

## The Paradox of Vigilance: Contesting Citizenship in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Nicholas Rush Smith  
Department of Political Science  
University of Chicago  
nrsmith@uchicago.edu

Paper Prepared for the Political Theory Workshop  
University of Chicago  
May 20, 2013

**Abstract:** Democratic theorists have long argued that democracy is strengthened by active, vigilant citizens who watch over the state and that social movements, as society’s “watchdogs,” serve this function. However, vigilante movements – collections of vigilant citizens who challenge the state’s sovereignty over punishment – present a paradox for these theories. That is, modern democracy demands vigilance from its citizens to limit the power of the state, but that the same vigilance, when taken too far, can present a danger to other citizens by challenging the state’s protection of rights.

Through the example of Mapogo a Mathamaga, one of South Africa’s largest vigilante groups, the paper explores this paradox. In dialogue with democratic theorists from Aristotle to Rosanvallon, this paper argues that Mapogo members engage in a form of vigilant citizenship. One particular way that they watch over the state is by challenging the state’s universal extension of human rights. Mapogo members argue that the extension of rights enable criminality and moral disorder. As a result, they challenge the state’s rights guarantees for unruly youth whom they claim are the source of this disorder. That South Africa’s citizens fought apartheid for a state based on strong human rights protections makes it all the more surprising that so many of its citizens banded together into a group like Mapogo to challenge the extension of rights to others.

**Author’s Note:** This is a draft version of Chapter 4 of my dissertation, *The Rights of Others: Vigilantism and the Contradictions of Democratic State Formation in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. The Social Science Research Council generously funded the fieldwork upon which this paper is based through their International Dissertation Research Fellowship program. **As this is a draft, please do not cite or circulate without the author’s permission.**

## Introduction

I first encountered John Magolego, the “Life President”<sup>1</sup> of South Africa’s largest vigilante movement, Mapogo a Mathamaga, at the upmarket Centurion Mall in suburban Pretoria. Nattily attired in a tan pinstriped suit, Magolego carried himself with the gentleness of a grandfather, his temperate demeanor contrasting sharply with the image of a wild vigilante leader for whom I had prepared myself. We settled into seats at a café, ordered breakfast, and began a lengthy interview about Mapogo’s history, Magolego’s views on crime, and his acquittal on murder charges in connection with a fatal beating allegedly administered by Mapogo members. As the interview wound down, I changed tack and asked Magolego how he felt about being called a vigilante. His response caught me off guard. Apparently avoiding my question, he asked me in an almost Socratic tone, “What does the word vigilant mean? In the dictionary.”

Struggling to formulate an exact answer, I stumbled over my words before answering, “To be vigilant means to watch out carefully. To be aware.”

“Beautiful,” he said, continuing in his teacher like way. “But in South African terms, it doesn’t mean that. Are you aware of that?” When I agreed the term often had a bad connotation, he spoke fast and louder, emphasizing the point. “In essence, it doesn’t mean somebody who is watchful...I would agree with them if they would follow the meaning of the word relatively that we are a watchful [group], people who are vigilant enough to see that it fits with our running normally and fine. But now...if they say vigilante, they say in their mind, we are just a group of people who are headless, people who don’t even think.” Mimicking Mapogo’s critics, he continued, “ [Mapogo] just go around *sjamboking* [beating] people, harassing people in a group’ and that is why I say, ‘No. We are not that bunch of rubbish.’”

---

<sup>1</sup> This is the title Magolego used to describe himself during our interview. Author Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010, Centurion, Pretoria, South Africa.

The reason why Magolego insisted they were not vigilantes surprised me (see also J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 225). He seemed bothered by the word's contemporary connotations of "headless" violence, rather than the word itself. Magolego implied that what separated his group from vigilantes was not the use of extra-judicial violence because he had described at length earlier in our interview the usefulness of corporal punishment to "discipline" criminals and turn them away from crime. Rather, to Magolego, the purposeless violence that people associated with vigilantism was not analogous to the deliberateness of Mapogo's beatings. Apparently, it is not the use of violence that defines a vigilante, to Magolego, but the manner and ends to which one uses it. That his group maintained order through disciplinary violence, Magolego told me earlier in the interview, ultimately corrected the post-apartheid state which was failing in its responsibility to protect law abiding citizens. While Magolego objected to being called a vigilante, he suggested that if people used the term with its original sense of vigilance over state and society he might accept it.

Vigilance has long been a key concept in both theoretical and historical studies of civic engagement. Scholars frequently argue that the oversight of the state by an active, critical citizenry is a necessary and desirable part of democratic life. If the institutions of democracy fail to check political leaders from violating individual rights or undermining the common good, theorists argue, a watchful citizenry must do this work instead. However, in what follows, I will use practices of vigilantism – communal extra-judicial punishment – as one peculiar manifestation of vigilant citizenship to show that the ideal of a vigilant citizenry has a paradoxical quality built into it. On the one hand, citizenship necessitates an active watchfulness over the state to ensure that the state does not violate the rights of its citizens. Yet, on the other hand, that same vigilance may undermine the basis of democratic citizenship by attacking the

state's protection of equal rights for all citizens. Vigilantes often claim that criminals violate the rights of law abiding citizens but are afforded rights that may leave the alleged criminal unpunished. Therefore, vigilantes claim, democratic rights work against their "rightful" possessors and must be "corrected" so that only those "deserving" of these protections may benefit from them. In other words, practicing vigilant citizenship, paradoxically, may undercut the ostensibly egalitarian legal foundations of citizenship itself.

Recognizing the paradoxical quality of vigilance is important because it pushes us to rethink how we understand citizenship. Rather than viewing citizenship as a bundle of rights or a set of duties, as many studies of citizenship do, by focusing on practices of vigilance we can view citizenship itself as a terrain of contestation (Smith 1993; Smith 1997). Put differently, citizenship is a political field over which people compete, sometimes violently, for the rights citizenship affords. While citizenship is a legal landscape laying out the terms of participation in a political community it is also a political language that allows people to compete over the grounds of political membership. As much as they are legal terms, the language of rights and duties are conceptual weapons in the battle over political belonging. That is, the rights of citizenship and their attendant duties become the grounds upon which vigilant citizens contest others' claims to the benefits citizenship. Viewed through the lens of vigilantism, the ideal of active, vigilant citizenship, which is so often celebrated, takes on a different cast and starts to look remarkably contradictory – at once necessary, laudable, and threatening.

Vigilantes are, admittedly, a rather extreme case of the dynamics I describe but have the benefit of putting into sharp relief qualities that may be present but not readily apparent in more quotidian examples of vigilant citizenship. And of all the South African vigilante groups, Mapogo is perhaps the best case through which to think, if only because it was at one time South

Africa's largest vigilante group, claiming up to 70,000 members at its height. Mapogo also typifies the contradictions built into the ideal of vigilant citizenship. Mapogo's members are active citizens who engage in risky action for the (perceived) betterment of the political community by critically watching how the state enacts its law. They oversee the workings of the state and check its power when they think its institutions are not functioning as they should. Their citizenship is demanding and costly, both in terms of the time they spend on their activities and in terms of the danger involved with them. Yet, at the same time, their activities often contest the legal foundations of South African citizenship, most obviously when the group engages in violence against suspected criminals. The group's leaders insist that criminals infringe on the rights of others, that constitutional rights improperly protect them, and that when Mapogo beats suspected criminals they "correct" both the criminal and the state's flawed rights regime. In doing so, Mapogo members assert an ideal of moral citizenship in which not all people are equally deserving of the rights of citizenship, a claim sharply at odds with the state's human rights based constitution. That Mapogo's leaders contest the state's extension of human rights – something they argue enables criminality and disorder to proliferate – challenges the very basis of post-apartheid citizenship itself and highlights the contradictory nature of their citizenship.

### **Vigilant Citizenship in Theory and in Practice**

Whether liberal or republican, theorists of citizenship have long argued that vigilance is a necessary part of civic engagement. While scholars have emphasized trust in the state as prerequisites to successful democratic governance over the last several decades (Almond and Verba 1965; Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Hardin 2002; Hardin 2002; Tilly 2005; see also Nannestad 2008), the importance of *distrusting* government, arguably, has a much longer

tradition in democratic theory (see Ely 1980; Hardin 2006, chap. 7; Tilly 2007, chap. 4; Rosanvallon 2008). Rulers and their agents, many democratic theorists have argued, fundamentally cannot be trusted. They are simply too liable to abuse their power and act for personal or parochial gains. When they do so, they threaten individual rights, attack public morality, and undermine the common good.

Two broad solutions to this problem have been proposed. One group of theorists, like Hume and Madison, have proposed institutional fixes – designing state institutions with sanctions, checks and balances so that even if they were run by knaves they would still function as if they were run by honest officials. A second group, which is my primary interest in this paper, has emphasized the role of citizens in keeping state leaders in check. From at least Aristotle’s *Politics*, theorists have argued that citizens have a duty to be actively watchful and vigilant over their government. Indeed, Aristotle went so far as to define democracy in these terms, arguing that democracy is a regime of sovereign citizens who act as “correctors” and “overseers” of public life (Rosanvallon 2008, 85). Building on this Aristotelian theme centuries later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2008, 125–126) argued that the ideal of direct democracy requires citizen “censors” to constantly watch public morality and ensure it is realized in the law. Writing in critique of Rousseau’s direct democracy, Benjamin Constant came to the surprisingly compatible conclusion that in representative democracy, citizens “must exercise an active and constant surveillance over their representatives, and reserve for themselves...the right to discard them if they betray their trust” (Constant 1988, 326). More than a half decade after Rousseau and Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville would similarly argue that active citizens were a vital check on democratic states. “[I]f in a democratic State, the governors have less honesty and less capacity than elsewhere,” he wrote, “the governed, on the other hand, are more enlightened and more

attentive to their interests. As the people in democracies is more incessantly vigilant in its affairs and more jealous of its rights, it prevents its representatives from abandoning the general line of conduct which its own prescribes” (Tocqueville 2007, 170).

In our own era, the importance of citizen watchfulness over state and society has remained a consistent theme in democratic theory. For example, the civic republican Philip Pettit (1997, 250–251) (echoing Thomas Jefferson) has argued that “the price of liberty is eternal vigilance” and that such vigilance is an expression of the civic virtue which necessarily underpins a healthy republic. In a complimentary vein, deliberative democrats like Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1994) have argued that the organs of civil society – social movements, civic associations, and the like – are sites through which citizens can develop the critical faculties necessary to oversee the work of increasingly bureaucratic modern states.<sup>2</sup> Most recently, the historian of democratic thought, Pierre Rosanvallon (2008), has argued that vigilant action is an informal, but crucial, check on government power between elections, democracy’s most formalized oversight mechanism. In sum, despite radical differences in perspective, canonical democratic theorists, both ancient and modern, have consistently pointed to active surveillance of the state and society by a dutiful, sovereign citizenry as a necessary and desirable component democratic life. The word vigilance, which connotes a sense of wakeful watchfulness captures these practices well.<sup>3</sup>

The ideal of vigilant citizenship does not only exist in the abstractions of democratic theorists; it also exists in the reality of democratic politics. In democracies across the globe, both historically and contemporarily, citizens have embraced their roles as watchdogs of the state and

---

<sup>2</sup> Cohen and Arato, of course, borrow heavily on Habermas’ (1989) seminal work on the public sphere.

<sup>3</sup> See The Oxford English Dictionary’s online entry for “vigilant.” Available at <http://www.oed.com.proxy.uchicago.edu/view/Entry/223334?redirectedFrom=vigilant#eid>. Accessed January 12, 2013.

of the common good. For example, in the United States, during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, groups of critical citizens formed “vigilance societies” and “vigilance committees” to serve causes ranging from promoting prohibition, to stopping communism, through extending rights to racial minorities (Capozzola 2002). In revolutionary France, “Citoyen” became the common term of address as revolutionaries embraced the necessity of “vigilant activism” embodied in the ideals of citizenship to ensure the revolution’s success (Sewell 2001, 217). In contemporary France, progressive citizens have carried on this tradition of watchful participation in the polity by forming groups of so-called *Observatoires* to monitor levels of economic inequality and push for egalitarian social policies (Rosanvallon 2008, 63). In the international arena, civil society groups like Human Rights Watch and Global Witness – note the emphasis on sight in their names – have linked constant watchfulness to greater democratic openness. . None of this, of course, has bypassed South Africa. For example, from at least the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, African activists formed Vigilance Associations to defend their political rights against the incursions of the racist colonial state (Dubow 2012, 39). More recently, academics and politicians have celebrated the country’s civics movement – a crucial part of the anti-apartheid struggle – as the country’s “watchdog” over the state (Lanegran 1995).

The modern citizenship these various movements represent, comparative sociologists and social historians have shown, emerged from contentious challenges for expanded rights.<sup>4</sup> Most of these studies are indebted, in one way or another, to the eminent sociologist TH Marshall’s (1964) seminal lectures on “Citizenship and Social Class.” In them Marshall argued that there are three forms of modern citizenship. The first form to emerge, civil citizenship, ensured the legal equality of all members of a political community regardless of class background. The

---

<sup>4</sup> The argument that the shape of contemporary citizenship is connected to a combination of contentious politics, state building, and class formation has been frequently repeated in the comparative historical literature on citizenship. See, for example, work by Bendix (1977), Mann (1993), Tilly (1996), and Somers (2008).

second type, political citizenship, extended the principle of legal equality to the political sphere ensuring rights to political participation for all citizens. The final category, social citizenship, developed last and ensured all citizens the right to a basic selection of public goods. On Marshall's account, each form of citizenship was a product of long-run state and class formation processes with citizens actively contesting the state for increasing inclusiveness. In this way, to Marshall, citizenship has a "revolutionary character" (Lipset 1964, xi) as the rights associated with it enable people to organize and progressively overcome existing legal, institutional, and economic inequalities.

In line with Marshall's predictions, the South African state has expanded citizens' rights across all three of these areas in the wake of the country's democratic revolution, albeit haltingly and unevenly. For example, the country's first democratic elections witnessed one of the most rapid and totalizing expansions of the franchise to a formerly subjugated group the world has ever seen, giving political citizenship to vast majority of the country's population for the first time. Following democratization the state enacted perhaps the world's most progressive constitution and formally granted civic citizenship to all South Africans, a marked change from the apartheid regime where non-whites had been subjected to systematic discrimination by the state's legal institutions (Abel 1995). As a result of this new civil equality, citizens and social movements frequently go to the courts to ensure that their constitutionally guaranteed social rights – including access to housing, water, and health care – are produced by the state (see J. Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 26–31; Paremoer and Jung 2011).

Yet, despite this incredible expansion of rights and contrary to Marshall's predictions, the post-apartheid proliferation of vigilantism suggests that, at times, citizens themselves contest the extension of rights. In other words, there is a profound irony with the emergence of vigilantism

in post-apartheid South Africa: it came about at a moment in which the state was rapidly expanding the rights associated with citizenship. And, as we shall see in the remainder of the paper through the example of Mapogo a Mathamaga, vigilantes contest the notion that all citizens are equally capable of holding the same rights in the first place.

Indeed, I would argue that Mapogo assert a fourth form of citizenship, which Marshall does not recognize: moral citizenship. To Mapogo members being part of a political community entails a set of moral obligations found in self-discipline and subjugation before authority. Mapogo members claim that criminals violate the rights of others – the right to live in peace, to retain private property and to prosper – and therefore do not meet these moral criteria. In so doing, they have forfeited their right to have rights. However, to Mapogo members, the extension of rights to criminal suspects undermines the state’s ability to punish them and, ultimately, prevents justice from being done. In other words, to Mapogo members, the restrictions South Africa’s constitution imposes on the state to protect the rights of suspected criminals prevent it from protecting the rights of law abiding citizens. That is, they challenge the rights restraining the state from violently addressing criminality and work to “correct” the state’s “unnatural” extension of rights to criminal suspects. The result is that in vigilantly overseeing the work of the state, they often end up violating the rights that the state protects and which South Africa’s democratic revolution was waged to produce. In asserting a moral claim to political belonging, Mapogo members make the field of citizenship – who is and is not a member of the political community – itself a site of contestation.

### **Mapogo and the Dawn of a New Democracy**

In the remainder of this essay, I will show that Mapogo is a collection of vigilant citizens who actively keep watch over the workings of the newly democratic state. They do this by

contesting the state's universal extension of human rights and trying to recreate post-apartheid citizenship based on subjection to "traditional" chiefly authority. I will also show that by "offering an alternative perspective on post-apartheid citizenship, one with far greater appeal to larger segments of the rural population than the egalitarian constitutionalist discourse so popular with the country's political leaders" (Oomen 2004, 161), Mapogo galvanized rural populations. It enabled large groups of new democratic citizens to engage in risky behavior, actively challenge the state, and "correct" its fallible legal procedures. Ironically, by asserting a moral vision of post-apartheid citizenship at odds with liberal statehood, Mapogo also enabled these new citizens to challenge the rights protections that had just been granted to them and therefore made the field of citizenship itself a site of contestation.

Mapogo a Mathamaga was founded in the Sekhukhune region of Northern Province (today Limpopo) by John Magolego in 1996, just over two years after South Africa's first democratic elections. The area is part of the former Lebowa "homeland," a stretch of arid hills and agave plants two hours north of Pretoria which the apartheid government handed over to a series of puppet rulers charged with leading the ostensibly independent "Bantustan." Mapogo began life, as with many vigilante organizations, by responding to an acute fear of crime. The charismatic Magolego founded it after eight business owners were murdered in rural Sekhukhune in just one month.<sup>5</sup> He saw the murders as more than just everyday crimes. Instead, because it was exclusively businesspeople being targeted by the area's criminals, to Magolego, the violence was an incipient class war being waged against property owners in the wake of the country's democratic revolution. "I called all the business people together," he said to me while describing the group's first meeting. "And I started to address them and made them aware that it was not an

---

<sup>5</sup> Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010.

ordinary theft or just to get something so that [thieves] could get something to eat. I made them aware this was *war* – wide killing.”<sup>6</sup>

Mapogo’s expansion came during a moment of rising concern over the extension of rights among both rural blacks and whites (von Schnitzler et al. 2001; Oomen 2004; J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007). Formerly black townships and villages were undergoing epochal challenges to chiefly and elder authority from young subjects below while white control over rural areas was being challenged by an alleged crime wave against white farmers. In each community the effect was to raise a moral panic about South Africa’s recently adopted rights-based constitution and the ways in which it supposedly hamstrung the police force, which many already perceived as ineffective. Mapogo responded to these assumed limitations by supplying swift justice premised on “African” values with the goal of restoring the respect for “traditional” authority which had been attacked during the country’s democratic revolution.

Magolego set up the organization as a combination of social movement, community group and membership association.<sup>7</sup> In the immediate wake of the killings, a group of several hundred businesspeople marched to the provincial capital under Mapogo banners to demand better protection for business owners and harsher punishments for convicted criminals (Oomen 2004, 156). At these early stages, the group was tenuously dedicated to working with the police, despite the leadership’s skepticism over the effectiveness of the state’s law enforcement

---

<sup>6</sup> Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010. Comaroff and Comaroff (2007, 226) cite similarly bellicose language from Magolego.

<sup>7</sup> In 2000, Magolego started a private security company under the Mapogo name (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 16). As the organization morphed into a security service, fees were charged on a sliding scale with reduced rates for individual members and higher rates for businesses (Human Rights Watch 2001, 99). Members were given placards to place in front of the homes and businesses to mark their membership in Mapogo. The placards featured two snarling leopards facing one another surrounded by the words “This Property is Protected by Mapogo a Mathamaga Business and Community Shield.” As the placards spread across the country – along with Mapogo’s reputation for violence – counterfeit signs quickly became a problem, which would eventually (and ironically) force Magolego to go to the courts to protect his trademark and allow his company to flourish. Although an important aspect of today’s organization is protection for a fee (J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007), it cannot be reduced to this function.

institutions (J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 227). Leaders wrote a constitution that encouraged members to operate within the boundaries of the law (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 13). When the group's volunteer patrollers would perform citizens' arrests they would hand the suspects over to the police. This uneasy cooperation was brief. Within three months, after the courts released several suspects on technical grounds, the group changed tactics and began to summarily beat suspected criminals that it apprehended (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 13). The effect was that, almost from its inception, the group oversaw the work of the state and of society – the essence of vigilant citizenship.

Such vigilance was evident in the group's first widely publicized action. The group first came to public attention outside of Sekhukhune when a large crowd of Mapogo members beat two escaped convicts to death and assaulted six other people (Oomen 1999, 45). By killing convicts the state failed to contain, Mapogo policed where they believed the state had failed. But the group didn't stop there. During the same event, they assaulted two police officers who were allegedly drunk on duty (Ibid). That is, the group did not only fill a gap in the state's security apparatus; it actively tried to "correct" it through disciplinary violence. The incident was not an isolated one. Two years later Mapogo members severely assaulted a police officer who had allegedly offered to warn a robbery suspect of impending arrest in exchange for a share of the loot (Ibid 49). Several months after that in mid-1999, Mapogo members kidnapped a police officer whom they accused of aiding a robbery syndicate and threatened to hold him hostage until the stolen goods were returned (Ibid; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 230). In this sense, Mapogo did not only police criminals; it also policed the state and its agents.

The group did not limit itself to overseeing the technical functioning of the state. Rather, it challenged the basic terms on which the state protected its citizens by attacking the strong legal

rights afforded to suspected criminals. To Mapogo members, undisciplined youth emboldened by their newfound democratic freedoms were responsible for the country's crime problem (von Schnitzler et al. 2001; Oomen 2004; J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007). Such suspicions about youthful freedom have a long history in Sekhukhune connected most immediately to a 1986 youth revolt against chiefly power as part of the attack on the apartheid system (von Schnitzler et al. 2001; Oomen 2005, 130). For three months, Sekhukhune youth affiliated with the United Democratic Front, like youth across the country (Seekings 2000), violently mobilized against the apartheid state, leaders of homeland governments, and their elders whom they saw as too complacent in the face of apartheid's brutality (Oomen 2005, 130). Youth chased some chiefs from the area, burnt others to death, and wrested away the chief's power to administer justice through the establishment of people's courts (Ibid.). And, as in the rest of the country (Haysom 1986), local authorities and their elite allies mobilized vigilante patrols to keep the youth down (Oomen 1999, 46), eventually relying on the South African Defense Forces to quell the revolt (Oomen 2005, 130). Although the violence was concentrated in a few short months in 1986, "the scars left by this war of youth against elders could be felt long into the post-apartheid era" (Ibid). During this period, battle lines were drawn between generations, between classes, and between "traditional" and "modern" authority in Sekhkhuneland. Magolego was a veteran of these conflicts struggling to suppress the youthful insurrection (J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 232), and, in many ways, is still fighting the same conflict today.

In these early democratic years, in an area panicked about a criminal "war" being waged against the remaining vestiges of homeland authority and privilege and about rights protections for criminal suspects, Mapogo found instant popularity for their swift response to "disorderly youth." They shot to prominence for their liberal use of the *sjambok* – a stiff leather whip used

by colonial officials and white farmers to enforce political subjugation and labor discipline (Oomen 2004, 162; J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 229). When newspapers reported that they threw suspected criminals into crocodile infested waters and dragged others behind cars, their notoriety only grew (Oomen 2004, 153). That their means for dispensing “justice” contrasted so sharply with the loping pace of the state’s legal apparatus aided the group’s popularity. In the wake of these attacks, Mapogo grew rapidly. By 2000, it claimed between 50,000 and 70,000 members, including 10,000 white farmers, spread across the country in 72 branches (Oomen 2004, 153; Gottschalk 2005, 2; Human Rights Watch 2001, 99). Its branded use of corporal punishment against suspected criminals was particularly appealing to new members. By 2000, Mapogo members faced more than 300 criminal charges, which included 19 murder charges, 13 attempted murder charges, charges for possessing illegal weapons, and numerous assault charges (Human Rights Watch 2001, 100; Sekhonyane and Louw 2002, chap. 3). Magolego himself was arrested and eventually acquitted on murder charges in connection with a beating the group administered in 1997.<sup>8</sup>

Such swift punishments are necessary, in the Mapogo worldview, because the country’s rights-based legal procedures are far too cumbersome and fallible to ensure justice. Von Schnitzler et al. (2001, 18) capture the groups’ ethos well: “Rather than relying on seemingly endless trials obstructed by the rights enjoyed by the accused, and which often only lead to small bail payments, as well as a corrupt police force that rarely manages to return stolen goods to the victim, Mapogo responds with swift, violent punishment and the promise to repair the damage done to the victim.” As Magolego bluntly explained to me, “[I]f the law says there must be a

---

<sup>8</sup> Magolego and the others were eventually acquitted of the charges after a lengthy, oft delayed trial of the type Mapogo leaders regularly rail against. Oomen (2004, 164) relays the irony nicely: “Aided by the best lawyers in the country and accompanied by scores of Mapogo supporters to each trial, they secured an acquittal in August 2000 on the basis of conflicting eye-witness reports, after exactly the type of drawn-out, technical court case so often criticized by the organization.”

warrant of search, which should be signed before we can come and search, that is stupid. You know why do I say so? Because the criminal will start removing items that he has stolen and you can come tomorrow and search.”<sup>9</sup> Mapogo’s appeal is that they bypass such procedures and challenge the state’s provision of rights. For example, a song often sung at Mapogo rallies provocatively asks, “Where have you seen such a thing as a criminal with rights?” (Oomen 2004, 157). The argument that extensive legal rights are cumbersome and lead to perverted outcomes also carries well across racial lines in the rural areas where Mapogo is based. Capturing the group’s frustrations with the state’s legal procedures, one white Mapogo member told a magazine reporter in 2000, “The thing that shocks me is that I’m degraded to the level where I actually have to go out and lynch these people. I don’t want to degrade myself like that. It’s the government’s job” (quoted in Human Rights Watch 2001, 100–101).

To reduce Mapogo’s violence, however, to a functional response to the state’s slow legal procedures would be a mistake. On the contrary, Magolego insists that beating suspected criminals has positive social benefits beyond crime deterrence which are deeply rooted in “African tradition.” Magolego describes the beatings in religious terms as a conversion or healing experience that permanently turns criminals away from crime. In our interview he explained to me that, “[I]f you offend other people, if you steal, you rape, you kill, and you will be punished. And for that you will never do it again. That is the most important aspect of it. We don’t preach the gospel of killing someone. No. Our main idea is let the criminal be punished, let him feel pain so that he should he should never do dirty things to other people.” To Magolego, the infliction of pain has a specific, calculated purpose. He told me that corporal punishment “is a natural practice that we used to see” which enforces “discipline” on suspected criminals so that they can “repent and leave their dirty activities” and be “born again.” Elsewhere, he has gone so

---

<sup>9</sup> Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010.

far as to argue that such practices are a form of “African medicine” (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 14). To him, *sjamboking* is “a traditional medicine” which is necessary “because that of the white doctors is too sweet” (Magolego quoted in Oomen 1999, 48). On his account, such punitive techniques are not only good for the souls of the suspected criminal but also good for the soul of the nation. He told me that he is not only stopping crime; he is repairing a broken state. As he explained, “A nation without discipline has got no direction at all.” It is only when South Africa returns to “African” ways for dealing with disorder, he argued, that the country “will have a normal society.”<sup>10</sup>

Such arguments are consistent with Magolego’s claim that Mapogo is a cultural organization “set up not only to address the current failures of policing, but also as a way of dealing with crime that is fundamentally different from and superior to the ‘Western system’” (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 18). Sounding like a Burkean organic intellectual, he told me that, “The idea is that this is a traditional organization – a traditional and cultural organization. Why do I say cultural? That means we stick to our culture. We stick to our basics. We stick to the natural rules.”<sup>11</sup> To Magolego, the problem is that the South African police are hamstrung by “Western” human rights protections that are not “naturally” suited for an “African” society. Indeed, to Mapogo members the breakdown of “African” forms of social order and its replacement with “Western” rights protections has the perverse consequence of enabling disorder – both social and moral – to proliferate. For example, at a Mapogo rally in the wake of the government’s decision to distribute copies of the constitution to all South African school children, Magolego decried the action by arguing that “the Bill of Rights and Duties which has

---

<sup>10</sup> Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010.

been distributed to schools without consulting us as parents is a piece of dirt and teaches our children lawlessness" (quoted in Oomen 2004, 161).

It would be wrong to suggest, however, that Mapogo reject engagement with the state altogether. On the contrary, through Magolego's leadership, Mapogo has been regularly drawn into electoral politics. For example, in the lead up to the country's first democratic elections Magolego ran for parliament in the Sekhukhune area as part of the right-wing National Party before splitting with the organization and approaching the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party (Oomen 1999, 46; von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 26).<sup>12</sup> Eventually he joined the United Democratic Movement for another unsuccessful parliamentary run in 1999 (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 26–27), which he claims to have aborted once he found out "that I couldn't take my *sjambok* to parliament" (Magolego quoted in Oomen 2004, 157).<sup>13</sup>

Just as Magolego has not completely rejected democratic electoral politics, Mapogo has not wholly forsaken the state's rights-based legal system. In fact, Mapogo frequently turn to the state to protect their rights – particularly their property rights. For example, Mapogo has regularly gone to the courts to insist that the state protect their trademark. Shortly after the group first gained public attention, Magolego told me, they started finding bogus billboards being put up across the country by people claiming to have a Mapogo franchise in a particular area. As Mapogo has expanded into a paid protection service, Magolego has demanded that the state

---

<sup>12</sup> Magolego's long association with right-wing parties has undoubtedly helped him expand Mapogo's appeal beyond the African community to white farmers. At one point Mapogo even received support from the widow of Chris Hani's killer, Clive Derby Lewis, and was associated with the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) (von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 27–30). Ironically, in order to defend Mapogo's association with such reactionary parts of the South African polity, Magolego has drawn on the language of democracy arguing that, "All those who have an anti-crime mind, those who feel sorry for what is happening in South Africa are welcome. We cannot choose. This is a democratic country" (Magolego quoted in von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 27).

<sup>13</sup> Magolego's involvement with the UDM was a crucial moment in the group's history which he claimed brought about a direct confrontation with the state. It wasn't until this parliamentary run, Magolego claims, that the state cracked down on Mapogo including arresting Magolego and other senior Mapogo members on murder charges. Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010.

guard against imitators using the Mapogo logo to start ersatz branches. Employing a string of lawyers and going regularly to the courts, Magolego has been waging a long war of attrition against his group's imitators to make sure the state protects his trademark.<sup>14</sup>

In this sense, rather than a complete rejection of the law, Mapogo might be best described as engaged in a critique of the law. As Magolego once said, "Mapogo is already in politics because we are debating the law of the country...Just as when Mandela and his group were worried about influx control and pass laws. This is exactly the same thing" (Magolego quoted in von Schnitzler et al. 2001, 27). In other words, just like the ANC of the 1960s, Magolego sees himself engaged in a crucial critique of a legal system which he sees as producing injustice in order to make the legal system more just. The crucial contrast between Magolego and Mandela, which makes Magolego's comparison deeply ironic, is that where Mandela fought for a law based in human rights and social justice while Magolego challenges both.

However, like Mandela's critique of apartheid law as being incongruous with the popular will, Mapogo's criticism of human rights is based on a claim that the law is ultimately founded in the sovereignty of the people and, therefore, can be rejected by the people. He justified the group's usage of illegal violence by explaining that, "The lives of the people are more important than the law itself because law has been made by people... If the police are unable to solve the problem, should there be no other person on earth who should come and protect the people?" That is, extra-legal violence is justified as long as it is used in a disciplined manner because such violence ensures justice, which is itself the goal of people's justice. When the law does not produce justice, the people's sovereignty demands that the people must. As Magolego said during our interview, "It's of no use to brag around saying that we have the most wonderful constitution in the whole world whereas people are dying on a daily basis here. No, we are not

---

<sup>14</sup> Interview with John Magolego, August 11, 2010.

happy about that. And, in essence, we are helping our government to govern properly.” In other words, Mapogo will work to “correct” the state when its laws prevent justice from being done.

### **Repairing the Nation when the State Cannot**

I saw all of these qualities – suspicion of human rights, fear of wayward youth, veneration of disciplinary violence, antagonism towards the state’s legal procedures, and a burning desire to repair the state by bringing it into line with “traditional” values – on display at the group’s 14<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration several weeks after my interview with Magolego. On Magolego’s invitation, along with a translator, I made my way to Mphahlele village in Sekhukhune, in the high plateau north of Pretoria. As we drove into the village, I was immediately struck by the sense of order, care, and pride about the place. It was framed by a row of the beautifully craggy hills that dot the area. Graceful pine and eucalyptus trees haphazardly lined the side of the roads. The sounds of an English-language evangelical church service drifted out of a large white tent in the center of the village, shifting between the preacher’s exhortations that Jesus Christ is the lord and the solemn drone of an organ. Teenage boys played pickup soccer on a dirt pitch with impressively sturdy wooden goal posts. The village’s homes, set along dusty, litter-free streets, were large and uniformly well kept.

After arriving in the village we asked for the chief’s court, per Magolego’s instructions. The court – by tradition the place where the chief would gather his senior counselors, take evidence in criminal cases, and run the public life of the village – is the primary symbolic site of chiefly law and order. We were directed to a community hall where a group of elderly men wearing Mapogo branded t-shirts sat stoically out front. We joined them and waited patiently for the celebration to start. Restless after an hour of sitting, we took a short stroll. Around the corner, in front of the chief’s house was a statue of Cedric Phatudi, the longtime chief minister of the

Lebowa homeland who ruled over the area during the height of the 1980s youth insurrection. The statue was made of white marble and surrounded by a neatly kept garden of aloes. It depicted Phatudi as a bald man in his mid-40s with a prominent mustache. He was dressed in a double breasted, military cut suit. The effect, intentional or not, was to make him look like the dictator of a small banana republic. Phatudi was born in Mphahlele, amplifying the celebration's connection to an ideal of reemerging chiefly authority.

Shortly after we returned to the hall, two buses arrived and Mapogo members poured out. It was an eclectic group. Elderly women dressed in ethnicized Pedi garb moved to the shade of a tent adjacent to the hall. A group of young men wearing Mapogo shirts over top of hip hop inspired fashions chatted amiably with one another. Middle aged men flaunted *sjamboks* and, from time to time, playfully whipped the ground. A few minutes after the bus arrived, Magolego and his entourage rolled into the yard in a line of late model sport utility vehicles. The Mapogo supporters promptly formed two lines on either side of Magolego's jeep. With *sjamboks* held aloft, they walked with the jeep while singing songs praising Mapogo and Magolego that were eerily reminiscent of apartheid-era struggle songs – a strange effect given Mapogo's long running repudiation of struggle politics. The strangeness was amplified by the song's lyrics which directly challenged the rights based order that emerged out of the struggle.<sup>15</sup> One commanded, "If you see a criminal disrespecting Mapogo, he is crazy and needs to be beaten." Another ordered that, "We should stop those dogs so they don't bite us." A third warned criminals, "You haven't seen trouble yet and now Mapogo is here." The presence of so many tightly clustered *sjamboks* amplified the effect of the songs' ominous lyrics.

When Magolego alighted from his jeep, he was met with a chorus of ululations. His appearance and demeanor contrasted sharply from the subdued man whom I had interviewed a

---

<sup>15</sup> The songs were sung in Pedi but translated to me while the group sang.

few weeks prior. His conservative business suit had been replaced by a military style jacket with leopard skin epaulets and two leopards embroidered on the front and back. He had a militarized Mapogo hat on his head. The outfit gave him the appearance of an ersatz general dressed for a ceremonial occasion. Watching him walk into the hall, I could not help but think of photos of Bheki Cele, the national police commissioner who had recently renamed himself a general and had taken to wearing military uniforms. Magolego looked like Cele's doppelganger, although it may have been more accurate to say the opposite since Magolego had been wearing his militarized uniform longer.

After the crowd filed into the hall behind Magolego, the celebration proceeded as if it were a cross between a church service and an ANC political rally (see also J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2007). The event started with people spontaneously breaking into song, a common practice in township religious revivals and political meetings. Members of the crowd then took the floor, in a seemingly impromptu manner, to testify about the effectiveness of Mapogo in their community and to praise Magolego because he brought Mapogo to them. One man, at the end of a fiery speech, assured the crowd that he was "speaking the truth" about Mapogo's effectiveness "as an apostolic prophet would." He then led the crowd in a pro-Mapogo chant that recalled anti-apartheid rallies from two decades prior: "Viva Mapogo! Viva! Viva Magolego! Viva!" The crowd responded to the call enthusiastically.

Hearing motivational conventions from anti-apartheid rallies was surprising, particularly since the speakers reiterated anti-ANC and anti-government themes throughout the proceedings. For example, a woman brandishing a *sjambok* spoke at length about how Mapogo "will do whatever it takes to prevent crime," including beating and killing suspected criminals, a clear rebuke of the ANC's stated support for a rights-based constitution. Later, a chief from a nearby

village spoke at length about the good things which had happened in his village since Mapogo set up a chapter. He argued that there was no mistake that Mapogo's success is entirely due to its alignment with "traditional" sources of authority: the chiefs, the ancestors, God, and John Magolego. As he said, "Mapogo is not only an organization of people but also an organization of ancestors, so we should have no fear [when conducting anti-crime patrols]" because the ancestors will protect the patrollers. In addition to the ancestors, he argued that "God gives us courage to fight crime but we do not fear anything because God sent us our own guardian angel in Mr. Magolego." This protection from spiritual sources, the chief argued, allows the organization to punish criminals in accord with the "traditions" of the past. The divinely-sanctioned beatings Mapogo administered, he told the crowd, would "make the government govern well by using the *sjambok*."

Between speeches, I took the opportunity to read a flier which was distributed to the crowd. It reinforced the speakers' claims that the decline of traditional authority in South Africa had precipitated a moral collapse along with rising crime. Under the Mapogo letterhead, the flier told its readers that "Our country is saturated with crime, our children are spoilt, they don't attend schools anymore, they abuse themselves with drugs, and they kill, rape, and commit horrible activities [sic]." Such "disordered children...without discipline and proper education" cause South Africa's troubles. This moralizing message provocatively contrasts with theories of crime which attribute crime to poverty or inequality. Indeed, the flier argues the opposite. Instead of poverty being the cause of crime, "crime brings poverty amongst our people, poverty brings illnesses and illnesses bring death [sic]." The leaflet went on to explain, "Our government is trying by all means to alleviate poverty amongst our people but criminals are suppressing that." And because life is nasty, brutish, and short the way forward is to "scandalize crime and suppress

it so that we can enjoy our country as proper citizens of our land.” In other words, crime is an attack on the contractual basis of post-apartheid citizenship. The flier suggests that making crime fighters tough, forcefully pushing back against fear caused by crime, and disciplining disorderly youth is the necessary response. “We are tired of thieves and we should get rid of cowardice and be ready to fight a winning battle. This is your message: That if you are afraid of pinpointing a criminal that you have seen, you are opening a road for crime to grow.” In other words, the flier demands that Mapogo’s members stay strong and remain vigilant in order to keep crime down. Doing so will “Let rain fall in abundance” – a clear allusion to local rainmaking practices which, by custom, venerate communities that work closely together (Landau 1993).<sup>16</sup>

All of these themes – that human rights corrupt children and cause crime, that rights make the state’s institutions fail, that Mapogo is righteous because it venerates “traditional” authority, and that Mapogo corrects how the government operates – were reproduced in Magolego’s keynote speech.<sup>17</sup> He took the floor after being honorifically introduced by a senior Mapogo official who recited his praise names to loud ululations from the women in the crowd and hooting and clapping from the men. Magolego began by telling the crowd that he was disappointed that even after fourteen years of “success” that there were still many people who wanted to destroy Mapogo. “But they cannot,” he roared, “because the ancestors and God are with us. With the ancestors, Mapogo can go through the desert without water and still remain strong.” Mapogo was strong because it had traditional authority behind it, he intimated, and the tragedy of the new South Africa was that it was rapidly getting rid of “proven” ways of

---

<sup>16</sup> On rainmaking rites in Tswana areas, see also Schapera (1971).

<sup>17</sup> In what follows, when I quote Magolego, they are as close to exact as I could produce given the constraints. Magolego spoke primarily in Pedi with occasional English mixed in. A research assistant fluent in Pedi translated as Magolego went along while I wrote down the translation. Fortunately, Magolego spoke slowly and, being an experienced and charismatic public speaker, would periodically pause to allow for a dramatic build up or to let points sink in. This allowed us to catch up on the translation and notes. Although the precise translation of Magolego’s words is imperfect, I am confident that the meaning of Magolego’s arguments is captured in the material presented here.

controlling society's ills in favor of a rights based legal system. It was "as a result of the decline of traditional punishment," he lectured, that "kids have no conscience and can kill easily. So as parents we need to work together to defeat this evil spirit. The government will not help us because they cannot govern." He concluded by telling the audience that because the government is hamstrung, South Africa's citizens need to look elsewhere for support. Magolego made it clear to the crowd that Mapogo is the best substitute. "If you have a child who is stealing in your house," he told his audience, "know that you have Mapogo with you. If you find your cows have been stolen from your *kraal*, you can come to Mapogo if they have brand marks and we will find them and bring them back... Let us protect ourselves like when you go buy an umbrella, when you are standing in the sun to create shade. Let Mapogo be the shade." He concluded by exhorting the audience to "Spread the message to those who are doing crime that Mapogo is back. We are going to stop all the nonsense. We are not here to play or do Mickey Mouse things." At that point, Magolego launched into a Mapogo praise song to enthusiastic participation by the audience, announced that two cows had been slaughtered, and invited people to step outside to eat.

As a buffet meal was laid out for the audience, I chatted with some of the chiefs and their representatives. One thoughtful man with Coke-bottle thick glasses laid out Mapogo's understanding of crime. He told me that the human rights regime which came with the democratic transition has created so many protections for suspected criminals that it has allowed crime to flourish. The result, he said with disbelief in his voice, was that "Now even a small child can report his parents to the police [for beating him]." His tone suggested that not only has the constitution enshrined human rights that protect criminals, it has also turned the moral order completely upside down such that legitimate forms of authority which guarantee and produce

order – that is, parental authority – have been subverted by the law. Thus in the Mapogo worldview, democratic law has perverse consequences: it promotes and protects lawlessness and moral disorder, rather than suppress them as it should.

Mapogo, according to the supporters with whom I talked, is there to make this contradiction go away by reinstating traditional authority housed in the institutions of the chieftaincy, parenting, and the “legitimate” deployment of violence. While chatting after the meal, Magolego echoed these sentiments and the blame Mapogo members place on rights-based democracy. He described to me how he wanted to expand Mapogo through the construction of a permanent headquarters in the rural areas of Limpopo where he will extend Mapogo’s work beyond security. He told me that it will house a job training institute, provide a chiefly court for large meetings of traditional elders, include a farm to create employment, and, most importantly, host a school where children will be raised with discipline. “At the school,” Magolego said poignantly, “we won’t have democracy – only discipline to teach [the children] how to behave. You see, crime is about a problem of morals, of culture. So what I am doing is repairing the nation.”

## **Conclusion**

As I have suggested throughout this essay, that vigilantes challenge the rights of others is a profound irony in post-apartheid South Africa. Many theorists expect the onset of democratic citizenship to correspond with increasing respect for the rights of others, particularly as citizens engage in contentious action to claim those rights. For example, Lynn Hunt (2008), in a recent history of human rights has argued that simply declaring new rights can have progressive political consequences as groups use rights that have been extended to others to make claims for themselves. However, as I have argued, vigilante politics suggest the opposite may also be true:

the extension of rights may produce the rejection of rights. In particular, vigilantes contest this basic right of criminal suspects to have rights. Vigilantes see suspects, who have allegedly trespassed locally imagined moral boundaries, as having forfeited their rights. In other words, vigilantes assume that criminal suspects are no longer citizens because they have been accused of violating the rights of law abiding citizens. In this sense, vigilantes use the language of citizens' rights to challenge the rights of others. In doing so, they claim to be watchful of the government, that they were fulfilling the duties of active citizenship and that they are working to repair the political community. They also make the field of citizenship itself a site of contestation as they challenge the extension of rights to others.

## Bibliography

- Abel, Richard L. 1995. *Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980-94*. New York: Routledge.
- Almond, Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba. 1965. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1977. *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Capozzola, Christopher. 2002. "The Only Badge Needed Is Your Patriotic Fervor: Vigilance, Coercion, and the Law in World War I America." *The Journal of American History* 88 (4) (March 1): 1354–1382.
- Cohen, Jean L., and Andrew Arato. 1994. *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Comaroff, Jean, and John L Comaroff. 2006. "Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction." In *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony*, edited by Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Comaroff, John L, and Jean Comaroff. 2007. "Popular Justice in the New South Africa: Policing the Boundaries of Freedom." In *Criminal Justice: International Perspectives*, edited by Tom R Tyler, 215–237. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
- Constant, Benjamin. 1988. "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns." In *Political Writings*, edited by Biancamaria Fontana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dubow, Saul. 2012. *South Africa's Struggle for Human Rights*. Jacana Pocket Series. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Ely, John Hart. 1980. *Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. *Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
- Gottschalk, Keith. 2005. "Vigilantism V. the State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of Pagad, 1996–2000." *ISS Paper 99* (February).
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hardin, Russell. 2002. *Trust and Trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- . 2006. *Trust*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Haysom, Nicholas. 1986. *Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand.
- Human Rights Watch. 2001. *Unequal Protection: The State Response to Violent Crime on South African Farms*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Hunt, Lynn. 2008. *Inventing Human Rights: A History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Landau, Paul S. 1993. "When Rain Falls: Rainmaking and Community in a Tswana Village, C. 1870 to Recent Times." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 26 (1): 1–30.
- Lanegran, K. 1995. "South Africa's Civic Association Movement: ANC's Ally or Society's 'Watchdog?' Shifting Social Movement-Political Party Relations." *African Studies Review*: 101–126.

- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1964. "Introduction." In *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall*, by T. H. Marshall. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Mann, Michael. 1993. *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Marshall, T. H. 1964. "Citizenship and Social Class." In *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall*, [1st. ed. in the U.S.A.]. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Nannestad, Peter. 2008. "What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 413–436.
- Oomen, Barbara. 1999. "Vigilante Justice in Perspective: The Case of Mapogo a Mathamaga." *Acta Criminologica* 12 (3): 45–52.
- . 2004. "Vigilantism or Alternative Citizenship? The Rise of Mapogo a Mathamaga." *African Studies* 63 (2) (December): 153–171.
- . 2005. *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era*. New York: Palgrave.
- Paremoer, Lauren, and Courtney Jung. 2011. "The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in Postapartheid South Africa." In *After Apartheid: Reinventing South Africa?*, edited by Ian Shapiro and Kahreen Tebeau, 199–230. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.
- Pettit, Philip. 1997. *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. *Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 2008. *The Social Contract*. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. New York: Cosimo.
- Schapera, Isaac. 1971. *Rainmaking Rites of Tswana Tribes*. Vol. v. 3. African Social Research Documents V. 3. Leiden: Afrika-Studiecentrum.
- Seekings, Jeremy. 2000. *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
- Sekhonyane, Makubetse, and Antoinette Louw. 2002. *Violent Justice: Vigilantism and the State's Response*. Monograph No 72. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Sewell, William H. 2001. "Le Citoyen/La Citoyenne." In *Democracy: A Reader*, edited by Ricardo Blaug and John Schwarzmantel. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1993. "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America." *The American Political Science Review* 87 (3) (September 1): 549–566. doi:10.2307/2938735.
- . 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U. S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Somers, Margaret R. 2008. *Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles, ed. 1996. *Citizenship, Identity and Social History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2005. *Trust and Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007. *Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis De. 2007. *Democracy in America (Volume 1, Unabridged)*. Stilwell, KS: Digireads.com Publishing.

Von Schnitzler, Antina, Goodwill Dithlage, Lazarus Kgalema, Traggy Maepa, Tlhoki Mofokeng, and Piers Pigou. 2001. *Guardian or Gangster? Mapogo a Mathamaga: A Case Study*. Violence and Transition Series. Johannesburg: CSV.