



**EXPLORING YOUNG PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS &
EXPERIENCES OF LOCAL POLICE SERVICES,
EFFICIENCY AND PERFORMANCE IN KHAYELITSHA**

FINAL REPORT



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Final Synthesis Report

14 January 2014

*Report Prepared For The Commission Of Enquiry Into Allegations Of Police
Inefficiency In Khayelitsha And A Breakdown In Relations Between The Community
And The Police In Khayelitsha*

FINAL REPORT

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CJCP	Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention
Col	Commission of Enquiry
CPF	Community Safety Forum
DOCS	Department of Community Safety
FGD(s)	Focus Group Discussion
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SANCO	South African National Civics Organization
SAPS	South African Police Service
UCT	University of Cape Town

INTRODUCTION

In August 2012, a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) to investigate the South African Police Services (SAPS) in Khayelitsha was established.ⁱ The CoI is mandated to investigate complaints received by the Premier that relates to the efficiency of the SAPS within the Khayelitsha region, specifically at three police stations, namely: Harare, Khayelitsha and Lingeletu West. In addition, the CoI is also investigating whether there is a breakdown in relations between the Khayelitsha community and members of the SAPS stationed at the three police stations in Khayelitsha, as well as other policing units operating in the area.

The Commission aims to explore allegations of, the reasons for, and causes of, the inefficiency and breakdown in relations, if they are found to exist. It is envisioned that through this process the commission will be able to generate a dialogue between the community and the police, which will serve to help improve SAPS service delivery in the future.

Contextualising Khayelitsha

Khayelitsha was established in 1983 based on the forced removal from different areas allocated for different racial groups. This was a forced removal instituted by the Group Areas Act no. 41 of 1950 under the apartheid regime. On "... 25th May 1983, Dr. Koornhof stated that Khayelitsha was intended to provide for the consolidated housing needs of the Black communities in the Cape Metropolitan area, and that as people voluntarily moved there, the possibility of other race groups being accommodated in older black townships would be considered."ⁱⁱ

Khayelitsha, a partially informal settlement was built for 'legal' and 'illegal' black Cape Town residents who were forcibly moved. This young township is situated approximately 35 kilometres outside of the Cape Town business central, and is South Africa's biggest township.ⁱⁱⁱ Khayelitsha was designed to accommodate 250 000 to 280 000 people,^{iv} but census results reveal that in 2001 the township housed 329 006 residents and increased to 391 749 in 2011.^v Based on the up to date census data there are 118 809 households in the suburb with an average household size of 3.30.

Households are faced with a lack of basic facilities and amenities, as only 62% have water piped into their homes or onto their dwelling. All twelve wards accommodate 118 809 households, of which 98.6% are Black African and (21.4%) half of the population comprise of young people between the ages of 15 to 24 years.^{vi} At the time of the 2011 census 62.0% of the population had an accumulative

income of less than R3 200^{vii} or less for each month that should be sufficient for an average of three people, translating into R969.69 per person each month.^{viii}

Overcrowding and lack of infrastructure, unemployment, poverty and frustration, poor economic and security conditions are risk factors for crime and violence.^{ix} Exacerbating the problem is youth unemployment in the area and this increases the likelihood of youth resorting to violence and criminality.^x Despite the population growth, provision has only been made for two additional police stations, to serve the whole of the Khayelitsha region (the three stations are Khayelitsha, Harare, Lingeelthu Wes).

Overview of recorded crime in Khayelitsha

Crime statistics are recognized globally as having severe limitations in reflecting the “true” state of safety within a community. At the heart of these limitations lies the fact that only crimes that are reported to the police, are reflected in official crime statistics. Any number of factors might lead to crimes not being reported to the police: a lack of trust in the police; a lack of faith that any action will be taken, or that a case will be resolved; the perception that a crime might not warrant police attention; fear of retribution or discrimination resulting from reporting, and others. There exists an inherent iterative shortcoming in this: if trust in the police is undermined, communities are less likely to report crime; if police do not have accurate statistics, they are less able to target resources and operations appropriately, which then further serves to highlight poor police performance and service delivery.

Other than data collected from victimization surveys or service delivery surveys, however, official police statistics continue to play an important role in determining trends in crime and violence in any particular site. Official reports are also vital in determining policing priorities, and operational planning.

Notwithstanding these limitations, it is useful to provide a brief overview of some of the relevant official and research data that exists on crime in Khayelitsha. Drugs coupled with youth unemployment, are commonly recognized as one of the driving forces, influencing young people to resort to a criminal lifestyle. In 2005, a study by the University of Stellenbosch’s Strategic Information Department, identified and mapped 31 illegal drug hubs in Khayelitsha (it would be a fair assumption to say that with the population expansion since this report, this number will have increased dramatically).^{xi} These factors are likely to impact on the levels of violent or contact crimes

in the area. According to the Medical Research Council's violent crime observations, Khayelitsha was found to have the highest murder and rape rates recorded nationally. Followed by its neighbouring town Nyanga, as the station with the second highest murder report rates.^{xii} Table 1 below illustrates that contact crimes reported within Khayelitsha range from 676 to 4860 over the past six years¹.

Table 1: SAPS Contact Crime Report Statistics - Khayelitsha

	April 2007 – March 2008	April 2008 – March 2009	April 2009 – March 2010	April 2010 – March 2011	April 2011 – March 2012	April 2012 – March 2013	Totals for the past 6 years
Murder	171	121	124	125	161	168	870
Total sexual crimes	269	218	259	252	249	246	1493
Attempted Murder	78	60	91	98	141	208	676
Assault GBH	617	556	554	615	631	707	3680
Common Assault	680	650	670	516	682	774	3972
Common Robbery	161	160	193	190	167	221	1092
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	1018	747	711	606	789	989	4860

When comparing reported contact crimes to property related crimes, the figures are lower ranging from 586 to 2283.^{xiii} To reiterate the point above, however, it is important to bear in mind that certain crimes tend to not be reported. This could be exacerbated by a perceived breakdown in relations between the community and the police, which provides the *raison d'être* of the Commission of Enquiry.

¹ Please note that all SAPS statistics presented are for the period of April 2007 to March 2013.


Table 2: SAPS Property Related Crimes- Report Statistics-Khayelitsha

	April 2007 – March 2008	April 2008 – March 2009	April 2009 – March 2010	April 2010 – March 2011	April 2011 – March 2012	April 2012 – March 2013	Totals for the past 6 years
Burglary at non-residential premises	62	66	88	91	99	127	533
Burglary at residential premises	359	404	385	326	350	459	2283
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	135	96	114	110	71	60	586
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	51	54	76	141	129	135	586

Background to the Study

It is against this profile of Khayelitsha that the current study was commissioned by the Col. This study is premised on the assumption that police statistics alone are insufficient to provide a complete picture of levels of crime and violence in the area, particularly in a context where there is a potential breakdown of the relationship between stakeholders. Further, there is no data on the use of alternative forms of justice, or recourse to vigilante /'mob justice' or other informal justice systems.

The study focused specifically on the experiences of young people in Khayelitsha. Young people are generally at greater risk of both victimization, and of engaging in anti-social, criminal or delinquent behaviour, than adults (REF). Experiences with any figures of institutions of authority are likely to mould relationships later in life, and may define the way that young people grow into adulthood. The experiences of young people with the police are thus particularly important in assessing the relationship between police and community in any given area. The study explores a number of safety issues, obtaining a broad understanding from the participants' perspectives, of their experiences of crime and violence. This includes threats or dangers faced by the participants, and their response to these. The categories of information collected by study participants is reflected in the diagram below (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Focus group information collected

Methodology


The following section discusses the sample design, focus group method, as well as the focus group guideline which informed each focus group discussion.

Sample Design

Three specific populations were identified for inclusion in the study: school safety marshals (adults working at and around schools, to ensure the safety of the school environment, learners and educators, and the perimeter of the school); participants from a Schools Improvement Project run by the University of Cape Town (UCT); participants of the Grassroots Soccer Group (a community youth sports programme offering a series of parallel interventions, including lifeskills). The research was conducted in December, a particularly bad time to conduct research with children and youth, as many are on holiday, and many of the activities come to an end during this period. Because of difficulties in securing sufficient participation from the identified stakeholders, an additional population was added to the initial three, Lovelife Groundbreakers. The final sample of focus group discussions (FGDs) is reflected in the figure below (Figure 2):

The focus group research method is an interview or open discussion with a small group of individuals. It incorporates semi-structured questions to illicit discussion and is usually led by a facilitator. Focus groups provide access to information that is not always obtainable through participant observation, individual interviews or even quantitative research methods¹. Using the focus group method, the study capitalised from group discussions and debates since it allowed for the exploration of dominant cultural values and norms and personal experiences that are in most cases dormant and difficult to obtain in individual interviews¹. This method brought about a multitude of perspectives and experiences of safety and crime in the areas in the Khayelitsha.

Figure 2: Focus group sample



These groups were either young people, or those both living and working with young people in the area. A total of six focus groups were conducted. While it was envisioned that two FGDs would be conducted with each of the above identified groups, this was not possible due to availability of participants. Therefore, one focus group was conducted with the UCT Schools Improvement Project and one with the Schools Safety Marshalls, as both of these groups are centred on safety and perceptions of safety at school. For the Football for Hope/Grassroots Soccer group, two FGDs were held, one with the soccer/life skills coaches and one with the under- 19 soccer team members. With regard to the Lovelife Groundbreakers group, two FGDs were conducted, one with the facilitators and the other with the participants of the initiative. Please see Appendix A for a complete breakdown of FGDs held, including the gender and age of participants.

Focus Group Structure

The study used a semi-structured interview guide that followed a sequence of questions, but was relatively flexible, to allow for probing where necessary (please See Appendix B).

A vignette in the form of a scenario was used as part of the process to facilitate the discussions. Vignettes are used to elicit information about perceptions, attitudes and beliefs that are held by the study participants^{xiv}. They are also particularly useful in cases where the research topic may be more sensitive^{xv}.

A generic set of questions was tailored to each set of focus group participants, to elicit information most relevant to them, and to their activities and experiences. This allowed for information on common variables to be extrapolated such as:

- What are the participants experiences of violence?
- How do they respond?
- If and on what terms do they engage with the police or with other community stakeholders, around issues of safety and crime?
- How are the police perceived? etc.

This was then followed up by more specific questions which allowed the experiences and situations, unique to each group, to be explored (Refer to Appendix B).

Study Limitations

There are a number of factors that should be considered in the interpretation of the research findings, and that may serve to bias the responses of the research participants.

- All participants were aware of the fact that this research was being undertaken for the Col. While this was not explicitly mentioned in the introduction of the consent process, the simple timing and nature of the research made this self-apparent. The groups may thus have provided a platform for participants to air the grievances, while minimizing any positive views or experiences they may have had.
- The recruitment process for participation in the research was undertaken through community-based groups or structures, and as such, the type of individual recruited into the research by definition has some form of collective association or affiliation, and may be considered to be more active, more engaged around community issues, and in some cases, more directly aware of issues regarding safety (i.e. the school safety marshalls). This fact may bias the responses and the degree to which the research represents ALL young people living in Khayelitsha. For example, street children living in the community may have somewhat different perceptions of the police, as might young business people. However, the consistency of the responses and discussions across all the groups included, suggest that

the research findings have some validity, in reflecting broad-based experience and perceptions of young people in Khayelitsha.

STUDY FINDINGS

The research findings are presented in five discrete, but related, sections. The first details young people's perceptions of crime and violence in Khayelitsha; the second builds on this to explore how safe they feel, and to unpack these feelings of safety; the following sections then look at the young people's perceptions of the South African Police Services in the area, while the Fourth section then looks at what steps the young people consider appropriate, and what steps they follow to make sure that they are safe, and that perceived justice is obtained. Finally, the results of the "visioning" exercise are presented and discussed within the context of the earlier research findings.

Perceptions and experiences of crime and violence in Khayelitsha

Perceptions of police tend to be informed by three factors: experience of services offered by the police, both direct and indirect; the experiences of others known to individuals – word of mouth – or which in turn may be informed by direct or indirect experiences; and public perceptions usually depicted or informed by the media – television, online or print news and stories. These perceptions in turn inform how any individual relates to the police, the trust they have in them, and the degree to which that individual or collective, will engage with the police, or will seek alternative means of security and justice.^{xvi} This distinction is an important one to make, particularly in the context of Khayelitsha, where the debate around police service delivery, and the establishment and challenging of the Commission of Enquiry itself, will have created a certain perspective of SAPS over and above any direct experience that any individual may have had.

The separation of direct experience and indirect perceptions, proved difficult to achieve throughout the research. Notwithstanding this, contact, or violent crimes, were most commonly cited as the crimes most experienced in Khayelitsha, across all the focus groups. When asked to indicate whether they had been a direct victim of crime, between one quarter and three quarters of the participants in all groups indicated, they had been victimized directly, suggesting that the opinions and perceptions across all groups were informed by sufficient first-hand experience.

In particular, murder, and robbery featured the most commonly, with the exception of the Lovelife Groundbreakers, who cited gangsterism as the most common form of violence in the community – a not-altogether unrelated crime given that both murder is often strongly associated with gangsterism. Indeed, it is worth noting that the conflation of gangsterism and all forms of violence was identified throughout the discussions in all the groups. Similarly, rape was identified in the top

five most common crimes across all the groups, except for the youngest set of young people – the 100UP learners. Possibly biased by the fact that many of the participating populations are in some ways associated with schools in the communities, much of the violence spoken about was related to the school environment or the school experience – the act of travelling to and from school – as much as being on the school premises. Robbery was defined by one group as being most common in relation to the taking of cell phones, school shoes and calculators, using force; while rape was defined as common both in schools and the community. This association between school and violence emerged even more strongly when the discussion moved from the most common acts of crime and violence to who is primarily responsible for perpetrating these acts. For example, learners from the 100UP group, as well as the School Marshalls, identified young people from Khayelitsha, and particularly, school children, as being responsible. In the words of one of the 100Up learners, “*...classmates and then they stopped going to school*”. One school marshall referred simply to the fact that “*young children are killing each other*”. Another group spoke of how gangsters would rob children coming to, or leaving school, or waiting outside the school gates. This association between school and violence was common across all groups, without exception.

Another common thread across all the groups was the fact that those most commonly responsible for the violence in Khayelitsha are known – both to the community and to the police. While most of the group participants were themselves young, “youth” were identified as being most commonly responsible for all the crime and violence in the communities.

The influence of gang-related violence was further reflected by the role of territory in the nature of the violence that occurs. Most broadly, one group simply spoke about how scared they are to go to specific areas that are identified as dominated by any specific gang (no specific gangs were identified by name). Another group specifically identified Harare, Section J and Site C as being areas of particular concern, where they felt particularly unsafe. Another group member spoke about how pervasive the problem is throughout Khayelitsha, highlighting Site B as being a hot spot for gang activity. This territoriality is however not simply a function of where an individual might be at any given time (i.e. not necessarily related to a particular route that one might take home through gang territory, for example), but is as much a function of where any individual might live. One learner describes how, if gangsters come to school and ask them where they live, they will be targeted: “*I go to school...it’s a big problem because they feel like it they just come to us, where you live. If I tell them the truth like I live in Site B, I’m in big trouble because they could beat me up and stab me, since there is that conflict, if you live in Site B you are part of the problem*”.

While rape was commonly identified by most of the groups as one of the five most common acts of violence to occur in Khayelitsha, there was significantly less discussion of experiences or examples of rapes. This is hardly surprising given the nature of the crime, and indeed any discussion of personal experiences within the group environment would have been discouraged by the facilitators, given the impact and harm of the crime itself, and the revisiting of the act, might have had on the individual. However, one specific example was given of another's experience, which illustrates both the involvement of gangs, but also the fact that this extends well into the physical school environment: A female learner recalled that *"last week Friday or Thursday some of the boys in Khayelitsha went into my school and then some of the girls had to lift their uniforms up and then three of the boys asked to kiss her and then she had to kiss them because they could stab her so she had to kiss all three boys"*.

Finally, the issue of drug use was also identified as a common theme across all the groups. In particular, and consistent with the literature identified above, "tik" and various derivatives were mentioned as ubiquitous: 'tik', 'nyaope', 'buttons', 'glue' and 'marijuana' were all common, while in young group, several boys mentioned that *'everyone is using the drugs, all age groups'* and that *'crime has increased because the drug use increased'*.

While often difficult to differentiate between perceptions informed by the direct experience of victimisation, and those informed by the experiences of others, it is apparent that there were very few study participants who had not been effected by violence in Khayelitsha. At best, this was violence experienced by family and classmates known to the participants, rather than by the individual themselves. As such, this provides enough evidence to suggest that the views of violence, of the police and of related safety and justice issues in the community, are reliably based on experience, as much as on what might be reported in the media or through broader public discourse. Most commonly though, study participants, regardless of age, were able to talk about direct experiences they had of violence, in both the areas they lived in Khayelitsha, and other areas their daily live take them.

Perceptions and feelings of safety

The feelings of safety felt by the study participants are clearly intricately related to both the direct and indirect experiences of crime and violence experienced by the young people, discussed above. These feeling of unsafety extend beyond the community into the institutions which should, always, be considered safe havens, such as schools. Of concerns is that the lack of safety within schools does not only impact on the learners themselves, but also on the adults who should be protecting them, such as the school marshalls. Several marshalls spoke of how they would be threatened by gangsters both on school premises and off, and while there may be an element of safety while patrolling the school grounds (although this should not be taken for granted), they were often targeted on the way home. Learners and young people are clearly aware of how vulnerable the marshalls may in fact be, and this may in part explain perceptions of some youth of the ineffectiveness of even the school marshalls. When young people were asked whether the school marshalls at least provided some sense of safety, several indicated that their role as guardians had been “lost”. One male learners explained that *“all they do is open the gates”*, while a female learner said *“sometimes they are even scared of school children”*. What this suggests is that there is a further vacuum in safety, despite alternative measures established to keep young people safe, exacerbating the vacuum left by police inefficiencies or failures to keep the community safe, perceived or actual.

On the whole, there is little differentiation between the safety of boys, and of girls, with different aspects of the violence impacting on young people in different ways. On the whole, boys were generally seen to be more vulnerable to direct gang violence, or for getting caught up into gang activities, while girls were perceived as more vulnerable to sexual violence. For example, one group member spoke of how boys from as young as 12 years old are targeted by gangsters, who recruit them as gang members. It was also suggested that boys are more likely to be attacked or assaulted because they are suspected to be rival gang members. An interesting differentiation between the safety of boys and girls emerged in one group, however, where one participant mentioned and the rest of the group agreed that females are perceived to be safer than males, particularly teen boys because of the targeting of boys as gang members. This perception, of boys as safer than girls, did not emerge in any other groups, however.

Different groups tended to identify different areas they felt were particularly unsafe, a fact which can easily be explained by the fact that these tend to be the parts of Khayelitsha they attend or are present at most frequently, or in which they live. For example, one group who were selected on the basis of their relationship with a community group active in Harare, identified Harare as being the centre of much of the gang-activity. Another group, who’s activities were based in Site B, identified

that as being a hot spot for gang activities. Other sites identified as areas where young people feel particularly unsafe include Section J and Site C,

It is unsurprising, given the experience and perceptions of crime and violence discussed above then, that with some exceptions, the majority of young people, both male and female, do not feel safe in their communities. One group explicitly spoke about some of the developmental implications of this – the impact that these feelings of unsafety has not only on the right of all young people to education, but also on their engagement in other important activities that are so essential in under-served communities such as much of Khayelitsha.

In this case, one of the youth group leaders felt that the levels of unsafety impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the interventions the group was offering, and was in fact one of the biggest challenges they face. In particular, feelings of unsafety influence the attendance of girls participating in the group, as they fear being victimised while travelling to the venue. One adult working with the young people, and who lives in a particularly violent section of Khayelitsha (Khanini) highlighted that most girls in the community do not attend school on Fridays because they fear for their lives. These fears relate to gangsters wanting to have romantic relationships with girls as young as 12. Because of their age, these girls find it particularly difficult to refuse these advances, hence they would rather avoid these situations by not going to school. This finding suggests that the education of girl learners in Khanini is being compromised because they feel too scared to go to school.

Notwithstanding this discussion, some notable exceptions to this dominant narrative of fear and unsafety were identified. In one group, a number of people reported that despite the levels of violence surrounding them, they did in fact feel safe. They put this down to the fact that community members (formalized into a collective called “Mayitshe”) and the police, were seen to patrol regularly. This suggests that there are some young people who do maintain some faith in the SAPS to keep them safe, although this may derive as much from the role of the Mayitshe, as the SAPS. In another group, some learners specifically states that they felt safe at the park, others felt safe at home, while a few emphasized that their feelings of safety increase when they are in a public space, surrounded by many people from the community.

The overwhelming theme thus emerging from the discussion on the safety of the young people, was that the vast majority felt unsafe in their communities, and extended beyond just the communities

in which they lived, but to the areas in which they travelled for recreation, and for schooling. Further, there was no indication that young people felt any safer at school than they did elsewhere in Khayelitsha. While it has already been noted that it is difficult to associate direct experiences of crime and victimization with feelings of unsafety, the fact that the majority of participants had experiences of some form of violence, or had been directly involved in some way, and the predominant feeling of unsafety, it may be concluded with some reliability that these perceptions of safety are informed by personal experience.

Perceptions of the SAPS

It has already been noted that perceptions of the police may be informed by direct interaction with them, either in relation to a crime or an administrative matter, or may be informed simply by indirect interaction or public opinion. Importantly, much of the comment and opinions on the SAPS in Khayelitsha, came from direct experience and all the groups were able to talk about a number of different experiences that they as individuals had with SAPS in Khayelitsha.

Police Visibility

Notwithstanding the perceptions of the research participants based on direct experience, it was considered important by the research team to establish the extent to which the residents of Khayelitsha (or at least of those sections of Khayelitsha represented in the FGDs), saw the SAPS in their community, and specifically, saw them on-duty and active. In the exploration of the participants experience with, and perceptions of, the Khayelitsha SAPS, it was clear that police visibility was not considered an issue. Almost uniformly, the research participants spoke of SAPS as being visible in the community, although in some instances they were perceived as not being as visible as they might have been previously. Most spoke of seeing police on patrol on a daily basis, most usually in police vehicles. The school marshalls, however, did feel that the SAPS were not as visible as “in the past”, indicating that there has been a significant decline in police presence at their schools. This was highlighted when one school marshall stated that “ *sometime they did visit us every day at school, now they come once a month*”.

Importantly, a learners in one group identified the fact that visibility was not the issue, and would not necessarily translate into a positive perception of police performance, but rather the ability of the SAPS to perform their duties: As one learner illustrated that “*it’s easy to go to them and tell them you have a problem, but it’s hard for them to help to do something about the problem*”. In another instance, a participant described the SAPS as “*lazy*”, another stating that “*they will see gangsters fighting but they will do nothing*”, and yet another pointing out that “*they will still be cruising even if someone is dying*”.

Several other common themes emerged across all the groups relating to police performance: perceived complicity in crime, including police misconduct; the police response to the community and victims of crime in particular; and briefly, the failure, more broadly, of the criminal justice system. Other issues mentioned included the poor image of SAPS, and a lack of resources. These are discussed in more detail below.

Police complicity in crime, and perceived misconduct

Common across all groups were reports of corruption, bribery, and misconduct, all of which serve to substantially undermine the public's faith and trust in the SAPS. This could take various forms, but a sufficient number of first-hand experiences of both complicity in, and corruption, were raised to suggest that this is a major impediment to both police efficiency, and trust in the police, in Khayelitsha. Misconduct could involve the taking of bribes, or simply taking of sides in disputes.

In one case, a school marshall suggested that *"Sometimes you can see that there is a connection between the police and some guys in the community. When something happens you can see that the police are taking sides"*. One learner from another group explained how the police are willing to take bribes, thus making it *"important for community members to befriend police as that is the only way how their problem will be heard"*.

The issue of alcohol was also strongly associated with direct corruption as well, with several participants referring to cases where the police were bribed with alcohol. For example, one learner described in detail a specific incident where his aunt's shebeen was robbed and the only way to ensure police co-operation was to bribe the police with a case of alcohol: *"A few months earlier they came to my aunt's tavern to provoke her licence; they wanted her to buy them a carrier bag of Amstel...now my aunt's friends with them now"*.

In another case, participants spoke of cases where police pretended to close down shebeens, but were open to negotiation in the form of alcohol: *"Every Thursday the police will go and shut a shebeen down and spend time inside and will come out with something and the bar will stay open."*

Others spoke simply of the SAPS spending time on duty in shebeens rather than patrolling or responding to calls.

Perception of police officials living in Khayelitsha versus officials living outside Khayelitsha

A common perception was reflected that appointing SAPS officials from outside the community would increase efficiency. In one case, a participant stated that if she sees police from Khayelitsha patrolling in her community, the response and action of the police are likely to be inadequate and they will mainly remain parked in townships. Conversely, SAPS officials from outside of Khayelitsha are perceived as being more efficient when responding to the needs of the community and deals with the situation in a more constructive way.

Others suggested that that if police officials are stationed in Khayelitsha, they should not live in the area because criminals would then target these police officials, thus impacting on their ability to do their work.

Other experiences raised by the research participants included certain officials being known to sell firearms in the community, or stealing goods from Somali shop-keepers, on the basis that they would have little recourse.

These experiences all combine to create the perception of the SAPS in Khayelitsha as corrupt and ineffective. One learner suggested that the only way to stay safe, was to befriend a police officer and pay him or her bribes, as that was the only way that they would stay safe.

While there are of course mechanisms to report corruption and abuse of power, these mechanisms may themselves be viewed as ineffective. A common theme in one group was that many community members are of the view that even if the SAPS officials are reported for corrupt operations, there will be no consequences or legal implications by the state.

Across all the FGDs discussed, there was no positive reports of police performance or integrity, with all participants choosing instead to focus on cases of corruption and bribery they themselves had experienced, or of which they were aware.

A common discussion across groups was whether police officers were better deployed from inside the community, or from other communities. The most common consensus was that police officers from outside the community would be less likely to be open to corruption, as they would not know the local criminals, or have existing relationships within the community that might prevent them doing their job effectively and transparently.

Police response to victims of crime and the reporting of crime

The manner in which police respond to reports of crime have a powerful influence over the likelihood of subsequent reports, the trust that is inspired in the police's handling of cases, as well as the broader-based public perception of the police. Throughout all the groups, not a single positive incident of interaction with the Khayelitsha police based on a report of crime, or any other request for assistance, was provided.

Despite the apparent visibility of the police in the community, SAPS were still perceived as being tardy in their response to crime. One participant, working with schools, explained that *"when the gangsters come, the teachers talk to us. We must talk to the gangsters; we must chase them away*

because we can't call the police, they take hours to come". Even when the police did respond, there was little evidence from the FGDs that the response was adequate.

Another learner recalled an incident when she got lost she asked the police to help and they refused, *"One day I took a bus, I was tired I fell asleep and then I missed my stop, about three or four vans passed me each time. I asked them to stop, they wouldn't".*

A learner in one group described an incident where she was robbed and sought police assistance immediately following the attack: *"I was robbed coming from Site B and then after I got robbed a police van came by, I stopped it and told them that I just got robbed. They (the perpetrators) were still on the main road between Site B and Khayelitsha, and when we told them (the police) that there they are and then the police officer said they don't have a gun with them so they can't go to them. We just sat there on the pavement until they (the perpetrators) left".*

A dissimilar incident was reported by a school marshall, who spoke of a case where, following a gang related incident at school he asked the police if they would assist in helping to take him home as he was afraid of his safety. However, the police refused *"...they said they can't go in that road. The road was closed because off the gangsters. So I must wait in the school till they are gone".*

In one group, learners described how the police would laugh or tease people when they report certain crimes. A specific example was cited, where a learner described a case of rape of a boy, which was laughed at by the police when the victim reported it. This inability of the police to deal particularly with cases of sexual violence was a recurrent theme. In one group, several participants felt that the police are not adequately trained when it comes to situations that require some sensitivity, and this is reflected in their treatment of these cases. For example, when men in the community report that they are being abused by their wife or girlfriend, rather than assist them, the police would laugh and make a mockery of them. When asked why the police would rather make fun of the situation than assist male victims of domestic violence, some mentioned that they think that police officials are ill-equipped to deal with these situations and that they would rather go to non-governmental organisations (NGO's) for help. Related to this, one participant recalled an earlier experience when police failed to assist her with a personal family issue. More specifically, she went to the police station for assistance or a possible referral to an organisation because her sister was displaying problematic behaviours (using substances, dropped out of school, used to run away from home). She said that SAPS was unhelpful and told her that maybe her sister was sick (mentally unwell) rather than refer her to someone that could provide support.

Even in cases where the police took adequate reports of cases, there appears to be little faith that the cases will be investigated, for a variety of reasons. As one research participant reported, police would not do anything about the crime they have reported: *'police won't take reports they will just tell the victim they are also looking for the person'*.

To illustrate this further, FGD participant recalled how she informed the police about a community member that hides gang members in her home. No action was taken by the police, with their response simply that *"it's not their line of work and that they are not allocated there (stationed in that area), it is not my job"*. This non-responsive action by police was also stressed by another participant from the same group, who spoke of how SAPS *"just watch while kid's (gangsters) are killing each other in Section E"*.

While it is difficult to determine from the above any one reason for inefficiency in responding to reports of crime, or requests for assistance, there were a number of examples that point to both corruption (again), and a lack of training.

In a few instances, the lack of resources was also provided as a possible reason for the non-responsiveness of the police, or at least, as an excuse provided by the police for not responding. In the case of the hesitance of girl learners to attend activities because of the fear of rape and attack (cited above), the police were asked to intervene, but refused on the basis that they did not have vehicles to patrol the area (to and from the centre. However, it should be noted that a second reason was provided, that they were too scared to protect the girl learners from gangsters, because they feared they would be killed.

Failure of the Criminal Justice System

In one group, some (of the older participants) strongly believed that police inefficiency in Khayelitsha is linked to the perceived inadequacies of the criminal justice system. They explained that the existing laws of the country protect youth perpetrators. In addition, many felt that police effectiveness could be strengthened if current laws are reviewed and changed and that SAPS should *"encourage people to educate themselves about the laws of the country as well as their rights as citizens"*.

Rating of SAPS services in Khayelitsha

Over and above the discussions above, a ranking exercise was conducted with all the groups to stimulate discussion around certain aspects of SAPS service delivery. Each group was asked to grade SAPS services between very bad (1) and very good(5), with average marked as a 3. The intent ion of

this was more to generate conversation and for the group themselves to achieve consensus, than for each service to be “scored”. Seven service areas were listed: the service received at the local police station, SAPS response to distress calls or requests for assistance, broad SAPS liaison or relationship with the community, the service offered by SAPS officials on foot patrols, and then, separately, in patrol vehicles, SAPS special operations such as roadblocks, and the service offered to victims and survivors of crime.

The largely negative view of the SAPS emerging from the discussion above was continued into the discussions around specific service areas, with some notable exceptions (see Table 3 below). On the whole, the local SAPS were rated very poor on most areas. Considered particularly badly in the light of the community was the service that the police provided when responding to a call for assistance (a distress call), or when they were out on foot patrol, as well as the service that they offered to victims of crime. Several research participants mentioned that police would only patrol certain areas, and that community members or groups are more likely to patrol than the police are. Viewed almost as negatively was the service offered by SAPS in the form of roadblocks, or search and seizure activities. This elicited perhaps the most debate, with several groups agreeing that in fact the SAPS should be scored highly for these operations, based on the fact that they occurred frequently, and are pursued with some enthusiasm by the police. The motivation for this enthusiasm was perceived as being somewhat ulterior, with most of the group members agreeing that the only reason the SAPS conducted these roadblocks or search activities so frequently was in order to elicit bribes from the community members, most commonly in the form of cash, or alcohol, or in some cases drugs. One member suggested that special operations are only conducted when the police “*need money*” (and most often on Fridays).^{xvii}

The most positive response was provided when assessing the service that police provided when patrolling in vehicles. This stands in contrast to the anecdotes provided earlier in the discussion on police in patrol vehicles ignoring requests for assistance, but it was suggested by the group that the rating reflected simply the visibility of the police when patrolling in vehicles, rather than their efficacy in either preventing or responding to crime or requests.

One group came to the conclusion that the service provided by the SAPS at police station (which would include either administrative matters or reporting/following up on cases) was average, while all other groups rated the service received at stations as very bad. The motivation for rating the SAPS average in this instance revolved around the fact that the service depended very much on the individual police officer assisting at the station. Another factor raised was that police were significantly better at administrative matters than they are at operational matters (in the words of

one participant, the police are good at “*handing out stamps*”). One group of learners felt that some of the officers offered better service than others, sufficiently so to warrant a consensual average rating.

Table 3: Assessment of SAPS services rendered

SERVICES RENDERED	RATING				
	Very Bad	Bad	Average	Good	Very Good
Service at the SAPS station	XXXXX		X		
SAPS response to distress call from community	X XXXXX				
SAPS liaison / relationship with community	XXX	XXX			
SAPS officers on foot patrol	XXX XXX				
SAPS officers in vehicle patrols		XX	XXX		X
SAPS special operations (roadblocks, etc.)	XXXX				XX
Service to victims and survivors of crime	XXXX	XX			

Reporting of crime to the police

These factors all, for obvious reasons, undermine the likelihood of community members reporting crime to the police. The consensus across all the research groups was that the group members would not bother reporting crime or any acts of violence, to the police. For most participants, the scenario is simpler: “*reporting is a waste of time because police are not properly doing their job*”. One learner explained that even if a crime is reported, the police will not take it seriously: “*It’s easy to access the police, easy to go there, but it is hard to get them to help. It’s also difficult because police tend not to take certain crimes seriously*”.

Of note is that for one group of young people, however, the poor service they receive from the police was directly related to the socio-economic condition in which they live, stating that “*crime in Khayelitsha is not being reported because (reports) are not taken “seriously” as opposed to other “better” areas*”.

For one youth group, fearing for their safety leads to non-reporting of crime and violence because they are too scared of what the perpetrators (gangsters) will do, not just to them but also to their family

The poor response of the police to reports of crime is exacerbated by a perceived inability of the police to provide protection to those reporting crime, and again reflects the dominance of gangsters in the community. One reason commonly provided in any community for not reporting crime is the fear of retribution of “vengeance” by the perpetrator. This is a particularly powerful deterrent in cases where the perpetrators are commonly known to the victims of crime, a scenario that it has already been established is common in Khayelitsha. It is thus unsurprising that this was provided as an additional reasons for not reporting crime to the police by one group (see text box).

For some of the young people in one group, an important caveat to the general feeling that reporting was pointless was implied: they would be willing to report if they got the assistance that they need, and that this may depend on the individual officer dealing with the case. This is an important observation as it recognizes that the potential does exist within SAPS in Khayelitsha to provide an effective service. This was further reinforced by another group, which spoke of a radio that had been given to one of the community structures to call the police for assistance when they needed. This was followed, however, by the observation that the police never answered the radio, and the group members then resorted to calling the police on the mobile phones, as they would have normally.

Alternatives steps to ensure safety

Given the common perceptions that the police are not performing adequately in Khayelitsha, and the lack of trust and faith in them to keep the community safe, clearly exhibited above, the research participants were asked what alternative measures they took, or they were aware of others taking, to keep themselves safe. This is a particularly important avenue of exploration given the reported increase in vigilante attacks occurring in Khayelitsha. An initial open discussion on alternatives to formal police structures was followed by a scenario where participants were asked to complete a story in which a young house burglar was caught by neighbours escaping from a house with stolen goods. While there was no mention of vigilantism or mob justice mentioned in the posing of the question, discussion immediately jumped to formal and informal structures (CPFs and street committees), and then to the use of mob justice by street committees and informal community structures. No mention was made of more conventional measures, many of which might be seen as out of the reach of those living within Khayelitsha, such as private security, or target hardening.

Community Policing Forums (CPFs) were mentioned by almost all the groups as one alternative to the police, both in terms of preventing and responding to crime. However, these structures were usually mentioned in passing, with a common recognition that they had a role to play, but did not play a dominant role in safety. Instead, other, less formalized community structures seemed preferable alternatives for both ensuring safety, and achieving a perceived sense of justice.

Most dominant, particularly in two of the groups, was the role of street committees, and the intermediary role that the local South African National Civics Organization (SANCO) play between street committees and the SAPS. The process was described in some detail by one group member (a school marshall): *“the street committee will report the incident to SANCO, and they would then report the incident/crime to the police”*. However, according to the school marshalls, more often than not the police does not do anything about the report. The same individual continued: *“if I report a case to the street committee, obviously the street committee will report it to the police. If the police don’t respond obviously we are gonna have to take it in our own hands”*.

Another group emphasized the role of the taxi drivers as informal law enforcers in the community. Taxi drivers patrol the community at night in private cars, both together with, and separate from, neighbourhood watches and street committees. According to the group, taxi drivers feel no compunction attacking any individual they encounter they suspect of engaging in crime, or wandering the street with no *“legitimate”* business. The same group reported that the taxi drivers are seen as being the *“most powerful”*, and are the ones seen as taking primary responsibility for policing the community. The sense of power attached to the taxi drivers, it was reported, stems from

their no-tolerance and violent approach to suspected criminals. The consensus among group members is that the streets were safer as a result of the taxi drivers role as law enforcement.

This however, was also noted as a very real conflict, and broadened the scope further for corruption involving the SAPS, as in earlier discussion the taxi drivers were mentioned as being in collusion with the police, and complicit in the provision of bribes to the local SAPS.

Case Study

Tshepo 22 years old has recently dropped out of university and has been hanging out with guys that his mother does not approve of. In the last six months, Tshepo has lost a lot of weight and everyone suspects that he is using Nyaope/Tik. About a week ago, Tshepo was caught carrying a DVD player out of a neighbour's house. Mrs.Majola reported this to the police, however, since the report she has not received any feedback. Yesterday, another community member spotted Tshepo breaking in to another neighbour's house. After numerous robberies the community is furious ... **What happened next?**

The concept of mob justice or vigilantism is not something that is confined to the older research participants, but is as common in the narratives of the younger group members. One of the groups of school-aged participants came up with three different scenarios in response to the case study exercise provided to them, all of which focused on the use of "mob justice" (see text box).

Table 4. Scenarios provided by a group of learners

Scenario 1

The community organised a meeting to discuss the issue about Tshepo. They informed the mother about their decision on what they are going to do to Tshepo, if they see him again. The next time they saw Tshepo they took the law into their hands (i.e mob justice).

Scenario 2

The community members take the law into their own hands and beat him up. Tshepo goes to the hospital after being released he is arrested and released after two weeks. He realizes his mistake and tries to make things right but it's hard because of the stigma associated with his name. He moves to the Eastern Cape to start over and makes a better life for himself.

Scenario 3

The community members are going to have a meeting on how to solve this issue. They are going to his family members about his behaviour. They will demand that Tshepo leaves the community. If they fail to do that mob justice will take place. It might happen that they might kill him or even burn down his home. But if his family manages to discipline him he might be able to realise his mistakes and learn from them. He will then go back to varsity and pay back for the equipment that he has stolen.

It is also useful to note that there is little ambiguity around the concept of mob justice as referred to by various group members. All were clear that the retribution taken by non-formalized community members was violent in nature, and may or may not result in the death of the suspect. The extent of the punishment is viewed as being unrelated to the severity of the crime – it is merely a function of the exasperation and frustration that the community feels with the inadequacy of the police response. Some specific examples of the nature of mob justice were provided by one group, possibly informed by both their own experience and recent reports in the media. These included the use of whatever weapons were to hand, ranging from pangas, knives and stones, to sticks and shovels; to the burning of suspects, forcing them to drink battery acid, or leaving them bound on railway lines. These possible methods were not confined to any one group, but were all mentioned by multiple groups, the consensus being that despite one's personal feelings, no-one would try to intervene in such cases, and would stand by and watch, or cheer on those dispensing the "justice".

Of note in the above scenarios by the group of learners is that there is a clear process followed in the first two options, with community members meeting with the young person's family to try and resolve the criminal behaviour before resorting to a violent response. Conversely, and also very illuminating, is the fact that in two of the scenarios the vigilante response is seen as a form of criminal rehabilitation, with the aim of "helping" the young person acknowledge his behaviour and changing the pattern of behaviour. The degree to which this happens in practice could not be ascertained, and no other groups provided such a clear separation of options, rather all choosing to focus simply on the fact that the suspect would simply be beaten, or killed. There was no deviation at all, across any of the groups, from the envisaged response of the community to the scenario provided, with all focusing immediately on a mob justice response. These responses clearly drew on personal experience, and acts of justice that the research participants had seen: *"The person that I saw that was squashed by a train he was robbing someone, so they took him and threw him in front of a train;"* another: *"My family will burn him, by the time they catch him they are very angry."*

An interesting description of the role of men and women in the dispensing of mob justice was identified by one group member. She explained that first, men in the community would beat the alleged perpetrator to the extent that they cannot move. The women then come to assist by *"pouring salt and spice"* into the open wounds. They then take this further by throwing either hot water or hot oil on the alleged perpetrator.

While there was no difference in the scale of violence, or the validity of community violence as an acceptable and needed measure, in the narratives provided by older group participants and the younger participants, or between male or female members, one learner did report that she felt

“bad” for the person, and “sad” when the mob justice happens in front of her, and that as much as the person deserved what they get, it “still isn’t right”. This attitude, however, seemed to vary across groups, with a slightly older young person (also female) in another group stating that “When you see people get robbed and people get raped...when you know the crime happened to people that you know and you see that person actually getting beaten-up you don’t really feel sorry for them. Even though you wish they don’t beat him to death, but you hope...you feel like... you are also angry. I was robbed, my sister was raped.”^{xviii}

Visioning

In concluding the groups, each was asked to describe their vision of what Khayelitsha would look like in a perfect world, or what they wanted Khayelitsha to be. This was deliberately left open, allowing participants to identify any particular aspects of improvement they considered important, or most important to them. The focus was thus not on the physical environment, policing or other areas of service delivery, or governance, although these all emerged amongst the different groups as important in realizing an ideal community.^{xix} Of interest is that while safety is prioritized by some, it features less significantly, and at times is not mentioned, by others.

For one group, an ideal Khayelitsha is one where they feel safe and a place where people have ‘no worries’. For other young people in the study a safe Khayelitsha would be “a place with brick houses”. A place with no crime and violence, more positive role-models for young people and less ‘shebeens’ was considered as secure for both teen participants and the older group participants.

Some groups conceptualized the exercise within safety terms, unsurprising given the prior discussions and focus of the research. For these, a safe Khayelitsha would have parks and recreational centres for young people and children to spend their leisure time. One teen participant believed that a safe community is considered safe if they can view police officers as role models and as upstanding citizens.

One group moved beyond the visioning exercise to briefly describe how they saw the goal of a safe Khayelitsha achieved. This group believed that to achieve a crime-free and safe community military forces should step in. Others asserted that the SAPS officials should have a no tolerance approach to crime and violence in the community, “like the taxi drivers”. In their discussions they envisaged a functioning police service as “the SAPS in Durban who uses violence to control a community”.

Finally, one group of learners summed up their vision of Khayelitsha in one sentence: “a place where government officials are not greedy and a place where people value the importance of education.”

One group of learners were asked if any of them would like to be a police officer. All of the learners expressed their reluctance to ever become, or no aspirations to become, a police officer, influenced most often by the negative physical image of the police, as well as the perceptions of corruption.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The discussions conducted during the FGDs reveal communities in Khayelitsha that case the SAPS in the area in an overwhelmingly negative light. This perceptions seems to be based on a combination of both direct experience of interaction with the police, as well as the experiences of others in the community. One of the key challenges in gauging individuals opinions of the police is the extent to which they are informed by their own experiences, and individuals own experiences of crime and violence in Khayelitsha, and the degree to which they are informed only by public opinion and conversations, and the experiences of others. From the examples provided across all the groups, both of the young people and those working with young people in the community, suggest that there are few who have not been directly affected by various acts of violence in their community. This is an important departure point in considering what the implications of the findings.

In the first instance, the common stories provided by the research participants of cases of crime and violence, which have been experienced on the streets, in the schools and to a lesser degree, in their homes, suggest that any concerns for their safety and well-being are well-founded. The anecdotal and qualitative descriptions of their experiences reflect the more quantitative experiences that are depicted in the official police statistics for Khayelitsha. While there is little way, beyond a large and costly victimization to assess the veracity of the official data, there is sufficient evidence from the experiences of the young people to suggest that Khayelitsha comprises communities that can accurately be characterized as violent.

The situation faced by the SAPS is undoubtedly difficult, and they are arguable in an intractable position. While there is little way to determine the degree to which the high levels of violence is a result of police inefficiencies (whatever the causes), their challenge in adequately addressing the violence is severely undermined by the overwhelmingly negative standing they hold in the eyes of the community, and any attempt on their part to remedy the situation, and to deal with the high levels of crime and violence is likely to be exponentially more difficult as a result of this breakdown in the relationship.

Notwithstanding this, there appears to be enough evidence that the behaviour of police within the community has not helped their standing at all. Across all the FGDs, individuals were able to cite examples of corruption and bribery, primarily between the police and taxi drivers, and police and shebeen owners, but pervasive to the general community as well. In some instances, the police are seen as being openly complicit in some criminal activity, while in others, they appear simply to be

unwilling, unable, and too fearful, to respond appropriately to criminal acts and violence, and to patrol violent hot spots.

The perceptions of police corruption is exacerbated by the fact that many of the perpetrators of violence are known to community members, and it was commonly expressed, to the police themselves. The police are thus seen as being either unwilling or unable to deal with the perpetrators, a fact that is attributed either to a generally corrupt relationship, or to the fact that they are simply too scared (also a recurring theme).

The perceptions of corruption are heightened by the commonly experienced behaviour of the police during operational activities such as roadblocks, as it does from any perceived institutional or formalized relationship with gangsters.

The predominance of gangs and gang-related violence in the Khayelitsha communities, together with the related drug issues, suggest that even should the police be in a position and willing to effectively perform their duties, a need exists for more specialized interventions to deal with gang-related violence. Existing community-based measures supported by government, such as the school marshalls, clearly have their own limitations, and are seen to be ineffective by many of the marshalls themselves, and by the learners they should be keeping safe. This situation is exacerbated by the violence and gang activity outside of the school environments, and within. It should also be noted that there appears to be a conflation of most violence experienced by community members, with gang-related activities. This is particularly evident in relation to violence that occurs at schools.

The relationship with taxi drivers, perceived or actual, is in itself problematic. The relationship is perceived as being corrupt, with the taking and passing of bribes between the two, on the one hand; while on the others, the taxi drivers seems to be filling to a degree the vacuum left by the absence of effective policing in patrolling and dealing with criminal activities.

Given that this research is specifically targeting the experiences of young people in Khayelitsha, and those who work with them, it is important also to note the developmental implications on the young people themselves, of the research findings.

- Young people's experiences of the police are likely to shape their engagement with the police, and other institutions of authority, and the terms on which they engage, as they grow into adulthood. Negative experiences, and a lack of trust as children and teens, will increase the likelihood that individuals grow or continue to distrust the police, and develop a pattern of non-reporting, and seeking alternative solutions.

- There is sufficient evidence that the failure of policing in the community is directly impacting on young people's, and particularly young girls, attendance and retention at schools. Over and above the human rights implications of this, it also has potential economic implications. Most fundamentally, however, education has been recognized as one of the most significant resilience or protective factors for young people.
- The exposure to extreme forms of violence, in the form of mob justice, that was commonly and without exception reflected in the research, increases the risk of longer term violent outcomes and solutions. Simply, the greater the exposure to violence as a child and youth, the greater the risk of that child engaging in violence as they get older, using violence to resolve conflict or disputes, but as importantly, of falling victim to violence as they grow older as well. The extreme, and brutal, community-sanctioned violence to which the young people are exposed, and the already apparent desensitisation of the young people to this, has long-lasting and profound implications for their own well-being, and safety, and that of those with whom they engage as adults.
- The experiences of violence, and the perceived inability of the police to address them, also clearly impact on important opportunities for young people to engage in activities offered by community groups and institutions from outside Khayelitsha, such as sports and extra-curricula activities such as lifeskills. These are particularly important in socio-economically depressed or deprived communities, as they often are the only opportunities young people have to engage in programmes and experiences that shape healthy young adults.

There is little way of testing the opinions, experiences and perceptions of the police so commonly expressed by the research participants, but it is unlikely that there is not some substance to some if not all the experiences that have shaped these perceptions. Regardless, it is clear that the young people in the communities that make up Khayelitsha have no faith in the police to either keep them safe, or to deal with reported cases of crime, and violence, that occur.

Appendix A – Breakdown of Focus Group Discussions

- **1 FGD- School Marshalls** , 10 participants (4 Males and 6 Females, all >21 years old)
- **1 FGD- 100UP Learners**, 18 participants (2 Males and 16 Females, 16 to 17 years old)
- **2 FGD- Grassroots Soccer**
 - **Facilitators**, 15 participants (6 Males and 9 Females, 18 to 30 years old)
 - **Under 19's**, 9 participants (all males, 16 to 19 years old)
- **2 FGD- Lovelife Groundbreakers**,
 - **Facilitators**, 8 participants (1 Male and 7 Females, 18 to 34 years old)
 - **Youth Group**, 12 participants (8 Males and 4 Females, 12 to 25 years old)

Appendix B – Focus Group Structure

Activity	Research Question	Description of Activities	Time Allocation
Introduction		<p>Good day. My name is I am a researcher with the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP). We have asked you all to come here today to help us understand young people's safety in the community. This will be done by delving into the perceptions and experiences of police in Khayelitsha, how well they are doing (efficiency) and their performance. CJCP is an organisation that is focused primarily on research and training. In other words we are not affiliated / associated with the police or the department of justice; we do research to gain an in-depth understanding of how crime fits into our society, whilst at the same time uncovering best practices to combat crime.</p> <p>You have been selected because you are either representing a group of young people who live or spend time in the area, or because you work with young people in Khayelitsha.</p> <p>First, thank you for agreeing to participate in the research. We should not need more than an hour of your time, and everything you say will be treated confidentially, and anonymously. We will not need any information other than your first names. The information given today will be recorded by the scribe and with your permission a tape-recorder will be used so that we do not omit any information discussed here today. We will be asking questions about your experiences of crime and of violence in your area; whether you report crime, and who you report it to; your feelings of safety in the community, and your interactions with the police.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does anyone have any questions? Does anyone in the group feel uncomfortable or not want to participate in the study? <p><i>Information to record: Participant group, location, time, number of participants, number of males, females, age span. At end, time of completion.</i></p>	5 mins
		<p>Ground rules:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Everyone has a chance to speak You have to ask questions if you don't 	5 mins

Activity	Research Question	Description of Activities	Time Allocation
Ground Rules & Ice Breaker		<p>understand</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Everyone's ideas, opinions and experiences are important There are no right or wrong answers <p>Any other rules?</p> <p>ICE BREAKER</p> <p>If you were a colour what would you be?</p> <p><i>[For this activity respondents should write down the colour and their name on their name tag and that will be their nickname for the rest of the discussion]</i></p>	
Discussion	Nature and extent of Crime and Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Learners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are you aware of the School Marshall programme? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Where did you hear about the programme? Do you think this programme is necessary? Do you feel safer knowing there are School Marshalls around? How many of you have experienced violence or crime? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What type of crime/violence was it? Did it happen to you personally, or someone that you know? (e.g. Family, friend, etc.) Who was the perpetrator? Where did this incident occur? Did it happen within the last year? How often do crimes like this happen? To you? School Marshalls (SM) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can you tell us more about the School Marshall programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> When did it start? How does one become a School Marshall? Do you think the programme is effective? What are the main challenges? What are the common 	10 mins

Activity	Research Question	Description of Activities	Time Allocation
		<p>crimes/violence young people are exposed to in Khayelitsha?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Who are the common perpetrators? Where are the most common places where these incidences occur? Did you find that many of these crime/violent acts happened within the last year? How often do crimes like these happen in the community? Do you think that gangsterism is a problem in this community? <p><i>[This question will only be asked if not explored in the initial questions pertaining to experiences of crime and violence]</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If yes, why do you say so? If no, why do you say so? 	
	Reporting Patterns & Reasons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did you report the crime? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If yes, to whom? Were you satisfied with the help you received? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If not, why was this? Do you always report the crime/violence, or does it depend on the type of crime/violence? Are you generally likely to report to the police again, based on your experience? 	10 mins
Discussion	Perceptions of SAPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How often do you see the SAPS in your area? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Where do you see them? Are they on duty when you see them? How often do you see the SAPS <i>in</i> uniform in your area? Do you think the SAPS are accessible (i.e. easy to access)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If yes, explain If no, explain Can you name/ list other interactions that you've had with the SAPS? (For example, certifying a document, asking for directions, reporting a crime, being stopped by the police etc.) How would you rate the following SAPS activities in your area? (Ranging from very poor to very good): 	15 mins

Activity	Research Question	Description of Activities	Time Allocation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service at the SAPS station SAPS response to distress call from community SAPS liaison / relationship with community SAPS officers on foot patrol SAPS officers in vehicle patrols SAPS special operations (roadblocks, etc.) Service to victims and survivors of crime 	
Group Work	Case Study	<p>Scenario</p> <p>Tshepo, 22 years old, has recently dropped out of university and has been hanging out with guys that his mother does not approve of. In the last six months, Tshepo has lost a lot of weight and everyone suspects that he is using Nyaope/Tik. About a week ago, Tshepo was caught carrying a DVD player out of a neighbour's house. Mrs.Majola reported this to the police, however, since the report she has not received any feedback. Yesterday, another community member spotted Tshepo breaking in to another neighbour's house. After numerous robberies the community is furious ...</p> <p><i>What happened next?</i></p> <p><i>(For this activity, the respondents will be divided into three groups)</i></p>	10 mins
Discussion	Violence Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could you mention a few measures of how do residents in your community (Khayelitsha) ensure their safety? Why do you think they use these measures, and not others? What other ways are there that you can think of, or know, to ensure your and their safety? Do these measures work? 	5 mins
	Feelings of safety in Khayelitsha	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What time of the day do you think is the unsafe/safe for community members in Khayelitsha/school area (<i>i.e. in or around the school premises</i>)? Are there particular areas in Khayelitsha / school area (<i>i.e. in or around the school premises</i>) that you feel are unsafe? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> And why do you say that? Are there particular areas in Khayelitsha / 	5 mins

Activity	Research Question	Description of Activities	Time Allocation
		<p>school area (i.e. in or around the school premises) that you feel are safe?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> And why do you say that? <p><i>(Possible mapping exercise (time dependent) – please draw the areas around your home. Where do you feel safe, where do you feel unsafe? What are the threats? Where are your places of safety? Where are the police stations?)</i></p>	
Closing (Vision for Khayelitsha)		<p>In an ideal world –what would your community look like in terms of safety? For:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Young people; Women; Men; and People living with disabilities <p><i>(For this exercise the participants will be divided into four groups)</i></p>	5 mins

Appendix C – Overview of participant groups

What is the Football for Hope Movement?

Football for Hope was established in 2009 when the centre opened its doors in Khayelitsha. It is a youth driven initiative that aims to educate, empower and engage the youth around HIV prevention through the use of soccer based activities. Football for Hope is largely a



collaborative effort undertaken by the Football for Hope Movement, Grassroots Soccer, the Khayelitsha Development Forum and various other funders and supporters. FIFA used the 2010 World Cup as a platform to promote this initiative by using soccer as a driving force in tackling social issues. Grassroots Soccer is tasked with implementing the initiative in the community.

Grassroot Soccer's 'Skillz' curriculum focuses on building basic life skills that help boys and girls adopt healthy behaviours and live risk-free. Through a series of interactive activities and discussions students gain a tangible understanding of HIV and AIDS and get a chance to practice the skills necessary for sustainable behaviour change. Key curricular topics include: making healthy decisions, avoiding risks, building support networks, reducing stigma and discrimination, increasing knowledge about testing and treatment, addressing gender issues, and assessing values.

Source: Grassroots Soccer, 2009, Football for Hope Center opens its doors to Khayelitsha and the world. Available online at www.grassrootssoccer.org. Accessed 10 December 2013.

Second source taken directly: Grassroots, 2013, What we do. Available online at www.grassrootssoccer.org. Accessed 10 December 2013.

The 100UP Learners Programme



The first group consisted of learners from the University of Cape Town's (UCT's) Schools Improvement Initiative. The 100-UP programme was developed to prepare academically gifted learners from Khayelitsha for further education at institutions such as UCT^{xx}.

This programme spans across 3 years. The programme has taken 5 academically strong learners from twenty secondary schools in Khayelitsha. Over the 3 year period the learners are groomed by staff and students from the University of Cape Town, expertise are drawn from a cross-section of faculties and departments to ensure that this programme is a success^{xxi}. In so doing, the long-term objective of the 100-UP programme is to build institutional knowledge and experience to better inform the university's bridging programmes as well as any other school based interventions^{xxii}.

100-UP Programme includes:

1. Residential camps where students will receive academic enrichment in mathematics; sciences and English. The final grade 12 camp will focus on preparing for the end-of-year matriculation exams and 'pre-bridging' into university life. Key to all the camps will be the mentors who will be university students drawn from similar backgrounds to the 100-UP participants. The residential component of the programme will be held at UCT's central campus in Rondebosch, Cape Town.
2. Grades 11 and 12 Saturday school programme will include academic enrichment and extra curricular activities. In Grade 12 there will be a growing emphasis on university preparation (and planning activities). Saturday classes will also take place at UCT's central campus.
3. Saturday tutoring programme in partnership with UCT student organisations will give participants weekly tutoring and homework support. These sessions will be run at various centres in Khayelitsha.
4. Exposure to various UCT activities such as Career Open Days, Science Expos and Minquiz, among others.

Source Taken: 100-UP Programme; Available Online: http://www.sii.uct.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/100_broch.pdf

A total of 18 grade 11 learners from the 100-UP programme took part in the focus group discussions. Of which two learners were male and 16 learners were female.

School Safety Marshalls

The School Safety Marshalls Programme is staffed primarily by previous Bambanani volunteers who were developed by the Department of Community Safety in the Western Cape which is premised on

the eight principles outlined in the Batho Pele^{xxiii}, namely: consultation. Service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money.

Through this strategy the Department of Community Safety has followed a transformatory and participatory methodology which is not only supported by the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) but also the ikapa Growth and Development White Paper (2007) as well^{xxiv}. In so doing the strategy aims at encouraging community involvement, community empowerment, and social cohesion in order to deliver services that are representative of civic importance^{xxv}. The school safety marshalls formed the second group, which consisted of 10 school safety marshalls, of which four were male and six were female.

LoveLife

All of the research participants in this component of the study are affiliated or works for the loveLife Khayelitsha Y-centre. This organisation is a community based centre that offers numerous programmes and services to youths in Khayelitsha to promote their self-worth and well-being.^{xxvi} The loveLife Y-centre forms part of a bigger Non-Profit Organisation that functions on a national-basis. The organisation has partnered with the Western Cape Violence Prevention Unit through Upgrading as well as the City of Cape Town and is situated in Harare, one of the subareas in Khayelitsha.^{xxvii}



The loveLife organisation offers multiple programmes and projects all designed with the purpose of addressing the individual, structural and social factors that inhibit youths to become successful and that drive the HIV epidemic among the young people.

loveLife is a HIV-prevention initiative introduced in 1999 to counteract the pandemic at the time. Since 1999 the organisation has taken great strides and have partnered with numerous non-governmental organisations and private funders to tackle the epidemics young people face by supporting and running programmes on a national and community level.

The organisation works with groundbreakers in 200 community-based organisations, 500 clinics and 5,600 schools nation-wide to implement their youth programmes. The loveLife has managed to reach 500,000 youths each month through different interactive and contemporary medias such as ICT, radio, Television shows, integrated media campaigns and other private media channels.

Source: loveLife, What We Do, Available at: <http://www.lovelife.org.za/corporate/lovelife-programmes/>, Accessed on: 10 December 2013.

NOTES

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- ⁱⁱ Cleminshaw D, From Crossroads to Khayelitsha to...? pp 11- 14. Available at: <http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/remar85.4/remar85.4.pdf>.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Curry E, South Africa: New, Assertive Women's Voices in Local Elections, Inter Press Service News Agency, Journalism and Communication for Global Change.
- ^{iv} Underhill G, Police chief mum on Khayelitsha, 24 August 2012, Available at: <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-24-00-police-chief-mum-on-khayelitsha-inquiry>
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- ^{vi} City of Cape Town, 2011 Census Suburb Khayelitsha, July 2013.
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- ^{vii} Business Trust & The Department of Local Government, Nodal Economic Profiling Project: Khayelitsha, Western Cape, 2007.
- City of Cape Town – 2011 Census Suburb Khayelitsha, July 2013
- ^{viii} City of Cape Town – 2011 Census Suburb Khayelitsha, July 2013
- ^{ix} Nleya N & Thompson L, Survey Methodology in Violence prone Khayelitsha, Cape Town, South Africa, IDS Bulletin, 40 (3), May 2009.
- ^x Altbeker A, Murder and robbery in South Africa: A tale of two trends, Crime and violence injury prevention in South Africa, pp. 131 – 160.
- ^{xi} Unit for Religion and Development Research, University of Stellenbosch and Transformation Africa, Khayelitsha: A Transformation Research project, 2005
- ^{xii} Altbeker A, Ibid.
- ^{xiii} SAPS, 2013, Crime research and statistics. Available at www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2013/crime_stats.htm.
- ^{xiv} Barter C & Renold E, The use of vignettes in qualitative research. *Social Research Update*, 25, 1999.
- ^{xv} Barter C & Renold E, The use of vignettes in qualitative research. *Social Research Update*, 25, 1999.
- ^{xvi} Of note is the fact that in many instances those who interact with the police at police stations, directly, often have a higher opinion of the police than those who rely only on perceptions and word of mouth to shape their own opinions (see Burton P, Du Plessis Am Leggett T, Louw, A, Mistry D and Van Vuuren H, National Victims of Crime Survey: South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 2003m amongst others)
- ^{xvii} It must be noted that although that although the increased frequency of roadblocks on Fridays, for example, may have been perceived as relating to corruption in various forms, there is a strong likelihood that this is a deliberate operational planning practicality, relating to the common increased occurrence of crime over weekends, and in particular, Friday nights.
- ^{xviii} It was noted by one group facilitator that throughout these discussions on revenge killings and mob justice, most of the group was laughing, and relaxed. It was noted that this dynamic could result from either a coping mechanisms to the trauma experienced, and the very violent nature of the experiences being discussed, or could indicate a total desensitisation of the participants to the violence.
- ^{xix} It must be noted that due to time constraints this exercise was not conducted with one group, the school marshalls.
- ^{xx} 100-UP Programme; Available At http://www.sii.uct.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/100_broch.pdf
- ^{xxi} Ibid.
- ^{xxii} Ibid.
- ^{xxiii} Department of Community Safety Western Cape, 2006/7: An improved service methodology, 2008. Available Online http://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2010/7/methodology_bk.pdf
- ^{xxiv} Ibid.
- ^{xxv} Ibid.
- ^{xxvi} loveLife, Khayelitsha Y-Centre Launch, Available at: <http://www.lovelife.org.za/corporate/press/news/khayelitsha-y-centre-launch/>, Accessed on: 10 December 2013.

^{xxvii} loveLife, Khayelitsha Y-Centre Launch, Available at:
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