

Online Appendix

Appendix A1. Descriptive Statistics, El Salvador 2014 Postelectoral Survey

Variable	Mean	Sd	Min	Max	N
Ind. Vote Buying	0.03	0.16	0	1	994
Neigh. Vote Buying	0.21	0.41	0	1	991
List Experiment	1.17	0.94	0	5	992
List Exp. Treatment	0.50	0.50	0	1	1008
Remittances	0.20	0.40	0	1	1002
Vote propensity	0.42	0.49	0	1	1008
Left	0.28	0.45	0	1	1008
Center	0.43	0.50	0	1	1008
Right	0.29	0.45	0	1	1008
Age	2.04	0.77	1	3	1004
Gender	0.51	0.50	0	1	1008
Education	1.71	0.70	1	3	1004
Income	1.81	0.87	0	3	1008
Income missing	0.11	0.31	0	1	1008
Urbanicity	0.55	0.50	0	1	1008
Reciprocity	2.45	0.92	1	4	1003
Monitoring	0.39	0.49	0	1	981
Muni. Poverty	27.96	19.22	0	45	984
Muni. Remit. capita	0.05	0.03	0	0.08	1008
Muni. Emig. capita	0.12	0.07	0.03	0.49	1008
VB_ARENA	0.74	0.44	0	1	205
VB_FMLN	0.54	0.50	0	1	205
VB_Other party	0.04	0.20	0	1	205
VB_food	0.43	0.50	0	1	228
VB_clothes	0.31	0.46	0	1	228
VB_campaign	0.15	0.36	0	1	228
VB_homegood	0.19	0.40	0	1	228
VB_constr_ag	0.07	0.26	0	1	228
VB_money	0.15	0.36	0	1	228
VB_othersgift	0.02	0.15	0	1	228

Appendix A2. Question Wording, El Salvador 2014 Postelectoral Survey

Variables	Question/Operationalization
Ind. Vote Buying	"Did you receive a gift or favor from a party or candidate in exchange for your vote during the campaign for the presidential elections of this year?" 0=No, 1=Yes
Neigh. Vote Buying	"For the next several questions, I would like you to think only about this year's presidential electoral campaign. During this campaign, did you see people from the parties or candidates giving gifts or favors in your community in exchange for votes?" 0=No, 1=Yes
List Experiment	"For the next two questions, I'm going to read lists of activities that citizens do during electoral campaigns. You will be able to read those lists in cards that I will give to you. For each list, I would like you to count HOW MANY of the items you did during the presidential election campaign. Then, please tell me HOW MANY, not WHICH ONES apply to you. - You saw campaign flyers in your neighborhood. - You went to a campaign event. - You received a gift or a favor in exchange of your vote. [TREATMENT GROUP ONLY] - You discussed politics with your neighbors. - You did not go to vote." 0-4 control group, 0-5 treatment group; Second list noted in intro is a different list experiment.
List Exp. Treatment	Assignment to treatment group, 0/1
Remittances	"To what extent does the income of your household depend on remittances; that is, economic help from abroad? A lot, some, a little, or none?" Recoded none=0, all else=1.
Age	"What is your age in years?" Recoded to 18-29=1, 30-50=2, 50+ = 3.
Gender	Recorded by interviewer. Male=0, female=1.
Education	What was the last year of studies that you completed? Recoded to primary or less=1, Secondary=2, Postsecondary=3.
Income	"Adding together your salaries and other income, how much does your family receive approximately per month?" Recoded to 0=no answer, <\$90/month; \$90-\$360/month; \$360+/month
Income missing	Income answer=0, Income no answer=1

Urbanicity	Rural=0, Urban=1
Reciprocity	"Could you tell me how much you agree with the following phrase? 'When someone does me a favor, I feel obligated to return the favor.' Do you strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree or strongly agree?" 1-4
Monitoring	[IF VOTED IN THE FIRST OR SECOND ROUND] "Do you believe that the government or the parties can discover for whom you have voted?" [IF DID NOT VOTE] "In the event that you had voted, do you think that the government or the parties could find out how you had voted?" 0=No, 1=Yes
Muni. Poverty	Percentage of municipal population that lives under national poverty line - from UNDP 2006
Muni. Remit. capita	Percentage of municipal population that receive remittances (Census 2007 and Acevedo 2012)
Muni. Emig. capita	Number of emigrants who have left (in percentage) (Census 2007 and Acevedo 2012)
VB_ARENA	[IF Neigh VB=Yes] Which parties gave these gifts or favors? (DO NOT ACCEPT 'ALL', SPECIFY, UP TO 3)
VB_FMLN	
VB_Other party	
VB_food	[IF Neigh VB=Yes] What did they give? (NOTE) And anything else? (NOTE UP TO 3)
VB_clothes	
VB_campaign	
VB_homegood	
VB_constr_ag	
VB_money	
VB_othergift	

Appendix A3. Descriptive Statistics, LAPOP 2010-2012

Variable	Mean	Sd	Min	Max	N
Vote Buying	0.15	0.36	0	1	36873
Remittances	0.11	0.31	0	1	64515
Democracy	5.22	1.72	1	7	61253
Persuade	1.51	0.89	1	4	63598
Participation	0.20	0.17	0	1	63737
Partisan	0.66	0.47	0	1	64515
Past Vote	0.73	0.44	0	1	64515
Ideology	5.50	2.53	1	10	52065
Ideology (Cat)	1.14	0.85	0	2	52065
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1	64515
Age	39.28	15.93	16	99	64272
Education (Cat)	1.85	0.77	0	3	64114
Wealth	4.15	2.04	0	9	64515
Rural	3.12	1.54	1	5	64515

Appendix A4. Question Wording, LAPOP, 2010-2012

Variables	Question
Vote Buying	Recode of Clie1. "In the last years and thinking about electoral campaigns, did any candidate offer you a favour, food or any other thing in exchange for your vote or support for that candidate or party?" Recoded to 1 if frequently or rarely, 0 otherwise.
Remittances	"Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?" Yes/No
Democracy	"Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with that view?" 1-7
Persuade	Recode of pp1. "During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate?" 1= Never 2=Rarely 3= Sometimes 4=Very frequently
Participation	Index of participation in religious organizations (cp6 cp7-cp9, cp13), parents' associations, community associations, professional organizations, political party meetings.
Partisan	"Do you currently identify with a political party?" Yes/No
Past Vote	"Did you vote in the past presidential elections?" Yes/No
Ideology	Self-placement in 1-10 ideological scale, 1 means left, 10 means right.
Ideology (3)	Recode of ideology. 0 if Ideology <5, 1 if Ideology=5 and 2 if Ideology>5
Female	1 Female, 0 Male.
Age	"What is your age?"
Education (4)	Recode of years of education (ed) in four categories. 0 no education; 1 for years 1-6; 2 for years 7-12; 3 for years 13-24.
Wealth	Index combining the responses to several items. "To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house?" Television, refrigerator, landline telephone, cellular telephone, car, washing machine microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing.
Rural	Size

Appendix B. Survey Design, Salvadoran Survey

B1. Survey Design

Survey Firm: Borge y Asociados

Field Dates: April 12-24, 2014

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of adults (18+)

N: 1,008 adults

Sample Design: The survey utilized a multistage random sample with 84 final sampling points (segments), including 12 respondents per segment. Sampling proceeded as follows: The sampling frame consisted of the electoral registry, with primary sampling units chosen proportionate to the size of voting centers within department – municipalities. Within municipalities, random selection proceeded by electoral centers, census tracks, and census blocks, with final sampling points (segments or blocks) containing 12 respondents. Households and respondents within households were chosen randomly in a way that ensured gender balance.

Appendix C. Further Results, El Salvador

Table C1: List Experiment Randomization Balance

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	T-test p-value	Chi-square p-value
Remittances	0.19	0.21	0.45	0.46
Vote propensity	0.43	0.41	0.66	0.66
Left	0.27	0.29	0.33	0.33
Center	0.45	0.42	0.48	0.48
Right	0.29	0.29	0.95	0.95
Age3	2.05	2.03	0.81	0.41
Female	0.53	0.50	0.34	0.34
Education	1.71	1.72	0.85	0.78
Income	1.79	1.84	0.27	0.74
Income missing	0.11	0.10	0.52	0.52
Urban	0.54	0.56	0.12	0.12
Reciprocity	2.50	2.40	0.14	0.14
Monitoring	0.38	0.40	0.54	0.54

Table C2: Parties and Goods Distribution in Respondents' Neighborhoods

Which Parties?	Percent Mentioning	SE
ARENA	73.6%	(3.9%)
FMLN	53.9%	(4.4%)
Other	4.0%	(1.4%)
What was Distributed?		
Food	42.7%	(4.5%)
Clothing	31.3%	(3.9%)
Campaign Materials	15.0%	(2.9%)
Home Goods	19.5%	(3.3%)
Construction / Agriculture	7.4%	(1.8%)
Money	15.0%	(2.7%)
Other	2.3%	(1.2%)
N	228	
<p>Cell entries are the percentage of respondents mentioning which parties and what types of goods were distributed in their neighborhoods. Percentages do not round to 100 since all respondents indicating vote buying in their neighborhoods could mention up to three parties / goods. Linearized standard errors adjusted for the survey design are in parentheses.</p>		

Table C3: Predicting Vote Buying in the 2014 Salvadoran Presidential Elections, Full OLS Baseline Regressions

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
<u>Control List</u>					
Remittances	0.325*	0.257+	0.297*	0.289+	0.259+
	[0.133]	[0.140]	[0.132]	[0.148]	[0.138]
Age		-0.076	-0.084	-0.08	-0.076
		[0.096]	[0.091]	[0.097]	[0.096]
Gender		0.047	0.079	0.029	0.047
		[0.087]	[0.081]	[0.086]	[0.086]
Education		0.04	0.027	0.047	0.036
		[0.069]	[0.078]	[0.066]	[0.071]
Income		-0.1	-0.139	-0.101	-0.104
		[0.107]	[0.114]	[0.104]	[0.106]
Income Missing		-0.467	-0.496	-0.472	-0.479
		[0.297]	[0.296]	[0.283]	[0.293]
Urban		-0.081	-0.052	-0.081	-0.088
		[0.131]	[0.142]	[0.151]	[0.143]
Reciprocity		-0.061	-0.042	-0.07	-0.062
		[0.056]	[0.059]	[0.060]	[0.058]
Monitoring		-0.202	-0.253	-0.179	-0.205
		[0.163]	[0.178]	[0.148]	[0.161]
Poverty				-0.002	
				[0.004]	
Remittances %				1.399	
				[2.153]	
Emigrants %					-0.269
					[0.829]
Treatment Constant	0.03	0.013	0.110+	0.011	0.012
	[0.072]	[0.079]	[0.051]	[0.080]	[0.077]
<u>Control List</u>					
Remittances	-0.283**	-0.237**	-0.239*	-0.260**	-0.238*
	[0.076]	[0.078]	[0.082]	[0.080]	[0.079]
Age		0.012	0.024	0.013	0.012
		[0.067]	[0.062]	[0.069]	[0.067]
Gender		-0.176+	-0.187+	-0.177+	-0.176+
		[0.096]	[0.093]	[0.096]	[0.096]
Education		0.144*	0.155+	0.136*	0.148*
		[0.062]	[0.072]	[0.063]	[0.065]
Income		0.228**	0.233**	0.214**	0.232**
		[0.063]	[0.065]	[0.062]	[0.060]
Income Missing		0.567**	0.546*	0.554*	0.578**
		[0.187]	[0.184]	[0.189]	[0.184]
Urban		-0.089	-0.108	-0.096	-0.081
		[0.080]	[0.099]	[0.086]	[0.088]
Reciprocity		-0.033	-0.022	-0.027	-0.032
		[0.032]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.033]
Monitoring		0.143+	0.123+	0.124	0.146+
		[0.076]	[0.069]	[0.070]	[0.073]

Poverty				-0.001	
				[0.002]	
Remittances %				0.628	
				[1.010]	
Emigrants %					0.265
					[0.347]
Control Constant	1.180**	1.193**	1.168**	1.193**	1.193**
	[0.045]	[0.040]	[0.036]	[0.038]	[0.040]
Department FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	986	947	947	924	947
R ²	0.01	0.064	0.104	0.066	0.064

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Cell entries are from OLS regressions with the list experiment as the dependent variable.

Linearized standard errors adjusted for the survey design in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the department level.

Table C4: Mechanisms Linking Remittance Receipt to Party Targeting, Full OLS Regressions

	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
<u>Treatment List</u>							
Remittances	0.315*	0.309*	0.320*	0.517**	0.083	0.088	0.201
	[0.125]	[0.124]	[0.117]	[0.169]	[0.197]	[0.196]	[0.211]
Vote Propensity	-0.056		0.118	0.145	0.001	0.088	0.158
	[0.148]		[0.188]	[0.275]	[0.158]	[0.253]	[0.303]
Left		-0.071	0.029	0.035	-0.037	0.029	0.051
		[0.123]	[0.151]	[0.172]	[0.142]	[0.197]	[0.223]
Right		-0.092	-0.052	-0.061	-0.257	-0.209	-0.306
		[0.188]	[0.203]	[0.214]	[0.227]	[0.236]	[0.238]
Propen×Left			-0.198	-0.183		-0.154	-0.234
			[0.191]	[0.269]		[0.275]	[0.327]
Propen×Right			-0.126	-0.091		-0.131	0.001
			[0.154]	[0.216]		[0.231]	[0.314]
Remit×Propen				-0.417			-0.445
				[0.259]			[0.560]
Remit×Left					-0.266	-0.236	-0.319
					[0.290]	[0.290]	[0.432]
Remit×Right					0.744*	0.732*	1.015*
					[0.310]	[0.309]	[0.363]
Remit×Propen×Left							0.468
							[0.604]
Remit×Propen×Right							-0.349
							[0.688]
Age	-0.063	-0.066	-0.062	-0.051	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054
	[0.098]	[0.096]	[0.099]	[0.098]	[0.097]	[0.096]	[0.097]
Gender	0.081	0.058	0.061	0.065	0.053	0.051	0.054
	[0.080]	[0.087]	[0.085]	[0.088]	[0.094]	[0.091]	[0.094]
Education	0.028	0.026	0.025	0.019	0.032	0.032	0.023
	[0.076]	[0.072]	[0.073]	[0.074]	[0.069]	[0.072]	[0.071]
Income	-0.124	-0.108	-0.103	-0.097	-0.099	-0.094	-0.095
	[0.114]	[0.105]	[0.103]	[0.103]	[0.099]	[0.098]	[0.099]
Income Missing	-0.485	-0.407	-0.384	-0.369	-0.349	-0.316	-0.306
	[0.289]	[0.275]	[0.269]	[0.266]	[0.266]	[0.263]	[0.272]
Urban	-0.043	-0.071	-0.058	-0.054	-0.04	-0.036	-0.034
	[0.146]	[0.131]	[0.129]	[0.131]	[0.126]	[0.127]	[0.126]
Reciprocity	-0.036	-0.032	-0.029	-0.035	-0.021	-0.023	-0.029
	[0.052]	[0.058]	[0.051]	[0.049]	[0.051]	[0.051]	[0.048]
Monitoring	-0.22	-0.236	-0.213	-0.208	-0.206	-0.199	-0.201
	[0.176]	[0.185]	[0.182]	[0.181]	[0.186]	[0.188]	[0.185]
Treatment Constant	0.124+	0.163+	0.12	0.098	0.189*	0.165*	0.143+
	[0.062]	[0.082]	[0.072]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.071]	[0.072]
<u>Control List</u>							
Remittances	-0.251**	-0.268**	-0.278**	-0.398**	-0.277	-0.283	-0.354*
	[0.078]	[0.085]	[0.082]	[0.108]	[0.164]	[0.168]	[0.141]

Vote Propensity	0.217*			0.012	0.127	0.046	0.001
	[0.089]			[0.165]	[0.085]	[0.162]	[0.145]
Left	0.230*	-0.002	0.056	0.118	0.013	0.007	
	[0.092]	[0.197]	[0.176]	[0.108]	[0.192]	[0.194]	
Right	0.331**	0.309	0.310+	0.378*	0.382*	0.395*	
	[0.107]	[0.179]	[0.161]	[0.129]	[0.176]	[0.164]	
Propen×Left			0.27		0.23	0.266	
			[0.253]		[0.250]	[0.253]	
Propen×Right			0.012		0.038	0.038	
			[0.176]		[0.185]	[0.150]	
Remit×Propen			0.241			0.305	
			[0.147]			[0.360]	
Remit×Left				0.581+	0.566+	0.566	
				[0.289]	[0.289]	[0.388]	
Remit×Right				-0.307	-0.304	-0.34	
				[0.227]	[0.231]	[0.247]	
Remit×Propen×Left						-0.214	
						[0.593]	
Remit×Propen×Right						-0.121	
						[0.398]	
Age	-0.016	0.015	-0.01	-0.018	-0.013	-0.015	-0.019
	[0.074]	[0.064]	[0.071]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.068]	[0.068]
Gender	-0.188+	-0.183+	-0.190+	-0.193+	-0.173+	-0.174	-0.178
	[0.091]	[0.097]	[0.096]	[0.099]	[0.098]	[0.099]	[0.106]
Education	0.150+	0.175*	0.166*	0.172*	0.162*	0.159*	0.163*
	[0.071]	[0.064]	[0.064]	[0.066]	[0.067]	[0.066]	[0.065]
Income	0.211**	0.196**	0.183*	0.180*	0.181*	0.177*	0.177*
	[0.067]	[0.063]	[0.062]	[0.065]	[0.065]	[0.065]	[0.065]
Income Missing	0.529*	0.476*	0.441*	0.429*	0.442*	0.417*	0.407*
	[0.188]	[0.169]	[0.167]	[0.161]	[0.165]	[0.161]	[0.165]
Urban	-0.106	-0.1	-0.094	-0.101	-0.119	-0.12	-0.118
	[0.104]	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.094]	[0.095]	[0.096]	[0.095]
Reciprocity	-0.017	-0.03	-0.027	-0.021	-0.034	-0.034	-0.028
	[0.029]	[0.034]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.027]
Monitoring	0.091	0.11	0.087	0.084	0.071	0.063	0.067
	[0.062]	[0.078]	[0.070]	[0.070]	[0.081]	[0.084]	[0.083]
Control Constant	1.077**	1.003**	0.998**	1.007**	0.973**	0.994**	1.004**
	[0.031]	[0.048]	[0.081]	[0.058]	[0.045]	[0.068]	[0.060]
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947	947	947	947	947	947
R ²	0.113	0.121	0.127	0.128	0.136	0.138	0.141

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Cell entries are from OLS regressions with the list experiment as the dependent variable. Linearized standard errors adjusted for the survey design are in brackets, including clustering of standard errors at the department level.

Appendix D. Characterization of Voters, Latin America

In Table D1, the models test whether receipt of remittances decreases turnout propensities, making these individuals more likely to be the object of *turnout buying* (dummy variable indicating voting in past presidential elections); and their location along the left–right ideological spectrum, which may make remittance recipients attractive to party machines seeking to cement emerging conservative ideological leanings (*loyalty buying*). After controlling for a set of socio-demographic factors, remittance recipients turn out to vote less and are more likely to self-identify with the right. We provide the ATEs of remittances on Table D2. On average, remittance recipients are about 5 percentage points less likely to turn out to vote; and slightly more likely to locate themselves towards the right of the ideological spectrum (0.037 points in the 1-10 ideological scale or 0.6%).

Table D1. Remittances and Political Behaviour in Latin America, 2004–2014

DV	Voted	Ideology
Remittances	-0.142** [0.024]	0.0486+ [0.026]
Gender	0.0412** [0.014]	0.0848** [0.014]
Age	0.0514** [0.001]	0.00731** [0.001]
Education	0.361** [0.011]	-0.130** [0.011]
Wealth	0.0250** [0.005]	0.0358** [0.005]
Rural	0.0602** [0.005]	0.0626** [0.005]
Partisan	-0.689** [0.017]	-0.0493** [0.017]
Center	-0.0124 [0.019]	
Right	0.0550** [0.017]	
Constant	-1.672** [0.056]	6.006** [0.054]
Country Fes	Yes	Yes
Year Fes	Yes	Yes
Estimation Method	Logit	OLS
Observations	130897	130897
R ² or Pseudo R ²	0.117	0.047

Robust Standard errors in brackets: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table D2. Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) of Receiving Remittances on Political Behavior, Augmented Inverse Propensity Weighted Estimator

	Percentage points
Voted in the last presidential election	-5.3**
Political Ideology	.037* points on a continuous 1-10 scale

In a series of additional models we further tested whether the effect of remittances on the likelihood of being targeted by clientelistic machines is reinforced if respondents exhibit a lower propensity to vote and self-locate toward the right of the political spectrum. The interaction effect between centrist and rightist ideological positions and remittances confirms that Latin American remittance recipients who locate themselves toward the centre/right of the ideological spectrum are significantly more likely to be targeted than non-remittance recipients with the same ideological preferences. This result squares with the finding that remittance recipients tend to self-identify with conservative ideological positions, making them an attractive target of *loyalty buying* for right-wing parties searching to strengthen emerging loyalties. Finally, although the interaction between turnout propensity and remittances is correctly signed (as well as the triple interactions), there is no support for the claim that a lower propensity to vote makes remittance recipients susceptible to targeting. As we mention in the conclusions, it could be argued that turnout buying becomes especially salient for parties' electoral mobilization strategies only in contexts of high electoral competition, as in the case of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race, justifying why the result seems not to hold at the regional level. This is an important avenue for future research.

Table D3. Mechanisms Linking Remittance Receipt to Party Targeting LAPOP 2010–2012

	Vote Buying	Vote Buying	Vote Buying
Remittances	0.0581 [0.105]	0.325** [0.120]	-0.007 [0.227]
Center	-0.233** [0.064]	-0.172** [0.059]	-0.371** [0.121]
Right	-0.249** [0.059]	-0.207** [0.056]	-0.474** [0.108]
Vote Propensity		0.327** [0.064]	0.152 [0.098]
Remittances×Center	0.447** [0.165]		0.789* [0.312]
Remittances×Right	0.314* [0.138]		0.373 [0.282]
Remittances×Propensity		-0.0258 [0.133]	0.109 [0.244]
Propensity×Center			0.189 [0.139]
Propensity×Right			0.302* [0.123]
Remit×Propen×Center			-0.503 [0.373]
Remit×Propen×Right			-0.080 [0.312]
Constant	-1.388** [0.193]	-1.492** [0.193]	-1.332** [0.203]
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17921	17921	17921

Standard errors in brackets + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$; all models control for partisanship, persuasion, support for democracy, education, wealth, age, gender, and rural location.