaab to intimidate, extort and influence the Somali people living in the areas under Somali state control, while restoring trust in the state structures and <u>rule of law</u>.</p> <p>The relevant FGS and FMS institutions need to further develop the capacity to employ, prepare, direct and sustain the personnel required to carry out these functions.</p> <p>Among the international partners, UNSOM should lead on coordinating, and providing enabling advice and support, including via programming, for <u>civilian stabilisation</u>, with UNDP, agencies, funds and programmes, and international and national partners providing support in the domains where they have relevant expertise. The international security operations should protect and enable civilian stabilisation and related governance functions, and the operation should have appropriate civilian personnel to advise the mission leadership on its role in this regard, to participate in planning, assessment and related processes and to liaise with the relevant Somali agencies and other international partners. Other international partners should support the relevant FGS and FMS agencies with capacity building, institutional support and enabling programme support.</p>

A shift in focus from controlling territory to protecting people	
<p>Gaining military control over territory has dislodged the formal Al Shabaab presence, but it has failed to disrupt their intimidation, extortion and influence over the people.</p> <p>This approach has thus not resulted in a weakened Al Shabaab, nor has it resulted in greater security and stability.</p> <p>As a result of this approach AMISOM and the SNA has been tied down for the last few years in a mostly static defensive posture to protect the approximately 77 Forward Operating Bases and population centres under the nominal control of the Somali state.</p> <p>The proposed solution, namely that Somalia, with international support, generates Somali security forces that can free-up AMISOM, so that AMISOM and the SNA can gain control over more territory, is unlikely to produce a different result from what has been achieved with this approach to date.</p>	<p>Somali authorities and their international partners should consider shifting their approach to security and stability away from a pre-occupation with countering Al Shabaab militarily, where progress is measured by liberating territory from Al Shabaab, to enabling stability through a <u>balance of physical security and civilian governance, law enforcement and justice</u> in those areas under the control of the state.</p> <p>The main effort should be directed at transforming the nominal control the FGS and FMS currently have over the major population centres into <u>substantial and effective rule of law</u> that ensures that the Somali state has the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and that Al Shabaab is denied the opportunity to threaten and extort people and commits acts of violence against them.</p> <p>In order to shift from a territorial control approach to security to a <u>threat-based approach</u>, the FGS and FMS will need to invest in improving its <u>intelligence</u> capabilities, including is <u>financial and organised crime</u> intelligence capabilities, so that it can anticipate Al Shabaab’s modus operandi and disrupt it based on <u>intelligence-based operations</u> rather than territorial presence.</p> <p>This does not mean that there should be no focus on recovering strategic territory, only that it should not be the primary theory of change. <u>Strategic territory that still needs to be recovered</u> includes, for instance, Lower and Middle Shabelle which are both critical for securing Mogadishu, and the main roads and strategic points in Middle Juba such as Buale, the official capital of Jubaland.</p>
A Reconfigured AMISOM to support SSF operations	
<p>AMISOM has successfully achieved its core mandate of protecting the Somali state and international partners in Somalia over the past 13 years, and enabling the political and federal state-formation processes to take shape.</p> <p>With international support and together with other bilateral forces, AMISOM has successfully displaced Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and most of the major urban centres in southern and central Somalia.</p> <p>However, it is now over-extended and cannot make significant further gains without being relieved by the SSF from protecting those areas already liberated from Al Shabaab.</p>	<p>Having considered the spectrum of options, the independent assessment views a <u>reconfigured AMISOM</u> as the most viable option for providing an international security force capable of protecting the Somalia state and international partners, disrupting Al Shabaab and other threats, and operating in support of the SSF.</p> <p>The independent assessment recommends that the AU PSC and UN Security Council consider transitioning from AMISOM to a new African support mission to Somalia in 2022. This will signal that AMISOM has <u>successfully completed</u> its primary mandate, to help establish the Somali state, and represent the start of a <u>new phase</u> in the AU’s relationship with Somalia, during which the SSF assumes primary responsibility for its own security and the AU <u>shifts into an enabling and supporting role</u>.</p> <p>Regardless of which option is ultimately chosen, the requirement is for an international security operation that can <u>guarantee Somalia’s stability</u>, protect the FGS and FMS against Al Shabaab and other threats, enable the SSF to progressively become the <u>main operational component</u>, and to support the SSF until it is able to take over <u>full responsibility</u> for Somalia’s security.</p>

	<p>An international security operation will need to retain the <u>core capabilities</u> necessary to protect the FGS and FMS, including the ability to <u>disrupt</u> Al Shabaab and other armed threats so that they are unable to threaten the survival of the Somalia state, but the posture and focus of the mission should shift to a <u>supporting role that is geared towards enabling</u> SSF operations.</p> <p>Such a new operation should be designed to temporarily overcome the operational challenges that currently undermine the ability of the FGS and FMS to deploy its own military, police and civilian stabilisation assets, so that its planning and support capabilities can be used to <u>deploy and sustain the SSF and their civilian stabilisation counterparts</u>, and can be employed to support SSF operations.</p> <p>Currently, AMISOM's <u>sectors do not conform to FMS boundaries</u>. It is strongly recommended that an international security operation should be reconfigured to support the Somali statebuilding project, including supporting the SSF and its civilian stabilisation counterparts along with its federal and member state arrangements.</p> <p>The support an international security operation provides to the SSF should be reduced over time, in step with the capabilities and experience gained by the SSF. A detailed transition plan will need to be developed, but in-principle this should be a <u>phased process</u>, where the SSF progressively assumes <u>greater responsibility</u> for security. In the initial phases the SNA will operate alongside or be embedded in the international operation but eventually they will take over <u>lead responsibility</u> and the international operation will progressively provide less support.</p> <p>However, any changes in the mandate, role and capacity of AMISOM, and any adaptations to international security support beyond 2021, need to ensure that the <u>strategic gains</u> made to date are protected and consolidated, and need to avoid <u>increasing risk</u> to the Somali people and state, and their international partners.</p>
<p>Adapt capacity building support to a new people-centred approach to stabilisation and a changing threat landscape</p>	
<p>Whilst a number of soldiers and police officers are being trained, relatively few have been deployed.</p>	<p>The FGS, FMS and international partners should jointly assess what the challenges are that is preventing more soldiers, police and civilian stabilisation personnel from being deployed.</p> <p>Such an assessment may lead to more support in the future being directed at developing <u>logistic and other support</u> and enabling capabilities, as well as further investments in the institutional capabilities of the SNA and SPF and relevant civilian agencies to deploy, manage and support units and staff once deployed.</p> <p>In the meantime, the SSF and international partners should work closely with the international security operation to <u>help deploy, sustain and support</u> SNA, SPF and civilian stabilisation units and personnel.</p> <p>Consideration should be given to developing a common doctrine for the SNA or at least some form of <u>common training curriculum</u> that would ensure a greater degree of standardisation of procedures, technics, tactics, equipment,</p>

	weapons and ammunition across the different military and police units being trained.
Establish a Joint Fusion Cell	
<p>There is a large number of international actors involved in the security and other sectors, and typically each actor tries to carve out a niche area with specific national counterpart institutions.</p> <p>This has resulted at times in duplication and competition, and has contributed to the fragmentation of Somali institutions, including especially the SNA. Inadequate coordination among international partners undermines the overall capacity of the FGS, FMS and SSF to act coherently.</p>	<p>In order to ensure that international security support is aligned behind a Somali-led stabilisation and statebuilding vision and FGS and FMS intent to implement such a vision, the SSF and relevant FGS and FMS ministries and institutions, the international security operation, bilateral forces, UNSOM, UNSOS and international partners need to establish a <u>joint fusion cell</u> that will ensure that their combined effort is joined-up, comprehensive, coherent and synchronised.</p> <p>The training and preparation of the SSF and related civilian agencies should be closely coordinated with the international security operation with whom they will be subsequently co-deployed and with whom they will undertake joint operations.</p>
Anchor international support in a Somali-led Regional Stability Pact	
<p>Somalia has become an important space for geopolitical competition, influence and power projection in recent years. Interference by external actors in Somali politics has undermined commitment to a common federal statebuilding project. However, the wider region is also a source of funding for training and equipping the SSF and investing in other aspects of state building.</p>	<p>Somalia's immediate neighbours and the wider region have a long-term vested interest in Somalia's security. A <u>regional stability pact</u> could serve as a high-level political and security forum where a regional political and security framework that endorses and support the Somali government's vision can be agreed, emerging problems addressed and progress can be assessed. This could generate high-level political attention and focus on Somalia's strategic vision and its interlinkages with regional security drivers.</p>
Gender and Women, Peace and Security	
<p>The independent assessment noted that apart from UNSOS, there were no women in the senior leadership of UNSOM, AMISOM, EUTM, EUCAPS and the other international partners.</p>	<p>In the context of the UN Secretary-General's commitment to gender parity and global Women, Peace and Security norms (UNSC Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions), this needs to be addressed.</p> <p>The independent assessment took note that the Peacebuilding Fund will allocate 50% of its funding in the coming five years to programmes aimed at increasing the role of women in peacebuilding, and encourage the Somali government and other international partners to increase their efforts to ensure that the civilian stabilisation and governance capacities being developed also advance female representation in line with the Somali Women Charter.</p> <p>The international security operation and the SSF should have female engagement teams and other such military, police and civilian capabilities and expertise that can assist the SNA and SPF to engage with and ensure that the rights and needs of Somali women and girls are taken into account and addressed.</p>

	<p>International partners and the SSF should ensure that the military, police and civilian capacities generated are inclusive of all clans and minorities and efforts are made towards increasing female representation.</p> <p>The independent assessment encourages the Somali government and all international partners to increase their efforts to ensure that the military, police and civilian capacities being developed and deployed are appropriately gendered and that the operations they undertake are gender sensitive and rights-based.</p>
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## Annex 2: Summary of international security operation options

Options	Advantages	Disadvantages
UN stabilisation operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multidimensional &amp; integrated</li> <li>• Joint analysis and planning</li> <li>• Single point of coordination for Somali authorities and international partners</li> <li>• Funded by assessed contributions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of an African and AU identity</li> <li>• UN doctrinal guidance against enforcement and counter-terrorism operations</li> <li>• Somali government preference for a direct transition from AMISOM to the SSF</li> <li>• Distract attention from the focus on supporting Somali security and stability operations</li> </ul>
Joint AU-UN operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retains African and AU identity</li> <li>• Multidimensional &amp; integrated</li> <li>• Enhance AMISOM with additional enabling capabilities</li> <li>• Single point of coordination for Somali authorities and international partners</li> <li>• Funded by assessed contributions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN doctrinal guidance against enforcement and counter-terrorism operations</li> <li>• Somali government preference for a direct transition from AMISOM to the SSF</li> <li>• Distract attention from the focus on supporting Somali security and stability operations</li> </ul>
Ad hoc regional coalition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bilateral and AMISOM forces can be combined</li> <li>• Stronger link between regional political and security framework and security operation</li> <li>• Link to regional interests increases sustainability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of AU strategic direction &amp; identity</li> <li>• Regional instability can negatively affect ad hoc coalition</li> <li>• Lacks predictable and sustainable financing</li> </ul>

Reconfigured AMISOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build on AMISOM’s successful track-record</li> <li>• Reconfigure with minimum disruption and risk</li> <li>• Established financing mechanism</li> <li>• Somali government prefers direct transition from AMISOM to the SSF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Command and control</li> <li>• Negative perceptions among Somali population,</li> <li>• Current static posture</li> <li>• Funding gap</li> </ul>
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