

"They have freedom of choice"

Indonesian immigrants' discourse on religion and modernity
in the Netherlands



Maria Ingrid Nabubhoga

Research Institute for Philosophy,
Theology and Religious Studies (IPTR)

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

During the second part of the 20th century, the Netherlands evolved from an emigration to an immigration society (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid, 2001). Through this process, the Netherlands has become a multicultural society and it caused a cultural change. Both native Dutch people and immigrants have had to adapt to the challenges of this situation. One of the thorny topics is religion. Recent research by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), *Outside Church and Mosque (Buiten kerk en moskee)*, shows that the number of atheists and agnostics in the Netherlands continues to grow while the number of the so-called “modern-day spirituals” shows no increase in the last decade (De Hart et al., 2022). For Dutch people in general, religion has become less important during the second part of the 20th century. Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has experienced, on the one hand, ongoing secularization, and on the other hand, the rise of immigrant religions, particularly Islam. The return of religion to the public arena, due to immigration, is an issue that is often debated (Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010).

In the Dutch debate on religion in the public arena, Indonesian immigrants tend to be neglected, as the debate tends to concentrate on Muslim immigrants, particularly from Morocco and Turkey. This is likely because Indonesian immigrants are classified by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) as “Western migrants” (CBS, n.d.) and they are successfully integrated into Dutch society (Scheffer, 2007; Oostindie, 2010; Bosma, 2012). Indonesian immigrants are comprised of different groups, which vary in terms of ethnic background, religion, employment opportunities and affinity with Dutch society. The major category of Indonesian immigrants is “the repatriates” from the former Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) who came to the Netherlands between 1945 and 1962. These post-colonial immigrants consisted of first-generation Dutch families (*totoks*), the Indo-European or Indo-Dutch (*Indische Nederlanders*), the “socially Dutch” people, which is a group of highly educated Indonesians and Christians, including some Peranakan Chinese, Moluccan colonial soldiers, and a small number of Papuans (Oostindie, 2010; Bosma, 2012). The Indonesian people who came to the Netherlands after 1962 are a group that is overlooked in the category of Indonesian immigrants. They are culturally and ethnically different from the Dutch, yet, in the Netherlands, they are put in the category of “Western” immigrants. This dissertation focuses on this last group, particularly their discourse on religion and modernity.

Following the guidelines of Verschuren and Doorewaard (2010), the following sections describe and justify why this study (the project framework) was conducted, what was studied (the conceptual design), and how the study was conducted (the technical design).

1. Project Framework

In the Netherlands, religion and modernity are generally deemed incompatible. Many people recognize just one form of modernity, namely European modernity. Modernization equals Europeanization. Yet, the notion that modernization means the eradication of religion is increasingly contested by the existence of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000; 2003), including religious modernities (Jenkins, 2007; Mahbubani, 2008; Hefner, 2009; Ali, 2016). The notion of multiple modernities indicates that modernity is not a single event. When the programs of Western European modernity, based on the Enlightenment, spread out to non-European civilizations, they were adopted selectively and transformed culturally within the specific contexts of other civilizations. In the Asian hemisphere, for example, many people and policymakers assume that modernization can be comfortably based on religious principles (Mahbubani, 2008), thus, the concepts of religion and modernity are intrinsically related.

More or less in harmony with the founding fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, secularization theorists held that modernization would lead to secularization (Wilson, 1966; Berger, 1967; Martin, 1969). They recognized only one form of modernity, namely European modernity, and equated modernization with rationalization, a loss of faith and a loss of enchantment. From its very beginning, secularization theory was questioned by scholars who, for example, claimed that religion had not disappeared, but religious institutions had lost their significance. People identified religion with an institution, the Church, and because of de-churching, religion had become invisible (Luckmann, 1967). The decline in the importance of religion was only true of the churches but not of individual religiosity (Luckmann, 1967; Davie, 2002).

In the 1980s, in the Netherlands, there was a debate about whether or not secularization was an irreversible and universal process (Mulder, 1981; Houtepen, 1989). At present, it is widely acknowledged that it is not. According to Berger (1999), there is a global resurgence of religion, but Europe is an exceptional case (Davie, 2000; 2002). However, religion returned to the public arena (Thomas, 2005), also in the Netherlands (Van de Donk et al., 2006; Schmeets & Van der Bie, 2009), and thus the secularization theory has to be modified. A significant amount of research has been done on this issue already. From 2002 to 2012, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) financed a research program on “The Future of the Religious Past” (NWO, 2002). From 2012 to 2018, NWO sponsored another research program on “Religion in Modern Society” (NWO, 2012). One of the research questions (No. 61) of the National Science Agenda reads: Are religion and modernity competitors? (Nationale Wetenschapsagenda, n.d).

One of the nine research projects in the NWO program of Religion in Modern Society (2012-2018) deals with the issue of immigration and religion (NWO, 2013). The research shows that the religious practices of Muslim children in Turkish and Moroccan immigrant families are substantially influenced by their parents (De Hoon & Van Tubergen, 2014). Moreover, adolescents from immigrant backgrounds are considerably more religious than their native counterparts, and immigrants from Muslim backgrounds are more religious than immigrants from other religious backgrounds (Van der Pol & Van Tubergen, 2014).

In addition to the studies on Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, there are also studies on African Christian immigrants (Krabbenborg, 1995; Ter Haar, 1995; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; Van Dijk, 2000; 2002; Van den Broek, 2003). Research shows, in the case of African Catholics in the Netherlands, religion could contribute to either assimilation, integration or segregation, depending on the perspective from which the situation was viewed (Van der Meer, 2010). In her studies, Ter Haar pointed out that African Christians in the Netherlands generally identify themselves first as Christians rather than Africans or African Christians (1998a, pp. 83-84).

While many studies deal with religion in the Netherlands among Turkish, Moroccan, and African immigrants, few exist on Indonesians. The present project aims to contribute to this body of knowledge by studying the discourse of religion and modernity in the Netherlands among the fourth-largest immigrant group with whom the Dutch share a long history: Indonesians. Indonesia and Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands serve as mirrors to study and reflect on religion in modern society.

The Indonesians were the first post-war immigrant group that the Dutch encountered in the 1940s and 1950s. In Indonesia, the Dutch colonial government were already faced with the dilemma of “Western civilizing mission” versus “respect for indigenous cultural” (Van Doorn, 1995, p. 154; Scheffer, 2007, p. 181). The arrival of the repatriates from the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) was followed by other immigration flows from Suriname, Antilleans, and Arubans. In the 1970s, the temporarily recruited “guest workers” from Turkey and Morocco started to settle permanently in the Netherlands with their families. The Netherlands became a country of immigrants with great cultural diversity, which generated issues like assimilation, cultural identity, and minority rights. In this case, the Netherlands, according to the influential Dutch sociologist Jacques Van Doorn (1995, p. 82), “has become more like the Netherlands East Indies”.¹

¹ JAA Van Doorn served in the Dutch Army between 1947 and 1950 during the decolonization war in Indonesia.

In *Indische lessen* (1995), Van Doorn proposed looking at the Dutch colonial experiences in the Netherlands East Indies as a mirror to the post-war Netherlands. Exploring the Netherlands East Indies' colonial experiences and the repatriation of the post-colonial immigrants can be fruitful for the knowledge and assessment of the Dutch minority issue (Van Doorn, 1995, p. 83). Nevertheless, the Netherlands has difficulty in facing up to its colonial past. As pointed out by Kennedy and Valenta, "this aspect of Dutch history is rarely recalled in current discussions where all too often the encounter between the Dutch state and non-Western religions is presented as a highly recent event" (2006, p. 343). The way the Netherlands treats the ethnic minorities in the post-war Netherlands shows their evasiveness in dealing with colonial history (Scheffer, 2007, p. 179)². Regarding post-colonial migrants, Bosma (2012, p. 198) wrote:

Although experiences with post-colonial migrants in the 1970s played an important role in the formulation of the 'minorities policies' at the end of that decade, post-colonial immigrants themselves did not figure in them as a single category. First of all, the Indische Nederlanders did not become part of the 'minorities'. They had been declared to be fully integrated more than a decade earlier (Willems, 2001, pp. 197-203). This meant that more than half of the post-colonial migrant population in the Netherlands was excluded from the minorities discourse and later on from the multicultural discourse as well. ... Indische Nederlanders were neither socially nor politically marginalised. On the contrary, the vast majority did pretty well on both accounts.

In answering the question, "Why there is no post-colonial debate in the Netherlands?", Bosma (2012, p. 200) pointed out the difficulty in tracing post-colonial boundaries in the Netherlands because, unlike other post-colonial societies in Europe, the Dutch post-colonial boundary is not based on race or religion, but on social and cultural divisions. The distinction between "Western" and "non-Western" immigrants is not used in a strictly geographical sense but "as a way of measuring the distance from

² In recent years, however, the Dutch debate on the colonial past in Indonesia intensified. In March 2020, the Dutch King, Willem Alexander, apologised for the "excessive violence" inflicted in Indonesia during colonial rule. In February 2022, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte apologised after a major historical study by the Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD), the Royal Institute for Language, Land and Ethnology (KITLV), and the Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH) (<https://www.niod.nl/en/projects/independence-decolonization-violence-and-war-indonesia-1945-1950>) revealed that the Netherlands used systematic and excessive violence in Indonesia's war of independence (Oostindie et al., 2022). Reactions to the study were divided. While some praised the study as an important acknowledgement of the crimes committed by the Dutch, others criticized it for being a one-sided representation with little attention to the victims of Indonesian violence (Van der Mee & Boere, 2022).

Dutch mainstream culture” (Bosma, 2012, p. 200). Most post-colonial immigrants from Indonesia who came to the Netherlands between 1945 and the mid-1960s were Dutch citizens and, therefore, they are counted as “Western”. Japanese immigrants in the Netherlands are also counted as “Western” as the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese, “subjects of an independent Asian power, were legally treated as equal to Europeans in colonial Indonesia from 1899 onwards” (Bosma, 2012, p. 201).

Although colonial history and migration history from the Netherlands East Indies are not the core of the present study, this history nevertheless plays a role as a “members’ resource” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72) in the discourse of Indonesian immigrants. The Netherlands’ colonial history and its impact on contemporary debates on religion in Indonesia is the focus of a parallel project, which is being conducted in the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations (NICMCR, hereafter the Consortium).³ The Consortium, established in 2010, is a network of universities and faith-based organizations in both countries. In 2014, inspired by Van Doorn’s *Indische lessen* (1995), the Consortium started the project “Indonesian Mirrors”, which aims to study multiple modernities and religions in the public arena in the Netherlands and Indonesia (NICMCR, 2015). The underlying conviction is that insight into colonial history and Netherlands-Indonesia bilateral relations can help grapple with religious issues in both societies, particularly concerning the contestation of modernity. The project consists of two subprojects; a historical project⁴ and a contemporary project. The present study is the latter.

There are several studies on Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands before and after Indonesian independence. Among them is a study by Harry A. Poeze (1986), who focused on Indonesian students, in the early twentieth century, who eventually became important nationalists in the period of the emergence of Indonesia as a nation. Two Indonesian scholars wrote about Indonesian students at the University of Leiden in the 1950s (Oetomo, 1957) and Indonesian student activities in several cities in the Netherlands (Gunawan, 1966). Additionally, there are studies about Indonesian women in Den Haag (Wilder, 1967) and Indonesian servants in the early 1900s (Cottaar, 1998). Patoppang (2009) wrote about the migrations of native Indonesians to the Netherlands from 1950 until 2000. There are at least five groups of Indonesian immigrants who came to the Netherlands: the students, the asylum seekers, the Indonesian nurses who came in the 1970s and 1990s, the job seekers, and those who were married to Dutch citizens (Patoppang, 2009).

³ <http://nicmcr.org/>

⁴ The parallel project in Indonesia started with a contribution to the Contending Modernities program at Notre Dame University investigating how religion and modernity interact (Hefner & Bagir, 2021).

Concerning religion, several studies have been done on Indonesian Christian immigrants (Budiman, 1996; Verhaar-van Roon, 2005; Castillo Guerra et al., 2006) and Moluccan Christians (Anakotta, 1996; Pluim & Kuyk, 2002; Jansen, 2008). Jansen's studies on the missionary vocation and approach in the 21st-century Dutch society of Gereja Kristen Indonesia Nederland (GKIN) and Gereja Indjili Maluku (GIM) conclude that the two Reformed churches are revising their mission. The two churches emphasize "the emotional side of faith, the sense of community, hospitality, and patience as strong missional features in a society marked by individualism, competition, and stress" (Jansen, 2008, pp. 186-187).

Steenbrink (2010) pointed out the importance of Indonesian Muslims for the general image and perception of Islam in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s Indonesian Muslims have become quite marginal among the much larger Muslim groups (Steenbrink, 2010, p. 47). Studies on the Indonesian Muslim community in the Netherlands have been done, among others, by Umar Ryad (2012), on the role of a Dutch convert, Mohammed Ali van Beetem (1879-1938), and Klaas Stutje (2016) on Indonesian Muslim groups in the Netherlands before World War II. In 1996, Muhammad Hisyam published his research on the emergence of *Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa* (PPME, Young Moslem Association in Europe), an organization of Indonesian Muslims living in Europe, founded in 1971. More than 20 years later, Sujadi (2017) wrote a dissertation on PPME, focusing on its establishment and development from 1971 to 2009. Before that, he published two articles on PPME's policies (Sujadi, 2006) and PPME's religious identity (Sujadi, 2013). There are two MA theses at Leiden University by Indonesian students on the Indonesian Muslim communities in the Netherlands. They are written by Abdul Manan Zaibar (2003), on the Islamic religious education curriculum and its implementation at the Indonesian School in Wassenaar, and by Ariza Fuadi (2011), on Islamic philanthropy of Indonesian Muslims in Amsterdam and the Hague.

In 2020, the Center for Area Studies (*Pusat Penelitian Kewilayahan*) of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*) published a book on the role of the Indonesian Muslim diaspora in building global religious connectivity in the Netherlands. The book illustrates a socio-historical overview of the growth of the Indonesian Muslim diaspora in the Netherlands and the various social dynamics they faced. The last two chapters of the book focus on the roles and activities of the Special Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (PCINU)⁵ in the Netherlands. PCINU's religious activity

⁵ Pengurus Cabang Istimewa Nahdlatul Ulama (PCINU) is the Netherlands branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (<https://nubelanda.nl/>). Established in 1926, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (<https://www.nu.or.id/>) is a traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia, which is also the largest independent Islamic

at the Al-Hikmah Mosque in Den Haag-which does not separate prayer rooms for men and women-is seen as progress by the local municipality “because it breaks the Islamophobic impression that Islam is segregative towards women” (Gusnelly et al., 2020, p.67).

Concerning Dutch integration discourse, a study by Vos and Van Groningen (2012) on Indonesian Muslims, who came to the Netherlands in the 1950s, shows that they have successfully integrated into and participated in Dutch society. Another study by Wijzen (2016, p. 234) shows that integration into modern Dutch society for young Indonesian Muslims “does not require less Islam, but rather more Islam-pure Islam” because Islam gives them a platform to be “citizens of the world”. For Muslim immigrants, including Indonesians, Islam and modernity are compatible, which is difficult for Dutch citizens, particularly policymakers, to understand (Wijzen, 2016, p. 234).

Indonesian Muslims distinguish themselves from Muslims of Turkish or Moroccan descent. The study of Wijzen and Vos (2014) on Indonesian Muslims in the Hague shows that Indonesian Muslims position themselves as being “more flexible” or “more open” and that they “are not like Arabs” who are “a bit strict”. Both Indonesian and Surinamese Muslim immigrants “wished to nuance the one-sided and the negative image of Islam in the Netherlands” and that they “wished to impress upon their fellow migrants, particularly from Morocco and Turkey, that they should adapt more to the Dutch culture” (Vos, 2017, p. 231).

The present study is a continuation of the previous studies, particularly those of Vos and Van Groningen (2012), Wijzen and Vos (2014), Wijzen (2016), and Vos (2017). However, elaborating on those studies, the present study does not focus on the issue of integration and immigration. It focuses on the notion of modernity and religion in the discourse of Indonesian immigrants with various (both religious and not religious) backgrounds.

organization in the world. PCINU was officially established in Amsterdam in 2015 on the initiative of the Indonesian Muslim diaspora in the Netherlands. It spreads messages about a tolerant Islam (*Islam toleran*) or Islam Nusantara (Islam of the Archipelago), claiming that Indonesian Islam is moderate and progressive.

2. Conceptual Design

In this section, the conceptual design, contribution aims, and main concepts to be used will be clarified (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010). The section consists of the research objective, research questions, theoretical framework, and research concepts.

2.1 Research Objective

The section above quoted one of the research questions (No. 61) of the National Science Agenda: Are religion and modernity competitors? (Nationale Wetenschapsagenda, n.d.). A related research question (No. 47) reads: How can social cohesion in a culturally and religiously diverse society be promoted? (Nationale Wetenschapsagenda, n.d.). According to the Research Agenda, this second question has two dimensions: Where do tensions come from? And what can we do about them?

Religion in modern Dutch society is a sensitive issue and possibly a threat to social cohesion. Religion, particularly Islam, is seen as a threat to Dutch liberal attitudes on issues such as sexuality, equal rights, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression (Gijssberts & Lubbers, 2009). Many Dutch people take it for granted that the integration of immigrants into Dutch society requires that they become less religious. For many immigrants, however, religion is not only an important identity marker but also a foundation for their social networks. In the case of African Catholics for example, religion contributes to their integration with Dutch Catholics as well as with those from different denominations (Van der Meer, 2010). Other studies show that transmission of religiosity within immigrant families is influenced by warm family ties on the one hand and integration into the host country on the other hand. Van der Pol and Van Tubergen (2014) found that religious transmission in Muslim immigrants is weaker if parents are more socially integrated into secular Dutch society. When parents are more integrated into religious communities, in which their beliefs and views are shared by others, religious transmission is stronger (Van der Pol & Van Tubergen, 2014).

Reflections on the relationship between religion and modernity have undergone a noticeable change over the last few decades (Casanova, 1994; 2011; Davie, 2000; Hefner, 2009; Aupers & Houtman, 2010; Turner, 2011; Martin, 2011; Pollack & Rosta, 2017). Sociologists' understanding of modernity is challenged by the relationship between secularity and religion in modern society. Modernity does not necessarily produce a decline in religion; it produces pluralization (Berger, 2012, p. 313). In the Netherlands, while church membership has been declining rapidly (Bernts & Berghuijs, 2016; Kregting, et al., 2018), there is a process of transformation of religion,

along with the trend of individualism of religion and faith experience (Houtman & Mascini, 2002; Sengers, 2005; Aupers & Houtman, 2010). Religion, a multi-layered religious field, argued Hellemans (2004), “is one domain among others in which modern society unfolds.” Religion is not the opposition to modernity. Within modern societies, there are various traditions including religious traditions. We should focus on the diverse and interconnected processes of religious modernisation because, as Hellemans argues, “modernity is, in fact, the foundation of religion in modern society” (2004, p. 80).

In the non-Western world, the influence of religion on public and private affairs is as strong as ever, for example when we look at the development of Pentecostal Christianity, resurgent Islam, and Hindu nationalism (Hefner, 2009). On her visit to Jakarta, in February 2009, the then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “As I travel around the world over the next years, I will be saying to people: if you want to know whether Islam, democracy, modernity and women’s rights can co-exist, go to Indonesia” (Mohammed & Davies, 2009). Clinton’s statement was quoted by the then-Indonesian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Retno Marsudi, in her speech at the launching of the Indonesia-Netherlands Society in The Hague on March 22, 2012. Marsudi (2012) proudly stated that “Indonesia today is widely regarded as living proof where democracy, Islam and modernity can thrive together”. In his speech at the opening of Muslim Fashion Festival Indonesia 2018 at the Jakarta Convention Centre, Indonesian President Joko Widodo said,

In adopting technology, developing a lifestyle industry like this is an integral part of what is called modernization. However, we must implement modernization without forgetting our religious values, and our traditional values. Nor must we forget our norms. We must not be detached from our religious values; we must not be detached from the roots of our culture or traditions (Jordan, 2018; translation by the author).

The overview above indicates that for Indonesians, religion and modernity are compatible. With this background, Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands have at least two relevant characteristics. First, they share a colonial history with Dutch society, yet they are neglected in the debates of religion in the public arena in the Netherlands. Second, their view of the compatibility of religion and modernity is in contrast to the general view of secular Dutch society. This raises questions about how Indonesian immigrants talk about, perceive, and experience religion and modernity in the Netherlands. What is their impression of Dutch society concerning religion and religious practice? What is their perception of homosexuality, abortion, and

euthanasia? How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves? Will discussions about the relationship between religion and modernity appear in a new light when seen from the perspective of Indonesian immigrants?

This research aims to acquire further insight into the relationship between religion and modernity (internal objective) and to contribute to the theories of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants from a post-colonial perspective (external objective). This research will also reflect on how insights gained in this study implicate the dialogue between the Netherlands-Indonesia, especially in the context of the Consortium.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

In the research project on immigration and religion (NWO, 2013), the researchers asked if religion hinders the integration of (Turkish and Moroccan) Muslims in the Netherlands. They concluded that it did not. Muslim immigrants integrate in terms of education and labour. However, they do not secularize, in the sense that religion becomes less important to them (Fleischmann & Maliepaard, 2015). The researchers theorize that, until recently, the emphasis of integration studies was on socio-economic aspects. The religious dimension is rather new and difficult to measure.

Research by the SCP shows that the economic integration of immigrants is slow but successful, but the cultural gap between the Dutch and immigrants grows (Huijnk et al., 2015; Huijnk, 2018). While the Dutch become more secular, Muslim and Christian immigrants remain religious (Huijnk, 2018; De Hart & Van Houwelingen, 2018). This trend was also observed by The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in a report on diversity in the Netherlands (Jennissen et al., 2018). Earlier, the WRR noted decreasing "identification" with modern Dutch society and noted multiple identifications and loyalties (Meurs, 2007). On the other hand, the SCP observed that the tolerance of what is different and strange by the Dutch has decreased (Den Ridder et al., 2019).

Acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, and euthanasia are often seen as criteria for successful integration. As Scheffer (2007, p. 38) argues: Muslims must adjust to a liberal, secular, and democratic society. They do not have to do away with Islam and spiritual tradition. Scheffer (2007) explicitly takes inspiration from Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch Arabist and Islamologist, who was appointed in 1889 to be the Advisor on Arabian and Native Affairs to the Dutch Colonial government in the Netherlands East Indies. Hurgronje "attempted to free the Indies Muslims from what he saw as 'the Medieval rubbish which Islam has been dragging along

in its wake for too long', and therefore they would be capable of adapting to new ideas stemming from the western tradition of liberalism in the nineteenth century" (Burhanudin, 2014, p. 52).

Inspired by Hall (1992), who made in-depth studies of the development of modernity and the struggle between the West and the rest of the world, this study uses post-colonialism as a theoretical frame (Young, 2001; Desai & Nair, 2005). Post-colonialism is a broad label for a body of knowledge studying and criticizing the Western impact on the non-Western world. It deals with the issue of European colonization of Africa, Latin America, Asia and other parts of the world, and also traces not only what the colonizers did but what kind of response came from the colonized people, as well as their struggles during and after colonialism.

The post-colonial theory hypothesises that Westerners created images of the non-Westerners as "others". Westerners did not "discover" others but they "constructed" them and these images of the other presupposed self-images. Orientalism (Said, 1978) does not go without Occidentalism (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). It is mutual. Post-colonial theory, in historical terms, according to Young,

is not in any sense simply a western or even metropolitan phenomenon, but the hybrid product of the violent historical, political, cultural and conceptual terms. Resistance against the west has always involved resistance from within as well as outside it, beyond its permeable and porous boundaries. Postcolonialism is neither western nor non-western, but a dialectical product of interaction between the two, articulating new counterpoints of insurgency from the long-running power struggles that predate and post-date colonialism (2001, p. 68).

In exploring the notion of modernity through the perception of Indonesian immigrants, this study focuses on the concept of "multiple modernities". Authors such as Eisenstadt (2003) and Mahbubani (2008) claim that non-Western societies accepted modernity, but not its European form. De-secularism combines with de-Europeanization (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 161). In his book, *The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East* (2008), Mahbubani observes that modernity is multiple. Non-Westerners appreciate the European heritage of Enlightenment and Western values of modernity, but they have their modernization which differs from modernization in the West.

In describing the "march to modernity", Mahbubani (2008) writes about the transformations in Asia and the Muslim world. According to Mahbubani (2008),

Westerners fail to understand that modernization is not the equivalent of Westernization. Non-Westerners appreciate the European heritage of Enlightenment and Western values of modernity, but they have their modernization which is accompanied by de-Westernization. Mahbubani (2008) believes that Asian countries, especially India and China, will be better able than the West to solve their problems, but not without first appropriating Western culture. With this, he adds his voice to the debate on culture and religion in the global world order. In this debate, some emphasize the clash between Europe and the East (Samuel Huntington), while others stress the victory of Western modern democracy after the fall of communism (Francis Fukuyama).

There has been an ambivalent interaction between the West and the East concerning the development of capitalism, liberalism, democracy, technology, and human rights. Material and idealistic “products” from the West have been exported with power to the non-Western world. These idealistic “products” have been adopted mainly in the East and implemented in their terms, most often with criticism of the West. Now the Asian world is challenging the West, with increasing success, and bringing its own religious culture to the fore. But Europe continues its triumphant feeling of victory, or retreats in its fortress and according to Mahbubani, “it is now actually impossible for the Western mind to conceive of Islamic civilization re-emerging as an open and cosmopolitan civilization” (2008, pp. 150-151).

The key argument of the advocates of the concept of “multiple modernities” is that modernity comes in various forms and is contingent on culture and historical circumstances. Modernity is not an exclusively Western phenomenon. Through the perspective of non-Western immigrants in this study, we move away from the Eurocentric view of the modern world. Inspired by Bhabra (2007, p. 152), in this study “modernity is placed in a frame of interconnections or networks, of peoples and places that transcend the boundaries established within the dominant approaches”. By addressing the relationship between modernity, post-colonial theory, and Eurocentrism, Bhabra challenges “the continued privileging of the West as the ‘maker’ of *universal history* and seek[s] to develop alternatives from which to begin to deal with the questions that arise once we reject this categorization” (2007, p. 2, *italics original*). Bhabra also addresses the absence of the colonial encounter from the social sciences and the implications of the construction of a specifically “colonial gaze” (2007, p.11). She suggests, following what the historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s (1997) calls “connected histories”, as an alternative way of addressing questions of modernity.

In the last chapter, this study will explore several theories of modernity from the perspective of Indonesian immigrants, assuming that the above-mentioned dilemma

between “Western civilizing mission” and “respect for indigenous cultural” is related to a struggle about what is perceived as the “heritage of Enlightenment” and the “values of modernity” (Wijsen, 2009, p. 159), whether or not modernity can cope with religious otherness, and whether or not modernity requires the eradication of religion from the public space.

2.3 Research Issue

This study examines the discourse of Indonesian immigrants about religion and modernity in the Netherlands. The notion of modernity is the focus, not the issue of integration, whether or not religion hinders integration in modern society. The main question to be answered is: Does the notion of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants need a revision? Inspired by the three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis (see later), the sub-questions are: (a) How do Indonesian immigrants speak about religion and modernity? (b) What mental models do they draw upon? and (c) How do they position Dutch society (macro) and Dutch people (micro) in relation to themselves?

2.4 Definition of Concepts

By a “modern” society we mean a society that is industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, and secular (Hall & Gieben, 1992, p. 277). For Berger (1980), the transformation from a pre-modern to a modern society has to do with a shift from fate to choice. In pre-modern society, the way people raised their children, earn their living, practiced their faith and so on, was a given, taken for granted. In modern society, there is a plurality of life options available to humans. This agency makes their choices quite personal and relative. Choices are not based on the authority of parents or leaders but on the autonomy of human beings. They have to decide for themselves, on rational grounds. However, their freedom implies respecting the freedom of others. This is also how Scheffer (2007, p. 38) defines modernity. Modern society is liberal, secular, and democratic.

The notion of “multiple modernities” presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world is to see it as “a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs” (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 536). One of the implications of the term is “that modernity and Westernization are not identical” (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 536). The notion of multiple modernities attempts to undermine the hegemony of Western modernity and reflects cultural diversity and multiplicity. It acknowledges various expressions of culture and traditions and is reflective of a pluralist view of the world. The notion of multiple modernities opens new ground for modernization theory (Schmidt, 2006; Bhambra, 2007; Lee, 2008;

Fourie, 2012). According to various scholars of religion, this is particularly true for the view that modernization necessarily implies secularism. While modernization has had some secularizing effects, it has also provoked the movements of counter-secularization. With Europe as the exception (Davie, 2002) of the desecularization thesis (Berger, 1999), the world today is massively religious, which means there are forms of modernization that are based on religious principles (Jenkins, 2007; Mahbubani, 2008; Hefner, 2009; Ali, 2016). This is what we mean by “religious modernities”. The forms of religion may be as diverse as the forms of modernity (Davie, 2013, p. 109).

Originally the term secularization referred to the expropriation of a church building by the state, functional differentiation, or the separation of church and state. As explained by Casanova,

Secularization usually refers to actual or alleged empirical-historical patterns of transformation and differentiation of the institutional spheres of “the religious” (ecclesiastical institutions and churches) and “the secular” (state, economy, science, art, entertainment, health and welfare, etc.) from early modern to contemporary societies (2011, p. 55).

In a secular state, religion does not interfere in state affairs, and the state recognizes religion as an independent domain. Consequently, religions were marginalized to the fringes of society. When scholars speak about post-secular societies today, they do not mean that people are now more religious than before, but that religion has returned to the public domain due to neo-liberalism and migration (Habermas, 2009; Molendijk, 2015). It is important to consider that the “religious” and the “secular”, as viewed by Asad (2003), are not essentially fixed categories. For Asad, the secular is

a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledge, and sensibilities in modern life. To appreciate this it is not enough to show that what appears to be necessary is really contingent—that in certain respects “the secular” obviously overlaps with “the religious” (2003, p. 25).

In *A Secular Age*, Charles Taylor (2007) distinguishes between secularity as the retreat of religion from public space and as the decline of beliefs but ultimately focuses on secularity as a change in the “conditions of belief”. Casanova adds, there are “different types of ‘secularities’ as they are codified, institutionalized and experienced in various modern contexts and the parallel and correlated transformations of modern ‘religiosities’ and ‘spiritualities’” (Casanova, 2009, pp. 1049-1050).

While agreeing that modern industrial societies are “secular”, Thomas Luckmann in *The Invisible Religion* (1967) argues that the social and cultural changes that produced modernity have not changed the fundamental “religiousness” of human beings. In his effort to understand the locus of the individual in the modern world, Luckmann insists that the problem of individual existence in society is essentially a “religious” one (1967, p. 12). Following Durkheim’s claim in *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1964), Luckmann maintains that “the world view, as an ‘objective’ and historical social reality, performs an essentially religious function and define[s] it as an *elementary social form of religion*. This social form is universal in human society” (1967, p. 53, italics original). The identification of religion and church has oriented scholars toward a relatively narrow field, in which church-orientated religion has become a marginal phenomenon in modern societies. For Luckmann, a modern individual is not becoming less religious, instead, the specific substantive content of religion has changed to “invisible religion” themes such as autonomy, familism, sexuality, self-expression, self-realization, and other “less important topics” (1967, pp. 110-114). Many of the themes originated in the traditional Christian cosmos, while some others originated in the “secular” institutional ideologies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1967, pp. 107, 113).

In this study, reference is made to religion as religious institutions or the shared beliefs and practices of people who classify themselves as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, et cetera. A close explanation of this understanding is offered in the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*:

Religion-from the Latin “religare” (to bind back)-typically refers to an institution with a recognized body of communicants who gather together regularly for worship, and accept a set of doctrines offering some means of relating the individual to what is taken to be the ultimate nature of reality (Reese, 1999, p. 647).

While there have been many publications and scholarly approaches to the subject of religion, there is no definition of religion that is universally valid and generally accepted in religious studies or the social sciences. Pollack and Rosta (2017, pp. 34-35) highlight three problems in the attempts to have a generally applicable definition of religion: (1) The diversity of religious forms and ideas makes it impossible to agree on a uniform definition of religion; (2) The fact that there are only religions in the plural and not in the singular; and (3) The elements of Western and Christian thinking influence the definition of religion as a late product of the history of religion in Europe and greatly restricted its universal applicability.

The study of religion is one of the areas in which post-colonial critique has been strong. It is particularly related to the above-mentioned last point addressed by Pollack and Rosta (2017), the problems related to defining religion. The concept of “religion” has been argued to be a product of Western Christianity and an instrument of colonial domination, which has been applied to non-Western contexts. Religion is seen as a good example of how Westerners constructed images of “the others”. A famous example is the term Hinduism (Smith, 1963) as the systematization of a huge variety of beliefs in India. Various and contrasting traditions were labelled “Hinduism” by Max Müller, who had never been to India. The same applies to the word *agama* in the Indonesian language.

Agama is the Indonesian equivalence for the English word “religion”. It is a loan word from Sanskrit, which is used for the Western notion of religion (Smith, 1963, pp. 58-59). When the Indonesian indigenous peoples wanted to preserve their ancestral traditions, the Dutch missionaries distinguished custom, *adat*, which is a Sanskrit word for tradition, teaching, or post-Vedic text, from religion, *agama*. Following Orientalists such as Hurgonje, Dutch colonial administrators used *adat* for “genuine” Indonesian “folk” beliefs, as opposed to (dangerous) Islam or *agama* (Trouwborst, 2002, p. 675).

Throughout Indonesian history, the meaning of *agama* has shifted and been appropriated culturally and politically (Hidayah, 2012). Today, the term is equated with world religions to exclude Indonesian mysticism from the *Pancasila*⁶ politics of six religions that are officially recognized by the state, namely Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.⁷ The presidential decree No. 1 of 1965 on religious blasphemy triggered a debate of the meaning of *agama*, as it states that only the official six religions are protected by the state. Until 2017, the Indonesian state had refused to recognise indigenous beliefs (*aliran kepercayaan*)-there are hundreds of them in the archipelago-as religions (*agama*) because they do not have sacred scriptures, major religious figures (prophets), nor are they internationally recognized. This exclusive definition of *agama* has discriminated against indigenous beliefs to the extent that they were deemed illegal and heretic. Nevertheless, since 7 November 2017, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) recognized indigenous beliefs although “it does not clearly establish that the beliefs enjoy the same level of protection as do the other six religions” (Butt, 2020).

⁶ *Pancasila* is the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. Pancasila comprises five principles, which include belief in One Divine Lordship, just and civilized humanity, Indonesian unity, democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives, and social justice for all Indonesians.

⁷ President Sukarno recognized Confucianism as a religion in 1965. President Suharto de-recognized it in 1967 and President Abdurrahman Wahid recognized it again in 2000.

For most Indonesians, religion (*agama*) and belief (*kepercayaan*) are different concepts (Fachrudin, 2017; Butt, 2020). Both concepts play a role as “members’ resources” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72) in Indonesian immigrants’ discourse. Religion refers exclusively to religions recognized by the state, while beliefs refer to the broad category of indigenous mysticism and spiritual practices (Butt, 2020). The understanding of these concepts is a legacy of colonial knowledge production, which is critically examined in post-colonial theory as being influenced by power relations.

Post-colonialism is a theoretical orientation in history, literature and philosophy criticizing the Western impact in the non-Western world. Although the genealogy of post-colonial theory is complex and extensive, it was Edward Said’s critique in *Orientalism* (1978) of the cultural politics of academic knowledge that founded post-colonial studies (Young, 2001). According to Said, Orientalism “expresses and represents the Orient-as an integral part of European *material* civilization and culture-culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” (1978, p. 2, *italics original*). The relationship between Occident and Orient is “a relationship of power: of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (1978, p. 5). Said employs Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse and Gramsci’s notion of hegemony by arguing that Orientalism,

can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient-dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western-style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (1978, p. 3).

The concept of Orientalism is never far from the idea of Europe itself, in the sense that “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, [and] experience” (Said, 1978, pp. 1-2, 7). Post-colonialism constitutes a critical response to this conception. Post-colonial theory “is designed to undo the ideological heritage of colonialism not only in the decolonized countries but also in the west itself” (Young, 2001, p. 65).

In this study, the term “Indonesians” is used for Indonesian people who were born and raised in Indonesia whether or not they are Indonesian passport holders. In 2016, the WRR (Bovens et al., 2016) published a report about the classification of immigrants. It advised avoiding the use of dichotomies such as *autochthonen* (natives) and *allochthonen* (non-natives) and advocated labels that would allow multiple

identities and loyalties, for example, Dutch with a migration background or Dutch of Turkish or Moroccan descent. The criterion for “immigrant background” is the birthplace of the person (first generation), the birthplace of the mother, or (in case the mother was born in the Netherlands) the father (second generation). Defined as such on April 1, 2020, there were 355.052 immigrants with an Indonesian background in the Netherlands: 95.960 first-generation and 259.092 second-generation Indonesians, which makes them the fourth largest immigrant community in the Netherlands (CBS, n.d.).

The Indonesian community in the Netherlands is very diverse. Among them are the Indo-Dutch, Moluccans, Peranakan Chinese, and Indonesians of different ethnic backgrounds. The arrival of the first three groups in the Netherlands is linked to colonial history (Oostindie, 2010; Bosma, 2012) but each group has different migration history. The Indo-Dutch came between 1945–1962. Most Indo-Dutch⁸ people hold Dutch passports, although some may identify themselves more as Indonesians. The migration history of the Moluccans is different but related to that of the Indo-Dutch (Oostindie 2010).⁹ The Moluccan community has about 45.000 people. 95% of them are Christians (many of them being Protestants) and the others are Muslims (Van der Hoek, 1994). Two mosques are considered “Moluccan”, one in Ridderkerk and the An-Nuur Mosque in Waalwijk. Some Moluccans identify themselves as Dutch, others as Indonesian and others as Moluccan. Like the Moluccans, the migration history of the Peranakan Chinese to the Netherlands is also related to that of the Indo-Dutch. The Peranakan Chinese or the Chinese Indonesians were among the repatriates who left Indonesia for the Netherlands between 1945–1980 (Tjiiook-Liem, 2017). They are a well-educated, Dutch-speaking minority group, whose socioeconomic integration in the Netherlands was considered highly successful (Oostindie, 2010, pp. 28–29; Tjiiook-Liem, 2017, p. 3).

According to the Embassy of Indonesia, there are some 15.000 Indonesians of differing ethnic backgrounds in the Netherlands, who are part of the fourth group distinguished above. According to the definition by the Embassy, Indonesians are Indonesian passport holders. These are visitors and itinerants from Indonesia who stay in the Netherlands temporarily as visitors, diplomats, business people, students and guest workers. For example, in the 1990s, a group of around 700 nurses were invited to the Netherlands due to a shortage of nurses in this country.

⁸ There are numerous websites, some dealing with the past, www.javapost.nl and others with the present, www.indisch3.nl

⁹ This history is much more complex, but it goes beyond the scope of this study.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Indonesian immigrants are classified as “Western” by CBS. This classification is related to the history of the migration of the Dutch repatriates (including the Indo-Dutch, the Moluccans and the Peranakan Chinese) from Indonesia between 1945 and 1962 and it is assumed that repatriates are already adjusted to the Dutch lifestyle. Most of these “Indonesians” are descendants of Dutch colonialists in Indonesia. The above definition of immigrants makes the distinction between the Indonesians, the Indo-Dutch and Dutch people with Indonesian backgrounds less relevant. This study focuses on the Indonesians who come to the Netherlands after 1962 as a group that is overlooked in the category of Indonesian immigrants.

3. Technical Design

The technical design describes and justifies how to study the topic, the view of science and the type of knowledge that is generated (research strategy), the research material (sources) and the methods of data generation and analysis, as well as the structure of this study (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010).

3.1 Research Strategy

This research is based on a case study of Indonesians in the Netherlands. Most often case studies are used in practice-oriented research leading to “what to do” (or operational) knowledge. The case studies are small-scale and in-depth, studying a limited number of people in their natural surroundings (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010, pp. 156, 159). However, this strategy can also be used for “how it is” (conceptual) knowledge. Wester and Peters (2004, p. 37) distinguish four functions of a theory-oriented case study: testing, exploration, illustration, or description of processes. The present study is explorative in the sense that it makes general insights on religion and modernity more concrete by studying a specific immigrant community.

3.2 Research Sources

The material for this study was generated by interviewing thirty people (research participants) within the Indonesian community: seventeen women and thirteen men (see Appendix 1). To gain an “Indonesian perspective” people who were born in Indonesia and left Indonesia for the Netherlands when they were at least ten years of age were interviewed. The interviewees came to the Netherlands between 1966 and 2013. These people do not belong to “the repatriates” group. They came to the Netherlands for mainly three (often combined) reasons: work, study, and family (marriage, partnership, and joining family members). The youngest interviewee is 24 years old and the eldest

is 93 years old. Except for one informant, who lived in the Netherlands for two years (2013-2015), the other twenty-nine informants have lived or have been living in the Netherlands for at least seven years when interviewed. Six informants have returned to Indonesia but often come to the Netherlands for their work.

The interviewees were selected using the snowball method. They were selected randomly from different Indonesian communities and then asked for further recommendations if they knew someone with the study criteria. To get diverse information, interviewing people from the same group such as a religious community was avoided. It would have been easy to interview the members of an Indonesian Muslim community or a Christian community in a specific city, however, this was avoided so as not to end up only interviewing people who are interested in religion.

Interviewees have different religious backgrounds. Thirteen of them are Muslims. Seven are Protestants. Four are Catholics. Two interviewees, who were raised as Muslims, claimed to be Atheists. Four interviewees-one raised as a Confucian, one raised as a Muslim, one raised as a Hindu, and one refused to say his religious background-said that they no longer practice religion but refused to call themselves atheists. All interviewees received religious education in school and outside of their formal school in Indonesia.

Interviews are coded with two letters referring to the interviewee's (religious) background and gender respectively: A is Atheist; C is Catholic; M is Muslim; N is Not Practicing; P is Protestant; M is man; W is woman. Interviewees with similar backgrounds and gender were numbered. Examples:

PW1: Protestant Woman 1.

PW2: Protestant Woman 2.

MM1: Muslim Man 1.

MW1: Muslim Woman 1.

3.3 Research Method

3.3.1 Method of Data Collection

The main data collection was done through interviews, that were conducted between 2015 and 2019. Interviews were conducted in different cities in the Netherlands (Nijmegen, Eindhoven, Leiden, Amsterdam, Breukelen, Den Haag, and Rotterdam), where the interviewees live and work, and in Yogyakarta, Indonesia as six of them have returned to Indonesia. The interviews were semi-structured. A topic guide was used but the order of the topics and their formulation was left open. The interviews

lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour and 45 minutes. They were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia and English. Occasionally, some interviewees combined Bahasa Indonesia and Javanese, and others used Dutch words and expressions when answering the questions. The English translation of the quoted interviews in Bahasa Indonesia, Javanese, and Dutch are mine. The translation of the quoted interviews throughout the dissertation is slightly adjusted (with square brackets) to increase the readability of the quotations. All thirty interviews are transcribed. Secondary data was gathered from online media such as newspapers and websites.

3.3.2 Method of Data Analysis

Inspired by the notion of “multiple modernities” as “a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs” (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 536), and the post-colonial approach based on Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse, this study uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed by Norman Fairclough (1992) to analyse the data. Discourse, according to Fairclough, “is a mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world, especially upon each other, as well as a mode of representation” (1992, p. 63). A discourse consists of several statements working together to form what Michel Foucault calls “a discursive formation” (1972, p. 38).

In his approach to discourse analysis, Fairclough begins by developing an analytical framework for studying language in its relation to power and ideology (Fairclough, 1989). For Fairclough, the relationship between discourse and social structures is dialectical. Social structures determine discourse, and discourse has effects on a social structure, therefore, discourse contributes to social continuity and social change (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 37-41). Fairclough (1992) attempts to draw together language analysis and social theory, in which he combines the social-theoretical sense of “discourse” with the “text-and-interaction” sense in linguistically-oriented discourse analysis. In using the term “discourse”, Fairclough is proposing to regard language use as a form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables (Fairclough, 1989; 1992). According to him, “discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world meaning” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64).

While there is a variety of approaches to discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1985), based on the nature of their social orientation to discourse there are two-although not absolute-divisions of approaches to discourse analysis: non-critical approaches and critical approaches (Fairclough, 1992, p. 12). The difference, according to Fairclough (1992, p. 12), is that “critical approaches describe not only discursive practices but

also show how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief". CDA assumes (1) that language is a practice just as any other practice; the only difference is its linguistic form; (2) that there is a dialectical relation between language use and social reality; and (3) that this relation is mediated by discursive practice (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 62-100; 2001, pp. 18-22).

CDA takes its inspiration from Michel Foucault but also goes beyond Foucault by assuming that there is a dialectical (not deterministic) relation between language use and social reality. In *Discourse and Social Change* (1992), Fairclough explains how his approach is different from Foucault's approach to discourse analysis in studies of social and cultural change. According to Fairclough, the absence of discursive and linguistic analysis of real text in Foucault's analysis becomes a contrast between Foucault's and text-oriented discourse analysis (TODA) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56). Nevertheless, Foucault provides valuable theoretical insights about discourse, which are incorporated into Fairclough's approach. Although one may, in principle, need a linguistic background when doing discourse analysis, it is a multidisciplinary activity (Fairclough, 1992, p. 74). In the past decades, discourse analysis has become an innovative method in religious studies (Wijisen, 2010; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; Ndaluka, 2012; Suhadi, 2014; Vos, 2017; Saptaningtyas, 2020).

Fairclough (1992; 2001) uses a three-dimensional conception of discourse that includes the "text" dimension (description stage), the discursive practice dimension (interpretation stage) and the social practice dimension (explanation stage). In using the term "text", Fairclough refers to both written and spoken texts as products of the process of text production. The process includes the process of production of which the text is a product, and the process of interpretation of which the text is a resource (Fairclough, 1989, p. 24).

The description stage (linguistic practice) is the analysis of the formal features of the text, which can be organized under four main headings: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure (Fairclough, 1989, p. 75). Vocabulary includes "alternative wordings" and their political and ideological significance, "word meaning" and "metaphor" (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 75-77). Fairclough (1992, pp. 193-194) also mentions "overwording" as a sign of intense preoccupation and "rewording", which is generating new wordings which are set up as alternatives to, and in opposition to, existing ones. The analytic question in this stage is: What words and expressions do discourse participants use?

The next stage is the interpretation stage (discursive practice), which is the analysis of the production, distribution and consumption of text. When discourse participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk, they draw on members' resources¹⁰ (Fairclough, 1989, p. 163) or mental models (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 75) stored in their long-term memory. Texts are produced and consumed in specific ways in specific social contexts (Fairclough, 1989, p. 78). Furthermore, because texts exist in intertextual relations with other texts, they are "dialogic", which Fairclough refers to as "intertextuality" (1989, p. 155). Intertextuality points to the productivity of texts and the way texts transform earlier texts, restructuring and turning them into new conventions (genres, discourses) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 102). The concept of intertextuality was introduced by Julia Kristeva, who derived the concept from Mikhail Bakhtin's "translinguistic" theory (Bakhtin, 1981; 1986, as cited in Kristeva, 1986). Fairclough makes a distinction between "manifest intertextuality", where specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text and "constitutive intertextuality" (or interdiscursivity). The analytic question in this stage is: What do discourse participants refer to or draw upon?

The explanation stage (social practice) is the analysis of the socio-cognitive conditions and effects of texts. In this stage, a discourse is portrayed as part of a social process. It shows how discourse is determined by social structures and the reproductive effects discourses have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them (Fairclough, 1989, p. 163). Fairclough (1992, p. 64) distinguishes three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse. First, discourse contributes to the construction of "social identities" and "subject positions" (identity). Secondly, discourse helps construct social relationships between people (relational). And thirdly, discourse contributes to the construction of a system of knowledge and belief (ideational). The effects of discourse are "mediated" by members' resources, also called interpretative procedures. The explanation stage is concerned with the social constitution and change of members' resources, including their reproduction in discourse practice. When aspects of members' resources are drawn upon as interpretative procedures, they are reproduced or transformed (Fairclough, 1989, p. 163). The analytic questions in this stage are: What are the social conditions and effects of what discourse participants say? Is there any reproduction or transformation in the participants' discourse practice? How do discourse participants position others in relation to themselves?

One of the aspects of the explanation stage is the relation of discourse as a social practice to ideology and power (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 86-87). Fairclough draws

¹⁰ The term "members' resources" is mentioned already in the project framework concerning the historical background of the interviewees.

upon Althusser's view of ideology (1971) and Gramsci's concept of hegemony (1971). Fairclough, however, does not accept Althusser's view of ideology in general in which ideology is inseparable from society. According to Fairclough, "Ideologies arise in societies characterized by relations of domination on the basis of class, gender, cultural group, and so forth. When human beings are capable of transcending such societies, they are capable of transcending ideology" (1992, p. 91). Furthermore, Fairclough's view of discourse is in harmony with Gramsci's concept of hegemony (1971). Fairclough (1992, p. 92) writes that in Gramsci (1971, p. 324), there is "a conception of subjects as structured by diverse ideologies implicit in their practice which gives them a 'strangely composite character'", and "a view of 'common sense' as both a repository of the diverse effect of past ideological struggles, and a constant target for restructuring in ongoing struggles". The concept of hegemony "provides for discourse both a matrix-a way of analyzing the social practice within which the discourse belongs in terms of power relations, in terms of whether they reproduce, restructure or challenge existing hegemonies-and a model-a way of analyzing discourse practice as a mode of hegemonic struggle, reproducing, restructuring or challenging existing orders of discourse" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 95). With the combination of the Foucaultian view of discourse and a Bakhtinian emphasis on intertextuality, as well as Gramscian conceptualization of power struggle and power relations in terms of hegemony, Fairclough's approach to discourse and discourse analysis fits as a method of analysis for investigating the perception of Indonesian immigrants about religion and modernity in the Netherlands.

In applying the three stages of CDA (linguistic practice, discursive practice, and social practice), similar texts will be used but analysed differently in the three stages of analysis. The texts discussed in the analysis of discourse as linguistic practice (description stage) will come back in the analysis of discourse as discursive practice (interpretation stage) and discourse as social practice (explanation stage). The focus of each stage is different. The analysis of discourse as linguistic practice focuses mainly on the formal features of the text (vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure). The focus of the analysis of discourse as discursive practice (interpretation stage) is on "interaction" within the "text-and-interaction" view of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4). At this stage, the texts indicate different fields of presence, memory and concomitance (Fairclough, 1992, p. 102). The focus of the analysis of discourse as social practice (explanation stage) is on the social conditions and the constitutive or constructive effects of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4). Throughout the three stages, Fairclough takes into account the three dimensions of macro (societal), meso (institutional), and micro (individual) levels of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56), as well as constant comparative analysis (Fairclough,

1992, p. 193). Constant comparative analysis is useful to identify similarities, correlations, and differences (contradictions) between texts. Constant comparative analysis allows for the identification and exploration of connections between interviewees' discourse.

3.4 Structure of the Study

After this Introduction (Chapter I), this study will continue with an analysis of how Indonesian immigrants talk about, perceive, and experience religion and modernity in the Netherlands, and how they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves. During the interviews, there are three common topics which are most often mentioned by Indonesian immigrants. They are the Netherlands as a secular state, the Netherlands as a liberal state, and individualistic notions in the Netherlands. The three following chapters are based on those topics. Chapter II discusses how Indonesian immigrants speak about and constitute the idea of secularization in the Netherlands, including their impression of Dutch society concerning religion and religious practice. Chapter III explores how Indonesian immigrants talk about liberalism in the Netherlands, and how they speak about drugs, prostitution, homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, cohabitation, and same-sex marriage. Chapter IV discusses Indonesian immigrants' discourse of individualism in the Netherlands by focusing on their impressions and experiences living in the Netherlands, their relationship with Dutch people, and the relationship between Dutch parents and children. Chapter V contains conclusions and discussions. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part concerns the relationship between religion and modernity (empirical level), which is a further discussion on the research sub-questions: (a) How do Indonesian immigrants speak about religion and modernity? (b) What mental models do they draw upon? and (c) How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves? The second part deals with the main research question (Does the notion of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants need a revision?) and concerns the contribution of this study to the theories of modernities in the light of non-Western immigrants (theoretical level). The third part concerns the implications of the study on the Netherlands-Indonesia Dialogue.



CHAPTER II

Secularization in the Netherlands

*“A shared living space for the
equally respected religious and
non-religious people”*

Introduction

At the beginning of every interview, interviewees were asked about their impression of the Netherlands concerning religion and social life. One of the most common responses was secularization in the Netherlands. In most interviews, the term “secular” came out spontaneously. When this occurred, interviewees were asked to give an example of the term. In some interviews, interviewees were deliberately asked their opinions on whether the Netherlands is a secular state or not and why they think so. This chapter explores how they speak about secularization, what they refer to, and the effect of the secularization discourse.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part is the analysis of discourse as linguistic practice. In this part, the focus is on the words and expressions used by interviewees. The second part is the analysis of discourse as discursive practice, with a focus on the references or the “members’ resources” of interviewees when they speak about secularization. The third part is the analysis of discourse as social practice, which focuses on the social conditions and effects of secularization discourse as shared by interviewees.

1. Analysis of discourse as linguistic practice

The first stage of the three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis, according to Fairclough (1992), is the linguistic analysis, also called the description stage. In this stage, vocabularies and phrases in the texts are examined, which include overwording, rewording, alternative wording, as well as grammar, including sentence features like active-passive, modality, and agency. The analytic question in this stage is: What words and expressions do discourse participants use when speaking about secularization in the Netherlands?

While several interviewees mentioned the term “secular”, others spoke about the decline of religion, the role of the state, and the attitude of Dutch people. Most described the Dutch as “atheist”, “rational”, “irreligious”, “agnostic”, “far from religious life”, and that they “do not have faith”, “do not need religion”, and “do not believe in God”. Several interviewees also spoke about Dutch religiosity and spirituality. These topics will be discussed in the following sections.

The Netherlands is a very secular state

Various interviewees spoke about the Netherlands as a secular state. Five interviewees, MM1, MM2, MM6, MW7, and PM1, gave definitions of the term secular. Interviewee MM2 told how he explained a secular state to his visiting wife while he was a student at Leiden. He said,

Text 2.1

I showed her [my wife] that the Netherlands is a very secular state. Secular means that the state has replaced religion almost in most aspects. In Indonesia, it is not [like that]. For example, [when] people get married, [the Dutch] do not need religion. If they have declared [that they] love each other, [they] just have to report it to the city hall to make it legal. [...] I also showed my wife that in Den Haag there is also a mosque. If we¹¹ [Muslims] want [to worship], [we] can. In that way, in my opinion, we [Muslims] become more religious in the Netherlands. Our faith has more quality because nobody imposes anything [to perform prayer] on us [Muslims].¹²

Interviewee MM2 mentioned the noun “state” two times (overwording) to emphasize its character as being secular and its role in replacing “religion”. The adverb “almost” implies that there are areas in which religion still plays a role. The negative sentence “in Indonesia it is not [like that]” implies two things: first, in Indonesia, the state has not replaced religion in most aspects, and second, in Indonesia, people “need” a religion to legalize marriage. The noun “city hall” is an alternative wording to the noun “state” to indicate its specific role in legalizing marriage in the Netherlands.

The text states that a Muslim can perform religious worship because mosques are available in the Netherlands, and practicing religion is an individual choice. The

¹¹ Bahasa Indonesia has two different forms of “we/us/our/ours”. They are defined as “kita” and “kami”. “Kita” (inclusive “we”) includes both speaker(s) and listener(s) while “kami” (exclusive “we”) excludes the listener(s). It is important to note that some Indonesians use both “kami” and “kita” loosely and interchangeably because they do not recognise the different meanings of the two pronouns. In an informal situation, “kita” (inclusive “we”) is used more often to express togetherness. Interviewees often used “kita” (inclusive “we”) although they pointed to an exclusive “we”. In this text, interviewee MM2 used “kita” (inclusive “we”) to refer to Muslims.

¹² Saya tunjukkan bahwa Belanda adalah negara yang sangat sekuler. Sekuler itu artinya bahwa negara hampir menggantikan agama dalam banyak hal. Kalau di Indonesia kan nggak. Contohnya apa, orang menikah itu nggak perlu agama. Mereka kalau udah menyatakan saling cinta itu ya udah terus harus lapor ke *gemenree* itu bisa sah kayak gitu. [...] Saya juga perlihatkan ke istri saya, di Den Haag juga ada masjid. Kalau kita mau [beribadah] bisa. Jadi justru dengan begitu, menurut saya, kita di Belanda itu menjadi jauh lebih beriman. Menjadi lebih berkualitas keimanan kita. Karena kita tidak perlu ada yang ngajak-ngajak. Interviewed on December 23, 2015.

phrase “nobody imposes anything [to perform prayer] on us [Muslims]” signifies that in Indonesia, there is social pressure to perform prayer. The phrases “we [Muslims] become more religious” and “our faith has more quality” are overwording to emphasize the effect of having the choice to practice religion without being imposed by other people.

The statement regarding the legality of marriage in the city hall in the Netherlands is also stated by seven interviewees, CM2, MM6, MW2, MW4, PM1, PM2, and PW4. When asked about the marriage procedure in the Netherlands, interviewee MW2 responded,

Text 2.2

Here [in the Netherlands], here is the law. The law is the most important and then the religion. In Indonesia, it is the religion and then the law [...] while here [in the Netherlands], well, church, but you must go first to the city hall. The city hall is higher.¹³

Interviewee MW2 mentioned “here [in the Netherlands]” three times (overwording) to emphasize that in the Netherlands, “the law” (overwording) is more important than “religion”. The noun “church” is an alternative wording to the noun “religion”. The noun “city hall” is an alternative wording to the noun “law”. The “city hall” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize its higher position in comparison to the “church”.

When asked to give an example of being secular, interviewee PM1 replied,

Text 2.3

Secular in the sense that they [Dutch people] have freedom. [The Dutch state] gives freedom to religion or the church to grow but it [the Dutch state] also does not encourage it to grow. [...] Therefore, secular, in my opinion, among the Dutch society here, is a shared living space for the equally respected religious people and non[-religious] people. Therefore, both [the religious people and the non-religious people] are respected and their existence is recognized. That is secularism here in the Netherlands in my opinion. [It is] secularism that recognizes the existence of groups within society and that recognition includes how each group listens to each other's opinions.¹⁴

¹³ Di sini, di sini tu, *wet*. *Wet* yang paling utama baru agama. Kalau di Indonesia kan, agama baru *wet* ya [...] kalau di sini yah, *church*, tapi kamu harus ke *gemeente* dulu. *Gemeente* yang *boven*. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

¹⁴ Sekuler dalam arti mereka punya kebebasan, Memberikan kebebasan kepada agama atau dalam arti gereja untuk tumbuh tetapi mereka pun juga tidak mendorongnya untuk tumbuh. [...] Jadi sekuler itu menurut aku, dalam artian, antara di masyarakat Belanda sini, yang beragama dan yang tidak itu punya

Interviewee PM1 mentioned the noun “freedom” twice (overwording) to emphasize the importance of “freedom” for Dutch people, concerning religion or the church. The conjunction “or” indicates the equation of “religion” and the “church”. The interviewee contrasted the actions of the Dutch state in giving “freedom to religion or the church to grow” while at the same time “does not encourage it to grow”. He also mentioned the verb “respect” twice, the verb “recognise” twice and the noun “recognition” once (overwording) to emphasize the Dutch state’s and Dutch people’s respect and recognition of religious and non-religious people. The term “secular” according to this interviewee is related to the “freedom” of religion and the church to grow, as well as “respect” for religious and non-religious people. The term “secularism” deals with the “recognition” of various groups within Dutch society, which includes the groups’ interaction in listening to each other’s opinions.

When asked if he thinks the Netherlands is a secular state, interviewee MM6 replied,

Text 2.4

I think so. Liberal¹⁵ secular. Secular [means that] the Dutch [state] has never questioned the establishment of a house of worship as long as it does not disturb public order. Usually, that [public order] is the consideration. Usually, the considerations of an establishment of a house of worship are matters of parking, perhaps environmental impact, including the surrounding environment, whether it would damage the housing area or the environment. Therefore, in my opinion, it is very secular because all the requirements [to establish a house of worship] are universal values. Universal values [such as] issues of order, security, health, etc. Therefore, as long as they [the requirements] are fulfilled, the Dutch [would say], “You are welcome to build a mosque”. Even in [a big city like] Utrecht, the mosque is located in the middle of the city, in the middle of the city centre, outside the train station. That would not be possible if the state is not a secular state. If the Netherlands is not a secular state [it would not be possible]. That is what I mean. Because before this, [the Netherlands] was a Christian [state]. I do not know Catholic or Protestant, but it was Christian. They [the Dutch] have experienced a period in which religion had too much interference in the state’s affairs, which resulted in a big impact. In the end, religion becomes a private affair. The state is managing public order issues.¹⁶

ruang hidup yang sama, yang sama-sama dihargai. Jadi dua-duanya dihargai ada, so dua-duanya diakui keberadaannya. Itu yang menurut aku sekularisme di Belanda sini. Jadi sekularisme yang mengakui keberadaan kelompok-kelompok yang ada di dalam masyarakat dan pengakuan itu juga sampai kepada bagaimana opini mereka juga didengarkan satu sama lain. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

¹⁵ In this chapter, the focus is on the use of the term “secular” only. The term “liberal” will be discussed in the next chapter.

¹⁶ *I think so. Liberal sekular. Sekuler itu Belanda itu tidak pernah memusingkan pendirian rumah ibadah*

Interviewee MM6's definition of "secular" concerning the state's role and the freedom of religion is close to the previous definitions of interviewees MM2 (Text 2.1) and PM1 (Text 2.3). Interviewee MM6 mentioned the phrase "universal values" twice (overwording) to emphasize the values used by the Dutch state in the establishment of a house of worship such as a mosque. He mentioned (public) order three times (overwording) to show that (public) order is a criterium to limit freedom of religion (to build a mosque). The adverb "even" in "even [in a big city like] Utrecht" indicates an emphasis on the surprising fact that the mosque in Utrecht is in the middle of the city. The phrases "in the middle of the city", "in the middle of the city centre", and "outside the train station" are overwording to emphasize the location of the mosque.

By contrasting the Netherlands as a secular state and the Netherlands as a Christian state, the interviewee implied that if the Netherlands is a Christian state, it would not be possible to build a mosque in the middle of a city centre. His usage of the phrase "a big impact" because of "too much interference in the state's affair" is not clarified. Nevertheless, the phrase correlates with "religion becomes a private affair". The text states that in a secular state, religion is a private affair. The establishment of a house of worship in a secular state is not a religious issue but a public order issue, and the requirements are not based on religious values but universal values.

Interviewee PM1 also spoke about the Netherlands as a former Christian state. When asked if the Netherlands is a religious country, PM1 replied,

selama itu tidak mengganggu *public order*. Biasanya itu yang jadi alasan. Biasanya masalah pendirian rumah ibadah itu urusannya adalah masalah parkir kemudian lingkungan, AMDAL (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan) mungkin ya, termasuk lingkungan sekitar apakah itu akan merusak tatanan perumahan atau lingkungan. Jadi menurut saya itu sekuler sekali karena itu yang diajukan syaratnya adalah nilai-nilai universal. *Universal values*. Masalah ketertiban kemudian masalah keamanan, masalah lingkungan, kesehatan dan lain-lain. Jadi selama itu terpenuhi maka Belanda, "Silahkan mendirikan masjid". Bahkan sekilas Utrecht itu kan masjidnya ada di tengah-tengah kota, di tengah *centrum*, keluar stasiun. Itu nggak mungkin ada jika negara itu bukan negara sekuler, kalau Belanda itu bukan negara sekuler. Itu maksud saya. Karena kan sebelumnya Kristen di sini. Saya nggak tahu Katolik atau Protestan ya tapi Kristen. Mereka telah mengalami masa di mana bahwa agama itu terlalu mencampuri negara itu kemudian imbasnya besar. Akhirnya kemudian agama udah milik privat. Yang negara atur adalah masalah *public order*nya. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

Text 2.5

Fifty years ago the Netherlands was still a Christian state in terms of percentage. The percentage of Dutch people who went to church at that time was more than 50%, almost 70% I think. Thus, at that time [...] the Netherlands was a religious state. However, looking at the situation now, [it is] not [a religious state].¹⁷

The phrases “a Christian state” and “a religious state” are overwording to emphasize that fifty years ago, church and state in the Netherlands were close. The nouns “percentage” and “percent” are overwording to emphasize that the Netherlands was a Christian state in terms of the percentage of people who went to the church.

While other interviewees labelled the Netherlands “very secular”, two interviewees, AM1 and MM1, considered the Netherlands “not fully secular”. When asked his opinion about tolerance in Indonesia and the Netherlands, interviewee MM1 said,

Text 2.6

I always tell my Dutch friends that in Indonesia, although we [Indonesia] [have] many Muslims, five religions¹⁸ are recognized and we celebrate all five religions' holy days. Many [Dutch friends] are surprised [to hear that] on the campus [where I work]. Here [in the Netherlands], it is not [like that]. Only Christmas is a public holiday. Other religions? Although they [the Dutch] say this is a secular state, the King officially belongs to a church, Christian. Official. The King is not allowed to have other religions. It has been [like that] since the Prussian era. That is what I have read. Yes, the government [is secular] but the kingdom is not. That is the difference. The government yes, the kingdom no. As a state yes, as a kingdom no. It is secular as a state [and] as a government. The government, the state, yes, it is secular but the kingdom and the king, the monarch? No. They have to be Christian.¹⁹

¹⁷ Lima puluh tahun yang lalu Belanda masih negara Kristen dalam artian prosentase, prosentase orang Belanda yang ke gereja itu melampaui 50% lebih, hampir 70% kalau menurut aku dulu waktu itu. Nah saat itu [...] Belanda adalah negara *religious*. Tapi kalau melihat situasi sekarang, tidak, menurut saya. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

¹⁸ MM1 mentioned “five religions”, which was the case for the period before 2000 when Confucianism was not recognized as an official religion in Indonesia. Confucianism was officially recognised as one of the sixth religions in Indonesia in the year 2000. However, later in the interview, MM1 revised his statement by mentioning six religions.

¹⁹ Saya selalu bilang ke teman-teman saya yang Belanda, di Indonesia walaupun kita tu banyak Muslim, tapi lima agama diakui dan kelima limanya hari besarnya kita rayakan. Banyak yang terkejut lho di kampus. Di sini nggak. Kan cuma Natal yang libur. Agama lain? Walaupun mereka mengatakan ini negara sekuler, raja itu secara *official* punya gereja, Kristen. *Official*. Nggak boleh raja punya agama

Interviewee MM1 contrasted “we [Indonesia] [have] many Muslims” and “five religions are recognized, and we celebrate all the five religions’ holy days”, with the Netherlands, where “only Christmas is a public holiday”. The second “although” in the text indicates a contrast between the Dutch state being secular and the Dutch King “officially belonging to a church”. The interviewee repeated this contrast several times (overwording) to emphasize that the Dutch state is secular but the kingdom of the Netherlands is “officially” Christian.

When asked whether religion is public or private in the Netherlands, interviewee MM1 replied,

Text 2.7

Answer (A): Private.

Question (Q): In Indonesia?

A: It should be private, but [struggling to find words] yeah, like what I said earlier if [a state is] secular, [state and religion are] really separated. Indonesia cannot be called fully secular. Even for me, I do not know if there is a state that is really secular because each state [in the world] still observes at least Christmas.

Q: Turkey and France for example?

A: But they [the Turkish] are observing Eid Al-Fitr. France, I do not know. They [the French] are observing Christmas. In my definition, when they [states] are still observing Christmas and a certain religion’s holy days, [the state] cannot be called secular because they [Christmas and a certain religion’s holy days] become public, right? They become public holidays.²⁰

The phrase “it should be private” is a statement with obligational normative modality (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 164, 171). It shows that in Indonesia, religion is not private.

lain. Itu kan udah dari jaman Prussia seperti itu. Itu yang saya baca. *The government yes, but the kingdom no. Itu dia bedanya mbak. The government yes, the kingdom no. As a state yes, as a kingdom no. Dia sekuler secara state, as a government. A state lah ya, the government. The government, the state, ya, dia sekuler, but the kingdom and the king, the monarch? No. Mereka harus Kristen.* Interviewed on May 13, 2015.

²⁰ Jawab (J): Privat.

Tanya (T): Di Indonesia?

J: Harusnya *private*, tapi [...] ya itu tadi [...] Kalau sekuler benar-benar dipisah gitu lho. Indonesia nggak bisa disebut sekuler, sepenuhnya. Bahkan kalau untuk aku, nggak tahu aku negara mana yang benar-benar sekuler karena setiap negara masih *observing Christmas* paling nggak.

T: Turki dan Perancis misalnya?

J: Tapi mereka *observing* Idul Fitri. Perancis aku nggak tahu. Mereka *observing Christmas*. Kalau menurut definisi aku, ketika mereka masih *observing Christmas* dan hari-hari besar agama tertentu, nggak bisa disebut sekuler. Karena itu jadi publik kan? Jadi *public holiday*. Interviewed on May 13, 2015.

The first adverb “really” is overwording to emphasize that state and religion are “separated” in a secular state, which Indonesia is not. The phrase “Indonesia cannot be called fully secular” indicates that Indonesia is secular to a certain extent. The phrases “really separated,” “fully secular,” and “really secular” are overwording to emphasize that secular means state and religion are separated. For MM1, no state in the world is “really secular”. MM1 went further by comparing the Netherlands and Indonesia on being secular.

Text 2.8

Geert Wilders once said that the culture of the Netherlands is influenced by Christianity and Judaism. That was what Geert Wilders said. I said [to my Dutch friends], you do not even celebrate Hanukkah. [You] do not make it a holiday. The Judaism that you and Geert acknowledged as a part of European culture, don't you question it? We [Indonesia], indeed, we are a secular state, but [we] recognize five religions, now six, including the Chinese [religion], Confucianism. All are celebrated, fair. Secular but it is fairer in my opinion. I said to my Dutch friends, we [Indonesians] are more tolerant in this matter than you are. You said [you are] secular. No [you are not] for that matter [celebrating religious holiday]. But regarding people, Dutch people are the same as Indonesian people. I do not know [about small cities], because I lived in Medan, Bandung, and Jakarta²¹. Regarding the culture of a big city, in my opinion, they [people in big cities in Indonesia and the Netherlands] are the same. But for the culture of a small city [in Indonesia], maybe not. We [Indonesians in small cities] are more communal. For big cities, I think Indonesia is as secular as the Netherlands. Big cities.²²

Interviewee MM1 spoke about different aspects of the secularity of the Netherlands in comparison to Indonesia. First, on a macro-level, both Indonesia and the Netherlands are secular states to a certain degree. Second, in terms of religious observances,

²¹ Medan, Bandung, and Jakarta are among the largest cities in Indonesia.

²² Geert Wilders pernah ngomong kalau budaya Belanda itu terpengaruh oleh Kristen dan Yahudi. Itu kata Geert Wilders. Aku bilang Hanukkah aja kamu nggak rayakan. Nggak bikin hari libur. Itu Yahudi yang kamu, yang Geert akuin sebagai bagian dari budaya Eropa, nggak kalian tanyakan? Kami, emang kami negara sekuler, tapi mengakui lima agama, sekarang enam. Masuk Cina, Confucian itu. Semuanya dirayakan, adil. Sekuler, tapi ini lebih adil menurutku, aku bilang sama temen-temen orang Belanda. Kami itu lebih toleran untuk hal ini, gitu loh. Daripada kalian. Kalian ngomongnya sekuler. Enggak. Untuk hal itu, tapi orang-orangnya, sama aja dengan orang Indonesia. Aku nggak tahu ya karena aku tinggal di Medan, di Bandung, di Jakarta. Untuk kultur kota besar menurutku sama, gitu loh. Tapi untuk kultur kota kecil itu mungkin enggak. Lebih communal kita. Untuk kota besar aku pikir Indonesia sama sekularnya dengan ini dengan Belanda. Kota besar. Interviewed on May 13, 2015.

Indonesia “is secular but fairer” and “more tolerant” than the Netherlands because the Dutch “do not even celebrate Hanukkah” while Indonesia acknowledges six official religions and celebrates their holy days. He mentioned “Geert Wilders”, leader of the Dutch right-wing *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom [PVV])²³, three times (overwording) to emphasize Wilders’ statement on the culture of the Netherlands and Europe (alternative wording) that is influenced by Christianity and Judaism. Third, on a micro-level, only Indonesians in big cities are secular. He mentioned “big city” three times (overwording) to emphasize that Indonesian people in big cities are as secular as the Dutch. He contrasted it with Indonesians in small cities, who are “more communal”.

The text mentions that being secular, i.e. people in big cities in Indonesia, is the opposite of being communal, i.e. people in small cities. In this case, being secular correlates with being individualistic. The fact that Indonesian people in small cities are not secular confirms his previous statement (Text 2.7) that Indonesia “cannot be called fully secular”.

When asked to describe his impression of the Netherlands when he first arrived, interviewee AM1 said,

Text 2.9

A: There was a bit of a surprise for me when I began meeting with religious people in the Netherlands. People who have maintained religious identity. I am not sure if they are spiritually religious, but they are definitely culturally religious. Many Catholics were outspoken, in the sense that, you know, when we talk about religion to them, they will openly say that they believe in God. What was so surprising for me was that quite a number of them were university lecturers, who have a very strong position on their religious values and their religious views. [...] and I have met some students who were also religious. [...] So that was a bit of a revelation for me, the fact that it is not as secular as I thought it would be. And then, of course, knowing about the Bible Belt, which includes Katwijk and these other places.

Q: Did it change your perception [about the Netherlands]?

A: Well, it is still vastly secular I think and most people that I have met were either irreligious or actually adamantly atheists so it is part of the diversity. I mean, I think you would probably find it anywhere, right? In Sweden or other Scandinavian countries that are very atheistic. So probably, there are going to be quite significant numbers of minorities of people who still believe in religion.²⁴

²³ <https://www.pvv.nl/>

²⁴ This is an original quote. The interviewee used English. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

For interviewee AM1, the Netherlands is “not as secular” as he thought it would be because he met “religious people” and there is “the Bible Belt, which includes Katwijk and other places”²⁵. The phrases “a bit of a surprise”, “so surprising for me” and “a bit of a revelation” are overwording to emphasize the interviewee’s surprise at the fact that there are “significant numbers of minorities of people who still believe in religion” including university lecturers, students and people in the Bible Belt area. The interviewee mentioned the adjective “religious” seven times (overwording) to emphasize the existence of religious people in the Netherlands. He classified being religious as “spiritually religious” and “culturally religious”. He used alternative wordings to identify “religious people”. They are “people who have maintained religious identity”, people who “believe in God”, people who have “a very strong position on their religious values and religious views”, and “people who still believe in religion”.

For interviewee AM1, the Netherlands is “still vastly secular”, explaining that he mostly met “irreligious people” and “adamant atheists”. He equated the Netherlands with “Sweden” and “other Scandinavian countries” for being “very atheistic” (overwording) with “quite a significant number of minorities of people who still believe in religion”. The text indicates that there is a small minority of religious people in secular Dutch society.

When asked if she thinks the Netherlands is a secular state, interviewee MW7 replied,

Text 2.10

A: Secular. Because they [the Dutch] separate religion from other matters. Separate. It [separation] is not like Indonesia. [In Indonesia], religion is number one in people’s lives. It is not like that here [in the Netherlands]. Religion [in the Netherlands] is like when it is needed. How to put this? Well, it is not something that is very primary in the Netherlands.

Q: Some say that religion cannot go hand in hand with modernity in European countries, but in Indonesia, it happens. It is possible. In your view, is it possible [in the Netherlands]?

A: No. Because of the contradiction. The principle views from the religious side [or] religious opinions are very contradictory to modernization. That is what I think. In my view, it seems that it is difficult [for religion and modernity to go hand in hand] in the Netherlands.

²⁵ The “Bible Belt” in the Netherlands is characterized by the presence of conservative orthodox Calvinist Protestants communities located in the Province of Zeeland, the Province of Gelderland, the Province of South Holland, the Province of Overijssel, the city of Urk in the Flevoland Province, and the municipality of Dantumadiel in the Province of Friesland.

Q: *Can a person be religious and modern at the same time?*

A: *[He/she] can. Like the people in Indonesia. [They are] religious in a way that you do all the rituals. However, to be religious like Indonesians, who still go to church every Sunday, pray five times a day, and do all kinds of things, is difficult [for the Dutch] in the Netherlands.*²⁶

Interviewee MW7 identified the term “secular” as a separation of religion from other matters in the Netherlands. She contrasted it with Indonesia, where religion is “number one in people’s lives”. The phrases “religion is like when it is needed” and “it is not very primary in the Netherlands” are overwording to emphasize that religion in the Netherlands is not prioritized in Dutch people’s lives. The noun “contradiction” and the adjective “contradictory” are overwording to emphasize her opinion that it is difficult for religion and modernity to go hand in hand in the Netherlands because they are in contradiction with one another (macro-level of discourse). She indicated that a person can be religious and modern at the same time in the case of Indonesians (micro-level of discourse). She implied that being religious like Indonesians, in the sense of doing all the rituals, is difficult for the Dutch. The text implies that in the Netherlands, religion and modernity are incompatible, and it is difficult for a Dutch person to be religious-in terms of doing all the rituals-and modern at the same time.

When asked if she has met any Dutch people who are religious and whether they are as religious as Indonesians, MW7 replied,

Text 2.11

[Religious people in Indonesia and the Netherlands] are almost the same. My husband’s colleague [a Dutchman] is a very religious person. A Protestant. His children go to Sunday school. The children were taught the Bible stories [about] Noah and Jesus. The names of his children are Noah and Joshua. He is like that because that was how he was brought up by his [Dutch] parents. And he still

²⁶ J: Sekuler. Karena mereka kepisah urusan agama dan yang lain. Kepisah. Mereka nggak kayak di Indonesia kan agama jadi nomor satu dalam kehidupan mereka. Itu kan nggak juga di sini. Agama itu kayak semacam *waneer het nodig is*. Gimana ya. Ya nggak jadi primer bangetlah di Belanda.

T: Ada yang bilang bilang *religion and modernity* itu tidak bisa berjalan beriringan di negara-negara Eropa, tapi di Indonesia itu terjadi. Itu bisa. Kalau di pandanganmu itu bisa nggak?

J: Nggak. Karena kontradiksi, *principële opvattingen van religieuze kant*, pendapat-pendapat religious itu kontradiktif sekali dengan modernisasi. Menurut aku begitu. Yang aku lihat kayaknya kalau di Belanda susah.

T: Bisakah seseorang itu religius dan modern pada saat yang sama?

J: Bisa. Ya itu kayak orang di Indonesia. *Religious in a way that you do all the rituals*. Kalau *religiousnya* seperti orang Indonesia yang masih ke gereja setiap hari minggu, yang masih sholat lima kali sehari segala macam itu di Belanda susah. Interviewed on March 24, 2019.

*follows the mindset of his parents. But even though he is religious, he is modern. It is contradictory to what I said earlier.*²⁷

The phrase “very religious” (overwording) is equated to the fact that the children of her husband’s colleague go to Sunday school, are taught the Bible stories [about] Noah and Jesus, and are named Noah and Joshua. She indicated that the case of her husband’s colleague, who is “very religious” and “modern”, contradicts her previous statement (Text 2.10) about the incompatibility of religion and modernity in the Netherlands. The text implies a connection between the religiosity of the man with how he was brought up by his parents.

Many churches are empty

In speaking about secularization in the Netherlands, various interviewees pointed out the decline of religion, particularly Christian practices. When asked about his experience as a student in Leiden, interviewee MM2 stated that in the second semester of their studies, Indonesian Muslim students would have found “their own niche in the secular world in Leiden”. When asked if he thinks Leiden is secular, he replied, “Yes. Yes. Formally. Even though there are churches, many churches are empty. The ones that have attendance are mosques, right?”²⁸ The adverb “formally” indicates the state of Leiden of being a secular city which can be seen from the many empty churches. Interviewee MM2 contrasted the empty churches with the mosque’s attendance, which indicates that Leiden is formally secular in terms of the decline of Christianity.

Another interviewee, NM1, spoke about the city of Amsterdam. When asked whether he thinks that the Dutch are secular, he replied,

Text 2.12

Yes, overall, especially in Amsterdam. Amsterdam is very [secular], well, they [the Dutch] still get together during Christmas but when I lived at the student house, I rarely saw [my] Dutch friends go to church on Sunday. None. Young

²⁷ Hampir sama. Koleganya suaminya orang *religious* banget. Kristen Protestan. Dia anaknya masih ke *Sunday school*. Anak-anaknya diajarin cerita *Bible*, Noah, Jesus. Nama anaknya pun Noah dan Joshua. Dan kenapa dia begitu karena dia dididiknya begitu sama orang tuanya. Dan dia itu masih ngikutin pola pikirnya orang tuanya. Tapi dia pun walaupun dia *religious* ya modern. Kontradiktif juga ya sama yang aku bilang tadi. Interviewed on March 24, 2019.

²⁸ J: Semester berikutnya kita sudah, *find their own niche* di *secular world* di Leiden.

T: *Do you think Leiden is secular?*

J: Yah. Ya dong. *Formally*. Meskipun ada gereja, tapi kan banyak gereja yang kosong. Yang isi itu justru masjid-masjid. Ya toh? Interviewed on December 23, 2015.

*people do not go to church but for sure they go home for Christmas because [it is] a family gathering, so that is different. Thus, young Dutch people are secular in terms of religious ideology. That is secular.*²⁹

Interviewee NM1 overworded “overall, especially” to emphasize that the city of Amsterdam is secular. He contrasted the fact that Dutch people still get together during Christmas and that young people do not go to church. He repeated the phrase “young people” (overwording) to emphasize that young people in the Netherlands “are secular in terms of religious ideology”. In this case, “religious ideology” is part of the Christian Christmas tradition, however, the holiday is not celebrated by young Dutch for its religious meaning. It is celebrated for a secular reason, which is a family gathering.

Three interviewees, CW1, MW1, and PM1, mentioned the decline in church attendance by pointing out that some Dutch people only go to church once a year for Christmas. Interviewee MW1, who is married to an Indo-Dutchman, said that the family of her husband “are still Catholic” but “they only go to church once a year for Christmas”.³⁰ When asked about her experience in going to church during Christmas, interviewee CW1 replied, “During Christmas [the church is] very full. Very full. Many Dutch people. But probably they just [do] it for formality because other than that they never come again [to church]”.³¹

Interviewee CW1 repeated the phrase “very full” twice (overwording) to emphasize how full the church is with Dutch people during Christmas. The adverb “probably” implies a possibility of “formality” as the reason why many Dutch people go to church during Christmas. The noun “formality” indicates that going to church for Christmas is the only religious practice that many Dutch people still do as Christians.

When asked about her impression of religious life in the Netherlands, CW1 said, “[The Dutch] do not have faith. They [the Dutch] do not [have faith]. All my [Dutch] ex-boyfriends do not have religion. [They] do not believe in God”.³² The interviewee

²⁹ Ya secara keseluruhan ya, khususnya di Amsterdam. Amsterdam sangat, yah, mereka tetap berkumpul saat natal, tetapi selama aku di *student house* itu ya, jarang aku lihat teman-teman Belanda pada hari Minggu pergi ke gereja itu ya, nggak ada. Anak-anak muda itu kan nggak pergi ke gereja. Tapi tetap kalau mereka natal itu pasti pulang karena kumpul keluarga. Itu jadi beda. Jadi anak-anak Belanda itu sekuler dalam hal ideologi keagamaan. Itu sekuler. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

³⁰ Mereka masih Katolik cuma ke gerejanya hanya setahun sekali, waktu natal. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

³¹ Kalau *Christmas* gitu, waduh penuh banget. Penuh banget. Orang Belandanya banyak. Tapi mereka hanya ini doang, formalitas doang kali yah karena selebihnya mereka nggak pernah datang lagi. Interviewed on May 11, 2016.

³² Nggak punya iman. Mereka itu nggak. Mantan pacar-pacarku semua itu tidak ada yang punya agama. Tidak percaya Tuhan. Interviewed on May 11, 2016.

alternated the word “faith” with “religion” and “believe in God” to emphasize the absence of religion and the belief in God among Dutch people.

When asked his impression of religious life in the Netherlands, interviewee CM1 replied,

Text 2.13

Actually, Europe lost all religions. All churches are dead. Why? The church is too conservative, and people feel more independent [and] private. The priests are too conservative. Secondly, there are many influences from Eastern spirituality such as yoga, Zen, Dao, et cetera. Now there are various types. Therefore, many people from India came here to teach yoga or I don't know what kind of spirituality. Hundreds of them [people from India] come here [to the Netherlands] and they [people from India] attract Dutch people because they [Dutch people] have lost their grip on the church. The church [in the Netherlands] is too dogmatic and does not give life grip in [people's] hearts. They [churches] do not provide a spiritual grip but only command dogma and the priests are conservative. [People are] not allowed to use a condom, not allowed to live together [without being married], not allowed to do this, to do that. Young Dutch people ignore that. They [young Dutch people] like to get together, to get together, and so forth. The church is too conservative, [the church] does not follow the current development of young people.³³

Interviewee CM1 mentioned the adjective “conservative” four times (overwording) and the adjective “dogmatic” (alternative wording) to emphasize that both the church and the priests do “not follow the current development of young people”, which resulted in the death of the churches in Europe. He defined being conservative as “giving commanding dogma” such as “not allowing people to use a condom and to live together [without being married]”. These things are “ignored”, particularly by

³³ Sebetulnya Eropa kehilangan semua agama. Gereja semua mati. Karena apa? Gereja terlalu kolot dan orang tambah merasa merdeka, pribadi, dan pastornya terlalu kolot, sehingga banyak orang, dan kedua, banyak pengaruh dari spiritualitas dari Timur. Yoga, zen dan sebagainya, dao, dan banyak sekarang aliran macam-macam. *Dus*, banyak orang dari India, yang datang di sini untuk mengajar yoga atau ndak tahu spiritualitas apa saja. Ratusan ke sini dan itu menarik orang Belanda karena mereka kehilangan pegangan gereja. Gereja terlalu dogmatis dan tidak memberi pegangan hidup dalam hati. *Dus* mereka tidak memberi pegangan spirituil tapi hanya komando dogma saja. Dan pastornya kolot, tidak boleh, tidak boleh pakai kondom, tidak boleh hidup bersama, tidak boleh ini, tidak boleh itu. Anak-anak muda ndak gubris. Mereka suka kumpul, kumpul bersama dan sebagainya. *Dus* gereja terlalu kolot, tidak mengikuti perkembangan jaman untuk anak muda. Interviewed on November 7, 2017.

young people. He also mentioned that “people feel more independent [and] private”³⁴ and, therefore, act contrary to the conservative character of the church. This text shows an individualistic notion in the sense that young Dutch people do not like to be told what to do. It corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM2, who said that for some Dutch people, “religion is considered curbing” their freedom³⁵. This text (Text 2.13) also corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.10) on the contradiction between religious opinion and modernization.

Interviewee CM1 mentioned the noun “spirituality” three times (overwording) to emphasize the influence of “Eastern spirituality” that attracted Dutch people and the fact that the churches do not provide “a spiritual grip” “in people’s hearts”. The noun “spirituality” also contrasts “religions, which are considered “lost” in Europe. This text states that “Eastern spirituality” is compatible with the “independent” and “private” character of the Dutch, particularly young people, as opposed to the church that “does not follow the current development of young people” and, therefore, has “lost their grip on the church”.

When asked whether the Dutch are religious, interviewee PM1 replied,

Text 2.14

If we look at it from the percentage of their [Dutch people's] church attendance, yes, now more [people] do not go to church. More than 60% [of the Dutch population] do not go to church and indeed, it can be proven statistically. There is proof. Yes, [60% do not go to church] or [they] do not belong to any religious institution. But in my opinion, we cannot necessarily conclude that they [Dutch people] are irreligious. No. Most [Dutch people] are irreligious? No. In my opinion, they [Dutch people] have another religiosity, that needs to be investigated. Religiosity in a secular context, secularism like in the Netherlands.³⁶

³⁴ Topic of being independent and private will be discussed more in Chapter IV.

³⁵ Asked “What do you think about religion in the Netherlands?”, interviewee CM2 said: They [the Dutch] actually do not hate religion but they [the Dutch] are afraid and lazy [to perform religious rituals], in my opinion. They actually want to believe [in religions] but are unable [to do it] logically. On the other hand, [they are] often lazy [to perform religious rituals]. [For some Dutch people], religion is considered curbing [their freedom]. However, many of my native Dutch friends are religious. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

³⁶ Kalau kita melihat dari prosentase kehadiran mereka di gereja, ya sekarang ini lebih banyak yang tidak ke gereja. Lebih dari 60% yang tidak ke gereja dan itu memang secara statistik sudah bisa dibuktikan. Ada itu pembuktiannya. Ya, atau tidak, tidak terikat dengan institusi keagamaan manapun. Tetapi itu pun menurut aku tidak serta merta kita bisa menyimpulkan bahwa mereka itu tidak beragama. *Nee*. Sebagian besar tidak beragama? *Nee*. Menurut aku mereka itu punya relijiusitas yang lain, yang perlu diselidiki. Relijiusitas di konteks sekular, sekularisme seperti di

The interviewee mentioned the verb “proven” and the noun “proof” (overwording) to emphasize that there are statistical records of the number of people who do not go to church in the Netherlands. He contrasted the statements “more than 60% of the Dutch population do not go to church” or “do not belong to any religious institution” with the statement “they [Dutch people] are irreligious” to indicate a difference between “belong to a religious institution” with “religiosity”. The text implies that there is an ambiguity of religiosity and secularity in the Dutch society, which “needs to be investigated”.

When asked about religiosity in a secular context, interviewee PM1 said,

Text 2.15

I have a different definition of religiosity. Using the idea of Grace Davie, believing does not mean belonging, but there is also believing that is also belonging as, probably a measurement of perhaps what people say as the actual diversity. Although I do not completely agree with Grace Davie's opinion, it [the concept of believing without belonging] helps to see, to describe the situation in the Netherlands, that here in the Netherlands there are many believing and not belonging. However, I also doubt it because possibly, there is also a fact that states that here [in the Netherlands], there is no believing and there is no belonging. Or the believing is on other things, not a matter of religions, but their believing is [that] they have other spirituality. This is rather difficult to explain.³⁷

Interviewee PM1 mentioned the name “Grace Davie” twice (overwording), the term “believing” six times (overwording) and “belonging” four times (overwording) to emphasize the concept of believing without belonging that can help to describe the situation in the Netherlands. The text indicates a correlation between “believing” and “other spirituality”.

When asked if someone can be modern and religious at the same time, interviewee CM2 replied,

Belanda ini. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

³⁷ Aku punya definisi lain dari relijiusitas. Menggunakan pendapatnya Grace Davie tadi itu, yah *believing* itu belum tentu *belonging*, tapi ada juga yang *believing* dan juga *belonging* sebagai mungkin ukuran yang mungkin orang bilang itulah keberagamaan yang sebenarnya. Walaupun aku tidak setuju sepenuhnya dengan pendapat Grace Davie ini tapi menurut aku itu membantu untuk melihat, mendeskripsikan situasi yang ada di Belanda sini. Bahwa di Belanda sini lebih banyak *believing and not belonging*. Tetapi, aku sangsi juga karena kemungkinan juga ada, juga ada kenyataan yang menyatakan bahwa di sini itu tidak ada *believing* dan tidak ada *belonging*. Jadi bisa jadi, atau mereka *believingnya* itu di hal yang lain. Bukan masalah agama-agama tapi *believingnya* mereka itu, mereka punya spiritualitas yang lain begitu. Nah ini agak susah untuk dijelaskan. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

Text 2.16

A: Yes, he/she can. In my opinion, religion is a belief and there is a term called a moral compass, ethical compass, moral compass, or moral character. That is what guides humans and I think it is good, and there is a community for that. But [people] must not forget that it is just a belief. It cannot be considered or applied literally. [People] can take the good things from it.

Q: So, a person can be religious and modern.

A: Yes.

Q: What if a person is not religious and modern? Does that mean the person has no moral compass?

A: More or less [he/she does not have a moral compass], in my observations. I do not know [how to explain] why non-religious people have a different moral compass from religious people. Of course, people who are atheists or not religious are similar to me and you. He also has feelings [and] he also has manners, but I think sometimes it leads more to social competence. So, he does not do something because it is not considered good by society. That is the definition of ethics or morals, right? What is not considered good by society should not be done. But a religious person is more, how to say it, transcendental, more than that. Sometimes the feeling of love, especially of the Christians, is still a little higher. For Muslims, it is a different story. [For the Muslims], it is more [about] obedience to God, to Allah. Oh, Allah said this, so I do this. The Christians are more about love, in my opinion. Good people, the Dutch, especially those who are Protestants, will not lie. They will not deceive other people because indeed, it is not allowed. I put my thumbs up for that. But I see that for non-religious people, that is not a problem.³⁸

³⁸ T: Bisakah orang menjadi modern dan beragama pada saat yang sama?

J: Ya, bisa. Menurut saya agama itu kan kepercayaan dan ada istilahnya moral kompas. Kompas etika, kompas moral atau akhlak. Itu kan yang membimbing manusia dan menurut saya itu baik, ada komunitasnya. Tetapi jangan lupa bahwa itu hanya kepercayaan. Tidak bisa dianggap, diterapkan secara harafiah. Diambil baiknya saja.

T: Jadi orang bisa beragama dan modern.

J: Ya.

T: Bagaimana kalau orang itu tidak beragama dan modern? Apakah itu artinya tidak ada moral kompasnya?

J: Lebih kurang menurut pengamatan saya. Entah kenapa orang yang tidak beragama itu moral kompasnya berbeda dengan orang yang beragama. Tentu orang yang ateis atau tidak beragama itu mirip dengan saya sama anda. Dia juga punya perasaan, dia juga punya sopan santun tetapi menurut saya kadang-kadang itu lebih menjurus ke kompetensi sosial. Jadi dia tidak melakukan sesuatu karena itu tidak dianggap baik oleh masyarakat. Sebenarnya memang itu kan definisi etika atau moral? Apa yang tidak dianggap baik oleh masyarakat jangan dilakukan. Tetapi kalau orang yang beragama itu lebih, apa ya, transedental, lebih di atas itu. Kadang-kadang itu rasa kasihnya itu masih agak lebih tinggi lah terutama orang yang beragama Kristen lah, nasrani. Kalau yang

Interviewee CM2 equated religion with a belief and connected it with “a moral compass”. The phrases “ethical compass”, “moral compass”, and “moral character” are overwording to emphasize that humans are guided by a moral compass. He indicated a caution that religion as a belief “cannot be considered or applied literally”. The interviewee indicated a difference in the moral compass of religious and non-religious people. He said that atheists or non-religious persons “are similar to you and me”, but their actions are based on “social competence”, which he distinguished from “transcendental”. The difference with a religious person is that a religious person, particularly a Christian, has a higher feeling of love. The interviewee distinguished the Christians from the Muslims. The Christians are “more about love” whereas the Muslims are “more about obedience to God”. The nouns “God” and “Allah” are overwording to emphasize that the Muslims are obedient to what “Allah said”. He also contrasted good Dutch Protestants, who will not lie because it is not allowed, with non-religious people, who do not have a problem lying.

We don't talk about religion

Interviewees were asked if they talk about religion with Dutch people. While some of them replied yes, in a particular context (at home, in a church or mosque, or at work with their Christian or Muslim colleagues), most interviewees stated that in the Netherlands people “do not talk” about religion because it is a “private matter”. When asked if he speaks about religion with his Dutch friends, interviewee MM2 replied,

Text 2.17

For [my] Dutch friends, religious matters are perhaps not too interesting. That is the sociology. Except when he or she is someone who studies theology or something [like that], perhaps [he or she] will ask more. But when I played badminton or did other [activities] [with my Dutch friends], it was very rarely that we spoke about religion. First, because the young generation of Dutch people is already very secular, they do not want to talk about it. It is not an interesting subject to talk about. It is your business, like that. Or maybe because it is their way of, I do not know, it is part of a personal matter. Privacy. [We] never [talked about religion]. Therefore, no questions on whether you are a Muslim or not.³⁹

beragama Islam itu lain lagi, lain cerita. Itu lebih menurut ke Tuhan ke Allah. O, Allah bilang begini ya saya begini. Tapi yang Kristen itu lebih ke kasihnya itu menurut saya. Orang yang baik, orang Belanda terutama yang beragama Kristen Protestan itu mereka tidak mau bohong. Menipu orang itu mereka tidak mau karena memang itu tidak boleh. Itu jadi itu saya acungi jempol. Tetapi kalau orang yang tidak beragama itu tidak bermasalah itu saya lihat. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

³⁹ Teman-teman Belanda itu persoalan agama mungkin nggak terlalu menarik bagi mereka. Itu sosiologisnya. Kecuali kalau dia seorang yang belajar tentang teolog atau apa, mungkin akan tanya lebih banyak. Tapi selama saya di badminton atau apa jarang sekali ngobrol tentang agama tentang

The phrases “it is not too interesting”, “they do not want to talk about it”, “it is your business”, and “it is part of personal matter” are alternative wording to emphasize that religion is a private matter and the Dutch, particularly young people, are “already very secular” in that they “very rarely” talk about religion. The text indicates an exception that people who find religion an interesting subject to talk about are those “who study theology or something like that”.

When asked whether religion is private or public, interviewee MM3 compares Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Text 2.18

In Indonesia, religion is public and majority. Thus, religion belongs to the majority. The minority has a very small space. While in the Netherlands, it is private. Thus, religion is within an individual's body, but the values are public. The values are cross-country. Here [in Indonesia], [people] want to bring religion to the public.⁴⁰

Interviewee MM3 mentioned the noun “majority” twice (overwording) to emphasize that in Indonesia, religion, in this case, Islam, is a public matter and belongs to the Muslim majority. He indicated a contrast between “religion is within an individual's body” and “the values are public”. He alternated “the values are public” with “the values are cross-country” to emphasize the scope of “religious values”. This text implies a distinction between the private character of “religion” within an individual's body and “religious values”, which are public matters.

Interviewee MW2 also indicated that religion in Indonesia is public. When asked about the difference between life in Indonesia and the Netherlands, she replied, “In Indonesia, our life is based on religion” while “life [in the Netherlands] is not based on religion”. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.10) that in Indonesia, “religion is number one in the people's lives” whereas in the Netherlands “it is not something that is very primary”. Interviewee MW2 then

apa kayak gitu. Saya kira itu. Pertama karena generasi muda Belanda kan sudah sangat sekuler jadi mereka tidak mau membicarakan itu. Itu bukan soal yang menarik untuk dibicarakan. *It's your business* gitu kan. E, atau, mungkin juga karena itu cara mereka, apa nggak tahu, itu bagian dari pribadi lah. *Privacy*. Nggak pernah. Jadi nggak bertanya-tanya apa kamu Muslim apa bukan kayak gitu. Interviewed on December 23, 2015.

⁴⁰ Di Indonesia agama itu publik dan mayoritas. Jadi agama punya mayoritas. Yang minoritas sedikit sekali ruangnya. Sementara di Belanda itu *private*. Jadi agama itu ada di dalam tubuh orang sendiri-sendiri, tapi nilainya publik. Nilainya lintas negara. Kalau di sini kan agama ingin dibawa ke publik. Interviewed on December 27, 2015.

quoted the statement of Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), the former Governor of Jakarta, on the purpose of putting religion on the Indonesian identity card or *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP). She said,

Text 2.19

It is reasonable that Ahok said that. [Ahok said], “What is the purpose of putting religion [on the identity card]?” For what? Well, they [Indonesians] said that if [someone] dies, no one would know [his or her religion to determine the funeral rites]. Well, [that person] has relatives. He or she has neighbours [therefore, the relatives or neighbours would know the person’s religion].⁴¹

Interviewee MW2 indicated her agreement with Ahok about not putting religion on the Indonesian identity card. She contrasted her opinion with the opinion of the Indonesian people. The fact that religion is stated on the Indonesian identity card implies that religion in Indonesia is public.

When asked whether the Dutch are religious, interviewee MM5 answered,

Text 2.20

There are religious [people]. I have neighbours, old people. Both of them diligently go to church on Sundays. A man and a woman. Well, for young people [in the Netherlands], you can see it for yourself [that they are not religious] but not all of them [are not religious]. There are some [religious young people too]. That depends on their parents. However, for them [Dutch people], indeed, religion is a private matter. The schools here [in the Netherlands] do not have what [Indonesian] people call the religious school. There is none. If [anyone] would like to learn about religion, they call [a teacher] on their own initiative, private.⁴²

The text implies that there are Dutch people who are religious, particularly old people. In the case of young people in the Netherlands, being religious “depends on the parents”. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.11) about a man who is religious because he was brought up by his parents to be religious.

⁴¹ Wajar kalau Ahok bilang gitu. Buat apa dicantumkan agama? Buat apa gitu loh? Kan kata mereka kalau meninggal nggak ada yang tahu. Lho kan dia punya saudara, dia punya tetangga. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

⁴² Yang *religious* ada. Kebetulan saya juga punya tetangga, orang tua-tua tapi, dua-duanya minggu itu rajin ke gereja. Laki-perempuan. Ya kalau yang muda-muda ya seperti mbak lihat sendiri gitu. Tapi nggak semuanya. Mereka juga ada. Itu tergantung dari orang tuanya. Tapi mereka itu memang kalau agama itu urusan pribadi. Di sekolah sini nggak ada istilahnya sekolah agama, ndak ada. Kalau umpamanya mau belajar agama mereka panggil sendiri, privat. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

Interviewee MM5 gave an example of religion as a private matter in the absence of “what [Indonesian] people call religious schools”⁴³ and on the fact that if one would like to learn about religion in the Netherlands, he or she can do it in private.⁴⁴

When asked his opinion on Dutch people’s acceptance of religious people in the Netherlands, interviewee PM1 responded,

Text 2.21

*Oh, they [Dutch people] do not prohibit people to have religion here in the Netherlands. And in my opinion, indeed, that is all because of the Dutch law, which is quite, very clear that religion is a private matter and everyone has the right to adhere to a religion, the right not to adhere to a religion, the right to be an atheist, or choose his or her own way. It does not matter.*⁴⁵

The text shows a relationship between the freedom of religion and Dutch law in the Netherlands. The noun “right” is repeated three times (overwording) to emphasize the rights and freedom everyone has in the Netherlands to choose his or her own way, which is protected by the law.

Interviewee MW7 mentioned that the Netherlands is a modern country. When asked to give an example of how modern the Netherlands is, she replied,

Text 2.22

[The Dutch are modern] in their mindset. [For example], sexual education. It [sexual education] has been taught [to children] since the age of 8 at school.

⁴³ Religious education is a compulsory subject in every Indonesian school. In the context of Islam, Indonesia has Islamic educational institutions known as *Madrasah* (Islamic School), *Pesantren* (Islamic Boarding School), which are under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and, *Sekolah Islam* (Islam School), which has its religious education curricula, and therefore, is under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Outside of formal school, there are Islamic classes, usually run by local mosques, to teach children to read the Quran in Arabic, which is called *Taman Pendidikan Al Qur'an* (Quranic Education Center, TPA) or *Taman Pendidikan Qur'an* (TPQ).

⁴⁴ Based on the statements of at least two other interviewees, MW2 (Text 3.31) and MM6 (footnote 127), this is the case for most Indonesian Muslim parents in the Netherlands who do not send their children to an Islamic school. They assign a religious teacher to teach their children at home. In the last sentence of the text, “If [anyone] would like to learn about religion, they call [a teacher] on their initiative, private”, interviewee MM5 did not specify the subjects (anyone and they). I can only assume he referred to the Indonesian Muslim community.

⁴⁵ Oh mereka tidak melarang orang-orang untuk beragama di sini, di Belanda. Dan menurut aku memang itu semua dikarenakan hukum Belanda yang cukup jelas sekali bahwa agama adalah hal pribadi dan setiap orang berhak untuk beragama, berhak juga untuk tidak beragama, berhak juga untuk menjadi atheis, atau memilih jalannya sendiri-sendiri, ndak apa-apa. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

In Indonesia, do they teach elementary school children in grade four [about sexual education]? [In the Netherlands], at least they [school children] have been informed that a baby comes from papa's sperm, which enters mama's egg. In the context of religion, for example, an 18-year-old girl may suddenly come home wearing a headscarf while her parents are agnostic. Even though I know the Dutch parents must be in shock that their daughter wants to convert to Islam, the parents would be ok with that. Or vice versa, for example, the [Dutch] parents are very religious, and suddenly their child no longer wants to deal with religion. That is ok. There is no need to force the child. So, I think the [Dutch] mindset is already open, more modern. In Indonesia, in social life, you have to think about what other people say, what religion says.⁴⁶

Interviewee MW7 mentioned the noun “mindset” twice (overwording) to emphasize that the Dutch are “open” and “modern”. She compared the Netherlands to Indonesia in the context of sex education at school, and parents’ acceptance of their children’s choice to be religious or not. The text states that being “modern” equals having an open mindset. For example, in sexual education and having individual freedom to be religious or not.

When asked if she talks about religion with Dutch people, interviewee MW2 responded,

Text 2.23

Here [in the Netherlands], [we] are not supposed to ask [about] religion. That is private. [We] cannot [ask about it]. [We are] not free. Well, how to put it, we cannot discuss religion with people. It is something that can cause emotion but well, I also do not tell [people about my religion]. [...] That [religion] is my business. In the Netherlands, the saying is niet mee bemoeien (do not interfere). Do not bemoeien (interfere).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ T: Kamu tadi sebut Belanda itu modern. Bisa kamu beri contoh bagaimana modernnya Belanda?

J: Di pola pikirnya. Seperti pendidikan seksual. Itu dari umur 8 tahun di sekolah sudah diajarin. Di Indonesia anak SD kelas 4 emang udah diajarin? Paling nggak mereka udah dikasih tahu anak bayi itu datangnya dari spermanya papa masuk ke telornya mama. Dalam bidang agama. Misalnya anak udah usia 18 tahun tahu-tahu pulang-pulang udah pakai jilbab padahal orang tuanya agnostik misalnya. Walaupun aku tahu si orang tuanya itu pasti shock, si orang tua Belandanya ini bahwa anaknya mau masuk Islam, mereka ya *it's ok*. Atau sebaliknya, misalnya orang tuanya sangat beragama, tahu-tahu anaknya sama sekali nggak mau tahu urusan agama, *it's ok*. Nggak usah dipaksain. Jadi menurut aku pola pikirnya sudah *open*, lebih modern. Kayak di Indonesia yang harus dengan mikirin apa kata orang, kehidupan sosialnya, apa kata agama. Interviewed on March 24, 2019.

⁴⁷ Kalau di sini, bertanya agama itu tidak boleh. Itu privat. Nggak bisa. Nggak bebas. Gimana ya, kita nggak bisa diskusi masalah agama sama orang. Itu sesuatu yang bisa menimbulkan emosi, tapi ya, saya juga nggak ngasih tahu [agama saya]. [...] [Agama] itu urusan saya. Kalau di Belanda dibilang

Interviewee MW2 used inclusive “we” (*kita*) to indicate everyone in the Netherlands. The negative phrases “not supposed to”, “cannot [ask about it]”, “not free”, “cannot discuss religion with people”, and “*niet mee bemoeien*” are alternative wording to emphasize that people cannot ask about religion. The negative verbs “cannot” and “not supposed to” indicate a normative statement with obligational normative modality (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 164, 171; 2013, p. 269). The negative adjective “not free” indicates a limit to the freedom of speaking about religion, which is confined to a private sphere.

The text gives two reasons why people cannot talk or ask about religion in the Netherlands. First, because it is “private” and second, because “it is something that can cause emotion”. The latter is more of a consequence if people do not follow the norm. Interviewee MW2 adapted to the norm by choosing not to tell people about her religion because it is her business. Comparing the statement of interviewee PM1 (Text 2.21) to interviewee MW2 (Text 2.23), it shows that according to them, people in the Netherlands are free to have a religion (or not), but they are not free to talk about it.

When asked if anyone made comments about her wearing a headscarf for the first time, interviewee MW1 replied,

Text 2.24

I went to the place of my client. She said, “Why do you make yourself ridiculous? You make yourself ridiculous”. And I said, “Why ridiculous? It is my personal [business]. Whether you judge it is good or not is up to you. It is not my business with you. It is my business with God”. [My client said it] because I am wearing a headscarf. For me, what is important is [that] my husband said [it is] good. Other people? ‘t Kan me niet schelen (I don’t care), [I] don’t care.’⁴⁸

Interviewee MW1 mentioned the noun “business” twice (overwording) to emphasize that wearing a headscarf is her business with God. The phrase “it is up to you” and “I don’t care” are overwording to emphasize that she does not care what other people think about her wearing a headscarf because it is not their business. This text corresponds to the previous text (2.23) that religion is private, and people are not supposed to interfere in this matter.

niet mee bemoeien. *Jangan bemoeien*. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

⁴⁸ Saya kan pergi ke tempat klien. Dia bilang, “Kenapa kamu membikin diri *belachelijk*? *Je self belachelijk maken*”. Terus saya bilang, “Kenapa *belachelijk*? Ini pribadiku. Kamu menilai bagus of tidak itu terserah kamu. Itu bukan urusan saya dengan kamu. Itu urusan saya dengan Tuhan”. Karena saya pakai jilbab. Buat saya, yang penting suami saya bilang bagus. Orang lain? ‘*t Kan me niet schelen*, nggak peduli. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

When asked if he speaks about religion with his colleagues, interviewee CM1, who is a priest and a university professor in business studies, replied,

Text 2.25

A: Here [on the campus], I should not mention God. If I mention God [they would say], “You are out”. I would get kicked out of the field of business because a business does not recognize God. In the international management model of organization, the word God is taboo. So, if you speak about God, you are not a businessman anymore.

Q: Can you speak about spirituality?

A: That’s possible. That’s possible. Because spirituality is not religion. Spirituality is what I call *zingeving*. *Zingeving* is meaningfulness. It’s meaningfulness. What is the meaningfulness of your job? Meaningfulness is not the same as religion. Everyone [at the university] knows I am a Jesuit, but I have never spoken about God. [...] In the church, it is different. Although here [at the university] there are also many Catholics, they [the Catholics at the university] never speak about religion in this environment. When they [the Catholics at the university] meet me, [we meet] as businessmen, never about religion.⁴⁹

Interviewee CM1 mentioned “God” six times (overwording) to stress that in his work environment as a professor, he “should not mention God”. Similar to the statement of interviewee MW2 (Text 2.23), this text also implies obligational normative modality (Fairclough, 2013, p. 269). In this case, if he does not follow the norm, he would bear the consequence of being “kicked out” of his job. The interviewee emphasized the field of business as a secular sphere by stating that “the word God is taboo” in the field of business. He contrasted the possibility of conversations about “God” with conversations about “spirituality”, which he equated with the Dutch word “*zingeving*” (giving meaning) that he translated into “meaningfulness” (overwording).

The text shows a difference between “spirituality” or “meaningfulness” and “God” or “religion”. The first two terms belong to a secular sphere (university and business

⁴⁹ J: Di sini [kampus] jangan saya sebut Tuhan. Kalau saya sebut Tuhan, *you are out, kicked out* di bidang bisnis. Karena bisnis tidak kenal istilah Tuhan. In the international management, model of organization, the word God is taboo. So, if you speak about God, you are not anymore a businessman.

T: But you can speak about spirituality.

J: That’s possible. That’s possible. Because spirituality is not religion. Spirituality is what I call *zingeving*. Itu *zingeving* is meaningfulness. It’s meaningfulness. What is the meaningfulness of your job? Meaningfulness is not the same as religion. Semua orang tahu saya Jesuit tapi saya ndak pernah bicara tentang Allah. [...] Di gereja lain. Biar pun di sini banyak orang Katolik juga, tapi mereka ndak pernah bicarakan agama di lingkungan ini. Kalau mereka menghadapi saya sebagai *businessmen*, tidak pernah tentang agama. Interviewed on November 7, 2017.

field) and, therefore, they are possible to be talked about while the latter belongs to a religious sphere (church). This text confirms text 2.23 regarding the limitations of speaking about religion, which can only be done in a private, in this case, a religious sphere.

They use logic

When asked about their interaction with Dutch people regarding religion and religious practice, several interviewees, particularly the religious interviewees, replied with stories about the challenge of explaining their religious position to “irreligious” people, who use “their logic”. When asked if he, as a Muslim, speaks about religion with Dutch people, interviewee MM4 replied,

Text 2.26

It is often troublesome when I have to explain. For Dutch people, it does not make sense that we [Muslims] have to pray five times a day at already specified times. They [the Dutch] asked, “Why do you have to do that?” That was the thing I always had to explain. I have my faith in my religion with my heart whereas they [the Dutch] use logic. Therefore, even when I explain it as best as I could, they sometimes [say], “Oh, that does not make sense in our logic. How long can you work then? Why do you have to go back and forth to pray like that?” [That is] because they are far from religious life or [far from] having faith in a particular religion.⁵⁰

Interviewee MM4 mentioned the verb “explain” three times (overwording) to emphasize his difficulty in explaining why he must pray five times a day. The phrases “my faith,” “my religion”, and “my heart”, the location of his faith, are alternative wording, which drives his religious practice (praying five times a day). He contrasted “my heart” and “their logic” to indicate why his religious practice “does not make sense” (mentioned twice) to the Dutch. He also implied that the questions the Dutch people ask him are caused by their distance from religious life and the absence of faith. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM2 who said that the Dutch “want to believe [in religions] but are unable [to do it] logically” (see footnote 35).

⁵⁰ Seringkali saya yang repot itu menjelaskan. Bagi orang Belanda kan tidak masuk akal ketika kita harus berdoa selama lima kali sehari dalam jam-jam yang sudah ditentukan. Bagi mereka, ngapain mesti kamu harus kayak gitu? Itu yang harus selalu saya jelaskan padahal saya meyakini agama saya itu dari sudut pandang hati, mereka pakainya logika, jadi kadang saya menjelaskan sebagai apapun kadang mereka “O, itu nggak masuk dalam logika kami. Terus kamu harus kerja berapa lama? Ngapain kamu harus bolak-balik berdoa kayak gitu itu”. Karena mereka kan yah, jauh lah dari kehidupan agama atau berkeyakinan terhadap suatu agama tertentu. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

Interviewee MW4, who is married to a Dutchman, also spoke about “logic”.

Text. 2.27

Q: Do you talk about religion with your husband?

A: It is because of [my] husband [that my] journey, from the diversity in Indonesia, that prioritizes practice, prioritizes actions, deeds, but the inner core is rather neglected [...] Because of [my] husband, my journey is deeper. [We talked about] creation, evolution, all of that. [We talked about] why do you perform shalat (prayer)? Why do I fast? Why is it like that? [It is] from, from deeper, what do you call it, theology.

Q: So, you had that discussion with your husband. What is his opinion?

A: Oh, he is an engineer, therefore, [he uses] logic. But indeed, logic cannot [unfinished sentence]. Logic and reason, and revelation. [They] cannot meet. There are certain things that religion is about belief but it does not necessarily [unfinished sentence] if we do not know the explanation.⁵¹

Interviewee MW4 mentioned “[my] husband” twice (overwording) to emphasize the importance of her husband to her “deeper journey” in practicing religion. The nouns “practice,” “actions,” and “deeds” are overwording to stress what the Indonesians prioritize when dealing with religion. The adverb “rather” indicates that the “inner core” of religion in Indonesia is being neglected to a certain extent. The interviewee implied that her discussion with her husband on the “inner core” of religion contributes to her “deeper journey”. She equated “deeper” discussions about the “inner core” of religion as “theology”.

The noun “logic”, repeated twice (overwording) and the noun “reason” are alternative wording. MW4 contrasted them (“logic and reason”) with “revelation”. She tried to clarify her statement in an incomplete sentence by stating that “religion is about belief” without further clarification. Nevertheless, she indicated the importance of knowing the explanation of religion as a belief. The nouns “religion” and “belief” can be seen as alternative words to the noun “revelation”, which “cannot meet” with “logic” and “reason”.

⁵¹ T: Do you talk about religion dengan suami?

J: Dari suamilah saya itu, *journey* ya, dari keberagaman di Indonesia yang, yang kayak mengutamakan *practice*, mengutamakan amalan-amalan, perbuatan gitu ya, tapi *inner core*-nya agak di *neglected* gitu ya. [...] Dari suamilah saya itu, *journey* saya itu lebih dalam. Dari *creation*, dari *evolution*, dari semuanya. Kenapa kamu shalat, kenapa saya puasa, kenapa begitu. Dari, dari *deeper* apa ya *theology* gitu.

T: So, you had that discussion with your husband. Kalau pendapat dia apa?

J: Oh dia kan insinyur ya, jadi *logic*. Tapi memang *logic* nggak bisa, *logic* sama apa namanya *reason* and *revelation*, you can't meet somewhere. Jadi *there are certain things that religion is about belief*. Tapi *it does not necessarily* [incomplete sentence] kalo kita nggak tahu jawabannya.

When asked what kind of talk about religion she and her husband did, interviewee MW4 replied,

Text 2.28

He [my husband] knows Hellenistic philosophy. It is from him [my husband] that I learned philosophy. His perspective is very Aristotelean, whereas my [perspective] is very Ghazalean. [...] Al Ghazali is the revival of the [unfinished sentence]. If there is no Quran, there is no hadith⁵² in the world. Al Ghazali's book is the port for you to guide you. Al Ghazali. He is the proof of religion.⁵³

Interviewee MW4 mentioned Al Ghazali, an 11th-century Persian philosopher and theologian of Islam, four times (overwording) to emphasize the importance of Al Ghazali, who influenced her perspective on religion. This perspective is different from her husband, whose perspective is “very Aristotelean”. She implied that the book of Al Ghazali is as important as the Quran and the *hadith*.

When asked about her interaction with Dutch people when it comes to her religious practice, interviewee MW4 said,

Text 2.29

It seems [to Dutch people] that I'm holding to a big daddy in the sky. No, it is not. No, it is not. Because people here [say], “Oh you are praying to the big daddy in the sky”. [I say], “That is your concept. It is not mine. That is not my world”. Indeed, the deeper you learn about religion, the easier for you to explain. [When I can explain], they [the Dutch] have their respect [for me]. [They say], “Oh, you are doing it as a conviction. You are not doing it by birth”. Before I met my husband, I was a Muslim by birth and now I can say to them [the Dutch], “I'm a Muslim by conviction, with consciousness”. [I am] happy [that] they [the Dutch] also appreciate, respect [me]. So, it is easy for them [the Dutch] to ask [me] something [related to religion or religious practice] because it is not just about Islam. Religion here has tarnished. [The Dutch say], “We don't need religion”. Very secular. [The Dutch say] “We don't need religion”.⁵⁴

⁵² *Hadith* is an Islamic term referring to the record of the words and actions of the prophet Muhammad.

⁵³ Dia [suami] tahu Hellenistic philosophy. Dari dialah saya ini belajar philosophy. Soalnya pandangan dia itu Aristoteles banget gitu. Terus akunya Al Ghazali banget gitu. [...] *Al Ghazali is the revival of the [...] if there is no Al Qur'an, there is no hadith in the world, Al Ghazali's book is the port for you to guide you. Al Ghazali. He is the* [unfinished sentence]. *The proof of religion*. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

⁵⁴ *It seems like I'm holding to a big daddy in the sky. No, it's not. No, it's not. Soalnya kan orang sini, “Oh you are praying to the big daddy in the sky.” That is your concept. It's not mine. That's not my world. Memang, the deeper you learn about religion, the easier for you to explain. Mereka juga ada respect. “Oh, you are doing it this conviction. You are not doing it by birth.” Sebelum aku ketemu suami, I was a Muslim by birth. And now I can say to them I'm a Muslim by conviction. Dengan kesadaran. Tapi seneng, mereka juga*

The phrases “big daddy in the sky” and “no it is not” are mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize that the concept of praying to a big daddy in the sky belongs to the Dutch and not to her, MW4. She repeated the notion of “deeper” in learning religion as stated in text 2.28, which makes it easier for her to “explain” her position as a religious person. Her ability “to explain” her religious position is equal to “being a Muslim by conviction, with consciousness”. The text makes a contrast between being a Muslim “by birth” and “by conviction” (mentioned twice, overwording). The text implies that being “very secular” is related to the fact that “religion has tarnished” and the people “do not need religion”.

For many interviewees, talking about “faith” is not only challenging with irreligious Dutch people but also with their children, who were born and educated in the Netherlands. Four Muslim interviewees, MM4, MM6, MW4, and MW6, and two Christian interviewees, CW2 and PM1, pointed out that to be “successful” in giving their children a religious education, Indonesian parents in the Netherlands have to do it “with Dutch-style”, “with strong arguments” because “parents have to be rational” when educating children in the Netherlands. Interviewee MW4 said that she “has to be a step ahead” of her children because her children “go to school in the Netherlands” and ask questions such as “Why do you pray? Why do you worship God? Why do you believe in God? Is there a God?”⁵⁵ Interviewee CW2 stated that “providing a definition” to children “who have reached puberty” is difficult for parents because the children “have their thoughts, ideas and principles”, “become rational”, and “refuse to go the church”.⁵⁶

Yet, their attitude is very religious

While saying that the Netherlands is secular and Dutch people do not speak about religion, various interviewees also pointed out that the “attitude” and “the values”

appreciate, respect gitu ya. Jadi mereka, apa ya, easy, kayak nanya sesuatu jadi easy. Soalnya bukan hanya Islam, religion di sini itu tarnish gitu. We don't need religion. Sekular banget gitu. We don't need religion. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

⁵⁵ Asked “Do you speak about religion with your [Dutch] husband and children?”, interviewee MW4 said: Because you have to know why are you doing certain things? Why do you pray? Why do you worship God? Why do you believe in God? Is there a God? [...] My children think like that. They [my children] go to school here [in the Netherlands]. I have to be a step ahead of my children. I must explain things like natural law [and] supreme law [to my children]. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

⁵⁶ Asked “Is it difficult to educate children in the Netherlands?”, interviewee CW2 replied: When the children are in puberty, they start to have their thoughts, ideas, and principles. That is difficult [for the parents]. The difficulty is in providing a definition. [The children asked], “What is the definition of doing good things? What is the definition of practicing religion? Why do you need to practice religion when you do good things every day? Why do you have to go to the church every Sunday when you have done good things every day?” That is the difficulty. Interviewed on November 17, 2019.

of Dutch people are “religious”. When asked if he thinks Dutch people are secular, interviewee NM1 answered,

Text 2.30

It [their religious ideology] is secular. Their [young Dutch people's] view has probably been separated from religious paradigm or discourse, yet, their attitude is very religious in terms of [the] attitude towards other people. Thus, if you hit each other in a traffic accident or unintentionally crash with each other on the street, they would definitely apologize to each other. I think that is a religious attitude, which may have stepped out from religious discourse but in fact, it shows an attitude or a value, a value that is taught by religion. However, we [my Dutch friends and I] do not directly speak about religion.⁵⁷

Interviewee NM1 contrasted the “secular view” of young Dutch people with “their attitude”, which is “very religious”. The adjective “attitude” is mentioned four times (overwording) to emphasize that young Dutch people’s attitude is very religious. He equated “religious paradigm” with “religious discourse” (overwording) and distinguished them from “religious attitude” and “religious value”. The act of apologizing to each other, according to the interviewee, is an example of a religious attitude or religious value.

When asked whether she thinks there are religious values in the Dutch people’s daily life, interviewee PW3 responded,

Text 2.31

In my opinion yes, indeed, they [the Dutch] have religious values. For example, on the bus, old people and pregnant women are prioritized. Things like that. That is a religious value, that, in my opinion, no longer exists in our hometown in Jakarta. In the busway [in Jakarta], they [Indonesians] are indeed indifferent. [Indonesians] even pretend to sleep [when they see old people or pregnant women on the bus], whereas the people here [in the Netherlands], immediately when they see a person, who looks older than 65 or 70, people are going to stand up and that [old] person will have the seat. Things like that still happen a lot [in the Netherlands].⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Itu sekuler. Pandangannya itu sudah mungkin lepas dari paradigma atau wacana-wacana agama tetapi berlakunya sangat religius dalam arti apa, dalam arti sikap terhadap orang lain gitu ya. Jadi kalau kamu secara nggak sengaja tabrakan atau apa itu senggolan di jalan itu pasti mereka sama-sama minta maaf. Menurutku itu sifat religius yang mungkin sudah keluar dari *discourse* agama tapi itu justru menampilkan suatu sikap atau nilai, nilai yang diajarkan oleh agama. Tapi kan kalau kita bicara langsung mengenai agama, nggak. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

⁵⁸ Kalau aku bilang ya memang mereka punya *religious value* ya, yang maksudnya yang Kalau misalnya

Interviewee PW3 mentioned the phrase “religious values” twice (overwording) to emphasize her answer that the Dutch do have religious values. She contrasted the attitude of people in Jakarta with people in the Netherlands. The text implies that the Dutch have religious values, while in Indonesia, especially in Jakarta, they “no longer exist”.

Interviewee MM3 said that the Dutch are “actually religious” and associated it with “religious values”. When asked about his impression of religious life in the Netherlands, he answered,

Text 2.32

Their [the Dutch's] religiosity is already beyond their religion. Religion is already embedded in the institutions, in the sense of only the values. The policies are based on religious values, for example, security, tolerance [and] freedom. Those are values in religion. Yeah, universal. Islam, Christianity, all have tolerance. The freedom for everyone. Respecting everyone. And then social security. For example, they care about poor people, et cetera. That is not only religion but [also] the state. I see that those universal values have entered the state's structure. The values. Therefore, when they [the Dutch] make rules, when they make laws, when they make policies, that are related to society, the citizens, they are actually religious. Those are the goals of religions like Islam, Christianity, and so forth.⁵⁹

The phrase “beyond their religion” is clarified by the phrase “religion is already embedded in the institutions”. Throughout the text, interviewee MM3 mentioned the noun “values” five times (overwording) to emphasize the importance of religious values as the basis of Dutch policies. The nouns “policies,” “rules” and “laws” are

naik bis, orang tua dan ibu-ibu hamil yang didahulukan. Yang kayak-kayak gitu. *That is religious values* yang menurutku malah udah nggak ada di kampung kita sendiri di Jakarta. Kalau di busway emang mereka ya cuek-cuek aja, malah pura-pura tidur lagi. Kalau mereka di sini, *immediately if they saw a person like older than 65 or 70, immediately people going to stand and that person (is) going to have that seat*. Yang kayak-kayak gitu masih, masih banyak. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

⁵⁹ Relijiusitas mereka itu sudah *beyond their religion*. *Religion* itu sudah masuk institusi, dalam pengertian, nilai-nilainya saja. Dari kebijakan itu sebenarnya berdasarkan sebetulnya pada nilai-nilai *religion* misalnya *security*, toleransi, kebebasan. Itu kan sebenarnya itu kan nilai-nilai dalam agama. Yah, universal. Islam, Kristen, ada toleransi semua. Kebebasan semua. Menghargai semua. Terus *social security*. Misalnya peduli terhadap orang miskin dan sebagainya. Itu kan ndak hanya agama, tapi negara. Saya melihat bahwa nilai-nilai universal itu sudah masuk dalam struktur negara. Nilainya. Jadi ketika dia membuat aturan, ketika dia membuat undang-undang. Ketika mereka membuat kebijakan yang berkaitan dengan masyarakat, dengan warga negara, itu malah *religious* itu sebetulnya. Itu kan yang dicita-citakan agama-agama kayak Islam, Kristen dan sebagainya. Interviewed on December 27, 2015.

alternative wording to emphasize that Dutch policies, rules, and laws are based on religious values. The interviewee alternated and equated “religious values” with “universal values”. The text implies that universal values exist in every religion. Examples of universal values are social security, tolerance, freedom, respect and caring for poor people, which are “the goals of religions”. When asked to clarify his statement about the religiosity of Dutch people, he responded,

Text 2.33

A: I do not judge Dutch people for not being religious because they never go to church. That is because their religious practice is already beyond ritual. [It is] already more than mere ritual. They [the Dutch] have practiced it in their daily life on how to be a religious person. Sometimes it is not based on religious awareness, but because of their obedience to rules. Being obedient to rules is religious teaching. Therefore, I keep considering the Netherlands as [a] very religious [country].

Q: Not secular?

A: Not secular. Wrong. No, I don't think so. The Netherlands is very religious in the sense of how they [the Dutch] are practicing the values of Christianity, the values of religions in general.⁶⁰

Interviewee MM3 distinguished between “being religious” and going to the church as an act of practicing religious rituals. To him, being religious is “more than a mere ritual” or “beyond ritual” (overwording). This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.10) who indicated that for Dutch people to be religious in the Indonesian way—in the sense of doing all the rituals—is difficult. The statement of interviewee MM3 also corresponds to the statement of interviewee PM1 (Text 2.14) about the distinction between “not going to church” and “being irreligious”.

The phrase “obedience to rules” (mentioned twice, overwording) as part of religious teaching corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM2 (Text 2.16), “[for the Muslims], it is more [about] obedience to God, to Allah”. Both interviewees emphasized “obedience” as part of the religious moral compass (CM2, Text 2.16) and

⁶⁰ J: Saya tidak menjudge orang Belanda itu tidak *religious* gara-gara nggak pernah ke gereja. Itu karena cara beragama mereka sudah *beyond ritual*. Sudah lebih dari sekedar ritual. Mereka sudah mempraktekkannya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari sebagai orang beragama itu seperti apa. Kadang itu bukan didasari oleh kesadaran *religious*, tapi karena ketaatan mereka terhadap aturan. Taat terhadap aturan itu ajaran agama. Jadi saya tetap menganggap Belanda sangat *religious*.

T: Not secular?

J: Not secular. Salah. No. I don't think so. Belanda is very religious in the sense of how they are practicing the values of Christianity, the values of religion as a whole. Interviewed on December 27, 2015.

religious teaching (MM3, Text 2.33). While interviewee CM2 pointed to “God/Allah”, interviewee MM3 pointed to “rules”.

Interviewee MM3 also emphasized that “the Netherlands is very religious”, a statement he repeated twice (overwording) while stating that it is “wrong” to call the Netherlands a secular country. He alternated the values of “Christianity” with the values of “religions in general” to emphasize the values of religions that are practiced in the Netherlands. The text implies a difference between practicing religious rituals and practicing religious values.

Later in the interview, MM3 spoke about “a poll about the most Islamic countries in the world” and said that the Netherlands, together with other “Western, Christian countries” are on the first list “because the meaning of an Islamic country is a country that implements Islamic values”. He continued,

Text 2.34

In fact, countries like Indonesia and Arab countries are not on the list. Yes, they [the Dutch] are religious. I think that is why the poll put these countries [Western, Christian countries], including the Netherlands, as winners because they have practiced [religious values] in all matters. If you see the religiosity of a nation from its ritual, then maybe you will put India [and] Indonesia as the most religious countries because there are many religious rituals. But in practice, countries that practice religious values the most are countries like those [in the list of the poll]. [That is] my opinion.⁶¹

Interviewee MM3 contrasted “Indonesia” and “Arab” with “Western, Christian” countries, including the Netherlands, in terms of their practice of religious values, in this case, Islamic values. Referring to the difference between practicing religious rituals and practicing religious values (Text 2.33), MM3 distinguished India and Indonesia as being religious in terms of “religious ritual” from “the Western, Christian countries”,

⁶¹ Makannya kan ada *poll* negara paling Islamic di dunia itu misalnya. Malah yang ada di urutan pertama negara-negara Kristen, negara barat. Justru negara-negara di. Ada *poll*, *the most Islamic country in the world*, malah yangurut-urutan pertama kayak Belanda itu malah di urutan [...] Lho kenapa? Karena, yang dimaksud *Islamic country* adalah negara yang menerapkan nilai-nilai Islam. Nah malah negara Indonesia, negara Arab segala itu malah nggak masuk dalam urutan [...] Yes, they (the Dutch) are religious. I think that's why the poll memenangkan negara-negara ini, termasuk Belanda ini karena mereka sudah mempraktekkan dalam segala hal. Kalau kamu melihat religiusitas suatu bangsa itu dari ritualnya ya mungkin kamu akan menempatkan India, Indonesia, itu negara paling religius karena banyak ritual *religious*. Tapi kalau dalam praktek, negara yang paling banyak mempraktekkan nilai-nilai keagamaan ya negara-negara seperti itu. Menurutku lho. Interviewed on December 27, 2015.

that practice “religious values”. Five interviewees, MM4, MM5, MM6, MW2, and MW4 shared similar opinions in viewing “Islamic values” in the Netherlands.

When asked about the poll that put Western countries as being Islamic, interviewee MM6 replied,

Text 2.35

[The poll was] rated based on the cleanliness and the welfare of the state. Islam has universal values that are agreed upon by all. For example, we agree that cleanliness is good. All religions agree. All non-religious people agree. It is called universal values. Universal values. Universal values have become the concept of welfare states. Unfortunately, it does not happen in countries that are predominantly Muslim because everyone accumulates wealth.⁶²

This text corresponds to text 2.32 about universal values and text 2.33 about the values of religions in general. Interviewee MM6 also contrasted universal values as “the concept of welfare states” with the absence of universal values “in countries that are predominantly Muslim because everyone accumulates wealth”. This text implies that countries that are predominantly Muslim do not practice “universal values” or “religious values”, which confirms the statement in text 2.34 about Indonesia and Arab countries that do not implement “Islamic values”.

When asked to explain the Islamic concept of a welfare state, interviewee MM6 replied,

Text 2.36

Our [Islamic] concept is baldatun thayyibatun wa robbun ghofur, [which means] a country that is prosperous, good, safe, and forgiven by God because the people have faith. That is the concept of a welfare state in the Quran. In my opinion, the Netherlands is already baldatun thayyibatun. [It means] that [the Dutch state] ensures retirement and health insurance. The concept is very Islamic because it is qana'ah. Qana'ah means having sufficient [life]. It means that the [Dutch] government regulates how its society has sufficient food to eat, free education for children, and health and retirement are guaranteed. No elderly people are suffering [in the sense] that they have to work in their old

⁶² Dari kebersihan, dari *welfare statenya* itu. Itu penilaiannya dari situ, dari *universal value*. Islam punya satu nilai-nilai universal yang semua setuju. Misalnya kita setuju kebersihan itu baik. Semua agama setuju, semua orang yang tidak beragama pun setuju. Itu namanya nilai-nilai universal. *Universal values*. [...] Nilai-nilai universal ini sudah jadi konsep negara *welfare state*. Sayangnya tidak berjalan di negara-negara yang mayoritas Islam karena semuanya menumpuk kekayaan. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

age. That is the concept of a *madani* (civil) state. In Islam, there is the concept of *zakat al-mal*. *Zakat* (alms) of wealth. That is 2.5% of the wealth that we have after a certain period, for example, a year. If we collect that, it can cover [the cost of] education, health and retirement. In the time of the Prophet, it was [done by a financial institution] called *baitul mal* (house of treasury). In my opinion, this is implemented by welfare states such as the Netherlands, even with a higher percentage because the tax [in the Netherlands] is 40%. In the Netherlands, they tax nearly 40% of our salary. That is the concept of a welfare state. In that context, even Islam does not require up to 40% tax. Only 2.5%.⁶³

The phrase “*baldatun thayyibatun*” indicates that the Netherlands is a welfare state because it is “prosperous, good, [and] safe”. Interviewee MM6 implied that the Netherlands is not “*wa robbun ghofur*”, which he described as a country that is “forgiven by God because the people have faith”. He equated the Dutch government’s policy on education, health, and retirement with the concept of *qana’ah*, which he described as having sufficient life. He also equated the Dutch government’s tax rule with the Islamic concept of *zakat al-mal* (alms of wealth), which was done by the house of the treasury (*baitul mal*). The text implies that several Islamic concepts are in line with the Netherlands as a welfare state.

Three Muslim interviewees, MM4, MM5, and MW4, stated that the Dutch are “Islamic”. Throughout the interview, interviewee MM5 mentioned the phrase “*rukun-rukun Islam*” (the pillars of Islam) seventeen times (overwording) to emphasize that he found the pillars of Islam in the Netherlands. When asked his impression of living in the Netherlands, MM5 replied,

⁶³ Kalau konsep kita itu kan *baldatun thayyibatun wa robbun ghofur*. Jadi negara yang sejahtera, baik, aman kemudian diampuni Tuhan karena masyarakatnya beriman. Konsep negara sejahtera itu begitu di dalam Al Qur’an itu. Belanda ini menurut saya sudah *baldatun thayyibatun*. Bahwa pensiunan terjamin kemudian asuransi kesehatan terjamin dan konsepnya sangat Islami karena *qana’ah* ya, *qana’ah* itu artinya berkecukupan. Jadi pemerintah mengatur bagaimana masyarakat itu cukup untuk makan, anak sekolah gratis, kesehatan ok, pensiunan terjamin. Tidak ada orang tua yang sengsara, harus bekerja ketika tua. Itu adalah konsep negara *madani*. Di Islam itu ada konsep namanya *zakat al-mal*. Zakat harta. Itu 2,5% dari harta yang kita miliki setelah dalam jangka periode tertentu misalnya setahun, kita punya harta kemudian kita harus mengeluarkan dari itu. Nah itu, itu kalau dikumpulkan itu bisa menutupi pendidikan, kesehatan, pensiunan. Itu namanya *baitul mal*, waktu konsepnya jaman nabi. Itu menurut saya diterapkan oleh negara-negara *welfare state* seperti di Belanda. Bahkan dengan prosentasi yang lebih tinggi karena mereka pajaknya 40%. Hampir 40% dari gaji kita di Belanda. Itu adalah konsep *welfare state* dan itu Islam tidak mensyaratkan sampai 40%. Hanya 2,5%. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

Text 2.37

I learn a lot about Islam, [about] the pillars of Islam, in a country that never knows Islam. But they [the pillars of Islam] exist. The pillars of Islam exist here instead of in Islamic countries. I mean, yes, I am a Muslim. I was born into a Muslim family, but I found the true, real pillars of Islam in the Netherlands. For example, being on time exists in Islam. Keeping things clean also exists in Islam. Taking care of the environment also exists in Islam. Taking care of other people's feelings exists in Islam and keeping other people's rights and honour also exists in Islam. It [keeping other people's rights and honour] happens in the Netherlands. I mean, [people] do not roddelen (gossiping), [people] do not [tell other people], "You have to do this, you have to do that". No. Whereas in an Islamic country, people scoff at each other, claiming themselves as being the best. Islam is not like that. But here [in the Netherlands], it is very real for me. I learn, really, I, actually, I am closer to Allah in this non-Muslim country. I really feel that [closer to Allah] here. [People] are helping each other. Here [in the Netherlands], the people seem indifferent, but their sense of humanity is high. That exists in Islam.⁶⁴

The phrase "the pillars of Islam exist here instead of in Islamic countries" corresponds to the statements of interviewees MM3 (Text 2.34) and MM6 (Text 2.35) on the fact that predominantly Muslim countries, such as Indonesia and Arab countries, do not implement Islamic values. The text implies the presence of Islamic attitudes in the Netherlands. They are "being on time", "keeping things clean", "taking care of the environment", "taking care of other people's feelings", "keeping other people's rights and honour", "not gossiping", "not commanding", and "helping each other".

Interviewee MM5 repeated the phrase "I feel closer to Allah" (overwording) to emphasize what he felt upon finding the pillars of Islam in a non-Muslim country. He contrasted the phrase "people seem indifferent" with the phrase "their sense

⁶⁴ Saya banyak belajar Islam, rukun-rukun Islami di negara yang tidak pernah mengenal Islam. Tapi ada. Rukun-rukun Islaminya ada di sini. Daripada di negara Islam sendiri. Saya orang Islam, saya dilahirkan sebagai keluarga Islam, tapi rukun-rukun Islami yang benar-benar nyata saya temukan di negara Belanda ini. Ya misalnya, tepat waktu, itu ada di Islam. Jaga kebersihan itu juga ada di Islam. Menjaga lingkungan itu juga ada di Islam. Menjaga perasaan orang lain itu ada di Islam dan menjaga hak-hak asasi dan kehormatan orang lain itu juga ada di Islam. Yang ada di Belanda ini. Gitu. Dalam artian itu tidak *roddelen*, tidak meng [...] istilahnya itu eh, kamu harus begini, kamu harus begitu. Tidak. Sedangkan di di di negara Islam sendiri saling mencemooh, saling mengaku yang terbagus. Itu, nggak ada Islam begitu. Tapi di sini saya benar-benar nyata, saya mempelajari, benar-benar saya, sebenarnya saya lebih dekat kepada Allah di negara yang non-Muslim. Karena saya benar-benar merasakan di sini. Gitu. Saling membantu. Di sini orangnya kayaknya cuek tapi rasa rasa kemanusiaannya tinggi, nah itu kan ada di Islam. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

of humanity is high". The first implies what people see on the surface and the latter implies what interviewee MM5 experienced as well as recognized as part of Islamic teachings.

When asked how he explained his impression of the Netherlands to his guests-a group of men from an Islamic educational foundation based in West Java, who had a short visit to the Netherlands-, interviewee MM4 said,

Text 2.38

Yes, indeed here [in the Netherlands], they [the Dutch] are not, religiously [it is] not Islam but when they [the Dutch] develop their country, [they are] very Islamic because [they] implement justice principles. There is no discrimination and there is 0% corruption, and they really hold on to that.⁶⁵

Interviewee MM4 contrasted "they [Dutch people] are not, religiously [it is] not Islam" and "[they are] very Islamic". The adverb "very" emphasises how Islamic the Netherlands is perceived to be. The interviewee defined being "very Islamic" as "implementing justice principles", "no discrimination" and "0% corruption".

This text corresponds to the statements of interviewee MM3 (Text 2.32) about religious values that are embedded in the state's structure, interviewee MM6 (Text 2.35) about universal values that become the concept of the welfare state, and interviewee MM5 (Text 2.37) about Islamic teachings. The four texts (2.32, 2.35, 2.37, and 2.38) are similar to the statement of another Muslim interviewee, MW2, about her father's impression of the Netherlands. Her father said that people in the Netherlands, "do not have a religion but [they] follow the system like people with religion. [They] do not [do] corruption, respect other people, appreciate other people".⁶⁶

When asked whether religion exists in the life of Dutch people, interviewee MW4 responded,

⁶⁵ Ya memang di sini itu mereka nggak, secara agama bukan Islam tapi kalau membangun negara mereka itu sangat Islami, karena mereka menjalankan prinsip-prinsip keadilan. Tidak ada diskriminasi dan kemudian korupsi 0%, dan itu yang benar-benar mereka pegang. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

⁶⁶ Tapi papa bilanganya kehidupan di Belanda itu orangnya nggak beragama tapi mengikuti seperti orang beragama, sistemnya. Korupsi enggak, menghormati orang lain, menghargai orang lain. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

Text 2.39

*There is an interesting quote from Abduh, Muhammad Abduh. Imam Abduh as [people] usually [called him]. He said, "When I was in France, I saw Islam but there were no Muslims. When I was in Egypt, I saw Muslims but there was no Islam". There are no Muslims but there is Islam at a certain level, ok? Certain level.*⁶⁷

Interviewee MW4 spoke about Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian Islamic scholar, three times (overwording) to emphasize the "interesting quote" she used to answer the question about religion in the Netherlands. She indicated that, like Abduh in France, she also saw Islam in the Netherlands but did not see Muslims. She repeated the phrase "at a certain level" twice (overwording) to emphasize the level of Islam's existence in the Netherlands. This text implies a difference between Islam as a tenet and Muslims as people who follow or practice Islam. This text shows that interviewee MW4, as well as five other Muslim interviewees, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, and MW2, saw Islam in the sense of Islamic teachings and values being practiced in the Netherlands by Dutch people who are non-Muslims.

When asked about religious life in the Netherlands, interviewee PW3 stated that there are "some Dutch people who believe in God while some others completely do not know religion at all or completely do not know God because they are raised like that". The phrase "because they are raised like that" corresponds to the statements of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.11) and interviewee MM5 (Text 2.20) about parents in the Netherlands who play a role in determining whether their children will have a religious education or not. When asked whether Dutch people are religious, interviewee PW3 replied,

Text 2.40

*Religious? I think yes [they are] spiritual but religious? I do not think so. They [the Dutch] are spiritual. [They are] more interested in things like that. They [the Dutch] are more interested in spiritual matters. Because people here [the Dutch], strangely, although they are irreligious, believe in paranormal matters, which is so contradictory. [They believe] in psychic, medium, for real. They [the Dutch] often have events for those things on the weekends or once a month, there must be a paranormal beurs (exhibition). Really. And some of those people [the psychic and medium] open a clinic. So I said, oh ok, they [the Dutch] are, indeed, yes it is true that they [the Dutch] believe in supernatural matters.*⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Ada quote menarik dari Abduh, Muhammad Abduh. Imam Abduh lah biasanya gitu. Dia bilang gini, "When I was in France, I see Islam but there is no Muslim. When I was in Egypt, I see Muslim but there is no Islam". There is no Muslim but there is Islam, at a certain level ya, a certain level ya. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

⁶⁸ J: Beberapa ya [percaya kepada Tuhan], beberapa. Beberapa memang sama sekali nggak tahu agama sama sekali atau memang yang sama sekali nggak tahu Tuhan. Memang dibesarkan seperti itu.

Interviewee PW3 distinguished between “religious” and “spiritual”. She was uncertain if the Dutch are religious but certain that they are spiritual. The adjective “spiritual” is mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize that the Dutch are spiritual in the sense of “paranormal matters”. The phrase “spiritual matters”, “paranormal matters”, “supernatural matters”, “psychic”, and “medium” are alternative wording to emphasize that there are Dutch people who are “interested” in that matters. The text shows a contrast between being irreligious and the act of believing in supernatural matters. The expressions “really”, “for real” and “it’s true” are overwording to intensify interviewee PW3’s assertion about the interest of Dutch people in “supernatural matters”.

Five interviewees, AM1, NW1, NW3, PW1, and PW4, mentioned small religious communities, including migrant churches in the Netherlands. When asked about her impression of the religious life in the Netherlands, interviewee NW3 responded,

Text 2.41

In my opinion, the statement that religious life here is declining is an illusion. They [the Dutch] do not go to a conventional church such as Westerkerk and Oude Kerk. All of those have transformed into a place for exhibitions, exhibition centres, [and] things like that. However, their [the Dutch] religious life does not stop. [...] Someone [from an Indonesian community] took me to go to his community. [...] I was taken into a school hall, that was rented by an Indonesian community to hold a church service. Almost all the people were Indonesians. There were many Dutch people, who are married to the Indonesians [in that community]. They made music, prayed together, [and did] all kinds of activities there. After we [my husband and I] observed further, those [members of] small communities go from door to door to give support, to pray together. We [my husband and I] have been observing this. Our [Indonesian] neighbour is sick. Almost every week or every two weeks, surely some people come to pray for the [sick] husband.⁶⁹

T: Do you think in general Dutch people are religious or not?

J: Religious? Spiritual I think ya. Kalau religious? I think nggak kayaknya. Mereka spiritual. Lebih tertarik yang kayak gitu modelnya. Mereka lebih tertarik sama hal-hal spirit gitu. Karena orang di sini anehnya walaupun nggak beragama mereka percaya hal-hal yang paranormal, which is so contradictory gitu. Cenayang, medium, echt waar. Mereka suka ada event kayak gitu kak. Weekend-weekend. Atau sebulan sekali pasti ada paranormal beurs. Really. Dan beberapa orang yang kayak-kayak gitu buka praktek. Makannya aku bilang, oh ok. Mereka memang, iya, beneran, jadi mereka percaya hal-hal yang ghaib gitu. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

⁶⁹ Ungkapan kehidupan beragama di sini menurut adalah sebuah ilusi kalau menurut saya. Pada kenyataannya, mereka tidak ke gereja yang konvensional kayak Westerkerk, Oudekerk. Itu sudah semuanya berubah jadi tempat *tentoonstelling*, gitu-gitu ya, *exhibition centre*. Tetapi sebetulnya

Interviewee NW3 indicated the transformation of “a conventional church” into a non-religious place such as an exhibition centre. She contrasted “they [the Dutch] do not go to a conventional church” with “their religious life does not stop” to clarify why she thought the decline of religion “is an illusion”. She mentioned the noun “community” three times (overwording) to emphasize the existence of small religious communities such as an Indonesian community, that organize “a church service” and “all kinds of activities” including visiting sick people to support and pray with them. This text implies that “religious life” in the Netherlands exists particularly among migrant communities-in this case, Indonesian Christians-and involves many Dutch people who are married to the members of the communities. The religious services of these communities do not happen in “a conventional church” but in a secular place such as “a school hall”.

Following interviewee NW3 (Text 2.41) above, two interviewees, a husband, PM2, and a wife, PW5, shared similar opinions.

Text 2.42

Q: People say that the Dutch have no religion.

PM2: It's not true. It's not true. [...] Indeed, maintaining a church building is very expensive and indeed, many old people [go to church]. Why? They [the old generation who go to the church] do not want to change, so they still hold on to the old fashion [type of church]. There are no activities, and the liturgy is kept unchanged whereas our current society is different from the past. [...] Therefore, the church is empty. But sometimes we do not see. Have you been to the Crossroad [Church] in Amstelveen? There they have three services every week. It is full. Amstelveen. In English. They are international. They [the members of the Crossroad Church] don't have a liturgy because it is ecumenical, so they still have collections, Holy Communion, Bible reading, of course, prayers, of course, and singing, but there are no such thing as certain prayers, like in the Protestant church, and the mass ordinarily. They [the members of the Crossroad Church]

kehidupan beragama mereka tidak berhenti. [...] Waktu itu ada satu yang membawa saya pergi ke komunitas dia. Saya kaget karena saya dibawa ke sebuah *hall* di sekolah, [...] dan ternyata *hall* itu disewa untuk komunitas Indonesia melakukan kebaktian di situ. Hampir semuanya orang Indonesia. Ada banyak orang Belanda yang datang sebagai pasangan dari orang Indonesia. Mereka bikin musik, doa bersama, segala macam itu ada di situ. Dan ternyata juga, setelah kita amati lebih jauh, beberapa itu komunitas kecil-kecil itu datang dari rumah ke rumah untuk melakukan *support*, doa bersama. Kayak yang kita amati, tetangga kita ini kan sakit, yang satu ini. Tiap hampir seminggu sekali, dua minggu sekali, pasti ada orang-orang yang datang untuk mendoakan suaminya. Interviewed on December 10, 2017.

pray, praise, pray, read the bible, have sermons, collections, communion and then blessings. They [the members of the Crossroad Church] have three services in Amstelveen. And then the Hillsong [Church]. [...] That is also full. It is also international and full of young people. Now there is another one, the EO (Evangelische Omroep or Evangelical Broadcasting) with jongerendag (Youth Day). That takes all day from morning to night. They [Evangelical Broadcasting] usually rent stadiums or squares, which are used as places for worship and praise. There are various bands. All of them play Christian songs.

Q: So, if people say there is no religion in the Netherlands.

PM2: No. No, that is not true. Now when people say, "It's not like in Indonesia". [I say], "Wait, in Indonesia it [church] is full. Now I ask, do Indonesian people who go to church really have behoefte, the desire to worship?" No, no, no. Why do I know that? In Indonesia, you cannot be an atheist. Because you [Indonesians] have to have a religion. If you fill out a form, you are asked what your religion is. To get married, there must be a religion. It is not even allowed between a Muslim and a Christian [to get married]. [The religion] must be one. The Christian becomes a Muslim, or the Muslim becomes a Christian [to get married]. It must be one [religion]. The law does not allow [people with different religions to get married]. They [people who get married] must have the same religion. So, there are no atheists [in Indonesia]. Also, to enrol in a school, [Indonesians] will be asked [about their religion], therefore, we [Indonesians] pretend [to have a religion].

PW5: In some areas [in the Netherlands], there are also very many Christians. In Zwolle, Veenendaal, they [the Christians] are very trouw (faithful). Faithful. Especially in Urk. Urk is very, very, very, [unfinished sentence]. [People in Urk] wear black clothes. It is very conservative and to this day it still is.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ T: Ada ungkapan bahwa orang Belanda tidak beragama.

*PM2: It's not true. It's not true. [...] Memang betul gedung gereja itu pemeliharaannya sangat mahal dan memang banyak orang tua. Karena apa, mereka tidak mau berkembang, jadi itu tetep memang yang kuno dipegang. Tidak ada kegiatan apa-apa. Dan liturginya ya begitu terus padahal kita itu masyarakatnya sudah beda dengan dulu. [...] jadi gerejanya kosong. Tapi kadang kita itu nggak melihat. Pernah ke Crossroad di Amstelveen? Itu tiga kebaktian tiap minggu. Penuh. Amstelveen. Itu bahasa Inggris. Itu semua, internasional. Mereka betul tidak punya liturgi karena oekumenis jadi mereka tetep ada kolekte ada, perjamuan kudus ada, baca alkitab *of course*, doa *of course*, nyanyi-nyanyi tapi tidak ada itu kan doa ini, firman, yang seperti Kristen itu tidak ada. Misa-misa, ordinarium itu tidak ada. Jadi doa, puji-pujian, doa, baca alkitab, khotbah, kolekte, perjamuan kudus *and then* berkat. Itu tiga kali kebaktian di Amstelveen. Terus Hillsong [...] Itu juga penuh. Itu juga internasional dan penuh dengan*

Interviewee PM2 repeated the phrase “it’s not true” and said “no” frequently (overwording) to emphasize that it is not true when people say there is no religion in the Netherlands. He indicated that many churches are empty because maintaining a church building is very expensive, and only old people go to church because “they still hold on to the old-fashion type of church”. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM1 (Text 2.13) that the church is too conservative and does not follow the current development of young people. PM2’s phrase “but sometimes we do not see” implied that people do not see that there are churches in the Netherlands that are full of young people with many activities, such as the Crossroad International Church in Amstelveen and the Hillsong Church, and the event of Youth Day organised by the Evangelical Broadcasting. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee NW3 (Text 2.41) on the existence of religious communities outside of conventional churches.

Interviewee PM2 also contrasted the Netherlands and Indonesia. He implied that it is not clear whether Indonesians who go to church really have the desire to worship. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW4 (Text 2.27) on Indonesians who prioritize religious practice but neglect the inner core. Interviewee PM2 repeated the noun “atheist” (overwording) to emphasize that Indonesians cannot be an atheist. The statement that Indonesians must have religion corresponds to the statement of interviewees MW7 (Text 2.10), MM3 (Text 2.18), and MW2 (Text 2.19) on the fact that religion is a public matter in Indonesia.

Interviewee PW5 mentioned the phrases “very many Christians” and “very *trouw* (faithful)” which are overwording to emphasize that there are many Christians in Zwolle, Veenendaal, and Urk, who are very faithful. The adverb “very” is mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize that people in Urk are still extremely conservative. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee AM1 (Text 2.9) about people in the Bible Belt.

anak muda. Sekarang adalagi EO (*Evangelische Omroep*) dengan *jongerendag*. Itu sehari dari pagi sampai malam mereka itu biasanya sewa stadion atau alun-alun yg dibuat untuk kebaktian dan puji-pujian. Di situ itu macem-macam bandnya itu giliran yang main. Semua lagu Kristen.

T: Jadi kalau orang bilang di Belanda ndak ada agama.

PM2: No. No, *that’s not true*. Sekarang kalau orang bilang, itu ndak seperti di Indonesia, wait, di Indonesia penuh. Sekarang saya tanya, apakah orang Indonesia yang ke gereja itu apakah bener-bener punya *behoefte*, keinginan untuk berbakti? No no no. Kenapa saya tahu itu? Di Indonesia tidak boleh atheis. Karena harus punya agama. Kalau *fill the form*, harus ditanya agama apa. Nikah, harus ada agamanya. Bahkan tidak boleh Islam sama Kristen nggak boleh. Harus salah satu. Yang Kristen jadi Islam atau Islam jadi Kristen. Nggak boleh *wetnya*. Harus sama *geloofnya*. Jadi ndak ada atheis. Sekolah pun harus ditanya jadi kita kan pura-pura.

PW5: Di Beberapa daerah juga sangat banyak orang Kristennya. Di Zwolle, Veenendaal, itu juga mereka sangat *trouw*, setia. Apalagi di Urk. Urk itu malah sangat, sangat, sangat [*unfinished sentence*], pakai baju item-item. Itu sangat konservatif dan sampai sekarang itu masih. Interviewed on December 1, 2019.

When asked his opinion about the compatibility between religion and modernity in the Netherlands, interviewee MM6 replied,

Text 2.43

A: *Maybe the experience of the encounter of the Netherlands with religions such as Catholicism or Protestantism is different from the encounter of Indonesia with Islam. Maybe that is the background of why they [the Dutch] say that religion and democracy are incompatible. This is indeed a long debate. It has been debated for centuries.*

Q: *How do Indonesians view modernity in general, in Indonesia, and here [in the Netherlands]?*

A: *As a Muslim, I see that fiqh is always evolving. Fiqh is about Islamic law. It is always developing. It depends on the context. In the past, there was no wifi, there was no Facebook. So, when there is new progress, the [Islamic] law must also be reformulated. Therefore, modernity demands fiqh experts, the ulama (Islamic scholars), to think about what is best and how to respond to progress. That is clear from what Rasul (the messenger) [Muhammad] said. Rasul [Muhammad] said, "You understand more about your worldly affairs". In one hadith, he [Muhammad] said, "You understand more about your worldly affairs". Why did he say that? [Because] Rasul [Muhammad] already knew that his people would encounter an era different from his. [...] That is the contextualization of Islam. Therefore, Islam will always be contextual. [Islam] will always adapt to modernity, including its laws.*

Q: *Is that what makes modernity and religion compatible in Indonesia?*

A: *That is what I mean.*

Q: *What about modernity here [in the Netherlands]?*

A: *Modernity here [in the Netherlands], in the Dutch sense, right? The challenge [of modernity in the Netherlands], [for Muslims] is, for example, we [Muslims] have a friend, who, for example, chooses to be gay. This is modernity, right? As fellow humans, we [Muslims] have a formula in Islam. As a member (nahdlyin) of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama)⁷¹, I stick to what NU holds the most, which is we [Muslims] have ukhuwah Islamiyah, ukhuwah wathaniyah, and ukhuwah basyariyah. Ukhuwah Islamiyah is a brotherhood among Muslims, then [we have] brotherhood among one nation (ukhuwah wathaniyah), and thirdly, [we have] brotherhood of humankind (ukhuwah basyariyah). For example, we [our gay friend and us] do not meet on the level of Islam (ukhuwah Islamiyah), suppose I have the view that being gay is something that is prohibited in Islam, well, I do*

⁷¹ Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is a traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia, which is also the largest independent Islamic organization in the world.

not deny that some Islamic scholars allow it. But [let's say] for example, in Islam, in terms of ukhuwah Islamiyah, it [being gay] is forbidden, [therefore, we do not meet at this level]. For me, I feel that it [being gay] is a kind of choice although it comprises a long debate that it [being gay] is innate. It is similar to whether you choose to consume alcohol or not, which, in my religion, is not allowed. If you consume alcohol or you choose to be gay, we [my friend and I] do not meet in ukhuwah Islamiyah. But we still meet [in the level of ukhuwah basyariyah]. I will respect him as a human being, who chooses and has independent rights, to choose his life path. I will not be hostile to him. That is the modernity that I found in the Netherlands. I have met friends who chose to be gay or lesbian or friends who chose not to be religious. I will never have an antipathy toward them. I will really appreciate their choice as human beings and we can still chat together; we can be close friends because we are fellow human beings. I think that is ultimate, as a Muslim. To be able to love someone as a human being is the ultimate brotherhood. If people can appreciate humanity, then he is a Muslim who really understands his own Islam.⁷²

⁷² T: Apa pendapat anda tentang *compatibility* antara agama dan modernitas di Belanda?

J: Mungkin pengalaman antara persentuhan Belanda dengan agama misalnya Katolik atau Protestan itu lain. Beda dengan Indonesia bersentuhan dengan Islam ya. Mungkin itu latar belakang kenapa mereka mengatakan bahwa agama *and democracy* itu *incompatible*. Ini memang *long debate*. Sudah berabad-abad.

T: Bagaimana orang Indonesia melihat modernitas secara umum, di Indonesia dan di sini?

J: Saya sebagai orang Muslim itu kan melihat fikih itu selalu berkembang. Fikih artinya tentang hukum Islam. Itu selalu berkembang. Tergantung pada konteks. Dulu belum ada *wifi* belum ada *facebook*. Jadi ada kemajuan baru itu maka hukum itu juga harus dirumuskan ulang. Jadi modernitas itu menuntut para ahli fikih, para ulama, untuk berpikir bagaimana hal yang terbaik. Bagaimana menanggapi kemajuan ini. Itu jelas, kata Rasul. Rasul mengatakan, “Kamu lebih paham dengan urusan duniamu”. Dalam satu hadits dia bilang, “Kamu lebih paham tentang urusan duniamu”. Karena apa? Rasul sudah tahu bahwa umatnya akan menghadapi zaman yang berbeda dengan dia. [...] Nah itu adalah kontekstualisasi dari Islam. Jadi Islam akan selalu kontekstual, selalu akan beradaptasi dengan modernitas termasuk hukum-hukumnya.

T: Apakah itu yang membuat di Indonesia, modernitas dan agama bisa berjalan?

J: Itu maksud saya.

T: Kalau modernitas di sini?

J: Kalau di sini, modernitas dalam artian Belanda ya, tantangannya adalah misalkan kita punya, temen memilih misalnya untuk menjadi gay. Ini kan modernitas ya. Kita sebagai sesama manusia, kan. Kita punya rumusan dalam Islam, tapi yang paling dipegang sama NU adalah, saya sebagai *nahdlynniya* itu ada *ukhuwah Islamiyah*, *ukhuwah wathaniyah*, *ukhuwah basyariyah*. *Ukhuwah Islamiyah* itu adalah persaudaraan sesama Muslim, kemudian persaudaraan sesama satu bangsa, dan, yang ketiga adalah persaudaraan sesama manusia. Kalau misalkan secara Islam kita tidak ketemu. Misalkan saya punya pandangan bahwa gay itu adalah termasuk hal yang dilarang dalam Islam, saya tidak menafikan ada beberapa ulama yang membolehkan ya. Tapi misalkan saya, secara Islam, secara *ukhuwah Islamiyah*, itu kan misalnya dilarang. Saya merasa bahwa itu adalah semacam pilihan walaupun perdebatannya panjang bahwa itu adalah bawaan dari lahir. Itu misalnya saya mengatakan ini menurut agama saya tidak boleh karena itu sama dengan kamu

Interviewee MM6 implied a difference between the encounter of the Netherlands with Catholicism and Protestantism and the encounter of Indonesia with Islam, which for him may explain why for the Dutch, religion and democracy are incompatible. He alternated the noun “modernity” with “democracy”. He mentioned the term “*fiqh*” and “law” five times (overwording) to emphasize that Islamic law is always developing when there is new progress. The adjectives “developing” and “evolving” are overwording to stress that Islamic law will be reformulated. He equated modernity with “a new progress” (overwording) to indicate the context of an era. He repeated the statement of *Rasul* Muhammad (overwording) to emphasize that *Rasul* “already knew that his people would encounter an era different from his” and, therefore, “Islam will always be contextual” and “Islamic laws will adapt to modernity”. This implies the compatibility of religion, in this case, Islam, with modernity in Indonesia.

Interviewee MM6 repeatedly mentioned “as a Muslim” and “we (Muslims)” (overwording) and specified himself as a member of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization to emphasize his identity and point of view in explaining his view on modernity. The noun “choice” and the verb “choose” are overwording to emphasize that he appreciates the choice of other people as human beings. He repeated the noun “ultimate” (overwording) to emphasize that for a Muslim, to be able to love someone as a human being is the ultimate brotherhood. The word “human(s)” is mentioned seven times (including in “human beings”, “humankind”, and “humanity”) (overwording) to emphasize the “brotherhood of humankind” (*ukhuwah basyariyah*) as “modernity” that he “found in the Netherlands”. The text shows that modernity in the Netherlands is about a universal brotherhood or humanity where people have choices and independent rights. Modernity is also comprised of matters that are prohibited in Islam such as being gay and consuming alcohol, which is challenging for Muslims.

mau memilih alkohol atau tidak. Kalau kamu ambil alkohol, kamu memilih jadi gay, itu kita nggak ketemu di *ukhuwah Islamiyah*. Tapi kita masih bertemu dengan [dia di *ukhuwah basyariyah*]. Saya akan menghargai dia sebagai manusia yang memilih, punya hak independen, memilih pilihan jalan hidupnya. Saya tidak akan memusuhi dia. Itu modernitas yang saya temukan di Belanda. Saya ketemu teman-teman yang memilih jadi gay atau lesbian atau temen-temen yang memilih tidak beragama. Jadi saya tidak akan pernah antipati dengan mereka. Saya akan sangat menghargai pilihan mereka sebagai seorang manusia dan kita masih bisa ngobrol bareng, bisa teman dekat karena kita sesama manusia. Menurut saya itu *ultimate* ya dari seorang Muslim. Untuk bisa mencintai seseorang sebagai seorang manusia itu adalah persaudaraan paling puncak. Kalau orang sudah bisa menghargai *humanity*, kemanusiaan, maka dia adalah Muslim yang sangat paham dengan keIslamannya sendiri. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

2. Analysis of discourse as discursive practice

The analysis of discourse as discursive practice (interpretation stage) focuses on processes of text production, distribution, and consumption (Fairclough, 1992, p. 71). When discourse participants produce and consume text, they draw on other texts and mental maps (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 82-83) that are stored in their long-term memory (members' resources). Because texts always exist in intertextual relationships with other texts, they are "dialogic", which Fairclough refers to as "intertextuality" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 155). Intertextuality points to the productivity of texts and the way texts transform earlier texts, restructuring and turning them into new conventions (genres, discourses) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 102). The analytic question in this section is: What aspects of members' resources are drawn upon when discourse participants speak about secularization in the Netherlands?

The role of the state

In speaking about the meaning of "secular" as the separation of religion and state, various interviewees indicated the role of the Dutch state in 1) replacing the role of religion; 2) giving freedom to religions to grow, including building a house of worship, and; 3) giving freedom to people to have and not to have religion. Six interviewees, CM2, MM6, MW2, MW4, PM1, and PM2, referred to the "law" for marriage procedure, as being "higher than religion". Interviewee MM2 (Text 2.1) said,

[When] people get married, [the Dutch] do not need religion. If they have declared [that they] love each other, [they] just have to report it to the city hall to make it legal.

Interviewee PM1 referred to "the Dutch law" and "the right", indicating the neutrality of the Dutch state towards religion. PM1 (Text 2.21) said,

[...] they [Dutch people] do not prohibit people to have religion here [...] that is all because of the Dutch law, which is quite, very clear that religion is a private matter and everyone has the right to adhere to a religion, the right not to adhere to a religion, the right to be an atheist, or choose his or her own way.

Four interviewees, CM2, MM1, MM6, and NM1, referred to the success of governmental law enforcement in the Netherlands and the obedience of the Dutch citizens. The "law", as well as the notion of "freedom" and "rights", are implicit references (intertextuality) to the Dutch law system and the Dutch Constitution (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019), especially Article 1 regarding equal rights for

all persons in the Netherlands,⁷³ Article 6 number 1 regarding freedom of religion,⁷⁴ and Article 10 number 1 regarding respect for privacy.⁷⁵

Three interviewees, MM3, MM6, and PM1, implicitly referred to elements of liberal democracy by pointing to the notion of freedom⁷⁶ and individual and minority rights guaranteed by the Dutch state. Citizens in a liberal democracy, according to Verbeek,

are granted certain basic rights and duties, such as the freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the pursuit of happiness and the corresponding duties of religious tolerance and avoidance of harm to others. [...] In liberal democracy the rule of law is institutionalized. [...] In general, a liberal democracy tends to be committed to the ideal of mutual toleration and state neutrality (2013, pp. 176-177).

Various interviewees also mentioned the role of the state in Indonesia in comparison to the Netherlands. Interviewee MM1 referred to the acknowledgement of six official religions⁷⁷ in Indonesia and that Indonesia observes the holy days of these six religions. Implicitly, he referred to (intertextuality) the Indonesian Constitution particularly Article 29 Number 2 which states, “The state guarantees every citizen the freedom of religion and worship following his religion and belief” (DPRRI, n.d.; translation by the author).

Various interviewees referred to the Netherlands as a modern and welfare state, in which “the technology is advanced”, “the people are forward-looking”, and “the society is secure and prosperous”. Four Muslim interviewees, MM1, MM4, MM6, and MW2, drew upon the meaning of a welfare state from an Islamic perspective. When explaining the Islamic concept of a welfare state, interviewee MM6 drew upon a “system of knowledge” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 238), namely Islamic knowledge, to interpret the Netherlands as a welfare state by using the concepts of *baladatun thayyibatun* and *zakat al-mal* (explicit intertextuality). Interviewee MM6 (Text 2.36) said,

⁷³ “All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted”.

⁷⁴ “Everyone shall have the right to profess freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community with others, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law”.

⁷⁵ “Everyone shall have the right to respect for his privacy, without prejudice to restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament”.

⁷⁶ The notion of freedom will be discussed further in Chapter III.

⁷⁷ Interview conducted in 2015. At that time in Indonesia, there were six official religions namely Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. Since 7 November 2017, indigenous beliefs are recognized as the seventh official religion by Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.

[...] the Netherlands is already baldatun thayyibatun. [It means] that [the Dutch state] ensures retirement and health insurance. The concept is very Islamic [...]. In Islam, there is the concept of zakat al-mal. Zakat (alms) of wealth. [...]. In my opinion, this is implemented by welfare states such as the Netherlands.

The text indicates the compatibility of Islamic concepts with a non-Islamic system, which is drawn upon by Muslim interviewees, in this case, interviewee MM6, to describe the role of the Dutch state in managing its citizens.

Christianity

When various interviewees mentioned “religion” in the Netherlands, they often referred to Christianity, both Protestantism and Catholicism. They also alternated the word “religion” with “church”. Two interviewees, MM6 and PM1, indicated that the Netherlands is “no longer a Christian state”. Interviewee MM6 (Text 2.4) said,

They [the Dutch] have experienced a period in which religion had too much interference in the state’s affairs, which resulted in a big impact. In the end, religion becomes a private affair. The state is managing public order issues.

Referring to “the mosque” in “the middle of the city” of Utrecht, interviewee MM6 implicitly drew upon the Dutch pillar system, “a period in which religion had too much interference in the state’s affair”. MM6 (Text 2.43) also drew upon “a long debate” on the compatibility or incompatibility of religion and democracy, referring to the relationships between the Dutch state and religions (Catholicism and Protestantism).

Maybe the experience of the encounter of the Netherlands with religions such as Catholicism or Protestantism [...] is the background of why they [the Dutch] say that religion and democracy are incompatible. This is indeed a long debate. It has been debated for centuries.

He implicitly referred to the so-called “de-pillarization” (in Dutch: *ontzuiling*) process that happened in the Netherlands around the 1970s. This is common knowledge in the Netherlands and often spoken about in the public media. De-pillarization refers to the end of a society dominated by pillarization (in Dutch: *verzuiling*)⁷⁸. During the

⁷⁸ The term pillarization (*verzuiling*) refers to the segmentation of Dutch society according to different moral and/or religious doctrines from around 1900 to about 1970. There were three pillars namely the Calvinist or Dutch Reformed pillar, the Roman Catholic pillar, and the liberals and socialists pillar. Each pillar created its organizations such as a political party, schools, hospitals, sports clubs, a newspaper, and a broadcasting company (see Lijphart, 1968 for a classic study of the Dutch “politics

pillarization era, the Dutch harmonised differences between Catholics and Protestants through coalitions and compromises between the pillars. The process of de-pillarization in the Netherlands occurred simultaneously with mass immigration and the significant decline of church attendance and affiliation, which had begun in the 1960s. In the context of Dutch religious history, the period marked a shift from a pillarized society to a “secular or dechristianized” society (Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010, p. 239).

Interviewee PM1 (Text 2.5) said,

Fifty years ago the Netherlands was still a Christian state in terms of percentage. The percentage of Dutch people who went to church at that time was more than 50%, almost 70% I think. Thus, at that time [...] the Netherlands was a religious state. However, looking at the situation now, [it is] not [a religious state].

Interviewee PM1 drew upon the percentage of Dutch people who went to church in the 1960s⁷⁹ or before when the number was closer to 50% (intertextuality). The 1960s, however, is the period often referred to by scholars as the beginning of the decline of the Christian tradition in the Netherlands. The percentage of people who attended church has decreased from 50% in 1966 to 12% in 2015 (Bernts & Berghuijs, 2016, p. 25). Interviewee PM1 (Text 2.14) also drew upon statistics (explicit intertextuality) by saying “more than 60% of the Dutch population does not go to church” and “it can be proven statistically”. He did not specify the source of his remarks, but here again, it is widely known in the Netherlands and publicized through the media. The research God in Nederland reported that in 2015, 67,8% of the Dutch population does not follow a specific church (Bernts & Berghuijs, 2016, p. 23).

Other interviewees referred to the decline in church attendance. They stated that many Dutch people, who are “still Christians” only go to the church “once a year” for Christmas as a “formality”. Interviewee NM1 spoke about the “religious ideology” of young people in the Netherlands, which is “already very secular” by referring to the fact that they do not celebrate Christmas for its religious meaning but merely as “a family gathering” (Text 2.12). This is confirmed by the statement of interviewee AM1, who called some Dutch people “culturally religious” (Text 2.9).

of accommodation”). Since the 1970s, this unique societal arrangement of pillarization eroded as denominational institutions merged into ideologically neutral organizations. This so-called “de-pillarization” (*ontzuiling*) happened at the same time when the Netherlands became an immigrant country due to the coming of foreign laborers since the early 1960s.

⁷⁹ Interview conducted in 2015. In this context, the phrase “fifty years ago” literally means the year 1965. I believe interviewee PM1 implied the years before 1965 when church attendance was high.

Interviewee MM1 drew upon the statement of a Dutch politician, Geert Wilders (explicit intertextuality), who stated that the Netherlands is influenced by Christianity and Judaism. MM1 said (Text 2.8),

Geert Wilders once said that the culture of the Netherlands is influenced by Christianity and Judaism.

In an interview with Tony Jones on Australian television, ABC Lateline, in February 2013, Geert Wilders said, “I am proud to be a member of a society that is based, whose values are based on Christianity, Judaism and humanism” (Geert Wilders Weblog, 2013). Before that, on May 12, 2011, in Nashville, at the Cornerstone Church, USA, Wilders gave a speech entitled *A Warning to America*, with a similar message. He said,

Our Western culture based on Christianity and Judaism is superior to the Islamic culture. Our laws are superior to sharia. Our Judeo-Christian values are better than Islam’s totalitarian rules (Geert Wilders Weblog, 2011).

Interviewee MM1 also referred to the celebration of religious holy days of all acknowledged religions in Indonesia when stating that Indonesia is “more tolerant” than the Netherlands. He implied that Christianity has more privilege than Judaism in the Netherlands. He referred to Hanukkah, which is not a public holiday, although Wilders stated that Dutch culture is based on Christianity and Judaism. He said (Text 2.8),

I said [to my Dutch friends], you do not even celebrate Hanukkah. [You] do not make it a holiday [...] We [Indonesia], indeed, we are a secular state, but [we] recognize five religions [...] All are celebrated, fair. Secular but it is fairer in my opinion. I said to my Dutch friends, we [Indonesians] are more tolerant in this matter than you are. You said [you are] secular. No [you are not] for that matter [celebrating religious holiday].

Another interviewee, CM1, spoke about the death of the churches in Europe and referred to the commands and prohibitions of priests. He said (Text 2.13),

They [churches] do not provide a spiritual grip but only command dogma and the priests are conservative. [People are] not allowed to use a condom, not allowed to live together, not allowed to do this, to do that. Young Dutch people ignore that.

Interviewee CM1 drew upon the character of the churches and priests that are “too conservative”, and “do not follow the current development of young people”. He also referred to individualistic notions that “people feel more independent [and] private”. He then referred to the influence of “Eastern spirituality such as yoga, Zen [and] Dao” (intertextuality) that attract Dutch people who have “lost their grip on the church”.

Several interviewees spoke about some “spiritually religious” people, who “still believe in religion” and who “still go to church”. Interviewee PM2 (Text 2.42) referred to the Crossroad International Church in Amstelveen⁸⁰, the Hillsong Church Nederland⁸¹ and the big event of Youth Day organised by the “Evangelical Broadcasting (Dutch: *Evangelische Omroep Jongeren Dag*)”⁸² (explicit intertextuality) to indicate that there are vibrant religious activities, especially among young people in the Netherlands. While comparing the Dutch and Indonesians, he drew from the Indonesian mental model on the fact that the Indonesian state does not recognise atheism. This is a reference (intertextuality) to both the first tenet of *Pancasila*, the Indonesian national ideology, that states “Belief in One Divine Lordship”, and Indonesia's Criminal Code article 156a⁸³ that makes it illegal to promote atheism, or any faith other than the six official religious identities permitted in law (Cohen, 2018). Interviewee PM2 also referred to Indonesian Marriage Law No. 1 of 1974, particularly Article 2 (1) which states that “marriage is legal if it is carried out in accordance with the religious laws and beliefs of the parties” (Hukumonline.com, n.d.; translation by the author).

Interviewee PW5 (Text 2.42) referred to Zwolle, Veenendaal, and Urk (explicit intertextuality) as places that have many Christians who are very faithful and, in the case of Urk, “very conservative”. Another interviewee, AM1, referred to the religious people he met, including “many Catholics”, to whom he talked (explicit intertextuality). He said (Text 2.9),

There was a bit of a surprise for me when I began meeting with religious people in the Netherlands. [...] I am not sure if they are spiritually religious, but they are definitely culturally religious. Many Catholics were outspoken, in the sense that, you know, when we talk about religion to them, they will openly say that they believe in God.

⁸⁰ <https://gocommunitas.org/projects/crossroads-international-church-amstelveen-amsterdam/>

⁸¹ <https://hillsong.com/netherlands/>

⁸² <https://www.eo.nl/> ; <https://beam.eo.nl/evenement/eo-jongerendag>

⁸³ Article 156a states: “It is penalized with imprisonment for as long as five years whoever intentionally in public expresses a sentiment or commits an act: a. That essentially has the nature of hostility, abuse or defamation against a religion that is adhered to in Indonesia; b. With the purpose so that people not adhere to any religion that is predicated upon the Believe in the One God”.

Asked, “Did it change your perception [about the Netherlands]?”, interviewee AM1 implicitly drew upon statistics on secular majorities and religious minorities in various (Scandinavian) countries. He said (Text 2.9),

Well, it is still vastly secular I think and most people that I have met were either irreligious or actually adamantly atheists so it is part of the diversity. I mean, I think you would probably find it anywhere, right? In Sweden or other Scandinavian countries that are very atheistic. So probably, there are going to be quite significant numbers of minorities of people who still believe in religion.

Interviewee AM1 referred to “Sweden” and “other Scandinavian countries” (explicit intertextuality) as like the Netherlands in being “very atheistic” with “quite a significant number of minorities of people who still believe in religion” and referred to “the Bible Belt” as an example in the Netherlands. The Bible Belt is a metaphor for Christian minorities among many irreligious people.

Another interviewee, NW3 (Text 2.41), referred to the shared knowledge (social cognition) that many conventional churches in the Netherlands “have transformed into a place of exhibitions” but that “their [the Dutch] religious life does not stop”. She drew on her memory that she was taken to a school hall to hold a church service. “Almost all the people were Indonesians” but there were also “many Dutch people”.

The private sphere and the public sphere

In speaking about secularization, most interviewees compared the Netherlands to Indonesia regarding the place of religion. They referred to the fact that in Indonesia religion is “public” while in the Netherlands it is “private” and people “do not talk about it”. Eleven interviewees, AM1, CW2, MM1, MM2, MM3, MM4, MW4, MW7, PM2, PW2, and PW3, referred to the importance of “religious ritual”, “religious practice” and “religious argument” for people in Indonesia.

Interviewee MW2 stated, “In Indonesia, our life is based on religion” while “life [in the Netherlands] is not based on religion”. She drew upon the mental model of the role of religion in Indonesia by explicitly quoting the statement of Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), the former Governor of Jakarta, on the debate of the inclusion of religion on the Indonesian identity card or *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP) (intertextuality). She (Text 2.19) said,

It is reasonable that Ahok said that. [Ahok said], “What is the purpose of putting religion [on the identity card]?” For what?

In 2013 and 2014, Ahok expressed his objection to the inclusion of religion on identity cards. He said, “What is the point of mentioning your religion on your ID?” (The Jakarta Post, 2013) and “Why do we need a religion status on the identity card?” (Syatiri, 2014; translation by the author). By explicitly referring to these statements, interviewee MW2 contrasted with life in the Netherlands. The reference to Ahok serves to appreciate the Dutch view of religion. In Indonesia, religion is public, in the sense of being state-recognized. In the Netherlands, it is not.

Various interviewees indicated a difference between the private sphere and the public sphere when speaking about religion. They implied that in the public sphere, people are “not free” to speak about religion. Asked if he speaks about religion with colleagues, interviewee CM1 (Text 2.25) said,

Here [on the campus], I should not mention God. If I mention God [they would say], “You are out”.

Interviewee CM1 drew upon his experience in the university where he teaches business studies and where he does not “mention God” because he could be “kicked out” of “the field of business”, which “does not recognize God”. He then referred to a popular distinction in the Netherlands between religion and spirituality (Bernts & Berghuis, 2016, pp. 93-95), by saying that

[...] spirituality is not religion. Spirituality is what I call zingeving. Zingeving is meaningfulness.

When asked whether the Dutch are religious, interviewee MM5 (Text 2.20) answered,

There are religious [people]. [...] for them [Dutch people], indeed, religion is a private matter. The schools here [in the Netherlands] do not have what [Indonesian] people call the religious school. There is none. If [anyone] would like to learn about religion, they call [a teacher] on their initiative, private.

Interviewee MM5 may refer to the absence of the Indonesian type of confessional religious school, including that of an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*), or the (informal) Quranic Education Center. In the Netherlands, there are public school (*openbaar*), that does not have a religious affiliation and special school (*bijzonder*) that gives education based on a specific religion. Implicitly, interviewee MM5’s perception corresponds to the debate on Article 23 about religious education’s place in Dutch society and the role of the Dutch state concerning religion (Kennedy & Valenta, 2006).

Logic versus Faith

In speaking of the Netherlands as a secular state, various interviewees referred to the notion of rationalism among Dutch people. Seven interviewees, CM2, CW2, MM4, MM6, MW4, MW6, and PM1, mentioned the “difficulty” of “rationalism” or “logic” to “meet” “religion”. Interviewee MM4 referred to “praying five times a day” as an expression of “faith” in his “heart”, which “does not make sense” in the “logic” of Dutch people “because they [the Dutch] are far from religious life or [far from] having faith in a particular religion” (Text 2.26).

Interviewee MW4 spoke about her Dutch husband being logical by referring to him as “an engineer” (Text 2.27) and his perspective, which is “very Aristotelean” in contrast to her perspective, which is “very Ghazalean” (intertextuality). She (Text 2.28) said,

He [my husband] knows Hellenistic philosophy. It is from him [my husband] that I learned philosophy. His perspective is very Aristotelean,

In contrasting the perspective of her husband with her perspective, she referred to Al Ghazali (explicit intertextuality) saying:

Al Ghazali is the revival of the [unfinished sentence]. If there is no Quran, there is no hadith in the world. Al Ghazali's book is the port for you to guide you. Al Ghazali. He is the proof of religion.

Al Ghazali's works on science, Islamic reasoning, philosophy, and Sufism were praised by his contemporaries, who awarded him the title “the proof of Islam”. By referring to Al Ghazali, interviewee MW4 (Text 2.27) drew on the Islamic idea that religion and rationality are compatible; rationality need not be secular.

Three interviewees, CW2, MM6, and MW4, referred to “a Dutch style” of speaking “with strong arguments” and being “rational” when they speak with their children who are educated in the Netherlands.⁸⁴

Religiosity in a secular context

While various interviewees called the Dutch secular people, some of them also called the Dutch “religious”, “spiritual”, and “Islamic”. For each of these terms, the interviewees referred to different members' resources.

⁸⁴ See footnotes 55, 56, and 127 for full texts.

In labelling the Dutch “religious”, interviewee AM1 (Text 2.9) drew on a classification between “spiritually religious” and “culturally religious”. He referred to the people in the Bible Belt and the people who believe in God and religion as the “spiritually religious” people. “Spiritually religious” people include the people referred to by interviewees MM5, MW7, NW1, NW3, PW1, PW4, and PW5: the Christian migrant communities (Text 2.41), young people in the vibrant churches such as the Crossroad International Church, Hillsong Church Nederland and the Evangelical Broadcasting Youth Day (Text 2.42), people who go to church every Sunday (Text 2.20 and Text 2.11), people who send their children to Sunday school (Text 2.11), and Christian people in Katwijk (Text 2.9), Zwolle, Veenendaal, and Urk (Text 2.42).

Four interviewees, CW1, MW1, NM1, and PM1, referred to people who “go to the church once a year” to celebrate Christmas, or “get together for Christmas” without going to the church. These are the people who are referred to by interviewee AM1 as “culturally religious people” (Text 2.9).

In saying that the Dutch have “another religiosity in a secular context”, PM1 explicitly referred to a statement of Grace Davie that there is believing without belonging and belonging without believing. He (Text 2.15) said,

Although I do not completely agree with Grace Davie's opinion, it [the concept of believing without belonging] helps to see, to describe the situation in the Netherlands, that here in the Netherlands there are many believing and not belonging.

Interviewee PM1 (Text 2.15) immediately nuanced the statement by referring to a “fact” which shows that he does not “completely agree with Grace Davie”. He said,

There is also a fact that states that here [in the Netherlands], there is no believing and there is no belonging. Or the believing is on other things, not a matter of religions, but their believing is [that] they have other spirituality. This is rather difficult to explain.

Grace Davie (explicit intertextuality) is a British sociologist of religion. The concept of “believing without belonging” was first introduced by Davie (1990) in her article and later in her book *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (1994). Davie (1990) looked at the combination and the relationships between what she called “two distinct indicators of religiosity”: believing and belonging. According to her, the combination of believing and belonging is what characterizes British religion in the late 20th century. Davie wrote,

Believing, it seems, persists while belonging continues to decline-or to be more accurate, believing is declining (has declined) at a slower rate than belonging-resulting in a marked imbalance between the two variables; this imbalance pervades a very great deal of our religious life (Davie, 1990, p. 455).

By adding “This is rather difficult to explain”, PM1 (Text 2.15) implicitly referred to a complicated debate in the Netherlands where sociologists of religion and different research offices such as the CBS, the SCP, and the WRR, that publish numerous reports about the religious situation in the Netherlands, that partly overlap and partly contradict each other.

Five interviewees, AM1, CM1, NW3, PM1, and PW3, spoke about the “spirituality” of Dutch people. Two interviewees, AM1 and NW3, referred to “spiritually religious” people who still go to church and believe in God (Text 2.9 and Text 2.41). Three interviewees, CM1, PM1, and PW3, separated the meaning of “spirituality” from “religion” and “religiosity”. Interviewee CM1 (Text 2.13) referred to the Dutch concept of *zingeving* (giving meaning) when speaking about the meaning of “spiritual”. He also referred to “Eastern spirituality such as yoga, Zen and Dao”. Interviewee PW3 referred to “paranormal or supernatural matters” such as “psychic” and “medium” (Text 2.40).

When speaking about the religiosity of Dutch people, six Muslim interviewees, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, MW2, and MW4, referred to “Islamic values”, “Islamic teaching” and “the pillars of Islam” that “exist” and “are implemented” in the Netherlands. Examples of Islamic values and Islamic teaching, according to interviewees MM4 and MW2, are no discrimination, no corruption, and respecting other people (Text 2.38). Examples of the pillars of Islam, according to interviewee MM5, are being on time, keeping things clean, taking care of the environment, keeping other people’s rights and honour, not gossiping, not commanding, helping each other, and having a high sense of humanity (Text 2.37).

Interviewee MW4 explicitly referred to a statement by Muhammad Abduh (intertextuality). She (Text 2.39) said,

There is an interesting quote from Abduh, Muhammad Abduh. Imam Abduh as [people] usually [called him]. He said, “When I was in France, I saw Islam but there were no Muslims. When I was in Egypt, I saw Muslims but there was no Islam”.

Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian scholar who travelled to France in the late 19th century wrote, “I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but no Islam”.⁸⁵ This quote indicated the view that in comparison to Muslim majority countries, non-Muslim countries such as countries in the West, apply the teachings of Islam although they have small numbers of Muslims in the population (Knight, 2015).

Two interviewees, MM3 (Text 2.34) and MM6 (Text 2.35), referred to “the poll” of “the most Islamic countries in the world,” in which Western countries like the Netherlands are high on the list (intertextuality). Interviewee MM3 said,

Countries like Indonesia and Arab countries are not on the list. Yes, they [the Dutch] are religious. I think that is why the poll put these countries [Western, Christian countries], including the Netherlands, as winners because they have practiced [religious values] in all matters.

These interviewees drew upon the research in 2008 done by two professors from George Washington University, Rehman Scheherazade and Hossein Askari, on Economic Islamicity Index in 208 countries. The study looked at how closely the policies and achievements of countries reflect Islamic economic teaching. The study revealed the top ten countries that are Islamic in both economic achievement and social values are Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, Norway, and Belgium. The Netherlands is number 15 on the list (Scheherazade & Askari, 2010).

Religion and modernity

Four interviewees, CM2, MM5, MW7, and PW5, spoke about the compatibility of religion and modernity (macro-level) and the possibility of being a religious and modern person (micro-level) at the same time. Asked if the Netherlands is a secular state, interviewee MW7 drew upon a core characteristic of modern society. She (Text 2.10) said,

They [the Dutch] separate religion from other matters. Separate. It [separation] is not like Indonesia.

⁸⁵ Unfortunately, I could not find the source of the quote. The quote is cited by Ahmed Hasan (2011) in his article. However, Hasan does not mention the source of the quote.

Separation is what scholars call functional differentiation (Norris & Inglehart, 2011, p. 9). The view of the separation of religion and state is shared by several interviewees. Interviewee MM2 (Text 2.1) said,

[...] the Netherlands is a very secular state. Secular means that the state has replaced religion almost in most aspects.

When asked if religion and modernity are compatible, interviewee MW7 referred to “principle views” or “religious opinions” that are “very contradictory” to modernization. She (Text 2.10) said,

The principle views from the religious side [or] religious opinions are very contradictory to modernization. That is what I think. In my view, it seems that it is difficult [for religion and modernity to go hand in hand] in the Netherlands.

Interviewee MW7 also referred to religious rituals such as going to church every Sunday and praying five times a day as Indonesian ways of being religious (intertextuality), which are “difficult” for Dutch people (Text 2.10). Other interviewees drew upon the church as being “too dogmatic” and “does not follow the current development of young people” (CM1, Text 2.13) or “old fashioned” (PM2, Text 2.42) as contributing factors to empty churches in the Netherlands. Interviewees CM1, MW7, and PM2 implied that the compatibility of religion and modernity can be difficult for the Dutch.

When asked if a person can be modern and religious, interviewee CM2 (Text 2.16) referred to “a moral compass” (mental model, shared knowledge) that guides both religious and non-religious people. He (Text 2.16) said,

Religion is a belief and there is a term called a moral compass, ethical compass, moral compass, or moral character. That is what guides humans and I think it is good, and there is a community for that. But [people] must not forget that it is just a belief. It cannot be considered or applied literally. [People] can take the good things from it.

Interviewee CM2 implicitly drew upon a debate in the public media that because of secularization or de-churching, Dutch society loses its moral compass.

Asked if a person who is not religious has no moral compass, CM2 referred to a distinction between “societal competence” and “moral compass”, the latter being more “transcendental”. He (Text 2.16) said,

More or less [he/she does not have a moral compass], in my observations. I do not know [how to explain] why non-religious people have a different moral compass from religious people. Of course, people who are atheists or not religious are similar to me and you. He also has feelings [and] he also has manners, but I think sometimes it leads more to social competence. So, he does not do something because it is not considered good by society. That is the definition of ethics or morals, right? What is not considered good by society should not be done. But a religious person is more, how to say it, transcendental, more than that.

Interviewee CM2 implicitly drew on an old debate about whether morality needs to be religious (“transcendental”, based on “revelation”, as MW4 says in text 2.27) or can be autonomous (based on “logic and reason”, thus MW4 in text 2.27). When religious people claim that the danger of secularization is that Dutch society loses its moral compass, humanists react that this is nonsense because humanists also have a moral compass, a non-religious moral compass (Van Der Ham, 2022). In other words, humanism with a non-religious moral compass is also a significant element of modern values.

When asked his opinion about the compatibility between religion and modernity in the Netherlands, interviewee MM6 (Text 2.43) referred to the difference between “the encounter of the Netherlands with Catholicism and Protestantism” and “the encounter of Indonesia with Islam”, which contributed to the Dutch discourse on the incompatibility between religion and democracy. Interviewee MM6 drew upon the relationship between modernity and democracy in the sense that a modern state is a democratic state. This corresponds to Scheffer (2007, p. 38), who defines modern society as “liberal, secular and democratic”. Unlike Scheffer (2007), Bader (2007, p. 49) defines modern society as liberal and democratic but not necessarily secular.

When asked how Indonesians view modernity, MM6 (Text 2.43) said,

As a Muslim, I see that fiqh is always evolving. Fiqh is about Islamic law. It is always developing. [...] So when there is new progress, the [Islamic] law must also be reformulated. Therefore, modernity demands fiqh experts, the ulama (Islamic scholars), to think about what is best and how to respond to progress. That is clear from what Rasul (the messenger) [Muhammad] said. [...] In one hadith, he [Muhammad] said, “You understand more about your worldly affairs”. [...] Rasul [Muhammad] already knew that his people would encounter an era different from his. [...] That is the contextualization of Islam. Therefore, Islam will always be contextual. [Islam] will always adapt to modernity, including its laws.

He referred to *fiqh* (Islamic law) which is constantly developing, and the statement of *Rasul* [Muhammad] in the *hadith* (explicit intertextuality) to imply that Islam and its laws will always be contextual and adapt to modernity. He continued,

The challenge [of modernity in the Netherlands], [for Muslims] is, for example, we [Muslims] have a friend, who, for example, chooses to be gay. This is modernity, right? [...] As a member (nahdlyin) of NU, I stick to what NU holds the most, which is we [Muslims] have ukhuwah Islamiyah, ukhuwah wathaniyah, and ukhuwah basyariyah. [...] If you consume alcohol or you choose to be gay, we [my friend and I] do not meet in ukhuwah Islamiyah. But we still meet [in the level of ukhuwah basyariyah]. I will respect him as a human being, who chooses and has independent rights, to choose his life path. I will not be hostile to him. That is the modernity that I found in the Netherlands. I have met friends who chose to be gay or lesbian or friends who chose not to be religious.

He drew upon three concepts of brotherhood in Islam: *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic brotherhood), *ukhuwah wathaniyah* (national brotherhood), and *ukhuwah basyariyah* (brotherhood of humankind), which are held by the NU organization (explicit intertextuality). He referred to people who “chose to be gay or lesbian” and people who “chose not to be religious” as examples of modernity in the Netherlands. He drew upon the concept of the brotherhood of humankind (*ukhuwah basyariyah*) (explicit intertextuality) to explain how he, as a Muslim and a member of NU, defined modernity in the Netherlands: “That is the modernity that I found in the Netherlands”.

MM6’s description of modernity as the brotherhood of humankind corresponds to the French idea of fraternity in the motto “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, which are fundamental values for French society and democratic life in general. The concept of the brotherhood of humankind comes close to the First Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (OHCHR, n.d.).

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

The concept of the brotherhood of humankind in the Netherlands pertains to various interviewees’ implicit references to a liberal democracy through the notions of individual freedom, respect, rights, and the role of the state (Text 2.3, Text 2.4, Text 2.21, and Text 2.32).

3. Analysis of discourse as social practice

The analysis of discourse as social practice (explanation stage) focuses on the social conditions and effects of discourse. Fairclough (1992, pp. 64-65) distinguishes three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse: “social identity” or “subject position” (identity), “social relationships” (relational), and “systems of knowledge and belief” (ideational). The analytic questions in this stage are: What are the conditions and effects of what discourse participants say? Is there any reproduction or transformation in their discourse practice? How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves?

A shared living space for the equally respected religious and non-religious people

Various interviewees reproduced the discourse of secularization in the Netherlands in the sense of the neutrality of the Dutch state towards religion and that everyone has the right to have and not to have a religion. Interviewee MM6 said (Text 2.4),

Secular [means that] the Dutch [state] has never questioned the establishment of a house of worship as long as it does not disturb public order. Usually, that [public order] is the consideration. [...] it is very secular because all the requirements [to establish a house of worship] are universal values. Universal values [such as] issues of order, security, health, et cetera. [...] Even in [a big city like] Utrecht, the mosque is located in the middle of the city, in the middle of the city centre, outside the train station. That would not be possible if the state is not a secular state.

Interviewee MM6 reiterated the discourse of the Netherlands as a secular state by pointing out the role of the Dutch state in managing public order issues based on universal values (ideational) such as the establishment of a house of worship. He positioned the secular Dutch state as accommodating towards religious groups, in this case, the Muslims.

Interviewee PM1 (Text 2.3) said,

Secular in the sense that they [Dutch people] have freedom. [The Dutch state] gives freedom to religion or the church to grow but it [the Dutch state] also does not encourage it to grow. [...] Therefore, secular, in my opinion, among the Dutch society here, is a shared living space for the equally respected religious people and non-[religious] people. Therefore, both [the religious people and

the non-religious people] are respected and their existence is recognized. That is secularism here in the Netherlands in my opinion. [It is] secularism that recognizes the existence of groups within society and that recognition includes how each group listens to each other's opinions.

Interviewee PM1 also positioned the secular Dutch state as accommodating towards religions. Moreover, he positioned the Dutch as being respectful to both non-religious and religious people (relational). To have a shared living space where people are free and respected is one of the essential elements of liberal democracy. Another interviewee, MM2, reproduced the notion of freedom by stating that “we [Muslims] become more faithful in the Netherlands. Our faith has more quality because we [Muslims] do not need other people to ask us to join [them to perform prayer]” (Text 2.1) (identity).

It is my business with God

Several interviewees shared the discourse that religion in the Netherlands is private and people do not talk about it. Interviewee MW1 reproduced the notion that in the Netherlands religion is a private matter by stating that religion is her “personal business” (ideational). She said (Text 2.24),

I went to the place of my client. She said, “Why do you make yourself ridiculous? You make yourself ridiculous”. And I said, “Why ridiculous? It is my personal [business]. Whether you judge it is good or not is up to you. It is not my business with you. It is my business with God”. [My client said it] because I am wearing a headscarf. For me, what is important is [that] my husband said [it is] good. Other people? ‘t Kan me niet schelen (I don't care), [I] don't care.

While reproducing the notion that religion is a private matter, interviewee MW1 also indicated that she did not care what her client thought of her choice of wearing a headscarf. She expressed that the choice was not her client's business, but her business with God (relational).

Some interviewees positioned the Netherlands as different from Indonesia on the religious matter because in Indonesia, “religion is public and majority” and “the minority has a very small space”. Several interviewees positioned themselves (identity) differently from the Indonesian notion of the public role of religion by stating that religion in Indonesia “should be private” (ideational). They reproduced the Dutch notion of religion as a private matter. Interviewee MW2 (Text 2.19) stated her support of the statement of the former Governor of Jakarta by questioning, “What

is the purpose to put religion on the identity card?” When asked if she talks about religion with Dutch people, she responded (Text 2.23),

Here [in the Netherlands], [we] are not supposed to ask [about] religion. That is private. [We] cannot [ask about it]. [We are] not free. Well, how to put it, we cannot discuss religion with people. It is something that can cause emotion but well, I also do not tell [people about my religion]. [...] That [religion] is my business. In the Netherlands, the saying is niet mee bemoeien (do not interfere).

Interviewee MW2 reproduced the Dutch notion of the privacy of religion by “not telling her religion to other people” and by using the Dutch phrase *niet mee bemoeien* (relational). While reproducing the discourse of religion as a private matter, interviewees MW2 (Text 2.23) and CM1 (Text 2.25) transformed the notion of freedom of religion by stating that they are “not free” to talk about religion and God in a public sphere, as there would be consequences (relational). Interviewee CM1 (Text 2.25) said, “If I mention God, [they would say], ‘You are out’. I would get kicked out of the field of business because a business does not recognize God”.

I was a Muslim by birth and now I’m a Muslim by conviction

Various interviewees positioned non-religious Dutch as different from them. The interviewees shared the discourse of the Dutch as rational people by pointing out the difficulty to explain “faith” to people who use “logic”. Interviewee MM4 (Text 2.26) said, “I have my faith in my religion with my heart whereas they [the Dutch] use their logic” (identity). Several Indonesian parents stated that they have to apply the “Dutch style” in speaking with their children, who are educated in the Netherlands, by using “strong arguments” (relational).

Interviewee MW4 reproduced the discourse of rationality by emphasizing the importance of learning “deeper about religion” to “explain” her faith better (ideational). She said (Text 2.29).

Because people here [say], “Oh you are praying to the big daddy in the sky”. [I say], “That is your concept. It is not mine. That is not my world”. Indeed, the deeper you learn about religion, the easier for you to explain. [When I can explain], they [the Dutch] have their respect [for me]. [...] Before I met my husband, I was a Muslim by birth and now I can say to them [the Dutch], “I’m a Muslim by conviction, with consciousness”. [I am] happy [that] they [the Dutch] also appreciate, respect [me].

Interviewee MW4 transformed the concept of “praying to the big daddy in the sky” by indicating that the concept is not hers (identity). Reproducing the discourse of rationality, she experienced a transformation by saying, “Before I met my husband, I was a Muslim by birth and now I can say to them [the Dutch], I’m a Muslim by conviction, with consciousness” (identity). She is “happy” that Dutch people “respect” her (relational) when she said that she is a Muslim by conviction. This confirmed the statement of interviewee PM1 (Text 2.3) who positioned the Dutch as being respectful to religious people (relational).

It is not as secular as I thought it would be

Several interviewees transformed the discourse of the Netherlands as a secular state (ideational). Interviewee AM1 (Text 2.9) said,

There was a bit of a surprise for me when I began meeting with religious people in the Netherlands. People who have maintained religious identity. I am not sure if they are spiritually religious, but they are definitely culturally religious. Many Catholics were outspoken, in the sense that, you know, when we talk about religion to them, they will openly say that they believe in God. [...] So that was a bit of a revelation for me, the fact that it is not as secular as I thought it would be. And then, of course, knowing about the Bible Belt, which includes Katwijk and these other places.

Interviewee AM1 transformed his view of the Netherlands as a secular state because he met with religious people and knew about the Bible Belt in the Netherlands (ideational).

Another interviewee, MM1 (Text 2.6), transformed the discourse of the Netherlands as a secular state by indicating that while the Dutch state is secular, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is Christian (ideational).

Although they [the Dutch] say this is a secular state, the King officially belongs to a church, Christian. Official. The King is not allowed to have other religions. It has been [like that] since the Prussian era. That is what I have read. Yes, the government [is secular] but the kingdom is not. That is the difference.

Interviewee MM3 (Text 2.33) transformed the notion of the Dutch as secular people by labelling Dutch people and the Netherlands as very religious.

I do not judge Dutch people for not being religious because they never go to church. That is because their religious practice is already beyond ritual.

[It is] already more than mere ritual. They [the Dutch] have practiced it in their daily life on how to be a religious person. Sometimes it is not based on religious awareness, but because of their obedience to rules. Being obedient to rules is religious teaching. Therefore, I keep considering the Netherlands as [a] very religious [country]. [...] Not secular. Wrong. [...] The Netherlands is very religious in the sense of how they [the Dutch] are practicing the values of Christianity, the values of religions in general.

He also transformed the notion of religious practice such as going to church to practicing religious values, which are “more than mere ritual” (ideational).

Three interviewees, NW3, PM2, and PW5, positioned themselves differently from others who see religion in the Netherlands as declining (relational). These interviewees transformed the notion of the Dutch as secular people by indicating that there are Christian migrant communities (Text 2.41), young people in the Crossroad International Church, Hillsong Church Nederland and the Evangelical Broadcasting Youth Day (Text 2.42), and very faithful Christian people in Zwolle, Veenendaal, and Urk (Text 2.42).

Interviewee PM1 transformed the discourse of the Dutch as irreligious people by pointing out that Dutch people “have another religiosity in a secular context” (ideational) (Text 2.14). When asked about religiosity, he replied (Text 2.15),

I have a different definition of religiosity. Using the idea of Grace Davie, believing does not mean belonging, but there is also believing that is also belonging. [...] Although I do not completely agree with Grace Davie's opinion, it [the concept of believing without belonging] helps to see, to describe the situation in the Netherlands. [...] there is also a fact [...] that here [in the Netherlands], there is no believing and there is no belonging. Or the believing is on other things, not a matter of religions, but their believing is [that] they have other spirituality.

Interviewee PM1 indicated a different position from other people who spoke about religiosity in the Netherlands (identity) by reproducing Grace Davie's concept of “believing without belonging”, although he does not “completely agree with Grace Davie's opinion” (ideational).

Five interviewees spoke about the Dutch as spiritual people. Two interviewees, AM1 and NW3, reproduced the discourse of religious spirituality in the sense of traditional

religion. Three interviewees, CM1, PM1, and PW3, transformed the discourse about religious spirituality by distinguishing spirituality from religiosity (ideational). Interviewee PM1 stated that this kind of “believing” is “rather difficult to explain” (Text 2.15) (ideational). Interviewee CM1 equated spirituality with *zingeving* (giving meaning) (Text 2.25), which he classified as “not the same as religion” (ideational). Interviewee PW3 said (Text 2.40),

Religious? I think yes [the Dutch are] spiritual but religious? I do not think so. They [the Dutch] are spiritual. [...] They [the Dutch] are more interested in spiritual matters. [...] strangely, although they are irreligious, they believe in paranormal matters, which is so contradictory. [They believe] in psychic, medium, for real. They [the Dutch] often have events for those things on the weekends or once a month, there must be a paranormal beurs (exhibition).

Interviewee PW3 reproduced the notion of the Dutch as irreligious people by indicating that the Dutch “are spiritual” in the sense that they “believe in paranormal matters”, which for her is strange (ideational).

I saw Islam

Six Muslim interviewees, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, MW2, and MW4, identified “Islamic values”, “Islamic teaching” and “the pillars of Islam” that “exist” and “are implemented” in the Netherlands (ideational). Five of them, MM4, MM5, MM6, MW2, and MW4, reproduced the notion of the Netherlands as a secular state while indicating that Islamic teachings and values are being practiced in the Netherlands by Dutch people, who are non-Muslims. Quoting the statement of Muhammad Abduh, interviewee MW4 (Text 2.39) identified “Islam at a certain level” in the Netherlands (ideational). Her statement is shared by other interviewees. Interviewee MM6 (Text 2.36) equated the Netherlands as a welfare state with the Islamic concept “*baladatun thayyibatun*” (prosperous country) (ideational). Interviewee MM4 (Text 2.38) said, “When they [the Dutch] develop their country, [they are] very Islamic because [they] implement justice principles. There is no discrimination and there is 0% corruption, and they really hold on to that”.

Interviewee MM3 positioned himself differently from others who called the Netherlands a secular state (identity) by pointing out that the Netherlands “is very religious” in the sense of how the Dutch practice religious values (Text 2.33). When asked about his impression of religious life in the Netherlands, he answered (Text 2.32),

Their [the Dutch's] religiosity is already beyond their religion. Religion is already embedded in the institutions, in the sense of only the values. The policies are based on religious values, for example, security, tolerance [and] freedom. Those are values in religion. Yeah, universal. Islam, Christianity, all have tolerance. The freedom for everyone. Respecting everyone. And then social security. For example, they care about poor people, et cetera. That is not only religion but [also] the state. I see that those universal values have entered the state's structure. The values. Therefore, when they [the Dutch] make rules, when they make laws, when they make policies, that are related to society, the citizens, they are actually religious. Those are the goals of religions like Islam, and Christianity, and so forth.

By classifying security, tolerance, freedom, respect, and care about poor people as religious values, interviewee MM3 gave nuance to the meaning of “religiosity” that he viewed as “beyond religion” (Text 2.32) and “beyond ritual” (Text 2.33) (ideational). Interviewees MM3 (Text 2.32) and MM6 (Text 2.4 and Text 2.35) alternated the phrase “universal values” with “religious values”. By referring to the practice of “religious values”, interviewees MM3 (Text 2.32) and MM6 (Text 2.35) reproduced the result of “a poll about the most Islamic countries in the world” (ideational). Interviewee MM3 (Text 2.34) said,

In fact, countries like Indonesia and Arab countries are not on the list [of the poll]. Yes, they [the Dutch] are religious. I think that is why the poll put these countries [Western, Christian countries], including the Netherlands, as winners because they have practiced [religious values] in all matters. If you see the religiosity of a nation from its ritual, then maybe you will put India [and] Indonesia as the most religious countries because there are many religious rituals. But in practice, countries that practice religious values the most are countries like those [on the list of the poll].

The knowledge of Muslim interviewees about Islam plays a role as members' resources in their discourse of secularization in the Netherlands. It offers another lens of interpretation of the relationship between religion, especially Islam, and modernity. As an effect of finding “the pillars of Islam” in the Netherlands, interviewee MM5 (Text 2.37) said, “I am closer to Allah in this non-Muslim country”.

Conclusion

From the perspective of the interviewees, modern life constitutes a process of secularization in the sense of rationalization, individual freedom, and the decline of Christianity. They defined “secular” as concerning (1) the separation of religion and state including the role of the state in replacing religion, (2) the recognition of both religious and non-religious people in society, (3) the freedom of religion (religious people and religious institutions), and (4) the decline of church attendance. In their discourse, interviewees often equated “religion” with “church” or “Christianity”.

At the micro-level, they positioned the (irreligious) Dutch as different from them. They also positioned the Dutch as being respectful to both non-religious and religious people such as the Indonesians. They described Dutch people, on the one hand, as “very secular”, in the sense that they are “atheists”, they “do not need religion”, they “do not believe in God”, they “do not go to church”, and they “do not talk about religion”. The definition of secular also comes close to “rational” and “logical” (alternative wordings), and they used these words as contrasts to “religious”.

On the other hand, they described the Dutch as “spiritual” and adhering to “religious values”. They spoke of a minority of religious people and irreligious or secular people, who are religious in their attitude. For most interviewees, religious people are people who have maintained a “religious identity”, people who “believe in God”, people who practice religious rituals, and people who have “a very strong position on their religious values and views” (alternative wordings). In this understanding, there are two categories of being religious: “spiritually religious” (people who believe in God and have religious values and views), and “culturally religious” (people who go to church once a year and people who celebrate Christmas with family). A sub-category of being “religious” is attributed to people who implement religious values in their daily life, although they “do not believe in God” or “do not have a religion”.

At the meso-level, interviewees spoke about empty churches and the declining role of churches and religious education. The priests and old generations are “too conservative”, and young Dutch people “feel more independent and private”, which contributes to their interest in “Eastern spirituality, et cetera”. Interviewees also indicated that in the public sphere, people are “not free” to speak about religion.

At the macro-level, interviewees positioned the Dutch state as accommodating towards religions. The discourse of secularization in the Netherlands at the macro-level constitutes a discussion about the role of the state and, primarily, the

implementation of the law. Various interviewees drew upon the rule of law, which they saw as “above religion” and the role of the Dutch state in managing public order issues. In other words, according to Indonesian immigrants, a modern state is a democratic state. Modern life in the Netherlands bears religious values and religious attitudes of the people, although they are not aware of nor recognize them as religious attitudes. This is because “they are far from religious life”, in the sense that “religion is a private matter”, and young people do not receive religious education unless their parents choose to do so. In the Netherlands, there is no “religious school” in the Indonesian sense, such as an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*).

In the interviewees’ view, “religious values” in the Netherlands transform into “universal values” that “have entered the state’s structure”. For several Muslim interviewees, the Netherlands as a welfare state has a system that is in line with Islamic concepts. For some of them, the Netherlands is more Islamic than Indonesia and other Muslim countries as they recognized Islamic teachings and values practiced by the Dutch. In this case, they positioned the (non-Muslim) Dutch as more Islamic than them. The comparison with Indonesia as a mental model runs through almost all interviews.

For some interviewees, the Dutch are not secular because of the implementation of religious values at both macro and micro-levels. Furthermore, the freedom of religion in Dutch secular society has its limits when it comes to “talking about religion or God” as it is confined to the private sphere. One interviewee referred to “a long debate” in the Netherlands on the (in)compatibility of religion and democracy. For Indonesian immigrants, religion and modernity, including democracy, are compatible. One interviewee identified modernity in the Netherlands as a universal brotherhood or humanity in a liberal democracy where people have freedom and independent rights.



CHAPTER III

Liberalism in the Netherlands

“Of course, from a religious, moral view, those things contradict my faith”

Introduction

The second most common topic on religion and modernity mentioned by the interviewees is the Netherlands as a liberal state or the liberal attitude of the Dutch. Some interviewees mentioned the legality of “drugs,” “prostitution,” “cohabitation,” “abortion”, and “same-sex marriage” as examples of “liberalism” themselves. This chapter focuses on how they speak about those issues, what they refer to, and the social conditions and effects of liberalism discourse. This chapter consists of three parts, following the three stages of CDA. In the first part, the focus is on the words and expressions used by the interviewees when speaking about liberalism in the Netherlands. In the second part, I focus on the references (members’ resources) drawn upon by the interviewees. The final part focuses on the social conditions and effects of liberalism discourse, particularly the aspects of identity or position, their relationship with the Dutch, and their system of knowledge and belief.

1. Analysis of discourse as linguistic practice

The analysis of discourse as linguistic practice (description) focuses on the linguistic features of the text (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 70-71). In this stage, the focus is on the vocabulary, grammar and structure of the text which includes overwording, rewording, and alternative wording. The analytic question in this stage is: What words and expressions do discourse participants use when speaking about liberalism in the Netherlands?

The Netherlands is a liberal state

Besides calling the Netherlands “a secular state”, various interviewees called the Netherlands a “liberal” state or pointed out the “liberal attitude” of the Dutch when asked about their impression of the Netherlands and their interaction with Dutch people. Some interviewees called the Dutch “progressive”. Two interviewees, AM1 and MM6, called the Netherlands “liberal” and “secular” simultaneously, while others mentioned the two terms separately during the interview.

When asked what he knew about the Netherlands before he came, interviewee MM4 said, “What I had in mind before I came to the Netherlands was that it is a super liberal state because it legalizes marijuana and other stuff. If I may be specific, the drugs, which are forbidden in Indonesia”.⁸⁶ The verbs “legalize” and “forbidden” indicate a contrast between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

⁸⁶ Yang terlintas sebelum saya ke sana itu (Belanda) adalah [...] negara yang super liberal karena melegalkan ganja dan teman-temannya. Kalau boleh spesifik ya, obat-obatan yang di Indonesia dilarang beredar. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

When asked what he knew about the Netherlands before he came, interviewee AM1 replied,

Text 3.1

A: *I have a stereotype about the Netherlands that the Netherlands is a liberal, a super liberal state. It is even the most liberal state in the world. It allows prostitution, soft drugs, and so forth. Besides that, North Europe is surely known for being strong in [unfinished sentence]. I already knew that they [North European countries] are way more secular than other places like America or Australia. It seems that they [North European countries] have overcome the process of religious fights centuries ago.*

Q: *And when you came [to the Netherlands], what did you see?*

A: *Well, that was not my concern because I have never cared about religion, so I was never looking for that aspect when I came to the Netherlands. [...] There was a bit of a surprise for me when I began meeting with religious people in the Netherlands. [...] So that was a bit of a revelation for me, the fact that it is not as secular as I thought it would be. [...] ⁸⁷ So it made me realize that Dutch liberalism is really different from the idea of California liberalism, or what you call American liberalism. I do not think they [the Americans] are liberal so much as they [the Dutch] are. They [the Dutch] don't care about what other people do. [...] There is a very individualistic notion that if you are not bothering me, I won't bother you. [...] There is no effort to conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system, which I think is quite, it is nice that way. ⁸⁸*

Interviewee AM1, like the previous interviewee, MM4, also called the Netherlands “a super liberal state”. He rephrased his statement and said that the Netherlands “is even the most liberal state in the world” (overwording) because “it allows prostitution, soft drugs, and so forth”. The phrase “they [North European countries] have overcome

⁸⁷ The complete version of the statement “[...] There was a bit of a surprise for me [...] the fact that it is not as secular as I thought it would be [...]” are quoted and discussed in the previous chapter as the interviewee specifically spoke about secularization. See Text 2.9.

⁸⁸ J: Saya punya *stereotype* mengenai Belanda bahwa Belanda merupakan negara liberal, super liberal, bahkan paling liberal di dunia. Memperbolehkan prostitusi, memperbolehkan *soft drugs*, dan lain-lain. Selain itu Eropa Utara tentu kuat dengan apa namanya, waktu itu saya udah tahu bahwa mereka jauh lebih sekuler daripada tempat lain kayak Amerika atau Australia. Kayaknya mereka sudah melampaui pertarungan-pertarungan religious berabad-abad yang lalu.

T: Pas kamu datang, *what did you see?*

J: Itu bukan hal yang *concern* bagi aku karena aku juga nggak terlalu peduli dengan agama *so I was never looking for that aspect when I came to the Netherlands*. Note: From this point on, the interviewee (AM1) continued using English until the end of the interview. The rest of the text in English is an original quote. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

the process of religious fights centuries ago” implies a transformation from being religious to being “secular” and “liberal”. The phrase corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM6 (Text 2.43) in the previous chapter on the encounter of the Netherlands with Catholicism and Protestantism, which contributes to the debate on the compatibility of religion and democracy.

Interviewee AM1 spoke about the difference between “Dutch liberalism” and “California liberalism”. He alternated “California liberalism” with “American liberalism”. The phrases “they don’t care what other people do,” “if you are not bothering me, I won’t bother you,” and “there is no effort to conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system,” are overwording to stress the “very individualistic notion” in the Dutch society, which makes Dutch liberalism different from American liberalism. By comparing American and Dutch liberalism, he implicitly stated that American liberalism comprises an effort to conform people to a certain stereotype or value system, which is not the case with Dutch liberalism.

Interviewee MM6 stated his impression of the Netherlands as “a liberal, secular state”. When asked to give an example of being liberal, he responded,

Text 3.2

A: I see [the Netherlands] as [a] liberal [state] on, for example, prostitution. Here, [prostitution] is legal. They [prostitutes] even pay tax. The second [example] is the relationship between a man and a woman. It has nothing to do with religion. The regulation [for cohabitation] is a matter of justice. Justice means they [a man and a woman] are being protected as long as they [a man and a woman] like each other. For me, that is liberal because even [when a man and a woman] are not married, it is ok [to live together]. That is fun. I mean, that is your choice. It is truly your choice to choose [person] A or [person] B [for cohabitation]. It is up to you. In my opinion, that is liberal. I am saying this as an outsider, an Indonesian. And then drugs, like marijuana, and others, are allowed here. It is [allowed] to a certain degree but it is regulated. I think that is liberal. And then gay people have rights here, same-sex marriage, that is liberal.

Q: What do you think of abortion and euthanasia? Are they part of being liberal?

A: In my opinion, yes, they are part of the Dutch’s liberal values. Apart from whether I agree or disagree [on those is another matter] but in my opinion, in my view, those are their [the Dutch’s] liberal values although they also met with big resistance.

Q: Did you mean a protest?

A: Yes. A protest from the Dutch people. I know it as I often read the newspaper. Many people are against abortion. At least people are against it. I do not [know] much about euthanasia. It seems that there are not many people who are against it. Not as many as [people who are against] abortion.

Q: Do you know who is against it?

A: Usually religious groups such as a church community, religious groups and so forth but there are also humanitarian groups, human rights groups [who argue that] a fetus has the right to live. It [a fetus] should not be immediately [aborted]. Perhaps the negotiation is upon when an abortion is done. Perhaps when [a fetus is] already four months old, it is not allowed [to be aborted] or something but [the point is] some people are against it [abortion].⁸⁹

Interviewee MM6 mentioned the word “liberal” seven times (four times in the phrase “that is liberal”, thus overwording) to emphasize his view of the Netherlands as a liberal state. The words “legal”, “regulation”, “justice”, “protected”, “regulated” and “rights” are alternative wording to emphasize the rule of law that regulates and protects the Dutch citizens. The text implies that issues such as cohabitation and homosexuality have “nothing to do with religion” and are more related to “justice” in the sense of protection of individual “choice”. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW2 about

⁸⁹ J: Kalau liberalnya saya melihat tentang, e apa ya, kita contohkan prostitusi lah. Di sini kan legal, bahkan mereka bayar pajak. Yang kedua masalah hubungan antara laki-laki dan perempuan itu mereka tidak ada urusan dengan agama, tapi yang diatur adalah masalah keadilan misalnya antara, keadilan itu artinya mereka dilindungi selama mereka sama-sama suka. [...] Itu menurut saya liberal karena tidak menikah pun tidak apa-apa. Di situ asiknya. Maksudnya dalam artian asik itu ya itu pilihan kamu, bener-bener pilihan kamu memilih A atau B itu terserah. Itu menurut saya liberal. Ini saya mengatakan sebagai *outsider* ya, dari orang Indonesia. Kemudian obat-obatan seperti ganja dan lain-lain itu kan boleh saja di sini. Ada kadarnya tapi diatur. Itu menurut saya liberal. Kemudian gay itu juga diakui haknya di sini, nikah sesama jenis, itu liberal.

T: Apa pandangan anda tentang aborsi dan euthanasia? Apakah itu bagian dari liberal?

J: Menurut saya ya, itu bagian dari liberal values yang diusung oleh Belanda. Terlepas saya setuju atau tidaknya tapi menurut saya, dalam pandangan saya itu adalah *liberal values* yang mereka usung, walaupun resistensinya kan besar juga.

T: Protes maksudnya?

J: Ya protes dari kelompok Belanda sendiri. Saya tahu saya sering baca koran. Aborsi itu banyak yang menentang, setidaknya ada yang menentang. Kalau euthanasia saya tidak terlalu, kayaknya jarang yang menentang. Tidak sebesar aborsi.

T: Yang menentang ini dari yang anda tahu dari ?

J: Biasanya kelompok keagamaan kayak dari komunitas gereja, perkumpulan keagamaan dan lain-lain tapi juga ada yang humanitarian ya, kelompok-kelompok HAM bahwa janin itu berhak hidup gitu, harusnya tidak langsung (digugurkan). Mungkin negosiasinya adalah kapan bisa melakukan aborsi. Kalau usianya sudah 4 bulan mungkin nggak boleh atau gimana tapi ada yang menentang.

Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

marriage procedure (Text 2.2) that in the Netherlands, “the law is the most important and then the religion”. The phrases “truly your choice” and “up to you” are overwording to emphasize the freedom to choose to cohabit with anyone. It corresponds to the statement of interviewee AM1 (Text 3.1) on individualistic notions.

Interviewee MM6 mentioned the phrase “liberal values” twice (overwording) to emphasize that the legality of drugs, same-sex marriage, abortion, and euthanasia are part of the Dutch’s liberal values. He implied that being liberal means “allowing” things such as drugs “to a certain degree” and having them “regulated” by law. He indicated his “view” from his position as “an outsider”, a term that he alternated with “an Indonesian”. By saying “apart from whether I agree or disagree [on those is another matter]”, he made a distinction between his stance and his “opinion” or “view” (alternative wording) on abortion and euthanasia.

Interviewee MM6 made a classification of “church community, religious groups” (alternative wording) and “humanitarian groups, human rights groups” (alternative wording) to indicate different types of group that are against abortion. In correspondence with Text 2.16 about a non-religious moral compass, humanism as a modern value does not necessarily applies a liberal value. This text (3.2) states that the Dutch’s liberal values on abortion are not accepted by all Dutch people.

When asked her opinion of prostitution in the Netherlands, interviewee NW3 replied,

Text 3.3

So far, the government is still, quite progressive, or liberal although now I feel that they are less progressive than before. In 1999, for example, in the city of Amsterdam. [...] At that time, the Mayor of Amsterdam was from the socialist party. I felt that it was very progressive because I heard about his policy. He wanted the Red-Light District to not be separated [or] excluded from the life of good people. Therefore, in the Red-Light District area, there is a street, where the second and third floors of the tall canal houses were provided for rent by people, who do not work in the prostitution business or tourism business. [...] During my study, a representative of the Amsterdam city hall was invited to give a guest lecture. He explained that families with children are also welcomed to live in the Red-Light District area. At that time, I thought, wow, [that is] very progressive, crazy. That is great because the prostitution business was not regarded as something dirty and they [the Dutch government] believed, really believed that the prostitution business could be legalized, be legalized, and be managed well. Of course, later on, with the establishment of the European Union, which

*since the year 2000 onwards made European doors more open and easier to be penetrated from other countries, there are human trafficking issues. [...] To that point, I still see that the Netherlands is relatively more liberal than other European countries. [...] On matters such as sexuality and prostitution, as far as I know, Amsterdam was once liberal. [It] was once progressive but later it becomes more conservative.*⁹⁰

Interviewee NW3 mentioned the adjective “progressive” six times (overwording) and equated it with the adjective “liberal” (alternative wording) to emphasize her impression of the Dutch government. She mentioned the “Red-Light District” area three times (overwording) to stress the “very progressive” policy of the Dutch government regarding the “prostitution business” in Amsterdam around the year 1999. The noun “business” is mentioned four times to emphasize prostitution as legal commercial activity. The adjective “crazy” indicates her strong impression and emphasis on how progressive the policy of the municipality of Amsterdam on the Red-Light District area was “at that time”.

As examples of being “very progressive” she mentioned that (1) the houses in the Red-Light District area were “provided for rent by people, who do not work in the prostitution business or tourism business”, (2) “prostitution business was not regarded as something dirty”, and (3) “the Dutch government really believed that the prostitution business could be legalized and be managed well”. The text indicates that before 2000, the Netherlands is “relatively more liberal” than “other European countries” and after the establishment of the European Union, the city of Amsterdam has become “more conservative” on “sexuality and prostitution”.

⁹⁰ *So far pemerintah itu masih, masih cukup progressive atau liberal, walaupun sekarang ini rasaku, mereka less progressive than before. Jadi waktu 99, contohnya kota Amsterdam ya. Waktu itu aku merasa, di bawah partai sosialis ya waktu itu, ininya, Mayornya Amsterdam. Itu masih very progressive. Karena apa, aku mendengar policy-nya misalnya dia menginginkan Red-Light itu bukan district yang terpisah, dighettokan dari kehidupan orang baik-baik. Jadi, di dalam Red-Light itu ada satu jalan yang khusus lantai dua dan tiganya, kan itu bangunan rumah-rumah kanal yang tinggi-tinggi kan. Lantai dua dan tiganya, itu diundang orang-orang yang tidak bekerja di bisnis prostitusi atau bisnis tourism untuk tinggal di situ. Waktu aku kuliah, salah satu perwakilan gemeente diundang sebagai dosen tamu. Dia juga menerangkan bahwa family, jadi, Red-Light District itu juga diundang untuk family dengan anak yang mau tinggal di sana. Aku pikir waktu itu wow, progressive banget ya, gila. Hebat deh ini, karena bisnis prostitusi tidak dianggap sebagai sesuatu yang kotor, dan mereka percaya, sangat percaya, bahwa bisnis prostitusi bisa dilegal, e, di dilegalisir dan dimanage dengan baik. Nah, tentu kemudian dengan, dengan munculnya European Union, yang kemudian sejak dua ribu ke atas itu pintu Eropa lebih terbuka dan lebih mudah dibrobos masuk dari negara-negara lain, kemudian isu-isu human trafficking. [...] Jadi sampai pada titik itu aku masih melihat bahwa Belanda relatif lebih liberal dari negara-negara Eropa yang lain. [...] Jadi kalau di dalam misalnya hal-hal yang sifatnya seksualitas, prostitusi, pernah liberal, pernah progressive tapi kemudian menjadi lebih conservative, untuk kota Amsterdam yang aku tahu. Interviewed on December 10, 2017.*

The phrases “more conservative” and “less progressive” correlate with “human trafficking issues”. The phrases are related to the legality of prostitution as a business, as opposed to (illegal) human trafficking. The Dutch government, in this case, the city of Amsterdam, has become “more conservative” or more restrictive about prostitution, not in moral terms but in legal terms.

When asked about his interaction with Dutch people, interviewee CM2 replied,

Text 3.4

A: There is a strange thing. Usually, it is easier for me to be friends with Dutch women than with Dutchmen. I have female Dutch friends but not male Dutch friends. My male friends are usually all foreigners, non-Dutch.

Q: Why? What is it about Dutch women that Dutchmen do not have?

A: I also still do not know why. That is indeed strange. The majority of Dutch women are still conservative and somewhat SARA⁹¹. They do not like to interact with foreigners. Those who interact [with foreigners] are usually those who have an alternative worldview. Usually, they are left-wing people, liberal, [and] more open. But sometimes, as I said before, the liberal hypocrites presume that their worldview is the best. Anyway, that is why it is easier for me to make friends with Dutch women. It is because their worldview is more open, the liberal ones. With the Dutchmen who are liberal, I still do not know why [I am not friends with them].⁹²

The adjective “strange” is mentioned twice (overwording) by interviewee CM2 to emphasize the oddity of his interaction with Dutch people. He implied two types of Dutch women. The first type, and the majority, are those who are “still conservative

⁹¹ The Indonesian acronym SARA stands for *Suku* (ethnicity), *Agama* (religion), *Ras* (race) and *Antargolongan* (intergroup relations) to address the notion of diversity. SARA issues are considered highly sensitive and taboo to be discussed as they have the potential of disturbing social order and threaten the stability of the unity of the Indonesian nation. When someone or something is labelled “SARA”, they are seen to have a discriminatory attitude toward the SARA issues.

⁹² J: Ada keanehan ya. Biasanya saya itu malah lebih enak atau lebih bisa bergaul dengan orang Belanda yang perempuan daripada yang laki-laki. Jadi saya punya teman-teman perempuan Belanda tapi ndak punya teman laki Belanda. Teman laki saya itu biasanya orang asing semua, non Belanda.

T: Mengapa? Ada apa dengan perempuan Belanda yang tidak ada di laki-laki Belanda?

J: Itu saya juga masih belum tahu itu kenapa itu. Itu memang hal aneh. Mayoritas perempuan Belanda itu masih konservatif dan agak SARA ya. Mereka nggak suka berhubungan dengan orang-orang asing. Yang mau berhubungan itu biasanya yang punya pandangan dunia yang alternatif. Biasanya orang dari sayap kiri, liberal. Lebih terbuka. Tetapi kadangkala itu seperti yang saya ceritakan, orang yang sok liberal itu menganggap pandangan hidupnya itu yang terbaik. Jadi itu, kenapa kok saya lebih mudah berkawan dengan perempuan Belanda itu karena itu, mereka pandangan hidupnya lebih terbuka, yang liberal ini. Dan laki-laki yang liberal pun. Kenapa ya? Saya juga nggak tahu. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

and somewhat SARA". He used the Indonesian term SARA to indicate that the majority of Dutch women "do not like to interact with foreigners". The adverb "somewhat" indicates the degree of the SARA attitude. The second type, and the one the interviewee is friends with, are "those who have an alternative worldview". He equated people with "an alternative worldview" as "left-wing", "liberal", and "more open" (alternative wording) people. He also indicated that there are "the liberal hypocrites", who "presume that their worldview is the best". He referred to hypocritical Dutch who claimed themselves to be liberal but not accepting issues such as homosexuality (see Text 3.27).

They have a very good degree of freedom

Various interviewees responded to questions on their impression of abortion, euthanasia, drugs, prostitution and homosexuality in the Netherlands by talking about the notion of "freedom" and "tolerance". When asked his impression of the Red-Light District, interviewee NM1 replied,

Text 3.5

I just enjoyed looking around. One time when I walked into the Red-Light District area, there was a person, I did not know, who gave me brochures. Brochures. Two brochures. The first one was about the Red-Light District. The second one was about drug use and drug abuse. The point of the brochures was to give a description that when you are in the Red-Light District area, there were regulations there. You have to pay; you have to do this or that. That is the first. The second, you know, at the Red-Light District, there are these things. You are going to enjoy what is offered there but will also face risks. The brochure about the drugs also said the same thing. These things are freely sold and allowed to be consumed. I remember I read those brochures. They helped me. The explanation in the brochures gave descriptions of the impact [of what you do]. From there, I saw, saw that the phenomena of this society are different. I started to differentiate between freedom and rules, freedom and personal choice, [and] consciousness. I started slowly to differentiate them.⁹³

⁹³ Kalau melihat itu ya senang-senang saja. Suatu kali pas aku jalan di Red-Light District itu ada orang, ndak tahu siapa dia tapi dia memberikan selebaran. Selebaran. Dua selebaran. Yang pertama menyangkut Red-Light District. Yang kedua menyangkut *drug use and drug abuse*. Intinya adalah dua selebaran itu memberikan gambaran kalau kamu masuk ke Red-Light District ada aturan hukum di sana. Kamu harus bayar, kamu harus apa, harus apa yang pertama. Yang kedua, kamu tahu itu namanya Red-Light District, ada ini, ini, kamu akan menikmati apa di sana, tetapi kamu akan menghadapi juga resiko apa. Untuk yang *drugs* itu juga. Ini dijual bebas, boleh dikonsumsi. Aku ingat betul dua selebaran itu tak baca. Itu ikut membantu. Selebaran-selebaran penjelasan itu memberikan gambaran-gambaran mengenai dampaknya. Dari situ aku melihat, melihat fenomena di masyarakat ini berbeda. Aku mulai membedakan antara *freedom* dengan aturan. Antara *freedom* dan *personal choice, consciousness*. Aku mulai

Interviewee NM1 mentioned the noun “brochures” seven times (overwording) to emphasize the importance of the brochures in helping him to understand the regulation of prostitution and drug use in the Red-Light District area. The nouns “regulations” and “rules” are overwording used to stress the significance of rules in the Red-Light District area and their relation to one’s “freedom” and “personal choice”. He mentioned the noun “freedom” twice (overwording) to emphasize the difference between “freedom” and “rules”, as well as between “freedom” and “personal choice” and “consciousness” (alternative wording). The text mentions “differentiate” twice (overwording) showing that in the Netherlands, while there is freedom, there are also rules. It confirms the statement of interviewee MM6 (Text 3.2) on the fact that drugs are allowed “to a certain degree but it is regulated”.

When asked about his impression of Dutch society, interviewee NM1 continued,

Text 3.6

The Dutch are, I do not call them liberal, but they have a very good degree of freedom. I do not think they are liberal because that will imply something different. But they have freedom, freedom of choice. The basis, I think, is very impressive, the basis is the state law. The rest is your freedom of choice. As long as you obey the rule, the rest is your freedom. There is a consequence for each of our decisions. I think that is important. I am very impressed. Second, they are tolerant. Tolerant. Very tolerant. Indeed, we [Indonesians] still experience one or two or several cases that are discriminatory, like in a toko⁹⁴ or elsewhere, but overall, they [the Dutch] accept people from different backgrounds. [...] They are very open. Very open.⁹⁵

Interviewee NM1 distinguished the meaning of “liberal” from “they have a very good degree of freedom”. The distinction indicates that in his view “liberal” means unlimited freedom, but in the Netherlands, freedom is not unlimited. He mentioned the noun “freedom” five times (overwording) to emphasize the importance of “freedom of choice”. The adjectives “impressive” and “impressed” are overwording to emphasize

pelan-pelan membedakan. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

⁹⁴ A shop selling mainly Asian food products and take-away Asian food.

⁹⁵ Orang Belanda itu, aku tidak menyebutnya liberal tapi *they have a very good degree of freedom. I do not think they are liberal because that will imply something different, but they have freedom, freedom of choice.* Yang basisnya, itu menurutku sangat *impressive*, yang basisnya adalah hukum negara. *The rest is your freedom of choice. As long as you obey the rule, the rest is your freedom.* Ada konsekuensi untuk setiap keputusan kita. Nah itu penting menurutku. Aku terkesan banget. Yang kedua, toleran. Sangat toleran. Bahwa kita masih merasakan apa ya mungkin satu, dua atau beberapa kasus yang nuansanya diskriminatif seperti di toko atau apa, itu iya, tetapi secara keseluruhan mereka menerima orang dari berbagai latar belakang. [...] Mereka sangat *open*. Sangat *open*. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

his impression of the “state law” that becomes “the basis” of the “freedom of choice”. The phrase “state law” and the noun “rule” are alternative wording. The text implies a conditional situation between “freedom of choice” and “obeying the rule”.

Next to (“second”) obeying the rule is tolerance. He mentioned the adjective “tolerant” three times (overwording) and the phrase “very open” twice (overwording) to emphasize his impression of Dutch people. He equated “tolerant” with the fact that the Dutch “accept people from different backgrounds” and are “very open”. He indicated “several cases that are discriminatory” against the Indonesian people but they did not change his impression of the Dutch for being very open and very tolerant.

When asked about his impression of Dutch people, interviewee MM4 replied,

Text 3.7

Dutch people, in general, are very tolerant. Very tolerant. And in the context of religious practice, ok, indeed, they do not have any belief, atheists, but they are consistent in their liberal attitude. It means they really let you do your religious worship as long as you do not disturb other people's rights.⁹⁶

Interviewee MM4 mentioned the phrase “very tolerant” twice (overwording) to emphasize the attitude of Dutch people in general. The phrase “do not have any belief” and the noun “atheists” are alternative wording to emphasize that in a religious context, Dutch people do not have any belief. He described the Dutch “liberal attitude” as “they really let you do your religious worship as long as you do not disturb other people's rights”. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee NM1, who said, “As long as you obey the rule [and state law], the rest is your freedom” (Text 3.6). This text (Text 3.7) shows a relationship between being “very tolerant”, having “a liberal attitude” and having “rights”, which include the rights to do religious worship and the right to be an atheist or not having any belief. The text also indicates the mutuality of rights; you have the right to practice religion or not, “as long as you do not disturb other people's rights”.

Interviewee MM4 was then asked his perspective on the fact that marijuana, abortion, and euthanasia are legal.

⁹⁶ Orang Belanda secara umum sangat toleran ya. Sangat toleran dan e, dalam konteks beragama, okelah mereka memang tidak memiliki keyakinan apapun, atheis, tapi mereka itu konsisten dengan sifat liberal mereka. Artinya mereka benar-benar membiarkan kamu beribadah selagi kamu tidak mengganggu hak orang lain. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

Text 3.8

Q: You were saying that in the Netherlands, there is marijuana, et cetera., and abortion and euthanasia are allowed. From the perspective of the Muslims, how do they look at it?

A: Yes. Of course, in the beginning, because I departed from a very traditionalist Islamic tradition, scripturalist but not Wahhabi⁹⁷, scripturalist in the sense of people who studied Kitab Kuning⁹⁸, there was a stance to fight against it [the legality of drugs, abortion, and euthanasia]. I mean, why such things [drugs, abortion, and euthanasia] are allowed? Are not these things impairing? Et cetera. Those feelings appeared for sure. Nevertheless, we [Muslims] understand that [the legality of drugs, abortion, and euthanasia] is indeed the bad side. But the good side is that [for] Islam [Muslims] here [in the Netherlands], we [Muslims] have more freedom to practice our beliefs. We [Muslims] are allowed [to practice our belief]. It means it is better than if those things [drugs, abortion and euthanasia] are not allowed, and at the same time, we [Muslims] are also not allowed to practice our belief. Perhaps it is like that in socialist countries. Everything is banned and practicing our religion is also restricted. Thus, for me, as long as our [religious] activities are not restrained, I understand those things [the legality of drugs, abortion and euthanasia] are part of their [the Dutch] culture. Of course, from a religious, moral view, those things contradict my faith.⁹⁹

At first, interviewee MM4 used the pronoun “I” to indicate his background and his stance “to fight against it [the legality of drugs, abortion and euthanasia]” at the beginning of his stay in the Netherlands (micro-level). He indicated himself as coming from “a very traditionalistic Islamic tradition”, which he alternated with a “scripturalist” tradition. He equated the term “scripturalist” with “people who studied

⁹⁷ The term Wahhabi refers to any adherent of a conservative Muslim sect founded in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab.

⁹⁸ The Indonesian term *Kitab Kuning* (literally means “yellow book”) is used to refer to classical Islamic texts.

⁹⁹ T: Kan di sana ada tadi kamu bilang ganja dan teman-temannya, terus aborsi legal kalau di Belanda, terus ada euthanasia. Itu kalau dari perspektif orang Muslim itu bagaimana?

J: Ya. Tentunya pada awalnya, karena saya berangkat dari tradisi Islam yang sangat tradisional begitu, scripturalis, tapi bukan Wahhabi, tapi scripturalis dunia orang-orang dengan Kitab Kuning itu. Ada apa ya, kesan untuk memberontak lah, artinya kok ini boleh sih? Apa nggak merusak? dan segala macam, itu pasti ada. Cuman, ketika kita memahami bahwa itu memang sisi buruknya, tapi sisi baiknya, Islam di sini, kita lebih bebas untuk beribadah. Kita diijinkan begitu, artinya itu lebih baik daripada ini tidak boleh tapi disaat yang sama kita beribadah juga dilarang. Itu mungkin di dunia-dunia negara sosialis kan seperti itu, semua dilarang dan kemudian kita beragama pun dibatasi. Jadi bagi saya selama aktivitas kita tidak dipasung begitu ya saya akhirnya ya memaklumi saja itu sebagai bagian dari budaya mereka. Tentu kalau dari segi moral agama, itu bertentangan dengan apa yang saya yakini. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

Kitab Kuning or classical Islamic texts“ to distinguish the meaning of “scripturalist” from “Wahhabi”.

He then switched the pronoun “I” to inclusive “we” (*kita*) to indicate the opinion of the Muslims (meso level). He contrasted “drugs, abortion and euthanasia” as “the bad side” with “we [Muslims] are allowed [to practice our belief]” as “the good side”. He contrasted the verb “allowed” (overwording) with the verbs “banned”, “restricted” and “restrained” (alternative wording) to emphasize that in the Netherlands, drugs, abortion and euthanasia, as well as practicing Islam are allowed.

At the end of the text, interviewee MM4 switched the pronoun “we” to “me” to state his opinion. The adverb “as long as” indicates a consequential relation between “our [religious] activities are not restrained” and “I understand those things as part of their [the Dutch] culture”. He used “I” to speak of himself and not of “the Muslims”. The phrase “I understand” contrasts “to fight against it” at the beginning of the text. He implied his understanding of the legality of drugs, abortion and euthanasia as part of “the Dutch culture” while confirming that “those things” “contradict” his faith, which is Islam. The adjective “religious” and the noun “moral” are alternative wording to emphasize the Islamic view on drugs, abortion, and euthanasia.

When asked his impression of living in the Netherlands, interviewee PM1 replied,

Text 3.9

What makes me feel very, very free living in the Netherlands is the recognition of rights and obligations, the appreciation towards the rights and obligations of each individual, which is highly upheld here. And the thing I said earlier, our opinion is heard. And Dutch people are very, very open towards new opinions, towards new things. Moreover, coincidentally I am also a homosexual. This situation is also becoming one of the reasons why I chose the Netherlands as the destination for [my] study but [I] also want to stay longer in the Netherlands and build a life here. For me, [in the Netherlands] there is tolerance, which is quite extensive for anyone here. Although in Indonesia we often speak a lot about tolerance, in practice, tolerance is less, less felt, especially tolerance towards the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) people. Although maybe that is not the answer that often comes out from me, I think, that [tolerance towards LGBT people] is one of the fundamental reasons in responding to [the question] of why my choice was pointed to the Netherlands. Not France, not England not Germany, not other countries, but the Netherlands.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Yang paling membuat aku yang sangat-sangat merasa bebas tinggal di Belanda ini ada pengakuan hak-

The phrase “very, very free” is an overwording to emphasize what interviewee PM1 feels about living in the Netherlands. He indicated “the appreciation towards the rights and obligations of each individual”, the fact that people’s opinion is heard, and the “very, very open” (overwording) character of the Dutch towards “new things” as the things that made him feel very free in living in the Netherlands. These statements correspond to the statements of interviewee NM1, who “started to differentiate between freedom and rules” (Text 3.5) and spoke about the “openness” of Dutch people (Text 3.6).

Interviewee PM1 related the fact that he is “a homosexual” and “choosing the Netherlands” as his place “to study”, “to stay longer”, and “to build a life” (alternative wording). He contrasted tolerance in the Netherlands, “which is quite extensive for anyone” with tolerance in Indonesia, which is often spoken a lot but in practice is “less felt”, especially by LGBT people. He mentioned the noun “tolerance” four times (overwording) to emphasize “one of the fundamental reasons” that made him choose the Netherlands as his place to live in comparison to France, England, and Germany. It corresponds to interviewee NW3’s statement on the Netherlands being “relatively more liberal than other European countries” (Text 3.3).

When asked his opinion on the fact that homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and drugs are legal in the Netherlands, interviewee PM1 responded,

Text 3.10

Legal in that sense is not like turning a page of a book. Here in the Netherlands, before [they] come to a decision like that, there are hundreds of pages that they have to learn. It means the pages of the law book in the Netherlands. Indonesian people then think that here in the Netherlands homosexuals are allowed to be married, euthanasia is allowed, this, that, this that is allowed and then they connect them [to the notion] that the Netherlands no longer has morality. Yet for me, that is not what I see. [...] It takes a lot of time for the government to grant any permission to those who want to do euthanasia. So, they need to be

hak dan kewajiban, penghargaan atas hak-hak dan kewajiban masing-masing individu yang sangat dijunjung tinggi di sini. Dan yang aku bilang tadi, opini kita itu didengarkan. Dan orang Belanda sangat-sangat terbuka dengan opini baru, dengan hal-hal baru. Dan terlebih lagi, karena kebetulan aku juga seorang homoseksual. Situasi ini pun juga menjadi salah satu, salah satu alasan mengapa aku memilih Belanda sebagai tujuan studi tetapi juga punya tujuan untuk tinggal lebih lama di Belanda dan untuk membangun kehidupan di sini. Menurut aku ada ada toleransi yang cukup luas bagi siapapun di sini. Walaupun di Indonesia kita sering bicara banyak tentang masalah toleransi tetapi dalam prakteknya, toleransi itu kurang, kurang bisa dirasakan. Terutama toleransi terhadap orang-orang LGBT. Walaupun mungkin itu bukan jawaban yang sering keluar dari aku tetapi menurutku itu juga salah satu alasan fundamental dalam dalam menyikapi mengapa pilihanku ini jatuh kepada Belanda, tidak Prancis, tidak Inggris, tidak Jerman, tidak yang lainnya tapi Belanda. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

assisted by a psychiatrist. It needs, [I] don't know, three years or four years before they, eh, the decision is made. There is a discussion. Maybe I am wrong, I do not know, I do not have further information about this. It is just, they, they legalize it to make it easier in controlling it because otherwise, people will prefer to go abroad and there will be no control at all. [...] When homosexual marriage was legalized for the first time here in the Netherlands, in 2000, if I am not mistaken, there was openness from the society. And then the education to introduce what is homosexuality is more open, and there were more programs on TV and then many interviews on television, radio, et cetera. That makes the society here in the Netherlands open, that yes, if [it is] being discussed publicly in an honest way, openly, people's understanding becomes more open, and people then also become more critical to give their opinion. In my opinion, that is extraordinary here in the Netherlands. There is a time when we [Indonesians] are invited to think that although very controversial matters are legalized in the Netherlands, there is an accompaniment from the government, strict control from the government for all of those. Those are the things that Indonesians do not or do not yet know. In the end, the consequence [of not knowing] is that they [Indonesians] say that the Netherlands is the most immoral country. In my opinion, not to vilify Indonesia ok, but in fact, our [Indonesians] critical thinking on matters like that in the Netherlands is more sharpened.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Legal dalam arti itu tidak seperti orang membalik halaman buku begitu. Di Belanda sini, sebelum sampai ke sebuah keputusan seperti itu, ada ada ratusan halaman yang harus mereka pelajari. Istilahnya halaman-halaman dari buku hukum di Belanda sini. Jadi orang, orang Indonesia kemudian memikirkan bahwa di Belanda sini boleh nikah homoseksual, kemudian boleh euthanasia, boleh yang itu yang ini yang itu yang ini, terus kaitannya mereka itu mengkaitkannya Belanda sini sudah tidak bermoral gitu. Tapi menurut aku tidak seperti itu yang aku lihat. [...] Untuk memutuskan untuk euthanasia itu pun itu juga butuh banyak waktu sebelum ijin dari pemerintah itu turun. Jadi mereka perlu didampingi oleh psikiater, perlu, ndak tahu tiga tahun atau empat tahun sebelum mereka, e keputusan itu di diberikan. Ada pembicaraan. Mungkin aku salah, aku tidak tahu, aku belum punya informasi lebih jauh tentang itu. Cuma mereka, mereka itu melegalkan itu supaya lebih mudah untuk mengontrolnya karena kalau tidak, orang akan lebih memilih keluar negeri dan tidak ada kontrol sama sekali. [...] Saat-saat pernikahan homoseksual itu dilegalkan, pertama kalinya di Belanda sini, di tahun 2000 kalau tidak salah, ya istilahnya, justru apa, e, ada, ada keterbukaan dari masyarakat. Dan kemudian pendidikan untuk untuk mengenal apa itu homoseksualitas itu lebih banyak terbuka dan lebih banyak program-program di TV juga kemudian banyak wawancara di televisi, radio dan segala macam. Nah itu yang membuat masyarakat di Belanda sini terbuka bahwa ya kalau dibicarakan bersama secara jujur, terbuka begitu justru orang, pengertian orang itu menjadi terbuka dan orang kemudian juga menjadi semakin kritis untuk memberikan pendapat mereka. Itu yang menurut aku luar biasa di Belanda sini. Ada waktu di mana kita diajak berpikir bahwa walaupun hal-hal yang sangat kontroversial itu dilegalkan di Belanda, tapi e, di satu sisi ada, ada, ada pendampingan dari pemerintah, kontrol ketat dari pemerintah untuk semuanya itu. Nah itu yang orang-orang Indonesia tidak atau belum mengetahuinya. Akhirnya konsekwensinya ya akhirnya mereka mengatakan bahwa negara Belanda itu negara yang paling tidak bermoral. Menurut aku justru, justru, bukan menjelekkan Indonesia ya, tapi justru itu yang kekritisannya kita tentang hal-hal seperti itu di Belanda semakin diasah. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

The statement “like turning a page of a book” is a metaphor to refer to an easy thing to do. It is in contrast with “hundreds of pages” of the law book. The text shows that to make something “legal” in the Netherlands is not an easy thing to do as it “takes a lot of time for the government to grant any permission for those who want to do euthanasia”. The words and phrases “legal”, “law book”, “for the government to grant any permission”, “legalized”, “accompaniment from the government”, and “strict control from the government” are alternative wording to emphasize the government’s role and regulation in controlling the legality of “very controversial matters” in the Netherlands. This emphasis on the government’s role and regulation corresponds to the statements of previous interviewees on the state’s law on the legality of drugs (MM6, Text 3.2), prostitution (NW3, Text 3.3), and the state’s law as the basis of freedom of choice (NM1, Text 3.6).

Interviewee PM1 mentioned the noun “morality” and the adjective “immoral” (overwording) to emphasize what Indonesians “think” and “say” about the Netherlands in the context of “very controversial matters” such as homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and drugs. He contrasted what is (il)legal and what is (im)moral. He showed that Indonesian people “do not or do not yet know” that the legality of very controversial matters in the Netherlands comes with “strict control from the government”. The words “openness”, “openly”, and “honest” are alternative wording to emphasize the openness of Dutch society to talk about an issue such as homosexual marriage. He stated that in his opinion this is “extraordinary”, and it sharpens “our [Indonesians] critical thinking” on these matters.

When asked how did he deal with the fact that there are abortion, euthanasia, and prostitution in the Netherlands, interviewee MM5 replied,

Text 3.11

Honestly, it depends on our social interaction. [My] surroundings do not matter [to me] because I am an adult. Indeed, there is gambling, also [...] it is because [people in the Netherlands] feel free. No one forbids all of that. That depends on the individual, depends on the person. [...] For example, like me. Some men fell in love with me. Some women fell in love with me, especially because I work at a beauty salon. I do not hide [the fact that some men and women fell in love with me]. However, in that case, [I] found a way [to react to them in a way] that they will not be offended when I say, “No”. They were not angry. [I said], “You [fell in love] with the wrong person”. They respected [me]. They did not force but they were straightforward, “I like you”. They frankly stated it. Openly [they said], “I am gay”, “I am a lesbian”, “I like you”. [They] did not hide it. There

is no hypocrisy here [in the Netherlands]. That is what I see. Things like that, personal behaviour like that, is their personal matter. What is important is to take care of ourselves when we [Indonesians] live in a foreign country. We have to be good at taking care of ourselves.¹⁰²

The phrases “[people in the Netherlands] feel free” and “no one forbids all of that” (alternative wording) indicate the notion of individual freedom. Negation is used five times to show freedom “here” (“they”) and lack of freedom among “ourselves” (“we”). The phrases “it depends on our social interaction”, “that depends on the individual”, and “depends on the person” are alternative wording to emphasize that everyone has the freedom to choose what he or she does. The phrases “they were not angry”, “they respected [me]”, “they did not force but they were straightforward”, “they frankly stated it”, and “[they] did not hide it” are alternative wording to emphasize that “there is no hypocrisy [in the Netherlands]”. The text indicates the character of Dutch people as straightforward, respectful and open. The phrase “take care of ourselves” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize what is “important” when an Indonesian lives in a foreign country.

When asked her opinion of abortion and homosexuality in the Netherlands, interviewee CW1 responded,

Text 3.12

It seems that there are not many abortions here. Not many. Because they, all girls here [in the Netherlands], by the age of 12, are already given birth control. It is those who would like to get pregnant, who have difficulty. [For] my Dutch friends, it may take several years [for them to get pregnant] because the influence of the pill is still a lot in their bodies. [...] They [the Dutch] really appreciate it when people have a baby here because their [Dutch women's] bodies have been treated to not get pregnant since [they were] young. For gay, here, [gay people] are already

¹⁰² T: Sebagai seorang Muslim bagaimana anda menghadapi aborsi, euthanasia, prostitusi di sini?

J: Jujur saja, tergantung dari pergaulan kita. Lingkungan juga nggak berpengaruh karena saya juga sudah dewasa. Ada judi, ya, ya bisa juga [...] karena merasa bebas ya, ndak ada yang melarang itu. Itu tergantung dari individunya. Tergantung dari manusianya. [...] Kalau umpamanya kayak saya sendiri gitu ya. Cowok ada yang jatuh cinta ke saya, yang cewek ada yang jatuh cinta ke saya. Apalagi saya kerjanya di salon. Saya nggak menutupi. Tapi dalam artian itu, gimana caranya supaya mereka itu nggak tersinggung kalau bilang, “o ndak.” Mereka nggak marah. “Wah kamu salah orang.” Mereka menghormati. Nggak memaksa gitu. Tapi mereka terus terang, o, saya suka ke kamu. Terus terang mereka cerita. Terbuka gitu, “saya gay”, “saya lesbi”, “saya suka kamu,” gitu. Nggak nutup-nutupin. Istilahnya nggak ada kemunafikan di sini. Di mata saya begitu. Kalau soal begitu kelakuan pribadi begitu ya urusan pribadi mereka. Yang penting gimana kita menjaga diri kita sendiri, di mana kita tinggal di negara orang. Harus pandai-pandai menjaga diri. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

*completely accepted. Don't [you] have the audacity to speak of discriminating against gay people. Just don't, don't do it. Because they [the Dutch] would think, you are very discriminating, like that. Many of my friends are gay.*¹⁰³

Interviewee CW1 repeated the negative phrase “not many” twice (overwording) to emphasize that there are not many abortion cases in the Netherlands. The text indicates a causal relationship between “not many abortions” with the usage of “birth control” by Dutch women since “the age of 12”, which contributed to the “difficulty” “to get pregnant”. The phrase “birth control” and the noun “the pill” are overwording to emphasize the usage of “birth control” by Dutch women.

Interviewee CW1 emphasized the acceptance of gay people by repeating the negative auxiliary verb “don’t” and the adjective “discriminating” (overwording) to stress that it is not allowed to discriminate against gay people. She strengthened her statement by indicating that many of her friends “are gay”. The text implies the openness of Dutch people and the acceptance of homosexuality, which correspond to the statements of interviewee PM1 (Text 3.9 and Text 3.10).

Rational manner

Interviewees AM1 and AM2 stated their stance on abortion, drugs and euthanasia issues. Both mentioned “research” as the Dutch’s rational manner in dealing with the future (AM1) and as what the interviewee (AM2) believed. Interviewee AM2 claimed to be “very pro-choice”.

Text 3.13

Q: What is your opinion on abortion?

A: I am very pro-choice. When the baby is not viable the moment it is taken out from [a woman's] body, but well, now that is also controversial because, with the advancement of technology, people can say a four-month-old [fetus] can be saved. But no, we do not know. For me, the most important is the well-being [of the mother]. When the mother feels that “I cannot give a decent life for my child, I have many limits,” she [the mother] should be able to decide.

¹⁰³ Kayaknya nggak banyak yang aborsi di sini loh. Nggak banyak. Karena mereka, semua anak di sini kan umur 12 tahun sudah dikasih pil KB. Justru yang mau hamil itu yang sulit. Teman-temanku yang orang Belanda itu bisa beberapa tahun loh, karena pengaruh pilnya itu kan masih banyak di tubuh mereka. Jadi mereka tu yang, kemarin juga tu temenku resepsi dia berhenti rokok, berhenti pil, berhenti minum, hamil akhirnya setelah dua tahun. Jadi mereka appreciate banget kalau punya *baby* di sini loh. Karena badan mereka sudah dijaga supaya nggak hamil dari kecil. Kalau yang gay, di sini sudah di*accept* banget lah. Jangan berani-berani kalau ngomong ngediskriminasiin *gay people*. Jangan aja, jangan. Karena mereka nanti pikir, ih, elu diskriminasi banget gitu kan. Temanku tu banyak gay. Interviewed on May 11, 2016.

We cannot possibly gamble with fate by saying that the baby, who will be born, is going to be safe, whereas during the pregnancy the mother also has already put her well-being at stake. Therefore, it means there are two lives, which will be threatened. Yes, yes, I am very pro-choice.

Q: *And on drugs?*

A: *Drugs? I really believe in research. [...] When, for example, people say [that] marijuana, joint, is actually not dangerous and a cigarette is far more dangerous [than marijuana], if the research shows like that, fine, we hold on to the research. We cannot have faith in [a statement that says], oh marijuana is bad, and so forth. No. We stick to the results of the research. If research states like this, then we follow it.¹⁰⁴*

Interviewee AM2 mentioned the phrase “very pro-choice” twice (overwording) to emphasize his stance on abortion. He said that for him, “the most important is the well-being [of the mother]” and the mother “should be able to decide” to have an abortion. He contrasted “gamble with fate” and being “very pro-choice”. He used the inclusive “we” (*kita*) to refer to both Dutch and non-Dutch people like himself. The noun “research” is mentioned five times (overwording) to emphasize his belief in research. The text contrasts “faith” and “research”. The phrases “we cannot possibly gamble with fate” and “we cannot have faith” indicate AM2’s stance as “a very pro-choice” person in the case of abortion, and as someone who “really believes in research” in the case of drugs such as marijuana.

Interviewee AM1 called the Dutch “very rational” and compared the Dutch to the Indonesians.

¹⁰⁴ T: *What is your opinion on abortion?*

J: Saya sangat *pro-choice*. Selama bayi tidak *viable* pada saat dikeluarkan dari tubuh. Tapi ya, sekarang itu juga kontroversi karena orang dengan kemajuan teknologi, orang bisa bilang [...] umur 4 bulan itu sudah bisa diselamatkan, konon katanya. Tapi tidak, *we do not know*. [...] Bagi saya, yang paling penting adalah kesejahteraan. Pada saat si ibu merasa, “saya tidak bisa memberikan kehidupan yang layak bagi anak saya, banyak keterbatasan saya,” dia seharusnya bisa memutuskan. Kita tidak mungkin berjudi dengan nasib, mengatakan bahwa bayi yang lahir nanti itu kemudian akan sejahtera sementara pada saat mengandung juga si Ibu sudah mempertaruhkan kesejahteraannya. Jadi artinya ada dua kehidupan yang akan terancam. Ya, ya saya sangat *pro-choice*.

T: *And on drugs?*

J: *Drugs?* Saya sangat percaya pada penelitian. [...] Pada saat, misalnya, orang bilang, marijuana, *joint* itu sebenarnya tidak berbahaya dan jauh lebih berbahaya rokok, penelitian menunjukkan seperti itu, *fine*, kita berpegang pada penelitian. Kita tidak bisa beriman pada o ya, ganja itu jelek segala macam. No. *We stick to the results of the research*. Kalau *research* bilang begini, kita ikuti itu. Interviewed on June 13, 2016.

Text 3.14

Q: What is your opinion on abortion and euthanasia?

A: 'm liberal. I support all of that. I think we [Indonesians] should conduct those kinds of changes in Indonesia but I'm very realistic [...] I mean, I would love it if Indonesia became more liberal. I think what is so good about the Netherlands is that they [the Dutch] are very rational and that they understand they deal with the future in a rational manner. They [the Dutch] conduct research and they try to find out what they need to do in the future and then they chart a course in accordance with their plans. So it [Dutch society] is a very structured society. They know where they are going, or they do not know where they are going but they discuss it openly and, in the media, and stuff like that, using a much more scientific approach. That is a much better society than we [Indonesians] have here [in Indonesia] not just in this. These [abortion and euthanasia] are hardcore, you know, like soft drugs and stuff like that. Even in a lot of, other liberal countries, it is still a big debate, right? But in a lot of the more less controversial patterns like the separation of church and state, you know, it is very important where the decisions for the state in various sectors are never mixed with religious positions. I mean, of course, you can see like Geert Wilders, right? Yeah, ok, you can understand that is not religious. It is more based on ethnicity, or racial position, which is as stupid, I guess, as a religious position. So, I can't say that it [the issue of Wilders] is fully 100% rational, obviously not. There is a lot of fear, and there are a lot of problems. I think multiculturalism is very difficult anyway in any case, especially in a formerly monocultural community like the Netherlands.¹⁰⁵

Interviewee AM1 stated that he is “liberal” (micro-level of discourse), which he indicated by stating that he “supports all of that” and stating that Indonesians “should conduct those kinds of changes”. The adjective “rational” is mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize how the Dutch “deal with the future”. The text indicates the Dutch’s “rational manner” as “they conduct research”, “they chart a course in accordance with their plans”, “it is a very structured society”, “they know where they are going” and “they discuss it openly using a much more scientific approach” (alternative wording), which, according to AM1, is “much better” and “so good about the Netherlands” (macro-level of discourse). The phrase “they discuss it openly” corresponds to interviewee PM1’s statement (Text 3.10) on the openness of Dutch society to discussing an issue such as homosexuality publicly.

¹⁰⁵ This is an original quote. The interviewee used English. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

The text compares Dutch society with Indonesian society saying that the former is “much better” because the Dutch use “a much more scientific approach” and “the decisions for the state in various sectors are never mixed with religious positions”. Interviewee AM1 compared the Netherlands to “other liberal countries” where “hardcore” matters such as soft drugs, abortion, and euthanasia are “still a big debate”. The adjective “hardcore” contrasts with the phrase “less controversial”.

The text mentions the Dutch politician “Geert Wilders” to point out the issue of “ethnicity or racial position”. Interviewee AM1 considered the case of Wilders to be “as stupid as religious position”. At the beginning of the text, he called the Dutch “very rational”. He then made an exception that in the case of Wilders, the issue is “obviously” not “fully 100% rational” (overwording). The phrases “a lot of fear” and “a lot of problems” (alternative wording) have consequential relationships with “multiculturalism is very difficult”.

When asked if he thinks Dutch society is tolerant in comparison to Indonesian society, interviewee AM1 replied,

Text 3.15

This is a hard question. I think they [the Dutch] are a very analytical society and that they [the Dutch] have values, liberal values, which promote this idea of multiculturalism as a treasure. But as we [everyone] have seen recently, it shifts. It is shifting because the analysis is shifting. So, they [the Dutch] are thinking about whether multiculturalism is something possible to conduct as a sort of a societal project. Indonesia does not have that because we [Indonesians] do not ascribe to the value of multiculturalism in the sense that we [Indonesians] want to create a multicultural society. We [Indonesians] are already one, and it is historically rooted, and we are dealing with what we have and the problems, which we have now, but Europe is on a multicultural project. They [Europe] want to create a multicultural society from a monocultural one. Because of the strength of the state, you know, I mean it [the Netherlands] is a much stronger society, right? The state is much more in control. So, these questions are discussed analytically at the national or the regional level and I am seeing that there is a shift in paradigm. They [the Dutch] shift away [from monoculturalism] towards multiculturalism because I think they are thinking that it [monoculturalism] is not really working as well as they thought it would be. The assumption was that people who are non-Western would go to the Western community and they [non-Western] were transitioned to become westernized and embrace the values, the western values, the western liberal values that these countries have. I think there

is a shift currently in Europe where they [Europeans] are thinking that this is not going to work. Especially people from Muslim communities, they are not going to change their values. I do not know what is going to happen in the future. [...] You know, there is a feeling amongst the white people that they are not really in control of the world anymore so there is a lot of anxiety I think, of the declining of imperial culture. Because when they [the white people] thought that they were in control of the world, the idea of multiculturalism was appealing and it was safe because the assumption was that they were trying to westernize everyone, make everyone believes in their values, right? But that is not happening even with people who came into their own society. So, I think it was a big shock for them [the white people], they had to rethink about their civilization goals. So, this is about what we [everyone] are in the middle of, right? So, the rise of new atheism is also part of that Western anxiety. It is part of Western anxiety that people are not accepting liberal values.¹⁰⁶

Interviewee AM1 mentioned “multicultural” (multiculturality, multiculturalism) eight times (overwording) which shows a preoccupation with the topic (Fairclough, 1992, p. 193). The text differentiates between multiculturalism as an ideal-in the case of the Netherlands-and multiculturality as a fact-in the case of Indonesia. Throughout the text, interviewee AM1 mentioned “they [the Dutch]”, “they [Europeans]”, they [the white people]”, and “the Western community” interchangeably (alternative wording) to refer to the Dutch society as part of Europe and the Western community.

Like text 3.14, this text indicates that Dutch society is “a very analytical society” that has “very liberal values”, and “a much stronger society” than Indonesia. The noun “values” is mentioned eight times (overwording) to emphasize the “liberal values” of the Dutch, which equates “western values” and “western liberal values” (overwording). The verb and noun “shift” are mentioned six times (overwording) to emphasize the shift from “monoculturalism” to “multiculturalism” in the Netherlands and Europe. The text indicates that the idea of “monoculturalism” is not really working because non-Western people “are not accepting the western, liberal values”, particularly “people from Muslim communities”.

The phrase “they [the white people] are not really in control of the world anymore” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize “the declining of imperial culture”. The phrase “in control of the world” equates “they were trying to westernize everyone” and “make everyone believes in their values” (alternative wording). The text mentions “Western anxiety” three times (overwording) about non-Western people not accepting

¹⁰⁶ This is an original quote. The interviewee used English. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

liberal values, which became “a big shock for them” and caused them to rethink “their civilization goals”.

A Women-friendly state

Three interviewees, MM4, MW3, and NW3, spoke about the Netherlands as a “women-friendly” state. When asked about her first impression of the Netherlands, interviewee NW3 replied,

Text 3.16

In my perception, the Netherlands was women-friendly, liberal. [I thought of it as] women-friendly because it was related to our organization in Surabaya before I came to the Netherlands. It was a women's organization. Particularly at that time, our organization dealt with the victims of domestic violence, and we [our organization] advocated a policy for anti-domestic violence law, which was later officiated by Megawati in 2004 or sometime before the end of her term [as a president]. At that time, we tried to establish a shelter for women, who were victims of violence. We had several funds, and the funds were from the Netherlands. One of them was an organization called Mama Cash. At that time, the Komnas Perempuan (National Committee on Violence Against Women) was not established yet, because it was before the May 1998 [riots]. At that time, in my mind, oh, apparently equal rights and issues of domestic violence [in the Netherlands] have been handled well. That was in my mind because well, the funding [organization] was willing to disburse funds abroad. I thought naively at that time, it meant, within their country [the Netherlands], [women issues] were already well taken care of, right?¹⁰⁷

The phrase “women-friendly” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize interviewee NW3’s perception of the Netherlands before she came. She equated “women-friendly” with “liberal” (alternative wording). She indicated a causal

¹⁰⁷ Mungkin bisa dibilang Belanda di bayangan saya itu *women friendly*, liberal. Karena begini, *women friendly*nya itu karena berkait dengan kami punya lembaga di Surabaya waktu itu sebelum saya datang ke Belanda. Ini adalah *women's organization*. Dan secara spesifik pada waktu itu organisasi kami menangani korban-korban kekerasan dalam rumah tangga dan kami mengadvokasi *policy* untuk undang-undang anti KDRT yang kemudian disahkan Megawati baru 2004 atau dua ribu berapa sebelum dia turun itu ya. Nah pada waktu kami berusaha untuk mendirikan *shelter* untuk perempuan-perempuan korban kekerasan itu kita mendapatkan beberapa *funding* dan *funding* itu dari Belanda salah satunya nama organisasinya Mama Cash. Terus terang, pada waktu itu belum ada Komnas Perempuan karena itu sebelum Mei 1998. Jadi pada waktu itu di pikiran saya, o ya rupanya persamaan hak kemudian isu-isu kekerasan dalam rumah tangga itu sudah, sudah tertangani baiklah begitu. Itu, itu yang ada di kepala saya karena ya *funding*nya aja sampai mau mengucurkan dana keluar negeri. Berarti dalam pikiran naif saya pada waktu itu, dalam negeri mereka udah bagus gitu kan? Interviewed on December 10, 2017.

relationship between the Netherlands as a women-friendly state and funding coming from the Netherlands for the Indonesian women's organization that she was part of. The phrases "in my perception", "in my mind" and "I thought naively" are overwording to emphasize interviewee NW3's perception of the Netherlands regarding women's issues before she came to the Netherlands.

When asked whether the Netherlands met her expectations after she arrived, interviewee NW3 replied,

Text 3.17

A: Not 100%. One [of the things] that surprised me was at the train station, there was a campaign with posters. The posters contained [a message] that if you are a victim of domestic violence, you can contact, there was a name of an institution, an address, and a telephone number. It means [the number of incidents of] domestic violence here [in the Netherlands] is still high, therefore, help from an NGO or an institution needs to be offered. That was the first. The second thing was the election before the recent one¹⁰⁸. There was a quite conservative Catholic party¹⁰⁹. At that time, we [my husband and I] watched [the television] and I said, "What?" This is the Netherlands?" Ah, it erased my perception of the Netherlands as a women-friendly [state] because of that party, the SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij or Calvinist Reformed Political Party). There is also the ChristenUnie, CU (Christian Union). Both the SGP and the CU are conservative. I watched [about the SGP on the television]. Both of us [my husband and I] watched [it on the television]. I said, "What?" Because there [on the television], it was written, discussed and the leading persons were interviewed, that one of the things they [the SGP] wanted, was for women to return to the house.

Q: When did this happen?

A: About five, four years ago. Women may vote but they cannot be elected as politicians. Then, women were suggested to go back to the family, to be 100% housewives and mothers. For example, [they] discussed how nowadays it is difficult to pick up a child after school because many mothers have to work, therefore, the child has to eat at school, whereas they [the Dutch] have a custom that a child is picked up in the afternoon. The basis of the school [in the Netherlands] is the neighbourhood, therefore, it is close for children

¹⁰⁸ This interview was conducted in December 2017. The "recent" election was in March 2017. "The election before the recent one" means the election of 2012.

¹⁰⁹ She mistook the SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij), a Calvinist Reformed Political Party, for "a quite conservative Catholic party".

to go to school. The mother picked up the kid [from school], [the kid] ate at home, [and the mother] brought [the kid back to the school] after lunch. That is not possible anymore, the tradition, because women work outside of the house. Therefore, it was advised that these mothers, you [mothers] go back to the house. Be a mother, be an educator for the next generation, bla bla bla. I thought, my goodness, this is the Netherlands. If this is somewhere like Saudi Arabia or Indonesia, I maybe still [understand], ok, I can accept that there is this state *ibuism* such as Dharma Wanita and so forth. In the New Order period, women [in Indonesia] were really put in the domestic sector but apparently here [in the Netherlands], there has been a movement in that direction too. Whether [the movement] was being accepted or not, it may not be too [...] but [the fact that] people still have such an idea, a [political] party, an institution, still has such an idea, I thought, this is crazy. That made me ask, wait, wait, wait, is this really what [the Netherlands as a women-friendly state] I once believed in?¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ J: Nggak 100% juga. Salah satu yang bikin aku terkaget-kaget adalah, di stasiun waktu itu ada kampanye poster-posternya itu semuanya sama. Dan poster-posternya itu berisikan kalau kamu jadi korban kekerasan di dalam rumah, kamu bisa pergi menghubungi, terus ada nama institusinya, alamat dan nomor telepon. Itu artinya bahwa *domestic violence* di sini pun masih cukup tinggi begitu, sehingga perlu ditawarkan bantuan dari NGO atau institusi. Ya itu pertama. Kemudian yang kedua, pada waktu sebelum pemilihan yang terakhir, tetapi pemilihan yang sebelumnya. Kan ada partai Katolik yang cukup konservatif itu. Yang waktu itu kita nonton, aku sampai bilang, "What? Ini Belanda?" Ah, ini menghapus *image*ku tentang Belanda yang *women friendly*. Karena partai itu SGP. Ada juga ChristenUnie. ChristenUnie sama SGP ini konservatif. Saya ngeliat (yang SGP), kita berdua lagi ngeliat. Saya sampai, "what?" Karena di situ ditulis, didiskusikan dan kemudian diwawancarilah tokoh-tokohnya. Nah salah satu yang mereka ini inginkan adalah perempuan kembali ke rumah.

T: Ini kapan kejadiannya?

J: Kira-kira 5 tahun, 4 tahun yang lalu. Perempuan boleh memilih tetapi tidak boleh dipilih menjadi *politician*. Terus kemudian perempuan disarankan untuk kembali ke keluarga, menjadi 100% ibu rumah tangga dan ibu. Jadi kayak misalkan waktu itu yang dibahas bagaimana sekarang ini jemput anak untuk pulang sekolah aja sulit karena banyak ibu yang harus bekerja, jadi anak itu harus makan di sekolah. Sedangkan mereka punya kebiasaan anak itu siang itu di jemput. Karena kita kan sekolah kan basisnya *neighbourhood* jadi anak tu dekat sekolah. Ibu jemput, makan di rumah, balikin lagi, kan gitu, setelah selesai jam makan. Nah itu nggak bisa lagi, tradisi itu karena perempuan banyak bekerja di luar rumah. Jadi disarankan bahwa ibu-ibu ini kembalilah kau ke rumah, maksudnya kalian jadilah ibu, jadilah pendidik generasi yang berikutnya, bla bla bla. Aku pikir, buset ini Belanda. Kalau ini mana gitu, Arab Saudi atau Indonesia, aku mungkin masih ya ok percaya gitu ya dengan *state ibuism* yang kayak Dharma Wanita yang segala macam jaman Orba dulu itu kan, perempuan bener-bener diposisikan di sektor domestik gitu ya. Tapi ternyata di sini ada gerakan yang menuju ke sana juga gitu. Perkara itu dibeli atau nggak, artinya ya gerakan itu diikuti orang atau tidak, itu mungkin tidak terlalu ini ya. Tetapi bahwa orang masih punya ide seperti itu ya, partai, institusi masih punya ide yang seperti itu, aku pikir, gila nih. Nah itu yang membuat aku tuh kemudian bertanya-tanya, wait, wait, wait. Apakah benar ini yang aku dulu yakini itu? Interviewed on December 10, 2017.

The text specifies that the Netherlands is “not 100%” women-friendly because there is domestic violence in the Netherlands, and there are statements by the SGP leading persons on women’s issues. Interviewee NW3 equated “the posters” that offered help to “victims of domestic violence” with the assumption that “[the number of incidents of] domestic violence here [in the Netherlands] is still high”. The phrases “a quite conservative Catholic party”, “the SGP”, and “the *ChristenUnie*” are overwording that she used to emphasize that there are conservative Christian political parties in the Netherlands. She referred to the SGP six times (overwording) to emphasize that the party has a discriminative stance towards women.

The text indicates an equation between the SGP ideas that women cannot be elected as politicians, and that women must stay at home and take care of the children, with the situation of women in “Saudi Arabia” and “Indonesia” (alternative wording). The phrases “*state ibuism*” (Indonesia’s New Order state ideology on motherhood) and “*Dharma Wanita*” (Dutiful Women) are alternative wording to emphasize that in the Indonesian New Order (1966-1998), “women were really put in the domestic sector” and “apparently in the Netherlands there has been a movement in that direction too”. The expressions “What? This is the Netherlands?”, “my goodness, this is the Netherlands”, and, “I thought, this is crazy” are overwording to emphasize NW3’s surprise at the fact that “people” and “a political party” (alternative wording) in the Netherlands such as the SGP “still have such an idea” to put women in the domestic sector.

Another interviewee, MW3, spoke about her experience as a woman with a headscarf when she studied at Maastricht.

Text 3.18

Q: How was your experience when you came to Maastricht? [You were] wearing a headscarf. Did people talk to you or ask you about it [wearing a headscarf]? How was your interaction with your friends?

A: I did not have any problem. Maybe because I am a person who, I am not very sensitive about [what] other people [think of me], or about those kinds of things. My friends asked me to go out, “Let us hang out in a bar” and I joined, and I drank Coca-Cola. Just like that. They [my friends] know I do not drink alcohol. One of my friends said, “Hey, they are talking about you”. [I asked], “Talking about what?” [My friend said], “They are guessing what is the color of your hair and how long it is”. [I asked], “So what is their guess?” [My friend said], “Your hair must be long and black”. [I said], “Yes, that is correct. It is no longer strange, right?” Well, things like that. Only, I indeed see that, I feel that they are, because I am wearing a headscarf, they

are a bit [makes a distancing gesture], like that.

Q: *Your Dutch friends?*

A: *Dutch friends. Maybe on one side, they are a bit distant but on the other side, they respect [me]. Like that. Really respect. Respect, respect. They respect it like, "This is a lady. This is a lady. [No one] cannot do anything foolish to her", like that.*¹¹¹

The phrases "I indeed see that" and "I feel that" are alternative wording to emphasize what interviewee MW3 saw and felt about her Dutch friends in their interaction with her. She repeated the verb "respect" five times (overwording) to stress that her Dutch friends respect her. She equated being "respected" with the fact that she is seen as "a lady" and no one "cannot do anything foolish to her". The text indicates that although her Dutch friends were "a bit distant" they "respect" her.

Interviewee MM4 said that he "changed a lot" after living in the Netherlands. When asked in what context he changed, he responded,

Text 3.19

Before I left [for the Netherlands], I already learned enough progressive Islam. I mean, I am used to getting together with young NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) people and having discussions [with them] here [in Indonesia]. When I was involved in the KMNU (NU Student Association) with progressive Islam friends, it was common to have such discussions. However, before I went to Europe, I could not accept the fatwa (a legal opinion or religious decision made by an Islamic scholar) of Gus Ulil, who said that women do not have to wear a headscarf. [It is] just like what Professor Quraish Shihab said that he also does not oblige his daughter to wear a headscarf. Before this [I went to Europe], I could not

¹¹¹ T: *How was your experience waktu masuk ke Maastricht? Jilbaban gitu. Apa diajak ngobrol, ditanya atau gimana berteman, dalam berteman?*

J: *Aku sebenarnya nggak ada masalah sih ya, karena mungkin aku juga orangnya e, nggak, nggak terlalu peka sama orang e sama yang kayak gitu-gitu gitu loh. Jadi, paling juga, mereka ngajakin ke bar. "Ayo kita ngumpul-ngumpul yuk di bar." Terus ya [...] aku minum coca cola, kayak gitu aja. Mereka udah tahu, aku nggak minum alkohol mereka tahu. Pernah ada yang bilang, "Eh mereka ngobrolin kamu loh." "Ngobrolin apa?" "Pada tebak-tebakan rambut kamu warnanya apa dan sepanjang apa" katanya. "Terus tebakkan mereka apa?" "Pasti panjang dan rambutnya hitam." "Iya bener. Nggak aneh lagi kan?" Ya gitu aja sih, cuman, cuman emang sih aku ngeliat, aku ngerasa, kalau mereka itu, karena aku pakai kerudung mereka agak-agak [menunjukkan isyarat menjaga jarak] gitu loh.*

T: *Yang orang Belanda?*

J: *Orang Belanda gitu loh, tapi, dan mungkin, di satu sisi rada-rada eh narik diri, tapi di sisi lain mereka respek gitu loh. Respek banget gitu. Respek, respek karena ngerasa ngerespek kayak, "This is a lady, gitu loh. This is a lady. Yah, nggak boleh macem-macam sama dia", gitu. Interviewed on May 13, 2015.*

accept that fatwa because it is stated in the Quran [that a Muslim woman must cover her head]. However, when I was in the Netherlands, in Europe, I thought when all Muslim women are obliged to wear a headscarf, that is, well, that is not the standard of courtesy there [in the Netherlands]. I mean, what is the purpose of a headscarf? The purpose of a headscarf is to avert a woman from men's harassment or to make a woman more respectable. In the Netherlands, even without a headscarf, we [Muslims] are already respected. Even in Indonesia, it is also like that. Therefore, when I was in the Netherlands, I began to understand the fatwas that were produced by Gus Ulil, for example, he allows us [Muslims] to drink [alcohol]. In liberal Islam, it is accepted.¹¹²

Interviewee MM4 mentioned the organization “NU” twice (overwording) to emphasize his involvement with NU. The phrases “progressive Islam” (mentioned twice, overwording) and “liberal Islam” are alternative wording to refer to NU members who have “progressive views towards Islam”. The name Gus Ulil (Ulil Abshar Abdalla)-an Indonesian Muslim (NU) scholar and one of the founders and the coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal [JIL])¹¹³, is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize Gus Ulil’s “liberal” opinion on headscarf and alcohol. On the headscarf, MM4 also equated the opinion of Gus Ulil with Professor Quraish Shihab, an Indonesian Muslim scholar and former Minister of Religious Affairs (March 1998 - May 1998).

Interviewee MM4 mentioned the noun “*fatwa*” three times (overwording) and the noun “headscarf” six times (overwording) to emphasize his changing perspective on the *fatwa* of wearing a headscarf for Muslim women. He alternated “the Netherlands” with “Europe” to refer to the Netherlands as part of Europe. The text indicates that in the Netherlands, Muslims-including Muslim women with or without a headscarf-are respected. This corresponds to the experience of interviewee MW3 (Text 3.18) with

¹¹² Sebelum berangkat saya sudah cukup belajar tentang e untuk apa ya, Islam yang lebih progresif begitu, artinya dengan berkumpul dengan anak-anak muda NU itu kan, diskusi-diskusi itu sudah biasa. Di sini. Jadi ketika di KMNU dengan teman-teman yang Islam yang progresif itu kan, diskusi-diskusi semacam itu biasa. Cuma ketika di Eropa itu, dulu saya belum bisa menerima fatwanya Gus Ulil, mengatakan bahwa orang, wanita itu tidak harus berjilbab, seperti yang dikatakan Profesor Quraish Shihab juga bahwa dia tidak mewajibkan anaknya untuk berjilbab. Sebelumnya saya nggak bisa menerima fatwa itu, toh karena itu di Qur'an ada kok, gitu. Nah, tapi ketika saya di negeri Belanda, di Eropa. Saya berpikir ketika semua orang Muslim harus diwajibkan berjilbab ya e, apa ya, itu kan bukan standar kesopanan di sana. Artinya, tujuan jilbab itu apa sih. Tujuan jilbab itu kan menghindarkan wanita dari godaan lelaki. Atau biar wanita itu lebih terhormat. Di Belanda itu, toh nggak berjilbab pun kita sudah dihormati kok gitu. Bahkan di Indonesia pun seperti itu. Jadi yah, saya kemudian memahami fatwa-fatwa yang diproduksi oleh Gus Ulil itu di sana. Seperti dia membolehkan minum. Kalau di dalam Islam liberal kan boleh. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

¹¹³ www.islamlib.com

her Dutch friends, who respect her as a woman with a headscarf. This text (3.19) also implies that in liberal Islam, a woman does not have to wear a headscarf, and Muslims are allowed to drink alcohol.

There are many challenges to do things that we call “immoral”

Nine interviewees, MM1, MM2, MM3, MM4, MW1, MW2, MW4, MW6, and PM1, mentioned “morality” and “religious view”. When asked what he told his family in Indonesia about the Netherlands, interviewee MM2 replied,

Text 3.20

There are many challenges to do things that we [Muslims] call “maksiat” [making a quotation mark gesture] (immoral). There are many things. There are drinks, food, [and] shows. There are different kinds of shows like the various kinds of things on the internet. If [someone] wants to, [he or she] can spend a whole day downloading porn. There are also TV shows and there is the Red-Light [District] but no, we [Muslims] know. Therefore, we [Muslims] really learn to be an individual, who is responsible for our own [actions]. If we were someone who believes that we want to adhere to a certain religion as our way of life, [we] can do it well there [in the Netherlands], and it is guaranteed. In us [in Indonesia] it is not [like that] because our state is very worried that we would become irresponsible citizens, become irresponsible umat (adherents of religion). [We] have to always be controlled, be supervised, be monitored, and so forth.¹¹⁴

While mentioning the adjective “immoral (*maksiat*),” interviewee MM2 made a gesture of quotation marks with his fingers (observed by the interviewer) to show that he specially used the term. He indicated “drinks,” “food,” and “shows” as examples of “immoral” things. Although he did not specify what kinds of drink, food, or show, they are implicitly associated with what is considered objectionable on Islamic moral grounds such as alcohol, pork, pornography, prostitution, and sexually related shows. He used inclusive “we” (*kita*) to refer to the Muslims. The phrase “no, we know” correlates with the phrase “we [Muslims] really learn to be an individual,

¹¹⁴ Tantangan banyak untuk berbuat hal-hal yang kita nyebutnya “maksiat” gitu kan. Itu kan banyak sekali. Ada minuman, ada makanan, ada tontonan. Tontonan itu kan macem-macem. Mulai dari internet yang sangat banyak kalau mau *download* porno itu sehari-hari bisa. TV juga ada, *Red-Light* juga ada, kayak gitu. Tapi enggak, kita tahu. Jadi kita belajar betul-betul menjadi pribadi yang *responsible for our own*. Kalau kita menjadi seorang yang percaya bahwa kita ingin menjadikan agama tertentu sebagai *our way of life*, ya bisa di sana dengan baik gitu, dan dijamin. Nah, di kita kan enggak? Karena negara kita sangat khawatir kita menjadi e, apa namanya, warga negara yang tidak bertanggungjawab. Menjadi umat yang tidak bertanggung jawab. Harus selalu dikontrol, harus diawasi, harus dimonitor, dan seterusnya. Interviewed on December 23, 2015.

who is responsible for our own [actions]”. The interviewee implied the notion of individual freedom, which corresponds to the statements of interviewee NM1 (Text 3.5 and Text 3.6) on freedom of choice.

The text implies a contrast between the role of the Dutch government, which “guaranteed” people “to adhere to a certain religion” and the role of the Indonesian government, which is “very worried” that Indonesians “would become irresponsible citizens, become irresponsible *umat*”. The phrases “irresponsible citizens” and “irresponsible *umat*” are alternative wording to indicate that Indonesian citizens are also adherents of a religion. The adverb “very” in “our state is very worried” indicates the interviewee’s emphasis on how the Indonesian state “always” “controls”, “supervises”, and “monitors” (overwording) its citizens.

When asked if he had an interesting experience when he lived in Den Haag, interviewee MM4 replied,

Text 3.21

A: I hosted many guests at my house [in the Den Haag]. There was a time when I had a visit from a [Indonesian] group from the Syafana Foundation in Tangerang [West Java]. It is an educational foundation that manages education like that of Al Azhar, from playgroup up to high school level. These are people whom I may say, very, how do I call it, very strictly practicing religion.

Q: Pious?

A: Super. Maybe they are very strict but conservative. They are quite conservative because they are old people. So, these are old people who have an educational perspective on children, morals, and so forth. They asked me, anyway, we were talking about alcohol [in the Netherlands] and I told them that most of the young people here [in the Netherlands] already have sex since they are in high school. They were incredibly shocked. They are like, “How come? The morality [of Dutch youth] is very shattered but the [Dutch] state can be this advanced”. Thus, economically the [Dutch] state is very advanced but on the other side, the morality [of Dutch youth] is wrecked. In the beginning, they were struggling with it but then [we] compared it to Indonesia. We [Indonesians] have a lot of rules, morals and so forth, but from the side of the development, the state [Indonesia] is catastrophic.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ J: Di rumah saya sering silih berganti orang datang sebagai tamu. Ada rombongan dari Yayasan Syafana di Tangerang. Itu yayasan pendidikan yang mengelola pendidikan, semacam sekolah, pendidikan kayak Al Azhar gitu ya, yang berjenjang dari tingkat PAUD sampai dengan tingkat SMA. Mereka ini orang yang boleh dikatakan sangat e, apa ya, bagaimana menyebutnya, ya sangat menjalankan agama dengan ketat.

T: Pious?

Interviewee MM4 mentioned the phrase “very strictly practicing religion”, the adjective “super [pious]” and the phrase “very strict but conservative” (overwording) to emphasize how conservative his guests were. He indicated a contrast between “the morality [of Dutch youth] is very shattered” and “the [Dutch] state can be this advanced”, a statement that he repeated twice (overwording). The verbs “shattered” and “wrecked” are overwording to emphasize the morality of Dutch youth. The phrase “the morality [of Dutch youth] is very shattered” corresponds to the statement of interviewee PM1 (Text 3.10) on Indonesians who “say that the Netherlands is the most immoral country”.

The verb “struggling” indicates MM4’s guests’ difficulty in understanding the contrast between the “morality” of Dutch youth and the advancement of the Dutch state. The adjective “catastrophic” in the case of the Indonesian state is the opposite of the adjective “advanced” in the case of the Dutch state. The adjective “advanced” is associated with the noun “development”. The text shows a relationship between “morality” and the advancement of a state.

When asked her opinion of abortion in the Netherlands, interviewee MW1 replied,

Text 3.22

Here [in the Netherlands], indeed, there is a medical [procedure for abortion], [there is] a special hospital for an abortion. [...] That [abortion], in fact, according to religion, is not allowed. It is similar to killing. As long as it [the fetus] does not have a soul yet, yes [it can be aborted]. As it is said [according to religion] that if [the fetus] is already eight weeks old, [the fetus] already has a soul, it is no longer [allowed to be aborted]. Except when it is still a blood clot, it is ok. [...] [Here the hospital is] responsible and if something happens, they [hospitals] can be prosecuted. And this [abortion] is always being controlled.¹¹⁶

J: Super. Ya mungkin sangat ketat tapi konservatif. Mereka cukup konservatif karena mereka kan orang-orang tua. Jadi ini orang-orang tua yang punya perspektif pendidikan terhadap anak, moral dan segala macam. Kemudian mereka bertanya. Anyway, kita ngomongin soal ini ya, apa, alcohol dan kemudian saya menceritakan bahwa anak-anak di sini tu rata-rata sudah berhubungan seksual dari mulai sekolah SMA dan mereka luar biasa kagetnya. Seolah-olah, “Kok bisa ya? Remuk sekali moralnya tapi negaranya begitu maju semacam ini.” Jadi secara ekonomi kok bisa sangat maju tapi di satu sisi moralnya kok hancur gitu. Ya, mereka awalnya berontak gitu, tapi kemudian membandingkan dengan Indonesia yang kita banyak sekali aturan, moral dan segala macam tapi dari segi perkembangan negaranya kan hancur lebur semacam itu. Interviewed on January 17, 2015.

¹¹⁶ Kalau di sini sih memang medis ada, rumah sakit yang khusus untuk abortus. [...] Itu sesungguhnya menurut agama juga nggak boleh. Itu kan sama saja membunuh, asalkan dia belum bernyawa ya. Seperti dikatakan kalau udah 8 minggu itu, udah, mereka udah ada nyawanya, itu udah nggak. Kecuali kalau masih gumpalan darah itu ya nggak apa-apa. [Di sini rumah sakit itu] bertanggung jawab dan kalau ada

Interviewee MW1 mentioned the phrases “there is a medical [procedure for abortion]” and “[there is] a special hospital for an abortion” (overwording) to imply that abortion in the Netherlands is legal and is done medically in a hospital. She contrasted the phrases “there is a special hospital for an abortion” and “according to religion, is not allowed”. She alternated “it is not allowed” with “it is similar to killing” to refer to religious rule. She rephrased her statement about religious rule by stating that “as long as it [the fetus] does not have a soul yet, yes [it can be aborted]” and “if [the fetus] is already eight weeks old, [the fetus] already has a soul, it is no longer [allowed to be aborted]”. The text implies that “according to religion”, in this case, Islam, abortion is allowed when “[the fetus] does not have a soul yet”. The verb “prosecuted” and the phrase “always being controlled” indicate the control of the Dutch government on the abortion procedure in the Netherlands.

When asked her opinion on homosexuality, interviewee MW2 responded,

Text 3.23

We [Muslims] also become open-minded towards them. It is their life. I know a homosexual man. I said to him, “You know the consequence. You know what you will receive in the afterlife”. Fine. I do not forbid him by saying, “Don’t you [do this], don’t [do this]”, but I said, “You know the consequence, you know, what, in the afterlife, what you will get”.¹¹⁷

Interviewee MW2 said that Muslims (meso level of discourse) become open-minded towards homosexuals by saying “It is their life” and “I do not forbid him”. She repeated the phrase “don’t you [do this]” (overwording) to emphasize that she was being open-minded towards the “homosexual man”. She mentioned the noun “consequence” two times (overwording) and the noun “afterlife” twice (overwording) to emphasize “what” the man “will get” in “the afterlife”. The text shows continuity in change. On the one hand, Indonesian Muslims become open-minded. On the other hand, they repeat Islamic teachings.

When asked her opinion on cohabitation, interviewee MW4 replied,

apa-apa mereka bisa dituntut. Dan ini juga selalu dikontrol ya. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

¹¹⁷ Kita ikut jadi *open mind* sama mereka. Ya itu kehidupan mereka. Saya ada kenal orang homo, saya bilang sama dia, kamu tahu konsekuensinya, kamu tahu apa yang kamu akan terima di akhirat, ya sudah. Saya nggak melarang dia kamu jangan-jangan, tapi saya bilang kamu tahu konsekuensinya, kamu tahu, apa, di akhirat kamu akan dapat apa. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

Text 3.24

I have a soft spot for that thing, ok. Samenwonen (cohabitation), or marriage in our [Indonesian understanding], is an agreement between two [people]. [...] For me, that is marriage. It is just not being legalized [by religious law]. For me, that is marriage. That is [a] commitment. Legality for us is indeed, in a mosque, it needs only two people and one, who can just [act] as a witness. That's it. Samenwonen (cohabitation) for most people here [in the Netherlands] is legalized at the city hall. Registered cohabitation. For me, that is marriage. For me, there are no illegitimate children. By the way, there are no illegitimate children in it [registered cohabitation]. So, when Indonesian people say, "o, kumpul kebo"¹¹⁸ (cohabitation)", [it is] very negative for them [Indonesians] whenever I told them [Indonesians] [about registered cohabitation]. But then they are like, "Oh, yes, yes. Oh yes, yes, why for us [Indonesians] kawin siri (unregistered Islamic marriage) is legal in the eyes of Islam, but why being registered at the city hall is not legal?" They [kawin siri and registered cohabitation] are the same. Therefore, it is about our [Indonesians] understanding, our view."¹¹⁹

The phrase "soft spot" implies interviewee MW4's acceptance of cohabitation. She indicated *samenwonen* (cohabitation) as "an agreement between two people" and equated it with "marriage" (alternative wording). Throughout the text interviewee MW4 mentioned the term "legality," "legalized," "legal" and "illegitimate" (overwording) to emphasize the importance of what is considered "legal" in the context of marriage and cohabitation in the Netherlands and Indonesia. The text implies the legality of Islamic marriage (*kawin siri*, which is not registered in the Indonesian civil registry) with registered cohabitation in the city hall in the Netherlands.

¹¹⁸ The derogatory term "*kumpul kebo*" literally means buffalo (*kebo*) gathering (*kumpul*). It is a slang term for two heterosexual people in a relationship who live together without being married, which is considered immoral or sinful in Indonesia.

¹¹⁹ *I have a soft spot sama kayak gitu ya. Samenwonen, marriage kalau di kita, itu kan agreement between the two. [...] For me that's marriage. Cuma nggak dilegalisasikan aja. For me, that's marriage. That's commitment. Legalitas di kita memang kalau di di masjid kan, it needs only two and one who can just [act] as a witness. That's it. Terus samenwonen kebanyakan orang di sini itu di, dilegalisasikan ke gementee. Register samenwonen kayak gitu itu. For me, that's marriage. For me, there are no illegitimate children. By the way, there are no illegitimate children in it. Jadi kalau orang Indonesia bilang, o kumpul kebo, negatif banget kalo aku cerita kayak gitu. Terus mereka, o ya ya. O ya ya, kenapa kita kawin siri legal di mata Islam, kenapa kalo registered di gemeente nggak legal? It is the same. Jadi memang understanding kita aja, pengertian kayak kita aja. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.*

They do not fully accept it

Six interviewees, CM2, MM1, MM6, MW1, MW3, and MW4, indicated that not all Dutch people “fully accept” issues of abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. Interviewee MM6 (Text 3.2) said, “Some people are against it [abortion]”. When asked their opinion of homosexuality in the Netherlands, a couple, MM1 and MW3, replied,

Text 3.25

MM1: *They [the Dutch] are not that open. During the [gay] parade they [the Dutch] are open but individually [unfinished sentence].*

MW3: *But old people here [in the Netherlands] still cannot accept [homosexuality].*

MM1: *Not only old people. My [young Dutch] friends [too]. When we talk about it [homosexuality] [my Dutch friends] are also hmm, hmm (showing dislike expression). Don't ever speak about gay [people] after sport. After sport, we [my male friends and I] are all undressed [in the dressing room]. One of my colleagues said, “Everybody will feel uncomfortable”. Commonly, the dressing room [at a sports place] is open, right? Never talk. Never discuss. Never talk about that [homosexuality]. [It] makes everybody uncomfortable.¹²⁰*

Interviewee MM1 mentioned the adjective “open” twice (overwording) to indicate that on the individual level, Dutch people “are not that open”. Interviewee MW3 indicated that old people in the Netherlands “still cannot accept homosexuality”. Interviewee MM1 confirmed this and added that it is “not only old people”. The phrases “don't ever speak about gay [people] after sport”, “never talk”, and “never discuss” are overwording to emphasize that topic of homosexuality makes people in MM1's sports group “uncomfortable”. The text implies that not all Dutch people “accept homosexuality”.

¹²⁰ T: *And homosexuality?*

MM1: *Tapi mereka nggak seterbuka itu. Itu juga pada saat parade mereka terbuka, tapi kalau satu-satu [unfinished sentence].*

MW3: *Tapi orang-orang tua yang di sini masih belum bisa nerima gitu lah.*

MM1: *Nggak cuma orang tua. Temen-temen aku aja, yang cuma pada ngomongin itu, hmm, hmm (showing dislike expression). Jangan pernah ngomong gay habis sport. Habis sport itu kan buka baju semua. Everybody will feel uncomfortable. Itu kata salah satu kolega. Kan biasa kan, tempat ganti bajunya semuanya kan buka kan? Never talk. Never discuss, never talk about that. Make everybody uncomfortable.*

When asked her opinion about homosexuality, interviewee MW1 responded,

Text 3.26

Some people like it. [I] mean, they do not care about it. Some people care, like him [her husband]. He does not like a homosexual.¹²¹

By adding the phrase “[I] mean,” the meaning of the verb “like” in the first sentence is equivalent to the phrase “do not care”. Interviewee MW1 mentioned the verb “care” twice (overwording) and the verb “like” twice (overwording) to emphasize that there are people who like and do not like homosexuality. MW1’s husband, an Indo-Dutchman, belongs to the category of those who “do not like” homosexual people. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewees MM1 and MW3 (Text 3.25) that not all Dutch people “accept homosexuality”.

When asked his opinion of homosexual people in the Netherlands, interviewee CM2, answered,

Text 3.27

Q: What is the perception of Indonesian people here [in the Netherlands] about those things [abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality]?

A: I follow Dutch law on the issue of abortion. For the issue of euthanasia, mostly yes [I follow Dutch law]. Sometimes in the issue of euthanasia, there are extreme cases. [Those are] people who would like to kill themselves. There are [Dutch] people who still oppose that [euthanasia]. About 80% [of people are open to euthanasia]. I follow Dutch law [on the matter of euthanasia].

Q: Do you think Indonesian people here [in the Netherlands] experience culture shock on these matters [abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality]?

A: In my opinion no because these [abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality] are not daily issues. These are incidental matters. Well, homosexuality is a daily issue. In my opinion, I do not know if I represent most Indonesian or not, but in my opinion, some people are like that [homosexual]. What can we do about it? Some are born that way [as a homosexual]. In my opinion, [we] should not expose it on a large scale. If there are people who would become [a homosexual], it is up to them but [we] should not consider this as generally normal. That is my opinion. Maybe Indonesian people who live here have a similar opinion to me or are similar to the Dutch. But the Dutch are like I said before, they are hypocritical. In my opinion, most of them [the

¹²¹ Ada juga orang-orang yang seneng, maksudnya nggak perduli. Ada juga yang perduli, seperti dia [suami]. Dia nggak suka sama homo.

Dutch] do not always accept [homosexuality] fully. Of course, some fully accept it [homosexuality] but in my opinion, they [Dutch people who accept homosexuality] are still a minority. Maybe about 20% [or] 30% of people.¹²²

Interviewee CM2 said that he “follows the Dutch law” on the issue of abortion and euthanasia. He also indicated that he distinguished his opinion from that of the Dutch on homosexuality. The text shows that there are Dutch people who are opposed to euthanasia and Dutch people do not always accept homosexuality. The phrase “like I said before, they are hypocritical” is related to his statement about “the liberal hypocrites” (Text 3.4), who claimed to be liberal but actually do not accept issues such as homosexuality.

I am worried

Various interviewees expressed their concern for their children, who are growing up in the Netherlands. They stated that “it is a challenge” and “it is difficult” for them as parents. Comparing television programs for children in the Netherlands and Indonesia, a couple, MM1 and MW3, said,

Text 3.28

MM1: I feel that my children are safer here [in the Netherlands] than in Indonesia.

MW3: Because here [in the Netherlands], tv [programs] for children are specifically [made] for children and the advertisements [unfinished sentence].

MM1: The advertisements are also for children. So from morning until 6 pm [the television programs] are certainly family-friendly.

Q: So, for children's education it is safer [in the Netherlands]?

¹²² T: Bagaimana pandangan orang Indonesia yang tinggal di sini tentang hal-hal tersebut?

J: Aborsi saya ikut hukum Belanda saja. Euthanasia ya sebagian besar. Kadang-kadang kalau euthanasia itu ada juga yang kasus yang ekstrim ya. Orang yang mau bunuh diri itu memang orang sini aja masih menentang ya. Jadi 80% lah [yang terbuka dengan euthanasia]. Saya ikut hukum Belanda lah.

T: Kalau dari pandangan orang Indonesia apakah menurut anda mereka mengalami *culture shock* atas hal ini?

J: Menurut saya tidak karena ini bukan masalah yang dialami sehari-hari. Karena ini kan secara insidental saja. Kalau yang homo itu ya sehari-hari ya. Kalau itu pendapat saya, ini saya tidak tahu saya mewakili orang kebanyakan orang Indonesia atau tidak tapi menurut saya ya memang ada orang yang begitu, apa boleh buat. Tapi ada juga yang tidak terlahir demikian. Menurut saya jangan diekspos besar-besaran lah. Kalau yang mau ya, terserah tapi jangan dianggap ini secara umum normal. Itu kalau menurut pandangan saya. Orang Indonesia yg tinggal di sini itu mungkin mirip saya ya, atau mirip orang Belanda. Tapi orang Belanda juga seperti yg saya bilang itu tadi ya, munafik itu tadi. Menurut saya tidak selalu menerima secara penuh ya. Kebanyakan. Tentu ada yang menerima secara penuh tetapi itu masih minoritas menurut saya itu. Mungkin 20%, 30%.

MM1: *For me, personally, it is safer [in the Netherlands].*

MW3: *Because the children are still small so for example, influence or [struggling to find words].*

MM1: *And culture.*

MW3: *The influence of the culture to drink [alcohol] or go to a discotheque does not [happen] yet.*

MM1: *Not yet.*

MW3: *Later, that [will make us] worried.*

Q: *When [the children are] teenagers?*

MM1: *That is when I am worried. I think maybe I move [my children] to Brunei Darussalam.*¹²³

Interviewees MM1 and MW3 indicated that for them the Netherlands is safer than Indonesia for their small children because “tv [programs] for children are specifically made for children” and advertisements until 6 pm are “family-friendly”. They then mentioned the adjective “worried” twice (overwording) to emphasize their concern when their children are teenagers. The text implies that in the Netherlands there is a culture “to drink alcohol or go to a discotheque” that makes interviewees MM1 and MW3 “worried” as it may “influence” their children when they are teenagers.

When the wife, MW3, was asked if it was hard for her to adjust to life in the Netherlands, the husband, MM1, repeated his worry, specifically for his daughter, the eldest child.

Text 3.29

Q: *Is adjusting to life in the Netherlands hard for you?*

MW3: *Not hard.*

MM1: *But I am actually a little bit worried about when my daughter grows up. When she becomes a teenager. I am worried but actually, when I see the*

¹²³ MM1: Aku ngerasa lebih aman anak-anakku di sini daripada di Indonesia.

MW3: Soalnya di sini tv buat anak-anak itu khusus buat anak-anak aja, dan kalau iklan [...]

MM1: Iklannya juga buat anak-anak. Jadi pagi sampai jam 6 itu pasti *family-friendly* acaranya.

T: Jadi kalau untuk pendidikan anak lebih aman [di Belanda]?

MM1: Aku lebih, buat aku pribadi.

MW3: Karena ini anak-anak masih kecil ya. Jadi kalau misalnya, *influence* apa yaa [...]

MM1: Dan *culture*.

MW3 *Influence culture* buat minum-minum atau ke diskotik itu belum.

MM1: Belum.

MW3: Nanti. Itu baru khawatir.

T: Kalau sudah *teenager*?

MM1: Itu baru. Aku baru khawatir. Aku berpikir apa nanti aku pindahkan ke Brunei Darussalam.

news about how teenagers in Indonesia are, I am more worried [if my daughter is] in Indonesia. Everywhere [makes me worried]. Here [in the Netherlands], teen pregnancy is regarded as the lowest [in the world].

MW3: *Just pray.*¹²⁴

Interviewee MM1 mentioned the adjective “worried” three times (overwording) to emphasize his worry for his daughter. At first, he indicated his worry when his daughter becomes a teenager in the Netherlands. Secondly, he rephrased his “worry” if his daughter is in Indonesia, this time to a higher degree as he used the adverb “more” (overwording). In the end, he stated that “everywhere” makes him worried for his daughter. The text makes a comparison between teenagers in Indonesia and the Netherlands in the context of “teen pregnancy”. In relation to the previous text (3.28), this text (3.29) implies that female teenagers are “safer” in the Netherlands than in Indonesia in the case of teen pregnancy.

Interviewee MW6 also expressed her worry about her children's social interaction.

Text 3.30

Q: As a mother, how do you see the social interaction between boys and girls [in the Netherlands]?

*A: Well, as a mother, [I am] rather worried about my children. But what I am sure of [is that] the [religious] foundation that I have given [to my children] is already quite sufficient. They [the children] should be able to struggle for [their] future. [I am] still afraid, the worry stays, clearly it is there. What am I supposed to do? I mean, a child needs, needs the outside environment. [My child] does not only need me, therefore, now, the main thing is, I have given [my children] a [religious] foundation. Now the choice is up to the children themselves. I can only support them with prayers. Alhamdulillah (praise be to Allah) they are still, for example when [they] have problems, [they] always tell me.*¹²⁵

¹²⁴ T: Apakah menyesuaikan diri di Belanda ini berat untuk anda?

MW3: Nggak berat.

MM1: Tapi aku sebenarnya rada kuatir lho kalo soal anak perempuanku kalau udah gede. Sebenarnya. Kalau udah *teenager* itu. Aku, aku khawatir. Tapi sebenarnya kalau misal aku ngeliat berita gimana *teenager* di Indonesia, aku lebih khawatir lagi di Indonesia. Di mana-mana gitu. Karena di sini *teen pregnancy* itu termasuk paling rendah.

MW3: Berdoa aja. Interviewed on May 13, 2015.

¹²⁵ T: Sebagai ibu, bagaimana mbak melihat pergaulan sosial anak perempuan dan anak laki-laki?

J: Ya, namanya kita seorang ibu ya, agak takut kan, gimana anak kita. Tapi yang saya sendiri yakin basis yang saya berikan sudah, yah sudah lumayan cukup. Harusnya mereka bisa berjuang untuk ke depannya. Takut sih takut tetep, khawatir sih tetep, jelas ada terus kan. Gimana lagi ya. Maksudnya,

The noun “worry,” and the adjectives “worried” and “afraid” are overwording to emphasize interviewee MW6’s concern about her children. She mentioned “[religious] foundation” twice (overwording) to stress what she has given to her children. MW6’s statement corresponds to the statements of interviewees PW5¹²⁶ and MM6¹²⁷, who spoke about the importance of giving religious education to their children as a provision for the children’s social interaction when they are older.

Interviewee MW6 indicated that her children need both her and “the outside environment”. Like interviewee MW3 in text 3.29, interviewee MW6 also mentioned “prayers” to support her children. She indicated that while “the choice” of action is “up to her children”, she is thankful to Allah that her children still come to her when they have problems.

Like interviewee MW6 above, interviewee MW2 also mentioned “outside” of the family and teaching Islam to her children. When speaking about Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands, she mentioned that there are “strict” Indonesian Muslims. When asked about the education of the children of strict Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands, she answered,

Text 3.31

A: They [strict Indonesian Muslims] send their children to an Islamic school. For me, what is important, in the family, we teach [the children] Islam [at home]. When [they are] outside [of the family], well, the children also need the future. The network is important. I do not want my children [...] because I know in Eindhoven there are a lot of Moroccan and Turkish people. If the network of my children is those people [the Moroccans and Turkish], their [the Moroccans and Turkish] behaviour is like hooligans. The Moroccans are

anak itu ya butuh, butuh lingkungan luar. Bukan butuh saya doang, jadi ya sekarang pokoknya saya sudah memberikan basis. Sekarang pilihan tinggal di anak itu sendiri. Ya saya cuma bisa bantu dengan doa. Alhamdulillah mereka masih misalnya kalau ada masalah selalu curhat ke saya. Interviewed on June 15, 2016.

¹²⁶ Asked, “So, people [in the Netherlands] can be modern and religious?” PW5 answered: if we [Indonesians] educate [children with religious education] from a young age, [the religious education] will be rooted in them [the children]. Therefore, even though the state of this world is getting further away from God, they [the children] have a [religious] basis. Interviewed on December 1, 2019.

¹²⁷ In reply to the question “Can you imagine your children growing up [in the Netherlands]?” MM6 said: That is a challenge [...]. [The challenge has started] even when the children are teenagers. Some [Indonesian Muslim parents] have failed, and some have succeeded, as far as I know. [...] Failing means [their children] live a free life [having sex before marriage], dating, et cetera. Answering the follow-up question, “Is there another challenge [for Indonesian parents in the Netherlands]?”, MM6 said: Religious education. In Indonesia, [religious education] is very strong. Here [in the Netherlands], [Indonesian Muslim children] get religious education only at least once a week. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

*known as mafia, hooligans. They [the Moroccans] speak a dirty language.
The Moroccans in Helmond are known as criminals.*

Q: Is it because they are poor?

A: Family education.

Q: But they are Muslims, right?

A: Muslims, they [the Moroccans] are indeed Muslims but yeah, that is why, in Indonesia, they [Indonesians] are Muslims but you know, what is important for us [Muslims] is being open-minded to other people, to people outside of us [Muslims]. Do not close ourselves. Because I do not want my children to be fanatics. Being fanatic makes us [Indonesian Muslims] blind towards other people.¹²⁸

Interviewee MW2 indicated a difference between herself and the “strict Indonesian Muslims”, who send their children to an Islamic school. She indicated that she and her husband teach their children Islam at home, “in the family”. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM5 (Text 2.20) on the fact that if one would like to learn about religion, in this case, Islam, in the Netherlands, he or she can do it at home, in private.

Interviewee MW2 contrasted “in the family” and “outside of the family”. She indicated the importance of “network” for the future of her children. She mentioned “the Morrocans” three times (overwording) and referred to both “the Moroccan and Turkish people” three times (overwording) to emphasize that their behaviour “is like hooligans”. She specified her statement by mentioning “the Moroccans”, particularly “in Helmond”, who “are known as mafia, hooligans”, “speak a dirty language” and are “known as criminals” (alternative wording). She mentioned “fanatic” twice (overwording) to emphasize that she does not want her children to be fanatics. She equated being fanatic with being “blind towards other people”. The text implies a difference between Moroccan Muslims and Indonesian Muslims, who are “open-minded”. The phrase “open-minded” equals the phrase “do not close ourselves to people outside of us [Muslims]”.

¹²⁸ J: Mereka ngirim anaknya ke sekolah Islam. Kalau saya, yang penting di keluarga kita ajarin Islam. Kalau di luar, yah, dia juga perlu masa depan. *Network* itu penting. Karena saya tahu di Eindhoven itu banyak orang Maroko dan Turki. Nanti *network* mereka orang-orang itu. Kelakuannya yang berandal-berandal. Orang Maroko itu kan terkenal mafia, berandal, berandal. Omong-omong kata jorok. Orang Maroko itu di Helmond terkenal kriminal.

T: Itu apakah karena mereka miskin?

J: Didikan keluarga.

T: Tapi mereka Muslim kan?

J: Muslim sih Muslim tapi yah, makannya itu di Indonesia mereka Muslim tapi, kita itu yang penting *openmind* sama orang, sama orang luar. Jangan menutup diri. Saya nggak mau anak-anak jadi fanatik. Karena fanatik itu membutuhkan kita terhadap orang lain. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

When asked about her interaction with Dutch people, interviewee MW2 spoke about her next-door neighbour and her son. When asked if the neighbours are Christian or irreligious, she replied,

Text 3.32

A: The mother is Catholic. The mother is a very church person. Still diligent, and active in the church. The son is not.

Q: Is that normal for the Netherlands? [Is that] common?

A: Common, common. It is not something [a big deal]. The mother cannot force the son [to be religious]. But well, I am still applying the Indonesian system to my children. I teach them [religion]. We [my husband and I] are also responsible as parents. Not only [responsible for the children's] culture, [but also, we are] responsible [for the] afterlife. That is why [I] teach the children shalat (prayer) too.¹²⁹

Interviewee MW2 equated being “a very church person” (overwording) with “still diligent, active in the church”. She contrasted “the mother”, a Catholic woman, who is “active in the church” and “the son”, who “is not” a church person. She mentioned the adjective “common” twice (overwording) to emphasize that the fact that the mother is religious and the son is not religious “is a common thing” and “is not something [a big deal]” in the Netherlands. She contrasted the statements “the mother cannot force the son to be religious” and “I am still applying the Indonesian system to my children”. She implied a difference between her neighbour, a Dutch mother, and herself, an Indonesian mother. The phrase “applying the Indonesian system to my children” equals “I teach them [religion]”. The text indicates that for Indonesians, it is common to teach their children religion.

Interviewee MW2 indicated a causal relationship between “I teach them [religion]” and “we [my husband and I] are also responsible as parents”. She mentioned the adjective “responsible” twice (overwording) to emphasize that as parents, she and her husband are responsible for their children's culture and the afterlife. She implied the Islamic teaching that in the afterlife, parents will be held accountable for their responsibilities in bringing up their children. The phrases “I teach them [religion]” and “[I] teach the children *shalat* too” are alternative wording to emphasize what she does as her responsibility as a parent according to Islamic teaching and

¹²⁹ J: Mamanya Katolik. Mamanya orang gereja banget. Masih rajin, aktif di gereja. Anaknya enggak.
T: Apa itu normal di Belanda? Biasa?

J: Biasa, biasa. Itu bukan sesuatu yang [...] Mamanya nggak bisa maksa anak ya. Tapi ya saya masih menerapkan sistem Indonesia sama anak-anak. Saya ajarin mereka. Kan kita tanggung jawab juga ya orang tua. Bukan hanya kultur ya, tanggung jawab akhirat. Makannya, anak-anak, saya ajarin juga shalat. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

what is common for Indonesian people. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.22) and interviewee PW3 (Text 4.17) regarding the fact that in the Netherlands, parents cannot force their child to be religious or on their choice of religion whereas, in Indonesia, there is a social pressure on parents to teach religion to their children and to follow “what religion says”.

Interviewee PW2 had an opinion different from interviewees MW6 (Text 3.30) and MW2 (Text 3.32) regarding giving a religious foundation to her children.

Text 3.33

Q: When your children grow up, would you be worried about their free social interaction (pergaulan bebas) [in the Netherlands]?

A: I have prepared myself for [their] free social interaction. How can I not? When [my children are] 15 years of age, my insurance, our insurance, [will] send a package of condoms to the children every month. [...] [I] must be ready whether I like it or not. [...] [I checked] the children's insurance. What tickled me was the fact that when they [my children] are 15 years old, once a month they will get a pack of condoms. Whether I like it or not I must be ready [for my children's social interaction]. The point is to be careful not to get pregnant. When [we] live here [in the Netherlands] [we] must be ready [for our children's social interaction]. [Indonesians in the Netherlands] try to fortify their children with religion from an early age. They [Indonesians in the Netherlands] think like that, right? But in my opinion, religion and daily life are different [matters]. Religion is mainly when we [religious people], for me, when we do not know where else to go, remember, there is God, who can help us. For me, that's it. Therefore, to expect that with religion, [by telling] the children this is a sin, that is a sin, it seems [to me] that it is very bullshit to live like that here [in the Netherlands]. I cannot be sure that I can instill that [religious teaching] in my children.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ T: Misalnya anak-anak sudah besar. Khawatir nggak mbak karena pergaulan bebas?

J: Pergaulan bebas sih aku sudah siapkan diri. Gimana enggak? Nanti mulai umur 15 tahun, dari asuransiku, asuransi kita, kirim setiap bulan satu pak kondom ke anak-anak. [...] Ya sudah harus siap mau nggak mau. [...] Asuransi anak-anak ini apa sih. Yang bikin geli ya itu nanti umur 15 tahun sebulan sekali dikirim satu pak kondom. Ya sudah ya mau nggak mau ya harus siap ya memang pergaulan bebas ya pokoknya hati-hati nggak hamil. Ya kalau emang hidup di sini ya udah harus siap. [Orang Indonesia di sini] dari awal berusaha, e anak masih bisa dibentengi dengan agama. Pikirnya mereka begitu kan tapi kalau menurutku agama dengan gaya hidup sehari-hari itu beda. Agama itu pokoknya pada saat kita kalau aku ya, pada saat kita nggak tahu harus kemana lagi, ingat masih ada Tuhan yang bisa nolong kita. Kalau aku tu itu jadi kalau mengharapkan bahwa dengan agama membuat anak-anak ah ini dosa, itu dosa, kayaknya kok *bullshit* banget hidup di sini. Aku nggak bisa yakin bahwa itu bisa kutanamkan ke anak-anakku. Interviewed on June 17, 2016.

The phrases “I have prepared myself” and “I must be ready” are overwording to emphasize interviewee PW2’s readiness to face what will happen to her children when they grow up, particularly in their free social interaction. The Indonesian phrase “*pergaulan bebas*” implies the possibility of premarital sex. She also repeated the phrase “whether I like it or not” twice (overwording) to emphasize that she must be ready that her children will receive a pack of condoms from their insurance company when they are 15 years old. She mentioned the noun “religion” four times (overwording) to emphasize that for her, “religion and daily life are different [matters]”. She repeated the phrase “this is a sin” twice (overwording) to stress that for her, using religion to “fortify” children is “very bullshit” (overwording).

Text 3.33 indicates that some Indonesian parents in the Netherlands use “religious teaching” to ward off their children from premarital sex. The statement “[Indonesians in the Netherlands] try to fortify their children with religion from an early age” confirms the statements of interviewees MM6 (footnote 127), MW2 (Text 3.32), MW6 (Text 3.30), and PW5 (footnote 126), and on giving “[religious] foundation” to Indonesian children in the Netherlands.

When asked if he could imagine having children in the Netherlands, interviewee MM4 answered,

Text 3.34

That is rather difficult. That is extremely difficult. [...] Once there was a family who shared their experience with me. They are Indonesians who have been living in the Netherlands for more than ten years. [They] have a son, [who receives] Dutch education. The mother is very conservative while the father already understands [and said], “Let it be. That is Dutch culture”. Their son is in high school. The mother is extremely concerned in thinking of finding a way so that her son will not bring a girl home. [...] One day she was extremely shocked [...] [to find out that] he [her son] was in his bedroom with a girl. [The mother was] incredibly shocked and she was also sad. I also imagine the consequence of being parents [in the Netherlands], especially [when you are] Muslims. That is extremely difficult, especially regarding pergaulan (interaction). They [the Indonesian couple] said, “Our son understands halal (permitted) and haram (forbidden), alcohol, and so forth. He even pays attention to checking the pork fat in his snacks. He does not drink alcohol either. But for his hubungan bebas (free social relationship), it is difficult”. That is for that couple. The mother was extremely sad and angry.¹³¹

¹³¹ J: Itu yang agak susah. Itu yang luar biasa susah. Ada satu keluarga yang curhat ke saya. Orang Indonesia

Interviewee MM4 mentioned the adjective “difficult” four times (overwording) and four times adding the adverb “extremely” (overwording) to emphasize the difficulty of being Muslim parents in the Netherlands. He indicated a contrast of attitude between “the mother is very conservative” and “the father already understands”. “Let it be. This [free social relationship] is Dutch culture”. Like the phrase “*pergaulan bebas*” used in text 3.33, the Indonesian noun “*pergaulan*” and the phrase “*hubungan bebas*” (alternative wording) in this text, imply the possibility of premarital sex, which is considered a sin in Islam, and became the biggest concern for the “very conservative” mother.

2. Analysis of discourse as discursive practice

The analysis of discursive practice is the intermediary between the analysis of discourse as linguistic practice and discourse as social practice. The discursive practice includes the production, distribution and consumption of texts. When discourse participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk, they draw on members’ resources (Fairclough, 1989, p. 163) or mental models (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 75) stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 9-10, 24). To look at the discursive practice, an intertextual perspective is used to explore the process of production, distribution and consumption of texts. In this stage, parts of the texts from the first stage (analysis of discourse as linguistic practice) are quoted again to show the references pointed out by interviewees. The analytic question in this section is: What members’ resources or mental models do discourse participants use to produce or consume texts about liberalism in the Netherlands?

State law

Eight interviewees, AM1, MM4, MM6, MW1, MW4, NM1, NW3, and PM1, referred to “government control”, “state law”, “rights and obligation”, “law book”, and “rules” (intertextuality) when they spoke about liberalism in the Netherlands and its relation

tapi ya sudah belasan tahun di Belanda, punya anak dan pendidikan Belanda. Mereka itu, ibunya ini konservatif sekali, ayahnya itu sudah memahami lah: biarin itu sudah *culture*nya Belanda. Anaknya menginjak masa SMA. Ibunya ini luar biasa pusingnya memikirkan bagaimana cara agar si anak ini tidak membawa wanita ke rumah. Anaknya cowok. [...] Pernah suatu ketika dia luar biasa kaget [...] anaknya itu sudah berduaan dengan wanita di kamarnya, di rumah itu. Luar biasa kaget gitu. Ya dia sedih juga. Itulah. Ya saya membayangkan juga konsekuensi menjadi orang tua di sana apalagi agama Islam itu luar biasa susah. Terutama ya itu, masalah pergaulan itu. Kalau halal dan haram, alcohol dan segala macam itu mereka mengatakan, anak saya paham. Bahkan ketika memantau lemak babi pun dia selalu lihat gitu loh di snacknya itu gimana, dan nggak minum alkohol juga, tapi kalau dengan hubungan bebas itu ya, itu susah. Itu bagi mereka. Ibunya itu sampai luar biasa sedih sampai marah-marah gitu. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

to individual freedom. Interviewee NM1 (Text 3.5) stated, “As long as you obey the rule, the rest is your freedom”.

Interviewee MM6 (Text 3.2) said,

I see [the Netherlands] as [a] liberal [state] on, for example, prostitution. Here, [prostitution] is legal. They [prostitutes] even pay tax. The second [example] is the relationship between a man and a woman. It has nothing to do with religion. The regulation [for cohabitation] is a matter of justice. [...] And then drugs, like marijuana, and others, are allowed here. It is [allowed] to a certain degree but it is regulated. I think that is liberal. And then gay people have rights here, same-sex marriage, that is liberal.

3

The phrase “prostitution is legal” is a reference (implicit intertextuality) to the *Act Lifting the Ban on Brothels 2000*¹³² on the legalization of prostitution. Although he did not mention his sources, MM6’s statement regarding justice for a man and a woman in the Netherlands is an implicit reference to the Dutch Constitution, especially Article 1 on equal rights for all persons in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019).¹³³ His statement on cohabitation is an implicit reference to the Dutch *Registered Partnership Act (Aanpassingswet geregistreerd partnerschap)* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.). His statement on the regulation of drugs is an implicit reference to the *Opium Act (Opiumwet)* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.). On gay rights, he implicitly referred to both the Dutch Constitution, especially Article 1 regarding equal rights for all persons in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019), and the *Equal Treatment Act of 1994 (Algemene wet gelijke behandeling)* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.) regarding protection against discrimination on the grounds of homosexual and heterosexual orientation. On same-sex marriage, he implicitly drew upon the *Act on the Opening up of Marriage 2000 (Wet openstelling huwelijk)* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.).

Interviewee NW3 (Text 3.3) specifically referred to “the Mayor of Amsterdam” and “the policy” in 1999 concerning the Red-Light District (intertextuality). She said,

¹³² Before the enforcement of the *Act of Lifting the Ban on Brothels 2000*, Dutch policy concerning prostitution was regulated through the Act against Immorality of 1911 although it did not lead to the elimination of brothels and prostitution (Post et al., 2019).

¹³³ “All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted”.

I felt that it [the policy] was very progressive because I heard about his [the Mayor of Amsterdam] policy. [...] During my study, a representative of the Amsterdam city hall was invited to give a guest lecture. He explained that families with children are also welcomed to live in the Red-Light District area. [...] That is great because the prostitution business was not regarded as something dirty and they [the Dutch government] believed, really believed that the prostitution business could be legalized.

From 1994 to 2001, Dr Schelto Patijn, from the Labour Party, was the Mayor of Amsterdam. The “policy” that interviewee NW3 referred to was the *Wallenproject* (1996 to 2000) which regulated the prostitution sector and tackled the problem of organized crime in the Red-Light District area. In 2000, the project was extended and the name was changed to the *Van Traa* project. Its scope was expanded to the city of Amsterdam as a whole (Kleemans & Huisman, 2015). Interviewee NW3 also implicitly referred to the *Act Lifting the Ban on Brothels* 2000 regarding the legalization and practice of prostitution as regular labour. She referred to the increasing cases of human trafficking since the establishment of the European Union in 1993, which make the regulation of prostitution more complex, as in the development of the *Amended Bill Regulation of Prostitution* of 2014 and the *Bill Penalizing Abuse of Prostitutes Who Are Victims of Human Trafficking* 2014 (Post et al., 2019).

Interviewee PM1 (Text 3.10) spoke about “permission” from “the government” in the case of euthanasia. He said,

Here in the Netherlands, before [they] come to a decision like that there are hundreds of pages that they have to learn. It means the pages of the law book in the Netherlands.

The “pages of the law book” and the “decision” to do euthanasia are an implicit reference (intertextuality) to the *Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act* of 2001 that came into force in 2002 (WFRTDS, n.d.).

Regarding abortion, interviewee MW1 (Text 3.22) said,

Here [in the Netherlands], indeed, there is a medical [procedure for abortion], [there is] a special hospital for an abortion. [...] [Here the hospital is] responsible and if something happens, they [hospitals] can be prosecuted. And this [abortion] is always being controlled.

Interviewee MW1 implicitly drew upon (intertextuality) the Termination of Pregnancy Act (Wet afbreking zwangerschap) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.) particularly Article 2 which authorized licensing of certain hospitals and clinics to perform abortion.¹³⁴ The phrase “[Here the hospital is] responsible and if something happens, they [hospitals] can be prosecuted” is a reference to Article 17, Article 18, Article 19, and Article 19a of the Termination of Pregnancy Act (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.).¹³⁵

Individualistic notions

Five interviewees, AM1, MM2, MM5, MM6, and NM1, spoke about liberalism while referring to the “individualistic notions” in the sense that every individual in the Netherlands has “freedom of choice” and is “responsible for his or her action”. Interviewee AM1 (Text 3.1) said,

[...] the Netherlands is a liberal, a super liberal state. It is even the most liberal state in the world. It allows prostitution, soft drugs, and so forth. Dutch liberalism is really different from the idea of California liberalism, or what you call American liberalism. I do not think they [the Americans] are liberal so much as they [the Dutch] are. They [the Dutch] don't care about what other people do. [...] There is a very individualistic notion that if you are not bothering me, I won't bother you. [...] There is no effort to conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system [...].

Interviewee AM1 drew upon the idea of “California liberalism” or “American liberalism” (intertextuality) which he claimed to be “really different” from “Dutch liberalism”. He indicated American liberalism as an effort “to conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system”. Dutch liberalism, according to him, has “a very individualistic notion that if you are not bothering me I won't bother you”.

¹³⁴ Article 2: “Treatment aimed at terminating pregnancy may only be performed by a doctor in a hospital or clinic to which Our Minister has granted a license to perform such treatments”.

¹³⁵ Article 17: “The hospital or clinic where treatments aimed at termination of pregnancy are performed in violation of Article 2 or the order referred to in Article 10, first paragraph, will be punished with a fine of the fifth category.” Article 18: “1. A doctor who fails to comply with the provisions of Article 11, the first or sixth paragraph, will be punished with a fine of the third category. 2. A medical director who fails to comply with the provisions of Articles 11, paragraphs 2 and 3, and 12, will be punished with a fine of the fourth category.” Article 19: “1. The offenses made punishable in Articles 15, 16, paragraphs 1 and 3, 17 and 18 are violations. 2. In addition to the officials referred to in Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the chief medical inspector and inspectors of the State Supervision of Public Health, as well as the officials assigned to them, are responsible for the investigation of the criminal offenses referred to in the previous paragraph.” Article 19a: “Our Minister is authorized to impose an administrative fine of no more than € 33,500 in respect of an act that is contrary to Article 11, second paragraph, last sentence, third, fourth or sixth paragraph”.

In text 3.5, interviewee NM1 referred to “brochures” (intertextuality) that he received about regulations and the risks concerning prostitution and drug use in the Red-Light District area. He connected “the brochures” with the difference between “freedom”, “personal choice” and “rules”. In text 3.6, he repeated the notion of individual freedom by saying,

But they [the Dutch] have freedom, freedom of choice. [...] the basis is the state law. The rest is your freedom of choice. As long as you obey the rule, the rest is your freedom. There is a consequence for each of our decisions.

Interviewee NM1 referred to the “state law” (macro-level) and “freedom of choice” (micro-level) (intertextuality), and the connection of both. The references indicate that in Dutch liberalism, individual freedom is not unlimited because there are laws to be obeyed. This corresponds to the statements of interviewees MW2 (Text 2.23) and CM1 (Text 2.25) on the limit of freedom of religion. For them, Dutch society is “not free” because speaking about religion can only be done in a private domain.

Interviewee MM5 (Text 3.11) also referred to individual freedom by drawing upon his experience in working at a beauty salon and the fact that some men and women were straightforward with him (intertextuality). He said,

Openly [they said], “I am gay”, “I am a lesbian”, “I like you”. [They] did not hide it. There is no hypocrisy here [in the Netherlands]. That is what I see. Things like that, personal behaviour like that, is their personal matter.

Tolerance

Twelve interviewees, AM1, CW2, MM1, MM2, MM5, MM6, MW2, MW3, MW4, NM1, PM1, and PW3, drew upon the notion of “tolerance” in the Netherlands. Nine of them spoke specifically about tolerance concerning the acceptance of homosexuality. Interviewee PM1 (Text.3.9) referred to the openness of Dutch people, especially towards homosexuals. He also drew upon the notion of tolerance in Indonesia (intertextuality) as a comparison to the notion of tolerance in the Netherlands, particularly towards the LGBT people. He pointed out that tolerance towards LGBT people is “less felt” in Indonesia¹³⁶. The report of UNDP & USAID *Being LGBT in Asia: Indonesia Country Report* (2014, p. 9) stated that “Most people do not know openly LGBT people. Some tolerance rather than acceptance may be demonstrated towards people with diverse sexual orientation or gender identity, though this is unlikely to be true for family members”. Furthermore, the 2013 Pew survey found that 93% of people in Indonesia reject homosexuality and only 3% accept it (Pew Research

¹³⁶ Interview conducted in 2015, thus the interviewee referred to tolerance in Indonesia in the years before 2015.

Center, 2013).¹³⁷ Interviewee PM1 also referred to Dutch people's openness towards same-sex marriage (Text 3.10). He said,

When homosexual marriage was legalized for the first time here in the Netherlands, in 2000, if I am not mistaken, there was openness from society. And then the education to introduce what is homosexuality is more open, and there were more programs on TV and then many interviews on television, radio, et cetera. That makes the society here in the Netherlands open.

Interviewee PM1 made a direct reference (intertextuality) to the *Act on the Opening Up of Marriage* (*Wet openstelling huwelijk*) that came into force in 2001 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.). He also referred to “education”, and programs on “tv” and “radio” about homosexuality in the Netherlands as part of the “openness” of Dutch society towards homosexuals.

In text 3.15, interviewee AM1 drew upon the debates of multiculturalism in the Netherlands as a societal project. He then referred to the notion of multiculturalism in Indonesia by stating that in Indonesia, multiculturalism is a fact and historically rooted. He implicitly drew upon the Indonesian concept and national motto of multi-ethnic coexistence proclaimed as “Unity in Diversity” (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*). The motto refers to the diversity of ethnicities, religions and cultures and indicates a sense of unity among the people of Indonesia.

According to interviewee AM1, multiculturalism in Indonesia is different from the Netherlands or Europe in general because Europe “wanted to create a multicultural society from a monocultural one” (Text 3.15). He referred to the idea of multiculturalism, which came with an assumption that non-Western people would not “become westernized” and embrace “the western liberal values”. In text 3.14, interviewee AM1 specifically referred to the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who is against multiculturalism (explicit intertextuality). In his speech at the Western Conservative Summit on June 30, 2012, Wilders said,

Multiculturalism is a disaster. Multiculturalism has been such an enormous catastrophe because it has been a tool to promote Islam—an ideology that threatens our core values, such as tolerance. Multiculturalism made us open our borders to those who cannot be assimilated; it made us tolerate the intolerant (Geert Wilders Weblog, 2012).

¹³⁷ In 2020, the number of people in Indonesia who reject homosexuality decreased to 80% and the number of people who accept it increased to 9% (Poushter & Kent, 2020).

In text 3.15, interviewee AM1 emphasized “the shift” of the “paradigm” of “monoculturalism” in the Netherlands. The “shift” is implicit intertextuality to the different policies of inclusion in the Netherlands concerning immigrants. In 1983, the Dutch applied the *Ethnic Minority Policy* to reduce the social and economic disadvantage of ethnic minorities and to stimulate their emancipation and participation in Dutch society. In 1991, there was a shift from the ethnic minority policy to the *Integration Policy* that focused on the integration of ethnic minorities into Dutch society. Nevertheless, the public debate on immigration and integration has become very heated.

Interviewee AM1 also referred to “Western anxiety” (Text 3.15). It is implicit intertextuality to debates on immigration and integration in the Netherlands and Europe in general. In 2000, Paul Scheffer published an article entitled “The Multicultural Drama” referring to Dutch multicultural policies as “being responsible for the failure to address pressing integration problems, such as weakening cohesion, an eroding sense of national belonging and criminality” (Scholten, 2013, p. 108). Scheffer (2000) wrote,

A parliamentary inquiry into immigration and integration policy is needed because now whole generations are being written off under the guise of tolerance. The current policy of wide admission and limited integration increases inequality and contributes to a sense of alienation in society. Tolerance is groaning under the burden of overdue maintenance. The multicultural drama that is unfolding is therefore the greatest threat to social peace (translation by the author).

The “Western anxiety” concerning immigrants, in this case, non-Westerners particularly people from Muslim communities “who are not going to change their values”, is precisely what Mahbubani (2008) indicates in his book *The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*. Mahbubani (2008) points out that Westerners fail to understand that modernization is not the equivalent of Westernization because non-Westerners have their modernization which is accompanied by de-Westernization. While non-Westerners appreciate the European heritage of the Enlightenment and Western values of modernity, they adopted and implemented them on their own terms and bring their own religious culture to the fore. It is now “actually impossible for the Western mind to conceive of Islamic civilization re-emerging as an open and cosmopolitan civilization” (Mahbubani, 2008, pp. 150-151).

Women

Three interviewees, MM4, MW3, and NW3, referred to different members' resources when speaking about the Netherlands as "a women-friendly state". Interviewee NW3 (Text 3.16) said that in her perception, "the Netherlands was women-friendly, liberal". She referred to the Netherlands-based women's fund organization Mama Cash, which supported the women's organization in Surabaya (intertextuality) that she was involved. Since 1983, Mama Cash¹³⁸ has supported more than 130 organizations, networks and women's funds around the world. In talking about the women's organization in Surabaya, NW3 explicitly referred to the former Indonesian female president, Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004)¹³⁹ who enacted the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women in the Household No. 23 (*Undang-Undang tentang Penghapusan Kekerasan dalam Rumah Tangga*).

Interviewee NW3 then changed her perception of the Netherlands as a women-friendly state (Text 3.17) by referring to the campaign posters she saw at the train station. She drew upon common knowledge of domestic violence in the Netherlands. Interviewee NW3 also explicitly referred to the SGP (intertextuality) that was broadcasted in a television program. She (Text 3.17) said,

I watched [about the SGP on the television]. [...] Women may vote but they cannot be elected as politicians. Then, women were suggested to go back to the family, to be 100% housewives and mothers. [...] I thought, my goodness, this is the Netherlands.

The SGP¹⁴⁰ is a conservative Christian (Reformed) party that wants to conduct politics strictly according to Biblical standards and promotes the traditional (family) role of women (PDC, 2018). Interviewee NW3 equated the SGP's stance on women with the situation of women in "Indonesia". She explicitly referred to the notion of "*state ibuism*" and "*Dharma Wanita* (Dutiful Women)" under President Soeharto (1966-1998) (intertextuality). The concept of *state ibuism* is used by Julia Suryakusuma (1996; 2011) to address Soeharto's New Order ideology on motherhood. The concept of *ibuism* (motherhood), derived from the word *ibu* or "mother" in the Indonesian language, positioned a woman's role to be exclusively limited to the companion to the husband and a mother to her children (Suryakusuma, 1996; 2011). Under Soeharto's New Order regime, the wives of Indonesian civil servants became members of the state-

¹³⁸ <https://www.mamacash.org/en/en-homepage>

¹³⁹ Megawati Sukarnoputri served as the fifth president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004. She is the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president from 1945 to 1967. She is also the first female president of Indonesia.

¹⁴⁰ <https://sgp.nl/partij>

sponsored association called *Dharma Wanita*. *Dharma Wanita* prompted women to behave as submissive wives to support their husbands and the national government.

Two interviewees, MM4 and MW3, spoke about “women” and “headscarf[s]” in the Netherlands. Interviewee MW3 spoke about her experience of hanging out in a bar as a woman with a headscarf by implicitly referring to the Dutch value (mental map) of respect for women. She (Text 3.18) said,

Maybe on one side, they [Dutch friends] are a bit distant but on the other side, they respect [me]. [...] They respect it like, “This is a lady. This is a lady. [No one] cannot do anything foolish to her”, like that.

Another interviewee, MM4 (Text 3.19), said,

Before I went to Europe, I could not accept the fatwa of Gus Ulil, who said that women do not have to wear a headscarf. [It is] just like what Professor Quraish Shihab said that he also does not oblige his daughter to wear a headscarf. Before this [I went to Europe], I could not accept that fatwa because it is stated in the Quran [that a Muslim woman must cover her head]. However, [...] when I was in the Netherlands, I began to understand the fatwas that were produced by Gus Ulil, for example, he allows us [Muslims] to drink [alcohol]. In liberal Islam, it is allowed.

Gus Ulil or Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (explicit intertextuality) is the coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), an Indonesian Islamic intellectual social movement, founded in March 2001. On November 18, 2002, the Indonesian national newspaper, Kompas, published Gus Ulil’s writing entitled *Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam* (Refreshing Islamic Understanding), in which he argued, among other things, that,

Islamic aspects that reflect Arabic culture, for example, do not need to be followed. For example, headscarf, cutting hand, qishash¹⁴¹, stoning, beard, and robe, are not obligatory to be followed, because they are only a particular local expression of Islam in Arabia. What must be followed are the universal values that underlie these practices. The headscarf is essentially about wearing clothes that meet public decency standards. General appropriateness is of course flexible and develops according to the development of human culture (Abshar-Abdalla, 2002; translation by the author).

¹⁴¹ Qishash is an Islamic term interpreted to mean punishments inflicted upon the offenders by way of reciprocal punishment for causing the death of or injuries to a person.

Interviewee MM4 also referred to the Quran (explicit intertextuality) concerning headscarves. There are two verses in the Quran concerning decency and headscarves. The first verse says,

And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and guard their chastity and not reveal their adornments except what normally appears. Let them draw their veils over their chests, and not reveal their hidden adornments except to their husbands, their fathers, their fathers in law, their sons, their stepsons, their brothers, their brothers' sons or their sisters' sons, or their fellow women, those bondwomen in their possession, male attendants with no desire, or children who are still unaware of women's nakedness. Let them not stomp their feet, drawing attention to their hidden adornments. Turn to Allah in repentance altogether, O believers, so that you may be successful (Surah An-Nur -31 - Quran.com, n.d.).

The second verse says,

O Prophet! Ask your wives, daughters, and the believing women, to draw their cloaks over their bodies. In this way, it is more likely that they will be recognized as virtuous and not be harassed. And Allah is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful (Surah Al Ahzab - 59 - Quran.com, n.d.).

Interviewee MM4's statement "The purpose of a headscarf is to avert a woman from men's harassment, or to make a woman more respectable" (Text 3.19) is an indirect reference (intertextuality) to the statements in the Quran. He connected "the purpose of a headscarf" with the standard of courtesy in the Netherlands by drawing upon his experience of living in the Netherlands, where women are "respected".

Interviewee MM4 also referred to the Indonesian Muslim scholar Muhammad Quraish Shihab (explicit intertextuality), who "does not oblige his daughter to wear a headscarf". In 2004, Shihab published the book *Jilbab: Pakaian Wanita Muslimah dalam Pandangan Ulama dan Cendekiawan Kontemporer* (Headscarf: Muslim Women's Clothing in the View of Contemporary Ulama and Scholars) where he discusses interpretations by Muslim scholars on Muslim women's dress, albeit without expressing a preference for any opinion. In popular media, however, Shihab was often quoted as saying he never obliged the women in his family to wear a headscarf because for him wearing a headscarf should be one's own choice and not by force (Nazilah, 2019). In a talk show aired by the Indonesian TV channel Metro TV on December 27, 2020, an audience member asked his opinion on the headscarf, and how is its implementation in his family. Shihab replied,

You asked how is it in my family. My wife wears a headscarf, and my eldest daughter wears a headscarf, on their consciousness, not because I ordered them to. I think a headscarf is good but do not force people to wear a headscarf. Because there are Islamic scholars who said a headscarf is not obligatory, and there are Islamic scholars who said that it is obligatory to cover nakedness (aurat) (Rumi, 2020; translation by the author).

At the end of text 3.19, interviewee MM4 referred to “liberal Islam” by saying, “He (Gus Ulil) allows us [Muslims] to drink [alcohol]. In liberal Islam, it is allowed”. The term “liberal Islam” is an implicit reference (intertextuality) to the Indonesian Liberal Islam Network (JIL), whose members claim themselves to be proponents of liberal Islam in Indonesia. The term liberal Islam refers to a critical understanding of Islamic teaching based on the essential meaning of the text by going beyond the literal meaning of the text. On JIL’s web page, Gus Ulil, the coordinator, wrote,

The main objective of this group [JIL] is twofold. First, criticizing the understanding of Islam which is fundamentalistic, radical and inclined to violence. These kinds of understandings appeared like fungus after the reformation era in Indonesia, since 1998. [...] Second, to spread a more rational, contextual, humanist and pluralist understanding of Islam. For me and my friends who initiated JIL, Islam must be constantly confronted with changing social realities. The answers given by religion or religious scholars in the past are not necessarily correct for today. Therefore, a critical attitude in reading Islamic thought that we inherited from past religious scholars is very important (Abshar-Abdalla, 2008; translation by the author).

Drawing on these mental maps, interviewee MM4 could accept modern values such as freedom in the Netherlands.

Rational

Two interviewees, AM1 and AM2, referred to “scientific research” that is done in the Netherlands when dealing with the future. On the issue of abortion and drugs, interviewee AM2 (Text 3.13) said,

When, for example, people say [that] marijuana, joint, is actually not dangerous and a cigarette is far more dangerous [than marijuana], if the research shows like that, fine, we hold on to the research.

Interviewee AM2 referred to the pro-choice notion that advocates the legal rights of a woman to choose whether she will have an abortion. He also referred to research on the danger of drugs such as marijuana.

Interviewee AM1 referred to research and scientific approach as the Dutch way of dealing with the future “in a rational manner”. He said (Text 3.14),

I think what is so good about the Netherlands is that they [the Dutch] are very rational and that they understand they deal with the future in a rational manner. They [the Dutch] conduct research and they try to find out what they need to do in the future [...] the decisions for the state in various sectors are never mixed with religious positions.

Besides referring to research, interviewee AM1 also referred to Geert Wilders (explicit intertextuality) concerning the issues of an “ethnicity or racial position” (intertextuality) as an exception to the Dutch’ rational manner. AM1 continued (Text 3.14),

[...] Of course, you can see like Geert Wilders, right? Yeah, ok, you can understand that is not religious. It is more based on ethnicity, or racial position, which is as stupid, I guess, as a religious position. So, I can't say that it [the issue of Wilders] is fully 100% rational, obviously not. There is a lot of fear.

Wilders has strong views on Islam and its growing influence in the West. He has been charged several times for insulting religious and ethnic groups and inciting hatred and discrimination against Moroccans in the Netherlands. In 2012, he published *Marked for Death: Islam's War Against the West and Me*, in which he lays out his argument against Islam and multiculturalism. Wilders claims that Western culture is superior to all other cultures by comparison, and he rejects the idea that all cultures are equal. Wilders wrote, “When you compare the West to any other culture that exists today, it becomes clear that we are the most pluralistic, humane, democratic, and charitable culture on earth” (2012, p. 31). Wilders has been living under police protection due to numerous threats. In his book, he wrote, “It is the price for speaking the truth about Islam” (2012, p. 143).

Religion and morality

Twelve interviewees, CW2, MM1, MM2, MM3, MM4, MW1, MW2, MW4, MW6, PM1, PW2, and PW3, referred to “morality” and “religious view”. When asked about the perspective of Muslims on issues of drugs, abortion and euthanasia, interviewee MM4 (Text 3.8) said,

Of course, in the beginning, because I departed from a very traditionalist Islamic tradition, scripturalist but not Wahhabi, scripturalist in the sense of people who studied Kitab Kuning, there was a stance to fight against it [the legality of drugs, abortion, and euthanasia]. [...] But the good side is that [for] Islam [Muslims] here [in the Netherlands], we [Muslims] have more freedom to practice our belief. [...] Thus, for me, as long as our [religious] activities are not restrained, I understand those things [the legality of drugs, abortion and euthanasia] are part of their [the Dutch] culture. Of course, from a religious, moral view, those things contradict my faith.

Interviewee MM4 referred to “a very traditionalist Islamic tradition”, or “people who studied *Kitab Kuning*” (explicit intertextuality). *Kitab Kuning* is a term for books in Arabic script that are used in Indonesian Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren* and *madrasah*) to study Islam. The Muslim community in Indonesia is divided into “traditionalists” (with Nahdlatul Ulama [NU] as the major organization) and “modernists” (with the Muhammadiyah as the major organization). *Kitab Kuning* is mostly used in the “traditionalist” NU *pesantren* (Van Bruinessen, 1990).

Interviewee MW2 referred to the afterlife (*akhirat*) or the concept of life after death in Islam (Text 3.23). She said,

I know a homosexual man. I said to him, “You know the consequence. You know what you will receive in the afterlife”. Fine. I do not forbid him by saying, “Don’t you [do this], don’t [do this]”, but I said, “You know the consequence, you know, what, in the afterlife, what you will get”.

The concept of the afterlife is a social cognition, a shared belief or system of belief (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64) that interviewees draw upon when they speak about moral issues. It encourages Muslims to take responsibility for their actions on earth. They believe God will hold them accountable and reward or punish them accordingly. Homosexual acts are forbidden in Islamic jurisprudence. Accordingly, Muslims who have not followed Islamic teachings such as committing homosexual acts will receive punishment in the afterlife.

Interviewee MW4 drew upon the Dutch *Registered Partnership Act* (*Aanpassingswet geregistreerd partnerschap*) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.) (intertextuality) when speaking about the legalization of cohabitation (Text 3.24). She said,

Samenwonen (cohabitation) for most people here [in the Netherlands] is legalized at the city hall. Registered cohabitation. For me, that is marriage. [...] So when Indonesian people say, “o, kumpul kebo (cohabitation)”, [it is] very negative for them [Indonesians] whenever I told them [Indonesians] [about registered cohabitation]. But then they are like, “Oh, yes, yes. Oh yes, yes, why for us [Indonesians] kawin siri (unregistered Islamic marriage) is legal in the eyes of Islam, but why being registered at the city hall is not legal?” They [kawin siri and registered cohabitation] are the same.

She also drew upon the Indonesian term *kumpul kebo*, which literally means living together like buffalos, to refer to the Indonesian view of unmarried cohabitation of a heterosexual couple, and is considered immoral and sinful. She also referred to the Indonesian concept of *kawin siri* or *nikah siri* or Muslim marriage that is conducted without state recognition. From the perspective of Islam, *kawin siri* is lawful because of the presence of a Muslim wedding officiant (*penghulu*).

Three interviewees, MM2, MM4, and PM1, drew upon the notion of morality. Interviewee MM2 (Text 3.20) said,

There are many challenges to do things that we [Muslims] call “maksiat” (immoral). There are many things. There are drinks, food, [and] shows. There are different kinds of shows like the various kinds of things on the internet. If [someone] wants to, [he or she] can spend a whole day downloading porn. There are also TV shows and there is the Red-Light [District] but no, we [Muslims] know.

Interviewee MM2 referred to what is forbidden, and therefore, “immoral”, on Islamic moral grounds such as alcohol, pork, pornography, prostitution and sexually related show. Another interviewee, PM1, drew upon the Indonesian notion of morality and referred to the “law book in the Netherlands”. Speaking about the legality of homosexual marriage and euthanasia in the Netherlands, PM1 (Text 3.10) said,

Here in the Netherlands, before [they] come to a decision like that there are hundreds of pages that they have to learn. It means the pages of the law book in the Netherlands. Indonesian people then think that here in the Netherlands, homosexuals are allowed to be married, euthanasia is allowed, this, that, this, that is allowed and then they connect them [to the notion] that the Netherlands no longer has morality. [...] There is a time when we [Indonesians] are invited to think that although very controversial matters are legalized in the

Netherlands, there is an accompaniment from the government, strict control from the government for all of those. Those are the things that Indonesians do not or do not yet know. In the end, the consequence [of not knowing] is that they [Indonesians] say that the Netherlands is the most immoral country.

The phrases “the law book” and “strict control from the government” are references (implicit intertextuality) to the *Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2001* (WFRTDS, n.d.) in the case of euthanasia. In the case of same-sex marriage, the phrases refer to the *Equal Treatment Act of 1994* (*Algemene wet gelijke behandeling*) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.) regarding protection against discrimination on the grounds of homosexual and heterosexual orientation, and the *Act on the Opening up of Marriage 2000* (*Wet openstelling huwelijk*) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, n.d.). These references are what Indonesians “do not or do not yet know” and consequently label the Netherlands an immoral country. PM1 drew upon the Indonesian notion of morality that forbids “very controversial matters” such as homosexual marriage and euthanasia.

Another interviewee, MM4, referred to morality when speaking about premarital sex among young people in the Netherlands (Text 3.21). He said,

[...] I told them that most of the young people here [in the Netherlands] already have sex since they are in high school. They were incredibly shocked. They are like, “How come? The morality [of the young Dutch] is very shattered but the [Dutch] state can be this advanced”. Thus, economically the [Dutch] state is very advanced but on the other side, the morality [of the Dutch] is wrecked. In the beginning, they were struggling with it but then [we] compared it to Indonesia. We [Indonesians] have a lot of rules, morals and so forth, but from the side of the development, the state [Indonesia] is catastrophic.

Interviewee MM4 referred to the morality of young people in the Netherlands as “wrecked” or “shattered” because “they already have sex since they are in high school”. He compared it to Indonesia, which has “rules” and “morals” in the sense that premarital sex, considered a moral issue, is forbidden in Indonesia’s socio-cultural norms. The topic of sexual morality in text 3.21 corresponds to the findings of Hoko Horii, a PhD researcher at the KITLV (*Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*/Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) and Vanvollenhoven Institute. Horii (2016) wrote,

I recently had an interview with some Indonesians who are studying in the Netherlands. Their views on marriage and sexual morality were enlightening. One of my informants stated, "Our morality according to Islamic law is that sexual intercourse outside of marriage is a big sin, and unforgivable". The other informant continued, "So, discussing the minimum age of marriage for us Indonesians is like discussing the minimum age for having sex for Westerners, because in Indonesia one cannot have sex before marriage".

Premarital sex is one of the concerns for some Indonesians whose children are raised in the Netherlands. They referred to the notion of "*pergaulan*" (social interaction) or "*pergaulan bebas*" (free social interaction) or "*hubungan bebas*" (free social relationship), which they saw as part of "Dutch culture". Interviewee MM4 (Text 3.34) said,

They are Indonesians who have been living in the Netherlands for more than ten years. [They] have a son, [who receives] Dutch education. The mother is very conservative while the father already understands [and said], "Let it be. That is Dutch culture". Their son is in high school. The mother is extremely concerned in thinking of finding a way so that her son will not bring a girl home. [...] I also imagine the consequence of being parents [in the Netherlands], especially [when you are] Muslims. That is extremely difficult, especially concerning pergaulan. They [the Indonesian couple] said, "Our son understands halal and haram, alcohol, and so forth. He even pays attention to check the pork fat in his snacks. He does not drink alcohol either. But for his hubungan bebas, it is difficult".

The phrase "Dutch culture" corresponds to what interviewee AM1 (Text 3.1) called a "value system", a shared belief or knowledge of good and bad. Interviewee MM4 drew upon the Islamic teachings on what is considered permitted (*halal*) and forbidden (*haram*) such as alcohol, pork, and free social relationship. The Indonesian notion of "*hubungan bebas*" or "*pergaulan bebas*" is a discourse, used to express disapproval of a range of youthful behaviours, which include "premarital sex, alcohol and drug consumption, clubbing, consumption of pornography and cybersex, smoking, going out at night and gang fighting" (Webster, 2010, p.i). In Indonesia, behaviours associated with *pergaulan bebas* are negatively associated with imported Western culture (Webster, 2010). Two interviewees, MM1 and MW3, a Muslim couple, shared their concern for their children when they grow up (Text 3.28).

*MM1: For me, personally, it [children's education] is safer [in the Netherlands].
MW3: Because the children are still small so for example, influence or
[struggling to find words].*

MM1: *And culture.*

MW3: *The influence of the culture to drink [alcohol] or go to a discotheque does not [happen] yet. [...] Later, that [will make us] worried.*

Q: *When [the children are] teenagers?*

MM1: *That is when I am worried. I think maybe I move [my children] to Brunei Darussalam.*

Like interviewee MM4, interviewee MW3 also referred to “Dutch culture” which she described as “the culture to drink [alcohol] or go to a discotheque”. Interviewee MM1 referred to Brunei Darussalam, a Muslim-majority country, which in 2014 started the implementation and enforcement of Sharia law (PMO Brunei Darussalam, 2013). Interviewee MM1 also referred to “teen pregnancy” in Indonesia and the Netherlands (Text 3.29).

But I am actually a little bit worried about when my daughter grows up. When she becomes a teenager. I am worried but actually, when I see the news about how teenagers in Indonesia are, I am more worried [if my daughter is] in Indonesia. Everywhere [makes me worried]. Here [in the Netherlands], teen pregnancy is regarded as the lowest [in the world].

Interviewee MM1 compared teenagers in the Netherlands and Indonesia by referring to teen pregnancy. The Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey 2012 indicated that 10% of female teenagers aged 15-19 years old have given birth or became pregnant with their first child (Statistics Indonesia et al., 2013, p. 61). In 2013, CBS indicated that the birth rate among teenagers in the Netherlands was one of the lowest in the world. Since 2011, the amount of 15-19 years old girls who gave birth in the Netherlands was less than 0.5% (CBS, 2013).

Ten interviewees, CW2, MM1, MM4, MM6, MW2, MW3, MW6, PW2, PW3, and PW5, drew upon the “Indonesian system” of giving “a religious basis” or “religious education” to their children. Interviewee MW2 (Text 3.32) said,

I am still applying the Indonesian system to my children. I teach them [religion]. We [my husband and I] are also responsible as parents. Not only [responsible for the children's] culture, [but also, we are] responsible [for the] afterlife. That is why [I] teach the children shalat (prayer) too.

The phrase “the Indonesian system” refers to culture or shared beliefs of what is good and bad (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). She drew upon the Indonesian mental model

of giving religious education to her children, and the responsibility of parents in Islam, which is, among others, teaching their children about Allah and the afterlife.

In Indonesia, religious education has been a compulsory subject from elementary school up to the university level since 1966¹⁴². For some interviewees, a religious basis is expected to avert their children from the influence of parts of “Dutch culture” that are considered immoral according to religious teachings.

Liberal hypocrites

Six interviewees, CM2, MM1, MM6, MW1, MW3, and MW4, indicated that not all Dutch people accept issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. Interviewee MM6 (Text 3.2) referred to “religious groups such as a church community” and “humanitarian groups” that are against abortion.

Q: What do you think of abortion and euthanasia? Are they part of being liberal?

A: In my opinion, yes, they are part of the Dutch's liberal values. Apart from whether I agree or disagree [on those, is another matter] but in my opinion, in my view, those are their [the Dutch's] liberal values although they also met with big resistance. [...] I know it as I often read the newspaper. Many people are against abortion. [...] Usually, religious groups such as a church community, religious groups and so forth but there are also humanitarian groups, human rights groups [who argue that] a fetus has the right to live.

Interviewee MM6 referred to the “Dutch's liberal values” on the fact that abortion and euthanasia are legal in the Netherlands. He also referred to “the newspaper” (intertextuality) that reported that “many people are against abortion”. There is a pro-life movement in the Netherlands, which is organised by Christian-based organizations such as *Schreeuw om Leven* (Scream for Life) and *Stirezo*, and conservative Christian political parties such as the SGP and *ChristenUnie*.¹⁴³

Five interviewees, CM2, MM1, MW1, MW3, and MW4, referred to some Dutch people who “do not like” and “do not always accept” homosexual people. Interviewee CM2 drew upon statistics when he said that there are conservative, liberal, and liberal hypocritical people in the Netherlands (Text 3.4). Regarding “the liberal hypocrites”

¹⁴² The Indonesian Provisional People's Representative Council No 27/1966 (*Ketetapan MPRS No. XXVII/MPRS/1966*) on religion, education, and culture, stipulated that religious education is a compulsory subject from elementary school up to the university level.

¹⁴³ <https://www.schreeuwomleven.nl/>; <https://stirezo.nl/> ; <https://sgp.nl/home> ; and <https://www.christenunie.nl/>

he referred to some Dutch people who are hypocritical on the issue of homosexuality (Text 3.27). CM2 said,

But the Dutch [...] are hypocritical. [...] most of them [the Dutch] do not always accept [homosexuality] fully. Of course, some fully accept it [homosexuality] but [...] they [Dutch people who accept homosexuality] are still a minority. Maybe about 20% [or] 30% of people.

He referred to “about 20% or 30%” of Dutch people who fully accept homosexuality. Nevertheless, the SCP reported in 2018 that 92% of the people in the Netherlands believe that gay men and lesbians should be able to lead the life they want (Kuyper, 2018).

On euthanasia, interviewee CM2 said (Text 3.27),

[...] there are [Dutch] people who still oppose that [euthanasia]. About 80% [of people are open to euthanasia].

He referred to 80% of Dutch people, who are open to euthanasia. Based on a survey in 2018, CBS reported that 87% of Dutch people are open to euthanasia (CBS, 2019).

Interviewee NW3 referred to the city of Amsterdam as “once liberal but later becomes more conservative” on matters such as “sexuality and prostitution” (Text 3.3).

3. Analysis of discourse as social practice

The third stage of CDA is the analysis of discourse as social practice (explanation stage). This stage looks at the dialectical relation between language use and social practice. It focuses on the social conditions and effects of discourse. According to Fairclough (1992, pp. 64-65), there are three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse: “social identity” or “subject position” (identity), “social relationships” (relational), and “systems of knowledge and belief” (ideational). In this stage, parts of the texts (analysis of discourse as linguistic practice) are quoted again to show the reproduction or transformation of discourse. The analytic questions in this stage are: What are the social conditions and effects of what discourse participants say about liberalism in the Netherlands? Is there any reproduction or transformation in their discourse practice? How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves?

I started to differentiate between freedom and rules

Several interviewees reproduced the discourse of liberalism in the Netherlands by stating that they are “very impressed” and find it “extraordinary” (ideational) that “very controversial matters” such as abortion, euthanasia, drugs, prostitution, cohabitation, and same-sex marriage are “allowed”, “regulated by law”, and “controlled” by the government. Some interviewees indicated a process of learning about being responsible for their actions (ideational) and the freedom they have in the Netherlands (relational). Interviewee MM2 (Text 3.20) said,

Therefore, we [Muslims] really learn to be an individual, who is responsible for our own [actions]. If we were someone who believes that we want to adhere to a certain religion as our way of life, [we] can do it well there [in the Netherlands], and it is guaranteed.

Interviewee MM2 positioned the Dutch government as an institution that guarantees freedom to religious individuals like himself (relational). When asked how he dealt with the fact that there are abortion, euthanasia, and prostitution in the Netherlands, interviewee MM5 (Text 3.11) said,

Honestly, it depends on our social interaction. [My] surroundings do not matter [to me] because I am an adult. Indeed, there is gambling [...] it is because [people in the Netherlands] feel free. No one forbids all of that. That depends on the individual, depends on the person.

Interviewee MM5 positioned the Dutch and himself as free people. He reproduced the notion of individual freedom and indicated that his surroundings do not matter to him (relational) because every action “depends on the individual”. Another interviewee, PM1, stated that he “feels very free” (Text 3.9). He said,

What makes me feel very, very free in living in the Netherlands is the recognition of rights and obligations, the appreciation towards the rights and obligations of each individual, which is highly upheld here. And the thing I said earlier, our opinion is heard.

Interviewee PM1 emphasized the notion of freedom and the discourse that the rights and obligations of everyone in the Netherlands are highly upheld. He positioned the Dutch and himself as free individuals. While reproducing the discourse about government law and control of homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia and drugs, he also transformed the Indonesian discourse about the Netherlands (ideational). He said (Text 3.10),

[...] Indonesian people then think that [...] the Netherlands no longer has morality. Yet for me, that is not what I see. [...] It takes a lot of time for the government to grant any permission for those who want to do euthanasia [...] There is a discussion. [...] they legalize it to make it easier in controlling it [...].

By stating “Yet for me, that is not what I see”, interviewee PM1 positioned himself differently from Indonesian people (identity) who “think that the Netherlands no longer has morality”.

Interviewee MM6 positioned the Netherlands as a liberal state and identified the notion of individual freedom (Text 3.2). He said,

I see [the Netherlands] as [a] liberal [state] on, for example, prostitution. Here, [prostitution] is legal. [...] The second [example] is the relationship between a man and a woman. [...] The regulation [for cohabitation] is a matter of justice. Justice means they [a man and a woman] are being protected [...]. I am saying this as an outsider, an Indonesian. And then drugs, like marijuana, and others, are allowed here [...] to a certain degree but it is regulated. [...] Apart from whether I agree or disagree [on those is another matter] but in my opinion, in my view, those are their [the Dutch's] liberal values.

While reproducing the discourse of the Netherlands as a liberal state (ideational), interviewee MM6 positioned the Dutch differently from himself “as an outsider, an Indonesian” (identity). He distinguished between his “view” as an outsider and his stance (“whether I agree or disagree”) on “the Dutch’s liberal values” (relational).

Interviewee NM1 transformed his view of the Netherlands and how it affected him (ideational). He said (Text 3.5),

I saw [...] that the phenomena of this society are different. I started to differentiate between freedom and rules, freedom and personal choice, and consciousness. I started slowly to differentiate them.

While acknowledging the notion of freedom, NM1 also transformed his view of the “phenomena of Dutch society” that he saw as “different” from other societies (ideational). However, he did not position the Netherlands as “liberal”. He said (Text 3.6),

The Dutch are, I do not call them liberal, but they have a very good degree of freedom. I do not think they are liberal because that will imply something

different. But they have freedom, freedom of choice. The basis, I think, is very impressive, the basis is the state law. The rest is your freedom of choice. As long as you obey the rule, the rest is your freedom. There is a consequence for each of our decisions. I think that is important. I am very impressed.

Interviewee NM1 transformed the discourse of the Dutch as “liberal” people because the term liberal “implies something different” (ideational). He did not identify what is different but he opted to label the Dutch as people who “have a very good degree of freedom”. He reproduced both the notion of individual freedom and state law as the basic rule of Dutch society, which he considered “very impressive” and “important”.

Another interviewee, AM1, who identified the Netherlands as “a super liberal state”, transformed his view of “Dutch liberalism”. He said (Text 3.1),

[...] The Netherlands is a liberal, a super liberal state. It is even the most liberal state in the world. It allows prostitution, soft drugs, and so forth. [...] There was a bit of a surprise for me when I began meeting with religious people in the Netherlands. [...] It made me realize that Dutch liberalism is really different from the idea of California liberalism, or what you call American liberalism. I do not think they [Americans] are liberal so much as they are, they [the Dutch] don't care about what other people do. [...] There is a very individualistic notion that if you are not bothering me, I won't bother you. [...] There is no effort to conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system, which I think is quite, it is nice that way.

Interviewee AM1 reproduced the discourse of the Netherlands as a liberal state in the sense that prostitution, soft drugs, and so forth are allowed. He positioned Dutch liberalism to be “really” different from American liberalism (ideational) because the Dutch “do not care about what other people do” and “there is no effort to conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system”.

Dutch people, in general, are very tolerant

Various interviewees positioned the Dutch in general as “very tolerant” and “very open” towards people from different backgrounds (relational). Interviewee NM1 (Text 3.6) said,

They [the Dutch] are tolerant. [...] Very tolerant. Indeed, we [Indonesians] still experience one or two or several cases that are discriminatory, like in a toko or elsewhere, but overall, they [the Dutch] accept people from different backgrounds. [...] They are very open.

While reproducing the discourse of Dutch people as “very tolerant” and “very open” (identity), interviewee NM1 also indicated that Indonesians still experience discrimination (relational). Another interviewee, MM4 (Text 3.7), said,

Dutch people, in general, are very tolerant. [...] They do not have any belief, atheist, but they are consistent in their liberal attitude. It means they really let you do your religious worship as long as you do not disturb other people's rights.

Interviewee MM4 positioned the Dutch as tolerant towards religious people (relational). He reproduced the notion of freedom, especially freedom of religion because the Dutch “let you do your religious worship as long as you do not disturb other people's rights” (relational).

Interviewee PM1 positioned the Dutch as open and tolerant people, particularly towards himself (relational) as part of the LGBT community (identity) (Text 3.9). He said,

Dutch people are [...] very open towards new opinions, towards new things. Moreover, coincidentally I am also a homosexual. This situation is also becoming one of the reasons why I chose the Netherlands as the destination for [my] study but [I] also want to stay longer in the Netherlands and build a life here. For me, [in the Netherlands] there is tolerance, which is quite extensive for anyone here. [...] I think that [tolerance towards LGBT people] is one of the fundamental reasons in responding to [the question] of why my choice was pointed to the Netherlands.

Interviewee PM1 also transformed the Indonesian view of the Netherlands as an immoral country (ideational) (Text 3.10). He said,

When homosexual marriage was legalized for the first time here in the Netherlands, in 2000, [...] there was openness from society. [...] that is extraordinary [...]. There is a time when we [Indonesians] are invited to think that although very controversial matters are legalized in the Netherlands, there is an accompaniment from the government, strict control from the government for all of those. Those are the things that Indonesians do not or do not yet know. In the end, the consequence [of not knowing] is that they [Indonesians] say that the Netherlands is the most immoral country.

Interviewee PM1 reproduced the discourse of the Netherlands as a liberal state in the sense that same-sex marriage is legal, and there is openness from the society,

which is “extraordinary” for him (ideational). While maintaining the discourse of the legality of “very controversial matters” in the Netherlands and the strict control from the government, he positioned himself differently from Indonesians (identity), who say that “the Netherlands is the most immoral country”.

Interviewee MM5 also identified the Dutch as open people (Text 3.11). He said,

Some men fell in love with me. Some women fell in love with me [...] they will not be offended when I say, “No”. [...] They respected [me]. They did not force but they were straightforward, “I like you”. [...] Openly [they said], “I am gay”, “I am a lesbian”, “I like you”. [They] did not hide it. There is no hypocrisy here [in the Netherlands]. That is what I see. [...] personal behaviour like that, is their personal matter. What is important is to take care of ourselves when we [Indonesians] live in a foreign country. We have to be good at taking care of ourselves.

Interviewee MM5 positioned Dutch people as being respectful towards him (relational). He reproduced the notion of individual freedom in the sense that one can openly state that he or she is gay or lesbian (identity) and independence in the sense that Indonesians have to be good at taking care of themselves in a foreign country (relational).

When asked about her experience as a woman with a headscarf, interviewee MW3 stated that she “did not have a problem” (relational). She said (Text 3.18),

Maybe on one side, they [my Dutch friends] are a bit distant but on the other side, they respect [me]. [...] They respect it like, “This is a lady. [...] [No one] cannot do anything foolish to her” [...].

Interviewee MW3 positioned Dutch people as being respectful towards her and women in general (relational). Another interviewee, MM4, transformed his view on women wearing a headscarf (Text 3.19). He said,

[...] Before I went to Europe, I could not accept the fatwa of Gus Ulil, who said that women do not have to wear a headscarf. [...] However, when I was in the Netherlands, [...] that is not the standard of courtesy there [in the Netherlands]. [...] In the Netherlands, even without a headscarf, we [Muslims] are already respected.

While transforming his view on the headscarf (ideational), interviewee MM4, like interviewees MM5 and MW3 above, positioned Dutch people as respectful towards women and Muslims (relational). Interviewee MM4 reproduced the notion of respect, particularly to Muslims, in the Netherlands (relational).

They also met with big resistance

Several interviewees transformed the discourse of the Dutch as liberal people (ideational) by stating that not all Dutch people fully accept issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. When asked his opinion on abortion and euthanasia, interviewee MM6 (Text 3.2) replied,

In my opinion, yes, they [abortion and euthanasia] are part of the Dutch's liberal values. Apart from whether I agree or disagree [on those is another matter] but in my opinion, in my view, those are their [the Dutch's] liberal values although they also met with big resistance. [...] Many people are against abortion. [...] Usually religious groups such as a church community, religious groups and so forth but there are also humanitarian groups, human rights groups [who argue that] a fetus has the right to live.

Interviewee MM6 transformed the discourse of the acceptance of the legality of abortion by stating that “many people are against it”. He also distinguished between his stance (“whether I agree or disagree”) and his “view” on “the Dutch’s liberal values” (relational). He positioned the Dutch with liberal values as different from him (identity).

Interviewee NW3 modified her view of the Dutch government for being progressive on the issue of prostitution (ideational) (Text 3.3). She said,

So far, the government is still, quite progressive, or liberal although now I feel that they are less progressive than before. In 1999, for example, in the city of Amsterdam. [...] At that time, I thought, wow, [that is] very progressive, crazy. That is great because the prostitution business was not regarded as something dirty and they [the Dutch government] believed, really believed that the prostitution business could be legalized, be legalized, and be managed well. [...] To that point, I still see that the Netherlands is relatively more liberal than other European countries. [...] On matters such as sexuality and prostitution, as far as I know, Amsterdam was once liberal. [It] was once progressive but later it becomes more conservative.

Interviewee NW3 also stated that before she came to the Netherlands, she thought the Netherlands was “women-friendly, liberal” (ideational) because there was a Dutch-based women’s organization called Mama Cash, that gave funds to a women’s organization in Indonesia (Text 3.16). When asked whether the Netherlands is exactly as what she thought after she came, she replied (Text 3.17),

Not 100%. One [of the things] that surprised me was at the train station, there was a campaign with posters. The posters contained [a message] that if you are a victim of domestic violence, you can contact, there was a name of an institution, an address, and a telephone number. It means [the number of incidents of] domestic violence here [in the Netherlands] is still high.

Interviewee NW3 adjusted her view of the Netherlands as a women-friendly state (ideational). Another example she gave was the SGP that wants “women to return to the house” (Text 3.17). She questioned herself, “Is this really what [the Netherlands as a women-friendly state] I once believed in?” (ideational).

Five interviewees, CM2, MM1, MW1, MW3, and MW4, transformed the discourse of the acceptance of homosexuality in the Netherlands by pointing out that there are people in the Netherlands who “do not like” and “still cannot accept” homosexuality.

In text 3.27, interviewee CM2 identified Dutch people as “hypocritical” on the issue of homosexuality. He pointed out that Indonesians in the Netherlands either have a similar opinion to him or the liberal Dutch, who accept homosexuality (relational). He positioned liberal Dutch who accept homosexuality as different from him (identity).

In text 3.4, interviewee CM2 indicated three kinds of Dutch people (ideational): (1) the conservative, who do not like to interact with foreigners; (2) the left-wing or the liberal, who are more open; and (3) the liberal hypocrites, who presume that their worldview is the best. He noted it is easier for him to make friends with liberal Dutch women (relational).

The view of interviewee CM2 (Text 3.27) on Dutch people who are “hypocritical” is in contrast with interviewee MM5 (Text 3.11), who stated that “there is no hypocrisy” in the Netherlands. Interviewee CM2 spoke about Dutch people who do not accept homosexuality while interviewee MM5 spoke about Dutch people who openly stated that they are gay or lesbian. While interviewee CM2 transformed the discourse of the acceptance of homosexuality, interviewee MM5 reproduced the discourse of the Dutch as open people.

I would love it if Indonesia became more liberal

Two interviewees, AM1 and AM2, reproduced the discourse of the Netherlands as a liberal state while identifying Dutch people as “very rational” because they “conduct research” and use “a scientific approach”. Interviewee AM2 stated his position (identity) as “very pro-choice” on the issue of abortion, and that he “really believed in research” on the issue of drugs (Text 3.13). He acknowledged the notion of rationality and the discourse on the legality of abortion and drugs. He positioned the Dutch as similar to himself (relational) as he supported the legality of abortion and drugs (ideational).

Interviewee AM1 (Text 3.14) positioned himself as a liberal person (identity) who “would love it if Indonesia became more liberal” (ideational). He maintained the discourse of the Netherlands as an open society and positioned the Dutch society as “a much better society” than Indonesian society (relational) because the Dutch “deal with the future in a rational manner”. Nevertheless, when he spoke about Wilders, he made an exception to his view of the notion of rationality (Text 3.14). He said,

[...] It is very important where the decisions for the state in various sectors are never mixed with religious positions. I mean, of course, you can see like Geert Wilders, right? Yeah, ok, you can understand that is not religious. It is more based on ethnicity, or racial position, which is as stupid, I guess, as a religious position. So, I can't say that it [the issue of Wilders] is fully 100% rational, obviously not. There is a lot of fear, and there are a lot of problems. I think multiculturalism is very difficult anyway in any case, especially in a formerly monocultural community like the Netherlands.

Interviewee AM1 reproduced the notion of the separation of religion and state, and the debates on multiculturalism in the Netherlands, particularly the case of Geert Wilders. He transformed his view of the notion of rationality (ideational) in the case of Wilders by equating the case, which is based on racial position, with a religious position, and therefore, not fully rational.

In text 3.15, interviewee AM1 shared the notion of the Dutch as a very analytical society that has liberal values, which promotes the idea of multiculturalism as a treasure (ideational). He positioned Dutch multiculturalism as different from Indonesian multiculturalism. He indicated that in comparison to the Netherlands, Indonesians do not ascribe to the value of multiculturalism because Indonesia is historically already a multicultural society (relational). He also reproduced the discourse of the paradigm shift concerning monoculturalism in the Netherlands and

Europe by indicating that there is anxiety that non-Western people, especially the Muslim communities, are not embracing liberal values (ideational).

Those things contradict my faith

While reproducing the discourse of liberalism in the Netherlands, several interviewees identified themselves as religious (identity) and positioned the Dutch as different from them (relational). Interviewee MM4 (Text 3.8) indicated that the legality of drugs, abortion and euthanasia is “the bad side” of the Netherlands (ideational) because, from a religious, moral view, “those things” contradict his faith (relational). He also identified a “good side” of the Netherlands (ideational), which is the freedom for Muslims to practice their belief. While maintaining his religious position, he acknowledged the notion of freedom, especially the freedom to practice religion. Several interviewees reproduced the discourse of freedom of religion in the Netherlands because they feel free to practice religion. Two interviewees, MW2 (Text 2.23) and CM1 (Text 2.25), however, considered Dutch society as “not free” because speaking about religion can only be done in a private domain.

Interviewee MW4 (Text 3.24) emphasized the legality of registered cohabitation and considered it “equal to marriage” (ideational). She positioned herself differently from Indonesian Muslims who viewed cohabitation as “very negative” because it is not legal “in the eyes of Islam” (identity). She also transformed the Islamic discourse about the legality of marriage by stating that unregistered Islamic marriage (*kawin siri*) and registered cohabitation are the same (ideational).

Two interviewees, MM2 and MW2, became “very open” (ideational) and “learned to respect” homosexuals (relational). Interviewee MW2 said (Text 3.23),

We [Muslims] also become open-minded towards them [homosexuals]. It is their life. I know a homosexual man. I said to him, “You know the consequence. You know what you will receive in the afterlife”. Fine. I do not forbid him by saying, “Don’t you [do this], don’t [do this]”, but I said, “You know the consequence, you know, what, in the afterlife, what you will get”.

While reproducing the discourse of the acceptance of homosexuality and the notion of individual freedom (ideational), interviewee MW2 maintained the Islamic teaching about punishment for homosexuals in the afterlife (identity).

We are responsible as parents

Several interviewees reproduced the notion of Dutch culture, including liberal values, while expressing their concern for their children who grow up in the Netherlands. Interviewees MM1 (Text 3.28), MW3 (Text 3.29), MM4 (Text 3.34), and MM6 (footnote 127) stated that being Muslim parents in the Netherlands is “extremely difficult” and “challenging” (relational) particularly concerning premarital sex, which is considered part of the Dutch culture (ideational). Interviewee MM4 (Text 3.34) maintained the Islamic discourse of what is permitted and forbidden, and the Indonesian discourse of *pergaulan* or *hubungan bebas*, which is considered a moral issue and a sin in Islam (ideational). They positioned the Dutch and Dutch culture as different from Indonesians and Muslims (identity).

While expressing her concern about her children, interviewee MW6 (Text 3.30) also acknowledged the notion of individual freedom in the Netherlands by stating that “the choice is up to the children themselves”. She maintained her religious position (identity) by giving her children “a religious foundation” and “supporting them with prayers”. Her statement is similar to interviewee PW3 (Text 4.17), who also taught her son religion, and said, “But later on the options will be up to him [our son] whether he would like to follow us [our religious values] or not”.

Interviewee MW2 (Text 3.31) positioned herself (identity) differently from “strict Indonesian Muslims” in the Netherlands who sent their children to an Islamic school. She sent her children to a public school and taught her children Islam at home. She did not want her children to be fanatic (ideational) by pointing out the difference between Indonesian Muslims and Moroccan Muslims (identity). She identified Indonesian Muslims as “being open-minded” (ideational) to “other people” (relational). When speaking about her Dutch neighbours, interviewee MW2 (Text 3.32) said,

The mother is Catholic. The mother is a very church person. [...] The son is not. [...] The mother cannot force the son [to be religious].

Interviewee MW2 transformed the notion of individual freedom in the Netherlands in the sense that she and her husband teach their children religion and how to perform *shalat*. By “applying the Indonesian system” to her children, she positioned herself differently from her Dutch neighbour (identity), who cannot force her son to be religious. She reproduced the discourse of parents’ responsibility in Islam, which is, among others, teaching their children religion and performing *shalat* (ideational).

Five Christian interviewees, CW2, PM1, PW1, PW3, and PW5, maintained their religious position by giving or planning to give their children religious education (identity). Interviewee PW5 (footnote 126) said, “If we [Indonesians] educate [children with religious education] from a young age, [the religious education] will be rooted in them [the children]. Therefore, even though the state of this world is getting further away from God, they [the children] have a [religious] basis”.

Interviewee PW2 (Text 3.33) positioned herself differently from Indonesians in the Netherlands (identity). She transformed the Indonesian notion of giving religious foundation to their children by saying that the idea “to fortify children with religion from an early age” is “very bullshit” because she cannot be sure that she can instill religion in her children. She also reproduced the discourse on secularity by saying that “religion and daily life are different [matters]” (ideational).

Conclusion

Interviewees shared a similar view in considering liberal values as elements of modernity in the Netherlands. They defined “liberal” in the sense that (1) “very controversial matters” such as drugs, prostitution, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, cohabitation, and abortion, are allowed and legalized, and (2) as long as you obey the rule, the rest is your freedom. Dutch liberalism contains an individualistic notion and individual freedom. Nevertheless, in Dutch liberalism, freedom is not unlimited because there are rules to be obeyed. The term “liberal” also equals the term “progressive”. Some interviewees indicated that being liberal is close to being secular, in the sense that decisions for the state in various sectors are not mixed with religious positions.

At the micro-level, interviewees indicated that there are conservative, liberal, and liberal hypocritical people in the Netherlands. Muslim and Christian interviewees positioned liberal Dutch as different from them. One interviewee identified the liberal hypocrites as people who claimed to be liberal but were not. These people do not accept homosexuality. Moreover, there is resistance from religious groups against abortion, and there are conservative Christian political parties, such as the *ChristenUnie* and the SGP, which promote traditional (family) roles for women. In this case, some Dutch are not so liberal.

At the meso-level, several interviewees said that Dutch society is “a very analytical society” as the Dutch conduct research and use a scientific approach, for example,

in dealing with issues such as drug and drug use. Muslim interviewees stated that the Dutch liberal attitude gives them the freedom to practice their beliefs. They positioned the Dutch as respectful towards them (relational). Some of them specifically pointed out that the Dutch respect Muslim women with a headscarf. At the same time, they said that Muslims in the Netherlands have to be open-minded towards matters that are considered “immoral” from a religious point of view.

At the macro-level, interviewees labelled the Netherlands as “super liberal”, “very progressive”, “relatively more liberal than other states in Europe”, and “the most liberal country in the world”. In their discourse of liberalism, interviewees positioned the Netherlands as different from Indonesia. Just like the previous chapter, the discourse of liberalism in the Netherlands is also related to the implementation of the law, the role of the state, tolerance, and the notion of individual freedom and rights, which are elements of liberal democracy. All the “controversial matters” that are legal in the Netherlands are regulated by law and strictly controlled by the government.

Interviewees positioned the Dutch state and Dutch people in general as “very open” and “very tolerant” towards different opinions, the LGBT community, and people from various backgrounds, including religious people (relational). In the discourse of tolerance, one interviewee pointed out that there is a paradigm shift concerning monoculturalism and the debate on multiculturalism in the Netherlands. The Netherlands and Europe are experiencing anxiety that non-Western people, especially the Muslim communities in Europe, are not accepting liberal values. Geert Wilders’s view concerning Muslim immigrants is an example of the multiculturalism debate.

Most interviewees are “very impressed” with Dutch liberalism and became “very open” (ideational). Various interviewees stated that they feel free, recognised, and respected (relational). One interviewee, a homosexual man, stated that tolerance towards LGBT people is one of the reasons for him choosing the Netherlands as a country of residence. Another interviewee stated that he would love it if Indonesia became liberal. The comparison with Indonesia as a mental model runs through almost all interviews.

In their discourse of liberalism, interviewees identify liberal values and humanism as modern values. Humanism functions as a non-religious moral compass for non-religious people. While reproducing the discourse of liberalism, some interviewees maintained their religious position. They positioned the Dutch and Dutch cultures as different from them (identity). The Dutch have their value system, including

liberal values, which can be challenging for non-Western immigrants such as the Indonesians. Nevertheless, due to the individualistic notion, the Dutch do not conform non-Dutch to their value system. Several interviewees expressed concern about their children growing up in the Netherlands because the liberal values in Dutch culture contradict their faith. Some of them maintained “the Indonesian system” in raising their children by giving them “a religious foundation” with the hope that their children will hold on to it when they become adults.



CHAPTER IV

Individualism in the Netherlands ***“People live on their own”***

Introduction

Individualism is one of the prominent features of modernity in the discourse of Indonesian immigrants. The topic of individualism may seem to overlap with the topics of secularization and liberalism because it also touches upon the notions of freedom and tolerance, which run through the whole discourse of religion and modernity in the Netherlands. However, the topic of individualism is not explored further in the previous two chapters. The topic came up when the interviewees spoke about their impressions and experience living in the Netherlands, their relationship with Dutch people, and the relationship between Dutch parents and children. This chapter focuses on those themes.

Like the previous two chapters, this chapter is divided into three parts: the analysis of discourse as linguistic practice, the analysis of discourse as discursive practice, and the analysis of discourse as social practice. The focus here will specifically be on how the interviewees speak about individualism, what they draw upon, and the social conditions and effects of individualism discourse.

1. Analysis of discourse as linguistic practice

This stage of analysis will look at the linguistic features of the text. The focus is on the vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and structure of the texts (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 70-71). The analytic question in this stage is: What words and expressions do discourse participants use when speaking about individualism in the Netherlands?

We do not bother each other

In the previous chapter, it was shown that one of the meanings of being “liberal” in the Netherlands is related to “an individualistic notion that if you are not bothering me, I’m not bothering you”. Various interviewees expressed similar statements, using phrases such as “do not interfere,” “do not care,” “indifferent”, “independent”, “private”, “up to you”, “up to them”, “up to me”, and “I do what I want”. When asked about his impression of Dutch people, interviewee MM6 replied,

Text 4.1

They are friendly, mostly friendly. In terms of interaction, they are friendly. Even if they are not friendly, they will not bother us [Indonesians]. It means they are indifferent but mostly [they] are friendly.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Mereka ramah, kebanyakan ramah. Dari segi interaksi mereka ramah. Kalaupun tidak ramah mereka

Interviewee MM6 mentioned the adjective “friendly” five times (overwording) to emphasize that Dutch people are “mostly friendly”. He equated the phrase “will not bother us” with being “indifferent”. When asked about his impression of the Netherlands, he replied,

Text 4.2

Comfortable, clean, and [the people are] respectful. It means, they [the Dutch] respect [other people]. [The Dutch] do not mind other people's business. They [the Dutch] tend to let things be as long as they do not interfere with the public order.¹⁴⁵

Interviewee MM6 defined the adjective “respectful” and the verb “respect” as not minding other people’s business, which has a similar meaning to the phrase “will not bother” and being “indifferent” in the previous text.

When asked if she speaks about religion with Dutch people, interviewee MW6 replied,

Text 4.3

A: With Dutch people, it is usually on certain moments, such as the moment of Ramadan (fasting month). [...] The Dutch are more indifferent. It is up to you with your choice and me too. Do not, do not bother me. I see the Dutch are like that.

Q: Is it difficult or not to be a Muslim in the Netherlands?

A: So far, I have not felt any difficulties.

Q: Why do you think so?

A: I respect other people and I also expect to be respected by other people. Here [in the Netherlands], that happens. I do not bother you, and you do not bother me.¹⁴⁶

tidak akan ganggu kita gitu. Dalam arti ya cuek-cuek aja gitu tapi kebanyakan ramah. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

¹⁴⁵ Nyaman, bersih dan respect, artinya mereka menghargai. Nggak ngurusin urusan orang lain gitu. Mereka cenderung, sudahlah, selama tidak mengganggu *public order*. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

¹⁴⁶ J: Kalau orang Belanda itu ya paling biasanya, momen. Kayak setiap momen kalau ramadhan gitu. [...] Mereka lebih ininya cuek sih. Orang Belanda itu. Kamu terserah kamu dengan pilihan kamu dan saya juga, jangan, jangan mengusik saya. Kalau saya sih melihatnya seperti itu orang Belanda itu.

T: Menjadi orang Muslim di negara Belanda itu sulit atau tidak?

J: Sampai saat ini saya tidak merasakan kesulitan.

T: Menurut Mbak kenapa?

J: Saya menghormati orang lain dan saya juga berharap saya dihormati orang lain. Di sini itu terjadi. Saya tidak mengganggu kamu dan kamu tidak mengganggu saya. Interviewed on June 15, 2016.

Interviewee MW6 equated the adjective “indifferent” with “it is up to you with your choice and me too” and “do not bother me”. The phrase “I do not bother you and you do not bother me” also equates with respecting each other.

When asked about her impression of the Netherlands before she came, and whether it changed, interviewee MW7 replied,

Text 4.4

Modern, freedom, free world. In Indonesia, sometimes people are scared to say that I am an atheist, or I do not believe in God, for example. In the Netherlands, it is up to you. [One can say], “I am gay. I like women”. That is up to you in the Netherlands. [...] Not immediately change but through time. [...] Especially if we have travelled around the Netherlands, [we will see] differences among the Dutch from the North to the South. It is very different. People in big cities such as Amsterdam, Leiden, Rotterdam, and Den Haag are more individualistic. People in the South or the villages are usually more friendly, although if we narrow it down further, people in small villages are now, in my view, more sceptical towards foreigners. [...] But this is only in recent years, in the last five years as far as I understand. Since many refugees come here [to the Netherlands], they [the Dutch in the village] seem to be more careful to prevent their village from being full of foreigners. At least that is what happens to the village where I live now.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ J: Modern, *vrijheid*, dunia bebas. Jadi kayak di Indonesia kadang orang masih suka takut kalau dia bilang saya ateis atau saya tidak percaya Tuhan misalnya. Di Belanda terserah. Saya gay, saya suka sama perempuan, di Belanda terserah. Yang satu mendukung partai kiri, yang satu lagi mendukung partai kanan. Di Indonesia itu bisa jotos-jotosan tapi kalau di Belanda, silahkan. Nggak ada masalah. *Freedom of speech*. Itu sebelum saya datang.

T: Informasi tentang Belanda ketika itu kamu dapat dari mana?

J: Buku, dari dosen karena saya kuliah sastra Belanda. Informasi dari Belanda itu yang didapat ya di Belanda itu semua boleh, semua bebas, semua orang boleh melakukan apapun yang mereka inginkan, yang perlu mereka lakukan. Nggak kayak di Indonesia. Banyak tabu, banyak macam-macam.

T: *When you came here*, berubah nggak kesanmu tentang Belanda?

J: Berubahnya nggak langsung sih, jadi *through times*. [...] Terutama kalau kita udah keliling Belanda, kelihatan perbedaan orang-orang Belanda itu dari yang Utara sampai Selatan. Itu berbeda sekali. Jadi orang yang di kota-kota besar seperti Amsterdam, Leiden, Rotterdam, Den Haag itu lebih individualistis. Kalau yang di selatan atau yang di pedesaan pada umumnya itu lebih bersahabat walaupun kalau di *narrowin* lagi. Orang-orang di desapun yang kecil itu sekarang kalau aku lihat itu lebih skeptis terhadap orang-orang luar. Orang desa itu sekarang kalau misalnya, karena aku sekarang udah tinggal di desa, orang desa itu kalau ngeliat orang asing, non-Belanda terutama yang berkulit cokelat, hitam, itu agak lebih skeptik dulu. Eh, siapa itu? Kok tinggal di sini? Tapi ini hanya beberapa tahun belakangan ini, *the last five years* yang aku ngeh ya. Semenjak banyak *vluhtelingen* yang datang ke sini. Mereka lebih kayak menjaga diri supaya jangan sampai desanya mereka itu dipenuhi orang-orang luar. Paling nggak di tempat aku tinggal sekarang itu seperti

The noun “freedom”, and the phrases “free world”, “freedom of speech”, and “up to you” are overwording to emphasize that in the Netherlands, “everyone can do anything they want, that they need to do”. The statement “In Indonesia, sometimes people are scared to say that I am an atheist, or I do not believe in God” corresponds to interviewee PM2’s statement (Text 2.42) that Indonesians cannot be atheists. The phrases “I am gay. I like women” and “that is up to you in the Netherlands” are very similar to the statements of interviewee MM5 on Dutch people who say “I am gay, I am a lesbian” and “[people in the Netherlands] feel free” (Text 3.11). Interviewee MW7 contrasted the Netherlands, in which “everything is allowed, everything is free” with Indonesia, in which “there are many taboos, many things”.

She also differentiated Dutch people in the North and the South, as well as Dutch people in big cities and small villages. She contrasted the characters of Dutch people in the North and big cities as “more individualistic” with Dutch people in the South and small villages as “usually more friendly”. The text states that there are Dutch people who are individualistic, friendly, and sceptical. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM1 (Text 2.8) on the difference between Indonesian people in small cities, who are more communal and not secular, with people in big cities, who are secular and more individualistic.

When asked about her impression of Dutch society, interviewee PW5 replied,

Text 4.5

They [the Dutch] are more individualistic. For example, at work [you] cannot mix work with family matters. I mean, it is difficult for colleagues to become close friends. That is difficult because they are colleagues after all. I cannot be close [with my colleagues] like hartsvrienden (best friends). That would not do with colleagues.¹⁴⁸

The text indicates an individualistic notion in terms of a separation between the work and family spheres. Interviewee PW5 mentioned the adjective “difficult” twice (overwording) to emphasize the difference between a colleague and a close friend, and the difficulty to be both at the same time.

itu. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

¹⁴⁸ Mereka itu lebih individualistis. Contohnya di kerjaan itu nggak bisa dicampur dengan keluarga. Maksudnya kolega untuk menjadi teman dekat. Itu sulit karena bagaimanapun juga tetap kolega. Saya nggak bisa dekat seperti *hartsvrienden* (teman akrab). Itu nggak bisa dengan kolega. Interviewed on December 1, 2019.

When asked about her experience of taking her daughters, who were born and raised in the Netherlands, for a holiday in Indonesia, interviewee MW1 said,

Text 4.6

They [Indonesian family] asked, “Why don’t [the children] pray?” I said, “Let them [my children] be if they do not want to do it.” Maybe they [Indonesian family] spoke directly to my children because my children complained, “Why did aunt interfere [my business]?” Bemoeien (interfere). Here [in the Netherlands], it [interfering] is unusual. Another family is not allowed to interfere [other people’s business] but in the case of our children, Indonesian people [unfinished sentence]. I said [to my children], “They [Indonesian family] have good intentions. So don’t you, just listen to it [what the family say]. You do not have to say anything, just listen to it. If you would listen to it, great, thank goodness, but do not say unpleasant things.” [My daughter said], “Yes, I did listen but why did she bemoeien?” She [my daughter] does not like it.¹⁴⁹

The verb “interfere” is mentioned four times (overwording) to emphasize that people in the Netherlands do not interfere with other people’s business and that interfering is “unusual.” The text shows that in the Netherlands interfering with other people’s business, in this case asking if someone is praying or not, is “unusual” and “not allowed”. In other words, the Dutch value their privacy. In Indonesia, interfering, in the case of asking if someone is praying or not, is equal to “having good intentions”. Interviewee MW1 mentioned the verb “listen” four times (overwording) to emphasize that it is “great” if her children would listen to what the Indonesian family told or asked them because the Indonesian family have good intention.

This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW2 (Text 2.23), who used the phrase “*niet mee bemoeien*” to indicate that in the Netherlands religion is a private matter and people are not supposed to ask about religion.

Interviewee PW3, who is married to a Dutchman, also spoke about the notion of interference and said that her reality is “different”. When asked about the individual relationship within a Dutch family in comparison to an Indonesian family, she replied,

¹⁴⁹ [Mereka] ngomong sih. “Kenapa nggak shalat?” Kubilang, ah biar aja kalau dia nggak mau. Ya mungkin dia ngomong langsung sama anak-anaknya karena anak-anak ngadu, “Kenapa sih kok tante ikut-ikut campur sih?” Bemoeien. Di sini nggak biasa. Keluarga lain itu nggak boleh ikut campur tapi kalau anak kita orang Indonesia [...] saya bilang, “Tujuannya itu mereka baik. Kamu nggak boleh, dengerin aja. Kamu nggak usah ngomong apa-apa, dengerin aja. Kamu mau dengerin baik, syukur, tapi nggak usah ngomong yang nggak enak.” “Ya aku juga kan ndengerin, tapi kan kenapa dia bemoeien?” Dia nggak suka. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

Text 4.7

What is strange is, from some friends, who are married to Dutch people, I heard that Dutch families are independent, they will never interfere in the life of their children after they are married, but my reality is different. In my reality, the parents [of my husband] are still very much involved in all matters. I become astonished. How come my [Indonesian] parents seem to be very Dutch whereas the parents of my partner are more, more Asian? I mean, they [my husband's parents] must, must, must know everything. Luckily, they do not know about the matter in bed but for a matter of kitchen and matter of how much money [my husband and I] spend, they [my husband's parents] want to know. My parents do not know it.¹⁵⁰

The conjunction “but” and the adjective “different” in “but my reality is different” indicate a contrast between her experience of interference and what she heard about Dutch independence. Interviewee PW3 contrasted the phrase “Dutch families are independent; they will never interfere in the life of their children after they are married” with the phrase “the parents [of my husband] are still very much involved in all matters.” She also contrasted Indonesian parents and Dutch parents. She indicated that “Indonesian” and “Asian” parents (alternative wording) like to interfere in their children’s life whereas Dutch parents will never interfere in the life of their children. In this interviewee’s case, what happened is the opposite. She mentioned the modal verb “must” three times (overwording) to emphasize her parents-in-law’s interference in her family life. The noun “reality” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize that her reality is different from what she heard about Dutch families.

The Netherlands respects individual rights

Various interviewees spoke about individual rights that give people the freedom to do what he or she likes. When asked if he experienced culture shock when he first came to the Netherlands, interviewee MM6 replied,

¹⁵⁰ Yang anehnya, beberapa teman yang menikah sama orang Belanda, aku dengernya kan ya keluarga-keluarga Belanda itu independen. Nggak bakal mau nyampurin kehidupan anak-anak setelah berumah tangga. Tapi yang kenyataanku lain. Kenyataanku ini yang orang tua masih bener-bener terlibat sangat untuk segala urusan malah. Malah aku jadi heran loh orang tuaku kok jadi seperti Belanda sekali sementara orang tua partnerku itu lebih-lebih Asia sekali gitu. Maksudnya semua harus harus harus mereka tahu gitu. Untung saja urusan tempat tidur mereka nggak tahu. Tapi urusan dapur, urusan urusan berapa banyak uang yang keluar itu mereka ingin tahu. *His parents. My parents do not know it.* Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

Text 4.8

A: *Nothing. The culture shock was mostly in terms of mosques. I did not expect that here [in the Netherlands] access to mosques and access to Islamic communities would be enormous. I did not know that there are a lot of mosques here.*

Q: *What was your impression of the Netherlands before you came here?*

A: *I heard stories [about the Netherlands] from my lecturer. My impression was that it is a free country, and it respects individual rights. That is it. It is a free country, and it gives space for religious diversity. For me, that is extraordinarily good. It was funny when I saw a video of [Indonesian Islamic] preachers in the media, a media preacher, Felix Siauw if I'm not mistaken, on YouTube. He delivered a sermon in Groningen. He said that secularism had destroyed the Netherlands so that Christianity is declining, and so on. I do not think so, in fact, it [secularism] provides space for religion to develop more, including religions that are outside of the mainstream religion in the Netherlands, including people who choose not to have a religion or are agnostic. They are respected. In my opinion, it is an Islamic concept. In my view, Islam is precisely that because the prophet Muhammad was never forced to force people to convert to Islam. Allah said, "You just preach. Hidayah (guidance) is my business. Your duty is to deliver the message". It is clear that there is no compulsion in practicing religion according to the Quran. I think it [the Quran] also gives space to other groups to choose, for example, not to be religious. That is a choice. It is up to you. That is my impression.¹⁵¹*

¹⁵¹ J: Nggak ada. *Culture shock* paling dari segi masjid ya, jadi saya tidak tidak menyangka bahwa di sini akses terhadap masjid, kemudian akses terhadap komunitas-komunitas keislaman itu besar sekali. Saya nggak tahu kalau di sini masjidnya banyak.

T: Jadi sebelum datang ke Belanda, *what was your impression about the Netherlands?*

J: Saya dengar cerita dari dosen saya. Kesannya ya negara bebas dan menghargai hak-hak individu. [...] Ya itu, negara bebas, kemudian memberikan ruang terhadap keberagaman agama itu. Itu buat saya luar biasa bagus. Saya lucu itu waktu itu saya lihat satu video, salah satu ustad di media, ustad media, Felix Siauw kalau nggak salah, dia ada di YouTube itu dia ceramah di Groningen, dia mengatakan bahwa sekularisme itu telah menghancurkan negara Belanda katanya sehingga Kristennya menurun dan lain-lain. Menurut saya nggak, justru itu memberikan ruang untuk agama untuk lebih berkembang termasuk agama yang di luar mainstreamnya Belanda. Termasuk juga pada orang-orang yang memilih untuk tidak beragama atau agnostik, itu justru dihargai. Justru menurut saya, itu adalah konsep Islam menurut saya. Dalam pandangan saya Islam justru begitu karena, nabi Muhammad itu kan nggak pernah dipaksa untuk memaksa orang masuk Islam. Kata Allah itu, "Kamu dakwah saja, masalah mereka mau ikut atau enggak itu bukan urusan kamu, itu urusan saya," kata Allah. Hidayah itu saya urusannya. Kamu hanya tugasnya menyampaikan. Dan jelas kan, tidak ada paksaan dalam beragama, kata Al Qur'an. Menurut saya di situ juga memberi ruang terhadap kelompok-kelompok yang memilih misalnya untuk tidak ingin beragama. Itu pilihan, terserah. Jadi impresi saya begitu. Interviewed on November 30, 2018.

The phrase “Islamic communities” and the noun “mosques”, which is mentioned three times, are overwording to emphasize interviewee MM6’s culture shock. He mentioned the phrase “free country” twice (overwording) to stress that the Netherlands “respects individual rights” and “gives space for religious diversity”. The text indicates that respect for individual rights in the Netherlands is in line with the Islamic concept particularly because “the prophet Muhammad never forced to force people to convert to Islam” and “there is no compulsion in practicing religion according to the Quran”.

This text corresponds to the statements of interviewees MM2 (Text 2.1 and Text 3.20) and MM4 (Text 3.8) on the fact that Muslims have the freedom to practice their belief because mosques are available in the Netherlands, and practicing religion is a matter of individual choice guaranteed by law. It also corresponds to the statement of interviewee PM1 (Text 2.3) on the meaning of secularism in the Netherlands as a shared living space equally by respected religious people and non-religious people.

Another interviewee, MM5, also spoke about individual rights by comparing the reaction of Dutch people and Indonesian people on how people dress. He said,

Text 4.9

Here [in the Netherlands], when [someone] would like to [wear] gold clothes or would like to be naked, no one would [unfinished sentence]. [It is] up to him/her because [it is] their rights, whereas in our country [Indonesia], ouch! Well, here [the Netherlands] is a country [where one can do] whatever [he/she] likes.¹⁵²

The phrases “[someone] would like to [wear] gold clothes” and “[someone] would like to be naked” indicate choices. The conjunction “because” indicates a causal relation between “[it is] up to him/her” and “[it is] their right” to wear any type of clothes. The exclamation “ouch” shows the reaction of Indonesians if someone wears gold clothes or is naked, which is a contrast to the reaction of Dutch people because “[it is] up to him/her”. The phrases “[it is] up to him/her”, “[it is] their rights” and “[one can do] whatever [he/she] likes” are overwording to emphasize individual rights to do what he/she likes in the Netherlands.

¹⁵² Di sini mau pakaian emas atau mau telanjang gitu ya ndak ada *sing* [...] terserah *wong* hak mereka. Coba kalau yang negara kita, aduh! Lah di sini itu negara *sak karep-karepe*. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

When asked if she changed after living in the Netherlands, interviewee MW7 replied,

Text 4.10

Yes. From a negative-minded person. In Indonesia, we [Indonesians] are concerned about what other people are thinking about us. We [Indonesians] are worried that if I wear this, what would they say, things like that. In the Netherlands, whatever. I do not care. They [the Dutch] do not care. I do what I want. Therefore, [my] mindset has changed.¹⁵³

The phrase “negative-minded” is equal to being “concerned about what other people are thinking about us”. Interviewee MW7 contrasted the adjectives “concerned” and “worried” (overwording) with the phrase “do not care” (overwording). She indicated a change of mindset from a negative-minded person to a person who does what she wants. The text implies the individualistic notion in the sense that one does what he or she wants. This text corresponds to text 4.9 on individual rights in the Netherlands.

When asked how he feels after living for fifteen years in the Netherlands, interviewee MM5 replied,

Text 4.11

Here [in the Netherlands] people elevate each other. Right? Elevate in the sense that when helping other people, it is not directly here [in the Netherlands]. It is not shown, but they [the Dutch] really, really help without expecting anything in return. [The Dutch are] indeed indifferent because we do not know each other. It means that they [the Dutch] do not bemoeien (interfere). They do not interfere. But when for example, [somebody] needs help, [that person] will be helped, no matter who he or she is, no matter whether he or she is a family member or not. That is what I feel after living for fifteen years here.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ *Yes. From a negative-minded person. Kalau di Indonesia itu kita itu concern about what other people are thinking about us. We are worried about if I wear this, what would they say, kayak-kayak gitu. Di Belanda ya terserah aja. I don't care. They don't care. I do what I want. Jadi apa ya, pola pikirnya yang berubah. Interviewed on March 24, 2019.*

¹⁵⁴ *Di sini kan saling, saling mengangkat mbak. Ya toh? Yang mengangkat dalam artian itu, ya kalau gimana ya, menolong itu tidak secara langsung di sini, nggak diperlihatkan. Cuman mereka itu bener-bener membantu yang tanpa pamrih kan begitu. Ya cuek memang, karena kita nggak kenal, kan begitu. Dalam artian itu mereka nggak bemoeien. Nggak ikut campur. Tapi kalau memang kalau umpamanya perlu bantuan kan dibantu ndak peduli siapa, ndak peduli keluarga. Yang saya rasakan 15 tahun di sini begitu. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.*

The verbs “elevate” and “help” are overwording to emphasize that people in the Netherlands help each other. The conjunction “because” shows a causal relation between “indifferent” and “we do not know each other.” The adjective “indifferent” and the phrase “do not interfere” are overwording to emphasize that Dutch people do not interfere in other people’s business. The text shows that the Dutch are “indifferent” but when someone needs help, “that person will be helped no matter who he or she is”. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewees MW2 (Text 2.23) and MW1 (Text 4.6), who also used the Dutch phrase “do not interfere” (*niet mee bemoeien*) as part of respecting an individual’s rights. The perception of the Dutch being “indifferent” or “do not bother each other” is shared by many interviewees.

In text 2.39, interviewee MW4 was asked whether religion exists in the life of Dutch people. She answered that in the Netherlands, “there are no Muslims but there is Islam at a certain level”. She continued her statement by saying,

Text 4.12

But for the concept of social life, you [do] good to others, you know, from Jesus, you do not do what [you do not want] others do to you. That is very ingrained here [in the Netherlands]. Very ingrained here. You will not do bad [things] to other people because you do not want other people to do bad [things] to you. Like that. At a workplace, at school, in society, that is really, [I can] feel [it]. Our people [Indonesians] see it as oh, very individualistic. No, it is not.¹⁵⁵

At first, interviewee MW4 spoke about the existence of “Islam at a certain level” as discussed in text 2.39. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM6 (Text 4.8) regarding the view that respect for individual rights in the Netherlands is in line with the Islamic concept. Interviewee MW4 then switched to the concept of social life in the Netherlands as coming from Jesus. The phrase “very ingrained here” is repeated twice (overwording) to emphasize how the teachings of Jesus are deeply embedded in Dutch society. The adverb “really” implies an emphasis that she can “feel” the depth of Jesus’ teaching in the workplace, at school and in society. She stated that Indonesians see the Dutch society as “very individualistic” but she rejected that view by indicating that social life in the Netherlands is based on Jesus’ teaching of doing what you want others to do to you.

¹⁵⁵ Tapi untuk konsep bermasyarakat, *you good to others [...] you know [...] dari Jesus, you don't want to do what others do to you*. Itu *ingrained* banget di sini. *Ingrained* banget di sini. Kamu nggak akan berbuat jelek ke orang lain karena kamu nggak mau orang lain berbuat jelek ke kamu. Gitu. Di di tempat kerja, di tempat sekolah, tempat bermasyarakat, itu ini banget [...] terasa. Kalau orang kita ngeliatnya, o individu banget. *No, it's not*. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

The fact that Christian teaching is “very ingrained” in the social life in the Netherlands corresponds to the statements of interviewees NM1 and PW3 in Chapter II on “religious values” in the Dutch attitude such as apologizing to each other when unintentionally crashing with each other (NM1, Text 2.30) and giving one’s seat to old people and pregnant women in a bus (PW3, Text 2.31).

The statement of interviewee MW4 also corresponds to interviewee MM3, who described what Indonesian people meant as being individualistic.

Text 4.13

Q: *Do you think they [the Dutch] are individualistic?*

A: *No. Individualistic in terms of [religious] ritual practice, yes.*

Q: *In social life?*

A: *No, I don't think so. If [you] see gotong-royong (mutual assistance), if [you] compare it [Dutch social life] with gotong-royong and borrowing and lending [each other's things] like that [Indonesian social life], well, I think that is what Indonesian people meant as being individualistic. Those are the measurements of being individualistic. We [Indonesians], in the past, did gotong-royong because we were colonized. We lived in adversity thus we needed solidarity, otherwise, we would not survive. Those were the values of colonial society, which were constructed because of adversity. They [the notions of gotong-royong] are still important here [in Indonesia] but they [the notions of gotong-royong] cannot be used to judge Western people as being individualistic because the West has established its system. Poor people [in the West] are taken care of by the government. Does it then mean [that people in the West are] individualistic? No. Whereas here [in Indonesia], poor people are not yet taken care of by the government thus we [Indonesians] must not be individualistic.¹⁵⁶*

¹⁵⁶ T: *Do you think they are individualistic?*

J: *No. Individualis kalau dalam hal praktek ritual ya.*

T: *Dalam kehidupan sosial?*

J: *No, I don't think so. Kalau lihatnya gotong royong, kalau membandingkannya gotong royong, terus apa pinjam meminjam, kayak gitu ya. Saya kira itu maksudnya individualis bagi orang Indonesia. Ukurannya individualis itu itu. Kita dulu gotong royong itu kan karena dijajah. Kita hidup dalam kesulitan, jadi perlu *solidarity*, kalau nggak ya nggak bisa *survive*. Itu nilai-nilai masyarakat kolonial yang dibangun karena kesulitan. Ya kita masih penting itu di sini, tapi nggak bisa untuk *menjudge* orang barat individualis karena barat sudah menciptakan sistemnya. Kalau orang miskin kan dipelihara oleh negara. Terus itu individu? Nggak. Kalau di sini orang miskin belum dipelihara oleh negara jadi kita harus jangan individualis gitu. Interviewed on December 27, 2015.*

Interviewee MM3 indicated that the Dutch are individualistic in terms of religious ritual practice but not in their social life. This statement corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM1 (Text 2.13) on the individualistic notion that Dutch people “people feel more independent [and] private” in terms of religious practice.

The Indonesian term “*gotong-royong*” is repeated three times (overwording) to emphasize the measurements Indonesians used in seeing Dutch social life. The term “*gotong-royong*” implies that when people are not helping each other, they are being individualistic. The interviewee indicated that the notion of *gotong-royong*, which requires solidarity, is “the value of colonial society” because Indonesians “lived in adversity”. The text contrasts Indonesia and “the West”, including the Netherlands, which “has established its system”. The phrase “poor people [in the West] are taken care of by the government” signifies that people in the West, including the Netherlands, are not individualistic.

Self-decision

Various interviewees spoke about the individualistic notion in terms of “self-decision” and having an awareness of freedom and its limits. When asked her opinion on the fact that in the Netherlands there are drugs and prostitution, interviewee PW3 said,

Text 4.14

*Everything [is] allowed. That is because those [who use drugs and go to prostitutes] are based on self-decision, self-awareness, like that. Thus, it is not being forced to, but when your value is already ok, well, why do you need that kind of thing? That is why everything is allowed because you alone are the one who decides. You would use it [drugs], go ahead. You do not use it, no problem, like that. Whereas for us [Indonesians], the more it is forbidden, the more people want it. [In] every corner of this city, if [you] would like to smoke marijuana, to take drugs, go ahead, but you are on your own. If later something happens to you, it is your fault. They [the Dutch] have a saying, *eigen schuld, dikke bult*.¹⁵⁷ If you make a mistake, you are the one who pays [for the consequence]. If that is your mistake, you are the one who later must pay the fine. You must pay the fine for your own mistake, not other people. Therefore, they [the Dutch] are used to that.¹⁵⁸*

¹⁵⁷ The phrase *Eigen schuld, dikke bult* literally means “own fault, thick bump.” It can be freely translated into “It is your fault, you had it coming, it serves you right”.

¹⁵⁸ *Everything allowed.* Itulah makannya karena ini berdasarkan *self-decision* kan, *self-awareness* gitu. Jadi bukan yang dipaksakan tapi kalau, kalau nilai atau *value* elo udah ok ya *why do you need that kind of things?* Makannya ya *everything is allowed* karena elo sendiri yang tentuin, elo mau pakai ya silahkan. Kalau nggak mau pakai ya *no problem*, gitu. [...] Lah kalau kita malah semakin dilarang semakin,

The phrases “self-decision,” “self-awareness,” and “you alone are the one who decides” are overwording to emphasize that people in the Netherlands decide for themselves in dealing with everything that is allowed in the Netherlands. The text indicates a contrast between the Netherlands and Indonesia, which is shown by the verbs “allowed” (in the Netherlands) and “forbidden” (in Indonesia). The Dutch expression “*eigen schuld, dikke bult*,” implies a consequence of one’s action. The text implies that the Dutch are used to having self-decision for everything that is allowed in the Netherlands, and they are aware of the consequence of their own decision.

When asked whether religious life in the Netherlands is different from Indonesia, interviewee PW3 replied,

Text 4.15

Very, very. Very different in the sense that if we, I do not know whether it is because of the factor of how they [the Dutch] are raised or how we [Indonesian] are raised. In Indonesia, any religion is fanatic, fanatic, fanatic to the bone and skin and bone marrow. Therefore, if it is not my religion, it is not right. Whereas here [in the Netherlands], even in our church, I mean, even the pastor does not encourage people to convert to our religion, so, it is, it is your decision. In Indonesia, it is more [like saying], “Come convert to my religion,” like that. Whether it is Islam or Christianity or Advent, all are like that. [You] must, [you] must convert to my religion because it is more correct, like that, whereas here [in the Netherlands], evangelism like that is unlikely. Except when you are interested, then they [pastors in the Netherlands] will tell you. But if you are not interested, they do not, do not, do not encourage you [by saying], “Come convert to my religion”.¹⁵⁹

semakin pengen orang. [...] Semua sudut di kota ini kalau mau nyimeng mau ngobat ya silahkan, tapi itu sendiri gitu kalau ntar elo yang kenapa-napa ya salah sendiri. Jadi mereka punya peribahasa kan, *eigen schuld, dikke bult*. Kalau elu sendiri yang salah elu sendiri yang bayar ininya. Kalau itu kesalahan elu ya elu sendiri yang nantinya harus bayar *boetenya* istilahnya. Elu sendiri yang harus membayar denda kesalahan elu bukannya orang lain. Jadi ya mereka terbiasa kayak gitu. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

¹⁵⁹ Sangat-sangat. Sangat berbeda *in the sense* kalau kita, nggak tahu apa karena faktor mereka cara dibesarkannya atau kita cara dibesarkannya. Kalau di Indonesia, agama apapun fanatik, fanatik, fanatik sampai ke tulang dan kulit dan sumsum. Jadi kalau nggak agama gua nggak bener, gitu modelnya. Sementara di sini, bahkan di gereja kami ya, maksudnya bahkan pendetanya tu nggak *mengencourage* orang untuk masuk agama kita gitu, jadi *it’s, it’s on your decision*, gitu. Kalau di di Indonesia kan lebih, lebih ke ayo masuk agama gue gitu kan. Entah Islam, entah Kristen, entah advent semuanya modelnya gitu. Harus, harus masuk ke agama gua karena lebih benar gitu. Kalau di sini penginjilan kayak-kayak gitu nggak model gitu. Kecuali elu yang tertarik, nah mereka mau ngasih tahu. Tapi kalau elu nggak tertarik mereka enggak, enggak, enggak *encourage* untuk ayo pindah ke agama gua. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

The adverb “very” is mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize the difference between religious life in the Netherlands and Indonesia. The phrase “how they/we are raised” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize the possible “factor” that makes religious life in the Netherlands and Indonesia different. Interviewee PW3 mentioned the adjective “fanatic” three times (overwording), to emphasize the character of “any religion” in Indonesia. The nouns “the bone,” “skin” and “bone marrow” (alternative wording) are used to emphasize the adjective “fanatic.”

She contrasted the pastor in her church in the Netherlands, who “does not encourage people to convert to our religion” because “it is your decision” and people in Indonesia, who say, “Come convert to my religion.” The text signifies that religious life in the Netherlands is a matter of “your decision” as there is no effort to encourage people to convert to a religion. This text confirms the statement of interviewee MM2 (Text 2.1) on having the choice to practice religion without being imposed by other people.

When asked whether her Dutch husband goes to the church, interviewee PW3 replied,

Text 4.16

He does, but for them [the Dutch] it is more occasionally, so it is not an obligation, whereas, for us [Indonesians], worship is an obligation. For them [the Dutch] it is more like, when I want to go, I go.¹⁶⁰

Like text 4.15, this text shows a difference between “them [the Dutch]” and “us [Indonesians].” For the Dutch, going to church is “more occasionally,” “not an obligation,” and “when I want to go, I go”. The three phrases are alternative wordings to emphasize the individualistic notion of practicing religion for the Dutch, which is in contrast with the phrase “worship is an obligation” for Indonesians. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.10) who said, “In the Netherlands, religion is like when it is needed.” It also corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM3 (Text 4.13) who said that the Dutch are “individualistic in terms of [religious] ritual practice”.

When asked whether she will teach her religious values to her son, interviewee PW3 replied,

¹⁶⁰ *He does.* Ya tapi lebih ke *occasionally* kalau mereka kan ya. Jadi nggak model yang kewajibannya. Kalau kita kan wajib gitu yah beribadah. Kalau mereka lebih ke *when I want to go, I go*. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

Text 4.17

Yes. Yes, but later on the options will be up to him [our son] whether he would like to follow us [our religious values] or not or follow others or not. As parents of course [we] want him to follow us [our religious values], but here [in the Netherlands] we cannot force [our son]. If [we] lived in Indonesia [we] could [force our son], otherwise [he would be considered] misguided or a heathen [by Indonesians]. Here [in the Netherlands], his mother and father can be imprisoned [for forcing their son to follow the parents' religious values].¹⁶¹

The interviewee repeated the answer “yes” (overwording) to emphasize her intention to teach religious values to her son. The text indicates a contrast between what they “want” as parents and the fact that in the Netherlands they “cannot force” their child to follow their religious values. The adjectives “misguided”, and “heathen” are overwording to emphasize how Indonesians would judge parents who do not teach religious values to their children. This statement corresponds to her previous statement (Text 4.16) that for Indonesians, practicing religion, “is an obligation”. This text confirms the statements of interviewee MW7 (Text 2.22) and interviewee MW2 (Text 3.32) on the fact that in the Netherlands, parents cannot force their children to be religious or on their choice of religion whereas, in Indonesia, there is a social pressure on parents to teach religion to their children.

The fact that in Indonesia interviewee PW3 could force her child to follow her religious values corresponds to interviewee MM4’s statements below about “social pressure” in practicing religion in Indonesia. When asked to compare tolerance in the Netherlands and Indonesia, interviewee MM4 answered,

Text 4.18

Of course, the Netherlands is far more tolerant. Yes. Very. Far. Indonesia has not yet reached that level. Still far [from the Netherlands]. We [Indonesia] are still in the process. Practicing religion, for people in the Netherlands, really shows that it comes from an individual’s intention, not because of social pressure. In Indonesia, sometimes [when] all our neighbors pray while we do not, [we] will certainly feel awkward, except when the person does not care. [When] all our office mates are praying, how come we are the only one who is not? Sometimes it is like that in Indonesia. Therefore, we sometimes consider between our social needs and practicing religion but in the Netherlands, there is nothing like that.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ Ya. Ya tapi itu nanti juga terserah dia opsinya. Mau ngikut kita apa enggak, apa mau ngikut yang lain apa enggak. Yah kalau orang tua sih pasti pengennya, ngikut kita yaa. Tapi kan kita nggak bisa paksa di sini. Kalau tinggal di Indo bisa nih. Kalau nggak, sesat. Kalau nggak, kafir. Kalau di sini bisa-bisa mama bapaknya dipenjara. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

¹⁶² Ya tentu Belanda jauh lebih toleran. Ya. Sangat. Jauh. Indonesia itu belum sampai taraf itu. Masih

The adverb “far” and the adverb “very” are overwording to emphasize that the Netherlands is more tolerant than Indonesia. The text shows a contrast between “individual’s intention” (the Netherlands) and “social pressure” (Indonesia) in practicing religion. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee MW4 below. When asked how her Indonesian family dealt with her Dutch husband, who does not practice religion, interviewee MW4 replied,

Text 4.19

[My] mother [said], “Come on, teach [your husband] this, this”. But we [my family and I] teach if he [my husband] really wants to do it, right? [In my] assumption, most of us [Indonesian Muslims] practice [religion], really for the outer look, to be seen by other people. I mean, the inner, the inner is empty.”¹⁶³

The verb “teach” is repeated twice (overwording) to emphasize that the mother of interviewee MW4 asked her to teach her husband Islam. The phrases “for the outer look” and “to be seen” are overwording to emphasize that practicing religion for Muslims in Indonesia is only for other people to see. She contrasted the adjectives “outer” and “inner.” The adjective “inner” is mentioned twice (overwording) to emphasize that the “inner” motive to practice religion among Muslims in Indonesia is “empty.” Later in the interview, she explained her “deeper” “personal journey” to her “own religion” because of her discussions with her Dutch husband (see Text 2.27 and Text 2.28). When asked how she saw Indonesian people after her deeper personal journey, interviewee MW4 replied,

Text 4.20

That is why I spontaneously said, [in Indonesia] practice is more, more important than inner spirituality. It is practice. People must see, “Oh I give alms, oh I go to the mosque, oh I fast on Monday and Thursday,” therefore, it is the practice, it is more cultured, like that. My mother told me, “Teach your husband to pray.” Teaching is easy but [how about] the conviction within? [Do people] pray so [they] could be seen by others or [do they] pray because they worship Allah, worship God? I put more emphasis on deeper understanding.”¹⁶⁴

jauh lah. Kita proses. Beragama kalau orang di Belanda itu kelihatan betul-betul bahwa ini memang datang dari niatan masing-masing individu, bukan karena tekanan sosial. Di Indonesia itu kan kadang tetangga kita semua sholat, kalau kita nggak sholat sendiri pasti ya *pekewuh* kecuali memang betul-betul orangnya tidak peduli ya. Teman sekantor semua sholat masak kita nggak sholat sendiri, kan gitu kadang di Indonesia. Jadi kita kadang memikirkan antara kepentingan sosial kita dengan beragama. Tapi di Belandaitu kan nihil kan kayak gitu itu. Interviewed on January 17, 2016.

¹⁶³ Kalau Ibu, “Udah, ajarin gini-gini.” Tapi kan kita ajarin kalau dia itu mau bener-bener melakukan kan. Kalau asumsi, banyak kita *practice* itu bener-bener untuk *outer look*, biar diliat orang, *I mean, inner, innernya* kosong gitu. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

¹⁶⁴ Makannya aku langsung bilang, yang *practice* itu lebih, lebih penting daripada *inner spirituality*.

The adverb “more” is repeated twice (overwording) and the noun “practice” is also mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize that in Indonesia, religious “practice” is “more important” than inner spirituality. The phrases “Oh I give alms”, “Oh I go to the mosque”, and “oh I fast on Monday and Thursday” are overwording statements as examples of “practice” that must be “seen” by others.

Interviewee MW4 contrasted “pray so [they] could be seen by others” and “pray because they worship Allah.” The phrases “worship Allah” and “worship God” are overwording to emphasize the act of worshipping God in comparison to the act of praying to be seen by others. The phrases “inner spirituality,” “conviction within” and “deeper understanding” are overwording to emphasize what she considered more important than “practice.” This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee PM2 (Text 2.42), who indicated that [Christian] Indonesians go to church because they cannot be atheists, and implied that it is not clear whether those who go to the church really “have the desire to worship”.

Besides “self-decision” and “individual intention”, various interviewees also spoke about “awareness”. When asked whether he changed after living in the Netherlands, interviewee NM1 replied,

Text 4.21

Of course. In many ways. In the way I see things, in the way I see. But to me, freedom of choice is something very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very crucial. It is not about individuality, not individualism. It is how each individual has the ability, bravery and independence to decide something regarding his choice with a standard of public consensus. So far, as I saw my Dutch friends, they have that freedom but when they decide, they have considerations. The limit is legal regulation. The main thing is that I do not violate the law, and I do not get stopped by the police, it is ok for me to do my choice. This is probably too ideal and does not apply to everything but at least the phenomenon of those principles is what I observe in my Dutch friends. Thus, there is freedom of choice, but there is awareness about the frame, the limit. That is interesting. About being orderly, about throwing garbage, [everything is] very orderly.¹⁶⁵

Jadi *practicenya*. Orang harus liat oh, aku bersodaqoh, oh aku ke masjid, oh aku puasa senin kamis, jadi *practicenya* gitu, jadi semakin *cultured* gitu. E jadi ibuku nanya, o ajarin suami kamu e sholat. Ajarin sih mudah tapi *conviction* di dalamnya itu. Itu sholat karena biar dilihat orang atau sholat karena menyembah Allah? Menyembah Tuhan gitu. Aku lebih mentingin yang *deeper understanding*. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.

¹⁶⁵ *Of course. In many ways. In the way I see things, in the way I see. But to me, the freedom of choice is something very, very very very very very, very very crucial. Bukan individuality, bukan individualism. Jadi bagaimana*

The noun “way” is repeated three times (overwording) to emphasize the change in the way interviewee NM1 “sees” things. The adverb “very” is mentioned eight times (overwording) to emphasize how crucial “freedom of choice” is for him. He contrasted “individuality” and “individualism” (overwording) with “freedom of choice” (overwording). The phrases “the ability, the bravery and the independence” are overwording to emphasize an individual’s freedom of choice.

The noun “considerations,” and the phrases “a standard of public consensus,” “legal regulation,” “do not violate the law” and “do not get stopped by the police” are alternative wording to emphasize the “limit” of the freedom of choice. The text implies that in the Netherlands “freedom of choice” has its limits. This confirms the earlier statements on the limit of freedom in the Netherlands (CM1, Text 2.25; MW1, Text 2.24; MW2, Text 2.23; and NM1, Texts 3.5 & 3.6). The sentence “I do not violate the law” corresponds to the statements of interviewee MM3 (Text 2.33) about “being obedient to rules” as an implementation of religious teaching.

The adjective “orderly” is repeated twice (overwording) to emphasize Dutch awareness of the limit of freedom of choice, which is related to them being “very orderly”. This text corresponds to the statement of interviewee PW3 (Text 4.14) about the Dutch who are used to having self-decision for everything that is allowed in the Netherlands and are aware of the consequence of their own decision.

Another interviewee, MM5, also spoke about “awareness” concerning the Netherlands as a “prosperous” country. Throughout the interview, he mentioned the phrase “*rukun-rukun* Islam” (the pillars of Islam) seventeen times (overwording) to emphasize that he found the pillars of Islam in the Netherlands (see Text 2.37). When asked how the pillars of Islam can exist in the Netherlands, he responded,

Text 4.22

Why are developed countries prosperous? Because they [people in developed countries] conduct what Allah has sent down based on its function. For example, plants like these [pointed to the trees around us] are not allowed to be cut,

setiap individu punya kemampuan, keberanian dan *independency* untuk memutuskan sesuatu yang menyangkut pilihannya, tetapi dengan patokan konsensus umum. [...] Sejauh aku melihat teman-teman Belanda, mereka punya *freedom* itu, tetapi ketika memutuskan, ada *consideration*. Batasnya adalah aturan hukum. Pokoknya aku nggak melanggar hukum ini dan aku nggak kena semprit polisi, ndak apa-apa aku melakukan keputusan. Ini mungkin terlalu ideal dan tidak berlaku semua tetapi paling tidak fenomena-fenomena prinsip seperti itu aku perhatikan dari teman-teman Belanda. Jadi ada *freedom of choice* tapi ada kesadaran mengenai *frame*, batasnya. Itu menarik. Soal tertib, soal buang sampah, tertib sekali. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

right? And also, animals here [in the Netherlands]. When I asked, “Why don’t the animal be [unfinished sentence]?” [The Dutch answered], “Let them be.” Because God has a purpose. That exists in Islam. Anything that was created, the existing beings must have [a purpose]. That is the answer of Dutch people. I learned that from them. That amazed me. They [the Dutch] are prosperous. In the context of the free birds, [Dutch people] said, “They [the birds] already have their purpose.” If only our country [Indonesia] was like that, inshallah (God willing) [we are] also prosperous. In our country, birds are captured and killed. [Trees] are cut. Of course, there is a flood. [That is] because [Indonesians have] a lack of awareness. Here [in the Netherlands] the awareness is very high. Very high. Awareness exists in any religion on this earth. The key to life is only awareness. The key to human beings is in their awareness. That’s it. Here [in the Netherlands], the awareness is very high. It is incomparable.¹⁶⁶

The noun “prosperous” is mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize that developed countries, including the Netherlands, are prosperous because “they conduct what Allah has sent down based on its function.” The nouns “Allah” and “God” are overwording to emphasize that every godly creation has a purpose. The text implies that what Dutch people do is in line with Islamic teaching that God’s creations must have a purpose, and hence the Netherlands is prosperous. Interviewee MM5’s explanation of “Why are developed countries prosperous?” correlates to the statements of interviewee MM6 on the Islamic concept of a welfare state (Text 2.36) and interviewee MM4 on the advancement of the Dutch state (Text 3.21).

Interviewee MM5 mentioned the noun “awareness” six times (overwording) to emphasize awareness as “the key of life” that “exists in any religion on this earth”, and the fact that the level of awareness is “very high” (overwording) in the Netherlands. When asked whether Indonesians have awareness, interviewee MM5 replied,

¹⁶⁶ Mengapa negara-negara maju itu makmur? Karena itu mereka itu menjalankan apa yang sudah diturunkan sama Allah itu sesuai dengan apa fungsinya. Misalnya kayak tanaman gini nggak langsung boleh nebang kan? Dan juga hewan yang ada di sini. Kalau saya tanya, kenapa dia nggak [...] ini. “Biarkan.” Karena Tuhan punya, ada maksud. Lah itu kan ada di Islam. Apa yang sudah diciptakan, makhluk yang ada, itu pasti ada, ada [tujuannya], jawabannya orang Belanda begitu. Lah itu saya belajar dari mana mereka. Lah itu saya heran. Makannya mereka makmur karena apa, dalam artian itu kayak burung-burung dibiarkan bebas itu. Mereka sudah punya maksud sendiri, dia bilang gitu. Seandainya di negara kita kayak begitu *inshaallah* makmur juga. Kalau di negara kita ada burung begitu malah ditangkap, dibunuh. [Pohon-pohon] ditebang ya banjir lah. Karena kesadarannya kurang. Di sini kesadarannya tinggi sekali. Kesadaran itu ada di agama apapun di muka bumi ini. Kunci kehidupan itu cuma kesadaran. Kuncinya manusia itu ada di kesadaran. Itu aja. Di sini kesadarannya tinggi sekali. Ndak bisa dibandingkan. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

Text 4.23

[Indonesian Muslims] do not understand the Islamic pillars. That is the difference [with Dutch people]. [Indonesians have] a lack of awareness. [Indonesians] only think of [their own] stomach. What is important is my stomach is full. Here [in the Netherlands], it is not [like that]. They [the Dutch] put other people's stomachs as a priority. The key is one: aware. If [we] are not aware [we] are fainting. When people faint [they] cannot do anything. Aware. For example, like [how Dutch people deal with] a trash can. Plastic [trash] is put in the place of plastic. Here [in the Netherlands], awareness comes from within themselves. [Dutch people select] which one is wet [trash], which one is paper [trash]. At home is also like that. [The Dutch select] which one is organic [trash and which one is not]. In our country [Indonesia], [trash] is thrown away [without being separated]. They [Indonesians] are not aware. [Indonesians] are similar to sleeping people. The key is awareness.¹⁶⁷

Interviewee MM5 equated “do not understand the Islamic pillars” with a lack of awareness. The noun “awareness” is mentioned three times (overwording) and the verb “aware” is mentioned four times (overwording) to emphasize that awareness is “key”. He equated being unaware with being “fainting” and “sleeping”, in the sense that one “cannot do anything”. He contrasted Indonesians, who “are not aware”, with the Dutch, who have an awareness that “comes from within themselves”. The Indonesian expression “think of their own stomach” refers to being selfish. Similar to the previous text (4.22), this text implies that the Dutch practice elements of Islamic pillars, such as having individual awareness and not being selfish. Both texts 4.22 and 4.23 indicate a relationship between Dutch people, who have individual awareness, which is in line with Islamic teaching, with the prosperity of a developed country like the Netherlands. Furthermore, the care for animals and trees (Text 4.22) and trash (Text 4.23) show that the Dutch are not selfish (individualistic).

Tolerance

In the previous chapter on liberalism, nine interviewees spoke about tolerance, particularly concerning the Dutch's acceptance of homosexuality. Sixteen

¹⁶⁷ [Orang Muslim Indonesia] ndak ngerti rukun-rukun Islaminya. Lha itu bedanya. Kesadarannya kurang. Ya mementingkan perutnya sendiri. *Sing penting wetengku wareg*. Kalau di sini ndak. Mereka mementingkan perutnya orang daripada perutnya sendiri. Kuncinya cuman satu. Sadar. *Nek gak sadar lak pingsan. Nek wong pingsan lah kan gak iso opo-opo*. Sadar. Misalnya kayak istilahnya tempatnya sampah, mana yang plastik ya di plastik. Kan di sini tergantung dari mereka sendiri sadarnya. Mana yang yang, basah ya basah. Mana yang kertas ya kertas. Di rumah pun juga begitu kan. Mana istilahnya yang organik ya organik. Kalau di negara kita *wis diguwak*. Mereka nggak sadar. *Podo mbek wong turu*. Kuncinya itu sadar. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

interviewees, AM1, AM2, CM2, CW2, MM1, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, MW1, MW7, NM1, PM1, PM2, PW3, and PW5, including those who spoke of tolerance concerning homosexuality, also spoke about religious tolerance and its relation with individual rights. When asked to compare tolerance in the Netherlands and Indonesia, interviewee PW3 replied,

Text 4.24

*Here [in the Netherlands] there is more religious [tolerance] because they [the Dutch] do not care. Your life is your life. My life is my life. There [in Indonesia], your life is my life. My life is my life. How could that be? That person wants to interfere in other people's business but he does not allow people to interfere in his business. That is in Indonesia.*¹⁶⁸

The phrase “they do not care” is equal to the statement “Your life is your life. My life is my life.” The statement “your life is my life” is an alternative wording to the verb “interfere” to emphasize that Indonesians are less tolerant than the Dutch. The text shows a relationship between the individualistic notion of not interfering in other people's life with religious tolerance in the Netherlands.

When asked his opinion of tolerance in the Netherlands, interviewee PM1 replied,

Text 4.25

*Tolerance in the Netherlands is do your thing and I will do my thing. We [people who live in the Netherlands] do not bother each other. Do your thing and I will do my thing. Therefore, everyone, has their own space and time to grow on their own. If it is possible, if we could, we contact each other and talk to each other. If [we] could not, fine, it is ok.*¹⁶⁹

The phrase “do your thing and I will do my thing” and the phrase “we do not bother each other” is overwording to emphasize what tolerance means in the Netherlands. Interviewee PM1 indicated that while people in the Netherlands do not bother each other, there is a possibility to talk to each other. This text corresponds to text 4.24 on the relationship between individualistic notions and tolerance in the Netherlands.

¹⁶⁸ Beragama lebih di sini ya karena mereka kan nggak ambil pusing. *Your life, your life. My life, my life.* Kalau di sana mereka kan, *your life is my life, my life is my life.* Loh gimana, dia mau nyampurin urusan orang tapi urusan sendiri nggak mau dicampurin kalau di Indo. Interviewed on June 6, 2016.

¹⁶⁹ Kalau toleransi di Belanda itu, *do your thing and I will do my thing. We don't bother each other. Do your thing and I will do my thing.* Jadi semua-semua itu masing-masing punya ruang dan waktu untuk bisa berkembang sendiri-sendiri. Kalau bisa, kalau kita bisa, kita saling kontak dan saling ngomong, Kalau ndak bisa ya sudah itu ndak apa-apa. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

When asked her opinion of tolerance in the Netherlands, interviewee MW1 replied,

Text 4.26

Here [in the Netherlands] [people] live on their own. Like [with] the neighbour here [around the area], [we] do not know each other. The neighbour there (pointing to one direction), [we] do not know [them]. Tolerance here [in the Netherlands] means it is up to you, it is your right. It is unlike in Indonesia, [where people] seem to be angry [and say], “Oh, that person does not have a religion. We [Indonesians] do not make friends [with that person]”. In Indonesia [it] is like that.¹⁷⁰

Interviewee MW1 equated the phrase “[people] live on their own” with the fact that she and her neighbours “do not know each other”. The phrases “it is up to you” and “it is your right” are overwording to emphasize that being tolerant is related to individual rights. The phrases correspond to the previous texts (Text 4.24 & Text 4.25). Interviewee MW1 also contrasted tolerance in the Netherlands with Indonesia. This text implies that the Netherlands has more religious tolerance than Indonesia due to individual rights of not having religion.

When asked his opinion on tolerance in the Netherlands, interviewee CM2 replied,

Text 4.27

A: There are various definitions of tolerance. For some Muslims, maybe the radical ones, tolerance means they [the radical Muslims] can apply all their religious rules without having to consider other people. Without thinking about other people [non-Muslims]. Tolerance is actually, in my opinion, and this is also what most people in the Western world think, my freedom ends when other people are disturbed. For example, I am a Catholic. During the fasting period, on Friday, I refuse to eat meat. That is my intention. I will not force the canteen not to sell meat. Whereas some groups, especially in Indonesia, from certain religious groups, do not like pork, for example. They [people of a certain religious group] dare to force the canteen not to sell pork or even close the shops that have nothing to do with their [diet preference].

Q: What is tolerance in the Netherlands like?

A: That is similar to what I said earlier but the Dutch, who are not religious,

¹⁷⁰ Hidup masing-masinglah di sini. Seperti tetangga aja di sini, nggak kenal. Tetangga di sana [menunjuk ke satu arah] nggak kenal. Toleransinya itu iya itu terserah kamu. Itu haknya kamu. Jadi tidak seperti di Indonesia. Marah gitu kayaknya. “Oh dia itu nggak punya agama. Kita nggak usah bergaul.” Di Indonesia kan begitu. Interviewed on May 2, 2015.

like to make fun of religious people. So, tolerance is a bit lacking. They [the Dutch] are tolerant in the sense that they say, "It is up to you to believe [in a certain religion] but that is nonsense to me". So, there is also an element of harassment. Harassment against religious people.

Q: Also, against the Muslims?

A: Yes, but it is not as bad as against the Christians because they [the Dutch] think that the Muslims are actually still backwards. Just let them [the Muslims] be. Criticizing Islam means criticizing its backwardness. That is discrimination. [For the Dutch], the Muslims are not as advanced as the Christians. If a person is a Christian, his or her mind should be open, which means, he or she should leave religion. With the Muslims, what can they [the Dutch] do? They [the Muslims] come from a backward culture.¹⁷¹

While indicating that there are "various definitions of tolerance", interviewee CM2 gave two definitions. The first definition is tolerance "for some radical Muslims" and the second is tolerance according to "most people in the Western world". He described Dutch tolerance towards religious people as "it is up to you to believe [in a certain religion] but that is nonsense to me". This statement confirms the statement of interviewee MM4 (Text 2.26), who has difficulty explaining to the Dutch, who commented, "Oh, that does not make sense in our logic", why Muslims have to pray five times a day.

¹⁷¹ J: Definisi toleransi itu macam-macam. Buat beberapa kalangan Muslim ya, mungkin dari yang kalangan radikal, toleransi itu berarti mereka boleh menerapkan semua aturan agamanya tanpa harus *rekeninghouden*, tanpa memikirkan orang lain. Toleransi itu sebenarnya, kalau menurut saya, ini juga yang dianggap oleh sebagian besar orang di dunia Barat, kebebasan saya itu berakhir ketika orang lain itu terganggu. Misalnya begini saya orang Katolik terus pas masa puasa, hari Jumat itu saya nggak mau makan daging. Nah itu kan memang saya yang mau ya. Tapi saya tidak akan memaksa kantin tidak menjual daging. Sementara beberapa kalangan terutama di Indonesia, dari kalangan agama tertentu tidak suka daging babi misalnya. Mereka bisa sampai hati memaksa kantin tidak menjual daging babi atau bahkan menutup toko yang tidak ada hubungannya.

T: Toleransi di Belanda seperti apa?

J: Itu mirip yang saya utarakan tapi orang Belanda itu yang tidak beragama itu suka mengolok-olok orang yang beragama. Jadi toleransinya memang agak kurang. Mereka sih toleran dalam arti mereka mau bilang ya terserah kamu mau percaya tapi itu buat saya nonsense gitu loh. Jadi ada unsur pelecehan juga sih, harassment terhadap orang yang beragama.

T: Terhadap orang yang beragama Islam juga?

J: Ya, tapi tidak separah terhadap orang yg beragama Kristen karena mereka menganggap orang-orang yg beragama Islam itu sebenarnya masih terbelakang. Biarin aja lah. Mengkritik Islam itu juga berarti mengkritik keterbelakangan mereka, nah itu diskriminasi gitu loh. Jadi mereka itu belum semaju orang yang Kristen. Mestinya kalau orang yang Kristen itu kan, pemikirannya itu sudah terbuka ya harusnya meninggalkan agama. Tapi kalau yang Muslim yah apa boleh buat, mereka kan berasal dari budaya yang terbelakang. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

Interviewee CM2 equated “criticizing Islam” with criticizing Muslim’s “backwardness”, which is a discriminatory act. The text shows the Dutch’s different attitude towards the Muslims, who for the Dutch, “is actually still backwards”, and the Christians, who are “advanced”, and whose minds “should be open” and “should leave religion”. The text shows that in Dutch religious tolerance, “there is also an element of harassment against religious people”, particularly Christians. This corresponds to the statements of interviewee CM1 (Text 2.25), MW1 (Text 2.24), and MW2 (Text 2.23), and on the limit of freedom to speak about religion in the public domain.

Interviewee MM1 refused to call Dutch people tolerant. When asked if he thinks the Dutch are tolerant, he said,

Text 4.28

I do not call people here [in the Netherlands] tolerant. They [the Dutch] do not care. They [the Dutch] call it tolerance but actually it is not. In the actual definition of tolerance, it is not. Tolerance means putting in an effort to understand other people, right? In my language, what I comprehend [about tolerance is] to understand that you are different [from me]. Here [in the Netherlands], that [what people call tolerance] is not caring, but if you do all sorts of things [wrongly against me], I will hit you, [we] will have a quarrel. While you are different from me it is up to you, as long as you do not violate my private space. That is my understanding.¹⁷²

Interviewee MM1 distinguished the meaning of “being tolerant” and “not caring”. He implied that what the Dutch call “tolerant” is equal to “not caring”. He repeated the verb “understand” (overwording) to emphasize that the meaning of tolerance is putting in an effort “to understand that you are different [from me]”. He indicated that the Dutch do not care if other people are different from them, as long as they do not violate Dutch private space. The text implies that the Dutch do not put an effort to understand other people who are different from them and therefore, they are indifferent.

Unlike interviewee CM2 (Text 4.27), who stated that “tolerance is a bit lacking” in the Netherlands, and interviewee MM1 (Text 4.28), who refused to call the Dutch tolerant, interviewee AM2 called the Dutch “too tolerant”.

¹⁷² Saya nggak menyebut orang di sini toleran ya. Mereka nggak peduli. Sebenarnya, mereka menyebutnya toleran tapi sebenarnya bukan. Kalau dalam definisi toleran yang sebenarnya, bukan. Toleran itu kan juga berusaha untuk memahami orang lain kan? Kalau dalam bahasa saya, yang saya pahami, mengerti bahwa kamu itu berbeda. Kalau di sini itu nggak peduli, tapi kalau kamu itu macem-macem, saya akan pukul kamu, akan ribut. Selama kamu beda dengan saya terserah, asalkan kamu nggak merusak my *private space*. Itu yang saya tangkap. Interviewed on May 13, 2015.

Text 4.29

Q: How about tolerance in the Netherlands?

A: Oh, they [the Dutch] are very tolerant. Here [in the Netherlands] they [the Dutch] are very tolerant. I even think that they [the Dutch] are so tolerant that they can tolerate intolerant people. Sometimes I think [the Dutch] are too tolerant, too tolerant sometimes. The good thing is that this is because of my work experience or something, they [the Dutch] have a more elegant way to get rid of intolerant people. I do not know how they [the Dutch] do that but they [the Dutch employer] always find a way to kick out people from work if they are not good. [...] You know they [the Dutch] are very, very diplomatic in a way.

Q: Not direct?

A: No. They [the Dutch] are diplomatic when they avoid conflict. When they [the Dutch] feel that ok, I am going to say something, they can be direct. But when they feel that it will trigger a conflict, they will find another way. [...] They [the Dutch] always like to talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, talk.

Q: Having a discussion?

A: Discussion on what went wrong [and] on how we [the Dutch] can make this problem better, like that. Polder model. Yes, the polder model. You always have to talk about everything, everything, everything. Talk, talk, talk. To this day I still feel that that is also the reason why the decision [by the Dutch state] is slow to take. The Dutch tend to wait and see, wait and see.¹⁷³

Interviewee AM2 mentioned the adjective “tolerant” five times (overwording) to emphasize that the Dutch are not only “very tolerant” but sometimes “too tolerant” towards intolerant people. The phrase “very, very diplomatic” is overwording to

¹⁷³ T: Bagaimana dengan toleransi di Belanda?

J: Oh *they are very tolerant*. Di Belanda *Dutch people are very tolerant*. Even I think, saking tolerannya mereka bisa mentoleran orang yang intoleran. *Sometimes I think like it's too tolerant. It's too tolerant sometimes*. Tapi bagusnya kalau ini karena mungkin dari pengalaman kerja atau segala macam. Mereka itu, mereka punya cara yang lebih elegan untuk menghalau orang-orang yang intoleran. *I don't know how they do that but they always find a way to kick out people from work if they are not good*. [...] *You know they are very, very diplomatic in a way*.

T: Nggak direct?

J: No, mereka diplomatik pada saat mereka menghindari konflik. Kalau mereka merasa bahwa, *ok, I am going to say something, they can be direct*. Tapi kalau mereka merasa bahwa itu akan menyulut konflik, mereka akan menempuh cara lain. [...] *They always like to talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, talk, talk*.

T: Diskusi?

J: Diskusi. Apa yang salah, bagaimana caranya kita bisa membuat masalah ini menjadi lebih baik. Seperti itu. *Polder model*. Ya, *Polder model*. *You always have to talk about everything, everything, everything, talk, talk talk*. Sampai sekarang saya merasa bahwa itu juga yang menjadi masalah kenapa keputusan itu misalnya lambat diambil. Orang Belanda itu cenderung *wait and see, wait and see*. Interviewed on June 13, 2016.

emphasize that the Dutch are “diplomatic when they avoid conflict” and not always direct. The pronoun “everything” is mentioned three times (overwording) and the verb “talk” is mentioned twelve times (overwording) to emphasize that the Dutch “always have to talk about everything” to reach a decision, also called the *polder* model.

The society here is really closed

On the one hand, many interviewees spoke of the Dutch as very open and tolerant people due to the liberal values and individualistic notions that give people the freedom to do what they like. On the other hand, interviewees also spoke of the individualistic notions which contribute to the “difficulty” for non-Dutch people to enter Dutch society.

When asked if it is difficult to adjust to life in the Netherlands, interviewee NW3, who lived and studied in America, replied,

Text 4.30

Quite difficult because if I compare it to, for example, America or Indonesia, the society here [in the Netherlands] is really closed. In America, it felt easier for us to be friends and it is easier to open a network. Here [in the Netherlands], I made an effort. I spoke with one of the [Dutch course] volunteers there [pointing to the direction across her house], whose house is also around here. I said, “Madam, I would really like to learn deeper and longer, and practice my Dutch. Is it possible if I visit your house? I bring food and we have a chat”. She refused. She refused. She is only willing to do it in that [free Dutch course]. [She said], “My time is only in this [free Dutch course]. I dedicate it to this”. I said a similar thing to the neighbor, a Dutch lady, two doors down from here. I would like to learn Dutch more and practice more because at school it is more on theory, grammar, et cetera. [I asked], “May I visit your place? I will bring food. You do not have to prepare anything. We just chat”. She also refused. However, she is willing to talk, for example, when we meet in front of the house, or on the street. We could talk until about half an hour but when I would like to visit, to chat, she refused.”¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ Cukup sulit karena kalau saya bandingkan dengan misalnya di Amerika atau di Indonesia, masyarakat di sini benar-benar tertutup. Kalau di Amerika saya merasa kita lebih gampang untuk berteman dan membuka jaringan itu lebih gampang. Di sini saya usahakan seperti misalnya saya bilang sama salah satu *volunteer* di situ. Saya bilang, kebetulan dia rumahnya juga di sekitar sini. *Mevrouw*, saya itu ingin sekali belajar lebih lebih mendalam, lebih lama dan melatih bahasa Belanda saya. Apakah boleh gitu, kapan saya main ke tempat, ke rumah anda, saya bawa makanan, kita ngobrol-ngobrol. Dia nggak mau. Dia nggak mau. Dia hanya mau ya hanya itu. Waktuku ya hanya ini, aku dedikasikan untuk itu. Terus tetangga dua rumah dari sini, *buurvrouw*. Seorang Belanda juga. Saya juga bilang begitu sama dia. Saya pengen belajar bahasa Belanda lebih banyak lagi lah ya. Praktek gitu kan, kalau yang di sekolah itu kan lebih banyak teorinya, *grammar*, segala macam. Boleh nggak saya main

Interviewee NW3 contrasted the society in the Netherlands where it is “really closed” with America where it is “easier to be friends and easier to open a network”. She repeated the phrase “she refused” (overwording) to indicate the rejection of two Dutch ladies to her request to visit their homes and have a chat. The text implies that Dutch people are not open to accepting foreign guests into their homes.

When asked about his social interaction with Dutch people during his stay in the Netherlands, interviewee AM1 replied,

Text 4.31

*Dutch society is I think very difficult to penetrate. But I think, I mean, you know, a lot of like international students, they just gathered among themselves. But at the same time, I don't really, I mean I lived, much strongly within my own Indonesian community in the Netherlands.*¹⁷⁵

The statement “Dutch society is very difficult to penetrate” corresponds to the statement of interviewee NW3 that Dutch society is “really closed” (Text 4.30). The text states that on the hand, the Dutch are not open. On the other hand, the Indonesians, in this case, the students, prefer to be among themselves. When asked whether Indonesians integrate easily into Dutch society, AM1 answered,

Text 4.32

I think maybe there is a difference with American society because the problem with Dutch society is that because they have been monocultural for a long time, their transition to multiculturalism was very, it is not vague, but it is very, there is something about it, which is very thin. I think if you are an immigrant to the United States, you become an American, whereas if you go to the Netherlands, you do not become Dutch, because Dutch is a very loaded historical term, specific with race, with culture, with, you know, all of this stuff, so it is impossible. Whereas if you go to America, people become Americanized much more easily, maybe. I think that is how I feel. [...] I think the choice is harder for Indonesians to integrate into because first of all, Dutch society is hard to penetrate. Second of all, Indonesians are less comfortable penetrating it, right? [...] I think there is a strong cultural component to it that makes it more difficult. I think for instance, in the university system, the Dutch prefer to

ke tempatmu, nanti saya bawain makanan. Kamu nggak usah repot, pokoknya kita ngobrol aja, dan dia juga nggak mau. Tapi dia mau kalau misalnya ketemu di depan, di pinggir jalan terus ngobrol bisa sampai setengah jam, tapi kalau misalnya kita pengen berkunjung, ngobrol gitu dia nggak mau. Interviewed on December 10, 2017.

¹⁷⁵ This is an original quote. The interviewee used English. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

*have Dutch people teaching, instead of non-Dutch. So, there are a lot of cultures in which the Dutch feel that they should put their own people above or in front. And you don't see that much in the context of the US, where there are a lot of non-Americans who become Americans, you know, become Americanized. They become like university presidents and stuff like that, you know, who are non-traditional American, non-Anglo Saxon, blah blah blah, so the culture of the Netherlands definitely has a role to it.*¹⁷⁶

Like interviewee NW3 (Text 4.30), interviewee AM1 indicated the difficulty to enter Dutch society by comparing Dutch society to American society. He implied that the Dutch's transition from a monocultural society to a multicultural society "is very thin" and that makes it "impossible" for non-Dutch to be "Dutch".¹⁷⁷ He contrasted it with the United States, where non-Americans "become Americanized much more easily". This correlates to his statement (Text 3.1) on the difference between American liberalism and Dutch liberalism, in which the Dutch do not "conform people to a certain stereotype or a value system". The noun "culture" and the adjective "cultural" are mentioned four times (overwording) to emphasize that the culture of the Netherlands "plays a role" in making it difficult for non-Dutch to integrate into Dutch society. The interviewee repeated his statement seen in Text 4.31 that "Dutch society is hard to penetrate", and "Indonesians are less comfortable penetrating it" as indications of why it is difficult to integrate into Dutch society.

The statement "the Dutch feel that they should put their own people above or in front" corresponds to the statements of two interviewees, PW5 and CM2, about finding a job in the Netherlands. When asked if she ever felt discriminated against in the Netherlands, interviewee PW5 replied,

Text 4.33

*I work with people from many nations. They are tolerant towards each other. I do not feel any discrimination [in my work in the Netherlands]. Except in the case of people applying for a job, it is clear that they [Dutch employers] prefer Dutch people. It is clear.*¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ This is an original quote. The interviewee used English. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

¹⁷⁷ This interviewee spoke more about multiculturalism in the Netherlands and Europe in general, in the context of liberalism in the Netherlands. See Text 3.14. and Text 3.15.

¹⁷⁸ Saya di kerjaan itu banyak bangsa. Mereka itu saling toleran. Saya nggak merasa ada diskriminasi. Kecuali kalau dalam hal solisitasi itu jelas mereka lebih memilih orang Belanda. Itu jelas. Interviewed on December 1, 2019.

The phrase “it is clear” is repeated twice (overwording) to emphasize that Dutch employers prefer to hire Dutch people. When asked about his impression of Dutch society in general, interviewee CM2 replied,

Text 4.34

A: In general, they [the Dutch] are indifferent towards foreigners as long as they [the foreigners] do not bother them [the Dutch]. It is fine. But on the other side, a sense of ethnicity is still high here [in the Netherlands]. Therefore, finding a job, in my experience, is not that easy. For example, there is a choice of hiring a Dutch person or me. Maybe I am a bit smarter than the Dutch person, but they [the Dutch employers] would prefer to hire a Dutch person even though I am smarter.

Q: In your work, are you being treated differently [by the Dutch employers] or the same?

A: Just the same. There is no problem. Sometimes there is a misunderstanding. The Dutch are sometimes assertive. I am not always assertive, but I can be assertive. When I am assertive, the Dutch are often surprised [and asked], “Why are you so fierce?”

Q: Does being assertive mean someone is being direct or having an opinion?

A: Yes. Someone has an opinion. For example, [I] have an opinion that I do not like a certain thing so they [the Dutch] are [surprised]. They [the Dutch] have the idea that Asian people, especially people from Indonesia, are usually gentle, right?¹⁷⁹

The text shows a relationship between the Dutch being “indifferent towards foreigners” with the Dutch employers “prefer to hire a Dutch person” than a foreigner. The phrase “a sense of ethnicity is still high here [in the Netherlands]” corresponds

¹⁷⁹ T: Kesan anda tentang masyarakat Belanda secara umum?

J: umum sih mereka cuek lah sama orang asing asal tidak mengganggu mereka. Tidak apa-apa. Tapi di sisi lain. Rasa kesukuan nya masih tetap tinggi di sini. Jadi mencari pekerjaan itu di pengalaman saya tidak terlalu gampang. Misalnya ada pilihan ada orang Belanda sama saya. Mungkin saya agak lebih pandai dikit daripada orang Belanda, mungkin mereka lebih memilih yang Belanda walaupun saya lebih pandai.

T: Dalam pekerjaan apakah anda diperlakukan berbeda atau sama?

J: Sama saja. Tidak ada masalah. Kadang-kadang ada salah paham. Orang Belanda itu kan kadang-kadang asertif ya. Kalau saya itu tidak selalu asertif tapi bisa asertif. Pada saat saya asertif, orang Belanda itu seringkali kaget. Loh, ini kok kamu kok jadi galak.

T: Asertif itu maksudnya *direct*, punya opini?

J: Ya. Punya opini. Misalnya punya pendapat bahwa saya tidak suka suatu hal itu, jadi mereka lho. Mereka sudah punya bayangan jadi kalau orang Asia terutama orang dari Indonesia itu kan biasanya lemah lembut gitu ya. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

to the statement of interviewee AM1 (Text 4.32) that “there is a strong cultural component” that makes it difficult for non-Dutch to integrate into Dutch society. The text also implies a difference between “being Asian”, which is being “unassertive” and “gentle” with being Dutch, which is being assertive.

When asked whether it is easy to enter Dutch society, interviewee MW4, who is married to a Dutchman replied,

Text 4.35

In what way? Socially? No. I don't think it's easy. No. It's not easy. It's not easy. Maybe because we [Indonesians] live in an international community. For me, it does not matter. When [I was] younger, when [I had] not yet had children, had not yet really philosophized things, there was a kind of distance [between me and the Dutch]. They [Dutch people] would not be immediately warm and immediately accessible to you. If you are new and alone, and in [a situation] like that, it is difficult. Therefore, your friends are usually also expats, international people, and newcomers like that. Alhamdulillah, I'm easy. I can be with anybody, with newcomers or people here [in the Netherlands]. But [for] the level of a really best friend, [one] must build trust. My best friends are mostly expats, Americans, who are married to people here. [My best friends are] non-Dutch. Non-Dutch. Because Dutch people, in a certain way, are too calculating. The calculating, for me, is too rigid. I calculate my time as well but not really rigid like that. It's not easy.¹⁸⁰

The phrase “it’s not easy” is mentioned four times (overwording) to emphasize the difficulty to enter Dutch society. The phrase “maybe because we live in an international community” corresponds to the statement of interviewee AM1 (Text 4.31) that non-Dutch people live in an international community. The phrase “but [for] the level of a really best friend, [one] must build trust” corresponds to the statement of interviewee PW5 (Text 4.5) on the difficulty to be close friends with her Dutch colleagues.

¹⁸⁰ *In what way? Socially? No. I don't think it's easy. No. It's not easy. It's not easy. Mungkin karena kita juga tinggalnya internasional. For me it does not matter. Waktu muda dulu waktu belum punya anak, belum berfilsosofi banget, kayak ada distance. Mereka nggak akan immediately warm, and immediately accessible ke kamu. Kalau kamu baru, terus sendiri, ketemu kayak gitu, susah. Jadi temennya paling juga expat juga. Orang itu juga, yang international yang relate yang pendatang gitu yah. Alhamdulillahnya I'm easy. I can be with anybody. Pendatang atau orang-orang sini. Tapi the level really sahabat e, harus build trust. Sahabatku kebanyakan orang expat, orang Amerika yang married orang sini. Bukan Dutch. Non-Dutch. Soalnya Dutch in certain way yang itu, terlalu kalkulasi banget. Kalkulasinya terlalu, bagiku rigid banget. I calculate my time as well tapi nggak rigid banget gitu. It's not easy. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.*

Interviewee MW4 indicated two reasons why it is not easy to enter Dutch society. First, Dutch people “would not be immediately warm and immediately accessible” to international people. This statement corresponds to interviewee CM2’s statement (Text 4.34) about the Dutch being “indifferent towards foreigners”. Second, “Dutch people, in a certain way are too calculating”, particularly with time. This statement corresponds to the statement of interviewee NW3 (Text 4.30) about the Dutch being closed to foreigners and calculating their time.

Interviewee MW4 mentioned the verb “calculate” three times (overwording) to emphasize that the Dutch are “really rigid” in calculating their time. Several interviewees shared this opinion. They pointed to how the Dutch calculate their time, money, and food.

Besides using the verb “calculate”, six interviewees, AM2, MW1, MW6, MW7, PM2, and PW3, used the adjectives “stingy” (*gierig*), “frugal” (*zuinig*), and “modest” to describe the Dutch. When asked to compare the Dutch and Indonesians, interviewee PM2 said,

Text 4.36

*[When eating together in a restaurant] the Dutch pay for themselves. I prefer to pay for myself. That is why people call us [the Dutch and I] gierig, stingy. But the Dutch say [that they are] not stingy but zuinig, frugal. Other people call us [Dutch] stingy but we call ourselves frugal. [When we are served food and drinks], they have to be consumed. You will not be starving. Perhaps [the food and drinks] are not enough but you do not feel hungry. One pot of soup is just right [for the number of people being served]. Everything is calculated and consumed. In Indonesia, they [Indonesians] would throw half [of the food] away during a party or something. A lot of leftovers.*¹⁸¹

Interviewee PM2 differentiated the meaning of being “stingy” and “frugal”. He contrasted the Dutch, who calculate the amount of food for several people during a party, with Indonesians, who do not calculate the amount of food and end up throwing the leftover food away. The text implies that the Dutch are frugal, which means they calculate everything.

¹⁸¹ Kalau Belanda itu yang bayar sendiri-sendiri. Saya lebih baik bayar sendiri. Makannya kita dibilang *gierig*, pelit. Tapi orang Belanda bilang bukan pelit tapi *zuinig*. Hemat. Orang luar bilang kita pelit tapi kita bilangnya hemat. Makanan minuman itu harus habis. Kamu nggak akan kelaparan. *Not enough maybe yes but you don't feel hungry*. Itu sup satu panci itu persis pas. Semua sudah diatur dan abis. Coba Indonesia. *Half, they throw it away. Party* atau apa gitu sisa-sisain. Interviewed on December 1, 2019.

Interviewee AM2 indicated a relationship between the Dutch being “stingy” and the “Calvinist tradition” in the life of Dutch people. Asked how would he describe the Netherlands, he replied,

Text 4.37

Secular. I find it really, really secular except when it is related to tradition. They [the Dutch] are holding on to tradition. For example, on Saturday, and Sunday, stores are closed. It is actually based on Christian tradition, right? Sunday is the day of God. A day for God. To manage the state, [they are] very secular. There is no religion [in state-related matters]. But their [the Christian] tradition, especially Calvinist tradition, is very strong [such as the fact] that they have to save, save, save. That is why food [in the Netherlands] is constantly simple. That is why Dutch people are not champions in making a cake. Not the same as German people. The Germans, everything, the cake, the tarts, the tart, all is good. Here [in the Netherlands], [the cakes and tarts] are not [good]. For Calvinists, luxury is considered a sin. Calvinism is [the reason] why they [the Dutch] are considered stingy. Why are Dutch people stingy? Because they always feel that luxuriously spending money is a kind of sin. Experiencing worldly pleasure is a sin, sinful. Therefore, you have to strive to be, to always try to be close to God. [The Dutch] keep on living in a modest, modest, modest way. That is why they [the Dutch] are rich. Because they are constantly keeping money. Because they always think that [it is] not necessary, [it is] not necessary to spend [money]. There will be a time when [they] have to spend [money]. They [the Dutch] always think that something bad [that] will happen in the future [and they will need to spend money]. I like that. More or less I very much start to accept that and consider it as something good. Coming from Indonesia, where you know, you can easily spend blah blah blah for fun and everything.¹⁸²

¹⁸² T: Apakah Belanda itu negara sekuler atau religius atau *how would you describe it?*

J: *Secular. I find it really, really secular.* Kecuali pada saat itu menyangkut tradisi. Mereka berpegang kepada tradisi. Misalnya, hari Sabtu, hari-hari Minggu toko tutup. Nah itu sebenarnya kan berdasarkan pada tradisi Kristen kan. *Zondag is de dag van God.* Hari untuk Tuhan. Ya jadi, untuk mengelola negara, mereka tidak, sangat sekuler. Tidak ada agama. Tapi untuk tradisi mereka, apalagi tradisi Calvinis bahkan kuat sekali. Bahwa mereka harus *save, save, save*. Jadi makanannya itu sederhana terus, makannya di di orang Belanda itu nggak jago bikin kue, nggak sama dengan orang Jerman. Jerman itu kemana-mana, kuenya, tart-tartnya itu bagus-bagus semua. Karena di sini enggak. Orang Calvinis itu kemewahan itu dianggap sebagai suatu dosa. Calvinisme itu makannya mereka dianggap pelit. Orang Belanda itu kenapa pelit. Karena mereka selalu merasa *spending money in a luxury way is a kind of sin*. Merasakan kenikmatan dunia itu *sin. Sinful*. Jadi *you have to strive to be, to always try to be near God*. Hidup *modest, modest, modest* terus. Itulah mengapa mereka kaya. Karena mereka nyimpen uang terus. Karena mereka selalu berpikir bahwa, tidak perlu, tidak perlu *spending*. Akan ada masa di mana harus *spending*. *They always think about something bad will happen in the future*. Saya suka itu. Sedikit banyak saya sangat mulai menerima

Interviewee AM2 mentions the adjective “secular” three times (overwording) to emphasize that the state of the Netherlands is “very secular” in the sense that “there is no religion” in state-related matters. The noun “tradition” is mentioned four times (overwording) to emphasize that while the Dutch state is very secular, the Dutch are holding on to Christian tradition, particularly Calvinism. The adjective “Calvinist” and the noun “Calvinism” and “Calvinists” are overwording to emphasize that the Calvinist tradition is “very strong” in the Netherlands. The text indicates that Calvinism is the reason why on Saturday and Sunday stores in the Netherlands are closed, why Dutch food is simple, why the Dutch are considered stingy, why the Dutch keep on living modestly, and why the Dutch are rich.

The verb “save”, the phrases “living in a modest way”, “constantly keeping money”, and “[it is] not necessary to spend [money]” are alternative wordings to emphasize the influence of Calvinist teaching that considers spending money on luxury as “a kind of sin”. Interviewee AM2 contrasted luxury, which is considered a sin, with living modestly as a way to be close to God. At the end of the text, he also contrasted the Calvinist-influenced Dutch attitude with the Indonesian attitude of spending money “for fun and everything”. This corresponds to the comparison made by interviewee PM2 (Text 4.36) on the Dutch, who calculate and Indonesians who do not calculate. This text implies that on the state level, the Netherlands is a secular state but on the social and individual level, the Dutch society is influenced by Christian tradition, particularly Calvinism. This text corresponds to the statements of interviewees AM1 (Text 2.9) and NM1 (Text 2.12) about culturally religious people in the Netherlands including those who celebrate Christmas as a family gathering and not for its religious meaning.

When asked if it is difficult to adjust to life in the Netherlands, interviewee AM2 replied,

Text 4.38

A: Adjusting is not difficult. Well, here [in the Netherlands] everything is regulated but sometimes I am still, my weakness is that I am still late. Sometimes I am still late. That is my problem. While people here [in the Netherlands] are very on time, on time, on time. Another thing is being very Asian [in the sense of not expressing one's opinion] but I am learning to say, “Oh, I am too tired”. Directly saying what is in my heart.

Q: Is it difficult or not to enter Dutch society?

itu dan menganggapnya sebagai sesuatu yang baik gitu kan. *Coming from Indonesia where you know you can easily spend bla bla bla for for fun and everything.* Interviewed on June 13, 2016.

A: Actually, it is not. Well, that is when we [Indonesians] can speak good Dutch, fluently, without any problem. [In that case] you will be taken into the society.

Q: Do they treat us [Indonesians] differently?

A: No, no, no, no. They like us [Indonesians] because we can cook. There is another nuance [that Indonesians bring]. That is my opinion. I see, for example, for the upper-class Dutch, when we [Indonesians] are sophisticated, they [the Dutch] will accept us [Indonesians] [to enter their society]. Sophisticated means we [Indonesians] become very European, especially in speaking, especially in speaking [the Dutch language]. When we [Indonesians] speak without an accent, without grammatical mistakes, they [the Dutch] are very respectful. At that point, they [the Dutch] would [say], "Oh yes you are Dutch". At that point, their acceptance would be extraordinary and their attitude [towards us] instantly changes. They [the Dutch] are friendly but when they [the Dutch] feel, oh I still have to explain this word, or in the worst case, they have to switch to English, that is not good. They [the Dutch] will feel that there is still a gap. Ok, you [Indonesians] are not one of us. [That is] when they [the Dutch] have to switch to English [when talking to Indonesians].

Q: So they [the Dutch] prefer that we use Dutch.

A: Yes, yes, yes, very much. They [the Dutch] really like it. They [the Dutch] feel that that is the result of [our/Indonesians] hard work to be Dutch. It shows that you [Indonesians] are really trying, really want and try to be a part [of the Dutch society].¹⁸³

¹⁸³ J: Menyesuaikan sih enggak, Cuma, apa ya. *Everything is regulated* tapi saya itu masih, kadang-kadang itu masih apa ya, itu kelemahan saya, saya masih jam karet, kadang-kadang masih oya, kadang-kadang telat, *it's my own problem*. Sementara di sini orang sangat *op tijd, op tijd, op tijd*. Yang lainnya itu ya itu tadi, sangat Asia, bahwa kadang-kadang, tapi *I am learning to be, "oh I am too tired."* Langsung mengatakan apa yang ada dalam hati saya.

T: Masuk ke *Dutch society* itu sulit atau nggak?

J: *Eigenlijk niet ja. Wel*. Itu pada saat kita sudah bisa ngomong bahasa Belanda bagus, lancar, tidak ada ini, itu *you will be taken in*.

T: Dan mereka nggak perlakukan kita lain?

J: No, *Nee, nee, nee*. Mereka suka karena kita kan bisa masak, ada warna lain gitu kan. Kalau menurut saya ya. Saya lihat misalnya, untuk Belanda-Belanda kalangan atas, kalau kita *sophisticated*, mereka akan menerima. *Sophisticated* dengan kata bahwa kita sangat Eropa, terutama ngomong ya, terutama ngomong. Pada saat kita ngomong tanpa aksen, tanpa kesalahan grammatika, mereka sangat respek. Pada saat itu, o ya, *you are Dutch*. Pada saat itu akseptasi mereka luar biasa dan langsung berubah. Mereka ramah tapi pada saat mereka merasa o saya masih harus menjelaskan kata ini atau harus paling, paling buruk itu *switch to Engels*, dan itu nggak bagus. Mereka akan merasa masih ada gap. *Ok, you are not one of us*. Pada saat mereka harus *switch to English*.

T: Jadi mereka lebih suka kalau kita pakai Bahasa Belanda.

Interviewee AM2 contrasted himself, an Indonesian, who is “still late” with the Dutch, who are “very on time” (overwording). The phrase “very on time” also implies that the Dutch calculate their time well. He also indicated a difference between being “very Asian”, which is not direct, and being Dutch, which is being direct, which corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM2 (Text 4.34) about the difference between being Asian and being Dutch.

Unlike interviewees AM1, MW4, and NW3, interviewee AM2 indicated that entering Dutch society is not difficult “when we [Indonesians] can speak good Dutch”. He mentioned the adjective “sophisticated” twice (overwording) as an equivalent of “become very European” as well as “being Dutch” to emphasize that if Indonesians can speak Dutch without accent and grammatical mistakes, Dutch people would be “very respectful” [towards the Indonesians], “their acceptance would be extraordinary” and “their attitude [towards us] instantly changes” (alternative wordings). The text implies that “speaking good Dutch” (overwording) is a requirement to be accepted by the Dutch into their society.

When asked about his impression of living and working in the Netherlands, interviewee PM1 answered,

Text 4.39

On one side I cannot say yet that I have fully integrated into the Dutch culture because there are still many things to be learned about the culture and the way the Dutch people think. But I think, [on the other side], I am already on the right way to learning about how the Dutch people are more or less. I feel not like a Dutch person, but I feel that I am being recognized in the Netherlands. That is what I think is quite a difference. I still feel as an Indonesian and I respect Dutch people, like other Europeans and I feel [that I am] fully accepted here, in the sense that they [Dutch people] listen to my opinion and I listen to their opinion. Therefore, there is mutual appreciation and tolerance. [The Dutch] attitude towards us [Indonesians] is duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi (we are sitting low and standing tall together). We [the Dutch and Indonesians] have clarity of position with each other. We [the Dutch and Indonesians] are egal (equal), we have the same position before the law. Egal (equal), from French, égalité (equality), same.¹⁸⁴

J: Ya, ya ya, sangat. Mereka sangat suka. Mereka merasa bahwa itu adalah hasil dari kerja keras untuk menjadi Belanda. Itu menunjukkan bahwa you betul-betul *struggle*, betul-betul mau dan berusaha untuk menjadi bagian. Interviewed on June 13, 2016.

¹⁸⁴ Di satu sisi aku belum bisa mengatakan bahwa aku berintegrasi sepenuhnya dalam kebudayaan Belanda karena banyak juga yang masih harus dipelajari tentang budaya dan cara berpikir orang Belanda

The text states that to be fully integrated into Dutch culture, one has to learn about Dutch culture and the way Dutch people think. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee AM1 (Text 4.32) that “there is a strong cultural component” that makes it difficult for non-Dutch to integrate into Dutch society. The phrases “being recognized”, “fully accepted”, “they [Dutch people] listen to my opinion and I listen to their opinion”, “mutual appreciation” and the noun “tolerance” are overwording to emphasize the full acceptance of Dutch people to him.

The phrase “*duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi*” is an Indonesian proverb that means people are equal. The adjective “equal” (*egal*), the phrase “the same position” and the adjective “same” are overwording to emphasize the equality of the Dutch and Indonesians. The text confirms the statements of many interviewees on the fact that the Dutch respect other people.

Everything has to be very structured

Besides calling the Dutch very “calculating”, various interviewees also expressed their impression of the Dutch as “being orderly” including having “fixed schedules” and having to “make an appointment” in their life affairs. When asked whether he changed after living in the Netherlands, interviewee AM1 replied,

Text 4.40

A: Well sometimes I feel lonelier [in the Netherlands] than here in Indonesia, which I think is because of the way social relationships are set up in the Netherlands.

Q: Because people are more individualistic do you think? Or more independent?

A: Yeah. The way, I mean, everything has to be very structured. You know, when you meet people, you have to, have appointments and stuff like that. Less spontaneity in that regard. [...] They have fixed schedules. So, I mean, at least I was comparing it with my life before I came to the Netherlands, which was not very productive I guess [...]. It was a very Mediterranean kind of lifestyle, right? You just go to a café and just sit down and do nothing, no, I mean, talk and stuff, which is way more difficult to do in the Netherlands

beginitu. Cuma menurutku aku sudah di jalan yang pas itu untuk mengenal bagaimana kira-kira orang Belanda. Jadi aku merasa diriku itu bukan sebagai orang Belanda tetapi aku merasa bahwa diriku itu diakui di Belanda. Nah itu yang, yang menurut aku cukup ada bedanya. Aku sendiri tetap merasa diri sebagai orang Indonesia dan aku menghargai orang Belanda sama seperti orang-orang Eropa lainnya dan aku merasa secara penuh diterima di sini, dalam artian bahwa mereka mendengarkan opiniku dan aku mendengarkan opini mereka, begitu. Jadi ada saling, saling penghargaan ini, toleransi. Jadi orang itu walaupun sama kita, duduk sama rendah berdiri sama tinggi, Kita, kita punya, apa ya e, punya kejelasan posisi satu sama lain. Kita itu *egal*, kita itu se, se, sama posisinya di hadapan hukum. *Egal*, dari bahasa Prancis, *égalité*. Sama. Interviewed on May 12, 2016.

*because people have a specific schedule. You go to a café, yes, but you know, for an hour or something like that and then go back. I lived there [in the Netherlands] for quite a while so you do change your habit, right? So, you kind of start living with a very limited, you know, you meet people in the office and then you go back home and then, you know, it becomes really routinized. I do not know what is so different about Indonesia, but it is so different in that regard.*¹⁸⁵

The text implies a causal relationship between “the way social relationships are set up in the Netherlands” and “sometimes I feel lonelier [in the Netherlands] than here in Indonesia”. The phrases “everything has to be very structured”, “they have fixed schedules”, “people have a specific schedule” and “it becomes really routinized” are overwording to emphasize that social relationships in the Netherlands are less spontaneous. The text indicates a contrast between life in Indonesia with life in the Netherlands.

When asked whether she changed after living for six years in the Netherlands, interviewee PW2 replied,

Text 4.41

A: Oh, [I have become] far more independent. Far more independent. Now I can understand how those Dutch, not [only] the Dutch [but also] people who live here [in the Netherlands], indeed, have to think [for themselves]. Indonesian people call it individualistic because yes, we, indeed, cannot be dependent on other people. Everyone has his or her own business. Especially when I was sick, I had to be independent. I had to. My individualism came out. My life is my life. At least I take care of my family. To other people, I don't care about their business. Before that, I was still an Indonesian.

Q: Do you think the Dutch are individualistic?

A: Yes.

Q: Individualistic or independent or both?

A: For sure both because many of the families of my children's friends are single mothers, who are also working. I am amazed that they [the Dutch single mothers] have never asked for help or anything. Unlike [the Indonesian] people here [in the Netherlands] who asked, “Please help me pick up my kids. I will be a few minutes late”. People here [in the Netherlands] are used to living on a schedule. That is good. I learn a lot.

Q: And have you changed a lot?

A: Yes, yes, that is for sure. And I think people who are individualistic and

¹⁸⁵ This is an original quote. The interviewee used English. Interviewed on January 18, 2016.

independent have more positive [aspects] than negative [aspects].

Q: *Could you imagine living here in the future? Could you do it?*

A: *In fact, I feel that I could no longer live in Indonesia. If I return to Indonesia, I have to socialize and be friendly. Those things drain energy. Here [in the Netherlands], our life is more organized and more structured. In Indonesia, it is not [like that]. Time in Indonesia can be elongated. Here [in the Netherlands], everything has to be by appointment. I really enjoy [doing things by] appointment.*¹⁸⁶

Interviewee PW2 equated being “independent” (overwording) with being “individualistic” in the sense that people have to think for themselves because they cannot be dependent on other people. This corresponds to the statement of interviewee CM1 (Text 2.13) that in the Netherlands “people feel more independent [and] private”. The phrases “everyone has his or her own business” and “I don’t care about their business” are overwording to emphasize what being individualistic means. The phrases correspond to the statements of interviewee MM5 (Text 3.11) that in the Netherlands, “we have to be good at taking care of ourselves”, interviewee PW3 (Text 4.24), who said that in the Netherlands, “your life is your life” and “my life is my life”, and interviewee MW1 (Text 4.26), who said that “people live on their own” in the Netherlands.

¹⁸⁶ T: Selama tinggal di Belanda apakah ada yang berubah?

J: Oh jauh lebih mandiri. Jauh lebih mandiri. Aku sekarang bisa mengerti bagaimana orang-orang Belanda itu, e bukan orang Belanda, orang yang bertempat tinggal di sini itu memang harus berpikir. Kalau kata orang Indonesia individualistis karena ya memang kita memang tidak bisa tergantung sama orang. Semua orang punya urusannya masing-masing gitu. Terutama pas aku sakit. Itu yang membuat aku harus mandiri. Harus. Individualisku itu keluar. *My life is my life*. Minimal aku ngurusin keluargaku, orang lain *I don't care about your thing*. Soalnya sebelum itu aku masih orang Indonesia.

T: Menurut mbak orang Belanda individualis?

J: Ya.

T: Individualis atau independent atau dua-duanya.

J: Pasti dua-duanya. Karena banyak keluarganya teman-temannya anak-anak yang dia *single mom*, dia juga kerja. Tapi yang aku heran, nggak pernah dia minta tolong apa kek apa kek. Nggak seperti orang sini yang, tolong jemputin dulu ya aku terlambat berapa menit. Orang sini itu terbiasa *terschedule*. Bagusnya di situ. Jadi aku banyak belajar sih.

T: Dan Mbak jadi banyak berubah?

J: Ya, ya, pasti itu. Dan aku pikir positifnya jauh lebih banyak daripada negativenya orang individual dan orang independen itu.

T: Kalau mbak bisa membayangkan hidup di sini di masa depan, bisa nggak?

J: Justru aku merasa tidak bisa hidup lagi di Indonesia. Kalau aku balik ke Indonesia, aduh aku harus bersosialisasi yang berhaha-hihi. Itu kan bikin menguras energi. Kalau di sini kan hidup kita lebih tertata, lebih terstruktur. Kalau di Indonesia enggak. Waktu di Indonesia bisa molor-molor. Di sini apa-apa serba *afspraken*. Aduh itu aku *enjoy* banget kalau *afspraken* itu. Interviewed on June 17, 2016.

The phrase “I was still an Indonesian” implies that in Indonesia, people are dependent on other people and they care about other people’s businesses. Interviewee PW2 contrasted Dutch single mothers, who have “never asked for help” with Indonesian mothers in the Netherlands, who asked for help to pick up their children because they are late. She also contrasted living in Indonesia, where “time can be elongated” with the Netherlands, where “our life is more organized, more structured” and “everything has to be by appointment” (overwording). The text implies a correlation between being individualistic, being independent, and having a structured life.

When asked whether the Dutch are individualistic, interviewee MW4 answered,

Text 4.42

Yes and no. They [the Dutch] like to get together but they [the Dutch] are very guarded. [The Dutch consider] my time, my time, me time. They are not flexible to have a meeting like this [between you and me now], [by saying], “Oh yes, ok,” like that. They [the Dutch] are not like that. They [the Dutch] really calculate what is in it for me. [The Dutch would ask], “What’s in it for me? Is it just a meeting up, just eating out?” Or just [being carefree and saying] “I don’t care,” absent-minded, like that. They [the Dutch] are smarter [than being absent-minded]. They [the Dutch] are smarter. [The Dutch would think], “Is it time for me to go out, eat out, spend money? Haven’t I seen her or him for a long time? What is the point of me meeting her?” So, they [the Dutch] consider more. And timing. “Do I have time? Can I afford to have time [for that]?” In fact, Islamic teaching is like that. Islamic teaching is like that. [It is] about thinking, not [being] absent-minded.¹⁸⁷

This text shows that what the Dutch do in the context of thinking before doing something corresponds to Islamic teaching (mentioned twice, overwording). Interviewee MW4 indicated that the Dutch are both individualistic and not individualistic in the sense that they “like to get together” but are “not flexible”. The phrases “very guarded” and “not flexible” are overwording to emphasize that the Dutch really “consider” and “calculate” their time (overwording). The phrase “they are smarter” (mentioned twice, overwording) equates to “they [the Dutch] really calculate what is in

¹⁸⁷ *Yes and no. Mereka kebersamaan gitu suka, tapi dia guarded banget. My time, kayak my time, me time. Nggak kayak flexible, e ketemuan gini. O ya, oke deh, gitu. Dia nggak kayak gitu. Dia bener-bener calculates what’s in it for me. What’s in it for me? Is it just meeting out, just eat out? Or just, just I don’t care, absent-minded. Kayak gitu. Mereka lebih pinter. Mereka lebih pinter gitu. Is it time for me to go out, eating out, spend money? Haven’t I seen her or him for a long time? What is the point of me meeting her? So dia lebih ini, lebih dipertimbangkan. And timing. Do I have time? Can I afford to have time? Padahal Islamic teaching itu kayak gitu. Islamic teaching kayak gitu. Thinking, nggak absent-minded. Interviewed on May 17, 2016.*

it for me". This text confirms the statement of interviewee AM1 (Text 4.40) about Dutch people who are "less spontaneous" as they "have a specific schedule" for everything.

Dutch parents are on their own when they are old

The topics of Dutch orderliness, making an appointment, and the importance of time also came up when the interviewees spoke about the relationship between parents and children in the Netherlands. When asked how Dutch people raise their children, interviewee MW6 answered,

Text 4.43

Well, they [the Dutch] have orderliness. [Dutch] children are being taught and educated about being orderly whereas we [Indonesians] often do not [have orderliness], I would say. We [Indonesians] eat whenever we want. They [the Dutch] are not [like that]. There is time [to eat]. Since [Dutch people] are young, indeed, [they set] breakfast at certain hours. Breakfast is from this hour to this hour. If you [come] after those hours, you will not get breakfast. Something like that. [Dutch] lunch is bread. Only at dinner, it [the meal] is warm. [The Dutch] eat warm food [for dinner]. Whereas we [Indonesians] are more unorganized. We [Indonesians] eat whenever we want, whether we eat warm food or cold food, it is up to us. Dutch people are very organized.¹⁸⁸

The text implies that the Dutch are taught to be orderly since they are young. The noun "orderliness" and the phrases "being orderly" and "very organized" are overwording to emphasize that the Dutch are very organized. Interviewee MW6 contrasted the Dutch, who "are very organized" with Indonesians, who "are more unorganized". This text confirms the statements of interviewees AM1 (Text 4.40), AM2 (Text 4.38), MW4 (Text 4.42), and PW2 (Text 4.41) above of the difference between the Dutch, who are very organized, and Indonesians, who are unorganized and more flexible.

When asked about the relationship between parents and children in the Netherlands, interviewee MM5 replied,

¹⁸⁸ Ya mereka punya keteraturan. [Anak juga] diajar, dididik dengan keteraturan. Kalau kita malah seringkali tidak, tidak ada keteraturan kalau saya bilang. Kita makan kapanpun kita mau. Kalau mereka nggak. Ada jamnya. Itu dari kecil memang benar-bener sarapan jam segini, sarapan dari jam segini sampai jam segini. Kalau kamu lebih dari jam segitu ya kamu nggak dapat sarapan gitu istilahnya gitu. Makan siang gitu roti, hanya makan malem itu panas, makan panas. Kalau kita kan lebih nggak teratur. Kita makan kapan kita mau. Mau makan panas atau makan dingin, terserah. Orang Belanda itu sangat teratur. Interviewed on June 15, 2016.

Text 4.44

Well, it is not like in Indonesia. [Dutch] culture is indeed different. Regarding the relationship between a child and a father, when [a child] becomes an adult, indeed, independence here [in the Netherlands] is like an obligation. [A child] must be independent. With the Dutch people here, [the relationship] between a father and a child, when [the father] is already old, is not like in Indonesia. What makes me proud as an Indonesian is that parents are above everything. Here [in the Netherlands], it is not the case. When [Dutch] parents are old, they are put in a nursing home. Mostly the parents have no one to take care of them anymore. In the case of us [Indonesians], children take care of their parents. Here [in the Netherlands], it is not like that. They [Dutch parents] are on their own when they are old. Maybe because of the busy [life] of modern people because here, time is really being prioritized. Right? It is never wasted. Another difference here [in the Netherlands], is making an appointment. In Indonesia, it is not like that. You can come at any time. If there is food you can eat it, anything. There, we Indonesians win. Our hospitality is incomparable to other people. While here [in the Netherlands], children make an appointment to visit their father and mother. It is because of their busy [life]. In Indonesia, people do not consider time. [They do] as [they] like.¹⁸⁹

Interviewee MM5 pointed out the difference between Indonesia and the Netherlands regarding the relationship between parents and children. The noun “independence” and the adjective “independent” are overwording to emphasize that a Dutch child must be independent when he or she becomes an adult. The text implies a connection between “the busy life of modern people” (overwording) and “time is being prioritized”, which affect the relationship between parents and children. The noun “time” is mentioned three times to emphasize another difference between the Dutch and Indonesians. This corresponds to the statement of previous interviewees that

¹⁸⁹ Nah itu nggak kayak di Indonesia. Emang budayanya memang lain. Dalam artian itu kalau hubungan anak dan bapak itu kalau sudah dewasa memang kemandirian itu di sini kayak suatu kewajiban. Harus mandiri gitu. [...] Cuman kalau orang Belanda di sini antara Bapak dan anak, kalau sudah tua itu nggak kayak di negara di Indonesia. Bangganya saya sebagai orang Indonesia itu orang tua itu di atas segala-galanya. Kalau di sini enggak. Kalau umpamanya sudah tua terus ditempatin di tempat jompo, gitu aja. Kebanyakan orang tuanya karena udah nggak ada yang ngurus lagi. Kalau orang kita kan anak ngurus orang tua. Ya kalau di sini ndak. Sendiri-sendiri. Kalau sudah tua ya. Mungkin dari kesibukan orang-orang modern karena di sini waktu itu diutamakan betul. Ya kan? Ndak pernah disia-siakan. Bedanya lagi di sini harus janji. Ya, kalau di Indonesia kan enggak. Dateng *sak karep-karepmu, ono dipangan*. Apapun gitu, nah di situ menangnya kita orang Indonesia. *Welcomenya* itu tidak bisa dibandingkan dengan orang lain. Kalau di sini sama Bapak Ibunya anaknya aja janji. Mau datang. Karena kesibukan mereka masing-masing. Kalau di Indonesia kan nggak lihat waktu, *sak karepe*. Interviewed on June 14, 2016.

time in Indonesia “can be elongated” (Text 4.41) while in the Netherlands “everything has to be by appointment” (Text 4.40 and Text 4.41) and the Dutch “calculate” their time (Text 4.42).

Interviewee MM5’s statement that “Dutch parents are on their own when they are old” because they “have no one to take care of them anymore” corresponds to the statement of interviewee NW3 below. When asked impression of the religious life in the Netherlands, interviewee NW3 replied,

Text 4.45

What I have said previously about the fact that in [the Dutch] society there are still religious people, who try to build their network, it can be a reaction. A church or a religious community is a reaction against individualism, which is very strong here [in the Netherlands]. I feel that here [in the Netherlands], it is more difficult to build a network, therefore, if people then form a religious community, which is very close and very supportive of each other, I can understand. [...] There are quite many [people] here [in the Netherlands], who are very alone. Alone and then he or she is found [dead]. Once I read in one of the newspapers that here in the Netherlands, the number of people who are found dead after a few days or a few weeks and even a few months is increasing. It means that they are alone, or they do not have strong contact with their friends and family. Was that the reason that some parts of society [then decided to], ok, let us establish a community, that is embracing each other, and religion or spirituality becomes a common bond? I am still questioning that. Maybe it needs further or deeper study.¹⁹⁰

The noun “reaction” is repeated twice (overwording) to emphasize that “a church or a religious community is a reaction against individualism.” The adjective “alone” is mentioned three times (overwording) to emphasize that not only there are many

¹⁹⁰ Jadi yang tadi, masyarakat banyak yang e masih, relijius, yang berusaha untuk membangun *network* mereka sendiri, dan itu bisa menjadi reaksi ya. Gereja *atau religious community* itu adalah reaksi dari individualisme yang begitu kuat di sini. Aku sih merasa di sini jauh lebih sulit gitu untuk membangun *network* jadi kalau kemudian kalau orang membentuk *religious community* yang begitu dekat, begitu saling mendukung, aku bisa memahami. [...] Kan banyak juga yang di sini yang bener-bener sebatang kara istilahnya. Ya sebatang kara terus ditemukan. Pernah, aku pernah baca di salah satu koran bahwa di Belanda ini, jumlah orang yang ditemukan meninggal setelah beberapa hari atau beberapa minggu bahkan beberapa bulan itu meningkat, gitu. Jadi artinya ya mereka sebatang kara atau tidak, tidak memiliki kontak yang kuat dengan kawan dan keluarga. Apakah itu yang kemudian juga ada beberapa bagian dari masyarakat yang, ok kita bentuk komunitas yang saling merangkul dan religion atau spiritualitas itu menjadi sebuah pengikat bersama. Nah itu yang aku masih pertanyakan. Mungkin butuh studi lebih e dalam lagi ya. Interviewed on December 10, 2018.

people who are “very alone”, but there are also people who are found dead alone. She equated the adjective “alone” with people who “do not have strong contact with their friends and family”. The phrase “do not have strong contact with their friends and family” corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM5 (Text 4.44) about old people who are on their own because they have no one to take care of them.

The nouns “church”, “religion”, “spirituality” and the phrase “religious community” are overwording to emphasize that religion or spirituality becomes a common bond for people to establish a close community. The text implies that individualism in the Netherlands is “very strong”, indicated by the difficulty “to build a network” and the number of people “who are very alone”.

Another interviewee, CM2, spoke about being individualistic in the context of a relationship between parents and children.

Text 4.46

Q: Are the Dutch individualistic?

A: Yes, obviously.

Q: In what case for example?

A: Personal interest is number one. For example, I, as an Indonesian. My mother in Jakarta is sick. [My mother said], “You go home, help me go to the hospital, bla, bla, bla.” I actually have a vacation plan or something but [I said], “Fine. I will go there [to Jakarta] for a while. So, [I am] willing to sacrifice [my plan for my mother]. Young Dutch will refuse to do that. [The Dutch would say], “I already have other appointments, or I already have plans”. On the other hand, the Dutch also have a social sense, because there are also Dutch people who take care of their parents without being paid.

Q: How is the relationship between Indonesian parents and children in the Netherlands?

A: That is often a conflict. Indonesian parents are often authoritarian. They do not want to listen to their children even though their children often sacrifice a lot. [...] My brother and sister [who are living in the Netherlands] do not go to church because they [my brother and sister] say they are lazy and busy. My mother [who is living in Indonesia] is a bit angry. [She asks me], “Why don’t your brother and sister go to the church?” [I reply], “Well, I don’t know, Mother. It’s none of my business”.¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ T: Apakah orang Belanda itu individualistis?

J: Ya jelas.

T: Dalam hal apa misalnya?

Interviewee CM2 equated being individualistic as putting personal interest as the number one thing for a Dutch person. He contrasted himself with young Dutch concerning the relationship between parents and children. In contrast to the statement of interviewees MM5 (Text 4.44) and NW3 (Text 4.45), interviewee CM2 pointed out that “there are also Dutch people who take care of their parents without being paid”. The phrase “without being paid” implies that in the Netherlands, people have to pay to be taken care of in a nursing home or their house when they are old. Interviewee CM2 also pointed out that the relationship between Indonesian parents and their children in the Netherlands often leads to conflict because “Indonesian parents are often authoritarian”. This corresponds to the statements of interviewees PM2 (husband) and PW5 (wife).

Text 4.47

Q: How is the relationship between parents and children in a Dutch family?

PM2: I know that the communication is good. The communication between [Dutch] parents and children. Even though a child is small, he or she can ask, “Why Papa? Why?” The father answers, “Because”. “Why?” “Because”. “Why?” “Because”. Up to an hour of the why-because-why-because session. If that happens in Indonesia, [Indonesian parents will say to the kid], “Keep your mouth shut. Whatever I say, it is because I say so. That is it. You talk too much. Go away”. In Indonesia, it is like that.

PW5: They [Dutch parents] value the opinion of a child.

Q: Is it true that when a child is an adult and lives alone, he or she has to make an appointment to meet his or her parents?

PM2: Oh yes. It is a common thing to make an appointment like that. We [parents and children] make that appointment to make it enjoyable for us. If you have an appointment, it's equally good for both parties. I can set my time.

PW5: We [I and my husband] make an appointment with our son.

PM2: That is not something negative in my opinion. If he [my son] would come,

J: Kepentingan pribadi itu nomor satu. Misalnya kalau saya sebagai orang Indonesia, ibu saya di Jakarta sakit. Kamu pulang, bantu saya ke rumah sakit, blablabla. Saya sebenarnya ada vakantie atau ada apa ya udah nanti saya ke sanalah sebentar gitu. Jadi mau berkorban ya. Kalau yang muda, Belanda itu tidak mau ya. Lho kan saya sudah ada janji gitu loh, atau saya sudah ada rencana. Tetapi di sisi lain, orang Belanda itu juga punya rasa sosial juga sih, sebab ada juga orang Belanda yang mengurus orang tuanya tanpa dibayar.

T: Bagaimana relasi orang tua dan anak Indonesia di Belanda?

J: Itu sering konflik ya. Kalau orang Indonesia itu kan orang tuanya suka otoriter. Tidak mau mendengarkan anak padahal anaknya seringkali juga banyak berkorban. [...] Kakak dan adik saya tidak ke gereja karena katanya males dan sibuk. Ibu saya agak marah kenapa kakak dan adikmu tidak ke gereja? Ya nggak tahu ma, itu kan bukan urusan saya. Interviewed on November 10, 2019.

he may. He has the key [to our house], but whether I'm at home or not, he does not know [because we do not make an appointment].

PW5: *It's not just the Dutch [who are like that]. So do we [my husband and I].*¹⁹²

Interviewee PM2 indicated that Indonesian parents are authoritarian and Indonesian children have to obey whatever parents say, which confirms the statement of interviewee CM2 (Text 4.46). Interviewees PM2 and PW5 contrasted authoritarian-Indonesian parents with Dutch parents who “value the opinion of a child”. Both interviewees indicated that making an appointment between parents and children in the Netherlands “is a common thing”, “enjoyable”, and “not negative”, which corresponds to the statement of interviewee PW2 (Text 4.41) who really enjoy doing things by appointment in the Netherlands.

2. Analysis of discourse as discursive practice

The second dimension of CDA is the analysis of discursive practice. To look at the discursive practice, an intertextual perspective is used to explore the process of production, distribution and consumption of texts. Intertextuality is the presence of other texts in a text. According to Fairclough (1989, p. 141), interpretations “are generated through a combination of what is in the text and what is ‘in’ the interpreter, in the sense of the members’ resources (MR) which the latter brings to interpretation”. The analytic question in this section is what aspect of members’ resources are drawn upon when discourse participants speak about individualism in the Netherlands?

¹⁹² T: Bagaimana relasi orang tua dan anak di keluarga Belanda?

PM2: Saya tahunya itu komunikasi itu lho bagusnya. Komunikasi antara orangtua dan anak. Jadi anak itu biar pun kecil, *they asked like why papa, why. Kita answer, because. Why because, why because. Sampai satu jam why because why because. Coba di Indonesia. Tutup mulut lu. Pokoknya papa bilang begitu ya begitu. Udah. Banyak mulut lu. Keluar sana. Like that in Indonesia.*

PW5: Mereka menghargai pendapat anak.

T: Apa betul ketika anak telah dewasa dan tinggal sendiri, mau ketemu orang tuanya harus buat *appointment*?

PM2: O ya to. Itu kan udah *algemeen* to buat *appointment* gitu. Kita *appointment* itu kan supaya kita enak. Kalau sudah *appointment* itu kan sama-sama enaknya. Saya bisa menentukan jam saya.

PW5: Kita dengan anak itu pakai *appointment*.

PM2: Itu bukan sesuatu yang negatif menurut saya. Tapi bagi mereka datenglah, boleh. Dia punya kunci kan tapi ya apa saya di rumah kan dia nggak tahu.

PW5: Bukan hanya orang Belanda. Kita pun juga begitu. Interviewed on December 1, 2019.

Individual rights

Various interviewees referred to “individual rights” and the “freedom” everyone has in the Netherlands to choose his or her way, which is regulated and protected by “the law”. Interviewee NM1 drew upon the legal frame (intertextuality). He (Text 4.21) said,

To me, freedom of choice is [...] very crucial. [...] As I saw my Dutch friends, they have that freedom but when they decide, they have considerations. The limit is legal regulation. [...] There is freedom of choice, but there is awareness about the frame, the limit.

Other interviewees referred to the notion of equality. Interviewee PM1 (Text 4.39) said,

[...] [The Dutch] attitude towards us [Indonesians] is duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi (we are sitting low and standing tall together). We [the Dutch and Indonesians] have clarity of position with each other. We [the Dutch and Indonesians] are egal (equal), we have the same position before the law. Egal (equal), from French, égalité (equality), same.

Interviewee PM1 directly referred to the Indonesian proverb *duduk sama rendah, berdiri sama tinggi* (explicit intertextuality), which indicates an equal status between people. He equated this condition as having the same position before the law. This is an indirect reference to Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution on equal rights for all persons in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019).¹⁹³ He also directly refers to the Enlightenment ideal of *égalité*, which corresponds to the statement of interviewee MM6 (Text 2.43) on the description of modernity as the brotherhood of humankind, which also corresponds to the French idea of fraternity in the motto “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”. The notion of equality before the law is an implicit reference to liberal democracy.

Sixteen interviewees, AM1, AM2, CM2, CW2, MM1, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, MW1, MW7, NM1, PM1, PM2, PW3, and PW5, referred to the relationship between individual rights and tolerance, including religious tolerance in the Netherlands. Interviewee MW1 (Text 4.26) said,

¹⁹³ “All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted”.

Here [in the Netherlands], [people] live on their own. [...] Tolerance here [in the Netherlands] means it is up to you, it is your right. It is unlike in Indonesia, [where people] seem to be angry [and say], “Oh, that person does not have a religion. We [Indonesians] do not make friends [with that person]”.

The phrases “it is up to you” and “it is your right” are indirect references to the freedom of religion (implicit intertextuality) in the Netherlands, particularly Article 6 number 1 of the Dutch Constitution (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019).¹⁹⁴ Interviewee MW1 drew upon (implicit intertextuality) the Indonesian mental model of keeping a distance from non-religious people. It is related to the fact that the Indonesian state does not recognise atheism or agnosticism. The first of the five principles of *Pancasila*, the Indonesian state ideology, is “Belief in One Divine Lordship”. Irreligiosity and non-believing are seen as unfavourable and inimical to being Indonesian.

Interviewee MM6 also connected the notion of individual rights to freedom of religion. He (Text 4.8) said,

[...] [the Netherlands] is a free country and it respects individual rights. [...] It is a free country, and it gives space for religious diversity. [...] I saw a video of one [Indonesian Islamic] [...] media preacher, Felix Siauw [...] on YouTube. He delivered a sermon in Groningen. He said that secularism had destroyed the Netherlands so that Christianity is declining, and so on. I do not think so.

The phrases “it is a free country and it respects individual rights” and “it gives space for religious diversity” are again indirect references (intertextuality) to the Dutch Constitution, especially Article 1 regarding equal rights for all persons in the Netherlands, Article 10 number 1 regarding respect for privacy, and Article 6 number 1 regarding freedom of religion (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019). Interviewee MM6 also referred to the statement of Felix Siauw (explicit intertextuality), which he disagreed with, about secularism that “had destroyed the Netherlands”.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ “Everyone shall have the right to profess freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community with others, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law”.

¹⁹⁵ I found two YouTube videos of Felix Siauw’s sermons. Nevertheless, both of them do not exactly match the interviewee’s description. The first video was taken in 2014 in Groningen. However, in the sermon, there is no mention of secularism destroying the Netherlands (DeGromiest, 2014). In the second video, Felix Siauw spoke about secularism but he did not say that secularism destroyed the Netherlands. He stated that because of secularism, in the sense of the separation of religion and state, Europe experienced a revival, and, through colonialism, Europe brought secularism to the Islamic world. While Europe experienced a revival, the Islamic world experienced a downturn because the Muslims left the religion (TAKWA ID, 2019; 1:55–2:09; 2:44–3:04; translation by the

Islam

Two Muslim interviewees, MM6 and MW4, referred to Islam. Interviewee MM6 drew upon “an Islamic concept”, “the Quran” and “the prophet Muhammad” (explicit intertextuality) when speaking about individual rights, secularism, and freedom of religion. He (Text 4.8) said,

In my opinion, it is an Islamic concept. In my view, Islam is precisely that because the prophet Muhammad never forced to force people to convert to Islam. [...] It is clear that there is no compulsion in practicing religion according to the Quran. I think it [the Quran] also gives space to other groups to choose, for example, not to be religious. That is a choice. It is up to you.

The phrase “it is up to you” is an indirect reference to Surah Al-Kafirun 109: 6: “Unto you your religion, and into me my religion”, which is popular among liberal Indonesian Muslims (Vos, 2017, p. 61). The phrase “Islam is precisely that” indicates a similar concept of individual freedom in secular and Islamic thought, based on the Quran. It gives space to non-religious individuals not to be religious.

Interviewee MW4 referred to Islamic teaching (explicit intertextuality) when she spoke about how the Dutch calculate their time and consider the purpose of doing something as a contrast to the Indonesian way of being “flexible” with time and “absent-minded” when doing something. She said (Text 4.42),

[The Dutch consider] my time [...]. They are not flexible to have a meeting like this [between you and me now] [...] They [the Dutch] really calculate what is in it for me. [...] they [the Dutch] consider more. [...] In fact, Islamic teaching is like that. [...] [It is] about thinking, not [being] absent-minded.

Dutch culture

Various interviewees referred to “Dutch culture” and “Dutch expressions”. Four interviewees, AM1, MW4, NW3, and PW5, spoke about the difficulty to enter Dutch society and becoming close friends with the Dutch due to the individualistic notions in the Dutch culture. Two interviewees, AM1 and NW3, drew upon the difference between society in America, in which it is “easier to be friends and to open a network” and the Netherlands, which is “really closed” and “very difficult to penetrate”. Interviewee AM1 (Text 4.32) said,

author). The statements in the second video slightly correspond to the statement of interviewee MM6. However, the video was uploaded in 2019 while I interviewed MM6 in 2018.

[...] the problem with Dutch society is that because they have been monocultural for a long time, their transition to multiculturalism was [...] there is something about it, which is very thin. [...] if you are an immigrant to the United States, you become an American, whereas if you go to the Netherlands, you do not become Dutch, because Dutch is a very loaded historical term, specific with race, with culture, [...] you don't see that much in the context of the US, where there are a lot of non-Americans who become Americans, [...] become Americanized. They become [...] university presidents and stuff like that [...] so the culture of the Netherlands definitely has a role to it.

Interviewee AM1 drew upon the notion of “monocultural” and “the transition to multiculturalism”, which are references (implicit intertextuality) to the Dutch debates on immigration and integration in the Netherlands. He also referred to “a strong cultural component” that is related to the notion of race, in which the Dutch “feel that they should put their own people above or in front”. This perception is shared by two interviewees, PW5 (Text 4.33) and CM2 (Text 4.34), who drew upon the notion of “ethnicity”, in which Dutch employees “prefer Dutch people” to foreigners to be hired. The three interviewees (AM1, CM2, and PW5) specifically referred to the case of foreigners applying for a job. Interviewee PW5 (Text 4.33) said,

I do not feel any discrimination [in my work in the Netherlands]. Except in the case of people applying for a job, it is clear that they [Dutch employers] prefer Dutch people.

The statements of interviewees PW5, as well as interviewees AM1 and CM2 on job opportunities for foreigners, contradict the statements of most interviewees about equality and discrimination in the Netherlands.

Interviewee MW7 (Text 4.4) referred to the differences between people in big cities such as “Amsterdam, Leiden, Rotterdam, and Den Haag”, who are “more individualistic” and people in the South or villages, who are “more friendly”. She also referred to the coming of “refugees” “in the last five years” that make Dutch people in the village “more sceptical towards foreigners” and “more careful to prevent their village from being full of foreigners”, “especially people with brown and black skin color”. She drew upon the influx of refugees (explicit intertextuality) to the Netherlands as part of the European migrant crisis, especially in the year 2015 when many people came to Europe to request asylum. CBS reported that in 2019, the total number of asylum seekers and following relatives has been in decline since 2015 (CBS, 2020).

Four interviewees, MM5, MW1, MW2, and PW3, referred to the Dutch expressions “*eigen schuld, dikke bult*” (own fault), “*bemoeien*” (interfere), and “*polder model*”. Interviewee MW1 (Text 4.6) said,

They [Indonesian family] asked, “Why don’t [the children] pray?” I said, “Let them [my children] be if they do not want to do it.” [...] my children complained, “Why did aunt interfere [my business]?” Bemoeien. Here [in the Netherlands], it [interfering] is unusual. Another family is not allowed to interfere [other people’s business] but in the case of our children, Indonesian people [unfinished sentence]. I said [to my children], “They [Indonesian family] have good intentions.

The word *bemoeien* refers to what Dutch people would not do in social interactions. It is an indirect reference (implicit intertextuality) to the Dutch Constitution Article 10 number 1 which reads “Everyone shall have the right to respect for his privacy” (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019). Interviewee MW1 also referred to the Indonesian mental model of asking about one’s religious practice, which, according to her, comes with good intentions.

Interviewee PW3 said (Text 4.14),

[...] Everything is allowed because you alone are the one who decides. [...] if [you] would like to smoke marijuana, to take drugs, go ahead, but you are on your own. If later something happens to you, it is your fault. They [the Dutch] have a saying, eigen schuld, dikke bult. If you make a mistake, you are the one who pays [for the consequence]. [...] they [the Dutch] are used to that.

The expression *eigen schuld, dikke bult* refers to the Dutch mental model of self-awareness and self-responsibility as a part of having individual freedom (intertextuality).

Interviewee AM2 identified the Dutch as being “too tolerant” and “very diplomatic” to avoid conflict by referring to the Dutch “*polder model*” (explicit intertextuality). He (Text 4.29) said,

Polder model. Yes, the polder model. You always have to talk about everything, everything, everything. Talk, talk, talk.

The Dutch noun “*polder*” is a mental map (Fairclough, 1992, p. 82). The word refers to the land created through building dikes and windmills to drain land and control water flow. The Dutch verb *polderen* means solving problems by using dialogue. The

term “*polder model*” refers to a decision-making model that can be time-consuming because every party has an equal say.

Christian tradition

Two interviewees, AM2 and MW4, referred to Christian tradition when speaking about the characteristic of Dutch people and social life in the Netherlands. Asked if the Netherlands is a secular or a religious state, interviewee AM2 (Text 4.37) answered,

To manage the state, [they are] very secular. There is no religion [in state-related matters]. But their [the Christian] tradition, especially Calvinist tradition, is very strong [such as the fact] that they have to save, save, save.

Interviewee AM2 (Text 4.37) first referred to “Christian tradition” (explicit intertextuality) in explaining why Saturday and Sunday stores are closed in the Netherlands. He then specified his reference to “Calvinist tradition” (explicit intertextuality) to explain why Dutch food is simple, why the Dutch are stingy, why they live modestly, and why they are rich. He drew upon the idea of Calvinist tradition as a way of life for the Dutch, that is no longer tied to religious belief. His statements on “Christian tradition” and “Calvinist tradition” are direct references to Calvinism as a value system.

Interviewee MW4 referred to “Jesus” (explicit intertextuality) when she spoke about social life in the Netherlands. She said (Text 4.12),

But for the concept of social life, you [do] good to others, you know, from Jesus, you do not do what [you do not want] others to do to you. That is very ingrained here [in the Netherlands]. Very ingrained here. You will not do bad [things] to other people because you do not want other people to do bad [things] to you. [...] At a workplace, at school, in society, that is really, [I can] feel [it]. Our people [Indonesians] see it as oh, very individualistic. No, it is not.

She drew upon both the text of Matthew, which says, “So whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets” (*Matthew 7:12 (English Standard Version)*, 2016), and the text of Luke, which says, “And as you wish that others would do to you, do so to them” (*Luke 6:31, (English Standard Version)*, 2016). Interviewee MW4 equated the reference with treating each other well, including not bothering each other, as a concept of social life in the Netherlands.

Being Dutch versus being Indonesian

Several interviewees drew upon the notion of “being Dutch” and compared it to the notion of “being Indonesian”. They spoke of the Dutch as being organised, punctual, assertive, direct, and not interfering in other people’s business, and compared them to Indonesians who are unorganised, flexible, gentle, friendly, not direct, unassertive, not punctual, and like to interfere in other people’s business. Interviewee PW3 (Text 4.7) said,

[...] I heard that Dutch families are independent, they will never interfere in the life of their children after they are married, but my reality is different. In my reality, the parents [of my husband] are still very much involved in all matters. [...] my [Indonesian] parents seem to be very Dutch whereas the parents of my partner are [...] more Asian? I mean, they [my husband’s parents] must, must, must know everything.

Interviewee PW3 referred to being Dutch in the sense that parents will not interfere in their children’s lives and being Asian in the sense that parents will interfere in their children’s life. Interviewee PW3, however, had the opposite experience.

Interviewee CM2 (Text 4.34) drew upon the notion that Asian people, in this case, Indonesians, are gentle, and the Dutch are assertive. This reference is also shared by other interviewees.

Interviewee PW2 (Text 4.41) first referred to the Indonesian understanding of “individualistic” as being independent in taking care of their own business and not caring about other people’s business. Her statement “Before that [coming to the Netherlands] I was still an Indonesian” refers to the Indonesian nature of being dependent on other people and caring about other people’s business. She also drew upon the pattern of life in the Netherlands, which is independent, punctual, based on schedule, and organized. She contrasted them with Indonesia, which is communal, unorganized, and where time can be elongated.

While speaking about the relationship between parents and children in the Netherlands, eight interviewees, CW2, MM5, MM6, MW4, MW7, PM2, PW3, and PW5, drew upon the Indonesian model of childcare. They indicated that Dutch parents “value the opinion of a child” while Indonesian parents are “often authoritarian”. Interviewee MM5 (Text 4.44) referred to “Dutch culture”, which is different from Indonesian culture.

When [Dutch] parents are old, they are put in a nursing home. Mostly the parents have no one to take care of them anymore. In the case of us [Indonesians], children take care of their parents. Here [in the Netherlands], it is not like that.

He drew upon the Dutch concept of elderly care (intertextuality). He also referred to the notion of “the busy life of modern people”, where time is “really being prioritized”. He contrasted it with Indonesia, where people “do not consider time”.

When asked whether he thinks the Dutch are individualistic, interviewee MM3 (Text 4.13) replied,

A: No. Individualistic in terms of [religious] ritual practice, yes.

Q: In social life?

A: No, I don't think so. [...] We [Indonesians], in the past, did gotong-royong, because we were colonized. We lived in adversity thus we needed solidarity, otherwise, we would not survive. [...] They [the notions of gotong-royong] are still important here [in Indonesia] but they [the notions of gotong-royong] cannot be used to judge Western people as being individualistic because the West has established its system. Poor people [in the West] are taken care of by the government. Does it then mean [that people in the West are] individualistic? No.

Interviewee MM3 first referred to the notion of religion as a private matter in the Netherlands. He then referred drew upon the Indonesian term *gotong-royong* (explicit intertextuality) as a “colonial value” that is used by Indonesian people as a measurement of individualism. He also referred to how the government in Indonesia and the West deal with poor people. He rejected the Indonesian view that Dutch society is individualistic by referring to the social security “system” of the Dutch government.

Seven interviewees, MM1, MM2, MM4, MM6, MW4, MW7, and PW3, referred to the notion of individual freedom regarding the choice to practice religion in the Netherlands and compared it to Indonesia, where practicing religion comes with social pressure. When asked whether her Dutch husband goes to the church, interviewee PW3 (Text 4.16) replied,

He does, but for them [the Dutch] it is more occasionally, so it is not an obligation, whereas, for us [Indonesians], worship is an obligation. For them [the Dutch] it is more like, when I want to go, I go.

The phrase “it is not an obligation” is a reference to the social norm in the Netherlands regarding religion. The phrase “worship is an obligation” is a reference to the social norm in Indonesia regarding religious practice.

Like interviewee PW3, interviewee MM4 (Text 4.18) drew upon the social norm of practicing religion in the Netherlands and Indonesia. He said,

Practicing religion, for people in the Netherlands, really shows that it comes from an individual's intention, not because of social pressure. In Indonesia, [...] we sometimes consider between our social needs and practicing religion but in the Netherlands, there is nothing like that.

3. Analysis of discourse as social practice

4

The analysis of discourse as social practice or the explanation stage focuses on the social conditions and effects of discourse. There are three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse: “social identity” or “subject position” (identity), “social relationships” (relational), and “systems of knowledge and belief” (ideational) (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 64–65). In this part, the focus is on how interviewees position themselves and have been positioned by others, and if there is any reproduction or transformation in their discourse practice. The analytic questions in this stage are: What are the social conditions and effects of what discourse participants say about individualism in the Netherlands? Is there any reproduction or transformation in their discourse practice? How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves?

It is a free country, and it respects individual rights

Several interviewees reproduced the discourse of individualism in the Netherlands by identifying the importance of freedom of choice with the law as the limit (ideational). They positioned the Dutch state as an institution that gives freedom to individuals in the Netherlands including themselves (relational). When asked whether he changed after living in the Netherlands, interviewee NM1 (Text 4.21) replied,

[...] To me, freedom of choice is something very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very crucial. [...] The limit is legal regulation. The main thing is that I do not violate the law [...].

When asked his impression of the Netherlands, interviewee MM6 replied,

[...] they [the Dutch] respect [other people]. [The Dutch] do not mind other people's business. They [the Dutch] tend to let things be as long as they do not interfere with the public order.

Both interviewees NM1 and MM6 reproduced the idea of having individual freedom and the importance of law (ideational). They positioned the Dutch state and Dutch people to be respectful to individuals living in the Netherlands (relational). When asked his impression of living and working in the Netherlands, interviewee PM1 (Text 4.39) answered,

[...] I feel [that I am] fully accepted here [...] We [the Dutch and Indonesians] have clarity of position with each other. We [the Dutch and Indonesians] are equal (equal), we have the same position before the law.

Interviewee PM1 positioned the Dutch to be equal to him (relational) before the law (ideational). Equality, as well as individual freedom and rights, are elements of liberal democracy.

When he found out that access to mosques and Islamic communities “are enormous” in the Netherlands, interviewee MM6 (Text 4.8) transformed his perception of the Netherlands (ideational). He reproduced the discourse of the Netherlands as “a free country” by rejecting Felix Siauw’s sermon on secularism (ideational). When asked his impression of the Netherlands, MM6 (Text 4.8) replied,

[...] It is a free country, and it respects individual rights. [...] it gives space for religious diversity. For me, that is extraordinarily good. [...] He [Felix Siauw] said that secularism had destroyed the Netherlands so that Christianity is declining [...]. I do not think so, in fact, it [secularism] provides space for religion to develop more, including religions that are outside of the mainstream religion in the Netherlands, including people who choose not to have a religion or are agnostic. They are respected. In my opinion, it is an Islamic concept. [...] Islam is precisely that because the prophet Muhammad was never forced to force people to convert to Islam. [...] I think it [the Quran] also gives space to other groups to choose, for example, not to be religious. That is a choice.

Interviewee MM6 transformed Felix Siauw’s statement about secularism (ideational). He also reproduced the Islamic concept (ideational) that is in line with the notion of giving freedom to other groups to practice religion and choose not to be religious.

Practicing religion comes from an individual's intention

Several interviewees pointed out the relationship between individuality and religious tolerance. They positioned the Dutch and Dutch society to be different from Indonesians in the context of practicing religion and religious tolerance. When asked whether her Dutch husband goes to the church, interviewee PW3 (Text 4.16) replied,

He does, but for them [the Dutch] it is more occasionally, so it is not an obligation, whereas, for us [Indonesians], worship is an obligation. For them [the Dutch] it is more like, when I want to go, I go.

When asked to compare tolerance in the Netherlands and Indonesia, interviewee MM4 (Text 4.18) answered,

[...] The Netherlands is far more tolerant. [...] Indonesia has not yet reached that level. [...] Practicing religion, for people in the Netherlands, really shows that it comes from an individual's intention, not because of social pressure. In Indonesia, sometimes [when] all our neighbors pray while we do not, [we] will certainly feel awkward [...] in the Netherlands, there is nothing like that.

Both interviewees PW3 and MM4 reproduced the social norm of individual freedom in practicing religion in the Netherlands by comparing it to the social norm of practicing religion in Indonesia (ideational). Both interviewees also positioned the Dutch as more tolerant than Indonesians. When asked to compare tolerance in the Netherlands and Indonesia, interviewee PW3 (Text 4.24) replied,

Here [in the Netherlands] there is more religious [tolerance] because they [the Dutch] do not care. Your life is your life. My life is my life. There [in Indonesia], your life is my life. My life is my life. [...] That person wants to interfere in other people's business, but he does not allow people to interfere in his business.

Interviewee PW3 emphasized the individualistic notion that contributes to religious tolerance in the Netherlands (ideational) while comparing it to Indonesians' attitude toward interfering in other people's business.

When asked his opinion on tolerance in the Netherlands, interviewee CM2 (Text 4.27) replied,

[...] The Dutch, who are not religious, like to make fun of religious people. So, tolerance is a bit lacking. They [the Dutch] are tolerant in the sense that they

say, "It is up to you to believe [in a certain religion] but that is nonsense to me". So, there is also an element of harassment. Harassment against religious people. [...] [For the Dutch], the Muslims are not as advanced as the Christians. If a person is a Christian, his or her mind should be open, which means, he or she should leave religion. With the Muslims, what can they [the Dutch] do? They [the Muslims] come from a backward culture.

While reproducing the notion of individual freedom, interviewee CM2 transformed the discourse of religious tolerance by pointing out the element of harassment against religious people in the Netherlands (ideational). He positioned some non-religious Dutch as "a bit" less tolerant towards religious people. He also identified different attitudes of non-religious Dutch towards the Muslims and the Christians (relational).

We cannot be dependent on other people

Several interviewees reproduced the discourse of individualism in the sense that Dutch people are independent, live on their own, and are very organised. When asked whether she changed after living for six years in the Netherlands, interviewee PW2 (Text 4.41) replied,

[...] people who live here [in the Netherlands], [...] have to think [for themselves]. Indonesian people call it individualistic [...] we [...] cannot be dependent on other people. Everyone has his or her own business. [...] I had to be independent. [...] My individualism came out. My life is my life. [...] Before that, I was still an Indonesian. I think people who are individualistic and independent have more positive [aspects] than negative [aspects].

Interviewee PW2 associated the notion of individualism with independence. She identified the Dutch as independent people who think for themselves and do not care about what others think about them. She reproduced the discourse of individualism by stating that her individualism "came out" (ideational).

When asked about the relationship between parents and children in the Netherlands, interviewee MM5 (Text 4.44) replied,

[...] When [a child] becomes an adult, indeed, independence here [in the Netherlands] is like an obligation. [A child] must be independent. [...] When [Dutch] parents are old, they are put in a nursing home. Mostly the parents have no one to take care of them anymore. [...] They [Dutch parents] are on

their own when they are old. Maybe because of the busy [life] of modern people because here, time is really being prioritized. [...] It is never wasted. [...] [in the Netherlands], children make an appointment to visit their father and mother. It is because of their busy [life].

Interviewee MM5 associated the notion of individualism with independence and the busy life of modern people (ideational). He and several interviewees reproduced the discourse of Dutch people for being very organised (ideational). When asked whether he changed after living in the Netherlands, interviewee AM1 (Text 4.40) replied,

[...] Sometimes I feel lonelier [in the Netherlands] than [...] in Indonesia, which I think is because of the way social relationships are set up in the Netherlands. [...] everything has to be very structured. [...] have appointments and stuff like that. Less spontaneity in that regard. [...] They have fixed schedules.

Interviewee AM1 reproduced the notion of social relationships in the Netherlands (ideational) that made him feel lonely. He positioned the Dutch way of social relationships to be different from that of the Indonesian.

Several interviewees attributed the difficulty of entering Dutch society to the notion of social relationships in the Netherlands (ideational). Interviewee MW4 (Text 4.35) indicated difficulty entering Dutch society and being best friends with Dutch people (relational) because the Dutch are “too calculating” with their time (ideational). She positioned the Dutch as slightly different from her (identity) by stating that she also calculates her time but is not as rigid as the Dutch.

Interviewee NW3 (Text 4.45) reproduced the individualistic notions of social relationships in the Netherlands by stating that there are “many people who are very alone” and “do not have strong contact with their friends and family” (relational). She also stated that “a church or a religious community is a reaction against individualism, which is very strong in the Netherlands” (ideational).

Indonesians see it as individualistic. No, it is not.

Two interviewees, MM3 and MW4, distinguished themselves from other Indonesians (identity) by identifying the Dutch as not individualistic (ideational). Interviewee MM3 (Text 4.13) reproduced the individualistic notion in religious ritual practice by indicating that practicing religion in the Netherlands is an individual choice (ideational). He then transformed the idea of being individualistic, which is perceived by Indonesian people as equal to being selfish (ideational). He indicated

that being individualistic in Indonesian perception is the opposite of having mutual assistance (*gotong royong*). He positioned himself (micro-level) differently from Indonesians (identity) who called the Dutch individualistic by pointing out that the Indonesian understanding of what is meant to be individualistic cannot be used to judge Western people (macro-level).

Interviewee MM3 transformed the discourse of Dutch society being an individualized society (macro-level) by referring to how the Dutch government deals with poor people (ideational) through the social security “system”. He (Text 4.13) said,

The West has established its system. Poor people [in the West] are taken care of by the government. Does it then mean [that people in the West are] individualistic? No.

Another interviewee, MW4 (Text 4.12), said,

But for the concept of social life, you [do] good to others, you know, from Jesus, you do not do what [you do not want] others to do to you. That is very ingrained here [in the Netherlands]. [...] At a workplace, at school, in society, that is really, [I can] feel [it]. Our people [Indonesians] see it as oh, very individualistic. No, it is not.

Interviewee MW4 reproduced the notion of not bothering each other in Dutch social life by referring to the Christian teaching “Do to others as you would like them to do to you” (ideational). Similar to interviewee MM3 (Text 4.13), she also indicated that for Indonesians, being individualistic is equal to being selfish. She implied that when people do not bother each other, it does not mean they are being selfish. She positioned herself differently from Indonesian people (identity), who viewed Dutch society as individualistic.

Conclusion

Interviewees identified individualistic notions as elements of modernity in the sense that (1) people do not bother each other, (2) they [the Dutch] do what they want, (3) there is freedom of choice and the limit is law regulation, and (4) everything is calculated. In their discourse, being individualistic equals being independent, organised, and private.

At the micro-level interviewees labelled the Dutch as individualistic in the sense that the Dutch have the freedom to choose what they want to do, including being religious or not. They also spoke of the Dutch as independent, organised, punctual, assertive, and direct. They positioned the Dutch to be different from them. Indonesians are unorganised, depend on other people, flexible, gentle, friendly, indirect, unassertive and not punctual. In the context of religion, for the Dutch, worship is a choice and an individual intention whereas, for Indonesians, worship is an obligation as there is social pressure to do so. Moreover, Dutch parents cannot force their children to be religious or not. Dutch parents value the opinion of their children.

Interviewees also labelled Dutch people “indifferent” in the sense that Dutch people do not interfere in other people’s business. For some interviewees, being indifferent equals being tolerant, in the way that people respect each other. Interviewees positioned the Dutch and Dutch society as tolerant and respectful towards them. One interviewee, however, refused to call Dutch people tolerant, because, for him, being indifferent is not the same as being tolerant. For the interviewee, tolerance requires “an effort to understand other people who are different from us”.

At the meso-level, several interviewees spoke, on the one hand, about Dutch society as an open society, and on the other hand, about the difficulty for foreigners to be immersed in Dutch society. Two interviewees referred to debates on multiculturalism in the Netherlands and the influx of refugees that make Dutch people sceptical about foreigners. Three interviewees referred to the Dutch preference to hire Dutch people instead of non-Dutch for a job. Other interviewees referred to the way social relationships in the Netherlands are set up by fixed schedules. Interviewees positioned the Dutch way of social relationships as different from that of the Indonesian. One interviewee referred to the Calvinist tradition that influences the Dutch way of life, such as being frugal, calculating, and orderly, which makes the Netherlands a rich country. Another interviewee referred to Christian teaching on respect and treating each other well as something very ingrained as a concept of social life in the Netherlands.

Several interviewees spoke of the notion of individuality as selfish behaviour. They referred to social inequality in Indonesia where people must not be selfish and help others, especially the poor. In a welfare state like the Netherlands, "poor people are taken care of by the government". In this case, the Dutch are not individualistic in the context of helping others. Additionally, one interviewee implied that the Dutch are not individualistic (selfish) as they take care of nature by managing the trash and caring for the animals and trees.

At the macro-level, interviewees spoke about the role of the government and Dutch law, which is similar to their discourse about secularization and liberalism. They indirectly referred to liberal democracy. They positioned the Dutch state as an institution that gives freedom to individuals in the Netherlands including themselves. They implicitly referred to the Dutch law that protects and regulates individual rights and freedom. They also spoke about how the Dutch government takes care of poor citizens, which is not the case for the Indonesian government. In this case, they positioned the Dutch state differently from the Indonesian state. Similar to the previous two chapters, interviewees drew upon Indonesia as a mental model. Interviewees stated that they feel "respected" and "accepted" by the Dutch and "equal" to the Dutch in the sense that everyone "has the same position before the law".

From the Indonesian perspective, individualistic notions, together with the notions of secularity and liberal values, are integral parts of modernity which recognise and protect individual freedom and rights and give space for religious diversity. A modern person is both free and responsible for his or her actions. Interviewees reproduced individualistic notions of social relationships in the Netherlands as part of a busy, modern life. They also indicated that living an independent, organized, free, and individualistic life contributes to insecurity, loneliness, and difficulty building a network. One interviewee pointed out that the establishment of a church or a religious community could be a reaction against individualism in the Netherlands because many people, especially the elderly, live alone and do not have close contact with their friends and family.



CHAPTER V

Conclusions

As mentioned in the introduction, this research aims to acquire further insight into the relationship between religion and modernity (internal objective) and to contribute to the theories of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants from a post-colonial perspective (external objective). The main question in this study is: Does the notion of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants need a revision? The sub-questions are: (a) How do Indonesian immigrants speak about religion and modernity? (b) What mental models do they draw upon? and (c) How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves?

In this research, Indonesia and Indonesian immigrants, the fourth largest immigrant community in the Netherlands, serve as mirrors to study and reflect on religion and modernity in Dutch society. To a large extent, interviewees' perceptions of religion, modernity, and the West reflect the influence of Dutch colonial modernization projects in Indonesia, particularly on the relationship between religion and state and its development during the process of modernization in Indonesia. Eisenstadt's "multiple modernities" approach contends that when the programs of European modernity, based on the Enlightenment, spread out to non-European civilizations, they were adopted selectively and transformed culturally within the specific contexts of other civilizations (Eisenstadt, 2000). The encounter of Dutch colonial modernization projects with Indonesian society brought a transformation of economic, political, religious, and cultural life, and continual innovation at both institutional and societal levels. The relationships between religion and state in Indonesia, and its influence on Indonesians' daily life, reflected in my interviewees' statements, are the legacy of the encounter of Dutch colonial modernization projects with Indonesian society.

As seen in Chapters II, III, and IV, the experience of living in Indonesia, including their memory and knowledge of the current Indonesian society, play a major part in the interviewees' perspectives of the Netherlands and Dutch society. All interviewees, including the atheists, received religious education at home and school. Some referred to or mentioned religious teaching and values when talking about modern life in the Netherlands. Such views are closely connected with their experiences of modernity both in Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The Indonesian immigrants' experiences are what Fairclough called "members' resources". When discourse participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk, they draw on members' resources. According to Fairclough, there are "specifically 'sociocognitive' dimensions of text production and interpretation, which centre upon the interplay between the members' resources

which discourse participants have internalized and brought with them to text processing, and the text itself, as a set of ‘traces’ of the production process, or a set of ‘cues’ for the interpretation process” (1992, p. 80). The interviewees’ “members’ resources” explain the background of interviewees’ perceptions of religion, religiosity, and modernity. In Fairclough’s terms, the members’ resources in interviewees’ discursive practice (interpretive stage) mediate their spoken “text” or linguistic practice dimension (description stage) and the social practice dimension (explanation stage).

To elaborate, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part concerns the relationship between religion and modernity (empirical level), which is a further discussion of the research’s sub-questions. The second part deals with the main research question. It concerns the contribution of this study to the theories of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants (theoretical level). The third part concerns the implications of the study on the Netherlands-Indonesia Dialogue.

1. Religion and Modernity: A Reproduction and Transformation of Discourse

5

This part answers the sub-questions of the study: (a) How do Indonesian immigrants speak about religion and modernity? (b) What mental models do they draw upon? and (c) How do they position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves? I will elaborate on them below.

How do Indonesian immigrants speak about religion and modernity?

Through Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework of critical discourse analysis, it was discovered that Indonesian immigrants’ discourse of religion and modernity in the Netherlands pointed to a legal dimension. Interviewees did not speak directly about the terms “modern” and “modernity” in their relation to religion but about issues commonly related to them, namely secularization, liberal values, individualism, rationality, freedom, and tolerance. They repeatedly spoke about or referred to the role of the state and the implementation of the law as core ideas in a modern state. Modernity in the Netherlands, for Indonesian immigrants, is about freedom of choice within legal limits guaranteed by the state. From their perspective, this is extraordinary as this is not what they know from Indonesia (members’ resources).

The Netherlands and the Dutch are secular in the sense that there is a separation between religion and state (macro-level of discourse), and many Dutch people “do not need religion”, “do not believe in God”, and “do not go to church” (micro-level of discourse). Being secular also means there is freedom of religion. Both religious and non-religious people are recognized and protected by law. Various interviewees indicated a difference between the private sphere and the public sphere when speaking about religion. Two interviewees stated that in the public sphere, people are “not free” to speak about religion.

In their discourse, interviewees did not speak specifically about institutional religions but about the Dutch’s religiosity, spirituality, and religious values. On the one hand, they called the Dutch state “very secular” and “very liberal”, on the other hand, they described the Dutch as spiritual and adhering to religious values, which are embedded in Dutch “institutions”, “policies” (meso and macro-level of discourse), and “attitude” (micro-level of discourse). Muslim interviewees described the Dutch as adhering to “universal” and “Islamic” values. Three of them stated that the Netherlands is “more Islamic” than Indonesia and other Muslim countries. For Muslim interviewees, security, tolerance, freedom, respect, justice, no discrimination, no corruption, caring about poor people, caring about the environment, being punctual, and keeping things clean are Islamic values, which are manifested in the Netherlands.

According to the interviewees, there are at least two categories of religious people in modern Dutch society. They are “spiritually religious” people (people who believe in God and have traditional religious values and views), and “culturally religious” people (people who go to church once a year and people who celebrate Christmas with family). Indonesian immigrants also identified a sub-category of being “religious”, which is attributed to people who practice religious values in their daily life, although they “do not believe in God” or “do not have a religion”. Several interviewees distinguished “spirituality” from “religiosity”. One of them equated spirituality with *zingeving* (giving meaning) which he claimed is “not the same as religion”.

The Netherlands and the Dutch are liberal in the sense that “very controversial matters” such as drugs, prostitution, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, cohabitation, and abortion, are allowed and legalized. The Dutch government plays an important role in controlling them. The usage of the term “liberal” implies that the Netherlands is adhering to secular law because issues that are not in accordance with religious laws are permitted by Dutch law. In the Netherlands, state law is above religion. Dutch liberalism contains an individualistic notion and individual freedom. Nevertheless, freedom is not unlimited because there are rules to be obeyed.

Interviewees identified individualistic notions as elements of modernity in the Netherlands in the sense that “people do not bother each other” and they have the individual freedom to decide what they would like to do concerning whom to live with or to marry, to consume drugs, to have an abortion, and to have euthanasia (freedom of choice); to practice and not to practice religion (religious freedom); and to live as a lesbian, a gay, a bisexual, a transgender, and to have the same-sex marriage (sexual freedom). They described the Dutch as individualistic, independent, private, and very organised people. The Dutch law protects individual rights and freedom, and everyone is equal before the law. A modern individual is both free and responsible for his or her actions. One interviewee (AM1, Text 3.1) mentioned all three aspects of modernity (secularization, liberalism and individualism) in one text.

So that was a bit of a revelation for me, the fact that it [the Netherlands] is not as secular as I thought it would be. [...] So it made me realize that Dutch liberalism is really different from the idea of California liberalism, or what you call American liberalism. [...] They [the Dutch] don't care about what other people do. [...] There is a very individualistic notion that if you are not bothering me, I won't bother you.

5

The notion of individuality is closely related to the notion of independence (personal autonomy) in a “very structured” life, in which people have to “make an appointment” or make a schedule for everything. The notion of individuality contributes to both the decline of Christianity and Dutch people’s attraction to “other kinds of spirituality” such as yoga, Zen, Dao, and paranormal matters. One interviewee stated that “churches are dead” because they are “too conservative” while people “feel more independent and private”. The notion of individuality also affects parents-children relationships in the Netherlands. Dutch parents value the opinion of their children. In contrast to authoritative Indonesian parents, religious Dutch parents will not impose their religious values on their children nor force their children to be religious.

Several interviewees spoke of the notion of individuality as selfish behaviour. This notion of individuality is related to social inequality in Indonesia where people must not be selfish and help others, especially the poor. In a welfare state like the Netherlands, “poor people are taken care of by the government” which means the Dutch are not individualistic in helping others. Additionally, one interviewee indicated that the Dutch are not individualistic because they care for nature by managing the trash and caring for the animals.

The notions of rationality, freedom, and tolerance appear in Chapters II, III, and IV. “The rational manner” of Dutch people contributes to the decline of religion in the Netherlands. One Muslim interviewee said that for the Dutch, “it does not make sense that Muslims have to pray five times a day” because “the Dutch use their logic”. Other interviewees pointed out that the Dutch “conduct research” and “use scientific approach” in dealing with the future. The effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch system are results of rationality, indicated in how everything is “very organised” and how the Dutch are “very calculating” with time and money.

The notions of freedom and tolerance often come together in Indonesian immigrants’ discourse. The Netherlands, for them, is a free country that respects individual rights and provides space for religious diversity. Most interviewees called the Dutch “very tolerant” in the way that they are respectful. One interviewee labelled the Dutch “too tolerant” because “they can tolerate intolerant people”. For one interviewee, some Dutch are “less tolerant” because there is “an element of harassment” against religious people.

What mental models do Indonesian immigrants draw upon?

There are at least four main references Indonesian immigrants drew upon when they speak about religion and modernity in the Netherlands namely state law, religion (Christianity and Islam), morality, and rationality. They constantly compared the Netherlands to Indonesia as a mental model (member’s resource), particularly on the role of the state and the implementation of the law. In the Netherlands, there is a separation of religion and state. Religion is a private matter and everyone has the right to be religious or not. In Indonesia, religion is a public matter and there is social pressure to practice religion. The Netherlands is a liberal state where drugs, abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and prostitution are legal and regulated by law. Indonesia is not a liberal state. Drugs, abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and prostitution are illegal and are considered immoral in Indonesia. The Dutch are individualistic in the sense that they have the rights and freedom to choose their way and are protected by the law. Dutch people “live on their own” in the way that they are independent, organised, and will not interfere in other people’s business. Indonesians are communal with the implication that they are dependent on other people, unorganised, flexible, and like to interfere in other people’s business.

When they spoke about the decline of religion in the Netherlands, interviewees mostly referred to Christianity. A few interviewees implicitly drew upon the “de-pillarization” as one of the factors that contribute to the shift of Dutch society from a pillarized society to a secular or dechristianized society. Regarding religiosity in

a secular context, one interviewee referred to the teachings of Jesus as being “very ingrained” in Dutch society, and another referred to the Calvinist tradition that influences the Dutch way of life. One interviewee drew upon Grace Davie’s concept of “believing without belonging” to describe the situation in the Netherlands.

When some interviewees labelled Dutch people outside of the church setting as “spiritual but not religious” and “their religiosity is beyond religion”, they implicitly drew upon the distinction between “religion” and “belief” in Indonesia. Until 2017, religion in Indonesia refers exclusively to six state-recognized religions (*agama*) as a bureaucratic category on the identity card. It does not matter whether one has an inner conviction or not. Belief in Indonesia refers to indigenous beliefs or indigenous religions (*aliran kepercayaan*) for spiritual practices outside of the six state-recognized religions.¹⁹⁶ The understanding of these concepts (members’ resources) is a legacy of colonial knowledge production. Moreover, one interviewee referred to the Dutch concept of *zingeving* as “spirituality” that he distinguished from “religiosity”. Two interviewees referred to “Eastern spirituality” and “supernatural matters” as non-religious spirituality.

Various interviewees referred to the Netherlands as a modern and welfare state, in which “the technology is advanced”, “the people are forward-looking”, and “the society is secure and prosperous”. Several Muslim interviewees associated individual rights, secularism, freedom of religion, and the concept of a welfare state with the universal teachings of Islam. One interviewee pointed out the compatibility of Islam with democracy by referring to the contextualization of Islam. When they spoke about the Netherlands being “more Islamic” than Indonesia and other Muslim countries, two interviewees referred to “a poll” about the most Islamic countries in the world. The poll shows that welfare states like the Netherlands apply the universal values of Islam although they have small numbers of Muslims in the population.

Interviewees referred to Indonesia’s socio-cultural-religious norms of “morality” when they spoke about the legality of “very controversial matters” such as prostitution, homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and premarital sex among young people in the Netherlands. They pointed to the differences between “Dutch culture” which has “liberal values” and “the Indonesian system” of giving children a religious basis to avert them from the influence of “Dutch culture” which is considered immoral according to Indonesia’s religious norms. One interviewee mentioned the difficulty of some Indonesians in understanding the relationship between the morality of

¹⁹⁶ Since 2017, indigenous beliefs are recognized as the seventh official religion by Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.

young people and the advancement of the Dutch state. He compared it to Indonesia which has “rules” and “morals” but the country’s development “is catastrophic”.

When asked if a person can be modern and religious, another interviewee referred to “a moral compass” that guides religious and non-religious (humanists) people in the Netherlands. According to him, the moral compass of religious people is “more transcendental” while the moral compass of a non-religious person is autonomous (based on reason). Interviewees also referred to “science” and “rational manner” when they spoke about Dutch society and the Dutch’s liberal attitude. Several interviewees labelled Dutch society “a very analytical society” as the Dutch conduct research and use a scientific approach in dealing with the future and issues such as drugs and abortion. Interviewees mentioned the “difficulty” of “rationalism” or “logic” to “meet” religion. Referring to the separation of religion and state, one interviewee said that in the Netherlands “the decisions for the state in various sectors are never mixed with religious position”.

How do Indonesian immigrants position Dutch society and Dutch people in relation to themselves?

Indonesian immigrants positioned Dutch society and Dutch people in general as “very open”, “very tolerant” and “respectful” towards them. In their discourse of secularization, they positioned the Dutch state as accommodating towards religions. Most interviewees reproduced the discourse of secularization by stating that because the Netherlands is a secular state (macro-level of discourse), it “gives space for religious diversity”. At the micro-level of discourse, they positioned the (irreligious) Dutch as different from them. By referring to the notion of rationality and religious illiteracy, Muslim and Christian interviewees expressed that talking about “faith” with irreligious Dutch people is challenging. Nevertheless, interviewees feel “free”, “respected”, and “accepted” to be whoever they are in the Netherlands, and their choice is “guaranteed” by Dutch law. Several Muslim and Christian interviewees stated that they “become more faithful” and their faith “has more quality” because practicing religion is “an individual intention”.

Several interviewees positioned themselves differently from other interviewees who see religion in the Netherlands declining. They transformed the notion of the Dutch as secular people (micro-level of discourse) by indicating that there are vibrant religious activities among young people such as the big event of Youth Day organised by the “Evangelical Broadcasting (*Evangelische Omroep Jongeren Dag*)”, the Christian migrant communities, and “very faithful” Christian people in the “Bible Belt” area. Other interviewees transformed the notion of the Dutch as secular people and the

Netherlands as a secular country by referring to the implementation of religious values in the Dutch' attitude and institutions (meso and macro-level of discourse). A Muslim woman said that she "saw Islam", and a Muslim man said that he found "the pillars of Islam" implemented in the Netherlands. For some Muslim interviewees, the Netherlands is "more Islamic" than Indonesia and other Muslim countries as they recognized Islamic teachings and values practiced by the Dutch. In this case, they positioned the (non-Muslim) Dutch to be more Islamic than them.

In their discourse of liberalism and individualism, interviewees positioned the Dutch government (macro-level of discourse) as an institution that guarantees freedom to individuals living in the Netherlands. They reproduced the discourse of liberalism in the Netherlands by stating that they are "very impressed" and find it "extraordinary" that "very controversial matters" such as abortion, euthanasia, drugs, prostitution, cohabitation, and same-sex marriage are "allowed", "regulated by law", and "controlled" by the government. Most interviewees identified the Dutch as "very tolerant", especially towards the LGBT community, and people from various backgrounds, including religious people (micro-level of discourse). Several interviewees, however, transformed the discourse of the Dutch as liberal people by stating that not all Dutch people fully accept issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. Two interviewees indicated that in the Netherlands, there is "anxiety" that non-Western people, especially the Muslim communities in Europe, are not accepting liberal values, and the Dutch have become increasingly sceptical towards foreigners, particularly refugees.

While reproducing the discourse of liberalism, several interviewees identified themselves as religious and positioned the Dutch and Dutch cultures with liberal values as different from them. They asserted their religious perspective on issues such as drugs, homosexuality, cohabitation, euthanasia, prostitution, and abortion as they "contradict" their faith. They also maintained "the Indonesian system" of giving religious education to their children to ward off some elements of "Dutch (liberal) culture" that are considered immoral from the religious point of view. Nevertheless, they positioned themselves differently from other religious immigrants, particularly the Turkish and Moroccans, by calling themselves "more open-minded".

In their discourse of individualism, interviewees positioned the Dutch (micro-level of discourse) as different from them. According to them, the Dutch are independent, organised, punctual, assertive, and direct, whereas the Indonesians depend on other people and are unorganised, flexible, gentle, friendly, indirect, unassertive and not punctual. Concerning religion, interviewees pointed out that for the Dutch, worship

is a choice and an individual intention (driven by inner conviction) whereas, for Indonesians, worship is an obligation (for outer look) as there is social pressure to do so. Moreover, Dutch parents cannot force their children to be religious or not. Dutch parents also value the opinion of their children. Most interviewees positioned the Dutch as more (religiously) tolerant than Indonesians. One interviewee, however, transformed the discourse of religious tolerance by pointing out the element of harassment against religious people in the Netherlands. He positioned non-religious Dutch as less tolerant towards religious people. He also identified different attitudes of non-religious Dutch towards the Muslims and the Christians.

Interviewees reproduced the discourse of individualism in the Netherlands by pointing out the importance of individual freedom in modern society. They positioned the Dutch state, Dutch society, and the Dutch people as respectful to individuals living in the Netherlands. Some interviewees attributed the difficulty entering Dutch society to the ways social relationships are set up in the Netherlands as Dutch people “live on their own” and are “less spontaneous”. They positioned the Dutch way of social relationships differently from the Indonesians. Several interviewees indicated loneliness and insecurity as the consequences of a free and individualistic society. One interviewee stated that “a church or a religious community is a reaction against individualism, which is very strong in the Netherlands”.

2. Contribution to the Theories of Modernity in the Light of Non-Western Immigrants

The main question to be answered in this study is: does the notion of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants need a revision? This study started with the theory of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000) as its focus to explore the Indonesian immigrants' perspective on modern Dutch society. The study found that the discourse of Indonesian immigrants touched upon several defining aspects of modernity. They are secularization, liberalism, individualism, and rationalism. The cores are freedom, rights, and law as the limits to freedom. Additionally, this study also showed that according to the interviewees, modernity and religiosity are compatible. Interviewees showed religious values outside of the religious sphere, which is often overlooked when scrutinizing the religious and secular discourse of modern societies. In this sense, the notion of modernity in the context of multiple modernities needs revision because, according to Indonesian immigrants' perception, European modernity is not as secular as Europeans themselves claimed. It is not secular Europe versus the religious rest of the world. It is the blurry

boundaries of religious-secular division in Europe, in this case, the Netherlands. Therefore, we need to look at it from different theoretical perspectives. In this case, the theories of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000) and trans-modernity (Dussel, 2012) can be helpful to further discern the findings of the study.

Dutch scholars of religion have used various theories in conceptualizing religion in modern society. Some scholars were involved in the NWO program of Religion in Modern Society (2012-2018) to gain a better picture of the changing role of religion in Dutch society. In the following sections, I will discuss the three theories of modernities while reviewing some of the studies done by Dutch scholars of religion from the perspective of Indonesian immigrants.

Multiple Modernities

The theory of multiple modernities emphasizes the various routes to modernity derived from internal conflict and confrontation within and between cultures. The elements of Western or European modernity undergo transformation and reconstruction or deconstruction when transported to other parts of the world in an attempt to shape their own modernity (Eisenstadt, 2003, pp. 535-537, 548-550). Through secularism, individualism, and migration, religion in the Netherlands and Europe in general, has experienced a tremendous transformation. While statistics report the ongoing decline of church membership and attendance, religious scholars argued that religious beliefs remained relatively popular in the notions and correlation of “believing” and “belonging” (Davie, 1990; Reitsma et al., 2012) as well as the renewed interest in “spiritual” meaning among individuals (Kennedy, 2005; Berghuijs et al., 2013; Bakker et al., 2013). The research *God in Nederland* (Bernts & Berghuijs, 2016) shows that the decline in church membership has increased from 61% in 2006 to 67,8% in 2015.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, church membership is not a precise indication of religiosity. Although the number is also declining from 2006 to 2015, there is 28% of Dutch people who believe in “something” (Dutch: *iets*). These people “abandoned the well-organized and normative religious organizations in favour of a more experiential and subjective spirituality, patching together elements from the wisdom sayings of different religious traditions and worldviews and unfolding religious flexibility” (Kalsky, 2017, p. 346).

The varieties of religiosity in secularized Netherlands can be seen from the perspective of multiple modernities in the context of the co-existence of secular

¹⁹⁷ Very recent research by CBS showed that church membership in 2022 has not declined further. In 2022, 42.8% of Dutch people considered themselves to belong to a religious denomination or philosophical group, almost the same as in 2021 (42.5%) (Schmeets & Houben, 2023).

and religious discourse (Berger, 2012, p. 314). The notion of multiple modernities remains close to the original secularisation thesis of Berger and Luckmann (1995) that modernity pluralizes, individualizes, and thus relativizes. Inspired by the approach of multiple modernities, several Dutch scholars embrace the notion of multiple religiosities, or multiple religious belonging in their research on the complexity and diversity of individual religious life in Dutch society (Kalsky, 2017; Berghuijs, 2017; Oostveen, 2017; Van der Braak, 2017; Berghuijs et al., 2018; Liefbroer et al., 2018).

Using the approach of religious belonging in terms of “feeling at home with” and “being related to” certain religious practices, the studies of Berghuijs (2017), show that multiple religious belonging is present among at least 23% of Dutch adults. Multiple religious believers see themselves as combiners of elements from various religious traditions. In their book *Flexibel Geloven* (Believing Flexibly), Kalsky and Pruim (2014) show that the individual life stories of eleven interviewees, who combine more than one religion or worldview, have a decisive influence on their spiritual choices. These flexible believers “indicate that theological and dogmatic distinctions are not relevant to their way of believing” and they apply different religious traditions “next to each other, just like the concepts of ‘religious’ and ‘spiritual’” (Kalsky, 2017, p. 349). This co-existence of different religious traditions or hybrid forms of religiosity in the practice of flexible believers is a result of an individual’s choice. This is in line with Berger’s statement that “modern religion is characterized by individuals who reflect upon, modify, pick and choose from the religious resources available to them” (Berger, 2005, p. 6). The hybrid forms of religiosity present hermeneutical challenges for the theology of religions (Oostveen, 2017) and require a paradigm shift from an “either/or” to a relational “as well as” approach when looking at the conception of religious identity and belonging (Kalsky, 2017).

Although none of my interviewees explicitly spoke about multiple religious believers, they did speak of the Dutch’s “different religiosity” and “spirituality” to indicate people outside of institutional religions, or what Charles Taylor (2007) called “spiritual pilgrims”, which includes those of flexible believers in a (post)modern time. Several interviewees labelled Dutch people as “spiritual but not religious” to refer to people outside the church setting. While there is a decrease in Christian faith, there is an increase in inner-life spirituality. Interviewees’ statements on spirituality resonate with the religious individualisation thesis (Davie, 1994; Heelas & Woodhead, 2005; Heelas, 2007; Pollack & Pickel, 2007) and New Age spirituality (Houtman & Aupers, 2007). Helaas and Woodhead’s *The Spiritual Revolution* (2005) argues that “religion” is giving way to “spirituality”. Nevertheless, the recent research by the SCP shows no increase in the number of modern-day spirituals while the

number of atheists and agnostics in the Netherlands continues to grow in the last decade (De Hart et al., 2022, pp. 167-168).

One interviewee spoke of the “different spirituality” of Dutch people inside the church setting. This corresponds to the research of Berghuijs et al. (2013) who focus on conceptions of spirituality among a representative sample of the Dutch population, using the respondents’ description of spirituality. Their research shows that the descriptions of “spirituality” by both “spiritual” and “non-spiritual” respondents inside and outside the church do differ but only relatively. Both groups describe spirituality mostly in cognitive terms, especially in the form of general references to a transcendent reality and they do not often refer to religion (Berghuijs et al., 2013, pp. 391-393).

Bakker et al. (2013) analyse the components of what they call “new spirituality”¹⁹⁸ and the components of what they call “traditional religion”¹⁹⁹. They suggest that for most people in the Netherlands, being “spiritual” is not related to traditional religion but is predominantly related to the “new spirituality cluster of expressions”, while being “religious” is associated with the expressions belonging to traditional, church-related religion (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 27). My interviewees’ perception of “spiritual” people in the Netherlands confirms the study by Bakker et al. however, my interviewees’ perception of “religious” people goes beyond the identification of people who are “church attenders, who are very likely to have a belief in God beyond doubt” (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 27).

Interviewees distinguished religion as a “practice” (ritual) and as an “institution”, which they view as declining, and religion as “values”, which they view as being embedded in Dutch institutions and attitudes. This corresponds to Berger and Luckmann, who stated that “the equation of modernity and secularism must be treated sceptically” because the institutional retreat of religions does not necessarily equate with the retreat of religious interpretations in consciousness (1995, pp. 36-37). They pointed out the United States as an example of a society that is both modern and religious and therefore defies the secularization thesis. Interviewees’ perception of the secular Netherlands being religious shows a nuance to secularization theory. The Netherlands has experienced a decline in religious practice and the loss of the influence of religious institutions on its society. However, the values of religion, as

¹⁹⁸ Comprises the variables spiritual transformation, monism, spiritual knowledge, syncretism, quest, New Age expectation, belief in paranormal issues, reincarnation and karma, the practices of self-perfectioning, pursuit of esoteric knowledge, experiences of connectedness, and non-religious transcendent experiences

¹⁹⁹ Comprises orthodoxy, affiliation, attendance, frequency of prayer, and religious transcendent experiences.

seen by interviewees, remain. In their view, religious interpretations of values in the consciousness of Dutch people may have been transformed into what interviewees called “universal values”, which the Dutch do not see as religious values. To a certain extent, interviewees’ perception of the nuanced religiosity of Dutch society reveals a hidden dimension, such as the values of religion, that does not appear in statistics about modern-day spirituals, atheists, and agnostics.

To a greater extent, interviewees’ view of the secular Netherlands as religious is in harmony with Arend van Leeuwen’s description of the term “secularism” and its relationship with Christianity (1964)²⁰⁰ and Tom Holland’s thesis on the complex role of Christianity in the formation of modern Western culture (2019). Van Leeuwen (1964, p. 333) wrote,

In a ‘Christianized’ world Christian ideas of one sort or another, Christian values and ways of living and thinking acquire a life of their own, like ripened fruit, like children fully grown or like the ever-widening circles a stone makes when it is thrown into water. In the course of modern history, this process has given rise to a bewildering variety of phenomena. The ideas and values thus liberated may remain in greater or lesser degree associated with their Christian origin; but such emancipation may also lead to a radical cleavage or even to open enmity. Not only modern nationalism, democracy, liberalism, capitalism and socialism, the concepts of modern science and the rise of modern technology, but also various philosophies of history as mutually irreconcilable as those of Comte, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche—they are all, in this sense, the ‘secularized’ products of Christian civilization.

The “secularized” products of Christian civilization corresponds to the perception of Indonesian immigrants who saw religious values embedded in Dutch institutions, policies, and attitude. One interviewee called Dutch religiosity “beyond ritual” or “beyond religion” to refer to the fact that Dutch people are no longer practising the “ritual” of religion while implementing religious values in their daily life. Another interviewee pointed out that Christian values are “very ingrained” in secular Dutch society. Several Muslim interviewees view security, tolerance, freedom, respect, justice, no discrimination, no corruption, caring about poor people, caring about the environment, being on time, and keeping things clean as the manifestation of Islamic values. In this case, the Netherlands is viewed as “more Islamic” than Muslim countries.

²⁰⁰ Arend van Leeuwen was a missionary in Malang (1950-1955) before he became the Director of Kerk en Wereld in Driebergen and professor at the Catholic University of Nijmegen.

The perception of the secular Netherlands as religious also complicates what Berger and Luckmann (1995) called the “crisis of meaning”. As a result of pluralism and secularism, the validity of shared meaning is difficult to maintain for larger groups of individuals in society. They wrote,

The analysis of systems of value and meaning in modern societies has to overcome particular difficulties. We have seen that it is not possible to speak in modern societies of a single and generally binding order of values. It may be true that beyond the legalized system of behavioural norms there are still elements of general morality. However, without careful research, it is not easy to decide what these might consist of and whether together they make up a framework of established morality. It certainly seems that there are a multiplicity of moralities, distributed across different communities of life and faith, which can be identified in the form of “partial catechisms” and particularistic ideological programmes (Berger & Luckmann, 1995, p. 66).

In the context of the Netherlands, the “elements of general morality” could be what interviewees called religious values. Whether the Dutch are aware of it or not, the “elements of general morality” in the Netherlands can be traced to Christian teachings. They are the roots of the ethical structures and cultural norms of Dutch society. Holland wrote,

Christianity, it seemed, had no need of actual Christians for its assumptions still to flourish. Whether this was an illusion, or whether the power held by victims over their victimisers would survive the myth that had given it birth, only time would tell. As it was, the retreat of Christian belief did not seem to imply any necessary retreat of Christian values. Quite the contrary. Even in Europe—a continent with churches far emptier than those in the United States—the trace elements of Christianity continued to infuse people’s morals and presumptions so utterly that many failed even to detect their presence. ... they were breathed in equally by everyone: believers, atheists, and those who never paused so much as to think about religion (2019, p. 517).

Christian values in modern Dutch society, as seen by Indonesian immigrants, are not confined to churches. In the following sub-sections, I will discuss the legacy of Christianity and its entanglement with secularity from the perspective of multiple modernities.

Cultural Christianity

On the surface, Christianity may have become less visible (Luckmann, 1967) in modern European society but from an outsider's perspective it is still very strong as the foundation of society and as a cultural heritage (Davie & Dinham, 2019). Christian tradition is one of the important influences that shaped European culture (Holland, 2019). Interviewees spoke about "culturally religious people" (people who go to church once a year and people who celebrate Christmas with family) and people who implement religious values in their daily life, although they "do not believe in God" or "do not have a religion". In describing the attitude and the social life of the Dutch, interviewees referred to "the teaching of Jesus", "Christian tradition", and "Calvinism". This is also the view of culture theologians such as Borgman (2006) and Bosman (2012), who defy the notion that faith in modern culture will disappear. They point out the task of theologians to reveal the presence of God in a new, modern situation (Borgman, 2006) because "God is active in all reality, also outside the official churches and also outside the borders of Christianity" (Bosman, 2012, p. 15). In *God is hier al!* (God is already here!) Bosman (2012) pointed out the many traces of Christian tradition in modern popular cultures, such as films, games, pop music, and commercials. This is close to the claim of Van Leeuwen (1964) that secularism is not a contradiction to Christianity but the fulfilment of Christianity.

Indonesian immigrants' perception of the implementation of religious (Christian) values by secular Dutch people is also in harmony with Norris and Inglehart's (2011) theory of secularization based on existential security. Their theory rests on two axioms: the security axiom and the cultural traditions axiom. On the cultural traditions axiom, they wrote,

The second building block for our theory assumes that the distinctive worldviews that were originally linked with religious traditions have shaped the cultures of each nation in an enduring fashion; today, these distinctive values are transmitted to the citizens even if they never set foot in a church, temple, or mosque. Thus, although only about 5% of the Swedish public attends church weekly, the Swedish public as a whole manifests a distinctive Protestant value system that they hold in common with the citizens of other historically Protestant societies such as Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands. Today, these values are not transmitted primarily by the church, but by the educational system and the mass media, with the result that although the value systems of historically Protestant countries differ markedly and consistently from those of historically Catholic countries—the value systems of Dutch Catholics are much more similar to those of Dutch Protestants than to those of French, Italian, or Spanish Catholics (Norris & Inglehart, 2011, p 17).

Contrary to the Indonesian immigrants' perspective, most Dutch people do not see the historical legacy of Christianity as an element of general morality. According to the Indonesian immigrants, it may be related to the loss or the lack of religious knowledge as one interviewee said, "They [the Dutch] are far from religious life", and therefore, "they do not have the outlook on how to behave like a religious person".

Religious Illiteracy

The lack of knowledge about religion and traditions in general (religious illiteracy) can be considered the consequence of the secularization of public space, including how religious education is organized in Dutch schools (Ter Avest et al., 2007; 2011). Most young people at secondary schools in the Netherlands are religiously analphabetic in the sense that they know nothing about faith, tradition, and rituals (Van Dijk-Groeneboer, 2017; Bakker & Ter Avest, 2019) although many of them "want to believe but do not know how" (Van Dijk-Groeneboer, 2017, p. 21; Van Dijk-Groeneboer & Brijan, 2013). These students are "highly interested in worldviews, rituals, religiosity, spirituality and related tradition" (Bakker & Ter Avest, 2019). In *The Future of Religious Education in Europe*, Stoeckl and Roy (2015, p. 4) state that "confessional religious education is likely to remain an important factor in the teaching of and about religions in Europe". The role of religious education is seen as crucial to maintaining the knowledge of not only Christian tradition but also other faith traditions within the context of pluralism.

In *Religion in Modern Europe* (2000), Grace Davie used Danièle Hervieu-Léger's (1993) notion of an "authorized memory", which lies at the heart of religious belief, to understand the uniqueness of the European situation. In her book, the evolution of European religiosity is seen through the concept of "mutating memory", namely those of vicarious, precarious, mediated, alternative, and conflicting memory (Davie, 2000, pp. 176-192). The place of religion in the lives of young people, especially the aspects of religious memory, is not only vicarious (through which a minority maintains the tradition on behalf of the majority) but also precarious (Davie, 2000, pp. 82-97; 2001, pp. 272-273). For Davie, the role of religious education in the school system is a crucial factor (2000, p. 97). On the widespread concern about religious (il) literacy in Europe, Davie and Dinham (2019, pp. 21-22) pointed out that "Europeans are rapidly losing the concepts, knowledge and vocabulary that are necessary to address the difficult questions that arise in the management of difference. What follows is a public conversation about faith, which is of poor quality-at best ill-informed, often ill-mannered and at times dangerously provocative".

From the perspective of Indonesian immigrants, while the imprint of Christian tradition is present in the Dutch culture, there is a lack of knowledge about religion and traditions in general. In the context of right-wing populism and Islamophobia, the imprint of Christian tradition is accentuated through the notion of Christian privilege in which there is a Christian superiority complex.

Christian Privilege

Referring to the definition of secular as a complete separation of religion and state, one Muslim interviewee stated that the Netherlands is not “a completely secular state”-in the sense of the separation of church and state-because the Netherlands still celebrates Christmas and other Christian feast days as public holidays. This interviewee also referred to Geert Wilders, the Dutch right-wing populist politician, who stated that the Netherlands is influenced by Christianity and Judaism, yet in practice, Hanukkah and or other Jewish celebrations are not celebrated as a national holiday in the Netherlands.

The celebration of Christian religious festivals as national holidays in the Netherlands is part of the manifestations of Christian privilege, described by Blumenfeld as “an invisible, unearned, and largely unacknowledged array of benefits accorded to Christians, with which they often unconsciously walk through life as if they effortlessly carry a knapsack tossed over their shoulders” (2006, p. 195; Blumenfeld et al., 2009, p. vii). Davie and Dinham (2019, p. 18) also pointed out that in European societies “calendars, seasons, festivals, holidays, weeks and weekends are all premised on the Christian narrative”. While the religious significance of the Christian narrative may have diminished, it still represents Christian dominance in the public sphere and favours those of the Christian tradition, whether active or not. According to Blumenfeld, a form of Christian privilege,

involves the notion that one does not have to educate oneself-to become familiar with the religious beliefs and customs of other religious communities. On the other hand, members of these other, often invisible, communities need to be familiar with Christian traditions not only because of Christian hegemony but also as a necessary condition for emotional and often physical survival to negotiate between the dominant Christian culture and their own religious cultures (2006, p. 205).

In the context of rightwing populism and Islamophobia, the notion of Christian privilege and its superiority complex comes out stronger and often with the inclusion of Jews through “the problematic reference to Europe’s “Judeo-Christian” tradition”

(Topolski, 2016; 2018). In his speech entitled *A Warning to America*, Wilders said, “Our Western culture based on Christianity and Judaism is superior to the Islamic culture. Our laws are superior to sharia. Our Judeo-Christian values are better than Islam’s totalitarian rules” (Geert Wilders Weblog, 2011).

Wilders²⁰¹ and other PVV representatives have politicized the issue of Islam, declaring Islamization as “the biggest problem” in the Netherlands (Damhuis, 2019a). Nevertheless, none of my interviewees felt threatened or intimidated by Wilders and his anti-Islam and anti-immigrant rhetoric. This is similar to the observation of an Indonesian BBC journalist in Den Haag, who reported that Indonesians living in the Netherlands do not seem to worry about Wilders (Siregar, 2017). However, in his article, an Indonesian student at Leiden University expressed his discomfort. He wrote,

What is not easy is knowing that in the Netherlands, which is the most liberal country in Europe, hatred towards certain groups, races and religions has now been institutionalized and has become normality. [...] So far only Moroccan immigrants are being targeted. However, seeing the political tendencies of Wilders and the behaviour of some other immigrant groups, immigrants from Turkey and Indonesia may become the next target because they are considered unable to integrate and respect the culture of the Windmill country. [...] In the end, Wilders, who is anti-Islam in the Netherlands, is similar to a noisy public figure in Indonesia. [...] They share similarities in discriminating zeal, low-thinking creativity, poor critical thinking, and being afraid of foreign ghosts (Hanafi, 2017; translation by the author).

Interviewees called Wilders “a lunatic person”, “the bad cop in Dutch politics”, and “a person who is looking for popularity with an unclear target, whether he aims at Islam or immigration”. Interviewees are also aware of Wilders’ claim to the superiority of being “native” Dutch, which means being white with Judeo-Christian heritage.²⁰²

²⁰¹ Wilders’ grandmother was born in Indonesia. According to the definition of the CBS, Wilders is a third generation “Dutch of Indonesian descent”, although he seldom speaks about it openly.

²⁰² In their research on populist parties’ supporters in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands on what they think of “European culture” and a “European heritage”, and how do such understandings relate to their belief in national culture, De Cesari et al. found out that the Dutch interviewees were “the most nationalist and xenophobic of all, declaring that many or even most refugees are only ‘pretending to be refugees’ to benefit from Dutch welfare. They stress the need to protect Dutch people and the Dutch nation, and they reject multiculturalism as a way to preserve ‘the nation’s cultural core’ (2020, p. 38).

While Wilders denounces Islamic culture as intolerant, sexist, and homophobic, he embraces the Dutch's progressive values, such as abortion, gender equality, gay rights, and the freedom of atheists and agnostics. In his open letter to Pope Francis in December 2013, Wilders pleaded, "I hope that the Holy Father will help us defend the West's Judeo-Christian and humanistic civilization, to which even atheists and agnostics owe their freedom and democracy" (Bodissey, 2013).

By pointing out the religious roots of secular values, Wilders frequently claims the Judeo-Christian and humanistic civilization as "our" [Dutch/Western] culture, which is being threatened by Islam. Tracing the genealogy of the signifier Judeo-Christianity, Topolski showed that the meaning of the signifier Judeo-Christianity "has shifted from originally excluding Jews and Catholics to now including them in order to fortify its exclusion of Muslims" (2016, p. 279). In addition to this, from the perspective of interviewees, the signifier "Judeo-Christian" used by Wilders to emphasize the culture of the "native" Dutch contains a paradox when it comes to the celebration of religious festivals as national holidays in the Netherlands. It excludes the Jewish tradition because, unlike Christian festivals, Jewish religious festivals (as well as other non-Christian festivals) are not celebrated as public holidays in the Netherlands. This exclusion shows another manifestation of Christian privilege.

Like Wilders, Thierry Baudet, the leader of the Forum for Democracy (FvD)²⁰³ who won the most votes in the 2019 provincial election, proudly defends Dutch and Western values, which he associates with the Judeo-Christian tradition. While Baudet also has an anti-immigration and anti-Islam agenda, he considers Wilders' anti-Islam rhetorics as "too far". Baudet calls himself "a critic of Islamism, the political Islam" (Damhuis, 2019a). He is "convinced that within the entire Islamic tradition, there are all sorts of points of departure for a much more pleasant interpretation of that religion" (De Winther & Witteman, 2018). Baudet's view of Islam echoed the attitude of the Dutch colonial government towards Islam in the East Indies, which was influenced by the advice of Snouck Hurgronje. The colonial government took a neutral position towards Islam as a religion and gave freedom to Muslims to carry out their religious activities. However, politically, any propagation of Islam as a political doctrine was prohibited (Benda, 1958; Steenbrink, 1993; Jung, 2010; Burhanudin, 2014).

Baudet is seen to be "flirting with Christianity" (Bosman, 2017; Damhuis, 2019b). He considered himself a "secular cultural Christian" (Dutch: *seculiere cultuurchristen*) (Bosman, 2017) and stated that Christianity is an important source of "who we are" as a Western civilization (Damhuis, 2019b). In response to Baudet's love for the

²⁰³ <https://fvd.nl/>

Christian tradition, Bosman wrote, “I find it even worse that ‘my’ Christianity (if I may be so immodest) is being robbed’ to act as leverage against my Islamic sisters and brothers in this country” (2017; translation by the author). While Bosman found it “good that politicians make an effort to revalue the Christian tradition and faith” he also “felt abused as a Christian voter” (2017; translation by the author). For Bosman, Baudet’s sympathy for Christianity is “primarily that of an intellectual outsider.” Baudet, as well as Wilders, “do not think of the word “Christianity” as a lived belief as it is practised and celebrated by billions of people worldwide, but rather a set of rules and notions such as “tolerance” or “freedom” (Bosman, 2017; translation by the author). From the perspective of multiple modernities, both Wilders and Baudet put the discourse of Christianity and Judeo-Christian traditions in parallel to secular discourse to be used as their political instruments, to gain voters, and to exclude Islam and (particularly Muslim) immigrants in the Dutch society. This challenges the religious-secular division in the context of Dutch secularity.

Religious-Secular Division

In their attempt to analyse the historical emergence and transformation of Dutch secularity, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, introduced the concept of “multiple secularities”, which is “the forms of distinction between the religious and other social domains (which are thereby marked as non-religious), that are institutionalized and in part legitimized through guiding ideas” (2012, pp. 886-887). Drawing on Eisenstadt’s notion of multiple modernities, Schuh et al. (2012) distinguished four basic types of secularity, namely secularity for the sake of individual rights and liberties; secularity for the sake of balancing religious diversity; secularity for the sake of societal integration and national development; and secularity for the sake of the independence of institutional domains. The notion of “secularity” is used in terms of “the cultural meanings underlying the differentiation between religion and non-religious spheres” (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012, pp. 875-876; Schuh et al., 2012, p. 357). According to Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), in the Netherlands, there is a shift from a model of secularity for the sake of accommodating religious diversity-which was expressed in the pillar structure as the characteristic model of the Dutch in dealing with religious diversity-to the models of secularity for the sake of individual liberties and secularity for the sake of national integration and development. The latter models are guided by the ideas of freedom, individuality, progress, enlightenment, and modernity (Schuh et al., 2012, pp. 352-353; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012, pp. 888, 890, 896), which are used by both Wilders and Baudet. In their rhetoric, Wilders and Baudet combine the ideas of freedom, individuality, progress, enlightenment, and modernity, with the term “Judeo-Christian tradition”.

From the perspective of Indonesian immigrants, the religious roots of Dutch secular values obscure the boundaries between the religious and the secular domain. On the macro-level, the Netherlands is, for the interviewees, “very secular” and “very liberal” in terms of the separation of church and state, the decline of religious institutions and the freedom of the individual. However, concerning Christian privilege on the national level, the Netherlands is “not completely secular”. Moreover, according to the interviewees, Christian values are also engrained in the Dutch welfare system. On the micro-level, Dutch people are “religious” because religious values are embedded in Dutch attitudes and social life even though most Dutch people do not recognize the religious roots. The problematic division and relation between the “secular” and the “religious” are part of the present-day debates regarding the term “post-secular”. The use of the term is a contested one (Molendijk, 2015). It indicates that within the secularized social structure of modern society, religious institutions are very much present and will not disappear (Molendijk et al., 2010).

Debates on the concept of post-secular refer to what Molendijk (2015) called “the intertwinement” of the secular and the religious, sometimes in new forms. The new public manifestations of religion, such as Islam and the Pentecostal movement are attributed to the emergence of the concept of post-secular. Molendijk (2015) also pointed out the difficulty in drawing the boundaries between the notion of private and public, and, secular and religious. Referring to Talal Asad’s *Formations of the Secular* (2003), Molendijk (2015, p. 109) asserted that “notions such as secularism and religion are embedded in discursive practices, which differ geographically and historically”. This fits with the perspective of multiple modernities, in which what counts as “religion” and “secular” may vary from country to country, depending on how the nation-state shapes the relation of the two. Molendijk’s assertion also fits with Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework of CDA in which the discursive practice (interpretive stage) mediates discourse participants’ (in this case, the Indonesian immigrants) linguistic practice (description stage) and the social practice (explanation stage). The view of Indonesian immigrants on the blurry boundaries between the religious and the secular in the Netherlands correlates to the notion of the religious and the secular in Indonesia, as described in the discursive analysis of the previous chapters.

In his article on the place of religion in the Western (post)secular city, Molendijk concluded that the precise location and the role of religion may have changed but religious organizations cater for human needs, fight for social justice, and empower people economically, socially and spiritually (2010, p. 160). Moreover, in the Netherlands as well as other countries in Europe, the coming of new arrivals, particularly Muslim immigrants, changes the religious landscape and challenges the assumption about the

place of religion. The differences in the degree and pattern of secularism in European societies make a case of multiple modernities (Martin, 2010, p. 70). Religious life in Europe, according to Davie, “is and will remain distinctive (if not exceptional), given the legacies of the past” (2006, p. 33). The crucial point to emerge from Eisenstadt’s multiple modernities, in the case of European exceptionalism, is “the continued space for religion and for religious movements within the unfolding interpretations of modernity. The forms of religion, moreover, may be as diverse as the forms of modernity” (Davie, 2002, p. 159). From the Indonesian immigrants’ perspective, the European secular modernity is not as secular as the Europeans themselves claimed because, in the case of the Netherlands, religious values are embedded in Dutch attitudes and institutions.

Liquid Modernity

Although not completely different from multiple modernities that have the notion of shifting from one to the other, liquid modernity emphasizes mixing. The theory of liquid modernity addresses the uncertain future characterized by a “fluid world of globalization, deregulation and individualism” (Bauman, 2002, p. 19). In liquid modernity, the contemporary world is seen as the era of liquidity, in which identity is fluid and the meaning of boundaries, including worldviews and religions, changes.

While speaking of multiple religious belonging, Berghuijs (2017) also speaks of “the blurring of the boundaries”, while Kalsky (2017) speaks of a “transcultural and transreligious perspective to underline the dynamic and moving character of meaning-making”. “The prefix ‘trans’ emphasizes the flowing and flexible shape of hybrid religious identities within a rhizomatic network” (Kalsky, 2017, p. 357). Both scholars exemplify the need to reconsider the concept of religious identity and belonging in an increasingly diverse society. The fluidity of being, the blurring of the boundaries and the freedom of an individual to make his or her own choices are some of the characteristics of what Zygmunt Bauman (2000) called “liquid modernity”.

From the perspective of liquid modernity, we are living in a world that is unfixed, ever-changing, and uncertain. Today’s society is more fluid, and individuals are “free” to “shop around” in the “supermarket of identities” (Bauman, 2000, p. 83). Fluid or liquid is used as a metaphor for explaining the present-day situation of permeable boundaries in a time of growing consumerism and globalization. In liquid modernity, the freedom of choice of an individual comes with its own risks because there is no one to rely on but himself. From the Indonesian immigrants’ perspective, having unlimited choices while living an independent, structured, and highly individualistic life contributes to insecurity and loneliness.

Several Dutch scholars embrace the notion of liquid modernity in their research concerning religion and morality in the Netherlands. In the book *Moral and Spiritual Leadership in an Age of Plural Moralities* (2019) edited by Hans Alma and Ina Ter Avest, sixteen contributors-many based in the Netherlands-addressed the challenges of moral and spiritual guidance in “liquid times”, from both a relational and dialogical perspective.

The Dutch sociologist and theologian Kees de Groot (2006; 2007; 2008; 2013; 2018; 2019) has published several articles and a book using Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity. De Groot (2008; 2013) presents three types of liquid religion by focusing on contemporary Christian culture as a fluid form of religion within the Dutch religious landscape. The first fluid type is community building within the religious culture such as the youth churches and the event World Youth Days. One of my interviewees, who called the Dutch religious, also pointed out the youth churches as a “new” kind of church designed to meet the needs of youngsters in experiencing spirituality.

The second fluid type of religious community, according to De Groot, is the ecclesial initiatives in a secular setting such as a community of patients, volunteers, staff and other participants of a church service in a hospital, who come from all kinds of denominations and religions, or with alternative and secular worldviews, and religious broadcastings on radio, television or on the world-wide-web (2008, pp. 285-286). The latter example indicates “the fluidization of a religious ritual” (De Groot, 2008, p. 287) as the viewers of religious broadcasting regard the act of watching as important for their religious life (De Groot, 2011).

The third fluid type is the cross boundaries of secular-religious phenomena presented by “those communities’ meetings in a secular setting without the involvement of organized religion, that resemble religious meetings and communities” (De Groot, 2008, p. 288). Examples of this type are the funeral of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn²⁰⁴, which portrayed a mosaic of rituals drawn from various repertoires, and the multi-cultural project at Zoetermeer in which a plurality of believers was brought together within the neutral setting of a museum (De Groot, 2008, p. 291).

One interviewee spoke of Dutch religiosity as being “beyond ritual” or “beyond religion” to refer to the fact that Dutch people are no longer practicing the religious

²⁰⁴ Pim Fortuyn was assassinated on May 6, 2002. He was shot by Volkert van der Graaf, an environmental and animal rights activist, in a car park outside a radio studio in Hilversum, the Netherlands. Thousands of people turned out for his funeral on May 10, 2002.

ritual of established religions such as the Eucharist, prayer, confession, et cetera. This might seem to be in contrast with the research of Kalsky and Pruim (2014), and Kalsky (2017) on the flexible believers in which the practicing of rituals is important as “rituals provide continuity, order, and bodily and spiritual wellbeing” (Kalsky, 2017, p. 350). Indonesian immigrants spoke of religious rituals in the orthodox sense of traditional religion, which is different from the context of Kalsky and Pruim’s flexible believers. The meaning of religion in the context of the flexible believers “is not a system of commands and prohibitions, but a spiritual space of living where conscious attention is paid to daily occupations, like cooking meals and eating together, prayer, meditation, dance and erotic power” (Kalsky, 2017, p. 350).

When speaking of religious rituals such as performing prayer and going to church or mosque, interviewees pointed out the difference between the Indonesians and the Dutch. According to them, in Indonesia, “worship is an obligation”, and observing religion is related to “social pressure”. Therefore, for many Indonesians, practicing religion is “for the outer look, to be seen by other people” while “the inner is empty”. In this Indonesian case, religious ritual is a continuity of practice out of compulsion demanded by society. In the Dutch case, a religious ritual is performed based on an individual’s choice.

Interviewees pointed out that in the Netherlands, people practice religion “with conviction, with consciousness” because “worship is a choice” and “observing religion is an individual’s intention” not social pressure. From the perspective of the interviewees, Dutch religious ritual is not only in contrast to the “Indonesian type” but also goes beyond that. Beyond ritual does not mean that the Dutch are not religious. On the contrary, the Dutch are “very religious” because religious values, such as tolerance, freedom, justice, and respect are already embedded in the life of the Dutch. In this case, Indonesian immigrants are pointing to the permeable boundaries of religion.

William Arfman’s studies (2014) on the permeable boundaries of different religious traditions analyse the ritual field of collective commemorations of the dead in the Netherlands in Catholic and Protestant settings, as well as outside the churches. Arfman distinguishes “rooted ritualizing” and “liquid ritualizing” by arguing that “the old, rooted ways of ritualizing are no longer an option, now that traditions have become challenged and social relations have increasingly turned fluid” (2014, p. 7). Through six case studies, Arfman showed how the challenges of creating a good ritual, attracting an audience and ensuring repetition were dealt with by both Protestant and Catholic churches as well as those outside the churches. The

similarities concerning how the challenges were dealt with in the six case studies define the characteristics of liquid ritualizing, which appear to be “an openness toward ritual transfer, the importance of networks, which is complemented by the seemingly paradoxical importance of locality, and an embracing of instability as not just a problem to be overcome, but a virtue as well” (Arfman, 2014, pp. 23-24).

While Arfman discusses rooted ritualizing that has turned into liquid ritualizing, De Groot points out a transition from a “solid” church to a “liquid” church in *The Liquidation of the Church* (2018). De Groot focuses on the Roman Catholic Church in the Netherlands. In the first part of his book, he criticizes Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity and his discussion of the role of religion. In Bauman’s view, the religious community is incompatible with liquid modernity except for fundamentalism. For De Groot, religion is still present in liquid modernity. He describes the Church as a hybrid organization. “In this manner, religion is crossing the boundaries of the parish and appears in other social contexts,” which he sees as “signs of ecclesial manoeuvres in liquid modernity” (De Groot, 2018, pp. 3-25). De Groot’s approach is different from Pete Ward (2002)’s concept of a liquid church. While Ward suggests that churches should adapt to liquid modernity, De Groot seeks to understand what it means for the Church to be part of liquid modernity. For De Groot, “the consequences of modernity are not only harsh for the way the Church is shaped, but also for the shaping of the Church itself. Liquid modernity may lead to a liquidation of the Church” (2018, p. 19).

One of the examples of the transition from a solid church to a liquid church is the case of chaplaincy in a hospital, prison or the army, in which the term “spiritual care” is used as an umbrella term for what chaplains from all denominations do (De Groot, 2018, p. 120). The use of the term “spiritual” is more inclusive of the term “religious”. In the Dutch language, the term “spiritual care” (*geestelijke verzorging*) “does not refer to the concept of ‘spirituality’, but to care (*zorg*) for the category of spirit and mind (*geest*) and to the common, inclusive word for the clergy (*geestelijken*)” (De Groot, 2018, p. 120).

In his book, De Groot (2018) discusses the concept of spirituality based on research on spiritual centers with a Christian background, conducted by the Tilburg research team. While the concept of spirituality was already known in the Christian tradition, “the phenomenon called *new spirituality* can be seen as the outcome of two trends in the religious landscape: pluralization and de-institutionalization” (2018, p. 99, *italics original*). The Tilburg research shows that their respondents (the visitors to Christian spiritual centers) “associate the term ‘religious’ with faith and commitment to a

religion, especially Christianity, while the term ‘spiritual’ is apparently connected to both the experiential dimension of religion and with a focus on the self. Spirituality can refer to both the Christian and other traditions” (De Groot, 2018, p. 106). The interest in spirituality, explains De Groot (2018, p. 99), “partly reflects diversity—in other words, the diminished dominance of the Christian religion—and partly reflects fluidity—in other words, a less binding and encompassing commitment to any institutional frameworks”.

My interviewees confirmed the result of the Tilburg research when they spoke about the “spirituality” of Dutch people, which refers to two things. First, spirituality that resonates with traditional religious faith, and second, spirituality that refers to the components of what Bakker et al. (2013) called “new spirituality”. The recent report of the SCP labels people with spiritual interests as “modern-day spirituals” (De Hart et al., 2022). My interviewees also confirmed the fact that the interest in spirituality such as new age or believing in paranormal issues is partly related to the decline of established religion and individualization. In addition to that, they also pointed out the interest in spirituality to deal with insecurity and loneliness. One interviewee mentioned “religious or spiritual community” as a common bond to deal with loneliness in the highly individualized Dutch society.

In the view of Indonesian immigrants, the fluidity of the religious or spiritual identity of people in the Netherlands, as shown in the studies of De Groot (2018) and Kalsky (2012; 2017), is the result of freedom of choice. They mentioned that as long as it is not against the law or bothering other people, an individual in the Netherlands is free to be religious or not, to have a choice in their sexual orientation, to marry or to live together with whoever they like, to have a child or not, to consume drugs, and to have euthanasia. All of these matters make the Netherlands not only secular and individualistic but also liberal.

Based on interviews with modern-day spirituals, agnostics and atheists on what gives their lives meaning, the recent SCP research finds that “for the modern-day spirituals, the most important thing is to develop and detach in order to come closer to their authentic core, whereas agnostics and atheists would rather enjoy life” (De Hart et al., 2022, p. 169). Both groups, which appear to be individualistic, are not interested in the “meaning of life” (usually provided by a religion) but more in the “meaning in life” in their own lives. One of my interviewees mentioned *zingeving* (giving meaning) when he spoke about spirituality as something different from religion. He also referred to the individualistic notion that “people feel more independent and private” when speaking about the declining role of churches.

Giving meaning to their lives themselves (meaning in life) provides individuals more freedom. Nevertheless, it also brings a possible consequence, namely great mental stress for the individual—for example, burn-outs, which may increase further in Dutch society (De Hart et al., 2022, p. 162). The possible consequence corresponds to the perspective of liquid modernity. In liquid modernity, the freedom of choice of an individual comes with its own risks because there is no one to rely on but himself. From the Indonesian immigrants' perspective, having unlimited choices while living an independent, structured, and highly individualistic life contributes to insecurity and loneliness.

Trans-modernity

The theory of trans-modernity offers a shift from Eurocentric to “a non-Eurocentric interpretation of the history of the world-system, a system only hegemonized by Europe for the last two hundred years” (Dussel & Fornazzari, 2002, p. 224). The term “trans-modernity” was coined by the Mexican historian and philosopher Enrique Dussel (2012). Dussel wrote about Latin American history, not from the centre of the world but “from the periphery”, from the perspective of marginalised people. Trans-modernity is anti-imperialist in the sense that it has a preference for peripheral voices of marginalized social groups or ethnic minorities. The notion of trans-modernity is useful in unfolding the non-western/non-European interpretation of modernity and its intercultural elements based on historical context. The notion of trans-modernity is more inclusive than both liquid modernity and multiple modernities as it takes the perspective of the non-western/non-European. It also offers “solidarity in place of hierarchy, solidarity even extended to European modernity” (Alcoff, 2012, p. 63).

Rogier Van Rossum criticized the Western “modernisation project” as “a civilizing mission” and embraced the notion of “transmodernism” (1995, pp. 147-149). In harmony with Van Rossum, Wijsen (2003) described the multicultural and pluralistic society in the Netherlands in terms of a “battle” or “struggle” over the “heritage of Enlightenment” and “the values of modernity”. Wijsen (2008, p. 45; 2009, p. 159) has also interpreted the “battle” over the “values of modernity” in terms of “trans-modernity”. In his view, “it is a battle about one of the fundamentals of modern society, the separation of rationality and religion” (Wijsen, 2003, p. 277). He has interpreted this battle in terms of “trans-modernity” (Wijsen, 2008, p. 45).

Trans-modernity is a transformation of modernity using resources of tradition. Trans-modernists are fed up with “old” interpretations of modernity that did not bring the peace and prosperity promised to the colonised peoples. They use their respective traditions to build up a better quality of life, to move beyond narrow-

minded interpretations of modernity to new societies where solidarity and consensus rule over European understandings of development and democracy, and where the dignity of the human persons have priority over their liberty. This is what one of my interviewees called “universal brotherhood”.

According to Sardar (2006, pp. 296-298), the notion of transmodernism introduces two shifts. First, it forces scholars to see non-Western cultures on their own terms, as part of a common future rather than as a backward past that must be modernised or civilised in Western ways. Sardar (2006, p. 297) mentions Indonesia as an example where non-Western cultures can modernise themselves. Second, trans-modernism introduces new ways of listening to non-Western cultures. It is not only the West that modernises the East, but the West has much to learn from the East. This is how Indonesian immigrants perceive modern Dutch society in terms of reciprocity and interdependence. Indonesian immigrants can learn, and they did learn from the Dutch. As seen in the previous chapters, interviewees stated how the experiences of living in the Netherlands have changed them. Some of them “became more open” towards “liberal” matters, “became more independent” and their life is “more structured”. Some others stated that they have become “more religious”, particularly because being religious is a choice, and they have the freedom to be religious or not. Interviewees with children learn from the Dutch to treat their children as equals and respect their children’s opinions.

The Dutch can also learn from the Indonesians. In his article *De rijkdom van een multiculturele gemeenschap* (2005), Paul de Blot suggested that the culture of the Dutch and the immigrants in the Netherlands could complement each other. He pointed out that the strengths of the immigrants in the Netherlands, the strong relationship and family ties and the inner sensitivity of the heart, are weak points of Dutch culture, that emphasize strong objectivity and I-orientation (De Blot, 2005, p. 84). De Blot spoke specifically about the strength of Indonesians and what the Dutch can learn from them.

Indonesians are more sensitive in listening to other people. [Indonesians use] listening language. Dutch people use the speaking language. Dutch people like to speak. [The Dutch say,] “You have to listen to me, but I don’t want to listen to you”. [...] Thus, it [having a listening language] is my strength because I am from Indonesia. I always listen. Indonesians never protest. They [Indonesians] stay silent. [When Indonesians] are annoyed [they] stay silent. That is the first strength of Indonesia. Second, the strength of Indonesia is kegotong-royongan (mutual assistance), always working together, and involving other people.

Third, Indonesians are clever in ngakalin (to outsmart something or someone). [Indonesians] always find a creative way [when they face an obstacle]. In the Netherlands [people] think rationally. Indonesians will find a creative way [of doing things] as long as it works out even though it is not rational (P. De Blot, personal communication, November 7, 2017; translation by the author).

De Blot's thinking can be seen as a trans-modern perspective. While suggesting what the Dutch and Indonesians can learn from each other, he used the resources of Indonesian tradition such as the concept of *kegotong-royongan* (mutual assistance) and the *waringin* (banyan tree) as a symbol of protection. Interviewees confirmed De Blot's statements as they also spoke about the difference between the I-oriented (individualized) Dutch culture and the relation-oriented (communal) Indonesian culture such as the *gotong-royong*. When asked what Indonesians can learn from the Dutch, De Blot said,

Learning to be more rational. Dutch people are more rational, therefore, Indonesians also have to learn. We [Indonesians] are too submissive. [Indonesians] must be brave enough to reason a lot. [...] In the Netherlands, there is a law. In Indonesia [there is a] connection. This is the difference. In the Netherlands, the law is blind. [...] In Indonesia the law [acts as a] waringin (banyan tree), therefore, everyone takes shelter under it. [The banyan tree] protects [people]. [...] The law in Indonesia is more of a protector than a punisher. Another thing is that Indonesians must be brave to defend themselves. [Indonesians] always give in, therefore, [they are] oppressed (personal communication, November 7, 2017; translation by the author).

In their discourse of secularization, liberalism, and individualism in the Netherlands, interviewees pointed to the implementation of law and the role of the Dutch state that gives freedom to individuals and protects individual rights, which are lacking in Indonesia. From the Indonesian immigrants' perspective, the Indonesian government can learn from the Netherlands.

Interviewees also pointed out that the Dutch can learn from Indonesians' flexibility and hospitality. One interviewee stated that Indonesians "win" on hospitality towards other people, in which an appointment to visit someone is not necessary, and the host will share food with the guests. Several interviewees pointed out that Indonesians have a flexible and adaptive attitude in adjusting to their surroundings. Muslim interviewees specifically called themselves "open-minded" and distinguished themselves from Muslims of Turkey and Moroccan descent who were not considered

open-minded. Muslim interviewees who called themselves open-minded confirm the study of Wijzen and Vos (2014) on Indonesian Muslims in the Hague who position themselves as being “more flexible” or “more open” and that they “are not like Arabs” who are “a bit strict”.

Indonesian immigrants’ perception of modern Dutch society is the result of a process of mutual learning in which they not only learn from the Dutch but also contribute to Dutch society. This is in harmony with Mahbubani’s (2008) analysis. In describing the “march to modernity”, Mahbubani (2008, pp. 162-163) mentions Indonesia as an example. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, and it shows rapid modernization and democratization. Although this study only looked at Indonesians in the Netherlands, results agree with Mahbubani’s (2008) analysis of the non-Western form of modernity. This study also finds that, according to the Indonesian immigrants, European secular modernity, at least in the case of the Netherlands, is not as secular as it seems. While Mahbubani conceptualizes the “march to modernity” in terms of “multiple modernities”, this study conceptualizes it in terms of “trans-modernity”, in which modernity has a preference for the peripheral voices of Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands. De Blot’s (2005) emphasis on the importance of complementary cultural elements between the Dutch and immigrants such as Indonesians, is an example of this. Interviewees pointed out the importance of independence for the Dutch (individuality), whereas Indonesians have the nature of being dependent on other people (communality). Using De Blot’s idea of complementarity, both sides can benefit and learn from each other through interdependency or having a mutually dependent relationship. It is what Dussel (1993) called “a process of mutual creative fertilization”. He wrote,

Trans-modernity (as a project of political, economic, ecological, erotic, pedagogical, and religious liberation) is the co-realization of that which it is impossible for modernity to accomplish by itself; that is of an *incorporative* solidarity, which I have called *analectic*, between center/periphery, man/woman, different races, different ethnic groups, different classes, civilization/nature, Western culture/Third World cultures, et cetera (Dussel, 1993, p. 76, italics original).

Most interviewees not only practice Dutch (Western) and Indonesian (Asian) values next to each other (multiplicity), but they also accept and elaborate on Dutch values, giving them a nuance of being modern and religious from an Indonesian perspective. This is in harmony with Mahbubani’s analysis (2008) of how people in Asian countries cope with modernity. Most interviewees implemented modernization while holding

on to religious values. While modernity embodies freedom and rights, protected and regulated by law, it also comprises matters prohibited in religion. According to Indonesian immigrants, modernity requires religions and religious laws to always be contextual and adaptive in responding to progress.

The Dutch debate on whether or not modernity can cope with religious otherness and whether or not modernity requires the eradication of religion from the public space is related to what Van Doorn pointed out as the dilemma of “Western civilizing mission” versus “respect for indigenous cultural (1995, p. 154) during the Dutch colonial past in Indonesia. The voices of Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands on the compatibility between religion and modernity, and the presence of religious values within secular modernity reflect voices from the Dutch colonial past. Interviewees’ understanding of the notions of religion and modernity, which play roles as their members’ resources in their discourse can be traced to the Dutch colonial past in Indonesia. During the colonial era, the Dutch brought with them European values of modernity including the concept of religion as part of their civilizing mission. The Indonesians accepted and adopted modernity, but not in its European form.

In Indonesia, Dutch colonialism and Islamic reform played a role in formulating and enacting modernities. Colonial modernisation was accompanied by Christianization. The resulting encounter with local Muslims was more or less peaceful in many cases. In fact, “different patterns of modernity overlapped rather than conflicted because European modernisers and Muslim reformers shared certain goals, such as improving living conditions and bringing order, justice and literacy to local populations” (Ali, 2016, p. 283). The so-called “Islamic Modernist” movements in Indonesia, most notably the organization called Muhammadiyah, which developed in the early 20th century, bear the characteristics of retaining and promoting Muslim identity while adopting the Dutch and Christian way of structuring their religious organizations (Azra, 2015). Prominent Muhammadiyah intellectuals such as Mukti Ali, who was the Minister of Religious Affairs from 1971 to 1978, and Kuntowijoyo, a professor of history at the Gadjah Mada University, were confident of the possibility of a fusion between Islam and modernity (Fuad, 2004, p. 409). Indonesian Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands share the view of Mukti Ali and Kuntowijoyo.

In a post-colonial and post-modern world, no culture can impose its worldviews on others. It is a non-dominating and non-apologetic, world. Interviewees agreed that Indonesians can learn from the Dutch experience, particularly the history of emancipation. They also indicated that the Dutch can learn from the Indonesians, particularly the principle that differences are complementary, not necessarily contradictory. There is the possibility of

mutual learning. The notion of “trans-modernity” offers the space for that learning. From the perspective of trans-modernity, the existence and voices of Indonesian immigrants not only add to the multicultural life of modern Dutch society but also function as a mirror reflecting voices from the Dutch colonial past (Van Doorn, 1995). Furthermore, a trans-modern perspective is in line with Fairclough’s shift from Foucault’s notion of power to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. According to Fairclough (1992, p. 58), Foucault’s notion of power is too deterministic. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is more dialectic. Hegemony²⁰⁵, according to Fairclough, “is about constructing alliances, and integrating, rather than simply dominating” (1992, p. 92).

3. Implications for the Netherlands – Indonesia Dialogue

This study was carried out in the context of the Consortium. The Consortium was initiated in Yogyakarta in 2010 during a meeting on theological education (Küster & Setio, 2014). Since 2010, the Consortium has developed into a network of Christian and Muslim scholars, religious leaders, and practitioners from Indonesia and the Netherlands. At the launch of the Indonesia-Netherlands Society in The Hague (March 22, 2012), the then-Indonesian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Retno Marsudi, referred to the Dutch picture of Indonesia as being an unstable, women-unfriendly, and corrupt country. In reaction to this, she stated that Indonesia has experienced economic growth of more than 6%, free media and gender balance. And she continued, “Today, Indonesia is registered among the 20 biggest economies in the world” and “Today, Indonesia is the third-largest democracy in the world” (Marsudi, 2012). Quoting the then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on her visit to Indonesia in 2009, Marsudi (2012) also added that Indonesia is a shining example of “women empowerment”.

On the same occasion, Nikolaas van Dam (2012), the then-Netherlands Ambassador to Indonesia, confirmed that Dutch people, in general, have little knowledge about present-day Indonesia, “Which Indonesia do the Dutch have in mind when they think of it? Is it a modern democratic Indonesia? Or is it something else? Something that once may have existed but is not there any longer?” Van Dam (2012) hoped that the Society could be instrumental in “bringing the peoples of modern Indonesia and the modern Netherlands closer together”. From a discourse-analytical perspective, the question is: What “modernity” did he have in mind? And does the word “modern” in the phrases “modern Indonesia” and “modern Netherlands” signify the same thing? Or is this utterance an example of multiple modernities?

²⁰⁵ Note that Fairclough uses the term “hegemony” differently from Dussel and Fornazzari (2002, p. 224), quoted earlier in this sub-section.

Looking at Dutch society from the perspective of Indonesian immigrants it can be stated that the Dutch are not “modern” in the way they think they are. First, they are not so secular. Interviewees pointed out that religious values are embedded in the Dutch culture and attitudes. Second, they are not so liberal as there is resistance from religious groups against abortion, and there are conservative Christian political parties, which promote traditional (family) roles for women. Interviewees also pointed out that religious people are not free to openly speak about their beliefs or to mention God in the public domain. Third, they are not so individualistic. Interviewees referred to the social security system in the Netherlands in dealing with poor people, and Dutch people’s care for animals and nature.

Interviewees stated that religious values are embedded in the Dutch culture and attitudes but that the Dutch themselves do not realize this. This is because they do not know what religion is anymore. Most young Dutch are “religious illiterates”. The Indonesians are educated in religion; thus, they know what religion is. Interviewees implied that the Dutch are more religious than they think.

The Notion of Religion

On closer inspection, the Indonesian mirror is more complex. The concept of religion that immigrants know from Indonesia, is the concept of religion that was constructed by the Dutch during the colonial era. It serves as a boomerang. This concept of religion is no longer taken for granted in the Netherlands, and it is also increasingly contested in Indonesia. Thus, the underlying question is not only what modernity is, but also what religion is. What religion are we talking about? The Indonesians did not have a word for religion in the pre-colonial era. Their religion came close to what we now would label mysticism. This is what interviewees call “religiosity”, or the subjective side of religion, such as when “religion” is not a bureaucratic category on the Identity Card but is an experience. Paul de Blot said,

Culturally, [Indonesians] do not have religion (tidak beragama) but believe in a divine lordship (bertuhan). Pancasila is about lordship (ketuhanan), not religion (agama). [...] In Indonesia, the basic is lordship. It does not matter whether someone is a Catholic or a Protestant. They can convert. A Catholic can convert to Islam when he or she is married to a Muslim. He or she converts to Islam but he or she still follows the Catholic priest[s] teaching]. That is typical of Indonesia (personal communication, November 7, 2017; translation by the author).

In this context, Indonesians can also be categorized as flexible or multiple believers (Kalsky & Pruim, 2014; Kalsky, 2017). As mentioned earlier, the distinction between “religion” and “belief” in Indonesia (Fachrudin, 2017; Butt, 2020) influenced interviewees’ perceptions of the notion of religion, religiosity, and spirituality in the Netherlands. Their perception is a consequence of the shifted meaning of organized religion (*agama*). It is also a consequence of the problematic relationship between the concept of *agama* and *adat* (‘folk’ beliefs) (Hidayah, 2012)-a legacy of colonial knowledge production-, as well as the Indonesian government’s control of religion and religious life in Indonesia. These consequences play roles as interviewees’ members’ resources in their discourse of religion and modernity in the Netherlands. From the perspective of Indonesians in the Netherlands, organized religion (*agama*) in the Netherlands is rapidly declining in terms of people’s affiliation with religious institutions. Nevertheless, Dutch people are “very religious” in the sense of the implementation of religious values beyond religious institutions.

Tolerance

The official Indonesian recognition of seven religions and excluding other religions are related to the issue of religious tolerance. This is an issue that the Consortium has been working on since 2010, both in the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Consortium has concluded that tolerance is costly and cannot be taken for granted. Sixteen contributors, eleven from Indonesia and five from the Netherlands contributed to the Consortium-book *Costly Tolerance* (Suhadi, 2018). Both the Netherlands and Indonesia have a problem with tolerance. Kennedy and Valenta referred to Dutch tolerance as

a *structural* tolerance, that mediated the relations between communities of belief (and unbelief) without requiring that individual members be particularly tolerant. In fact, one could argue quite the opposite: that the separate but equal institutions of Dutch pillarized society enabled the equitable distribution of government monies and support *across* communities while stimulating an intense distrust and intolerance *between* communities, particularly at the individual and ideological level (2006, p. 348, italics original).

The Dutch have been living in pillarized societies (Lijphart, 1968) or parallel societies without disturbing each other and calling themselves tolerant. This is what is often called cheap tolerance, namely indifference or tolerance that avoids encounters with “other people”. The presence of the non-Western Muslim minority in the Netherlands tests the tolerance of Dutch society. Indonesian immigrants pointed to the relationship between the individualistic notion of not interfering in other people’s life with religious

tolerance in the Netherlands. While most interviewees labelled the Dutch “very tolerant” in the way that they are respectful, one interviewee said some Dutch are “less tolerant” because there is “an element of harassment” against religious people.

On the tolerance and core values of Turkish Muslims in Dutch society, Speelman (2018, p. 203), in the above-mentioned Consortium book, states,

Most Turkish Dutch citizens are for instance tolerant, but not affirmative of homosexuality, an attitude that may be related to their adherence to religious organizations. Should the Dutch government see their disapproval as intolerable in a modern society, and therefore supervise Turkish religious organizations on a permanent basis?

In the context of Indonesia, Bagir (2018, p. 153), in the above-mentioned Consortium book, drawing on Alfred Stepan’s (2011) concept of “twin toleration”, described the relationship between religion and state in Indonesia as a category of “respect all”. This delineation means Indonesia “applies inclusive interfaith positive accommodations” (Bagir, 2018, p. 153; translation by the author). Although Indonesia has a large Muslim majority, Islam is not chosen as the state’s official religion. This can be seen as an example of costly tolerance. Nationalist Muslims in Indonesia proposed dropping the obligation to practice Islamic law for adherents of Islam, as well as the clause in the constitution that required the president to be Muslim, as a token of empathy and tolerance towards the citizens of Eastern Indonesia, who were non-Muslims. Costly tolerance happens “when a person or a group has the power to exert pressure, but they do not” (Suhadi, 2018, pp. 4-5; translation by the author).

For Muslims in Indonesia, living side by side with Catholics or Protestants is very common and can be called cheap tolerance. However, living side by side with stigmatized religious groups, such as Ahmadiya and Shia, is costly in the sense that one cannot take tolerance for granted. One must invest time and energy in living side by side with stigmatized religious groups. It is cheaper and easier not to discuss sensitive differences. It is safer to obey the traditional views adopted by many people. If one dares to disturb, he will get resistance in the form of rejection, slander, or considered betraying his community itself.

Religious Education

One way of enhancing costly tolerance is inclusive education. This is another issue that the Consortium has been working on from its very beginning. In Indonesia, religious education is compulsory for every student. The Indonesian government

uses the so-called mono-religious approach (Yusuf & Sterkens, 2015) or the exclusive model, in which a Muslim student will study Islam from a Muslim teacher. This exclusive model applies to students of other religions. The purpose of religious education in Indonesia is to instil religious doctrine in students to make them devout Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, Hindus and Confucians. In contrast to the Netherlands, religious education in Indonesia can be seen as “too religious”.

Religious education in the Netherlands has become an education on a generic “worldview” (Vermeer, 2013; Bertram-Troost & Visser, 2020). My interviewees pointed out the lack of knowledge about religion and religious traditions (religious illiteracy), particularly among young people in the Netherlands. Religious education in the Netherlands is regulated through Article 23 in the Dutch Constitution about freedom of education (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2019). The article allows the establishment of schools based on recognized religions and other convictions. The Dutch government subsidizes confessional schools. In the Netherlands, there has been a debate around Article 23, particularly on the existence of confessional schools and the necessity of religious education (Vermeer, 2013) and the Dutch state’s funding for confessional schools (Kennedy & Valenta, 2006).

Contrary to the Indonesian government’s attitude towards and involvement in regulating religion, the Dutch government takes an “impartial” stance towards religion and belief (Van Bijsterveld, 2010). In practice, the Dutch state has not been neutral concerning religion and, in fact, it is almost impossible to fully separate state and religion (Kennedy & Valenta 2006, pp. 337, 349). The debates related to Article 23 about state funding for religious education in the Netherlands, according to Kennedy and Valenta,

... derives not only, and perhaps not even primarily, from the issue of church-state relations as such, but rather from the question of how to transmit Dutch national identity, values and ways of life in the face of what might be called an increasing ‘intimacy’ and direct intermingling between Western and non-Western peoples, cultures and institutions in the Netherlands (2006, p. 339).

The presence of non-Western religious communities, particularly Islam, in the Netherlands challenges the religion-state relationship. The issue of education is central to this relationship. The interest in promoting the integration of Islamic minorities is not a new development. Kennedy and Valenta (2006) pointed out the rarely recalled aspect of Dutch colonial history, namely the encounter between Western and non-Western religions and how the Dutch government dealt with Islam in the Dutch East Indies through the advice of Snouck Hurgronje.

That is to say, considering Dutch late nineteenth-and twentieth-century history, we see a tendency to officially recognize at the domestic level, including in the field of education, both (Christian) religious difference and political difference while at the same time attempting in the colonial setting to secularize or bypass (Islamic) religious difference, to repress (indigenous) political difference and in all cases to prevent a political Islam (Kennedy & Valenta, 2006, p. 344).

The centrality of Islam in the historic encounter between the Netherlands and the Muslims in the Dutch East Indies has been “repressed” in the popular Dutch imagination. As a result, the majority of Dutch today “consider the recent arrival of a sizable Muslim minority in the Netherlands as the first encounter between Dutch society and Islam, and more specifically, between the Dutch state and Islamic education” (Kennedy & Valenta, 2006, p. 345).

While the Dutch and Indonesian contexts of religious education are very different, both countries can learn from each other, and their shared colonial past. Since 2016, the Consortium has been working on the issue of inclusive religious education by organising three conferences. Seven articles on inclusive religious education, four on the Netherlands and three on Indonesia were published as a special edition of the journal *Studies in Interreligious Dialogue* (Bagir et al., 2019). One of the articles in this journal called for a deeper reflection on the need for a broader, more inclusive understanding of what constitutes “religion” (De Vlieger, 2019).

The Separation of Religion and State

Within the discussion of religious education, the separation of religion and state has arisen. The Dutch Government is reluctant to interfere too much in religious education because it does not want to violate the independence of religious institutions. Some religious teachers, school leaders, trainers, and researchers,²⁰⁶ however, want the Dutch Government to be involved more and make religion an ordinary subject in the school curriculum, to be taught in all schools (Davidsen, 2022). This is to overcome the “religious illiteracy” that was mentioned before. The separation of church and state and their mutual independence was referred to by various interviewees as the core principle of modern society, for example in the case of marriage and schooling. But the relationship between religion and state has to be revised from the perspective of interdependence as well.

Between 2011 and 2022, the Consortium organized seven inter-faith dialogues. Since 2013, these inter-faith dialogues are organized in collaboration with the Netherlands

²⁰⁶ <https://lervo.nl/>

Embassy in Jakarta and the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague. From the Dutch side, there has been hesitation from the perspective of the separation of religion and state. State officials say that the Netherlands is a secular state. If the Dutch government is involved in religious affairs, it is from the perspective of de-radicalization and safeguarding freedom of religion. From the Indonesian side, the inter-faith dialogues have to be understood in the context of the public or soft diplomacy program of the Indonesian government (Affandi & Asad, 2019). Its mission is to spread the message that Indonesia is a living example that Islam and modernity are compatible.

On the one hand, public–private partnership is a “modern” idea in liberal and post-secular societies. Governments and religious institutions can collaborate in achieving public goals. On the other hand, governments and religious institutions must safeguard their independence. In organizing bilateral interfaith dialogues, the Consortium faces the dilemma that collaboration with the Dutch and the Indonesian governments increases the impact. Nevertheless, it is important not to be too close to these governments and be corrupted by them, by spreading their messages and state ideologies, whether they are the secular or religious.

Learning from the “mirror” of Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands, we can overcome this dilemma. In Indonesia, the government is too much involved in religious affairs. Religion is predominantly private (micro-level of discourse). In the Netherlands, religious institutions do play a role in the public domain (meso-level of discourse) while government involvement in religious affairs is too little. However, recently there has been more government involvement. In July 2019, Ambassador Jos Douma was appointed the first Netherlands’ Special Envoy for Religion and Belief. Moreover, there is a debate about reintroducing a Department of Religious Affairs within the Ministry of Legal Affairs (Steenvoorde & Ballin, 2013).

From a trans-modern perspective, Indonesian immigrants show that the Dutch can move from the modern value of independence to the value of interdependence and reciprocity in all respects, also in the issue of government and religion. Kennedy and Valenta (2006) write that on the one hand, abolishing Article 23 and stopping state intervention in religion completely would be a break with Dutch history. On the other hand, going back to the pillar system is unrealistic. The trans-modern value of interdependence can be a way forward. Thus, following Van Doorn’s suggestion (1995) to look at the Dutch colonial experiences in the Netherlands East Indies as a mirror to the post-war Netherlands, the presence, voices, and experiences of current Indonesian immigrants can be fruitful for the knowledge and assessment of the Dutch on religious issues in the Dutch society.



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EPILOGUE

Epilogue

Conducting research, writing, and finishing a doctoral dissertation come with considerable struggles and have pushed many to their limits. One of the aims of most researchers, like me, is to contribute to a wider knowledge base. In my case, conducting research on the discourse of an immigrant group to which I belong, in and about a country, that I now call my second home, has been both a rewarding and challenging process. While doing this research, I gained more knowledge not only about the Netherlands but also about my first home, Indonesia. My perception of the Netherlands as an Indonesian immigrant and a researcher has been challenged, enriched, shaped and reshaped by this research.

When I told my Dutch friends and acquaintances that I am conducting research on religion and modernity in the Netherlands, the most common reaction I received was, “Interesting” followed by an awkward silence as they either not knowing what else to say further, or having no interest in the topic despite saying that it is interesting. When I told my Indonesian friends about my research topic, the most common reaction was, “Which religion do you focus on?” These responses correlate to what some of my interviewees said. The Dutch “do not talk about religion” while Indonesians speak about organized religions.

Implementing Fairclough's three-dimensional model of CDA turned out to be a complex and challenging process as it requires a critical engagement between text and context, or between linguistic features and social practice mediated by discursive practice. During the process of data analysis, when an interviewee said something (text) that was unclear or unfinished, I could not simply interpret or clarify what was said, using a dictionary-based view of meaning. I had to look at the whole text and its context carefully. In Fairclough's CDA, the meaning of a word or a sentence is embedded in the usage. It is not about correctness or incorrectness. It is about how a speaker uses a word or a sentence, and what references (members' resources) he draws upon. Future researchers who will use Fairclough's CDA approach to analyse their data interview should keep the three-dimensional model of analysis in mind when conducting an interview. It will help them uncover more underlying ideas/ ideologies/power dynamics that shape their interviewees' language use. CDA is not only data analysis but also data generation.

While Fairclough's CDA has proven to be a powerful tool to understand some important aspects of Indonesian immigrants' discourse on religion and modernity, it may have caused the analysis to appear overwhelmingly repetitive for the readers.

It is because similar texts are used in all three stages of analysis although the focus of each stage is different. For future research, a combination of the analysis of discourse as discursive practice and social practice may be more effective, so readers do not have to see the same texts again and again.

A slightly similar remark applies to the micro, meso and macro-levels of discourse. From a CDA point of view, the distinction between these levels of discourse serves to clarify seemingly contrasting perceptions from different positions of the same speaker on a certain topic. For example, an interviewee identifies the Netherlands as a secular country (macro-level of discourse) but experiences in the everyday interaction that Dutch people are religious (micro-level of discourse). Correlations between these levels in the three-dimensional model of discourse analysis remain unclear.

This research is a qualitative case study that makes general insights on religion and modernity more concrete by studying a specific immigrant community. Although the scale is small, with a limited number of people, the findings of this research reveal a hidden dimension, such as the values of religion, that do not appear in statistics about religion and religious life in the Netherlands. To get a statistically representative form of data, quantitative research is needed. The findings of this research could be fruitful for future research, quantitative and qualitative or even a combination of both. The findings also lead to more new questions that can be investigated in future research, such as how to interpret cultural Christianity, as well as other related topics on religion, religiosity, and modernity from the perspective of both immigrant communities and the Dutch themselves.

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Informants

No	Abbreviation	Sex	Interview location & Date	Religious affiliation	Additional information
1	AM1	M	Yogyakarta, Indonesia January 18, 2016	Atheist Family background: Islam	Back in Indonesia since 2013 but travelling back and forth between Indonesia and the Netherlands for work.
2	AM2	M	Rotterdam June 13, 2016	Atheist Family background: Islam	n/a
3	CM1	M	Breukelen November 7, 2017	Catholic	n/a
4	CM2	M	Den Haag November 10, 2019	Catholic	n/a
5	CW1	F	Eindhoven May 11, 2016	Catholic	n/a
6	CW2	F	Den Haag November 17, 2019	Catholic	n/a
7	MM1	M	Nijmegen May 13, 2015	Islam	Husband of MW3
8	MM2	M	Yogyakarta, Indonesia December 23, 2015	Islam	Back in Indonesia since 2013 but travelling back and forth between Indonesia and the Netherlands for work.
9	MM3	M	Yogyakarta, Indonesia December 27, 2015	Islam	Back in Indonesia since 2007 but travelling back and forth between Indonesia and the Netherlands for work.
10	MM4	M	Yogyakarta, Indonesia January 17, 2016	Islam	Back in Indonesia since 2015 but travelling back and forth between Indonesia and the Netherlands for work.
11	MM5	M	Nijmegen June 14, 2016	Islam	n/a
12	MM6	M	Leiden November 30, 2018	Islam	n/a
13	MW1	F	Eindhoven May 2, 2015	Islam	n/a
14	MW2	F	Eindhoven May 2, 2015	Islam	n/a
15	MW3	F	Nijmegen May 13, 2015	Islam	Wife of MM1
16	MW4	F	Nijmegen May 17, 2016	Islam	n/a
17	MW5	F	Leiden June 6, 2016	Islam	n/a

No	Abbreviation	Sex	Interview location & Date	Religious affiliation	Additional information
18	MW6	F	Nijmegen June 15, 2016	Islam	n/a
19	MW7	F	Eindhoven March 24, 2019	Islam	n/a
20	NM1	M	Yogyakarta, Indonesia January 18, 2016	Not practicing Family background: Refused to say	Back in Indonesia since 2012 but travelling back and forth between Indonesia and the Netherlands for work.
21	NW1	F	Eindhoven May 13, 2016	Not practicing Family background: Hindu	n/a
22	NW2	F	Eindhoven November 28, 2016	Not practicing Family background: Islam	n/a
23	NW3	F	Amsterdam December 10, 2017	Not practicing Family background: Confucianism	n/a
24	PM1	M	Nijmegen May 12, 2016	Protestant	n/a
25	PM2	M	Amsterdam December 1, 2019	Protestant	Husband of PW5
26	PW1	F	Eindhoven June 18, 2016	Protestant	n/a
27	PW2	F	Leiden June 17, 2016	Protestant	n/a
28	PW3	F	Leiden June 6, 2016	Protestant	n/a
29	PW4	F	Yogyakarta, Indonesia July 28 & 29, 2017	Protestant	Back in Indonesia since 2010 but travelling back and forth between Indonesia and the Netherlands for work.
30	PW5	F	Amsterdam December 1, 2019	Protestant	Wife of PM2

TOTAL: 30

Atheist (A): 2

Catholic (C): 4

Muslim (M): 13

Not Practicing (N): 4

Protestant (P): 7

Woman: 17

Man: 13

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

Introduction

- a) Introduction
 - Interviewer name
 - A PhD student at the Radboud University
 - Conducting a PhD research on religion and modernity in the Netherlands from the perspective of Indonesian immigrants
 - A short explanation of the research topic and the relevance of the research
- b) Explanation of the interview
 - Thanking the interviewee for his/her willingness to be interviewed
 - Asking if he/she agrees that the interview will be recorded
 - Explaining the anonymity of their name in the thesis

Interviewee Background

1. Can you tell me your age, education, and current occupation?
2. Do you practice religion? If yes, which religion?
3. When did you come to the Netherlands?
4. For what reason did you come to the Netherlands?
5. How long have you been living in the Netherlands?

Impression of the Netherlands

1. What did you know about the Netherlands before you came?
2. What was your impression of the Netherlands when you first arrived?
3. What are your impression of the Netherlands and Dutch society now? Has your impression of the Netherlands changed after you live here?
4. What is your impression of the Dutch people?
5. How is your interaction with Dutch people?

Religious life in the Netherlands

1. What can you say about religious life in the Netherlands? What is your impression?
2. Does religion exist in the life of Dutch people?
3. Do you think the Dutch are religious? Can you give an example?
4. Is religion public or private in the Netherlands?
5. Do you think religious life in the Netherlands is different from Indonesia? Why?
6. Do you think the Dutch are secular? Can you give an example?
7. Do you think the Netherlands is secular? Can you give an example?
8. Do you think the Netherlands is a religious country? Can you give an example?

9. Can a person be religious and modern at the same time?
10. Do you talk about religion with Dutch people?
11. How is Dutch people's acceptance of religious people?
12. What can you say about Islam in the Netherlands?
13. (To Muslim interviewees) How is your experience living in the Netherlands as a Muslim?
14. What do you think of Geert Wilders?
15. Do you or will you teach your children religion?

Social life in the Netherlands

1. What can you say about tolerance in the Netherlands?
2. Do you think the Dutch are tolerant?
3. How are the relationships between a man and a woman in the Netherlands?
4. What can you say about the marriage procedure in the Netherlands?
5. What do you think of abortion, cohabitation, drugs, same-sex marriage, prostitution, and euthanasia in the Netherlands? What is your opinion on those matters?
6. Do you think the Dutch are liberal? Can you give an example?
7. Is it difficult to enter Dutch society? Why?
8. Do you think the Dutch are individualistic? Can you give an example?
9. What can you say about the relationships between Dutch parents and their children?
10. Is it difficult to adjust to life in the Netherlands?
11. How is Dutch people's acceptance towards foreigners?
12. Have you ever experienced discrimination? If so, how?

Netherlands-Indonesia

1. Do you think Indonesians integrate easily into Dutch society? Why?
2. Do you think you have changed after living here?
3. What can the Netherlands learn from Indonesia?
4. What can Indonesia learn from the Netherlands?

Closing

- Thanking the interviewee for his/her insights and cooperation.

Summary

In the Dutch debate on religion in the public arena, Indonesian immigrants tend to be neglected, as the debate concentrates on Muslim immigrants, particularly from Morocco and Turkey. This study examines the discourse of Indonesian immigrants about religion and modernity in the Netherlands. It aims to acquire further insight into the relationship between religion and modernity and to contribute to the theories of modernity in the light of non-Western immigrants from a post-colonial perspective. Indonesian immigrants in the Netherlands have at least two relevant characteristics. First, they share a colonial history with Dutch society. Secondly, their perception of the compatibility of religion and modernity is in contrast to the general perception of secular Dutch society. The main question to be answered in this research is: Does the notion of modernity in the light of Indonesian immigrants need a revision?

In exploring the notion of modernity through the perception of Indonesian immigrants, this study focuses on the concept of “multiple modernities”. Authors such as Eisenstadt (2003) and Mahbubani (2008) claim that non-Western societies accepted modernity but not its European form. The key argument of the advocates of the concept of “multiple modernities” is that modernity comes in various forms and is contingent on culture and historical circumstances. Modernity is not an exclusively Western phenomenon.

The main material for this research was generated by interviewing thirty people (research participants) within the Indonesian community: seventeen women and thirteen men. This research uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed by Norman Fairclough (1992) as a method to analyse the data. Inspired by the three-dimensional model of Fairclough’s CDA, the sub-questions of this study are: (a) How do Indonesian immigrants speak about religion and modernity? (b) What mental models do they draw upon? and (c) How do they position Dutch society (macro) and Dutch people (micro) in relation to themselves?

The study found that the discourse of Indonesian immigrants touched upon several defining aspects of modernity. Interviewees did not speak directly about the terms “modern” and “modernity” in their relation to religion but about issues commonly related to them, namely secularization, liberal values, individualism, rationality, freedom, and tolerance. Indonesian immigrants repeatedly spoke about or referred to the role of the state and the implementation of the law as core ideas in a modern state. Modernity in the Netherlands, for Indonesian immigrants, is about freedom of choice within legal limits guaranteed by the state. This study also showed that

according to the interviewees, modernity and religiosity are compatible. In their discourse, interviewees did not speak specifically about institutional religions in the Netherlands but about the Dutch's religiosity, spirituality, and religious values. On the one hand, they called the Dutch state "very secular" and "very liberal", and on the other hand, they described the Dutch as spiritual and adhering to religious values, which are embedded in Dutch "institutions", "policies" (meso and macro-level of discourse), and "attitudes" (micro-level of discourse). Muslim interviewees said that the Dutch adhere to "universal" and "Islamic" values. Interviewees showed religious values outside of the religious sphere, which is often overlooked when scrutinizing the religious and secular discourse of modern societies.

The author concludes that the notion of modernity in the context of multiple modernities needs revision because, according to Indonesian immigrants' perception, European modernity is not as secular as Europeans themselves claim. It is not a secular Europe versus the religious rest of the world. The boundaries between the religious and secular domains in Europe, in this case, the Netherlands, are blurred. Therefore, this study proposes to look at modernity from different theoretical perspectives, namely the theories of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000) and trans-modernity (Dussel, 2012), which are useful to explore the findings to further develop the research.

From the perspective of liquid modernity, today's society is more fluid, and individuals are "free" to "shop around" in the "supermarket of identities" (Bauman, 2000). When speaking of religious rituals such as performing prayer and going to church or mosque, my interviewees pointed out the difference between the Indonesians and the Dutch. According to them, in Indonesia, "worship is an obligation", and observing religion is related to "social pressure". In the Netherlands, people who are religious practice religion "with conviction, with consciousness" because "worship is a choice" and "observing religion is an individual's intention", and not the result of social pressure. According to the interviewees, Dutch religious ritual is not only in contrast to the "Indonesian type" but also goes beyond that. Beyond ritual does not mean that the Dutch are not religious. On the contrary, the Dutch are "very religious" because religious values, such as tolerance, freedom, justice, and respect are already embedded in the life of the Dutch. In this case, Indonesian immigrants point to the permeable boundaries of religion. Furthermore, in liquid modernity, the freedom of choice of an individual comes with its own risks because there is no one to rely on but himself. From the Indonesian immigrants' perspective, having freedom of choice within legal limits guaranteed by the state while living an independent, structured, and highly individualistic life contributes to insecurity and loneliness.

The notion of trans-modernity takes the perspective of the non-western/non-European. It introduces new ways of listening to non-Western cultures. It is not only the West that modernises the East, but the West can also learn from the East. This is how Indonesian immigrants perceive modern Dutch society in terms of reciprocity and interdependence. In a post-colonial and post-modern world, no culture can impose its worldviews on others. It is a non-dominating and non-apologetic, world. Interviewees agreed that Indonesians can learn from the Dutch experience, particularly the history of emancipation. They also indicated that the Dutch can learn from the Indonesians, particularly the principle that differences are complementary, not necessarily contradictory. The notion of “trans-modernity” offers the space for that learning. From the perspective of trans-modernity, the existence and voices of Indonesian immigrants not only add to the multicultural life of modern Dutch society but also function as a mirror reflecting voices from the Dutch colonial past (Van Doorn, 1995).

This study also reflects on how insights gained in this research enhance the dialogue between the Netherlands and Indonesia, especially in the context of the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations. The concept of religion that immigrants know from Indonesia is the concept of religion constructed by the Dutch during the colonial era. It serves as a boomerang. This concept of religion is no longer taken for granted in the Netherlands, and it is also increasingly contested in Indonesia. Thus, the underlying question is not only what modernity is but also what religion is. What religion are we talking about? The Indonesians did not have a word for religion in the pre-colonial era. Their religion came close to what we now would label mysticism. This is what interviewees call “religiosity”, or the subjective side of religion, such as when “religion” is not a bureaucratic category on the Identity Card but is an experience.

Looking at Dutch society from the perspective of Indonesian immigrants it can be stated that the Dutch are not “modern” in the way they think they are. First, they are not so secular. Interviewees pointed out that religious values are embedded in the Dutch culture and attitudes. Second, they are not so liberal as there is resistance from religious groups against abortion, and there are conservative Christian political parties, which promote traditional (family) roles for women. Interviewees also pointed out that religious people are not free to openly speak about their beliefs or to mention God in the public domain. Third, they are not so individualistic. Interviewees referred to the social security system in the Netherlands in dealing with poor people and Dutch people’s care for animals and nature.

From a trans-modern perspective, Indonesian immigrants show that the Dutch can move from the modern value of independence to the value of interdependence and reciprocity in all respects, as well as in the issue of government and religion. The presence of non-Western religious communities, particularly Islam, in the Netherlands challenges the religion-state relationship. The trans-modern value of interdependence can be a way forward. The presence, voices, and experiences of current Indonesian immigrants can be fruitful for the knowledge and assessment of the Dutch on religious issues in Dutch society.

Samenvatting

In het Nederlandse debat over religie in de publieke arena worden Indonesische immigranten vaak verwaarloosd, omdat het debat zich concentreert op moslimimmigranten, vooral uit Marokko en Turkije. Deze studie onderzoekt het discours van Indonesische immigranten over religie en moderniteit in Nederland. Het beoogt verder inzicht te verwerven in de relatie tussen religie en moderniteit en een bijdrage te leveren aan de theorieën over moderniteit in het licht van niet-westerse immigranten vanuit postkoloniaal perspectief. Indonesische immigranten in Nederland hebben minstens twee relevante kenmerken. Ten eerste delen ze een koloniale geschiedenis met de Nederlandse samenleving. Ten tweede is hun perceptie op de verenigbaarheid van religie en moderniteit in strijd met de algemene perceptie van de seculiere Nederlandse samenleving. De belangrijkste vraag die in dit onderzoek wordt beantwoord is: Heeft het begrip moderniteit in het licht van Indonesische immigranten een herziening nodig?

Bij het verkennen van het begrip moderniteit via de perceptie van Indonesische immigranten, concentreert deze studie zich op het concept van “multiple modernities (meervoudige moderniteiten)”. Auteurs als Eisenstadt (2003) en Mahbubani (2008) beweren dat niet-westerse samenlevingen de moderniteit accepteerden, maar niet de Europese vorm ervan. Het belangrijkste argument van de voorstanders van het concept van “multiple modernities” is dat moderniteit verschillende vormen kent en afhankelijk is van cultuur en historische omstandigheden. Moderniteit is geen exclusief westers fenomeen.

Het belangrijkste materiaal voor dit onderzoek is ontstaan door het interviewen van dertig mensen (onderzoeksdeelnemers) binnen de Indonesische gemeenschap: zeventien vrouwen en dertien mannen. Dit onderzoek maakt gebruik van Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), ontwikkeld door Norman Fairclough (1992), als methode om de gegevens te analyseren. Geïnspireerd door het driedimensionale model van Faircloughs CDA zijn de deelvragen van dit onderzoek: (a) Hoe spreken Indonesische immigranten over religie en moderniteit? (b) Op welke mentale modellen baseren zij zich? en (c) Hoe positioneren zij de Nederlandse samenleving (macro) en de Nederlander (micro) ten opzichte van zichzelf?

Uit het onderzoek bleek dat het discours van Indonesische immigranten verschillende bepalende aspecten van de moderniteit benoemde. De geïnterviewden spraken niet rechtstreeks over de termen ‘modern’ en ‘moderniteit’ in hun relatie tot religie, maar over kwesties die daar gewoonlijk mee verband houden, namelijk secularisatie,

liberale waarden, individualisme, rationaliteit, vrijheid en tolerantie. Indonesische immigranten spraken herhaaldelijk over of verwezen naar de rol van de staat en de implementatie van het recht als kernideeën in een moderne staat. De moderniteit in Nederland gaat voor Indonesische immigranten over keuzevrijheid binnen door de staat gegarandeerde wettelijke grenzen. Uit dit onderzoek bleek ook dat volgens de geïnterviewden moderniteit en religiositeit verenigbaar zijn. In hun discours spraken de geïnterviewden niet specifiek over institutionele religies in Nederland, maar over de religiositeit, spiritualiteit en religieuze waarden in Nederland. Aan de ene kant noemden ze de Nederlandse staat ‘zeer seculier’ en ‘zeer liberaal’, en aan de andere kant beschreven ze de Nederlanders als spiritueel en vasthoudend aan religieuze waarden, die ingebed zijn in de Nederlandse ‘instellingen’, ‘beleid’ (meso- en macroniveau van het discours) en ‘attitudes’ (het microniveau van het discours). Moslim-geïnterviewden zeiden dat Nederlanders ‘universele’ en ‘islamitische’ waarden aanhangen. De geïnterviewden lieten religieuze waarden zien die buiten de religieuze sfeer lagen, wat vaak over het hoofd wordt gezien bij het onderzoeken van het religieuze en seculiere discours van moderne samenlevingen.

De auteur concludeert dat het begrip moderniteit in de context van meervoudige moderniteiten herziening behoeft, omdat, volgens de perceptie van Indonesische immigranten, de Europese moderniteit niet zo seculier is als de Europeanen zelf beweren. Het is niet een seculier Europa versus de religieuze rest van de wereld. De grenzen tussen het religieuze en het seculiere domein in Europa, in dit geval Nederland, zijn vervaagd. Daarom stelt deze studie voor om naar moderniteit te kijken vanuit verschillende theoretische perspectieven, namelijk die van *liquid modernity* (de vloeibare moderniteit) (Bauman, 2000) en *trans-modernity* (de transmoderniteit) (Dussel, 2012), die nuttig zijn om de bevindingen van het onderzoek verder te ontwikkelen.

Vanuit het perspectief van *liquid modernity* is de huidige samenleving vloeibaarder en zijn individuen ‘vrij’ om ‘rond te shoppen’ in de ‘supermarkt van identiteiten’ (Bauman, 2000). Als ik sprak over religieuze rituelen zoals bidden en naar de kerk of moskee gaan, wezen mijn geïnterviewden op het verschil tussen Indonesiërs en Nederlanders. Volgens hen is in Indonesië het “praktiseren van religie een verplichting” en is het vasthouden eraan ook een gevolg van “sociale druk”. In Nederland praktiseren mensen die gelovig zijn religie ‘met overtuiging, met bewustzijn’ omdat ‘geloven een keuze is’ en ‘het vasthouden aan religie de wil van een individu is’, en niet het gevolg van sociale druk. Volgens de geïnterviewden staat het Nederlandse religieuze ritueel niet alleen in contrast met het ‘Indonesische type’, maar gaat het ook verder dan dat. Voorbij het ritueel betekent niet dat Nederlanders

niet religieus zijn. Integendeel, Nederlanders zijn “zeer religieus” omdat religieuze waarden, zoals tolerantie, vrijheid, rechtvaardigheid en respect al ingebed zijn in het leven van de Nederlanders. In dit geval wijzen Indonesische immigranten op de poreuze grenzen van religie. Bovendien brengt de keuzevrijheid van een individu in *liquid modernity* zijn eigen risico's met zich mee, omdat er niemand is waarop hij kan vertrouwen behalve zichzelf. Vanuit het perspectief van de Indonesische immigranten draagt de keuzevrijheid binnen de door de staat gegarandeerde wettelijke grenzen, bij aan onzekerheid en eenzaamheid. Mensen leiden een onafhankelijk, gestructureerd en zeer individualistisch bestaan.

Het begrip *trans-modernity* neemt het perspectief van het niet-westerse/niet-Europese in. Het introduceert nieuwe manieren om naar niet-westerse culturen te luisteren. Het is niet alleen het Westen dat het Oosten moderniseert, maar het Westen kan ook veel van het Oosten leren. Dit is hoe Indonesische immigranten de moderne Nederlandse samenleving waarnemen in termen van wederkerigheid en onderlinge afhankelijkheid. In een postkoloniale en postmoderne wereld kan geen enkele cultuur haar wereldbeelden aan anderen opleggen. Het is een niet-dominante en niet-apologetische wereld. Geïnterviewden waren het erover eens dat Indonesiërs kunnen leren van de Nederlandse ervaring, met name van de geschiedenis van de emancipatie. Ze gaven ook aan dat Nederlanders van de Indonesiërs kunnen leren, vooral het principe dat verschillen complementair zijn en niet noodzakelijkerwijs tegenstrijdig. Het begrip ‘transmoderniteit’ biedt de ruimte voor dat leren. Vanuit het perspectief van *trans-modernity* dragen de aanwezigheid en de stemmen van Indonesische immigranten niet alleen bij aan het multiculturele leven van de moderne Nederlandse samenleving, maar functioneren ze ook als een spiegel die stemmen uit het Nederlandse koloniale verleden laat horen (Van Doorn, 1995).

Deze studie reflecteert ook op hoe inzichten verkregen in dit onderzoek de dialoog tussen Nederland-Indonesië bevorderen, vooral in de context van het Nederlands-Indonesisch Consortium voor Moslim-Christelijke Relaties. Het religieconcept dat immigranten uit Indonesië kennen, is het religieconcept dat door de Nederlanders tijdens het koloniale tijdperk werd geconstrueerd. Het dient als een boemerang. Dit religiebegrip is in Nederland niet langer vanzelfsprekend, maar ook in Indonesië wordt het steeds meer betwist. De onderliggende vraag is dus niet alleen wat moderniteit is, maar ook wat religie is. Over welke religie hebben we het? De Indonesiërs hadden in het prekoloniale tijdperk geen woord voor religie. Hun religie kwam dicht in de buurt van wat we nu mystiek zouden noemen. Dit is wat geïnterviewden ‘religiositeit’ noemen, of de subjectieve kant van religie, bijvoorbeeld wanneer ‘religie’ geen bureaucratische categorie op de identiteitskaart is, maar een ervaring.

Als we vanuit het perspectief van Indonesische immigranten naar de Nederlandse samenleving kijken, kan worden gesteld dat Nederlanders niet “modern” zijn zoals ze denken dat ze zijn. Ten eerste zijn ze niet zo seculier. Geïnterviewden wijzen erop dat religieuze waarden ingebed zijn in de Nederlandse cultuur en houding. Ten tweede zijn ze niet zo liberaal omdat er verzet is van religieuze groeperingen tegen abortus, en er conservatieve christelijke politieke partijen zijn die traditionele (gezins)rollen voor vrouwen propageren. Geïnterviewden wijzen er ook op dat religieuze mensen niet vrij zijn om openlijk over hun geloof te spreken of God in het publieke domein te noemen. Ten derde zijn ze niet zo individualistisch. Geïnterviewden verwijzen naar het socialezekerheidsstelsel in Nederland in de omgang met armen en de zorg van Nederlanders voor dieren en natuur.

Vanuit een trans-modern perspectief laten Indonesische immigranten zien dat Nederlanders kunnen evolueren van de moderne waarde van onafhankelijkheid naar de waarde van onderlinge afhankelijkheid en wederkerigheid in alle opzichten, evenals op het gebied van bestuur en religie. De aanwezigheid van niet-westerse religieuze gemeenschappen, in het bijzonder de islam, in Nederland stelt de relatie tussen religie en staat op de proef. De transmoderne waarde van onderlinge afhankelijkheid kan een weg vooruit zijn. De aanwezigheid, de stemmen en ervaringen van huidige Indonesische immigranten kunnen vruchtbaar zijn voor de kennis en beoordeling door Nederlanders van religieuze kwesties in de Nederlandse samenleving.

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Curriculum Vitae

Maria Ingrid Nabubhoga was born in Semarang, Indonesia, on January 25, 1979. She holds a B.A. in English Literature from Gadjah Mada University (2006) and an M.A. in Colonial and Global History from Leiden University (2014). For her M.A., she wrote a thesis entitled “In our lonely place in the forests and wilderness”: Dutch Missionary Wives in the Netherlands East Indies in the Late Nineteenth-Century and Early Twentieth-Century. In November 2014, she enrolled as an (external) PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen within the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesia Consortium for Muslim-Christian Relations (NICMCR) in the project “Indonesian Mirrors”. Between 2017 and 2022, Maria presented her research at local and international conferences in the Netherlands and Indonesia. From 2019 to 2022, she worked as an education assistant at the Nijmegen Institute for Mission Studies (NIM) at the Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at Radboud University, where she organized and supervised the *Leergang Kerkelijke Inburgering* (Ecclesiastical Integration Course) for foreign missionaries in the Netherlands. She currently serves as the Netherlands coordinator of the NICMCR.

